Libertad de conciencia DERBYSHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL v.

TIMES 1
DERBYSHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL (APPELLANTS) v. TIMES NEWSPAPERS LIMITED AND
OTHERS (RESPONDENTS).
Lord Keith .
Lord Griffiths.
Lord Goff of Chieveley.
Lord Browne-Wilkinson.
Lord Woolf.
LORD KEITH OF KINKEL.
My Lords,.
This appeal raises, as a preliminary issue in an action of damaes for li!el, the "uestion whether a local
authority is entitled to maintain an action in li!el for words which reflect on it in its overnmental and
administrative functions. That is the way the preliminary point of law was e#pressed in the order of the
$aster, !ut it has opened out into an investiation of whether a local authority can sue for li!el at all.
Balcom!e L.%., ivin the leadin &udment in the Court of 'ppeal, summarised the facts thus(
)The facts in the case are fortunately refreshinly simple. *n two issues of +The ,unday Times+
newspaper on -. and /0 ,eptem!er -121 there appeared articles concernin share deals involvin the
superannuation fund of the 3er!yshire County Council. The articles in the issue of -. ,eptem!er were
headed +4evealed( ,ocialist tycoons+s deals with a La!our chief and +Bi5arre deals of a council leader
and the media tycoon+( that in the issue of /0 ,eptem!er was headed +Council share deals under
scrutiny.+ The council leader was $r. 3avid $elvyn Book!inder6 the +media tycoon+ was $r. 7wen
7yston. *t is unnessary for the purposes of this &udment to set in any detail the contents of these articles(
it is sufficient to say they "uestion the propriety of certain investments made !y the council of moneys in
its superannuation fund, with $r. Book!inder as the prime mover, in three deals with $r. 7yston or
companies controlled !y him.
8#cerpts from the articles ivin the flavour of the alleations made will !e found in the &udment at first
instance 9-11-: 0 'll 8.4. .1; to which those interested may refer. The council is the +administerin
authority+ of its superannuation fund under the ,uperannuation 'ct -1./ and the Local Government
,uperannuation 4eulations -12< =,.*. -12< >o. /0? made thereunder.) @ollowin the pu!lication
actions of damaes for li!el were !rouht aainst the pu!lishers of The ,unday Times, its editor and the
two &ournalists who wrote the articles !y 3er!yshire County Council =)the appellants)?, $r. Book!inder
and $r. 7yston. $r. 7yston+s action was settled !y an apoloy and payment of damae and costs. The
statements of claim in this action !y the appellants and in that !y $r. Book!inder are for all practical
purposes in identical terms. That of the appellants asserts in pararaph < that there were written and
pu!lished )of and concernin the council and of and concernin the council in the way of its dischare of
its responsi!ility for the investment and control of the superannuation fund) the words contained in the
article of -. ,eptem!er, and pararaph 2 makes a similar assertion in relation to the article of /0
,eptem!er. Aararaph 1 states(
)By reason of the words pu!lished on -. ,eptem!er -121 and the words and raph pu!lished on /0
,eptem!er -121 the plaintiff council has !een in&ured in its credit and reputation and has !een !rouht
into pu!lic scandal, odium and contempt, and has suffered loss and damae.) >o special damae is
pleaded. 7n B- %uly -11- @rench %. refused an application !y the appellants to amend the statement of
claim so as to plead a certain specific item of special damae.
The preliminary point of law was tried at first instance !efore $orland %. who on -; $arch -11- decided
it in favour of the appellants =-11- 0 'll 8.4. .1;?. Cowever, on appeal !y the present respondents his
&udment was reversed !y the Court of 'ppeal =Balcom!e, 4alph Gi!son and Butler-,loss L.%%.? on -1
@e!ruary -11/ 9-11/: D.B. ..E. The appellants now appeal, with leave iven in the Court of 'ppeal, to
your Lordships+ Couse.
There are only two reported cases in which an 8nlish local authority has sued for li!el. The first is
$anchester Corporation v. Williams 9-21-: - D.B. 10( <B L.T. 2E;. The defendant had written a letter to a
newspaper allein that )in the case of two if not three departments of our $anchester city council,
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Libertad de conciencia DERBYSHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL v. TIMES 2
!ri!ery and corruption have e#isted and done their nefarious work.) ' 3ivisional Court consistin of 3ay
%. and Lawrance %. held that the statement of claim disclosed no cause of action. The &udment of 3ay %.
at p. 1< of the Dueen+s Bench report is in these terms(
- / (
)This is an action !rouht !y a municipal corporation to recover damae for what is alleed to !e a li!el
on the corporation itself, as distinuished from its individual mem!ers or officials. The li!el complained of
consists of a chare of !ri!ery and corruption. The "uestion is whether such an action will lie. * think it will
not. *t is altoether unprecedented, and there is no principle on which it can !e founded. The limits of a
corporation+s riht of action for li!el are those suested !y Aollock C.B. in the case which has !een
referred to. ' corporation may sue for a li!el affectin property, not for one merely affectin personal
reputation. The present case falls within the latter class. There must, therefore, !e &udment for the
defendant.) Lawrance %. said that he was of the same opinion.
The Law Times report contains a somewhat loner &udment of 3ay %. in these terms(
)This action is !rouht !y the mayor, aldermen, and citi5ens of the city of $anchester to recover
damaes from the defendant in respect of that which is alleed !y them to !e a li!el on the corporation.
The alleed li!el is contained in a letter written !y the defendant to the editor of the +$anchester
8#aminer and Times+, which chared, as alleed !y the statement of claim, that !ri!ery and corruption
e#isted or had e#isted in three departments of the $anchester City Council, and that the plaintiffs were
either parties thereto or culpa!ly inorant thereof, and that the said !ri!ery and corruption prevailed to
such an e#tent as to render necessary an in"uiry !y a parliamentary commission. >ow it is for us to
determine whether a corporation can !rin such an action, and * must say that, to my mind, to allow such
a thin would !e wholly unprecedented and contrary to principle. ' corporation may sue for a li!el
affectin property, not for one merely affectin personal reputation. This does not fall within the class of
case in respect of which a corporation can maintain an action, !ut does fall within the second class
commented on !y Aollock C.B. in his &udment in the case of the $etropolitan ,aloon 7mni!us Co. Ltd.
v.
Cawkins, 0 C. F >. 2., with which * fully aree 9a "uotation follows: The chare in the present case is one
of !ri!ery and corruption, of which a corporation cannot possi!ly !e uilty, and therefore, in my opinion,
this action will not lie.) *t is likely that the Law 4eports version of his &udment was one revised !y 3ay %.,
in which he omitted the sentence which ends the Law Times report, so that the true and only ratio of the
decision is that a corporation may sue for a li!el affectin property, !ut not for one merely affectin
personal reputation.
$etropolitan ,aloon 7mni!us Co. Ltd. v. Cawkins =-2;1? 0 C. F >.
2. was an action !y a company incorporated under the %oint ,tock Companies 'ct -2;< in respect of a
li!el imputin to it insolvency, mismanaement and - B (
dishonest carryin on of its affairs. The Court of the 8#che"uer held the action to !e maintaina!le.
Aollock C.B. said at p. ..E, in the passae referred to !y 3ay %.(
)That a corporation at common law can sue in respect of a li!el there is no dou!t. *t would !e monstrous
if a corporation could maintain no action for slander of title throuh which they lost a reat deal of money.
*t could not sue in respect of an imputation of murder, or incest, or adultery, !ecause it could not commit
those crimes. >or could it sue in respect of a chare of corruption, for a corporation cannot !e uilty of
corruption, althouh the individuals composin it may. But it would !e very odd if a corporation had no
means of protectin itself aainst wron6 and if its property is in&ured !y slander it has no means of
redress e#cept !y action. Therefore it appears to me clear that a corporation at common law may
maintain an action for a li!el !y which its property is in&ured.) *n ,outh Cetton Coal Co. Ltd. v. >orth-
8astern >ews 'ssociation Ltd.
9-210: - D.B. -BB a newspaper had pu!lished an article allein that the houses in which the company
accommodated its colliers were in a hihly insanitary state. The Court of 'ppeal held that the company
was entitled to maintain an action for li!el without proof of special damae, in respect that the li!el was
calculated to in&ure the company+s reputation in the way of its !usiness. Lord 8sher $.4. said at p. -B2(
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Libertad de conciencia DERBYSHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL v. TIMES 3
)* have considered the case, and * have come to the conclusion that the law of li!el is one and the same
as to all plaintiffs6 and that, in every action of li!el, whether the statement complained of is, or is not, a
li!el, depends on the same "uestion - vi5., whether the &ury are of opinion that what has !een pu!lished
with reard to the plaintiff would tend in the minds of people of ordinary sense to !rin the plaintiff into
contempt, hatred, or ridicule, or to in&ure his character. The "uestion is really the same !y whomsoever
the action is !rouht - whether !y a person, a firm, or a company. But thouh the law is the same, the
application of it is, no dou!t, different with reard to different kinds of plaintiffs. There are statements
which, with reard to some plaintiffs, would undou!tedly constitute a li!el, !ut which, if pu!lished of
another kind of plaintiffs, would not have the same effect.) Ce went on to say that certain statements
miht have the same effect, whether made with reard to a person, or a firm, or a company, for e#ample
statements with reard to conduct of a !usiness, and havin ela!orated on the "uestion whether or not a
particular statement miht reflect on the manner of conduct of a !usiness, continued at p. -B1(
)With reard to a firm or a company, it is impossi!le to lay down an e#haustive rule as to what would !e
a li!el on them. But the same rule is applica!le to a statement made with reard to them. ,tatements - 0 (
may !e made with reard to their mode of carryin on !usiness, such as to lead people of ordinary sense
to the opinion that they conduct their !usiness !adly and inefficiently. *f so, the law will !e the same in
their case as in that of an individual, and the statement will !e li!ellous. Then, if the case !e one of li!el -
whether on a person, a firm, or a company - the law is that the damaes are at lare. *t is not necessary
to prove any particular damae6 the &ury may ive such damaes as they think fit, havin reard to the
conduct of the parties respectively, and all the circumstances of the case.) *n >ational Gnion of General
and $unicipal Workers v. Gillian 9-10<: K.B. 2- the Court of 'ppeal held that a trade union could, in
eneral, maintain an action in tort, and that an action for li!el was no e#ception to that rule. >o detailed
consideration was iven to the nature of the statements in respect of which the action miht lie, thouh
,cott L.%. at p. 2. referred to the disinteration of a trade union which miht result from a li!el, and
Gthwatt %. at p. 22 said that he saw no reason why a non-tradin corporation should not have the same
rihts as a tradin corporation as respects imputations on the conduct !y it of its activities.
The second case involvin proceedins !y a local authority is Bonor 4eis Gr!an 3istrict Council v.
Campion 9-1./: / D.B. -<1, a decision of Browne %. $r. Campion had distri!uted at a meetin of a
ratepayers+ association a leaflet savaely attackin the council, which sued him for li!el. 't the trial $r.
Campion conducted his own case without the assistance of solicitors or counsel. Browne %. found in
favour of the council and awarded it damaes of H/EEE. 't p. -.B he stated his intention to apply a
principle to !e found in >ational Gnion of General and $unicipal Workers v.
Gillian, from which he "uoted e#tensively in the followin paes. Ce continued at p. -.;(
)%ust as a tradin company has a tradin reputation which it is entitled to protect !y !rinin an action for
defamation, so in my view the plaintiffs as a local overnment corporation have a +overnin+ reputation
which they are e"ually entitled to protect in the same way (
of course, !earin in mind the vital distinction !etween defamation of the corporation as such and
defamation of its individual officers or mem!ers. * entirely accept the statement made in Gatley on Li!el
and ,lander, <th ed. =-1<.?, p. 0E1. para. 21E(
+' corporation or company cannot maintain an action of li!el or slander for any words which reflect, not
upon itself, !ut solely upon its individual officers or mem!ers.+ )Then there is a "uotation(
+To merely attack or challene the rectitude of the officers or mem!ers of a corporation, and hold them or
either of them up - ; (
to scorn, hatred, contempt, or o!lo"uy for acts done in their official capacity, or which would render them
lia!le to criminal prosecution, does not ive the corporation a riht of action for li!el.+ )* stress the words
+solely+ and +merely+ in those passaes. The "uotation iven in Galley there is from a Gnited ,tates case,
Warner v. *nersoll =-1E.? -;. @ed. 4. B--.) Browne %. then proceeded to consider $anchester
Corporation v. Williams, and after "uotin from the &udment of 3ay %. in the Law Times 4eport said at p.
-..(
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Libertad de conciencia DERBYSHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL v. TIMES
)3ay %. seems to put his &udment on two rounds6 first, that a corporation may sue for a li!el affectin
property and not for one merely affectin personal reputation. *f this was ever riht, it has in my view !een
overruled !y ,outh Cetton Coal Co. v. >orth-8astern >ews 'ssociation Ltd. 9-210: - D.B. -BB, -B0, -B;
=where su!stantially this arument was used !y the defendants? and !y >ational Gnion of General and
$unicipal Workers v. Gillian =where the $anchester Corporation case 9-21-: - D.B. 10 was cited?. The
other round seems to have !een that a corporation cannot !e uilty of corruption and therefore it cannot
!e defamatory to say or write that it has !een uilty of corruption. This was !ased on the o!iter dictum of
Aollock C.B. in $etropolitan ,aloon 7mni!us Co. v. Cawkins 0 C.
F >. 2. and was repeated later !y Lopes L.%. in ,outh Cetton Coal Co. v. >orth-8astern >ews
'ssociation Ltd. 9-210: - D.B. -BB, -0-.
The $anchester Corporation case is severely criticised in ,pencer Bower on 'ctiona!le 3efamation
=-1E2?, pp. /.1 and /2E6 in @raser on Li!el and ,lander, .th ed. =-1B<?, pp. 21 and 1E6 and !y 7liver %.
in Willis v. Brooks 9-10.: - 'll 8.4. -1- where he said, at p. -1/, that after readin the >ational Gnion of
General and $unicipal Workers case he areed with the editors of @raser, who say, at p. 1E(
+*t is respectfully su!mitted that the a!ove statement of the law !y 3ay %. ... is unsound in principle and
would not !e upheld in the Court of 'ppeal.+ )7liver %. in Willis v. Brooks 9-10.: - 'll 8.4. -1-, -1B said(
+Counsel for the defendants+ - who incidentally were ,ir Ialentine Colmes and $r. $ilmo - +did not
seriously contend that an action for li!el imputin somethin very like corruption, as in this case, would
not lie in any circumstances at the suit of a trade union.+ and he awarded the plaintiffs H;EE damaes. 's
* have said, the $anchester Corporation case was cited in the >ational Gnion of - < (
General and $unicipal Workers case and the li!el in that case seems to have imputed amon other
thins somethin very like corruption.) @inally, he said, at p. -.2(
)The actual decision in the $anchester Corporation case can perhaps !e supported, as $r. Waterhouse
suested, on the arument that the li!el there was not capa!le of referrin to a corporation consistin
=as the plaintiffs did? of the mayor, aldermen and citi5ens, and not, as here, of the chairman and
councillors. * think that that case is distinuisha!le from this on that round, and also on the round that in
my view none of the statements in the leaflet in this case actually impute corruption. But * hope that the
Court of 'ppeal will soon have occasion to consider the $anchester Corporation case.) *t is to !e
o!served that Browne %. did not ive any consideration to the "uestion whether a local authority, or any
other !ody e#ercisin overnmental functions, miht not !e in a special position as reards the riht to
take proceedins for defamation. The authorities cited a!ove clearly esta!lish that a tradin corporation is
entitled to sue in respect of defamatory matters which can !e seen as havin a tendency to damae it in
the way of its !usiness. 8#amples are those that o to credit such as miht deter !anks from lendin to it,
or to the conditions e#perienced !y its employees, which miht impede the recruitment of the !est
"ualified workers, or make people reluctant to deal with it. The ,outh Cetton Coal Company case would
appear to !e an instance of the latter kind, and not, as suested !y Browne %., an authority for the view
that a tradin corporation can sue for somethin that does not affect it adversely in the way of its
!usiness. The trade union cases are understanda!le upon the view that defamatory matter may
adversely affect the union+s a!ility to keep its mem!ers or attract new ones or to maintain a convincin
attitude towards employers. Likewise in the case of a charita!le oranisation the effect may !e to
discourae su!scri!ers or otherwise impair its a!ility to carry on its charita!le o!&ects. ,imilar
considerations can no dou!t !e advanced in connection with the position of a local authority.
3efamatory statements miht make it more difficult to !orrow or to attract suita!le staff and thus affect
adversely the efficient carryin out of its functions.
There are, however, features of a local authority which may !e rearded as distinuishin it from other
types of corporation, whether tradin or non-tradin. The most important of these features is that it is a
overnmental !ody. @urther, it is a democratically elected !ody, the electoral process nowadays !ein
conducted almost e#clusively on party political lines.
*t is of the hihest pu!lic importance that a democratically elected overnmental !ody, or indeed any
overnmental !ody, should !e open to uninhi!ited pu!lic criticism. The threat of a civil action for
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Libertad de conciencia DERBYSHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL v. TIMES !
defamation must inevita!ly have an inhi!itin effect on freedom of speech. *n City of Chicao v. Tri!une
Co. =-1/B? -B1 >.8. 2< the ,upreme Court of *llinois held that the - . (
City could not maintain an action of damaes for li!el. Thompson C.%. said at p. 1E(
)The fundamental riht of freedom of speech is involved in this litiation, and not merely the riht of
li!erty of the press. *f this action can !e maintained aainst a newspaper it can !e maintained aainst
every private citi5en who ventures to critici5e the ministers who are temporarily conductin the affairs of
his overnment. Where any person !y speech or writin seeks to persuade others to violate e#istin law
or to overthrow !y force or other unlawful means the e#istin overnment, he may !e punished !ut all
other utterances or pu!lications aainst the overnment must !e considered a!solutely privileed.
While in the early history of the strule for freedom of speech the restrictions were enforced !y criminal
prosecutions, it is clear that a civil action is as reat, if not a reater, restriction than a criminal
prosecution. *f the riht to criticise the overnment is a privilee which, with the e#ceptions a!ove
enumerated, cannot !e restricted, then all civil as well as criminal actions are for!idden. ' despotic or
corrupt overnment can more easily stifle opposition !y a series of civil actions than !y criminal
prosecutions.) 'fter ivin a num!er of reasons for this, he said(
)*t follows, therefore, that every citi5en has a riht to criticise an inefficient or corrupt overnment without
fear of civil as well as criminal prosecution. This a!solute privilee is founded on the principle that it is
advantaeous for the pu!lic interest that the citi5en should not !e in any way fettered in his statements,
and where the pu!lic service or due administration of &ustice is involved he shall have the riht to speak
his mind freely.) These propositions were endorsed !y the ,upreme Court of the Gnited ,tates in >ew
Jork Times Co. v. ,ullivan =-1<0? B.< G.,. /;0, /... While these decisions were related most directly to
the provisions of the 'merican Constitution concerned with securin freedom of speech, the pu!lic
interest considerations which underlaid them are no less valid in this country. What has !een descri!ed
as )the chillin effect) induced !y the threat of civil actions for li!el is very important. Duite often the facts
which would &ustify a defamatory pu!lication are known to !e true, !ut admissi!le evidence capa!le of
provin those facts is not availa!le. This may prevent the pu!lication of matters which it is very desira!le
to make pu!lic. *n Cector v.
'ttorney-General of 'ntiua and Bar!uda 9-11E: / '.C. B-/ the %udicial Committee of the Arivy Council
held that a statutory provision which made the printin or distri!ution of any false statement likely to
undermine pu!lic confidence in the conduct of pu!lic affairs a criminal offence contravened the - 2 (
provisions of the constitution protectin freedom of speech. Lord Bride of Carwich said at p. B-2(
)*n a free democratic society it is almost too o!vious to need statin that those who hold office in
overnment and who are responsi!le for pu!lic administration must always !e open to criticism. 'ny
attempt to stifle or fetter such criticism amounts to political censorship of the most insidious and
o!&ectiona!le kind. 't the same time it is no less o!vious that the very purpose of criticism levelled at
those who have the conduct of pu!lic affairs !y their political opponents is to undermine pu!lic
confidence in their stewardship and to persuade the electorate that the opponents would make a !etter
&o! of it than those presently holdin office. *n the liht of these considerations their Lordships cannot help
viewin a statutory provision which criminalises statements likely to undermine pu!lic confidence in the
conduct of pu!lic affairs with the utmost suspicion.) *t is of some sinificance to o!serve that a num!er of
departments of central overnment in the Gnited Kindom are statutorily created corporations, includin
the ,ecretaries of ,tate for 3efence, 8ducation and ,cience, 8nery, 8nvironment and ,ocial ,ervices.
*f a local authority can sue for li!el there would appear to !e no reason in loic for holdin that any of
these departments =apart from two which are made corporations only for the purpose of holdin land?
was not also entitled to sue. But as is shown !y the decision in 'ttorney-General v. Guardian
>ewspapers Ltd. =>o. /? 9-11E: - '.C. -E1, a case concerned with confidentiality, there are rihts
availa!le to private citi5ens which institutions of central overnment are not in a position to e#ercise
unless they can show that it is the pu!lic interest to do so. The same applies, in my opinion, to local
authorities. *n !oth cases * reard it as riht for this Couse to lay down that not only is there no pu!lic
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Libertad de conciencia DERBYSHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL v. TIMES "
interest favourin the riht of orans of overnment, whether central or local, to sue for li!el, !ut that it is
contrary to the pu!lic interest that they should have it.
*t is contrary to the pu!lic interest !ecause to admit such actions would place an undesira!le fetter on
freedom of speech. *n 3ie ,poor!ond v. ,outh 'frican 4ailways =-10<? ,.'.L.4. 111 the ,upreme Court
of ,outh 'frica held that the ,outh 'frican 4ailways and Car!ours, a overnmental department of the
Gnion of ,outh 'frica, was not entitled to maintain an action for defamation in respect of a pu!lication
alleed to have in&ured its reputation as the authority responsi!le for runnin the railways. ,chreiner %.'.
said at pp. -E-/--E-B(
)* am prepared to assume, for the purposes of the present arument, that the Crown may, at least in so
far as it takes part in tradin in competition with its su!&ects, en&oy a reputation, damae to which could !e
calculated in money. 7n that assumption there is certainly force in the contention that it would !e unfair to
deny to the Crown the weapon, an action for damaes for defamation, which is most feared !y
calumniators. >evertheless it seems to me that considerations of - 1 (
fairness and convenience are, on !alance, distinctly aainst the reconition of a riht in the Crown to sue
the su!&ect in a defamation action to protect that reputation. The normal means !y which the Crown
protects itself aainst attacks upon its manaement of the country+s affairs is political action and not
litiation, and it would, * think, !e unfortunate if that practice were altered. 't present certain kinds of
criticism of those who manae the ,tate+s affairs may lead to criminal prosecutions, while if the criticism
consists of defamatory utterances aainst individual servants of the ,tate actions for defamation will lie at
their suit. But su!&ect to the risk of these sanctions and to the possi!le further risk, to which reference will
presently !e made, of !ein sued !y the Crown for in&urious falsehood, any su!&ect is free to e#press his
opinion upon the manaement of the country+s affairs without fear of leal conse"uences. * have no
dou!t that it would involve a serious interference with the free e#pression of opinion hitherto en&oyed in
this country if the wealth of the ,tate, derived from the ,tate+s su!&ects, could !e used to launch aainst
those su!&ects actions for defamation !ecause they have, falsely and unfairly it may !e, criticised or
condemned the manaement of the country. ,uch actions could not, * think, !e confined to those !rouht
!y the 4ailways 'dministration for criticism of the runnin of the railways. Duite a num!er of Government
departments, as appeared in the course of the arument, indule in some form of tradin on a reater or
a lesser scale.
$oreover, the Government, when it raises loans, is interested in the ood or !ad reputation that it may
en&oy amon possi!le su!scri!ers to such loans. *t would !e difficult to assin any limits to the Crown+s
riht to sue for defamation once its riht in any case were reconised.) These o!servations may properly
!e rearded as no less applica!le to a local authority than to a department of central overnment. *n the
same case Watermeyer C.%. at p. -EE1 o!served that the reputation of the Crown miht fairly !e
rearded as distinct from that of the roup of individuals temporarily responsi!le for the manaement of
the railways on its !ehalf. *n the case of a local authority temporarily under the control of one political
party or another it is difficult to say that the local authority as such has any reputation of its own.
4eputation in the eyes of the pu!lic is more likely to attach itself to the controllin political party, and with a
chane in that party the reputation itself will chane. ' pu!lication attackin the activities of the authority
will necessarily !e an attack on the !ody of councillors which represents the controllin party, or on the
e#ecutives who carry on the day to day manaement of its affairs. *f the individual reputation of any of
these is wronly impaired !y the pu!lication any of these can himself !rin proceedins for defamation.
@urther, it is open to the controllin !ody to defend itself !y pu!lic utterances and in de!ate in the council
cham!er.
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Libertad de conciencia DERBYSHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL v. TIMES #
T! "o#"$%s&o# '%s( )!, &# 'y o*&#&o#, (+( %#d!r (! "o''o# $+, o- E#.$+#d + $o"+$ +%(or&(y
do!s #o( +v! (! r&.( (o '+&#(+&# +# +"(&o# o- d+'+.!s -or d!-+'+(&o#. That was the conclusion
reached !y the Court of 'ppeal, which did so principally !y reference to 'rticle -E of the 8uropean
Convention on Cuman 4ihts, to which the Gnited Kindom has adhered !ut which has not !een
enacted into domestic law. 'rticle -E is in these terms(
)-. 8veryone has the riht to freedom of e#pression. This riht shall include freedom to hold opinions
and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference !y pu!lic authority and reardless of
frontiers ... /. The e#ercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsi!ilities, may !e
su!&ect to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescri!ed !y law and are
necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial interity or pu!lic safety,
for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the
reputation or rihts of others, for preventin the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for
maintainin the authority and impartiality of the &udiciary.) 's reards the words )necessary in a
democratic society) in connection with the restrictions on the riht to freedom of e#pression which may
properly !e prescri!ed !y law, the &urisprudence of the 8uropean Court of Cuman 4ihts has esta!lished
that )necessary) re"uires the e#istence of a pressin social need, and that the restrictions should !e no
more than is proportionate to the leitimate aim pursued. The domestic courts have )a marin of
appreciation) !ased upon local knowlede of the needs of the society to which they !elon.
=The ,unday Times v. Gnited Kindom =-1.1? / 8.C.4.4. /;06 Barthold v.
Germany =-12;? . 8.C.4.4. B2B( Linens v. 'ustria =-12<? 2 8.C.4.4. 0E., 0-2?. The Court of 'ppeal
approached the matter upon the !asis that the law of 8nland was uncertain upon the issue lyin at the
heart of the case, havin reard in particular to the conflictin decisions in $anchester Corporation v.
Williams and Bonor 4eis G.3.C. v. Campion and to the a!sence of any relevant decision in the Court
of 'ppeal or in this Couse. *n that situation it was appropriate to have reard to the Convention.
Balcom!e L.%. referred in this connection to 4e. v. ,ecretary of ,tate for the Come 3epartment, 8#
parte Brind 9-11-: - '.C. <1<6 'ttorney-General v. Guardian >ewspapers Ltd. 9-12.: - W.L.4. -/026 *n re
W. =a $inor? =Wardship( 4estrictions on Au!lication? 9-11/: - W.L.4. -EE6 and 'ttorney-General v.
Guardian >ewspapers Ltd. =>o. /? 9-11E: - '.C. -E1. Cavin e#amined other authorities he concluded,
havin carried out the !alancin e#ercise re"uisite for purposes of 'rticle -E of the Convention, that there
was no pressin social need that a corporate pu!lic authority should have the riht to sue in defamation
for the protection of its reputation. That must certainly !e true considerin that in the past hundred years
there are only two known instances of a defamation action !y a local authority. Ce considered that the
riht to sue for malicious falsehood ave such a !ody all the protection which was necessary. ,imilar
views were e#pressed !y 4alph Gi!son L.%. and Butler(
,loss L.%., who o!served that the law of criminal li!el miht !e availa!le in suita!le cases, to afford
additional protection. 'll three Lords %ustices also - -- (
alluded to the consideration that the pu!lication of defamatory matter concernin a local authority was
likely to reflect also on individual councillors or officers, and that the prospect of actions for li!el at their
instance also afforded some protection to the local authority.
$y Lords, * have reached my conclusion upon the common law of 8nland without findin any need to
rely upon the 8uropean Convention. $y no!le and learned friend, Lord Goff of Chieveley, in 'ttorney-
General v.
Guardian >ewspapers Ltd. =>o. /? 9-11E: - '.C. -E1, at p. /2B-/20, e#pressed the opinion that in the
field of freedom of speech there was no difference in principle !etween 8nlish law on the su!&ect and
'rticle -E of the Convention. * aree, and can only add that * find it satisfactory to !e a!le to conclude that
the common law of 8nland is consistent with the o!liations assumed !y the Crown under the treaty in
this particular field.
@or these reasons * would dismiss the appeal. *t follows that Bonor 4eis Gr!an 3istrict Council v.
Campion was wronly decided and should !e overruled.
LORD /RIFFITHS.
UK
Libertad de conciencia DERBYSHIRE COUNTY COUNCIL v. TIMES $
My Lords,.
* have had the advantae of readin in draft the speech prepared !y my no!le and learned friend Lord
Keith of Kinkel, and for the reasons he ives, *, too, would dismiss the appeal.
LORD /OFF OF CHIE0ELEY.
My Lords,.
* have had the advantae of readin in draft the speech prepared !y my no!le and learned friend Lord
Keith of Kinkel. and for the reasons he ives, *, too, would dismiss the appeal.
- -/ (
LORD BROWNE1WILKINSON.
My Lords,.
*, too, would dismiss the appeal for the reasons iven in the speech of my no!le and learned friend Lord
Keith of Kinkel.
LORD WOOLF.
My Lords,.
*, too, would dismiss the appeal for the reasons iven in the speech of my no!le and learned friend Lord
Keith of Kinkel.

UK