Province of North Cotabato vs GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain

G.R. No. 1833591,

October 14, 2008

Decision:

CARPIO MORALES, J .:

Subject of these consolidated cases is the extent of the powers of the President in pursuing the peace process. While
the facts surrounding this controversy center on the armed conflict in Mindanao between the government and the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the legal issue involved has a bearing on all areas in the country where there
has been a long-standing armed conflict. Yet again, the Court is tasked to perform a delicate balancing act. It must
uncompromisingly delineate the bounds within which the President may lawfully exercise her discretion, but it must
do so in strict adherence to the Constitution, lest its ruling unduly restricts the freedom of action vested by that same
Constitution in the Chief Executive precisely to enable her to pursue the peace process effectively.


Facts:

On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the
Chairpersons of their respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on
the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia.

The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize, however, for upon motion of
petitioners, specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, this Court issued a
Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same.

The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiation and the concluding of several prior agreements
between the two parties beginning in 1996, when the GRP-MILF peace negotiations began. On July 18, 1997, the
GRP and MILF Peace Panels signed the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities. The following year, they
signed the General Framework of Agreement of Intent on August 27, 1998.

On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piol filed a petition, docketed as
G.R. No. 183591, for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
Temporary Restraining Order. Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to
compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its
attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD
and the holding of a public consultation thereon. Supplementarily, petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared
unconstitutional.

Issues:

1. Whether the petitions have become moot and academic

(i) insofar as the mandamus aspect is concerned, in view of the disclosure of official copies of the final draft of the
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA); and

(ii) insofar as the prohibition aspect involving the Local Government Units is concerned, if it is considered that
consultation has become fait accompli with the finalization of the draft;

2. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;

3. Whether respondent Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it negotiated and initiated the MOA vis--vis ISSUES Nos.
4 and 5;

4. Whether there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern (1987 Constitution,
Article III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (1987
Constitution, Article II, Sec. 28) including public consultation under Republic Act No. 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT
CODE OF 1991)[;]

If it is in the affirmative, whether prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is an appropriate
remedy;

5. Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be BINDING itself

a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or
political subdivision not recognized by law;

b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of
Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997), particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter
VII (DELINEATION, RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)[;]

If in the affirmative, whether the Executive Branch has the authority to so bind the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines;

6. Whether the inclusion/exclusion of the Province of North Cotabato, Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and
the Municipality of Linamon, Lanao del Norte in/from the areas covered by the projected Bangsamoro Homeland is a
justiciable question; and

7. Whether desistance from signing the MOA derogates any prior valid commitments of the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines.

Held:

The main body of the MOA-AD is divided into four strands, namely, Concepts and Principles, Territory, Resources,
and Governance.

The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies. Courts decline to issue advisory opinions or to
resolve hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic questions. The limitation of the power of judicial review
to actual cases and controversies defines the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power, to
assure that the courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government.

As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance,
the Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in
keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo.

Contrary to the assertion of respondents that the non-signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of the GRP
Peace Panel mooted the present petitions, the Court finds that the present petitions provide an exception to the "moot
and academic" principle in view of (a) the grave violation of the Constitution involved; (b) the exceptional character of
the situation and paramount public interest; (c) the need to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the
bar, and the public; and (d) the fact that the case is capable of repetition yet evading review.

The MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement
on Peace signed by the government and the MILF back in June 2001. Hence, the present MOA-AD can be
renegotiated or another one drawn up that could contain similar or significantly dissimilar provisions compared to the
original.

That the subject of the information sought in the present cases is a matter of public concern faces no serious
challenge. In fact, respondents admit that the MOA-AD is indeed of public concern. In previous cases, the Court
found that the regularity of real estate transactions entered in the Register of Deeds, the need for adequate notice to
the public of the various laws, the civil service eligibility of a public employee, the proper management of GSIS funds
allegedly used to grant loans to public officials, the recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth, and the
identity of party-list nominees, among others, are matters of public concern. Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subject of the
present cases is of public concern, involving as it does the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which
directly affects the lives of the public at large.

In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry
out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No.
8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal
authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a
gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the
very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are
unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its
way to independence.

The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of
2001 is declared contrary to law and the Constitution.
Laura quartulla
Magallona v Ermita

In March 2009, Republic Act 9522, an act defining the archipelagic baselines of the Philippines was
enacted the law is also known as the Baselines Law. This law was meant to comply with the terms
of the third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), ratified by the
Philippines in February 1984.
Professor Merlin Magallona et al questioned the validity of RA 9522 as they contend, among others,
that the law decreased the national territory of the Philippines hence the law is unconstitutional.
Some of their particular arguments are as follows:
a. the law abandoned the demarcation set by the Treaty of Paris and other ancillary treaties this
also resulted to the exclusion of our claim over Sabah;
b. the law, as well as UNCLOS itself, terms the Philippine waters a archipelagic waters which, in
international law, opens our waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels
(innocent passage) and aircrafts (overflight), undermining Philippine sovereignty and national
security, contravening the countrys nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation
of relevant constitutional provisions;
c. the classification of the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG), as well as the Scarborough Shoal (bajo de
masinloc), as a regime of islands pursuant to UNCLOS results in the loss of a large maritime area
but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence fishermen.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contentions of Magallona et al are tenable.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court emphasized that RA 9522, or UNCLOS, itself is not a means to
acquire, or lose, territory. The treaty and the baseline law has nothing to do with the acquisition,
enlargement, or diminution of the Philippine territory. What controls when it comes to acquisition or
loss of territory is the international law principle on occupation, accretion, cession and prescription
and NOT the execution of multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting
statutes to comply with the treatys terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves.
The law did not decrease the demarcation of our territory. In fact it increased it. Under the old law
amended by RA 9522 (RA 3046), we adhered with the rectangular lines enclosing the Philippines.
The area that it covered was 440,994 square nautical miles (sq. na. mi.). But under 9522, and with the
inclusion of the exclusive economic zone, the extent of our maritime are increased to 586,210 sq.
na. mi. (See image below for comparison)
If any, the baselines law is a notice to the international community of the scope of the maritime
space and submarine areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights.

Anent their particular contentions:
a. The law did not abandon the Sabah claim. This is evident on the provision of Section 2 of RA
9522:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as
provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea
around the territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the
Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.
b. UNCLOS may term our waters as archipelagic waters and that we may term it as our internal
waters, but the bottom line is that our country exercises sovereignty over these waters and
UNCLOS itself recognizes that. However, due to our observance of international law, we allow the
exercise of others of their right of innocent passage. No modern State can validly invoke its
sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that is exercised in accordance with customary
international law without risking retaliatory measures from the international community.
c. The classification of the KIG (or the Spratlys), as well as the Scarborough Shoal, as a regime of
islands did not diminish our maritime area. Under UNCLOS and under the baselines law, since they
are regimes of islands, they generate their own maritime zones in short, they are not to be
enclosed within the baselines of the main archipelago (which is the Philippine Island group). This is
because if we do that, then we will be enclosing a larger area which would already depart from the
provisions of UNCLOS that the demarcation should follow the natural contour of the archipelago.
Nevertheless, we still continue to lay claim over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal through
effective occupation.
NOTES:
Under UNCLOS and the baselines law, we have three levels of maritime zones where we
exercise treaty-based rights:
a. territorial waters 12 nautical miles from the baselines; where we exercise sovereignty
b. contiguous zone 24 nautical miles from the baselines; jurisdiction where we can
enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws (CFIS).
c. exclusive economic zone 200 nautical miles from the baselines; where we have the right to
exploit the living and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone
Note: a fourth zone may be added which is the continental shelf this is covered by Article 77 of the
UNCLOS.

Facts :
This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence of herein respondents acting in their capacities as
Senators via signing the said agreement.

The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the reduction of
tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new opportunities for
the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country.
These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as viewed by the signatory Senators,
a free market espoused by WTO.

Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and impair
Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the Constitution
was taken for granted as it gives foreign trading intervention.

Issue :
Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement.

Ruling:
In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the Constitution adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is
bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are considered automatically part of
our own laws. Pacta sunt servanda international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty
is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties.
Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as absolute because it
is a regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such as when Philippines joined the United
Nations (UN) it consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the concept of sovereignty as auto-
limitation. What Senate did was a valid exercise of authority. As to determine whether such exercise is
wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. The act of signing the said
agreement is not a legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership should this be the
political desire of a member. Also, it should not be viewed as a limitation of economic sovereignty. WTO
remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development
of international trade law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if not economic self-destruction. Thus,
the people be allowed, through their duly elected officers, make their free choice.

Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Pimentel vs. Executive Secretary
G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005

ROME STATUTE
Signing of Treaty vs. Ratification
Significance of Ratification
Who has power to ratify

FACTS:

The Rome Statute established the ICC which shall have the power to exercise its jurisdiction over
persons for the most serious crimes of international concern xxx and shall be complementary to the
national criminal jurisdictions. The Philippines, through Charge d Affairs Enrique A. Manalo of the
Philippine Mission to the UN, signed the Rome Statute on Dec. 28, 2000. Its provisions, however, require
that it be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval of the signatory states. Petitioners now file this
petition to compel the Office of the President to transmit the signed copy of the Rome Statute to the
Senate for its concurrence.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Executive Secretary and the DFA have a ministerial duty to transmit to the
Senate the copy of the Rome Statute

HELD:

We rule in the negative.

In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and
authority in external relations and is the countrys sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief
architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the countrys mouthpiece with respect to international
affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments,
extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact
the business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to
negotiate with other states.

Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to negotiate and enter into treaties, the
Constitution provides a limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the members of
the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by him. Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution provides that no treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

The participation of the legislative branch in the treaty-making process was deemed essential to provide
a check on the executive in the field of foreign relations. By requiring the concurrence of the legislature in
the treaties entered into by the President, the Constitution ensures a healthy system of checks and
balance necessary in the nations pursuit of political maturity and growth.

Signing vs. Ratification of Treaty

It should be underscored that the signing of the treaty and the ratification are two separate and distinct
steps in the treaty-making process. As earlier discussed, the signature is primarily intended as a means of
authenticating the instrument and as a symbol of the good faith of the parties. It is usually performed by
the states authorized representative in the diplomatic mission. Ratification, on the other hand, is the
formal act by which a state confirms and accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its
representative. It is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by the head of the state or of the
government.

Purpose of Ratification

Petitioners submission that the Philippines is bound under treaty law and international law to ratify the
treaty which it has signed is without basis. The signature does not signify the final consent of the state to
the treaty. It is the ratification that binds the state to the provisions thereof. In fact, the Rome Statute
itself requires that the signature of the representatives of the states be subject to ratification, acceptance
or approval of the signatory states. Ratification is the act by which the provisions of a treaty are formally
confirmed and approved by a State. By ratifying a treaty signed in its behalf, a state expresses its
willingness to be bound by the provisions of such treaty. After the treaty is signed by the states
representative, the President, being accountable to the people, is burdened with the responsibility and
the duty to carefully study the contents of the treaty and ensure that they are not inimical to the interest
of the state and its people. Thus, the President has the discretion even after the signing of the treaty by
the Philippine representative whether or not to ratify the same. The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties does not contemplate to defeat or even restrain this power of the head of states. If that were
so, the requirement of ratification of treaties would be pointless and futile. It has been held that a state
has no legal or even moral duty to ratify a treaty which has been signed by its plenipotentiaries. There is
no legal obligation to ratify a treaty, but it goes without saying that the refusal must be based on
substantial grounds and not on superficial or whimsical reasons. Otherwise, the other state would be
justified in taking offense.

President has the Power to Ratify Treaties

It should be emphasized that under our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President,
subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or
withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification. Hence, it is within the authority of the
President to refuse to submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for its ratification,
refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf is a
serious step that should not be taken lightly, such decision is within the competence of the President
alone, which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of mandamus. This Court has no jurisdiction
over actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties. The Court,
therefore, cannot issue the writ of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond its jurisdiction
to compel the executive branch of the government to transmit the signed text of Rome Statute to the
Senate.
Case: JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG) v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES (GR 125865)Date: March 26,
2001Ponente: J. Ynares- SantiagoFacts:
Two criminal informations for grave oral defamation were filed against Liang, a Chinese national who
was employed asan Economist by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), by his secretary Joyce Cabal,
before the MeTC Mandaluyong City.The MeTC, acting pursuant to an advice from the DFA that Liang
enjoyed immunity from legal processes, dismissed thecriminal informations against him. The RTC Pasig
City annulled and set aside the MeTCs dismissal. Hence, Liang filed apetition for review before the SC
which was denied ruling that the immunity granted to officers and staff of the ADB is notabsolute; it is
limited to acts performed in an official capacity. Hence, the present MR.
Issue:
WON Liang is immune from suit
Held:
No.
Ratio:
The Court found no reason to disturb the earlier decision.
The slander of a person, by any stretch, cannot beconsidered as falling within the purview of the
immunity granted to ADB officers and personnel.
The issue of whether or not Lianss utterances constituted oral defamation is still for the trial court to
determine J. Punos concurring opinion:
Liang contends that a determination of a person's diplomatic immunity by the DFA is a
political question
. It is solely within theprerogative of the executive department and is conclusive upon the courts.
Furthermore, the immunity conferred under the ADBCharter and the Headquarters Agreement is
absolute. It is designed to safeguard the autonomy and independence of international organizations
against interference from any authority external to the organizations. It is necessary to allow
suchorganizations to discharge their entrusted functions effectively. The only exception to this immunity
is when there is an implied or express waiver or when the immunity is expressly limited by statute. The
exception allegedly has no application to the case atbar."
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our system of separation of powers that
diplomatic immunityis essentially a political question
and courts should refuse to look beyond a determination by the executive branch of thegovernment,
and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the
governmentas in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the courts to accept the claim of immunity upon
appropriate suggestion by theprincipal law officer of the government, the Solicitor General in this case,
or other officer acting under his direction. Hence, inadherence to the settled principle that courts may
not so exercise their jurisdiction by seizure and detention of property, as toembarrass the executive arm
of the government in conducting foreign relations, it is accepted doctrine that in such cases the judicial
department of the government follows the action of the political branch and will not embarrass the
latter by assuming anantagonistic jurisdiction."

Liang, a bank official of ADB, is not entitled to diplomatic immunity and hence his immunity is not
absolute.
Under theVienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a diplomatic envoy is immune from criminal
jurisdiction of the receiving State for allacts, whether private or official, and hence he cannot be
arrested, prosecuted and punished for any offense he may commit,unless his diplomatic immunity is
waived. On the other hand, officials of international organizations enjoy "functional" immunities,that is,
only those necessary for the exercise of the functions of the organization and the fulfillment of its
purposes. This is thereason why the ADB Charter and Headquarters Agreement explicitly grant immunity
from legal process to bank officers andemployees only with respect to acts performed by them in their
official capacity, except when the Bank waives immunity. In other words, officials and employees of the
ADB are subject to the jurisdiction of the local courts for their private acts, notwithstandingthe absence
of a waiver of immunity.
Liang cannot also seek relief under the mantle of "immunity from every form of legal process" accorded
to ADB as aninternational organization.
The immunity of ADB is absolute whereas the immunity of its officials and employees is restrictedonly to
official acts. He stands charged of grave slander for allegedly uttering defamatory remarks against his
secretary.Considering that the immunity accorded to petitioner is limited only to acts performed in his
official capacity, it becomesnecessary to make a factual determination of whether or not the
defamatory utterances were made pursuant and in relation tohis official functions as a senior economist

Case Digest: The Holy See vs. Rosario, Jr.
G.R. No. 101949 01 December 1994


FACTS:

This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters located in the
Municipality of Paranaque. Said lot was contiguous with two other lots. These lots were sold to Ramon Licup. In
view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold, a dispute arose as to who of the parties has the
responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the relations of the parties was the sale by
petitioner of the lot of concern to Tropicana.

ISSUE:

Whether the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations regarding selling a lot to a private entity

RULING:

As expressed in Section 2 of Article II of the 1987 Constitution, we have adopted the generally accepted principles of
International Law. Even without this affirmation, such principles of International Law are deemed incorporated as
part of the law of the land as a condition and consequence of our admission in the society of nations. In the present
case, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of real estate business, surely the said transaction
can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied that the acquisition and subsequent
disposal of the lot were made for profit but claimed that it acquired said property for the site of its mission or the
Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines.

The Holy See is immune from suit for the act of selling the lot of concern is non-proprietary in nature. The lot was
acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made not for commercial
purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of residence of the Papal Nuncio. The
decision to transfer the property and the subsequent disposal thereof are likewise clothed with a governmental
character. Petitioner did not sell the lot for profit or gain. It merely wanted to dispose of the same because the
squatters living thereon made it almost impossible for petitioner to use it for the purpose of the donation.
Govt of Hong Kong vs. Olalia, G.R. No. 153675, April 19,
2007
This case discusses whether the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to
a prospective extradite in an extradition1 proceeding.
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of
Hong Kong signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It
took effect on June 20, 1997.
The Petitioner is the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region,
represented by the Philippine Department of Justice
The Respondents are Judge Felix Olalia and Juan Antonio Muoz
Facts: Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with
three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of
Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also
faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common
law of Hong Kong. Warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail
term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a
request for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The RTC, Branch 19, Manila
issued an Order of Arrest against private respondent. That same day, the NBI agents
arrested and detained him.

1 Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) defines "extradition" as "the
removal of an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to
enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection with any criminal investigation directed
against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or
government."

Private respondent filed a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner. After hearing,
Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is
no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high
"flight risk." Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing the case, it was then
raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge. Private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail and this was granted by
respondent judge.
Petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by
respondent judge. Hence, the instant petition.
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution
granting bail to a potential extraditee.
Held: No. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the
issuance of the arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of
the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive
from justice. Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus
probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.
Ratio:
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to
uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every
person. Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction
must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines
concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these
treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to
it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.
Extradition is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential
extraditee. Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in
character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a
crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or
punishment. It does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty
obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditees rights to life,
liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our
Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is a party. We
should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a
certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice Puno, proposed that a new
standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in
granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than
proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential
extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk
and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to
show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial
court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear
and convincing evidence."
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to
determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and
convincing evidence." If not, the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond
and his immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with
dispatch.


VINUYA VS. SEC. ROMULO Leave a comment
ISABELITA C. VINUYA, VICTORIA C. DELA PEA, HERMINIHILDA, MANIMBO, LEONOR H.
SUMAWANG, CANDELARIA L. SOLIMAN, MARIA L. QUILANTANG, MARIA L. MAGISA,
NATALIA M. ALONZO, LOURDES M. NAVARO, FRANCISCA M. ATENCIO, ERLINDA
MANALASTAS, TARCILA M. SAMPANG, ESTER M. PALACIO MAXIMA R. DELA CRUZ, BELEN A.
SAGUM, FELICIDAD TURLA, FLORENCIA M. DELA PEA, FRANCIA A. BUCO, PASTORA C.
GUEVARRA, VICTORIA M. DELA CRUZ, PETRONILA O. DELA CRUZ, ZENAIDA P. DELA CRUZ,
CORAZON M. SUBA, EMERINCIANA A. VINUYA, LYDIA A. SANCHEZ, ROSALINA M.BUCO,
PATRICIA A. ERNARDO, LUCILA H. PAYAWAL, MAGDALENA LIWAG, ESTER C. BALINGIT,
JOVITA A. DAVID, EMILIA C. MANGILIT, VERGINIA M. BANGIT, GUILLERMA S. BALINGIT,
TERECITA PANGILINAN, MAMERTA C. PUNO, CRISENCIANA C. GULAPA, SEFERINA S. TURLA,
MAXIMA B. TURLA, LEONICIA G. GUEVARRA, ROSALINA M. CULALA, CATALINA Y. MANIO,
MAMERTA T. SAGUM, CARIDAD L. TURLA, et al.
In their capacity and as members of the Malaya Lolas Organization,
versus -
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, THE HONORABLE
SECRETARY OF FOREIGNAFFAIRS DELIA DOMINGO-ALBERT, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY
OF JUSTICE MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, and THE HONORABLE SOLICITOR GENERAL
ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO
G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010
FACTS:
This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the Office of the Executive Secretary,
the Secretary of the DFA, the Secretary of the DOJ, and the OSG.
Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization registered with
the SEC, established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces
in the Philippines during the Second World War.
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ,
DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military
officers who ordered the establishment of the comfort women stations in the Philippines. But officials
of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the
individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japans
compliance with the Peace Treaty between the Philippines and Japan.
Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that respondents committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to espouse their claims
for the crimes against humanity and war crimes committed against them; and (b) compel the
respondents to espouse their claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan
before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international tribunals.
Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the war were dealt
with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations Agreement of 1956.
On January 15, 1997, the Asian Womens Fund and the Philippine government signed a Memorandum
of Understanding for medical and welfare support programs for former comfort women. Over the next
five years, these were implemented by the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
ISSUE:
WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioners
claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.
RULING:
Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the exclusive
prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners claims against Japan.
Political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.
One type of case of political questions involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-established
that the conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the
executive and legislativethe politicaldepartments of the government, and the propriety of what
may be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision. are
delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only
by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil.
But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts certainly possess
the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements. However, the question
whether the Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign
government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our
Constitution not to the courts but to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has
already decided that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for
reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the
courts to question.
The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in
foreign countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential sources of
information. He has his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners cause would be inimical to our
countrys foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious
implications for stability in this region. For the to overturn the Executive Departments determination
would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which
authority to make that judgment has been constitutionally committed.
From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a general principle, where such an
extraordinary length of time has lapsed between the treatys conclusion and our consideration the
Executive must be given ample discretion to assess the foreign policy considerations of espousing a
claim against Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners and those of the
Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient, and whether further steps are
appropriate or necessary.
In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a claim
within the international legal system has been when the individual is able to persuade a government
to bring a claim on the individuals behalf. By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting
to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its
own right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law.
Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic protection by
whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State is asserting.
Should the natural or legal person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their rights are not
adequately protected, they have no remedy in international law. All they can do is resort to national
law, if means are available, with a view to furthering their cause or obtaining redress. All these
questions remain within the province of municipal law and do not affect the position internationally.
Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this analysis.
Petitioners have not shown that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jus cogens
prohibitions at the time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of
international crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens.
The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been used as a legal
term describing obligations owed by States towards the community of states as a whole. Essential
distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international community as
a whole, and those arising vis--vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very
nature, the former are the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all
States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.
The term jus cogens (literally, compelling law) refers to norms that command peremptory
authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory
in the sense that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified only by general
international norms of equivalent authority
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.