Jihad and the Rifle Alone: Framing Abdullah Azzam

1.3. Abdullah Azzam

Azzam was born in Palestine in 1941. He conducted sharia studies at the prestigious al-Azhar
university in Cairo and after earning his PhD in 1973 he taught amongst other places at the
university of Amman in Jordan and at Abd al-Aziz in Jeddah where one of his students was a
young Usama bin Ladin.
Azzam is central for the understanding of todays militant Islamism for two reasons. First he
functioned as an important administrator and leading figure for the so-called Afghan Arabs:
the Arabian men who came to Afghanistan during the 80s to fight against the Soviet Union.
Azzam came to work as a link between Wahhabite interests in Saudi Arabia and these Afghan
Arabs that later came to form the seed of al-Qaida and the global jihadist movement. Second
Azzam came to function as a link in the chain of thinkers that comprises the history of
militant Islamism. In Azzams texts ideas that were developed by other thinkers such as Qutb,
Mawdudi, Faraj and Shariati came together and were developed. Azzam is in this way
standing on a point between the old militant Islamism and the new both historically and
ideologically. His message is not new. Other modern Islamist thinkers have propagated for
jihad. What differs him from these earlier thinkers is that he spoke directly to an existing
movement. Where the call for jihad earlier had been mostly rhetoric or only followed by a
very miniscule group Azzam wrote to an audience that actually followed his advice.
1
The purpose of the paper is as we have stated to understand the global jihadist movement
through a reading of its own texts. Its object of study is the idea world of global jihadism as it
is manifested in selected written texts. These selected texts are two of Azzams central texts:
Join the Caravan (Ilhaq bil-Qaafilah, 1987) and Defence of the Muslim Lands (Ad-Difaa An-
Araadil-Muslimeen, 1984). We read these texts as part of a process whose purpose is to
propagate for a certain way to perceive the world and thereby call for action. In short: as
frames. The works of Azzam is a fixed moment in a process that started before him and has
continued after. The object of the paper is this specific moment but to be able to understand it
we must place it within a greater historical context. Azzams texts must be thought of as an
answer to and as a development of this history. Though it is not any kind of history we are
1
Kepel, 2002, p. 144ff.
1
interested in but the history of ideas: how the ideas of militant Islamism has developed and
changed. Neither is it Islam we are interested in but Islamism as a modern political
movement. In some cases though, e.g. when it comes to the history of certain central
concepts, the line between Islam and Islamism gets blurred since even contemporary Islamist
ideologues such as Azzam refers to classical Islamic history.
Both Join the Caravan and Defence of the Muslim Lands are texts well suited for frame
analysis. The stated purpose of both texts is to incite to social action: to join the jihad. In the
second preface to Join the Caravan Azzam writes: () there are two duties which we are
trying to establish: the duty of Jihad (fighting), and the duty of arousing the believers.
2
It is
not only participation in jihad but also the arousing of the Muslims to fight that he considers a
duty. The title itself Join the Caravan is an urge towards the reader to join the jihad in
Afghanistan.
Defence of the Muslim Lands is the more extensive of the two texts. It is also a fatwa, an
answer to a religious legal question given by a religious authority. Fatawas usually deals with
subjects that are not touched upon or not answered sufficiently in the Quran or sunnah. A
fatwa is not binding but is rather to be thought of as guidance and its weight depends on the
status of its author. Fatawas does not however have to be answers to direct questions but can
also like in Azzams case be written against the background of a specific event or a
specific problem as an urge for Muslims to act in a certain way. To give Defence of the
Muslim Lands more religious weight Azzam had it signed and commented by other prominent
Muslim scholars.
3
2. The modern history of Islamism
The purpose of this chapter is to paint the historical background of Azzams work. The
chapter is chronologically structured and divided into three parts. The first starts with the birth
of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 and stretches to Nassers rise to power in Egypt 1954.
The second part deals with the age of Arabic nationalism from 1955 to the six-day war in
1967. The third and last part starts with the rise of Islamism after the six-day war to the
2
Abdullah Azzam, Join the Caravan, Azzam Publications, London, 2001, p. 18.
3
Abdullah Azzam, Defence of the Muslim Lands, Azzam Publications, London, 2002, p. xxii-xxiii.
2
murder of president Sadat in 1981. A period that saw the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the
Islamic revolution in Iran and the establishment of the world Azzam worked in.
2.1. 1928-1952
The history of modern militant Islamism can be traced to two main sources: Abul Ala
Mawdudi in Pakistan and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.
4
The second half of the 19
th
century saw the beginning of an upswing for Egypt nationalism.
The building of the Suez Canal resulted in a large influx of European citizens and ideas to
Egypt at the same time as the dependence on British economical aid deepened. This
dependency on British investors together with a rising identification with European culture
led to an increase of discontent in the lower classes. In the 1880s Egyptian officers that saw
Turkish and Cirsassian officers being promoted before them formed a secret society that
would become the core of the nationalistic movement.
At the same time a movement whose ambitions was religio-political rather than nationalistic
started to make itself heard. At the centre of this movement that reacted against the
modernization and secularisation of Egyptian society was two persons: Jamal al-Din al-
Afghani a teacher at prestigious al-Azhar university in Cairo and Muhammad Abduh.
This movement argued for a return to the way of life of the Prophet Muhammed and the first
generation of Muslims way of life. The purpose was to cleanse Islam from the inventions and
additions that has been added later and corrupted the religion. The movement took its name
salafiyya from the collective name of the first three generations of Muslims after
Muhammed. Even though the salafi movement was quite daring in its rhetorics it never
succeeded in becoming a vital political power. Instead, the first serious attempt to change the
political situation came from the Egyptian officers that in 1881 forced through a nationalistic
war minister and later a more liberal constitution. The British used the civil unrest that
followed as an excuse for a military intervention and in 1882 Egypt were occupied by British
forces. It was meant to be a short occupation but in reality it put Egypt under British rule until
the free officers military coup in 1952. The time until that was dominated by political unrest.
The most important political actors during this time were the British who in reality ran the
4
See e.g. Mattias Gardell, Bin Ladin i vra hjrtan: Globaliseringen och Framvxten av
Politisk Islam, Leopard Frlag, Stockholm, 2005; or Kepel, &&&&&&&
3
country the nationalistic waft party that was the most popular party in the country and king
Fuad. Out of this situation a forth actor merged that would come to play an important role in
Egypts domestic politics and in the development of militant Islamism: the Muslim
Brotherhood.
The Muslim Brotherhood emerged in a society that was deeply influenced by a newly
awakened nationalism in opposition to an occupational force and a growing discontent with a
parliamentary system that neither succeeded in freeing the country from occupation nor
creating a better life for its citizens. In their motto the brotherhood offered a third way: The
Quran is our constitution.
5
Their emergence in the end of the 1920s marked the birth of the
modern Islamist movement. Needless to say they were not the first Muslim movement in 20
th
century Egypt. We have already mentioned the salafi movement. What separated the
Brotherhood from earlier religious movements was their political activism. Their founder
Hassan al-Banna saw politics as a part of Islam and refused to acknowledge a difference
between the both.
6
The salafi movement was criticised for spending too much energy on
minor problems rather than focusing on Islams main enemies: imperialism and Zionism.
7
When the salafi movement criticised the ordinary Egyptian for not being religious enough, al-
Banna and the Brotherhood put great trust in the piousness of the masses. This open attitude
towards and trust in individual religiosity was within the Brotherhood pared with an interest
in the realities of the lower classes and a belief in their potential as a political power. The
basis of the Brotherhoods ideology was that Islam should be the foundation of society. In its
criticism of the salafi movement and of the traditional religious institutions there was an
ambition to make Islam a part of all aspects of daily life. Where nationalism, parlamentarism
and imperialism all considered to be western and for Egypt foreign ideas had failed, Islam
would succeed in guiding the country.
Our mission is one described most comprehensively by the term Islamic, though this word
has a meaning broader than the narrow definition understood by people generally. We belive
that Islam is an all-embracing concept which regulates every aspect of life, adjucating on
every one of its concerns and prescribing for it a solid and rigorous order.
8
5
&&&&&&
6
Lia, p. 58.
7
Lia, p. 59.
8
Lia, p. 75
4
The Islamism of the Brotherhood was not reactionary in the sense of striving for a return to
the past as the salafis did. Rather, Islam was viewed as guidance through modernity, not as an
alternative to it.
9
During the second half of the 1930s the Muslim Brotherhood grew to a mass movement and a
political force to be reckoned with. Its political program was clearly class based. Their
audience was first and foremost the educated lower middle class whose prospects of climbing
the social ladder was grim and they criticised the political and economic elite for corruption
and for being bearers of western, un-Islamic values.
The Brotherhoods swelling ranks and rising political power made them increasingly
inconvenient for the political elite and in 1948 the sitting Prime Minister Nokrashi ordered
their dissolution. At the end of he same year Nokrashi was murdered by a member of the
Brotherhood and a month later, its founder Hasan al-Banna was also murdered. The final
blow did not come until the free officers military coup and Nasser coming to power though.
The Brotherhood was accused of planning an attempt on Nassers life in 1954 and a large part
of their members were tortured and thrown in jail. This experience became a steel bath for the
Egyptian Islamist movement and came to influence its relationship with the regime for
decades to come.
If the relationship between Islamists and the sitting regime in Egypt during this time was
riddled with conflict things were of a different nature on the Indian subcontinent. The 1920s
and 30s saw serious conflict between the Muslim and the Hindu population. A large part of
the Muslims experienced a declining political influence, which resulted in demands for a
separate Muslim state. As in Egypt hence there existed a nationalistic movement but its main
enemy was not the British but the Hindus.
10

In the light of this conflict between Muslims and Hindus Abul Ala Mawdudi argued for a
return to original Islam, untainted by influences by Hinduism and western values. From the
beginning he was opposed to a separate Muslim state since he felt it would abandon the
Muslims left in India but he later changed his mind and started to argue for not only a Muslim
state but an Islamic state, governed by Islamic law.
Mawdudi emphasized Islams political character. He saw political power as a measurement of
and a guarantee for the vitality of Islam. Just like the Muslim Brotherhood he criticized the
9
Lia, p. 76.
10
&&&&&
5
religious establishment for not being enough involved in political and social issues but in
contrast to the Brotherhood he did not put his trust in the masses but in a political elite. The
creation of an Islamic state must start with the creation of a political Islamic elite a vanguard
that can initiate a peaceful revolution top down. To create such an elite Mawdudi forms a
party - Jamaat-e-Islam in 1941. Its purpose was to function as a vanguard for an Islamic
revolution. The historical background of this idea can be found both in Lenins theory of a
communist vanguard but also in the Quranic story of Muhammeds move from Mecca to
Medina the hegira. Muhammed and his followers emigrated from Mecca to Medina to
freely be able to exercise their religion. Mawdudi interprets this as a break with an
unbelieving environment with the purpose of creating a hard core a vanguard that can lead
the revolution as a blueprint for political action.
11
Mawdudi lays out the foundation for his view on the relation between Islam and politics in the
small pamphlet Jihad in Islam. Islam is according to Mawdudi not a religion in the ordinary
sense.
In common terminology religion means nothing more than a hotch potch of some beliefs,
prayers and rituals. If this is what religion means, then, it should, indeed, be a private
affair. ()There is no reason why you should take up a sword? Do you wish to convert
people to your faith by killing them? We are forced to admit the point that if you regard Islam
as a religion in the conventional meaning of the term and if, indeed, Islam be a conventional
type of religion, the necessity for Jihad cannot be justified.
12

If Islam had been a religion in the ordinary sense of the word there would have been no
reason to connect it to political struggle, armed or peaceful. But Islam is for Mawdudi not
only a religion but also a revolutionary ideology whose purpose is to change the present social
order. Islam is hence fundamentally political in character. Neither are the Muslims a nation.
To be a Muslim is for Mawdudi the same thing as belonging to a revolutionary party with
Islam as its ideology. To be a Muslim is to be an activist and jihad is the means through
which the struggle is conducted.
13
2.2. 1953-1966
11
Gilles Kepel, Jihad The Trail of Political Islam, p. 34f.
12
Mawdudi, Jihad in Islam, p. 3f.
13
Ibid. p. 5.
6
The period between Nassers rise to power and the six-day war was in Egypt a time of
nationalism. Nassers projects were to free Egypt from the shackles of its colonial past and
transform it to a modern independent nation.
14
The relationship between the Muslim
Brotherhood and Nassers regime was from the outset fairly good but broke down totally after
an attempt on Nassers life from one of the brothers. The regime answered with a liquidation
of the brotherhood and the execution or imprisonment of its leaders and activists. This
experience was to have a profound impact on future Islamist thinkers. The one whose voice
would be heard the loudest was Sayyid Qutb.
Qutb had worked as a teacher, journalist, author and as a literary critic. During the 1940s he
was one of Egypts leading voices of nationalism and provoked king Farouk enough to be
sent to the USA in exile for a few years to elude prison. It was during this period that he
discovered Islam and he joined the Muslim Brotherhood when he returned in 1951. After the
attempt on Nasser life he was sentenced in a summary trial to 25 years in prison. It was during
his time in jail that he wrote his most famous tract: Milestones.
15
The tone in Milestones differs radically from both that of al-Banna and Mawdudi. Where they
both believed in the possibility of changing society from participating in it in the case of the
Brotherhood through education of and preaching to the people and in Mawdudis case
through the creation of an Islamic elite Qutb had lost all faith in change from the inside.
Milestones opens with a description of humanity as standing on the brink of extinction. The
ideologies of the day democracy, Marxism, socialism, capitalism and nationalism have all
failed. The only thing that can lead humanity back on the right track is Islam.
16
For Islam to be
able to do that it must be cleansed from the corrupting effects of history.
If Islam is again to play the role of the leader of mankind, then it is necessary that the
Muslim community be restored to its original form. It is necessary to revive that muslim
community which is buried under the debris of the man-made traditions of several
generations, and which is crushed under the weight of those false laws and customs which
are not even remotely related to the Islamic teachings, and which, in spite of all this, calls
itself the world of Islam.
17

14
Kepel, The Roots of Radical Islam, p. 23.
15
Maalim fi al-tariq. Has also been translated as signposts or signs along the path.
16
Seyyid Qutb, Milestones, Dar al-Ilm, Damascus, p. 7ff.
17
Ibid., p. 9.
7
Qutb shares with Mawdudi this longing for a return to a more original version of Islam, divine
and untainted by human history and modernity. But Qutb pushes this longing further than
Mawdudi. The world of today is according to Qutb steeped in barbarism and ignorance. To
describe this condition Qutb borrows a concept from the Quran that describes the time before
Muhammed: jahiliyya.
If we look at the sources and foundations of modern ways of living, it becomes clear that the
whole world is steeped in Jahiliyya, and all the marvellous material comforts and high-level
inventions do not diminish this ignorance. This Jahiliyya is based on rebellion against Gods
sovereignty on earth. It transfers to man one of the greatest attributes of God, namely
sovereignty, and makes some men lords over others. It is now not in that simple and primitive
form of the ancient Jahiliyya, but takes the form of claiming that the right to create values, to
legislate rules of collective behavior, and to choose any way of life rests with men, without
regard to what God has prescribed.
18
Qutb shares the Muslim Brotherhoods view of western culture as morally bankrupt and
corrupting. Western ideologies such as democracy and nationalism are for Qutb a form of
paganism where the party, the people or the leader takes Gods place as the only entity worthy
of worship. With Mawdudi he shares the belief in a vanguard that leads the Muslim world
back on track. Since todays society is a copy of the barbarian pre-Muhammed age this
vanguard should be modelled after those who brought the world out of Jahiliyya for the first
time i.e. Muhammed and his followers. But as opposed to Mawdudi Qutb does not see this
vanguard as participating in the existing political system. This system is for Qutb rotten to the
core and must be avoided and opposed at every cost.
We must also free ourselves from the clutches of jahili society, jahili concepts, jahili
traditions and jahili leadership. Our mission is not to compromise with the practices of jahili
society, nor can we be loyal to it. Jahili society, because of its jahili characteristics, is not
worthy to be compromised with. Our aim is first to change ourself so that we may later
change the society.
19
Qutb hence argues for a withdrawal from society modelled on Muhammeds move to Medina
but in a more radical fashion that Mawdudi did. For Qutb the whole of society is jahiliyya.
18
Qutb, Milestones, p. 11.
19
Ibid., p. 21.
8
Therefore the vanguard must first withdraw from society and purify itself to be able to return
and change it from its foundations.
Milestones was smuggled out from prison, published in 1964 and became a bestseller. The
same year Qutb was released. However the revolutionary character of his works was too
obvious and when Nasser in 1965 announced that a new Muslim conspiracy had been
uncovered Qutb was accused of being its leader. He was hanged a few months later. The
seeds of nationalisms death and the rise of Islamism was however already sown and would
start to grow just a year later in 1967 with the humiliating defeat against Israel in the six-day
war.
2.3. 1967-1981
To consolidate his own power and reduce the ulemas the religious authority Nasser put al-
Azhar under state control in 1961. The university turned into a propaganda machine with the
purpose of showing the compatibility between Islam and Nassers socialism.
20
One of the
traditional roles of the ulema had been to function as intermediary between the people and the
state. As separate from the state the ulema had been able preach obedience to the sitting
regime at the same time as it could criticize it. In this way the ulema could function as a
neutral stabilizing force in society. In making the ulema into a tool for the state Nasser
deprived it its status as a trustworthy third part. The role as critic of the state in Islams name
was left vacant for other forces to fill. A vacuum had been created.
The Arab world had in large part after being decolonialized turned to the idea of Arab
nationalism whose goal was to unite its divided classes and peoples under a pan-Arabic unity.
In reality no such unity ever came to exist and the beginning of the end for Arab nationalism
came with the defeat against Israel in the war of 1967. Apart from being a crushing military
defeat it also hurt the nationalist idea. Nationalism had not been able to create the modern
ideal society that many had hoped for and now its flaws had been put out in the daylight with
the defeat against an inferior opponent. Nationalism no longer appeared to be the answer to
Egypts and the Arab worlds problem. Another vacuum had been created.
In Egypt this vacuum appeared to be filled by a leftist movement. As in large parts of the rest
of the world a leftist wave swept through the Egyptian universities during the last years of the
sixties. This leftist wave coincided with the creation of PLO as an autonomous Palestinian
20
Gilles Kepel, Jihad, p. 53.
9
organization. The leftist wave posed a threat to Nassers progressive image at the same time
as the creation of PLO made it harder for other Arab leaders to use the Palestinian cause as a
propaganda tool. The Palestinians now hade a voice of their own and fought for their own
sake. To stop the leftist forces, consolidate his own power and make them into a
counterweight to the lefts rising power at the campuses the newly assigned Anwar Sadat
started to free the imprisoned members of the Muslim Brotherhood. A similar development
gave the Islamists a strong foothold at universities not only in Egypt but also in Tunisia,
Algeria, Pakistan, Malaysia and Morocco.
21

The early 70s saw the birth of Jamaat Islamyia Islamic groups on Egypts universities.
With silent support from the state these groups offered students solutions of many of the
social problems that the Egyptian university system couldnt handle. In a short time the
number of students at Egyptian universities had more than doubled but the system had not
been able to follow this development. In addition the explosive rise in access to educated
young men flooded the market. Out of these a class of well educated young men with great
expectations but without the possibility of social advancement or professional career emerged,
a class that questioned the path Egypt had chosen. It was within this class that Islamism
started to take roots as an alternative to western values.
The quiet agreement between Sadat and the Islamists held up until 1977 and the Camp David
agreement between Egypt and Israel. The agreement was percieved by the Islamist movement
as a compromise towards the sworn enemies of Islam and as a treachery. The first
confrontation between the regime and the Islamist movement was initiated by a group that
media named Al Takfir w-al Hijra.
The real name of Al Takfir w-al Hijra was in translation The Society of Muslims. The group
formed around Shukri Mustafa, a Muslim Brother from Egypts countryside who during
Nassers cleansings had been put to jail between 1965 and 1971. It was there he first came in
contact with the writings of Qutb and Mawdudi.
There existed amongst the imprisoned Brothers different schools concerning how Milestones
should be understood. The main source of the disagreement was how to understand Qutbs
use of the terms mufasala and uzla, separation and withdrawal. Qutb uses these terms in his
discussion about jahiliyya. As we have seen earlier Qutb argues in favour for the creation of
an Islamic vanguard. This vanguard must separate itself and cleanse itself from jahili society.
21
Ibid., p. 64f.
10
The question was how to understand this separation. Both groups agreed that the Egyptian
society was jahili and therefore must be pronounced takfir, be excommunicated. The idea of
takfir stretches back to the 13
th
century and Ibn Taymiyya the Muslim theologian probably
most quoted by the jihadist movement. Facing the problem how the invading Mongols that
had converted to Islam should be dealt with Taymiyya meant that it is not enough to confess
ones self to Islam to be a Muslim. One must also fight to uphold Islamic law.
22
Doing this
Taymiyya opens up the possibility of excommunicating other Muslims as being false Muslims
or infidels on the basis of their actions.
One of the interpretations of Qutb said that mufasala and uzla meant separation and
withdrawal in a spiritual way. The movement was perceived as being in a phase of weakness
istidaf. To openly declare the surrounding society as takfir would have devastating
consequences for the movement. Instead one argued for an inner withdrawal where you in
secret considered the surrounding as jahiliyya but never expressed it.
23
The other interpretation argued for a total withdrawal from society. Shukri Mustafa shared
this interpretation. Al-Takfir w-al Hijra means excommunication and emigration, or to be
more precise: Muhammeds emigration from Mecca to Medina. This is as we have seen not a
new idea but what separated Shukri Mustafa from Mawdudi or Qutb was that he actually did
withdraw from society. Al Takfir w-al Hijra came to function as a sect that totally separated
itself from the rest of society. The members of the group lived together in apartments that
were paid for by mutual funds. They married partners that were assigned by Mustafa and
severed all unnecessary contact with society. Since Egyptian society according to Mustafa
was jahili he did not see a fundamental difference between it and e.g. its nemesis Israel.
Neither of the countries were in Mustfas eyes Muslim, i.e. belonged to Dar al-Islam the
House of Islam. Both were therefore a part of Dar al-Harb the House of War. When
questioned what he would do if Egypt were invaded by Israel he answered that he would flee,
just as he fled Egypt society.
If the Jews or anyone else came, our movement ought not to fight in the ranks of the
Egyptian army, but on the contrary ought to flee to a secure position. In general, our line is to
flee before the external and the internal enemy alike, and not to resist him.
24

22
David Cook, Understanding Jihad, p. 63ff.
23
Kepel, 2005, p. 74f.
24
Shukri Mustafa quoted in Ibid., p. 85.
11
Hijra became in Mustafas hands a political strategy for dealing with jahiliyya under istida
the phase of weakness.
25
Just as Qutb had done before him Mustfa argued that the ulema had been corrupted to work as
a tool for unrighteous rulers. Instead of listening to the ulema and the whole Islamic scholarly
tradition Mustafa argued for a more personal relation to God directly based on the Quran.
Mustafa hence share Qutbs and Mawdudis longing for a purer Islam, free from religious
authority, an Islam that builds a direct, unmediated link between God and man. This
dismantling of the legitimacy of the traditional religious institutions and demands of
individual religiousness creates a situation where it is not longer enough to confess ones self
to Islam to be a Muslim. One must also live and act according to the rules of Islam. This
insistence on action is implicit in Qutbs writings but is made explicit only with Mustafa.
There is hence a tension within Mustafs thought. On the one hand the concepts of istida and
hijra and on the other hand the insistence on action. This tension surfaced in 1977 when
members of the group kidnapped an ex-minister as a response to the arrest of 14 of its
members. When they were not released he was executed. After that a military court sentenced
Mustafa to death.
26
During the period from the student rises in 1968 to the Al-Takfir w-al Hijra affair in 1977 the
Islamist student movement Jamaat islamiyya had grown into a considerable political
force. After eradicating the political influence of the student left with the silent support of
Sadat Jamaat islamiyya islamized the universities. As opposed to Al Takfir w-al Hijra
Jamaat islamiyya was not a small sect but a mass movement. Where Al Takfir w-al Hijra had
great demands on the religiousness of the individual members Jamaat islamiyya was more
allowing. The movement was in this way similar to the Muslim Brotherhood in that they had
great faith in the individual piousness of the students and did not have detailed programs for
their behaviour. In doing this they were able to create a mass movement and influence society
from the bottom and from within. In an article written by one of its members to celebrate the
beginning of the 15
th
Islamic century four signs that indicates the existence of an Islamic
movement is mentioned: veiled women, men with untrimmed beards, early marriage and
attendance at public prayers on the Greater and Lesser Holidays.
27
Compare this with
Mustafas demands for a total withdrawal from society.
25
Ibid., p.
26
Ibid., p.
27
Ibid., p. 156f.
12
The good relations between Sadat and Jamaat islamiyya would not come to last though. With
the Al Takfir w-al Hijra affair the relationship between Sadats regime and the Islamists
became strained but the real breakdown came when Sadat in 1977 initiated the peace
negotiations with Israel that two years later would result in the Camp David agreement. The
Islamist movement saw Israel and the Jews as Egypts and the Muslims sworn enemies. A
peace with them was not considered acceptable. The tone between the regime and the
movement hardened between 1977-79. The regime shut down local offices and meeting
places and stopped its payments to the movement. This led to a rise in the support of the
movement. After the Camp David agreement in 1979 Sadat openly criticized the Islamist
movement for hiding its political ambitions under a religious robe. The final show off
between Sadat and Jamaat islamiyya came in 1981 when the movement was accused of
inciting and participating in riots and massacres of Christian copts in Cairo. After this the
movement lost a lot of its support from within the Egyptian society and Sadat could liquidate
the movement and arrest its members without any resistance. As for the Muslim Brotherhood
this did not mean the end of the movement. Parts of Jamaat islamiyya went underground
where it was extremized and came to fight a low intensive war against the Egyptian state well
into the 1990s.
28
The most formidable combination of Islam and politics during the 20
th
century is not however
to be found in Egypt but in Saudi Arabia. Its historical foundation is an alliance between
politics the house of Saud and religion the preacher Abd Al-Wahhab and his followers.
During the mid-18
th
century the Arabian Peninsula was divided between different tribes
fighting amongst themselves over scarce resources. An alliance between Wahhab and the
house of Saud gave the Sauds the upper hand in this Hobbesian war through providing their
conquest with the religious justification of being jihad at the same time as Wahhabs own
interpretation of Islam was spread over the whole Arabian Peninsula. This alliance between
the house of Saud and Wahhab and his followers is still a dominant factor in Saudi Arabic
politics. The Saud/Wahhab conquest of the Arabian Peninsula has come to be seen as a re-
enactment of Muhammeds conquest of the same area through the pairing of religion and
politics, of the book and the sword, in an undividable unity that is the model for the Muslim
vanguard.
29

28
See e.g. Montasser al-Zayyat, The Road to al-Qaeda: The Story of Bin Ladens Right-Hand Man, Pluto Press,
London, 2004.
13
Wahhabs interpretation of Islam Wahhabism can be described with three concepts: tawid,
takfir and jihad. Tawid is the Islamic version of monotheism. Within Sunni Islam it can be
described in three points: unity in the supremacy of God, unity in the worship of God and
unity in Gods name and properties. Unity in the supremacy of God means that there is only
one God and that he is the origin of everything. Unity in the worship of God means that
nothing besides God is worthy of worship and unity in Gods name and properties means that
only the representations and descriptions of God that are given by God are correct and
acceptable.
30
Out of these three points it is number two, unity in the worship of God Tawid
alibada that is given most weight in wahhabism. The other two points are according to
wahhabism not enough to distinguish a Muslim from an infidel. It is only tawid al-ibada that
can be the difference between monotheism and polytheism, between tawid and shirk.. In
reality this means a prohibition against all worship that is not directed directly against God
e.g. the naming of the Prophet Muhammed or another religious figure in prayer, to view as
another person as a link to God, to praise the dead or praying at their graves or building
monuments over them.
31
Those who do not share this interpretation of tawid or live up to it
can according to wahhabism not be considered as Muslims but are infidels and must be
fought.
32
Wahhabism hence uses the takfir concept in the same way as other theorists such as
Qutb. The difference between wahhabism on the one hand and Qutb on the other is that while
Qutb wrote in a weak position, Saud and the wahhabis used takfir as an excuse for jihad
and an actual conquest of the Arabian Peninsula.
Wahhabism cannot be viewed as an Islamic school in the traditional sense. Al-Wahhab only
wrote a few texts and they are mostly compilations of un-commented hadith.
33
It is rather an
attitude and a way of life that gets its expression in an intolerant attitude towards other forms
of Islam such as Shiism and Sufism that springs from a strife to purify the religion from
bida innovation and return to an original, true form of Islam as it is written in the Quran
and hadith. Because of its extreme intolerance against other forms of Islam and its close
relationship with the specific political environment of Saudi Arabia it is doubtful that
29
Gilles Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
Cambridge & London, 2004, p. ?????
30
Hamid Algar, Wahhabism: A Critical Essay, Islamic Publications International, Oneota, 2002, p. 31.
31
Hamid Algar, Wahhabism: A Critical Essay, Islamic Publications International, Oneota, 2002, p. 32f.
32
Ibid., p. 34.
33
Ibid., p. ?????
14
wahhabism would ever had spread from the Arabian Peninsula if it had not been for two
reasons: oil and emigrating members of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood.
Beginning with Nassers persecution of the Muslim Brotherhood during the mid 1950s many
of its members started to leave Egypt for Saudi Arabia. They were generally well-educated,
deeply religious, multi-lingual and therefore welcomed to the new country.
34
These political
refugees soon came to be an important part of Saudi Arabias intellectual life. They were
forbidden to proselytise but they used their newly won freedom to spread their teachings and
their texts internationally, which also spilled over inside the county. During the 1960s they
offered the younger Saudi generation a more active alternative to the conservative
wahhabism, though in a down toned version not to anger their host. In Saudi Arabia the
Brotherhood had a possibility to undisturbed unite their forces. They were given time and
means to create an international network for cooperation, education and distribution of their
doctrine mixed with Saudi Arabias wahhabism.
During the 1950s and 60s educated Egyptians started to find their way to Saudi Arabia in
search for a better life. These young men could often after a few years of work return to their
home country considerably richer then when they left. They brought with them the version of
Islam that they experienced had made this possible. A large group who had left their country
well educated but poor and without a future came back just a few years later as a new
prosperous upper middle class. This group was not as their parents inspired by a European
culture but of the Saudi version of a traditional Islamic culture with veiled women and strictly
religious men with beards and traditional clothes. Wahhabism came to be a symbol of social
success.
35
These were the intellectual prerequisites for the spread of international wahhabism.
The economic prerequisite came with oil.
In October 1973 Syria and Egypt attacked Israel with the purpose of restoring their lost
honour after the embarrassing defeat in 1967. The real winner of this war was not however to
become any of the combatants but rather Saudi Arabia who with its embargo on oil flexed its
muscles, raised the price of oil and its own revenues many times over. The war of October
1973 made Saudi Arabia into one of the riches countries of the world and gave it the
opportunity to spread wahhabism over the whole Muslim world. Prior to 1973 the Muslim
world had been a quilt of different schools and versions of Islam where religion usually had a
34
Kepel, The War for Muslim Minds, p. 172f.
35
Kepel, 2002, p. 71.
15
minor influence on politics. Saudi Arabia changed this through the internationalisation of
wahhabism. Imams educated in Saudi Arabia spread over the Muslim world together with
generous donations, cassette tapes, pamphlets and books in order to purify it from false
Islam. This way a void was filled that Arabic nationalism never succeeded in filling. Saudi
Arabia took the role of the protector of Islam and a pan-Islamic thought started to supersede
pan-Arabism.
36
The spread of wahhabism can be described as a silent revolution. In 1979 the Shiite imam
Ruholla Khomeini succeeded with something that neither Mawdudi, Qutb or any of their
followers had succeeded with: a real Islamic revolution.
Khomeini was, as opposed to Mawdudi and Qutb, an educated and recognized religious
authority and it was as such that he succeeded in uniting the religious class, the poor and the
middle class in a revolution against the existing order. The ideas that Khomeini based the
revolution was however not throughoutly his own. A large part was copied from or inspired
by Ali Shariati. Shariati was educated in Paris and well read in the revolutionary leftist writers
of the 50s and 60s such as Fanon, Guevara and Sartre. His own liberation theology was a
unification of this revolutionary leftism and Shiism.
Shariati was as we have seen not the first to combine Islam with the ideas of the revolutionary
left. Both Mawdudis and Qutbs notions of a revolutionary Muslim vanguard are clearly
indebted to Lenins writings.
37
Shariati shares their understanding of Islam as a revolutionary
religion and their critique of the religious authority as reactionary. The theme from Shariatis
thought that is the most important for this paper is however his conception of martyrdom.
Shiism has since the birth of Islam been a movement in headwind. Sunni Islam has from the
outset established itself as the dominant movement and the history of Shiism is therefore to a
large content characterized by stories of adversary, oppression and martyrdom. One of the
central stories of Shia Islam is the one about al-Husayn, the fourth calif and the grand child of
the Prophet. Al-Husayn was killed together with his family and his followers by the
competing and dominant Muslim power, the Umayyad. His martyrdom has since become a
symbol for the Shia view on martyrdom and participation in politics. As opposed to Sunni
Islam where the martyr generally is viewed as victorious and where martyrdom is a source of
happiness it is in Shiism a source of sorrow. Every year in the memory of Al-Husayns death
36
Ibid., p. 69ff.
37
For a diskussion on the relationship between jihadism and the revolutionary left see Roy, 2004, p. 41-57.
16
ashura is celebrated where Shiites whip themselves for not having been able to help him.
The political consequence of this view of martyrdom is withdrawal. Instead of actively
engaging in politics the Shiite way has traditionally been passively waiting for the return of
al-Mahdi - the twelfth imam. The return of the Mahdi signals the end of history when justice
is brought to the world. Until this return the Muslims must endure oppression. The traditional
Shiite attitude towards politics has therefore been not to participate it, endure oppression and
wait for the Mahdi. Shariti opposes this defeatist and passive interpretation of Islam in his
discussions about martyrdom.
The Arabic and Persian word for martyr is shahid. The word has a double meaning in that it
also means witness. Shariati puts great weight on this double meaning and argues that
Shiism is the only religion where the word predominantly means witness rather than
dead.
38
So instead of martyrdom, i.e. death, it essentially means life, evidence, testify,
certify. These words: martyrdom and bearing witness show the differences which exist
between the vision of Shiite Islamic culture and the other cultures of the world.
39
A martyr is for Shariati someone who negates his whole existence for an ideal. He thus
becomes a part of this ideal. He uses his death to bare witness for the sake of a cause.
40
Martyrdom is hence for Shariati an active action where a human chooses to use his death for
the sake of a cause, not through putting his life at risk in combat but by actively seeking
death. This is Shariatis interpretation of Al-Husayns martyrdom.
2.4. Epilogue
On the sixth of October 1981 the Egyptian president Anwar Sadat was murdered by some of
his own soldiers during a military parade. The soldiers belonged to a group that called itself
al-Jihad. The groups ideological leader was a man called Salam Faraj. He had prior to the
assassination summarized the groups ideology in a short book called Al jihad al farida al
ghaiba Jihad - the Absent Obligation.
The Absent Obligation settles the scores with the whole modern history of the Egyptian
Islamic movement that in Farajs eyes has failed with its goal of establishing an Islamic state.
38
Ali Shariati, Arise and Bear Witness, http://www.shariati.com/arise.html
39
Ibid.
40
Ali Shariati, Jihad & Shahadat, http://www.shariati.com
17
Faraj lists the strategies that the Islamic movement has used and failed with: to start official
organizations or parties, to educate the movement, to get prestigious jobs such as doctors or
architects, to preach or do emigrate.
41
All these strategies have proved ineffective in dealing
with the sitting regime. The only way to create an Islamic state is thus for Faraj through jihad.
Jihaad fee sabeel Lillah (in the cause of Allah), despite its overriding importance and its
great influence on the future of Islaam, has been neglected by present scholars, although they
know that it is the only way to bring Islaam back and cause it to come to the surface again.
42
Like many before him Faraj collects a large part of his reasoning from Ibn Taymiyya.
Taymiyya was active during the end of the 13
th
century when the Mongols invaded the
Muslim world. One of the problems he addressed was how one should act towards the
Mongols that converted to Islam. Taymiyyas answer was that only the ones that uphold
Islamic law and fight for Islam could be considered as Muslims. The Mongols fought in a
coalition of Christians , Shiites, converted and unconverted Mongols and could therefore not
be considered as Muslims according to Taymiyya. Neither did the Mongols rule according to
Islamic law, according sharia, but according to al-Yaasaq i.e. law based on a collection of
Islamic, Jewish, Christian and Mongol principles.
43
Therefore Taymiyya did something that
traditionally has been avoided in Islam: he pronounced other Muslims as takfir, as false
Muslims on basis of the quality of their religiosity. He did not only mean that the Mongols
were false Muslims but also that they were more dangerous than the infidels that did not call
themselves Muslims and that they had to be fought.
44
It was hence not enough for Taymiyya
for one to call oneself a Muslim to actually be a Muslim. One must also show it through
action and the best way to do this is through jihad. Jihad is the foremost way through which a
Muslim can show his faith and serve God.
45
Faraj adapts Taymiyyas reasoning to his present day Egypt.
46
Egypt is according to Faraj not
an Islamic state and its leaders are apostates from the faith. To fight them is therefore not only
permitted but an obligatory duty.
41
Muhammad Abdus Salam Faraj, The Absent Obligation, Maktabah Al Ansaar Publications, Birmingham,
2000, p. 37-44.
42
Ibid., p 14.
43
Cook, 2005, p. 63-66.
44
Ibid.
45
Kepel, 2005, p. 205.
46
Faraj, 2000, p. 26-30.
18
So if a part of religion is for Allaah and another is for other than him, fighting is obligatory
until the religion is for Allaah (alone).
47
Faraj hence takes the combination of takfir and
jihad further than anyone before him through arguing that not only can Muslims be false
Muslims because they dont live according to Islamic law but it is also the duty of true
Muslims to fight them. He quotes Taymiyya:
Every group which rebels against mutawaatir (clear-cut), law of the Islamic Shariah must
be fought by the consensus of all the Imaams (leaders) of Muslim, even if they pronounce the
Shahaadah (declaration of faith).
48
Traditionally jihad is not considered to be an individual duty fard ayn but a collective
duty fard kifaya except during a crises.
49
This means that jihad is usually not a personal
duty like fast, hajj, prayer, zakat or belief but a collective issue. If a sufficient number of
Muslims chose to fight there is no reason for the rest to also do it. Faraj, on the other hand,
means that jihad in todays situation is fard ayn for all Muslims, an obligatory duty: () it
becomes like praying and fasting.
50
AZZAM
47
Ibid., p. 25.
48
Ibid., p. 24.
49
Reuven Firestone, Jihad: the Origin of Holy War in Islam, Oxford University Press, New York/Oxford, 1999,
p. 60f.
50
Faraj, 2000, p. 59.
19
This chapter sets out to answer two questions: 1. What or which problem/s does Azzam
address in Join the Caravan and Defence of the Muslim Lands; and 2. Who is responsible?
Within these questions is also the question of who is the victim and who is the perpetrator.
On the surface it might seem obvious what the answers to those questions are but as we shall
see that is not necessarily the case.
The most obvious answer to the question of which problem that Azzam addresses is that it is
the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. Both texts were written during the mid-1980s during the
war in Afghanistan.
Defence of the Muslim Lands is divided into four chapters with a short introduction.
Afghanistan is not mentioned anywhere in the introduction or in the first chapter - Defence of
the Muslim Lands-The First Obligation after Iman.
51
Chapter 2The Ruling of Fighting in
Palestine and Afghanistan is the chapter that most exhaustively deals with Afghanistan. It is
also the shortest chapter with its two and a half pages. Besides Afghanistan Azzam also
mentions Palestine, the Philippines, Kashmir, Lebanon, Chad and Eritrea as countries where
Muslims should commit their efforts. These efforts should be focused on Afghanistan and
Palestine though since these represent the two gravest problems.
52
Out of those two Palestine
is the most foremost but there are other reasons to why Afghanistan should be the starting
point of a movement.
53
The first reason is that the battles in Afghanistan still are raging.
Second and third because there is a clear Islamic stamp on the fighting in Afghanistan that is
missing in Palestine. Azzam describes the Palestinian leadership as a mixture of Muslims,
communists and nationalists that fight for a secular state while the fighting in Afghanistan is
for an Islamic state.
54
The fourth reason is that the mujahideen in Afghanistan still has control and can handle the
situation without help from non-Muslim sources, which is not the case in Palestine.
Azzams final two reasons for concentrating the efforts on Afghanistan rather than on
Palestine is first that the former is easily accessible with over 3000km of borders and second
that the afghan people are well known for its strength and pride.
51
Azzam, 2002, p. xxii-xxiv, 1-17.
52
Azzam, 2002, p. 15.
53
Ibid., p. 16f.
54
Ibid., p. 16.
20
In chapter 3 Fard Ain and Fard Kifayah Afghanistan is again mentioned several times.
The expulsion of the Russians and the Communists from Afghanistan is described as a duty
fard ayn for all Muslims.
55

Also inn chapter 4 Important Questions it is clear that the problem that Azzam addresses
is the war in Afghanistan. The chapter answers questions such as if not a general Muslim
rallying to Afghanistan or Palestine would leave a political vacuum to be filled by
communists, baathists, nationalists and secularists in the other Muslim homelands, if one can
fight in Afghanistan despite that the afghan leadership is divided, if one can fight alongside
afghans who does not display an acceptable level of piety, if it is acceptable to accept help
from non-Muslims to wage jihad in Afghanistan or Palestine and under what conditions a
peace with the Russians in Afghanistan or the Jews in Palestine is acceptable.
56
The book ends
with a conclusion where Afghanistan is not mentioned.
Join the Caravan is divided into four parts and opens with two forewords. In the first
foreword the book is described as an answer to the many letters the writer receives with
questions for advice about how to come to Afghanistan.
57
Afghanistan is also mentioned in
the second foreword as a school and as the Land of Jihad.
58
Part 1 Reasons for Jihad
consists of sixteen points where Azzam states the reasons for why Muslims should join the
jihad. Out of these sixteen points four mentions Afghanistan: Due to the scarcity of men,
Responding to the Call of the Lord, Following the Pious predesessors and Protecting
the oppressed in the land.
59
Out of these four it is only the first Due to the scarcity of men
that deals specifically with the conditions in Afghanistan. In the other points Afghanistan is
used as an example to illustrate more general principal questions.
Part 2 O Islam! begins with a description of the sacrifices that the afghan Muslims has
been forced to make after the Russian invasion, the expectations they have for other Muslims
to come to their aid and the lack of religious education that characterize the new generation of
domestic afghan fighters.
60
Afghanistan is mentioned one more time and the chapter conclude
with a list of other places where Muslims has been oppressed and murdered.
61
Part 2 conclude
55
Ibid., p. 19.
56
Ibid., p. 31ff.
57
Azzam, 2001, p. 15.
58
Ibid., p.16f.
59
Ibid., p. 19-40.
60
Ibid., p. 41.
61
Ibid., p. 49.
21
with a summary where Afghanistan is not mentioned and a section with notes and advice for
those coming to Afghanistan. This section includes descriptions of the afghan people and
instructions on how they should be treated.
62

Part 3 Clarifications about the issue of Jihad today is a recapitulation of the earlier part
together with clarifications of certain points. Afghanistan is mentioned a number of times, e.g.
in connection to questions about womens status in the jihad.
63
To conclude there is no doubt that the problem Azzam addresses in both Defence of the
Muslim Lands and Join the Caravan is jihad in Afghanistan. In spite of that Azzams
argumentation often moves on a more abstract and general level. As we have already seen
Palestine is mentioned in both Join the Caravan and in Defence of the Muslim Lands.
Palestine is even described as the foremost Islamic problem.
64
In addition to Afghanistan and
Palestine a long list of countries and regions where Muslim action is needed are mentioned.
Afghanistan is hence for Azzam not a special case but one case among many. It is a symptom
of a graver disease. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is for Azzam a part of a larger
problem: the battle over Muslim territory.
The title Defence of the Muslim lands suggests that the problem addressed by Azzam not
necessarily is only the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan but the defence of Muslim lands in
general. The first chapter of the book Defence of the Muslim Lands-The First Obligation
After Imam has, as we have seen, no references to Afghanistan. Instead it is a more general
description of the rules on how attacks on Muslim lands should be dealt with. In this chapter
the enemy is not described as Russians or communists but in more general terms as
disbelievers. Jihad against the disbelievers is for Azzam of two types: offensive and
defensive.
65
His concern for the rest of the text is the second category: defensive jihad.
Defensive jihad is defined as () expelling the disbelievers from our land (). It is the
most important of the compulsory duties and arises in the following conditions:
A) If the disbelievers enter a land of the Muslims.
B) If the rows meet in battle and they begin to approach each other.
C) If the Imam calls a person or a people to march forward, then they must march.
D) If the disbelievers capture and imprison a group of Muslims.
66
62
Ibid., p. 53f.
63
Ibid., p. 60.
64
Azzam, 2002, p. 16.
65
Azzam, 2002, p. 4. We will return to Azzams theorizing about the different types of jihad in the next chapter.
22
Later he quotes Ibn Taymiyya: If the enemy enters a Muslim land, then there is no doubt that
it is obligatory for the closest and the next closest to repel him, because the Muslim lands are
like one land.
67

Even if Afghanistan is the more specific problem Azzam addresses, his argumentation starts
from a more general problem: aggression against Muslim lands. To justify his ideas about
how Muslims should act when a Muslim country is attacked by the disbelievers Azzam both
quotes scholars from all the four major schools of Sunni Islamic thought, refers to Islamic
history through the sunnah and quotes the Quran. By doing this Azzam places the war in
Afghanistan within a larger context. He puts it in the context of Muslim history and in the
context of religion, of Islam. The enemy then becomes not a specific one but the disbelievers,
i.e. all non-Muslims, in general.
In Join the Caravan Azzam is more vague about who constitutes the enemy. There are again
references to the disbelievers such as: () the tyrants have gained dominance over the
Muslims in every aspect and in every land. The reason for this is that the disbelievers only
stand in awe of fighting
68
, and So, if the fighting stops, the disbelievers will dominate, and
fitnah, which is Shirk (polytheism), will spread.
69
. So, as in Defence of the Muslim Lands the
main enemy of Join the Caravan are the disbelievers.
Azzam puts the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan into a wider context, which is the historical
conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims. The Soviets must be fought in Afghanistan
because they represent a threat from the disbelievers in general to the Muslims in general.
Azzam does however write about the enemy in an even more general fashion calling it only
the enemy
70
or the aggressor
71
. This indicates a widened applicability of his reasoning.
Even if both texts are written within the context of the war in Afghanistan they address larger
issues than only that conflict. Since they describe the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as a case
of disbeliever aggression against Muslims they are valid in all cases were Muslim lands are
under attack by non-Muslims. Azzam however does not stop there. In an extensive quote of
Qutb he takes the war in Afghanistan out of the historical context and puts it into a
metaphysical one.
66
Ibid., p. 4.
67
Ibid., p. 8.
68
Azzam, 2001, p. 19.
69
Ibid., p. 20.
70
Ibid., p. 27. Also see p. 50, point 1.
71
Azzam, 2002, p. 11.
23
Nor will it (Evil) allow Good to rise in whatever safe, well-established ways that the latter
follows, because the very growth of Good is a risk to Evil. The very existence of Truth is a
danger to Falsehood. And, no doubt, Evil will turn to hostility; and certainly, Falsehood will
defend itself by attempting to kill the Truth and suppress it by force. This is a natural
disposition, not a temporal matter! It is nature, and not a transient condition.
72
This conflict, which Azzam describes through Qutbs words, is not a specific historical
conflict but a universal conflict between good and evil, between truth and falsehood. Azzam
uses this metaphysical conflict between good and evil as a tool to discuss historical conflicts
as the invasion of or aggression against Muslim lands in general or more specific the war in
Afghanistan. He posits those conflicts as an example of the eternal struggle between good and
evil. Supporting his call for jihad in Defence of the Muslim Lands Azzam quotes the Quran:
And fight them until there is no more Fitnah (disbelief and polytheism: i.e. worshipping
others besides Allah) and the religion (worship) will be for Allah alone (in the whole of the
world)..
73
In Join the Caravan he writes: () if the fighting stops, the disbelievers will
dominate, and fitnah, which is Shirk (polytheism), will spread.
74
Jihad, thus can not only be
fought for the sake of a specific historic problem. The problem addressed by jihad is a-
historic. It is the eternal battle between good and evil where good means Muslim or Islamic
and evil everything else. This makes Azzams writings applicable not only to the specific
cases that he discusses but to any case were Muslim interests are perceived as being under
attack. His rulings thus become abstract and flexible. It has become possible to use his
reasoning as a tool to justify jihad in almost any situation or context. What constitutes
aggression against Muslims and therefore functions as a justification for jihad is so loosely
defined that there almost always are an excuse for jihad. Not even other Muslims are safe
from harm. Renegade Muslim groups has to be fought to () unify the Muslims and protect
their religion, honour and wealth, ().
75
This can be interpreted as that the line between good
and evil is not identical to the line between Muslim and non-Muslim. Therefore other
Muslims are also to be considered legitimate targets. As we have seen earlier jihadists such as
Shukri Mustafa and his Al Takfir w-al Hijra or Salam Faraj do, Azzam also quotes Ibn
Taymiyya to justify this: () if the aggression of a Muslim aggressor cannot be stopped
72
Azzam, 2001, p. 26.
73
Azzam, 2002, p. 10.
74
Azzam, 2001, p. 20.
75
Azzam, 2002, p. 12.
24
except by killing him, then he must be killed, ().
76
Azzams use of takfir however is far less
radical than Mustafas or Farajs. Even if he legitimizes the possibility of fighting other
Muslims he puts far more weight on arguing for cooperation over sectarian borders since
fighting the disbelievers is of greater importance than anything else.
() (H)ow can we fight with people like Afghans, amongst them truthful, amongst them
dishonest, where smoking and Niswar (a type of tobacco) is widespread, for which he would
even sell his gun?
We must fight, because fighting is based on confronting the greater harm. (---) We must
choose the lesser of two evils; which is the greater evil: that Russia takes Afghanistan, turns it
into a disbelieving country and forbids the Quran and Islam from it? Or Jihad with a nation
that has sins and errors?
77

So even if Azzam acknowledges the possibility of other Muslims being the enemy, fighting
the greater enemy, i.e. the disbelievers takes precedence. As we have seen in our historical
chapter, the early Muslim brothers also used a similar line of reasoning in trusting the piety of
the people to be able to focus on the main enemy. They also share with Azzam the idea of this
enemy being foreign. For the early Muslim brothers it was the British as well as ideas foreign
to Egypt and Islam such as nationalism, parliamentarianism and imperialism. For Mawdudi,
who shares the idea of the foreign enemy, it was the Hindus. Since then, however, Islamists
have generally turned towards the enemy within. Qutb and Mustafa following him, declared
the whole Egyptian society jahiliyya. Faraj saw the Egyptian regime as the root of evil. In The
Absent Obligation he writes: Fighting the enemy that is near to us comes before that which
is far.
78
Verily the main reason behind the existence of Imperialism in the Muslim lands is these
rulers (i.e. the local rulers). Therefore to begin with destroying the Imperialists is not a useful
action and is a waste of time.
79

Even if Faraj acknowledges that there is a foreign enemy the imperialists he finds fighting
this far enemy to be a waste of time. It is the local rulers the near enemy that are
responsible for the far enemys influence over Muslims lands.
76
Ibid., p. 12.
77
Ibid., p. 37.
78
Faraj, 2000, p. 48.
79
Ibid., p. 49.
25
Azzam then, seems to be the first writer since al-Banna and Mawdudi to put the far enemy
before the near enemy. Although one has to remember the specific conditions under which
they all wrote. Neither al-Banna nor Mawdudi were interested in fighting an enemy
politically or violently outside their countries. The reason for them giving priority to the far
enemy was that the far enemy was near. Even if the enemy was considered as being in some
sense foreign, it was present in their home region: the British in Egypt and the Hindus in
India. For Azzam however it was different. To fight in Azzams jihad you had to leave your
home, go to a foreign country and fight an enemy that were not present in your home country.
For the first time during the 20
th
century the main enemy is not thought about in nationalistic,
but rather in pan-Islamic terms.
80

Unfortunately, when we think about Islam we think nationalistically. We fail to let our vision
pass beyond geographic borders that have been drawn up for us by the disbelievers.
81
The jurists have documented that the lands of the Muslims are like a single land, so that
whichever region of the Muslims territory is exposed to danger, it is necessary that the whole
body of the Islamic Ummah rally together to protect this organ which is exposed to the
onslaught of the microbe.
82
Azzam does not take the doctrine of the far enemy all the way however. He does not consider
attacking the Soviet Union on its home soil as al-Qaida thought of doing with USA some
years later. Jihad against the Russians is for Azzam exclusively defensive. It is about
protecting the Muslim homeland against a foreign aggressor. His writings though constitute a
first step towards the full out offensive jihad against the far enemy represented by al-Qaida
and their followers. He is the first whose call to jihad is to all Muslims. Not only to the
Muslims of a specific region.
We have thus far seen that there are two levels in Azzams diagnostic framing. First there is
what we might call a historical/political level, which addresses actual aggression against
Muslim territory or against Muslims by the disbelievers. Second there is what we call a
metaphysical/religious level, which perceives aggression against Muslims as aggression
against Islam and describes it in terms of a battle between good and evil. There is however a
third level in Azzams diagnostic framing: an ethical/personal level. Being a struggle between
good and evil jihad is not solely confined to the outer world. It is also a struggle in the hearts
80
For a more detailed discussion of this see Gerges, 2005.
81
Azzam, 2002, p. 32.
82
Azzam, 2001, p. 46.
26
of all Muslims. Hence the greatest problem facing the Muslims is not a foreign aggressor but
themselves.
As we have seen earlier Azzam describes the war in Afghanistan not as contingent but as a
natural condition.
83
It is the way of the world. Since this conflict is a natural condition it
cannot in itself be considered a problem. I blame not the invader when he uses force or
prepares, For his way is to seize, and our concern must be to prepare.
84
Rather, the main
problem that Azzam addresses is the Muslim reaction to this conflict. For Azzam the jihad in
Afghanistan is not just a war between good and evil, between Muslims and disbelievers. It is
also an opportunity.
There is for Azzam an intrinsic value in jihad.
85
The problem is that Muslims in general does
not understand this. The enemy that the Muslims are facing in Afghanistan is just a contingent
manifestation of an eternal enemy. The war in Afghanistan is just a part of a conflict that has
been going on for a long time and will continue for a long time after that specific war has
ended. Therefore the real problem is within the Muslim community itself. It is the
unwillingness to actively partake in this conflict. The true enemy is not the disbelievers since
they are part of the natural order. The true enemy is rather within each individual Muslim. It
is the love of life: Anybody who looks into the state of the Muslims today will find that their
greatest misfortune is their abandonment of Jihad due to their love of this World and
hatred of death
86
It is also the love of this world, of worldly possessions and power:
Those who serve their lusts and their desires will not be satisfied except by contradicting the
Truth or rejecting a great part of it. If the scholars and those who govern, love power and
pursuit their desires, they will not find fulfillment (sic.) unless they oppose the Truth,
especially when the doubtful coincides with their lusts, thus tempting their lower nature. (---)
To follow vain desires blinds the eye of the heart until it can no longer differentiate between
Sunnah and Bidah, or inevitably reverses them such that it perceives the Bidah as Sunnah.
This is the plague that the scholars suffer when they prefer the life of this world, pursue lusts
and follow after rulers.
87

83
Azzam, 2001, p. 26.
84
Ibid.
85
This will be discussed at greater depth in the next chapter.
86
Azzam, 2001, p. 19.
87
Azzam, 2002, p. 48.
27
The battle between good and evil, between truth and falsehood is thus not only, or even
mainly, the battle between the Muslims and the disbelievers but a battle in the hearts of all
Muslims.
() (T)he perception of the truth relies on the enlightenment of the heart. When the heart
has a strong attachment to the life of this world and the bearer of this heart is immersed in
sin, ran (black covering) overcomes the heart, because every sin is a black stain on the
heart.
88
We can hence see that there are three levels in Azzams diagnostic framing These three levels
corresponds well with aspects of traditional jihad theory. The word jihad stems from the
Arabic word jahada. This is classically defined as exerting ones utmost power, efforts,
endeavours, or ability in contending with an object of disapprobation.
89
This object of
disapprobation is traditionally seen as being in one of three different forms: () a visible
enemy, the devil, and aspects of ones own self.
90
As we see these three different forms
corresponds with Azzams three levels of diagnosis. The visible enemy is the physical enemy
of the Russians or the disbelievers. The devil is the incarnation of evil and falsehood and
aspects of ones own self is the battle in the hearts of all Muslims. In the next chapter we will
examine if these three levels not only are a part of Azzams diagnosis, but also of his
prognosis.
3.1.1. Conclusion
We can now answer the two questions that this chapter set out with. First: which problem
does Azzam address with Join the Caravan and Defence of the Muslim lands? As we have
seen there are not one but three answers to this question. Azzam moves among three different
levels of diagnosis. On the first level, and perhaps the most obvious one, Azzam writes to
bring attention to the war in Afghanistan. On the second level he posits this war in a
metaphysical context. On this level the problem is not so much specifically the war in
Afghanistan but rather it being a manifestation of the universal conflict between good and
evil, between truth and falsehood. Being a universal conflict it is not confined to the
battlefield of Afghanistan, to our time or even to geographical space. It is also a conflict
88
Azzam, 2002, p. 49.
89
Muslim b. al-Hajjaj, Sahih Muslim, quoted from Firestone, 1999, p. 16.
90
Firestone, 1999, p. 16f.
28
within each Muslim. This conflict in the hearts of all Muslims constitutes Azzams third level
of diagnosis.
These three levels of diagnosis also correspond to our second question: who is responsible?
On the first level it is specifically the Russians and more generally the disbelievers that are
hold responsible and are seen as the enemy of the Muslims. On the second level it becomes
more complicated. Since the war in Afghanistan is seen as a part of a greater conflict between
good and evil the one to blame is evil or falsehood itself. But since the conflict between good
and evil is a universal one it is not really possible to put blame on anyone. Both good and evil
are universal parts of Gods creation. Both of them are just playing their part. It is not possible
to blame evil for being evil. This leads us to the third level. Since it is not possible to blame
evil for being evil the blame falls on those who fail to oppose evil: the Muslims. The only one
that can be hold responsible is the one who does not fight, neither the aggressor nor his own
weaknesses and shortcomings.
3.2.1. Jihad of the Sword
Azzams answer to the question of what that should be done is fairly straightforward. The
answer is jihad.
To repel the aggressor, the Muslims must turn to jihad. According to our modest experience
and knowledge, we believe that Jihad in the present situation in Afghanistan is individually
obligatory (Fard Ain), with ones self and wealth ()
91

Jihad is usually translated to holy war. This translation, although not totally wrong, does
not capture the whole width of the word. The words literal meaning in Arabic is striving or
91
Azzam, 2001, p. 41.
29
exerting oneself.
92
Since it is used in the Quran it also implicates striving with regard to
religion.
93
There is nothing in the word itself that has to do with warfare. Traditionally there
are three types of jihad: jihad of the heart such as the struggle against ones own
weaknesses and sinfulness -,jihad of the tongue such as speaking on behalf of good and
forbidding evil and jihad of the sword. When it is used by itself however the last meaning is
usually implicated.
94
Understood as jihad of the sword it has traditionally been defined by
classical Muslim jurists and legal scholars as warfare with a spiritual significance.
95
In
Encyclopedia of Islam it is defined as (i)n law, according to general doctrine and in
historical tradition, the jihad consists of military action with the object of the expansion of
Islam and, if need be, of its defense.
96
These are the classical definitions of jihad. But as
Cook writes, (t)he differences between what is written in theological and legal treatises and
what a believer may practice in any religion, moreover, are often substantial. Therefore, the
definition of jihad must be based both on what Muslims have written concerning the subject
and on the historical record of how they have practiced it.
97
On the basis of this Cook
suggests the definition ()warfare authorized by a legitimate representative of the Muslim
community for the sake of an issue that is universally, or near universally, acknowledged to
be of critical importance for the entire community against an admitted enemy of Islam.
98
Firestone gives a similar definition of jihad of the sword as () any act of warring
authorized by legitimate Muslim authorities on behalf of the religious community and
determined to contribute to the greater good of Islam or the community of Muslims, either in
part or as a whole.
99

There is no question that Azzams definition of jihad is jihad of the sword. The word Jihad,
when mentioned on its own, only means combat with weapons.
100
Both books are filled with
92
Firestone, 1999, p. 16; Cook, 2005, p. 1.
93
Cook, 2005, p. 1.
94
Firestone, p. 17.
95
Cook, 2005, p. 2.
96
Encyclopedia of Islam, quoted in Cook, 2005, p. 2.
97
Cook, 2005, p. 2.
98
Ibid., p. 3.
99
Firestone, 1999, p. 18.
100
Azzam, 2001, p. 51.
30
stories
101
and metaphors
102
of war and references to famous battles in Muslim history
103
.
Azzam also straight out rejects the distinction between the greater jihad and the lesser
jihad made by some scholars as stemming from a false hadith.
104
Differentiating between the
greater jihad and the lesser jihad belongs to a mystical tradition of Islam, giving jihad a non-
violent meaning. According to this interpretation the lesser jihad refers to war and the greater
jihad to an inner battle.
105
Azzam is quite clear in his refutation of this interpretation. (It) is
in fact a false fabricated hadith which has no basis.
106
Jihad for Azzam means actually
participating in armed combat. It is not enough to only support the jihad through words or
with money. () I have found that the Afghans are in severe need of money. But their need
for men is more severe ()
107

Donating money does not exempt a person from bodily Jihad, no matter how great the
amount of money given.
108
()(T)his is a place not for words but for action.
109

This demand of actual participation in armed combat turns Jihad into a social revolutionary
force.
At the same time that the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan and devote Arab Muslims started
to arrive there to fight the disbelievers, Ruhhulla Khomeini succeeded with something that no
other modern Islamic movement had succeeded with: to create a revolution. This success was
due to Khomeinis ability to unite Irans student radicals, pious middle class and urban poor
under one banner.
110
Other Islamists such as Mawdudi, al-Banna or Qutb had only been able
to appeal to one or another of these classes, making an all out revolution impossible.
Khomeini however fused the student radicals Marxism together with the middle class the
bazaar owners frustration over their loss of market to an elite around the imperial court,
and the economic uncertainty and dreadful living conditions of the urban poor.
111
As a cleric
101
Azzam, 2001, p. 33, 36.
102
Azzam, 2002, p. 45 We dont give you anything but the sword, p. 1 I have been raised between the hand
of the Hour with the sword (). He has provided sustenance from beneath the shadow of my spear ().
103
Such as The Battle of Badr, The Trench, Tabuk and Khaibar. Azzam, 2001, p. 52.
104
Azzam, 2001, p. 51.
105
Cook, 2005, p. 35ff. See also Firestone, 1999, p. 16ff.
106
Azzam, 2001, p. 51.
107
Azzam, 2001, p. 21.
108
Ibid., p. 51.
109
Ibid., p. 22.
110
Kepel, 2002, p. 107.
111
Kepel, 2002, p.108.
31
he attracted the support of the pious middle class and as an opponent to the Shah and U.S.
influence he attracted the support of the students. Khomeini succeeded in making Islam into a
revolutionary force and a promise of a better future through making it into an alternative to an
almost universally hated regime.
Azzams social revolution is of a different kind. It is not a national revolution as that in Iran
but an attempt to unite the whole Muslim world as one nation. It is a cry to the Muslims to
rally around a common cause and against a common enemy. Like Khomeini in his unification
of the different classes of Iranian society, Azzam proposes a democratization of jihad.
In the battle between Athens and the Persians at Salamis the Athenians had to abandon their
usual way of warfare to meets the Persians and the Phoenicians in their own element: water.
This required the Athenian aristocrats to leave their horsebacks and to fight among the poor
on the ships. Thus in battle making them all equal.
112
For Azzam through not allowing for the wealthy or for the scholars to escape from
participating in actual combat he turns jihad into an equalizing force where neither wealth nor
statue matters.
113
Again: on the battlefield are men are equal.
114
There are throughout both
Join the Caravan and Defence of the Muslim Lands both an implicit and an explicit critique of
the upper classes for not sufficiently engaging in jihad. In the preface to the second edition of
Join the Caravan Azzam writes: We found most of these people (that come to Afghanistan to
participate in jihad) to be from among those of modest upbringing, good-heart and healthy
character. We have seen that much education, with the accompanying suppression of good
deeds, brings about a cold heart, a slackened determination and a greed for life which
argues, unfeelingly and feebly, against evidence by way of barren disputation.
115
Azzams democratization of war becomes even more apparent in his discussion of the
obligatory character of jihad. In the Quran sura 2:216 says: Fighting is commanded upon
you even though it is disagreeable to you. But it is possible that you dislike something which
is good for you and that you love something which is bad for you. God knows, but you know
not. This sura is the starting point of a classic scholarly discussion about whether jihad is
prescribed for every Muslim male or if it might be ignored if enough others are willing to
112
Christopher Coker, Waging War Without Warriors: The Changing Culture of Military Conflict, Lynne
Rienner Publishers, London, 2002, p. 34f.
113
This does not apply to women though whom Azzam does not allow on the battlefield. Azzam, 2001, p. 60.
114
Christopher Coker, Waging War Without Warriors: The Changing Culture of Military Conflict, Lynne
Rienner Publishers, London, 2002, p. 34f.
115
Azzam, 2001, p. 16.
32
fight.
116
If jihad is obligatory for everyone, then it is fard ayn. If not, it is fard kifaya. Azzam
distinguishes between two different types of jihad. First there is offensive jihad. This is jihad
when the enemy is attacked in his own territory.
117
The purpose of offensive jihad is to expand
the Muslim territory. This kind of jihad is for Azzam not obligatory. It is fard kifaya. This
means that as long as someone does it the rest can stay behind.
The meaning of Fard Kifayah is that if there are not enough people that respond to it, then
all the people are sinful. If a sufficient amount of people respond, the obligation falls from the
rest.
118
Second there is defensive jihad. Defensive jihad means expelling the disbelievers from
Muslim lands.
119
This kind of jihad is obligatory on all Muslim males. It is fard ayn.
() Jihad under this condition (when the disbelievers enter a Muslim land) becomes Fard
Ain upon the Muslims of the land which the disbelievers have attacked and upon the Muslims
close by, where the children can march forth without the permission of the parents, the wife
without the permission of her husband and the debtor without the permission of the creditor.
If the Muslims of this land cannot expel the disbelievers because of a lack of forces, because
they are lazy, indolent or simply do not act, then the Fard Ain obligation spreads in the shape
of a circle from the nearest to the next nearest. If they to slacken or there is again a shortage
of manpower, then it is upon the people behind them, and on the people behind them, to
march forward. This process continues until it becomes Fard Ain upon the whole world.
120
Islam is traditionally considered as resting upon five pillars: Witness (shahadah), Worship
(salat), Fasting (sawm), Alms giving (zakat) and Pilgrimage (hajj).
121
These pillars are duties
that are obligatory for every Muslim to perform. For Azzam jihad is a duty on the same level
or above these.
122
He quotes Taymiyya: The first obligation after Imam (faith, belief) is the
repulsion of the enemy aggressor who assaults the religion and the worldly affairs.
123
When
jihad becomes fard ayn, i.e. when a Muslim land is under attack, it takes precedence over
116
Firestone, 1999, p. 60.
117
Azzam, 2002, p. 4.
118
Ibid., p. 19.
119
Ibid., p. 4.
120
Azzam, 2002, p. 5.
121
Arthur Goldschmidt, Jr., A Concise History of the Middle East, Westview Press, Boulder/San
Fransisco/Oxford, 1991, p. 42ff.
122
For example jihad has priority over hajj. See Azzam, 2002, p. 5f.
123
Azzam, 2002, p. 5.
33
everything but faith itself. Neglecting the Jihad is like abandoning fasting and praying. In
fact, neglecting Jihad is worse these days.
124

To make jihad into one of the pillars of Islam is a radical statement. Azzam was however not
the first contemporary thinker to do this. Although with a different aim than Azzam, Faraj
uses an argumentation similar to him in The Absent Obligation. Faraj also argues for that
jihad is fard ayn - an individual obligation for all Muslims.
125
He also turns jihad into a pillar
of Islam through comparing it to fasting as a prescribed obligation.
126
There is however a
major difference between Faraj and Azzam, which stems from the contexts they wrote in.
Azzam is calling for jihad against an external enemy in a faraway country. Faraj on the other
hand is using the same arguments to call for jihad against an internal enemy in his home
country. He clearly states that the near enemy takes precedence over the far enemy.
127
There is
hence in Farajs thought an awareness of the possibility of a globalized jihad but it is not until
Azzam and the war in Afghanistan that this seed starts to grow. Where Faraj still is thinking
in nationalistic terms and calling for jihad in his home country, Azzam sees his audience not
as Egyptians, Palestinians or even Arabs but as Muslims. Azzams jihad is for the whole
community of Muslim believers, for the whole of the ummah. It is hardly a coincidence that
the seeds of global jihad are sown by the Palestinian Azzam: stateless with his roots in
fighting against Israel on occupied Palestinian territory, in Egypts prestigious Al-Azhar, in
wahhabist Saudi Arabia and with the mujahideen in the mountains of Pakistan and
Afghanistan.
In making jihad obligatory for all Muslims Azzam attempts to unite the whole of the ummah
on a common path. As other 20
th
century Islamist thinkers have done before him he posits
Islam as the only way. Azzam however differs from the majority of those thinkers in that he
equates Islam with jihad. Jihad is for Azzam not only a means to an end; it is the most central
aspect of Islam after faith. In doing this Azzam proposes a social revolution within the Islamic
community where ones standing is not measured by ones wealth or education but by
participating in jihad. He even suggests that too much education corrupts the soul.
128
In jihad
all men are equal and only he who participates in jihad is without sin. () (T)he Prophet
124
Azzam, 2002, p. 27.
125
Faraj, p. 57ff.
126
Ibid., p. 58.
127
Ibid., p. 48.
128
Azzam, 2001, p. 16.
34
(SAWS) was asked: Is a martyr put to trial in his grave? He (SAWS) replied, The flashing
of swords above his head is sufficient trial for him.
129

Azzam takes revolutionary Islamism one-step further. Where earlier thinkers have seen Islam
as the only way and jihad as a means to establish an Islamic state, Azzam sees jihad as the
only way. He can therefore be described not only an Islamist but also a jihadist.
3.2.2. Jihad of the Tongue
As we saw in the previous chapter there are more aspects to Azzams jihad than only jihad
against a physical enemy: against evil and against ones self. Jihad against evil is traditionally
called jiahd of the tongue and means speaking out, forbidding evil and promoting good.
130

The battle between good and evil is by Azzam also described as a battle between truth and
falsehood.
131
This suggests a communicative aspect of battle and of jihad. The concepts of
truth and falsehood are only meaningful in speech, writing or any other form of
communication. It is only in the context of communication that one can conceive of things
being truth or false. Jihad then, is for Azzam apart from being armed combat also a form of
communication. There are two aspects of this communicative jihad. The first one is calling
for jihad and educating the mujahedeen. ()(T)here are two duties which we are trying to
establish: the duty of Jihad (fighting), and the duty of arousing the believers.
132
To call for
jihad is hence a duty on the same level as fighting. There is throughout both Join the Caravan
and Defence of the Muslim Lands a harsh criticism against the Islamic scholars who does not
use their knowledge and influence to call for jihad. What is the matter with the scholars, that
they do not arouse the youths for Jihad, especially since arousal is compulsory? (---) What is
the matter with the Imams, that they do not sincerely advice those who seek counsel from the
regarding going out with blood and soul in the Path of Allah?
133
Azzams criticism is not
limited to the scholars. It also goes out to all parents. What is the matter with the mothers,
that one of them does not send forward one of her sons in the Path of Allah, (). (---) ()
(W)hat is the matter with the fathers that they do not urge one of their sons, so that he can
grow up in the rearing-ground of heroes, the lands of men and the grounds of battle?
134
But
129
Azzam, 2002, p. 25.
130
Firestone, 1999, p. 17.
131
Azzam, 2002, p. 1.
132
Azzam, 2001, p. 18.
133
Ibid., p. 46f.
134
Ibid., p. 47.
35
the duty of arousing the believers does not only mean calling them to fight. It also means
providing education to the ones already on the battlefield. Azzam considers the low
educational level of the mujahideen to be a great problem and calls for he scholars to join the
jihad and teach the mujahideen.
135
Fighting is hence not totally sufficient. One must also fight
for the right reason and in the right way. Defence of the Muslim Lands in itself testifies to this.
It is as a fatwa i.e. a religious justification of jihad. It is a way to show for an audience that the
cause is just. In justifying an act one acknowledges that it is a form of communication. One
tries fix its meaning for an audience. This is the second aspect of the jihad of the tongue. One
has to keep in mind that jihad for Azzam essentially means armed combat. In writing about
jihad of the tongue Azzam does not necessarily mean preaching or any other verbal act the
way they are usually perceived. He is still writing about armed combat but about different
aspects of that armed combat. It is important for Azzam that the jihad is done in a correct way
because it has meaning not only in the moment and at the place were it happens. Jihad in
itself is a form of communication, of proselytising.
136
Jihad is Dawah with a force ()
137
Through both Join the Caravan and Defence of the Muslim Lands Azzam uses examples from
Islamic history to illustrate his reasoning. He puts the Afghan jihad into a greater historical
context. In doing this he acknowledges that the actions of the mujahideen in Afghanistan also
might be used as examples in the same way in the future. The actions in themselves are
communicative. They have a meaning in the same way as the actions of Muhammed and his
followers have. This communicative aspect of action in general and violent action in
particular is not unique for Azzams thought. It can be found throughout the whole Islamic
history of martyrdom. In Martyrdom in Islam David Cook describes martyrdom as a narrative
and the martyr as a communicative agent.
Martyrdom means witness. Witness is the most powerful form of advertisement, because it
communicates personal credibility and experience to an audience.
138

As we have seen this communicative aspect of martyrdom is also emphasized by Shariati
within the context of Shiism. Martyrdom is not a central theme in neither Join the Caravan
135
Ibid., p. 17, 21.
136
Faisal Devji discusses this communicative aspect of jihad. After 9/11 Osama bin Ladin described the attacks
as a speech and a call to Islam understood by everyone. It was for bin Ladin a form of proselytization much more
effective and universal than the traditional form of indoctrination and recruitment. Devji, 2005, p. 14f.
137
Azzam, 2002, p. 4.
138
David Cook, 2007, p. 1.
36
nor Defence of the Muslim Lands. However in another statement called Martyrs: The
Building Blocks of Nations Azzam is more outspoken on the subject.
The life of the Muslim Ummah is solely dependent upon the ink of its scholars and the blood
of its martyrs. What is more beautiful than the writing of the Ummahs history with both the
ink of a scholar and his blood, such that the map of Islamic history becomes colored with two
lines: one of them blackand the other one red History does not write its line except with
blood.
139

Notice the connection between writing and sacrifice. The sacrifice of the martyr is as much a
communicative event as the writing of the scholar. Through killing and dying for Islam the
mujahideen writes its history, a history that will be read and retold to make others follow in its
footsteps. This is what Azzam means with dawah with a force. Jihad with its sacrifice and
fighting is not only a way to protect the Muslims or expand their territory. It is not only a way
to conquer land or wealth but also a way to conquer hearts and minds. It is a call for others to
follow its example. The mujahideen in Afghanistan is for Azzam a vanguard not only because
it fights on the frontline but also because it leads with its example. With its actions the
vanguard turns the Muslims to the right path.
It will be like the small spark which ignites a large keg of explosives, for the Islamic
movement brings about an eruption of the hidden capabilities of the Ummah, and a gushing
forth of the springs of Good stored up in its depth.
140
As we have seen earlier this idea of a vanguard is a reoccurring theme in 20
th
century Islamic
thought. The vanguard is seen as an elite that in some way will lead the Muslims right. For
Azzam this means leading them to jihad.
As we saw in the first part of this chapter Azzam sees jihad as the most central part of Islam
after faith. As we have seen in this part Azzams jihad is quite a complex concept. For Azzam
jihad means armed combat but this armed combat has a wider meaning than just defending or
expanding the Muslim lands. It is also a form of communication whose purpose is to call for
others to follow. There is hence circularity in Azzams argumentation: jihad is fought for the
sake of bringing more people to fight it. It seems like jihad is fought for its own sake. This
brings us to the third aspect of jihad: the jihad of the heart.
139
Abdullah Azzam, Martyrs: The Building Blocks of Nations, at
http://www.religioscope.com/info/doc/jihad/azzam_martyrs.htm
140
Azzam, 2001, p. 34.
37
3.2.3. Jihad of the heart
As we have seen earlier Azzam outright rejects the distinction between the lesser and the
greater jihad as stemming from a false hadith. This could be interpreted as a rejection of the
spiritual side of jihad. That is however not the case.
Both jihad by the sword and jihad by the tongue are means to an end. Jihad by the sword is a
means to protect or expand the Muslim lands and jihad by the tongue a means to call for
others to join the jihad. In this call for jihad Azzam displays circularity in his argumentation.
Why do something with the purpose of making others do the same thing? The answer can
only be that this something has a value in itself. That it is not a means to an end but an end in
itself.
As we have seen earlier Christopher Coker distinguishes between instrumental and non-
instrumental, or existential ways of warfare.
The problem is that we so want to understand violence primarily in utilitarian, rational
terms, in terms of means and ends, that the question of what violence signifies, says, or
express seems, at best, to be of secondary importance.
141
Coker describes instrumental warfare as being created by the Greeks in starting to treat war as
a technical problem that could be solved by human reason.
142
It is in other words the
continuation of politics by other means.
Existential war however is not about reason but about identity. The existential warrior fights
not for a cause but for himself.
Violence is not only instrumental; it is also the moral essence of the warrior. For true
warriors, war-making is not so much what they do but what they are.
143

For the existential warrior violence has an existential meaning. It is life affirming and self-
affirming. It is the way through which he comes to know and create himself.
Both jihad by the sword and jihad by the tongue can be understood in utilitarian, rational
terms, in terms of means and ends. Jihad by the heart however cannot.
For Azzam jihad is a way to school the heart and the soul. In the second preface to Join the
Caravan he describes the Afghan jihad as a school that Islam may obtain many benefits
from.
144
It is not a school that in the first place teaches warfare or other worldly matters but
141
Coker, 2002, p. 6.
142
Ibid., p. 28.
143
Ibid., p. 6.
144
Azzam, 2001, p. 17.
38
rather a school of spirituality. Jihad is for Azzam a way for the Muslims to become better
men and to come nearer to God. It is in fighting and only fighting that man gets closer to the
divine.
() (T)he purification of the soul and the evolution of the spirit is lifted to great heights in
the midst of the battle.
145
The popular Jihad movement with its long part of effort, great sacrifice and serious losses,
purifies souls so that they tower above the lower material world. Important matters rise
above petty disputes about money, short-term desires and inferior provisions. Malice
disappears and souls are sharpened; and the caravan moves on from the foot of the mountain
up to the lofty summit, far away from the stench of clay and the struggles of the low
ground.
146
This symbolic language reappears in Defence of the Muslim Lands. () (T)he Prophet
(SAWS) warned about being preoccupied with the world, away from Jihad. He once pointed
to a plough and said: It does not enter a peoples homestead except that Allah enters
humiliation with it.
147

Worldly matters and engagement in it is for Azzam a distraction from divinity. The plough
signifies an attachment to the world and whats in it. It means turning your head from the
heavens to the earth. It turns people from the path of God. In contrast jihad is the way to leave
these worldly matters behind and purify ones self.
In On War Clausewitz describes a young mans first experience on the battlefield.
The novice cannot pass through these layers of increasing intensity of danger without
sensing that here ideas are governed by other factors, that the light of reason is refracted in a
manner quite different from that which is normal in academic speculation.
148
The battlefield presents the young man with an experience like none other, an experience that
is unique and cannot be prepared for or recreated except on the battlefield. It shows him the
limits of reason. For Azzam Clausewitzs refracted light of reason is something good. Reason
is a human property. Battle shows the limits of reason and thus the limits of man and the
world. It puts man on the border between the world and God.
145
Azzam, 2002, p. 25.
146
Azzam, 2001, p. 34.
147
Azzam, 2002, p. 25.
148
Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Everyman, London, 1993, p. 132. Quoted
from Coker, 2002, p. 30
39
Ask the people of the battle fronts because they are the nearest to Allah.
149
It does so not only because it refracts the light of reason but also because it frees the fighter
from his () love of this World and hatred of death ()
150
Again it turns him from the
world towards the divine, from the contingent to the eternal. Through jihad man turns his
back to the world and everything that is in it. They (the companions of the Prophet) had been
bathed in jihad and cleansed of engrossment in the world, just as a wound is bathed in
water.
151
So even if Azzam rejects the distinction between the lesser and the greater jihad there are
clearly spiritual aspects of his thinking. His version of jihad by the heart, of struggling against
ones own sinful inclinations, does mean a withdrawal from the world but through engaging
in battle. War thus changes from being an instrumental continuation of politics to be an act of
personal salvation for the individual warrior.
3.2.4. Conclusion
Prognostic framing is about proposing solutions for diagnosed problems. As we have seen
earlier Azzam addresses three connected problems: the situation in Afghanistan and the battle
between good and evil, both in the world and in the hearts of all Muslims. Azzams solution
for these problems is simple. It is jihad understood as armed combat. At a closer look
however we have seen that there are many aspects of Azzams jihad, each which corresponds
with different aspects of the problem itself and with the classical categorization of jihad in
three different types: of the sword, of the tongue and of the heart.
The solution for the situation in Afghanistan is armed combat: jihad by the sword. It is the
duty of all believers to participate in this jihad with their selves. It is not sufficient to only
support the jihad through money or words. Neither is only fighting in sufficient. It has to be
done in the correct way for the correct cause. This is where the jihad by the tongue becomes
important. The war in Afghanistan is seen not only as a war between two countries but a war
between good and evil. As such it is a part of a metaphysical conflict that has been going on
since the beginning of time. In this conflict actions does not only have direct repercussions
but becomes also a part of the history of the conflict. They become communicative. Jihad by
149
Azzam, 2002, p. 49.
150
Azzam, 2001, p. 19.
151
Azzam, 2001, p. 30.
40
the sword becomes jihad by the tongue in that Azzam acknowledges its actions as acts off
communication with present or future generations of Muslims.
Finally Azzam sees jihad not only as a means to an end. He sees it as an end in itself. Jihad is
for Azzam a form of salvation. It is a spiritual act that brings man closer to God.
3.3. Motivational framing
Motivational framing is about making an audience take the step from talk to action. It is a call
to arms, a way to motivate participation in activism. As we have seen in earlier chapters both
Join the Caravan and Defence of the Muslim Lands are in themselves calls to action. They are
a call to the Muslims to actively participate in jihad. The purpose of this chapter is to study
how Azzam argues to make this happen.
To make this move from talk to action Azzam uses both the carrot and the stick. The carrot is
showing the benefits of the jihad. The stick on the other hand is showing the consequences of
ignoring the jihad. Both the carrot and the stick are used on two different levels: the personal
and the collective. The personal level concerns the consequences for the individual Muslim
and the collective the consequences for the whole ummah.
3.3.1. The Carrot and the Stick
As we have seen in the previous chapter jihad for the individual is end in itself because it
brings man closer to God. While still alive however, man is still a part of the world and not
the divine. One of the great promises of jihad is therefore martyrdom. Hoping for
Martyrdom and a High Station in Paradise is Azzams 8
th
reason for jihad. He quotes a long
list of rewards for the martyr in paradise.
The martyr has seven special favours from Allah:
He is forgiven his sins with the first spurt of his blood,
He sees his place in Paradise (before his soul leaves his body),
He is clothed with the garment of Faith,
He is wed with seventy-two wives from the beautiful maidens of Paradise,
He is saved from the Punishment of the Grave,
He is protected from the Great Terror (of the Day of Judgement),
On his head is placed a Crown of Dignity, a jewel of which is better than the
World and all it contains, and he is granted intercession for seventy people of
41
his household.
152
The reward for giving ones live in jihad is paradise but not only that. It is a higher station in
paradise than for others. Azzam describes paradise as having a hundred levels and the highest
levels are reserved for those who fight.
153
Allah has preferred in grades those who fight with their possessions and their lives, over
those who sit back. And to all of them has Allah promised good (Paradise). But Allah has
favoured the Mujahideen over those who sit at home by a tremendous reward, by higher
grades from him, and with Forgiveness and Mercy.
154
These versions of paradise places Azzam within a classical hadith tradition. David Cook
groups the special qualities of the martyr in this tradition into different categories: ()
personal forgiveness as well as the ability to obtain forgiveness for his loved ones, the
certainty of paradise and protection from the torments of hell, honor and distinction, and
exaggerated sexual powers (in other traditions said to be either the power of 70 or 100
men.
155

We have already seen references to the two first categories: forgiveness and a place in
paradise.
156
Apart from the reference to the 72 houris in the quote above there are no other
references to sexual rewards in Join the Caravan or Defence of the Muslim Lands. References
to honour however, reoccurs throughout both books. These references do not state honour as a
reward of jihad though but rather as something that must be protected through jihad. Jihad is
in many places described as a shield or a protection for the honour of the ummah.
157
It is also
described as a protection for the honour of the Muslim women.
158
Nowhere is jihad or
martyrdom described as a means to achieve honour. It is rather a means to protect the
Muslims from attacks on their already existing honour.
This logic is apparent throughout both books. Rather than emphasizing the rewards of jihad
Azzam describes it as a duty, which therefore is followed by punishment if ignored rather
than reward if executed. There are of course rewards for participating in jihad. These are both
of a divine character such as a guaranteed place in paradise or of a worldly character such as
152
Azzam, 2001, p. 37.
153
Azzam, 2001, p. 18.
154
Azzam, 2001, p. 17.
155
David Cook, 2007, p. 37f.
156
See also Azzam, 2002, p. 49.
157
Azzam, 2001, p. 37; Azzam, 2002, p. 11, 13.
158
Azzam, 2001, p. 43ff.
42
the establishment of an Islamic state
159
but the focus of the books are not on these rewards. It
is rather the intrinsic good of jihad that is emphasized. That jihad in itself is a reward.
If there are few rewards for participating in jihad besides participation itself there are more
punishments for not doing so. Azzams third reason for jihad in join the Caravan is Fear of
Hell-Fire.
160
Since jihad is an obligation like fasting or praying, ignoring it is a sin and the
punishment is hell. Being weak and oppressed is not an excuse for not participating.
Weakness is not an excuse before the Lord of the Worlds. In fact, it is a crime making the
one committing it deserving of Hell.
161

One can here see a direct criticism against the theory of istida - the phase of weakness
reminiscent of Farajs. Being oppressed and in a weakened state is not an excuse for
postponing jihad or making it into a purely inner struggle. Jihad is clearly a duty for all
Muslims and neglecting it will lead to punishment in the life hereafter. Whoever did not go
out for Jihad, nor helped equip a fighter, nor treated a Mujahids family well in his absence,
Allah will afflict him with a calamity before the Day of Judgement.
162
There are no references to hell in Defence of the Muslim Lands. Instead there are punishments
of a more collective character. Early on Azzam paints a picture of the world divided into good
and evil that we have discussed in an earlier chapter. This battle between good and evil,
between truth and falsehood is a metaphysical conflict. It is the way the world is. The duty of
jihad means fighting for good and truth. Neglecting this duty does not cause evil to win over
good but Allah to replace the Muslims as the champions of good and truth. If you march not
forth, He will punish you with a painful torment and will replace you with another people,
()
163
So in neglecting the duty of jihad Muslims do not only risk hellfire but also that the
Muslims as a people will be deprived of their status as Gods chosen ones because of not
doing what God has asked of them. Because the Muslim people have been ordered as a whole
when jihad is Fard Ain they can also be judged as a whole. Neglecting the duty of jihad thus,
does not only have consequences for the individual but also for the Muslims as a people.
Azzam draws a picture of the contemporary Muslims as a people that has lost their touch with
God. He tells stories of Muslims not guarding the honour of their women, not protecting their
159
Azzam, 2002, p. 46; Azzam, 2001, p. 33ff.
160
Azzam, 2001, p. 23.
161
Ibid., p. 25.
162
Azzam, 2001, p. 49.
163
Azzam, 2002, p. 2.
43
children, of not allowing their sons to fight for Allah, who prefers life and worldly matters
before martyrdom and paradise. He tells of a people defeated and humiliated in Palestine,
Spain, Sudan, Lebanon, Somalia, Burma, Caucasia, Uganda, Zanzibar, Indonesia and Nigeria.
Will we take admonishment from the past before we lose the present? Or will history repeat
itself over us while we swallow degradation, fall into oblivion as those before us did, and lose
just as they lost?
164

The Muslims are for Azzam a people chosen by God to spread His word. Their present state
as oppressed and misfortunate is a result of them abandoning fighting in Gods name. Only
fighting can give the Muslims their prominence back.
165
Otherwise they will be replaced as
Gods people and fall into oblivion.
3.3.2. Conclusion
To urge the Muslims to fight Azzam uses both the carrot promises of rewards and the
stick threats of punishments. The promises of rewards are however more scarce than the
threats of punishment. For the individual Muslim the greatest reward for participating in jihad
is a guaranteed place and a high station in paradise with all its benefits. This promise of
paradise is however much less emphasized in Azzams writings than the intrinsic value of
jihad. The collective benefits of jihad are hardly mentioned except for the establishment of an
Islamic state.
Since Azzam sees jihad as an obligation there are more emphasize on the punishments that
ignoring that obligation results in. For the individual Muslim the most obvious punishment is
going to hell. The collective on the other hand is punished both by loosing its status as Gods
chosen people and by suffering humiliation and defeat.
We can se that Azzams motivational framing roughly follows the pattern of jihad by the
sword, tongue and heart that we have discussed in the previous chapters. The rewards and
punishments of the individual concerns his soul and therefore the jihad of the heart. The
collective being punished with defeat and humiliation refers to the jihad by the sword and the
metaphysical aspect of no longer being the champions of good refers to the jihad by the
tongue.
164
Azzam, 2001, p. 49.
165
Azzam, 2001, p. 19.
44
4. Concluding Description and Discussion
The purpose of this paper has been to facilitate an understanding of todays global jihadist
movement through a structured reading of two of its central texts: Abdullah Azzams Join
the Caravan and Defence of the Muslim Lands. This reading has been structured through
Benfords & Snows collective action frame typology. Azzams text has in the preceding
chapter been analysed as diagnostic, prognostic and motivational frames. These three
dimensions of analysis have together provided a complex picture of Azzams thinking, a
picture that enable us to answer the research question of the paper: 1. What separates Azzams
though from and what connects it with that of earlier 20
th
century Islamists? This chapter will
first conclude what we in the earlier chapters have said about Azzams worldview as analysed
through Benfords & Snowss collective action frame typology and second answer the
research question.
4.1. Azzam Framed
At a first glance it is easy to read both Join the Caravan and Defence of the Muslim Lands
simply as Azzams exhortation to join the Afghans in their battle against the Russians. This is
partly a correct interpretation but it is not the whole truth. The fight against the Soviet Union
is but one dimension of Azzams thought. Azzams argumentation in the two texts are
basically structured along three dimensions of classical jihadist theory: jihad of the Sword,
jihad of the Tongue and jihad of the Heart. These three different aspects of jihad are all
directed towards different enemies: a visible enemy, the devil and ones own self. To read
Join the Caravan and Defence of the Muslim Lands only as a call to arms against the Russians
is to only consider the first one of these three enemies. Azzam is however quite clear on that
the other two aspects of jihad are equally if not more important. He describes the war in
Afghanistan not as a unique event but as a part in a larger conflict: that between Muslims and
disbelievers and in extension between Good and Evil, i.e. a battle against the devil. Evil is
however not just present as an external enemy but also something that might exist in the heart
of every Muslim. Therefore jihad must also be considered as an inner struggle against ones
own weaknesses. This does not mean that Azzam subscribes to the view of jihad as being
primarily an inner struggle. He outright rejects the concept of the smaller and the greater
45
jihad. Jihad is for Azzam jihad by the Sword, i.e. armed combat. There is however a deeper
meaning to this armed combat than only fighting an external enemy. It has not only an
instrumental value, but also a value in itself. It is not primarily a means to an end, but an end
in itself. It is the most central aspect of Islam. This description of jihad as a pillar of Islam is
revolutionary not only in that it rejects the traditional view of what constitutes the base of
Islam but also in that it proposes a social revolution and a democratisation of the ummah
where ones standing does not depend on wealth or education but rather on participation in
combat, on ones willingness to die and kill for Islam.
These worldly aspects of jihad are though secondary for Azzam. Jihad is not described as a
means to an end but as an end within itself. It is the one thing that bring man the closest to the
divine. It is also an act of communication: calling for others to do the same.
Since Azzam considers jihad to be one of the pillars of Islam and as an obligation he
emphasizes the dire consequences of not participating in jihad rather than its rewards. As
motivation he uses the stick rather than the carrot. Since jihad is an end in itself it is also a
reward in itself. The punishments of not actively engaging in jihad are of both an earthly and
a divine character though.
Throughout both Defence of the Muslim Lands and Join the Caravan Azzam uses all the three
dimensions of classical jihad theory to diagnose, prognose and motivate. He therefore covers
a wide array of different aspects of the jihad: from the worldly to the divine, from the
personal to the collective. He makes jihad into an all encompassing principle of human
behaviour.
4.2. Azzam and his predecessors
Azzams call for jihad is a part of a great Islamic tradition. Calls and justifications for jihad
has been a part of Muslim history since the days of Muhammad in the same way that war has
been a part of the history of every society. For Azzam and other 20
th
century jihadists this
history is in itself a central aspect of the justification of violence. It is only by referring to
Islamic history that violence can be shown to be just. The question this paper set out to
answer is if Join the Caravan and Defence of the Muslim Lands can be described as being
solely contained by this tradition or if it contains some innovations. It is not the tradition as a
whole we are interested in though but its 20
th
century manifestations.
46
One important aspect of jihad that has been discussed since the first generations after
Muhammad is how other Muslims should be treated. Early Muslim history is not only the
history of conquest but also of internecine fighting within the Muslim community. The
greatest example of this being the rift between Sunni and Shia Islam. Azzam allows for the
possibility of fighting other Muslims but it is not a central tenet of his writings. He is far less
willing or interested in pronouncing other Muslims as takfir than e.g. Salam Faraj. Though
writing at almost the time as Faraj Azzam faced a very different reality. While Faraj was a
part of a very small group within Egypt society Azzam was in the middle of an international
movement. The only enemy within reach for Faraj was the local, hence the need for
justification of violence against other Muslims. For Azzam the enemy was foreign and his
fellow combatants came from different parts of the Muslim world, hence the need for unity.
This difference in who that is considered the main enemy however turns out to be the greatest
difference between Azzam and his predecessors. Azzam was the first truly anti-nationalistic
jihadist thinker of the 20
th
century. Both Mawdudi and al-Banna had foreign enemies but they
were not interested in fighting them outside their home countries. Qutb, Mustafa and Faraj all
confined themselves to Egypt, Khomeini to Iran and the wahhabites to the Arabian peninsula.
Azzam however was as a cosmopolite Palestinian already in the outskirts of nationalism and
the state system. It is therefore not surprising that he became the first to take the step from
fighting the near enemy to fighting the far enemy. Even though he did not take it all the way
and considered attacking the disbelievers on their home soil this might be considered one of
Azzams greatest contributions to jihadist ideology. The idea of the far enemy presupposes
the unification of Muslims and the abolishment of nationalism. It suggests that the state
system is a product of the oppressing disbelievers and that it therefore should be ignored and
fought. Though Azzam never pushed it that far it contains the seed of a truly global jihad
fought without consideration of borders or nationalities.
If turning from the near to the far enemy is Azzams first truly radical idea his view on jihad
as a pillar of Islam is the second. To see jihad as a pillar of Islam is however in itself not
unique for Azzam. Both Faraj and more importantly Taymiyya before him has described
jihad as being as or more important than everything but faith in itself. What makes Azzam
unique however is that he combines this view with an emphasis on the spiritual aspects of
jihad. For both Taymiyya and Faraj jihad was primarily a means to en end. For Azzam it is an
end in itself that contains the essence of Islam. For Azzam the true Muslim is first and
47
foremost a warrior. Jihad is not an obligation because Muslims or Muslim interests are
threatened. Rather it is a personal obligation in the ethical sense. It is a thing between man and
God. It is the only true way of life. Conceived this way jihad becomes a perpetum mobile tied
to neither history nor geography.
48
49