University of the Immaculate Conception vs Sec of Labor

GR 151379
Facts:
This case stemmed from the collective bargaining negotiations between petitioner University
of Immaculate Concepcion, Inc. (UNIVERSITY) and respondent The UIC Teaching and Non-
Teaching Personnel and Employees Union (UNION). The UNION, as the certified bargaining
agent of all rank and file employees of the UNIVERSITY, submitted its collective bargaining
proposals to the latter on February 16, 1994. However, one item was left unresolved and this was
the inclusion or exclusion of some positions in the scope of the bargaining unit.
The UNION it filed a notice of strike on the grounds of bargaining deadlock and unfair labor
practice. During the thirty (30) day cooling-off period, two union members were dismissed by
petitioner. Consequently, the UNION went on strike.
On January 23, 1995, the then Secretary of Labor, Ma. Nieves R. Confessor, issued an Order
assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute.
On March 10, 1995, the UNION filed another notice of strike, this time citing as a reason
the UNIVERSITYs termination of the individual respondents. The UNION alleged that the
UNIVERSITYs act of terminating the individual respondents is in violation of the Order of the
Secretary of Labor.
On March 28, 1995, the Secretary of Labor issued another Order reiterating the directives
contained in the January 23, 1995 Order. Hence, the UNIVERSITY was directed to reinstate the
individual respondents under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to the labor dispute.
The UNIVERSITY filed a MR. In the Order dated August 18, 1995, then Acting Secretary Jose
S. Brilliantes denied the MR, but modified the two previous Orders by adding:
Anent the Unions Motion, we find that superseding circumstances would not
warrant the physical reinstatement of the twelve (12) terminated employees.
Hence, they are hereby ordered placed under payroll reinstatement until the
validity of their termination is finally resolved.
Issue: WON payroll reinstatement, instead of actual reinstatement, is proper.
Held:
With respect to the Secretarys Order allowing payroll reinstatement instead of actual
reinstatement for the individual respondents herein, an amendment to the previous Orders
issued by her office, the same is usually not allowed. Article 263(g) of the Labor Code
aforementioned states that all workers must immediately return to work and all employers
must readmit all of them under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or
lockout. The phrase under the same terms and conditions makes it clear that the norm is actual
reinstatement. This is consistent with the idea that any work stoppage or slowdown in that
particular industry can be detrimental to the national interest.
In ordering payroll reinstatement in lieu of actual reinstatement, then Acting Secretary of Labor
Jose S. Brillantes said:
Anent the Unions Motion, we find that superseding circumstances would not warrant the physical
reinstatement of the twelve (12) terminated employees. Hence, they are hereby ordered placed
under payroll reinstatement until the validity of their termination is finally resolved.
As an exception to the rule, payroll reinstatement must rest on special circumstances that render
actual reinstatement impracticable or otherwise not conducive to attaining the purposes of the
law.
The superseding circumstances mentioned by the Acting Secretary of Labor no doubt refer
to the final decision of the panel of arbitrators as to the confidential nature of the positions
of the twelve private respondents, thereby rendering their actual and physical reinstatement
impracticable and more likely to exacerbate the situation. The payroll reinstatement in lieu of
actual reinstatement ordered in these cases, therefore, appears justified as an exception to the
rule until the validity of their termination is finally resolved. This Court sees no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Acting Secretary of Labor in ordering the same. Furthermore, the
issue has not been raised by any party in this case.
Petition denied.



G.R. No. 141471 September 18, 2000
COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN, petitioner,
vs.
ASSOCIATION OF EMPLOYEES AND FACULTY OF LETRAN and ELEONOR AMBAS, respondents
Facts: On December 1992, Salvador Abtria, then President of respondent union, Association of
Employees and Faculty of Letran, initiated the renegotiation of its Collective Bargaining Agreement with
petitioner Colegio de San Juan de Letran for the last two (2) years of the CBA's five (5) year lifetime from
1989-1994. On the same year, the union elected a new set of officers wherein private respondent
Eleanor Ambas emerged as the newly elected President (Secretary of Labor and Employment's Order
dated December 2, 1996, p. 12).
Ambas wanted to continue the renegotiation of the CBA but petitioner, through Fr. Edwin Lao, claimed
that the CBA was already prepared for signing by the parties. The parties submitted the disputed CBA to
a referendum by the union members, who eventually rejected the said CBA (Ibid, p. 2).
Petitioner accused the union officers of bargaining in bad faith before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). Labor Arbiter Edgardo M. Madriaga decided in favor of petitioner. However, the
Labor Arbiter's decision was reversed on appeal before the NLRC (Ibid, p. 2).
On January 1996, the union notified the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of its
intention to strike on the grounds (sic) of petitioner's: non-compliance with the NLRC (1) order to delete
the name of Atty. Federico Leynes as the union's legal counsel; and (2) refusal to bargain (Ibid, p. 1).
Issue: whether or not Letran is guilty of unfair labor practice.
Held: As regards the first issue, Article 252 of the Labor Code defines the meaning of the phrase "duty to
bargain collectively," as follows:
Art. 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively. - The duty to bargain collectively means the
performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for
the purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect to wages, hours of work and all other terms and
conditions of employment including proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions arising under
such agreement and executing a contract incorporating such agreements if requested by either party
but such duty does not compel any party to agree to a proposal or to make any concession.
Noteworthy in the above definition is the requirement on both parties of the performance of the mutual
obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating
an agreement. Undoubtedly, respondent Association of Employees and Faculty of Letran (AEFL)
(hereinafter, "union") lived up to this requisite when it presented its proposals for the CBA to petitioner
on February 7, 1996. On the other hand, petitioner devised ways and means in order to prevent the
negotiation.
Petitioner's utter lack of interest in bargaining with the union is obvious in its failure to make a timely
reply to the proposals presented by the latter. More than a month after the proposals were submitted
by the union, petitioner still had not made any counter-proposals. This inaction on the part of petitioner
prompted the union to file its second notice of strike on March 13, 1996.





Kiok Loy v. NLRC 141 SCRA 179 (1986)
Facts:
The Pambansang Kilusang Paggawa, a legitimate late labor federation, won and was subsequently
certified in a resolution by the Bureau of Labor Relations as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of
the rank-and-file employees of Sweden Ice Cream Plant.
The Union furnished the Company with two copies of its proposed collective bargaining
agreement. At the same time, it requested the Company for its counter proposals. Both requests were
ignored and remained unacted upon by the Company.
Thereafter, the Union filed a "Notice of Strike", with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR) on ground
of unresolved economic issues in collective bargaining.
Conciliation proceedings then followed during the thirty-day statutory cooling-off period. But all
attempts towards an amicable settlement failed.
The case was brought to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for compulsory
arbitration pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 823, as amended. But the Company requested for a lot
of postponements. NLRC ruled that respondent Sweden Ice Cream is guilty of unjustified refusal to
bargain, in violation of Section (g) Article 248 (now Article 249), of P.D. 442, as amended.

Issue: Whether the Company is guilty of unfair labor practice for refusal to bargain

Held: Yes. Petition dismissed for lack of merit.
Collective bargaining is one of the democratic frameworks under the New Labor Code, designed to
stabilize the relation between labor and management and to create a climate of sound and stable
industrial peace. It is a mutual responsibility of the employer and the Union and is characterized as a
legal obligation.
Article 249, par. (g) of the Labor Code makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to
refuse "to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of negotiating
an agreement with respect to wages, hours of work, and all other terms and conditions of employment
including proposals for adjusting any grievance or question arising under such an agreement and
executing a contract incorporating such agreement, if requested by either party.



G.R. No. 171231 February 17, 2010
PNCC SKYWAY TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT AND SECURITY DIVISION WORKERS ORGANIZATION
(PSTMSDWO), represented by its President, RENE SORIANO, Petitioner,
vs.
PNCC SKYWAY CORPORATION, Respondent.

Facts: Petitioner PNCC Skyway Corporation Traffic Management and Security Division Workers'
Organization (PSTMSDWO) is a labor union duly registered with the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE). Respondent PNCC Skyway Corporation is a corporation duly organized and
operating under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines.
On November 15, 2002, petitioner and respondent entered into a Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA) incorporating the terms and conditions of their agreement which included vacation leave and
expenses for security license provisions.
Petitioner also demanded that the expenses for the required in-service training of its member security
guards, as a requirement for the renewal of their license, be shouldered by the respondent. However,
the respondent did not accede to petitioner's demands and stood firm on its decision to schedule all the
vacation leave of petitioner's members.
Due to the disagreement between the parties, petitioner elevated the matter to the DOLE-NCMB for
preventive mediation. For failure to settle the issue amicably, the parties agreed to submit the issue
before the voluntary arbitrator.
Issue: whether the vacation leave valid

Held: The rule is that where the language of a contract is plain and unambiguous, its meaning should be
determined without reference to extrinsic facts or aids. The intention of the parties must be gathered
from that language, and from that language alone. Stated differently, where the language of a written
contract is clear and unambiguous, the contract must be taken to mean that which, on its face, it
purports to mean, unless some good reason can be assigned to show that the words used should be
understood in a different sense.
15

In the case at bar, the contested provision of the CBA is clear and unequivocal. Article VIII, Section 1 (b)
of the CBA categorically provides that the scheduling of vacation leave shall be under the option of the
employer. The preference requested by the employees is not controlling because respondent retains its
power and prerogative to consider or to ignore said request.



RFM CORPORATION-FLOUR DIVISION and SFI FEEDSDIVISION v.KASAPIAN NG MANGGA-GAWANG
PINAGKAISA-RFM (KAMPI-NAFLU-KMU) andSANDIGAN AT UGNAYAN NGMANGGAGAWANG
PINAGKAISA-SFI (SUMAPI-NAFLU-KMU)
G. R. No. 162324February 4, 2009
FACTS
Petitioner RFM Corporation, a domestic corporation enteredinto collective bargaining agreements
(CBAs) with the Kasapianng Manggagawang Pinagkaisa-RFM (KAMPI-NAFLU-KMU) andSandigan at
Ugnayanng Manggagawang Pinagkaisa-SFI (SUMAPI-NAFLU-KMU).Under the CBA, RFM agreed to make
payment to
alldaily paid employees on Black Saturday, November 1andDecember 31 if declared as special holidays b
y the nationalgovernment. During the first year of the effectivity of the CBAs in2000, December 31which
fell on a Sunday was declared by thenational government as a special holiday. Respondent unions
thusclaimed payment of their members salaries, invoking the CBAprovision. RFM refused the claims for
payment, averring thatDecember 31, 2000 was not compensable as it was a rest
day. The controversy resulted in a deadlock, drawing the parties tosubmit the same for voluntary arbitra
tion. The VoluntaryArbitrator (VA) declared that the provision of the CBA is clear,ruling in favor
of KAMPI-NAFLU-KMU and SUMAPI-NAFLU-KMU
andordered RFM to pay their salaries. The Court of Appeals(CA)affirmed the decision.
ISSUE
Whether or not the employees are entitled to the questionedsalary according to the provision of the
CBA.
RULING
If the terms of a CBA are clear and have no doubt upon theintention of the contracting parties, as in the
herein questionedprovision, the literal meaning thereof shall prevail. That is settled.

HALAGUENA vs. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES INC.

FACTS:
Patricia Halaguea, et. al, (Halaguea) are flight attendants employed by Philippine Airlines Inc. (PAL) as
well as members of Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP), the exclusive
bargaining agent of flight attendants, flight stewards and pursers of PAL.


Halaguea assails Sec. 144 of the CBA entered into by PAL-FASAP and FASAP, which provides for a
younger retirement age for female cabin attendants than those of their male counterparts, to be
unconstitutional.
Due to Halagueas claim, Robert D. Anduiza, President of FASAP submitted their 2004-2005 CBA
proposals and manifested their willingness to commence the collective bargaining negotiations between
the management and the association, at the soonest possible time.
Halaguea also filed before the RTC of Makati, Branch 147 a Special Civil Action for Declaratory Relief
with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction against
PAL for the invalidity of the assailed provision of the CBA. The RTC eventually granted such petition.
Aggrieved, PAL, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining
Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction with the Court of Appeals praying that the order of the RTC,
which denied its objection to its jurisdiction, be annulled and set aside for having been issued without
and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
The CA granted PALs petition on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction over a labor dispute, hence
the case at bar.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the petitioners action challenging the legality or
constitutionality of the provisions on the compulsory retirement age contained in the CBA between
respondent PAL and FASAP.
HELD:
Yes. The subject of litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, exclusively cognizable by the RTC.
Being an ordinary civil action, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of labor tribunals.
Not every controversy or money claim by an employee against the employer or vice-versa is within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. Actions between employees and employer where the
employer-employee relationship is merely incidental and the cause of action precedes from a different
source of obligation is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular court. Here, the employer-
employee relationship between the parties is merely incidental and the cause of action ultimately arose
from different sources of obligation, i.e., the Constitution and CEDAW.




G.R. No. 124224 March 17, 2000
NEW PACIFIC TIMBER & SUPPLY COMPANY, CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

Facts: The National Federation of Labor (NFL, for brevity) was certified as the sole and exclusive
bargaining representative of all the regular rank-and-file employees of New Pacific Timber & Supply Co.,
Inc. (hereinafter referred to as petitioner Company).
1
As such, NFL started to negotiate for better terms
and conditions of employment for the employees in the bargaining unit which it represented. However,
the same was allegedly met with stiff resistance by petitioner Company, so that the former was
prompted to file a complaint for unfair labor practice (ULP) against the latter on the ground of refusal to
bargain collectively.
2

On March 31, 1987, then Executive Labor Arbiter Hakim S. Abdulwahid issued an order declaring (a)
herein petitioner Company guilty of ULP; and (b) the CBA proposals submitted by the NFL as the CBA
between the regular rank-and-file employees in the bargaining unit and petitioner Company.
3

Petitioner Company appealed the above order to the NLRC. On November 15, 1989, the NLRC rendered
a decision dismissing the appeal for lack of merit. A motion for reconsideration thereof was, likewise,
denied in a Resolution, dated November 12, 1990.
4

Unsatisfied, petitioner Company filed a petition for certiorari with this Court.
Issue: whether the private respondents is entitled for benefits under CBA
Held: As for the term of the CBA, petitioner maintains that Article 253 of the Labor Code refers to the
continuation in full force and effect of the previous CBA's terms and conditions. By necessity, it could
not possibly refers to terms and conditions which, as expressly stipulated, ceased to have force and
effect.
14

According to petitioner, the provision on wage increase in the 1981 to 1984 CBA between petitioner
Company and NFL provided for yearly wage increases. Logically, these provisions ended in the years
1984 the last year that the economic provisions of the CBA were, to contract and law, effective.
Petitioner claims that there is no contractual basis for the grant of CBA benefits such as wage increases
in 1985 and subsequent years, since the CBA stipulated only the increases for the years 1981 to 1984.
Moreover, petitioner alleges that it was through no fault of theirs that no new CBA was entered pending
appeal of the decision in NLRC Case No. RAB-IX-0334-82.


G.R. No. 127598 January 27, 1999
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR LEONARDO QUISUMBING AND MERALCO EMPLOYEES AND
WORKERS ASSOCIATION (MEWA), respondents.

Facts: MEWA is the duly recognized labor organization of the rank-and-file employees of MERALCO.
On September 7, 1995, MEWA informed MERALCO of its intention to re-negotiate the terms and
conditions of their existing 1992-1997 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) covering the remaining
period of two years starting from December 1, 1995 to November 30, 1997.
1
MERALCO signified its
willingness to re-negotiate through its letter dated October 17, 1995
2
and formed a CBA negotiating
panel for the purpose. On November 10, 1995, MEWA submitted its proposal
3
to MERALCO, which, in
turn, presented a counter-proposal. Thereafter, collective bargaining negotiations proceeded. However,
despite the series of meetings between the negotiating panels of MERALCO and MEWA, the parties
failed to arrive at "terms and conditions acceptable to both of them."
On April 23, 1996, MEWA filed a Notice of Strike with the National Capital Region Branch of the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) which
was docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS-04-152-96, on the grounds of bargaining deadlock and unfair labor
practices. The NCMB then conducted a series of conciliation meetings but the parties failed to reach an
amicable settlement. Faced with the imminence of a strike, MERALCO on May 2, 1996, filed an Urgent
Petition
4
with the Department of Labor and Employment which was docketed as OS-AJ No. 0503[1]96
praying that the Secretary assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute and to enjoin the striking
employees to go back to work.
Issue: Whether the bonus is valid
Held: In the case at bar, the record shows that MERALCO, aside from complying with the regular 13th
month bonus, has further been giving its employees an additional Christmas bonus at the tail-end of the
year since 1988. While the special bonuses differed in amount and bore different titles, it can not be
denied that these were given voluntarily and continuously on or about Christmas time. The considerable
length of time MERALCO has been giving the special grants to its employees indicates a unilateral and
voluntary act on its part, to continue giving said benefits knowing that such act was not required by law.
Indeed, a company practice favorable to the employees has been established and the payments made
by MERALCO pursuant thereto ripened into benefits enjoyed by the employees. Consequently, the
giving of the special bonus can no longer be withdrawn by the company as this would amount to a
diminution of the employee's existing benefits.

Faculty Association of Mapua Institute of Technologyvs. CA
[GR. No.164060, June 15, 2007]
Facts:
MIT presented a new faculty ranking instrument to FAMIT. FAMIT agreed its adoption and
implementation, provided there is no diminution in rank and pay of the faculty members. This new
ranking system for the college faculty was incorporated in the new CBA.
After a month, MIT requested for amendments to the CBA, specifically as to the ranking sheet
attached as annex to the CBA. FAMIT rejected contending that the changes would violate the CBA
and result in the diminution of rank and benefits of the college faculty.
Meanwhile, MIT instituted some changes in the curriculum which resulted in changes in the number
of hours for certain subjects. Thus, MIT adopted a new formula for determining the pay rates of the
high school faculty.
FAMIT opposed the formula. FAMIT met with MIT to settle this but failed. MIT insisted its right to
change the pay formula used. The controversy was brought to the NCMB; then was referred to
voluntary arbitration. The Panel of VAs ruled in favor of FAMIT. CA reversed.
Issues:
1) Is MITs new proposal, regarding faculty ranking and evaluation, lawful and consistent with the
ratified CBA?
2) Is MITs development of a new pay formula for the high school department, without the
knowledge of FAMIT, lawful and consistent with the ratified CBA?
Ruling:
1) Considering the submissions of the parties, in the light of the existing CBA, we find that the new
point range system proposed by MIT is an unauthorized modification of Annex C of the 2001 CBA.
It is made up of a faculty classification that is substantially different from the one originally
incorporated in the current CBA between the parties. Thus, the proposed system contravenes the
existing provisions of the CBA, hence, violative of the law between the parties.
2) MIT cannot adopt its unilateral interpretation of terms in the CBA. It is clear from the provisions
of the 2001 CBA that the salary of a high school faculty member is based on a rate per load and not on
a rate per hour basis.
In our view, there is no room for unilateral change of the formula by MIT. Needless to stress, the
Labor Code is specific in enunciating that in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision
affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor of labor. The appellate court committed a grave
error in the interpretation of the CBA provision and the governing law.



G.R. No. 113337 March 2, 1995
RONALD MANLIMOS,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and SUPER MAHOGANY PLYWOOD
CORPORATION/ALBERT GO, respondents.
Facts: The petitioners were among the regular employees of the Super Mahogany Plywood Corporation,
a domestic corporation organized in 1988 and based in Butuan City. They had been hired as patchers,
taper-graders, and receivers-dryers. On 1 September 1991, a new owner/management group headed by
Alfredo Roxas acquired complete ownership of the corporation. The petitioners were advised of
such change of ownership; however, the petitioners continued to work for the new owner and were
considered terminated, with their conformity, only as of December 1991 when they received their
separation pay, 13th month pay, and all other benefits due them computed as of the said month. Each
of them then executed on 17 December 1991 a Release and Waiver which they acknowledged before
Atty. Nolasco Discipulo, Hearing Officer of the Butuan City District Office of theDepartment of Labor and
Employment (DOLE).
On 27 December 1991, the new owner caused the publication of a notice for the hiring of workers,
indicating therein who of the separated employees could be accepted on probationary basis. The
petitioners then filed theirapplications for employment. Except for Rosario Cuarto, they were hired on
probationary basis for six months as patchers or tapers, but were compensated on piece-rate or task
basis.
For their alleged absence without leave, Perla Cumpay and Virginia Etic were considered, as of 4 May
1992, to have abandoned their work. The rest were dismissed on 13 June 1992 because they allegedly
committed acts prejudicial to the interest of the new management which consisted of their "including
unrepaired veneers in their reported productions on output as well as untaped corestock or whole
sheets in their supposed taped veneers/corestock." However, upon their appeal, the effectivity of such
termination was deferred to 20 June 1992.
Issue: whether the employees are considered probationary employee
Held: It is settled that while probationary employees do not enjoy permanent status, they are accorded
the constitutional protection of security of tenure. They may only be terminated for just cause or when
they fail to qualify as regular employees in accordance with reasonable standards made known to them
by the employer at the time of their engagement.
16
This constitutional protection, however, ends upon
the expiration of the period provided for in their probationary contract of employment. Thereafter, the
parties are free to renew the contract or not.
17

The petitioners themselves admit that upon their request the effective date of their separation was
deferred from 13 June 1992 to 20 June 1992. The latter date apparently coincided with the expiration of
the six-month probationary period. This development has rendered moot the question of whether there
was a just cause of the dismissal of the petitioners other than Perla Cumpay and Virginia Etic.


G.R. No. 165407 June 5, 2009
HERMINIGILDO INGUILLO and ZENAIDA BERGANTE, Petitioners,
vs.
FIRST PHILIPPINE SCALES, Inc. and/or AMPARO POLICARPIO, Manager, Respondents.
Facts: First Philippine Scales, Inc. (FPSI), a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacturing
of weighing scales, employed Bergante and Inguillo as assemblers on August 15, 1977 and September
10, 1986, respectively.
In 1991, FPSI and First Philippine Scales Industries Labor Union (FPSILU)
3
entered into a Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA),
4
the duration of which was for a period of five (5) years starting on
September 12, 1991 until September 12, 1996. On September 19, 1991, the members of FPSILU ratified
the CBA in a document entitledRATIPIKASYON NG KASUNDUAN.
5
Bergante and Inguillo, who were
members of FPSILU, signed the said document.
6

During the lifetime of the CBA, Bergante, Inguillo and several FPSI employees joined another union, the
Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa (NLM), which was affiliated with a federation called KATIPUNAN
(NLM-KATIPUNAN, for brevity). Subsequently, NLM-KATIPUNAN filed with the Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) an intra-union dispute
7
against FPSILU and FPSI. In said case, the Med-Arbiter
decided
8
in favor of FPSILU. It also ordered the officers and members of NLM-KATIPUNAN to return to
FPSILU the amount ofP90,000.00 pertaining to the union dues erroneously collected from the
employees. Upon finality of the Med-Arbiter's Decision, a Writ of Execution
9
was issued to collect the
adjudged amount from NLM-KATIPUNAN. However, as no amount was recovered, notices of
garnishment were issued to United Coconut Planters Bank (Kalookan City Branch)
10
and to FPSI
11
for the
latter to hold for FPSILU the earnings of Domingo Grutas, Jr. (Grutas) and Inguillo, formerly FPSILU's
President and Secretary for Finance, respectively, to the extent ofP13,032.18. Resultantly, the amount
of P5,140.55 was collected,
12
P1,695.72 of which came from the salary of Grutas, while the P3,444.83
came from that of Inguillo.
Issue: whether or not the termination was valid
Held: In fine, We hold that while Bergante and Inguillo's dismissals were valid pursuant to the
enforcement of Union Security Clause, respondents however did not comply with the requisite
procedural due process. As in the case of Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission,
57
where the
dismissal is for a cause recognized by the prevailing jurisprudence, the absence of the statutory due
process should not nullify the dismissal or render it illegal, or ineffectual. Accordingly, for violating
Bergante and Inguillo's statutory rights, respondents should indemnify them the amount of P30,000.00
each as nominal damages.


TANDUAY DISTILLERY LABOR UNION, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LAMBERTO SANTOS, PEDRO ESTERAL, ROMAN CHICO,
JOSELITO ESTANISLAO, JOSE DELGADO, JUANITO ARGUELLES, RICARDO CAJOLES, and JOSEFINO
PAGUYO, respondents.
Facts: Private respondents were all employees of Tanduay Distillery, Inc., (TDI) and members of the
Tanduay Distillery Labor Union (TDLU), a duly organized and registered labor organization and the
exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of the petitioner company.
On March 11, 1980, a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), was executed between TDI and TDLU. The
CBA was duly ratified by a majority of the workers in TDI including herein private respondents, and a
copy was filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE) on October 29, 1980 for certification.
The CBA had a term of three (3) years from July 1, 1979 to June 30, 1982. It also contained a union
security clause. which provides:
All workers who are or may during the effectivity of this Contract, become members of the Union in
accordance with its Constitution and By-Laws shall, as a condition of their continued employment,
maintain membership in good standing in the Union for the duration of the agreement.
On or about the early part of October 1980, while the CBA was in effect and within the contract bar
period the private respondents joined another union, the Kaisahan Ng Manggagawang Pilipino KAMPIL)
and organized its local chapter in TDI, with private respondents Pedro Esteral and Lamberts Santos being
elected President and Vice-President, respectively.
Issue: whether private respondent committed disloyalty.
Held: It is clearly apparent that the BLR aforesaid Order which this Court upheld in G.R. No. 63995 when
it dismissed TDLU's petition in a minute resolution, did not pass upon the question of legality or illegality
of the dismissal of private respondents from TDI by reason of their expulsion from TDLU for disloyalty.
That question was neither raised nor passed upon in the certification case, and was not a proper issue
therein because a petition for certification election is not a litigation but a mere investigation of a non-
adversary character to determine the bargaining unit to represent the employees (George Peter Lines,
Inc. v. Associated Labor Union, 134 SCRA 82). Hence, no inference could be derived from the dismissal of
said petition that either the BLR or this Court has decided in favor of private respondents insofar as the
question of union disloyalty and their suspension and termination from employment of TDI is
concerned.
Simply put, the BLR ordered the holding of a certification election because the CBA in question had
already expired, its expiry date being June 30, 1982. Consequently, there appears to be no more
obstacle in allowing a certification election. "... [T]he contract bar rule will not apply in view of the
supervening event, that is, the expiration of the CBA."
But the fact that the CBA had expired on June 30, 1982 and the BLR, because of such supervening event,
ordered the holding of a certification election could not and did not wipe out or cleanse private
respondents from the acts of disloyalty committed in October 1980 when they organized KAMPIL's local
chapter in TDI while still members of TDLU. The ineluctable fact is that private respondents committed
acts of disloyalty against TDLU while the CBA was in force and existing for which they have to face the
necessary sanctions lawfully imposed by TDLU








G.R. No. 183335 December 23, 2009
JUANITO TABIGUE, ALEX BIBAT, JECHRIS DASALLA, ANTONIO TANGON, ROLANDO PEDRIGAL, DANTE
MAUL, ALFREDO IDUL, EDGAR RAMOS, RODERICK JAVIER, NOEL PONAYO, ROMEL ORAPA, REY JONE,
ALMA PATAY, JERIC BANDIGAN, DANILO JAYME, ELENITA S. BELLEZA, JOSEPHINE COTANDA, RENE DEL
MUNDO, PONCIANO ROBUCA, and MARLON MADICLUM, Petitioners,
vs.
INTERNATIONAL COPRA EXPORT CORPORATION (INTERCO), Respondent.
Facts: Petitioner Juanito Tabigue and his 19 co-petitioners, all employees of
respondent International Copra Export Corp-oration (INTERCO), filed a Notice of Preventive Mediation
with the Department of Labor and Employment National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB),
Regional Branch No. XI, Davao City against respondent, for violation of Collective Bargaining Agreement
(CBA) and failure to sit on the grievance conference/meeting.
1

As the parties failed to reach a settlement before the NCMB, petitioners requested to elevate the case
to voluntary arbitration. The NCMB thus set a date for the parties to agree on a Voluntary Arbitrator.
Before the parties could finally meet, respondent presented before the NCMB a letter
2
of Genaro Tan
(Tan), president of the INTERCO Employees/Laborers Union (the union) of which petitioners are
members, addressed to respondents plant manager Engr. Paterno C. Tangente (Tangente), stating that
petitioners "are not duly authorized by [the] board or the officers to represent the union, [hence] . . . all
actions, representations or agreements made by these people with the management will not be
honored or recognized by the union." Respondent thus moved to dismiss petitioners complaint for lack
of jurisdiction.
3

Petitioners soon sent union president Tan and respondents plant manager Tangente a Notice to
Arbitrate, citing the "Revised Guidelines" in the Conduct of Voluntary Arbitration Procedure vis a vis
Section 3, Article XII of the CBA, furnishing the NCMB with a copy
4
thereof, which notice respondent
opposed.
5

The parties having failed to arrive at a settlement,
6
NCMB Director Teodorico O. Yosores wrote
petitioner Alex Bibat and respondents plant manager Tangente of the lack of willingness of both parties
to submit to voluntary arbitration, which willingness is a pre-requisite to submit the case thereto; and
that under the CBA forged by the parties, the union is an indispensable party to a voluntary arbitration
but that since Tan informed respondent that the union had not authorized petitioners to represent it, it
would be absurd to bring the case to voluntary arbitration.
The NCMB Director thus concluded that "the demand of [petitioners] to submit the issues . . . to
voluntary arbitration CAN NOT BE GRANTED." He thus advised petitioners to avail of the
compulsory arbitration process to enforce their rights.
7


Issue: whether the petitioners has been duly represented
Held: Petitioners have not, however, been duly authorized to represent the union. Apropos is this
Courts pronouncement in Atlas Farms, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,
26
viz:
x x x Pursuant to Article 260 of the Labor Code, the parties to a CBA shall name or designate their
respective representatives to the grievance machinery and if the grievance is unsettled in that level, it
shall automatically be referred to the voluntary arbitrators designated in advance by parties to a CBA.
Consequently only disputes involving the union and the company shall be referred to the grievance
machinery or voluntary arbitrators.
27
(emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Clutching at straws, petitioners invoke the first paragraph of Article 255 of the Labor Code which states:
Art. 255. The labor organization designated or selected by the majority of the employees in an
appropriatecollective bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of the employees in such unit
for the purpose of collective bargaining. However, an individual employee or group of employees shall
have the right at any time to present grievances to their employer.
x x x x (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
To petitioners, the immediately quoted provision "is meant to be an exception to the exclusiveness of
the representative role of the labor organization/union."
28

This Court is not persuaded. The right of any employee or group of employees to, at any time, present
grievancesto the employer does not imply the right to submit the same to voluntary arbitration.


G.R. No. 123782 September 16, 1997
CALTEX REFINERY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (CREA), petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE S. BRILLANTES, in his capacity as Acting Secretary of the Department of Labor and
Employment, and CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), Inc., respondents.
Facts: Anticipating the expiration of their Collective Bargaining Agreement on July 31, 1995, petitioner
and private respondent negotiated the terms and conditions of employment to be contained in a new
CBA. The negotiation between the two parties was participated in by the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board (NCMB) and the Office of the Secretary of Labor and Employment. Some items in the
new CBA were amicably arrived at and agreed upon, but others were unresolved.
To settle the unresolved issues, eight meetings between the parties were conducted. Because the
parties failed to reach any significant progress in these meetings, petitioner declared a deadlock. On July
24, 1995, petitioner filed a notice of strike. Six (6) conciliation meetings conducted by the NCMB failed
to settle the parties' differences. Then, the parties held marathon meetings at the plant level, but this
remedy proved also unavailing.
During a strike vote on August 16, 1995, the members of petitioner opted for a walkout. Private
respondent then filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a petition for assumption
of jurisdiction in accordance with Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code.
Issue: whether the grievance machinery was proper.
Held: Petitioner contends that public respondent "derailed the grievance and arbitration scheme
proposed by the Union."
38
Petitioner argues that the proposed "Grievance Settlement Council" is
intended to "supplement the effort of the Vice President for Manufacturing in reviewing the grievance
elevated to him, so that instead of acting alone . . . he will be obliged to convoke a conference of the
Council to afford the grievant a thorough hearing." Petitioner's recommendation for a "single arbitrator
is based on the proposition that if voluntary arbitration should be resorted to at all, this recourse should
entail the least possible expense."
39

Private respondent counters that the disposition on the grievance machinery is likewise "fair and
reasonable under the circumstances and in fact was merely a reiteration of the (u)nion's position during
the conciliation meetings conducted by Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma."


G.R. No. 174420 March 22, 2010
MIGUELA SANTUYO
vs.
REMERCO GARMENTS MANUFACTURING, INC. and/or VICTORIA REYES.

Facts: From 1992 to 1994, due to a serious industrial dispute, the Kaisahan ng Manggagawa sa Remerco
Garments Manufacturing Inc.- KMM Kilusan (union) staged a strike against respondent Remerco
Garments Manufacturing, Inc. (RGMI). Because the strike was subsequently declared illegal, all union
officers were dismissed. Employees who wanted to sever their employment were paid separation pay
while those who wanted to resume work were recalled on the condition that they would no longer be
paid a daily rate but on a piece-rate basis.
Petitioners, who had been employed as sewers, were among those recalled.
Without allowing RGMI to normalize its operations, the union filed a notice of strike in the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) on August 8, 1995.
2
According to the union, RGMI conducted
a time and motion study and changed the salary scheme from a daily rate to piece-rate basis without
consulting it. RGMI therefore not only violated the existing collective bargaining agreement (CBA) but
also diminished the salaries agreed upon. It therefore committed an unfair labor practice.
Issue: whether voluntary arbitrator have jurisdiction
Held: voluntary arbitrators have original and exclusive jurisdiction over matters which have not been
resolved by the grievance machinery.
Pursuant to Articles 217 in relation to Articles 260 and 261 of the Labor Code, the labor arbiter should
have referred the matter to the grievance machinery provided in the CBA. Because the labor arbiter
clearly did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter, his decision was void.1avvphi1
Nonetheless, the Secretary of the Labor assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute between the union
and RGMI and resolved the same in his September 18, 1996 order. Article 263(g) of the Labor
Code
20
gives the Secretary of Labor discretion
21
to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute likely to
cause a strike or a lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest and to decide the
controversy or to refer the same to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration. In doing so, the Secretary of
Labor shall resolve all questions and controversies in order to settle the dispute. His power is therefore
plenary and discretionary in nature to enable him to effectively and efficiently dispose of the issue.



Hacienda Fatima v. National Federation of Sugarcane Workers GR No. 149440, 28 Jan 2003
Facts:When complainant union (respondents) was certified as the collective bargainingrepresentative,
petitioners refused to sit down w/ the union for the purpose of enteringinto a CBA. The workers
including complainants were not given work for more than 1month. In protest, they staged a strike w/c
was however settled upon the signing of aMOA. Subsequently, alleging that complainants failed to load
some wagons, petitionersreneged on its commitment to bargain collectively & employed all means
including theuse of private armed guards to prevent the organizers from entering the premises. Nowork
assignments were given to complainants w/c forced the union to stage a strike. Dueto conciliation
efforts by the DOLE, another MOA was signed by the parties & they metin a conciliation meeting. When
petitioners again reneged on its commitment,complainants filed a complaint. Petitioner accused
respondents of refusing to work & being choosy in the kind of work they have to perform.The NLRC
ruled that petitioners were guilty of ULP & that the respondents were illegallydismissed. The CA
affirmed that while the work of respondents was seasonal in nature,they were considered to be merely
on leave during the off-season & were therefore stillemployed by petitioners.
Issue:Whether the CA erred in holding that respondents, admittedly seasonal workers, wereregular
employees, contrary to the clear provisions of Article 280 of the Labor Code,which categorically state
that seasonal employees are not covered by the definition of regular employees under paragraph 1, nor
covered under paragraph 2 which refersexclusively to casual employees who have served for at least
one year
Held: No. For respondents to be excluded from those classified as regular employees, it is notenough
that they perform work or services that are seasonal in nature. They must havealso been employed only
for the duration of one season. The evidence proves theexistence of the first, but not of the second,
condition. The fact that respondentsrepeatedly worked as sugarcane workers for petitioners for several
years is not denied bythe latter. Evidently, petitioners employed respondents for more than one
season.Therefore, the general rule of regular employment is applicable.If the employee has
been performing the job for at least a year, even if the performance isnot continuous & merely
intermittent, the law deems the repeated & continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence
of the necessity if not indispensability of thatactivity to the business. Hence, the employment is
considered regular, but only w/respect to such activity & while such activity exists. Seasonal workers
who are called towork from time to time & are temporarily laid off during off-season are not
separatedfrom service in said period, but merely considered on leave until re-employed.

G.R. No. 114974 June 16, 2004
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK EMPLOYEES UNION (NUBE), petitioner,
vs.
The Honorable MA. NIEVES R. CONFESOR, in her capacity as SECRETARY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT; and the STANDARD CHARTERED BANK, respondents.
Facts: Standard Chartered Bank (the Bank, for brevity) is a foreign banking corporation doing business in
the Philippines. The exclusive bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of the Bank is the
Standard Chartered Bank Employees Union (the Union, for brevity).
In August of 1990, the Bank and the Union signed a five-year collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with
a provision to renegotiate the terms thereof on the third year. Prior to the expiration of the three-year
period
2
but within the sixty-day freedom period, the Union initiated the negotiations. On February 18,
1993, the Union, through its President, Eddie L. Divinagracia, sent a letter
3
containing its
proposals
4
covering political provisions
5
and thirty-four (34) economic provisions.
6
Included therein was
a list of the names of the members of the Unions negotiating panel.
7

In a Letter dated February 24, 1993, the Bank, through its Country Manager Peter H. Harris, took note of
the Unions proposals. The Bank attached its counter-proposal to the non-economic provisions proposed
by the Union.
8
The Bank posited that it would be in a better position to present its counter-proposals on
the economic items after the Union had presented its justifications for the economic proposals.
9
The
Bank, likewise, listed the members of its negotiating panel.
10
The parties agreed to set meetings to settle
their differences on the proposed CBA.
Issue: whether or not the Union was able to substantiate its claim of unfair labor practice against the
Bank arising from the latters alleged "interference" with its choice of negotiator; surface bargaining;
making bad faith non-economic proposals; and refusal to furnish the Union with copies of the relevant
data.
Held: The petitioner asserts that the private respondent committed ULP, i.e., interference in the
selection of the Unions negotiating panel, when Cielito Diokno, the Banks Human Resource Manager,
suggested to the Unions President Eddie L. Divinagracia that Jose P. Umali, Jr., President of the NUBE,
be excluded from the Unions negotiating panel. In support of its claim, Divinagracia executed an
affidavit, stating that prior to the commencement of the negotiation, Diokno approached him and
suggested the exclusion of Umali from the Unions negotiating panel, and that during the first meeting,
Diokno stated that the negotiation be kept a "family affair."
PHILIPPINE AMERICAN CIGAR & CIGARETTE FACTORY WORKERS INDEPENDENT UNION (NLU) vs.
PHILIPPINE AMERICAN CIGAR & CIGARETTE MANUFACTURING CO., INC.
G.R. No. L-18364, Feb 28, 1963.
FACTS:
October 23, 1958, Apolonio San Joses brother, Francisco San Jose, who is also a regular worker of the
respondent and a member of the complainant union, filed a charge for ULP against herein respondent,
which case is still pending.
Subsequent to the filing of the said charge, the respondent by its manager Chue Yiong, summoned and
advised union president Lazaro Peralta that if Francisco San Jose will not withdraw his charge against the
company, the company will also dismiss his brother Apolonio San Jose, to which the union president
replied that should not be the attitude of the company because Apolonio has nothing to do with his
brothers case.
On January 24, 1959, respondent did dismiss Apolonio San Jose without just and valid cause and in gross
violation of the operative CBA between the complainant union and respondent corporation.
ISSUE:
Whether the dismissal of a relative of an employee who filed an action against the employer is an ULP.

RULING:
YES. Section 4(a) (5) of Republic Act No. 875, provides that :
(a) It shall be ULP for an employer:
(5) To dismiss, discharge, or otherwise prejudice or discriminate against an employee for having
filed charges or for having given or being about to give testimony under this Act.
Although the cited law pertains to the specific employee who filed a case or given a testimony against
the employer, it should be construed in line with the spirit and purpose of said Section 4 and of the
legislation of which it forms part namely, to assure absolute freedom of the employees and laborers
to establish labor organizations and unions, as well as to prefer charges before the proper organs of the
Government for violations of our labor laws.
If the dismissal of an employee due to the filing by him of said charges would be and is an undue
restraint upon said freedom, the dismissal of his brother owing to the non-withdrawal of the charges of
the former, would be and constitute as much a restraint upon the same freedom. In fact, it may be
greater and more effective restraint thereto. Indeed, a complainant may be willing to risk the hazards of
a possible and even probable retaliatory action by the employer in the form of a dismissal or another
discriminatory act against him personally, considering that nobody is perfect, that everybody commits
mistakes and that there is always a possibility that the employer may find in the records of any
employee, particularly if he has long been in the service, some act or omission constituting a fault or
negligence which may be an excuse for such dismissal or discrimination. Yet, such complainant may not
withstand the pressure that would result if his brother or another member of his immediate family were
threatened with such action unless the charges in question were withdrawn.
What is prohibited to be done directly shall not be allowed to be accomplished indirectly. Thus in the
Matter of Quidnick Dye Works Inc. and Federation of Dyers, Finishers, Printers and Bleachers of America
(2 NLRB 963) it was held that the dismissal of a laborer on account of union activities of his brother
constituted an ULP.
The discharge of relatives of an employee who has himself been discriminately discharged, for no other
reason than the relation, is itself a discriminatory discharge, in violation of the Act. An illustration is
Memphis Furniture Co. (3 NLRB 26 *1937+), where the evidence indicated that the sole reason for the
dismissal of a female employee was that she was the wife of an employee who has been discharged. It
was held that the discharge under the circumstances was discriminatory and a violation of the Act, even
though discharged female employee was not herself a member of any union. The respondent thus made
union membership and activities a bar to the employment not only of the union member himself but of
members of his family as well. A more effective mode of discouraging of union affiliation could hardly be
found then the knowledge that such activities put not merely the union members employment but that
of those closely related to him in jeopardy.

G.R. No. 114521 November 27, 1998
CCBPI POSTMIX WORKERS UNION, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and COCA-COLA BOTTLERS, PHIL., INC., respondents

Facts: On April 20, 1987, the union struck. On even date, the company filed a Petition to Declare the
Strike Illegal, alleging that the union staged a strike without observing the mandatory seven-day strike
ban imposed under Art. 264 (f) of the Labor Code and that the strike was done in bad faith, considering
that the union did not exhaust the conciliation period. The strike, which lasted for about five months,
ended with the signing of the renewed CBA between the union and the company on November 27,
1987. The CBA includes the Memorandum of Agreement (the "Memorandum") drawn by the parties on
September 23, 1987, and the Amendments to Memorandum of Agreement (the "Amendments")
finalized on October 1987.
Issue: Whether or not the strike was illegal for failure to comply with the seven day strike ban.
Held: The strike requirements under Articles 264 and 265 of the Labor Code are mandatory requisites,
without which, the strike will be considered illegal. The evident intention of the law in requiring the
strike notice and strike-vote report as mandatory requirements is to reasonably regulate the right to
strike, which is essential to the attainment of legitimate policy objectives embodied in the law. Verily,
substantial compliance with a mandatory provision will not suffice. Strict adherence to the mandate of
the law is required.
In fine, we hold that for failure of the striking union to observe and comply with the seven-day
mandatory strike ban, the strike on April 20, 1987 was illegal.









G.R. No. 117169 March 12, 1997
PHILTREAD WORKERS UNION (PTWU), MAURICIO BARTOLO, CESAR DAVID, EMMANUEL AGUSTIN,
PECSON BARANDA, NELSON BAGUIO, ROLANDO MATALOG, PEPITO DAMICOG, EDUARDO SANTOS,
ISABELO GALOPE, REYNALDO MALEON, AL PEDRIQUE, BAYANI HERNANDEZ, ROBERT LORESCA,
LEONARDO LACSINA, petitioners,
vs.
SECRETARY NIEVES R. CONFESOR, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, GEN. RECAREDO
SARMIENTO, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, PHILTREAD TIRE & RUBBER CORPORATION, GERARD
BRIMO, HARRY McMILLAN, respondents.
Facts: On May 27, 1994, petitioner Philtread Tire Workers Union (PTWU), filed a notice of strike,
docketed as NCMB-NCR Case No. 05-281-94, on grounds of unfair labor practice, more specifically union
busting and violation of CBA.
2
On the other hand, on May 30, 1994, private respondent Philtread Tire
and Rubber Corporation filed a notice of lockout, docketed as NCMB-NCR Case No. 05-013-94.
3
It also
filed a petition to declare illegal the work slowdowns staged by the petitioner Union. Both cases were
then consolidated. Several conciliation meetings were conducted but the parties failed to settle their
dispute. Then on June 15, 1994, private respondent declared a company wide lockout which continued
until August 22, 1994. There were about eighty union members who were consequently dismissed.
On August 31, 1994, private respondent corporation requested the Secretary of Labor to assume
jurisdiction over the labor dispute. Hence, on September 8, 1994, Secretary Confesor issued the assailed
order.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent company affects national interest.
Held: We do not agree with the petitioners that the respondent company is not indispensable to
national interest considering that the tire industry has already been liberalized. Philtread supplies 22%
of the tire products in the country. Moreover, it employs about 700 people. The intervention of the
Secretary of Labor was therefore necessary to settle the labor dispute which had lingered and which had
affected both respondent company and petitioner union. Had it not been so, the deadlock will remain
and the situation will remain uncertain. Thus, it cannot be deemed that the Secretary of Labor had acted
with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed order as she had a well-founded basis in issuing the
assailed order. It is significant at this point to point out that grave abuse of discretion implies capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment. Thus, an act may be considered as committed in grave abuse of
discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility.


G.R. No. 120751 March 17, 1999
PHIMCO INDUSTRIES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE ACTING SECRETARY OF LABOR JOSE BRILLANTES and PHIMCO INDUSTRIES LABOR
ASSOCIATION, respondents.

Facts: On March 9, 1995, the private respondent, Phimco Industries Labor Association (PILA), duly
certified collective bargaining representative of the daily paid workers of the petitioner, Phimco
Industries Inc. (PHIMCO), filed a notice of strike with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board,
NCR, against PHIMCO, a corporation engaged in the production of matches, after a deadlock in the
collective bargaining and negotiation. On April 21, 1995, when the several conciliation conferences
called by the contending parties failed to resolve their differences PILA, composed of 352
2
members,
staged a strike.
On June 7, 1995, PILA presented a petition for the intervention of the Secretary of Labor in the
resolution of the labor dispute, to which petition PHIMCO opposed. Pending resolution of the said
petition or on June 26, 1995, to be precise, PHIMCO sent notice of termination to some 47
3
workers
including several union officers.
On July 7, 1995, the then Acting Secretary of Labor Jose Brillantes assumed jurisdiction over the labor
dispute and issued his Order ruling, thus:
WHEREFORE, ABOVE PREMISES CONSIDERED, and pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as
amended, this office hereby assumes jurisdiction over the dispute at, Phimco industries, Inc.
Accordingly, all the striking workers, except those who have been handed down termination papers on
June 26, 1995, are hereby directed to return to work with twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of this
Order and for the Company to accept them back under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior
to the strike.
The parties are further ordered to cease and desist from committing any act that will aggravate the
situation.
To expedite the resolution of this dispute, the parties are directed to submit their position papers and
evidence within ten (10) days from receipt of this Order.
Issue: Whether or not the match company affects national interest
Held: It is thus evident from the foregoing that the Secretary's assumption of jurisdiction grounded on
the alleged "obtaining circumstances" and not on a determination that the industry involved in the labor
dispute is one indispensable to the "national interest", the standard set by the legislature, constitutes
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction. To uphold the action of the
public respondent under the premises would be stretching too far the power of the Secretary of Labor
as every case of a strike or lockout where there are inconveniences in the community, or work
disruptions in an industry though not indispensable to the national interest, would then come within the
Secretary's power. It would be practically allowing the Secretary of Labor to intervene in any Labor
dispute at his pleasure. This is precisely why the law sets and defines the standard: even in the exercise
of his power of compulsory arbitration under Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, the Secretary must
follow the law. For "when an overzealous official by-passes the law on the pretext of retaining a
laudable objective, the intendment or purpose of the law will lose its meaning as the law itself is
disregarded"




















G.R. No. 166554 November 27, 2008
JULITO SAGALES, petitioner,
vs.
RUSTAN'S COMMERCIAL CORPORATION, respondent.

Facts: In October 1970, Julito Sagales was employed by Rustans Commercial Corporation as chief cook
in one of Rustans restaurants. He was an excellent employee receiving numerous awards. However, in
June 2001, Sagales was caught stealing a bag of squid heads worth P50.00. Sagales was not able to
produce a receipt for the said squid heads at that time. In the same month, Sagales underwent inquest
proceedings for qualified theft in the local fiscals office. In the said proceeding, Sagales was able to
produce the receipt for the said squid heads. He also averred that the squid heads are actually scraps of
the restaurant and are not fit to be served to customers; so if indeed he really wanted to steal and
profit, he would have stolen better quality squid heads. The fiscal dismissed the case against Sagales for
lack of evidence.
But at the end of the same month, the legal division of Rustan conducted its own investigation where
Sagales and his lawyer appeared. The security guards testified against Sagales. The chief cashier also
testified that the squid heads were unpaid. In July 2001, after investigation by Rustan, Sagales was
terminated.
Issue: Whether or not Sagaless termination is valid.
Held: No. Termination is too harsh in this case. The Supreme Court took into consideration the various
circumstances attendant to the case. Sagales has worked for Rustan for almost 31 years; (2) his tireless
and faithful service is attested by the numerous awards he has received; (3) the incident in June 2001
was his first offense in his long years of service; (4) the value of the squid heads worth P50.00 is
negligible; (5) Rustan practically did not lose anything as the squid heads were considered scrap goods
and usually thrown away in the wastebasket; (6) the ignominy and shame undergone by Sagales in being
imprisoned, however momentary, is punishment in itself; and (7) Sagales was already preventively
suspended for one month, which is already a commensurate punishment for the infraction committed.
Truly, Sagales has more than paid his due. Nevertheless, it is useless to reinstate Sagales because he
should have been retired already at the time of this decision. So instead of reinstatement, Sagales was
awarded separation pay computed at one-month salary for every year of service; backwages were also
awarded.
The Supreme Court also emphasized: the right of every employee to security of tenure is all the more
secured by the Labor Code by providing that the employer shall not terminate the services of an
employee except for a just cause or when authorized by law. However, the employer, in exercising its
right to terminate employees for just and authorized causes must impose a penalty commensurate with
the act, conduct, or omission imputed to the employee.
G.R. No. 125548 September 25, 1998
SOLVIC INDUSTRIAL CORP. and ANTONIO C. TAM, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and DIOSDADO LAUZ, respondents.

Fact: Complainant in his position paper alleged the following:
He started employment with respondent sometime in 1977. He occupied the position as extruder
operator. In the course of his employment, he performed his utmost best, and in fact has never been
suspended or reprimanded. On 17 January 1994, sans cause or due process, he was arbitrarily
terminated from service. Additionally, complainant alleged that he was not paid his service leave pay.
Respondent on the other hand, averred that:
Complainant who was hired in 1977 was actually terminated for cause on 17 January 1994. That the
termination of complainant arose from the incident that transpired on 17 January 1994 at about 7:00
p.m. On said occasion complainant upon seeing Foreman Carlos Aberin confronted him and thereafter
struck him in the shoulder beside the neck with a bladed weapon in the process, inflictingbodily
injury on him. That several days after said incident, complainant did not report for work, hence,
memorandum of preventive suspension dated 19 January 1994, received by him on 22 January 1994.
Correspondingly, Mr. Aberin executed an affidavit and submitted a medical certificate.
Complainant on the other hand, submitted his letter of explanation dated 24 January 1994 denying
complicity in the acts imputed to him. Thereafter, a series of administrative investigation was conducted
on 5, 12 and 19 February 1994, where complainant refused to give any further statement or
explanation. Subsequently, he was served his letter of termination dated 21 February 1994, which
however, he refused to receive. Relatedly, in a meeting conference held with the union officers by
Carlos Aberin and Diosdado Lauz on 26 February 1994, complainant admitted to attempting to take the
life of Mr. Aberin and apologized for the same.
In reply, complainant countered that he never struck Mr. Aberin with a bladed weapon, and that the
incident [was] not job related, hence cannot serve as basis for termination.
Respondents, on the other hand in reply, argued that:
Contrary to his allegation, he was given his day in court as [an] investigation was conducted. Moreover,
complainant in the course of his meeting with Mr. Aberin [and] with the union officers, admitted that he
assaulted the latter and even explanation apologized in exchange for the withdrawal of the criminal case
filed against him.
Issue: Whether or not reinstatement is proper
Held: In so ruling, we reiterate that an employer's power to discipline its workers must be exercised with
caution, lest it erode the constitutional guarantee of security of tenure.
12
This is especially true when
the penalty being imposed is dismissal, which leads to severance of employment ties and the economic
dislocation of the employee. Because of the serious implications of this penalty, "our Labor Code
decrees that an employee cannot be dismissed, except for the most serious causes. The overly concern
of our laws for the welfare of employees is in accord with the social justice philosophy of our
Constitution."
13

In sum, we believe Respondent Commission did not gravely abuse its discretion in holding that private
respondent should be reinstated, but not awarded back wages. Its Decision finds basis in Manila Electric
Co. v. NLRC
14
in which the Court allowed a similar relief.



















G.R. No. 155421 July 7, 2004
ELMER M. MENDOZA, petitioner,
vs.
RURAL BANK OF LUCBAN, respondent.

Facts: Respondent bank issued a resolution effecting a reshuffling of employees to further strengthen
the existing internal control system of all offices and employees. Petitioner was one of those included
for reshuffling. In a letter to his manager, petitioner expressed his refusal to be assigned to another
branch and his request to be excluded from its implementation. Said request was answered in the
negative. Petitioner then requested for a twenty-day sick leave due to his illness. While on leave,
petitioner filed a complaint before the RAB IV for illegal dismissal, underpayment, separation pay and
damages against respondent bank.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner was constructively dismissed from his employment

HELD: The SC ruled that it find no reason to disturb the conclusion of the NLRC and the CA that there
was no constructive dismissal.

Constructive dismissal is defined as an involuntary resignation resorted to when continued employment
is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or a diminution of
pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the
employee. Petitioner argues that he was compelled to file an action for constructive dismissal, because
he had been demoted from appraiser to clerk and not given any work to do, while his table had been
placed near the toilet and eventually removed. He adds that the reshuffling of employees was done in
bad faith, because it was designed primarily to force him to resign.

Jurisprudence recognizes the exercise of management prerogatives. For this reason, courts often decline
to interfere in legitimate business decisions of employers. Indeed, labor laws discourage interference in
employers' judgments concerning the conduct of their business. The law must protect not only the
welfare of employees, but also the right of employers. In the pursuit of its legitimate business interest,
management has the prerogative to transfer or assign employees from one office or area of operation
to another provided there is no demotion in rank or diminution of salary, benefits, and other
privileges; and the action is not motivated by discrimination, made in bad faith, or effected as a form of
punishment or demotion without sufficient cause. This privilege is inherent in the right of employers to
control and manage their enterprise effectively. The right of employees to security of tenure does not
give them vested rights to their positions to the extent of depriving management of its prerogative to
change their assignments or to transfer them.

Managerial prerogatives, however, are subject to limitations provided by law, collective bargaining
agreements, and general principles of fair play and justice. The managerial prerogative to transfer
personnel must be exercised without grave abuse of discretion, bearing in mind the basic elements of
justice and fair play. Having the right should not be confused with the manner in which that right is
exercised. Thus, it cannot be used as a subterfuge by the employer to rid himself of an undesirable
worker. In particular, the employer must be able to show that the transfer is not unreasonable,
inconvenient or prejudicial to the employee; nor does it involve a demotion in rank or a diminution of
his salaries, privileges and other benefits. Should the employer fail to overcome this burden of proof,
the employee's transfer shall be tantamount to constructive dismissal, which has been defined as a
quitting because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; as an offer
involving a demotion in rank and diminution in pay. Likewise, constructive dismissal exists when an act
of clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer has become so unbearable to the
employee leaving him with no option but to forego with his continued employment."

Petitioner's transfer was made in pursuit of respondent's policy to "familiarize bank employees with the
various phases of bank operations and further strengthen the existing internal control system" of all
officers and employees. We have previously held that employees may be transferred based on their
qualifications, aptitudes and competencies to positions in which they can function with maximum
benefit to the company. 34 There appears no justification for denying an employer the right to transfer
employees to expand their competence and maximize their full potential for the advancement of the
establishment. Petitioner was not singled out; other employees were also reassigned without their
express consent. Neither was there any demotion in the rank of petitioner; or any diminution of his
salary, privileges and other benefits.







G.R. No. 76645 July 23, 1991
PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
ALICIA LAPLANA, Hon. RICARDO ENCARNACION, and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION,respondents.

Facts: Alicia Laplana was the cashier of the Baguio City Branch Office of the Philippine Telegraph
and Telephone Corporation (hereafter, simply PT & T). Sometime in March 1984, PT & T's treasurer,
Mrs. Alicia A. Arogo, directed Laplana to transfer to the company's branch office at Laoag City. Laplana
refused the reassignment and proposed instead that qualified clerks in the Baguio Branch be trained for
the purpose. She set out her reasons therefor in her letter to Mrs. Arogo. On April 12, 1984, Mrs. Arogo
reiterated her directive for Laplana's transfer to the Laoag Branch, this time in the form of a written
Memorandum, informing Laplana that "effective April 16, 1984, you will be reassigned to Laoag branch
assuming the same position of branch cashier," and ordering her "to turn over your accountabilities such
as PCF, undeposited collections, used and unused official receipts, other accountable forms and files to
Rose Caysido who will be in charge of cashiering in Baguio." Apparently Laplana was not allowed to
resume her work as Cashier of the Baguio Branch when April 16, 1984 came. She thereupon wrote again
to Mrs. Arogo advising that the directed transfer was unacceptable, reiterating the reasons already
given by her in her first letter dated March 27, 1984.
Issue: Whether or not transfer was valid
Held: In this case, the employee (Laplana) had to all intents and purposes resigned from her position.
She had unequivocally asked that she be considered dismissed, herself suggesting the reason therefor
retrenchment. When so dismissed, she accepted separation pay. On the other hand, the employer has
not been shown to be acting otherwise than in good faith, and in the legitimate pursuit of what it
considered its best interests, in deciding to transfer her to another office. There is no showing whatever
that the employer was transferring Laplana to another work place, not because she would be more
useful there, but merely "as a subterfuge to rid . . . (itself) of an undesirable worker," or "to penalize an
employee for . . . union activities. . . ." The employer was moreover not unmindful of Laplana's initial
plea for reconsideration of the directive for her transfer to Laoag; in fact, in response to that plea not to
be moved to the Laoag Office, the employer opted instead to transfer her to Manila, the main office,
offering at the same time the normal benefits attendant upon transfers from an office to another.
The situation here presented is of an employer transferring an employee to another office in the
exercise of what it took to be sound business judgment and in accordance with pre-determined and
established office policy and practice, and of the latter having what was believed to be legitimate
reasons for declining that transfer, rooted in considerations of personal convenience and difficulties for
the family. Under these circumstances, the solution proposed by the employee herself, of her voluntary
termination of her employment and the delivery to her of corresponding separation pay, would appear
to be the most equitable.
G.R. No. 144412 November 18, 2003
ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and POTENCIANO L. GALANIDA, Respondents

Facts: Private respondent Potenciano Galanida was hired by petitioner Allied Banking Corporation on 11
January 1978 and rose from accountant-book(k)eeper to assistant manager in 1991. His appointment
was covered by a "Notice of Personnel Action" which provides as one of the conditions of employment
the provision on petitioners right to transfer employees:
"REGULAR APPOINTMENT: xxx It is understood that the bank reserves the right to transfer or assign you
to other departments or branches of the bank as the need arises and in the interest of maintaining
smooth and uninterrupted service to the public."
Private respondent was promoted several times and was transferred to several branches. Effecting a
rotation/movement of officers assigned in the Cebu homebase, petitioner listed respondent as second
in the order of priority of assistant managers to be assigned outside of Cebu City having been stationed
in Cebu for seven years already. Private respondent manifested his refusal to be transferred to Bacolod
City in a letter dated 19 April 1994 citing as reason parental obligations, expenses, and the anguish that
would result if he is away from his family. He then filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter
for constructive dismissal.
Issue: Whether or not there is a valid ground for the dismissal of the private respondent.
Held: The constant transfer of bank officers and personnel with accounting responsibilities from one
branch to another is a standard practice of Allied Bank, which has more than a hundred branches
throughout the country.
26
Allied Bank does this primarily for internal control. It also enables bank
employees to gain the necessary experience for eventual promotion. The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, in
its Manual of Regulations for Banks and Other Financial Intermediaries,
27
requires the rotation of these
personnel. The Manual directs that the "duties of personnel handling cash, securities and bookkeeping
records should be rotated" and that such rotation "should be irregular, unannounced and long enough
to permit disclosure of any irregularities or manipulations." The evidence on record contradicts the
charge that Allied Bank discriminated against Galanida and was in bad faith when it ordered his transfer.
Allied Banks letter of 13 June 1994
30
showed that at least 14 accounting officers and personnel from
various branches, including Galanida, were transferred to other branches. Allied Bank did not single out
Galanida. The same letter explained that Galanida was second in line for assignment outside Cebu
because he had been in Cebu for seven years already. The person first in line, Assistant Manager
Roberto Isla, who had been in Cebu for more than ten years, had already transferred to a branch in
Cagayan de Oro City. We note that none of the other transferees joined Galanida in his complaint or
corroborated his allegations of widespread discrimination and favoritism.
G.R. No. 147790 June 27, 2006
GENUINO ICE COMPANY, INC. Petitioner,
vs.
ALFONSO S. MAGPANTAY, Respondent.

Facts: Alfonso Magpantay (respondent) was employed as a machine operator with Genuino Ice
Company, Inc. (petitioner) from March 1988 to December 1995. On November 18, 1996, respondent
filed against petitioner a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for moral and exemplary
damages.
1
In his Position Paper, respondent alleged that he was dismissed from service effective
immediately by virtue of a memorandum, after which he was not allowed anymore to enter the
company premises. Respondent bewailed that his termination from employment was done without due
process.
2

Petitioner countered that he was not illegally dismissed, since the dismissal was based on a valid ground,
i.e., he led an illegal strike at petitioners sister company, Genuino Agro Industrial Development
Corporation, which lasted from November 18 to 22, 1995, resulting in big operation losses on the
latters part. Petitioner also maintained that respondents dismissal was made after he was accorded
due process.
Issue: Whether or not the dismissal was legal.
Held: Neglect of duty, to be a ground for dismissal, must be both gross and habitual.

Gross negligence
connotes want of care in the performance of ones duties. Habitual neglect implies repeated failure to
perform ones duties for a period of time, depending upon the circumstances. On the other hand, fraud
and willful neglect of duties imply bad faith on the part of the employee in failing to perform his job to
the detriment of the employer and the latters business. Thus, the single or isolated act of negligence
does not constitute a just cause for the dismissal of the employee.
Thus, the Court agrees with the CA that respondents four-day absence is not tantamount to a gross and
habitual neglect of duty. As aptly stated by the CA, "(W)hile he may be found by the labor courts to be
grossly negligent of his duties, he has never been proven to be habitually absent in a span of seven (7)
years as GICIs employee. The factual circumstances and evidence do not clearly demonstrate that
petitioners *respondent+ absences contributed to the detriment of GICIs operations and caused
irreparable damage to the company."




G.R. No. 110068 February 15, 1995
PHILIPPINE DUPLICATORS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and PHILIPPINE DUPLICATORS EMPLOYEES UNION-
TUPAS,
Facts: Petitioner Corporation pays its salesmen a small fixed or guaranteed wage; the greater part of
the latters wages or salaries being composed of the sales or incentive commissions earned on actual
sales of duplicating machines closed by them. Thus the sales commissions received for every duplicating
machine sold constituted part of the basic compensation or remuneration of the salesmen of the
Philippine Duplicators for doing their job.
The Labor Arbiter directed Petitioner Duplicators to pay 13
th
month pay to private respondent
employees computed on the basis of their fixed wages plus sales commission.
Sec. 4 of the Supplementary Rules and Regulations Implementing PD No. 851 (Revised Guidelines
Implementing 13
th
Month Pay) provides that overtime pay, earning and other remuneration which are
not part of the basic salary shall not be included in the computation of the 13
th
month pay.
Petitioner Corporation contends that their sales commission should not be included in the computation
of the 13
th
month pay invoking the consolidated cases of Boie-Takeda Chemicals, Inc. vs Hon. Dionisio
dela Serna and Philippine Fuji Xerox Corp. vs Hon. Crecencio Trajano, were the so-called commissions of
medical representatives of Boie-Takeda Chemicals and rank-and-file employees of Fuji Xerox Co. were
not included in the term basic salary in computing the 13
th
month pay.
Issue: Whether or not sales commissions comprising a pre-determined percent of the selling price of the
goods are included in the computation of the 13
th
month pay.
Held: Yes. These commission which are an integral part of the basic salary structure of the Philippine
Duplicators employees-salesmen, are not overtime payments, nor profit-sharing payments nor any
other fringe benefit. Thus, salesmens commissions comprising a pre-determined percent of the selling
price of the goods were properly included in the term basic salary for purposes of computing the
13
th
month pay.
Commissions of medical representatives of Boie-Takeda Chemicals and rank-and-file employees of Fuji
Xerox Co. were not included in the term basic salary because these were paid as productivity
bonuses which is not included in the computation of 13
th
month pay.

Eastern Telecomunications Phil. Inc. v. Eastern Telecoms Union, G.R. No. 185665
Facts: Eastern Telecom Philippines, Inc. (ETPI) plans to defer payment of the 2003 14th, 15th and 16th
month bonusessometime in April 2004. The company's main ground in postponing the payment of
bonuses is due to allege continuingdeterioration of company's financial position which started in the
year 2000. However, ETPI while postponing payment of bonuses sometime in April 2004, such payment
would also be subject to availability of funds.The union strongly opposed the deferment in payment of
the bonuses by filing a preventive mediation complaint with the NCMBon July 3, 2003, the purpose of
which complaint is to determine the date when the bonus should be paid.In the conference held at the
NCMB, ETPI reiterated its stand that payment of the bonuses would only be made in April 2004 towhich
date of payment, the union agreed. Subsequently, the company made a sudden turnaround in its
position by declaring thatthey will no longer pay the bonuses until the issue is resolved through
compulsory arbitration.Thus, on April 26, 2004, the union filed a Notice of Strike on the ground of unfair
labor practice for failure of ETPI to pay thebonuses in gross violation of the economic provision of the
existing CBA.On May 19, 2004, the Secretary of Labor and Employment, finding that the company is
engaged in an industry considered vitalto the economy and any work disruption thereat will adversely
affect not only its operation but also that of the other businessrelying on its services, certified the labor
dispute for compulsory arbitration. Acting on the certified labor dispute, a hearing was called on July 16,
2004 wherein the parties have submitted that the issues for resolution. Thereafter, they were directed
to submit their respective position papers and evidence in support thereof after whichsubmission, they
agreed to have the case considered submitted for decision.On April 28, 2005, the NLRC issued its
Resolution dismissing ETEU's complaint and held that ETPI could not be forced to paythe union
members the bonuses for the year 2003 and the 14th month bonus for the year 2004 inasmuch as the
payment of these additional benefits was basically a management prerogative, being an act of
generosity and munificence on the part of thecompany and contingent upon the realization of
profits.The CA declared that the Side Agreements of the 1998 and 2001 CBA created a contractual
obligation on ETPI to confer thesubject bonuses to its employees without qualification or condition. It
also found that the grant of said bonuses has alreadyripened into a company practice and their denial
would amount to diminution of the employees' benefits.Issue: Whether or not ETPI is liable to pay 14th,
15th and 16th month bonuses for the year 2003 and 14th month bonus for theyear 2004 to the
members of respondent union.Decision: From a legal point of view, a bonus is a gratuity or act of
liberality of the giver which the recipient cannot demand as amatter of right. The grant of a bonus is
basically a management prerogative which cannot be forced upon the employer who maynot be obliged
to assume the onerous burden of granting bonuses. However, a bonus becomes a demandable or
enforceableobligation if the additional compensation is granted without any conditions imposed for its
payment. In such case, the bonus istreated as part of the wage, salary or compensation of the
employee.In this case, there is no dispute that Eastern Telecommunications Phils., Inc. and Eastern
Telecoms Employees Union agreed onthe inclusion of a provision for the grant of 14th, 15th and 16th
month bonuses in the 1998-2001 CBA Side Agreement, as wellas in their 2001-2004 CBA Side
Agreement, which contained no qualification for its payment. There were no conditions specifiedin the
CBA Side Agreements for the grant of the bonus. There was nothing in the relevant provisions of the
CBA which made thegrant of the bonus dependent on the company's financial standing or contingent
upon the realization of profits. There was also nostatement that if the company derives no profits, no
bonus will be given to the employees. In fine, the payment of these bonuseswas not related to the
profitability of business operations. Consequently, the giving of the subject bonuses cannot
beperemptorily withdrawn by Eastern Telecommunications Phils., Inc. without violating Article 100 of
the Labor Code, whichprohibits the unilateral elimination or diminution of benefits by the employer. The
rule is settled that any benefit and supplementbeing enjoyed by the employees cannot be reduced,
diminished, discontinued or eliminated by the employer.



Manila Jockey Club Employees Union vs. Manila Jockey Club
[G.R. No. 167760. March 7, 2007]
Facts:
In their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), the parties agreed to a 7-hour work schedule from
9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon and from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. on a work week of Monday to Saturday. The
CBA likewise reserved in the employer certain management prerogatives, including the
determination of the work schedule.
MJC later on issued an inter-office memorandum declaring a change in the hours of work of regular
monthly-paid employees to 1:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. when horse races are held, that is, every Tuesday
and Thursday. But it maintained the 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. schedule for non-race days. Employees
questioned it as violative of the prohibition against non-diminution of wages and benefits. They
claimed that the employees are precluded from rendering their usual overtime work from 5:00 p.m.
to 9:00 p.m.

1) Was the change in schedule a valid?
Issue:
2) Was there diminution of benefits?
Held: Valid Exercise of management prerogative When the races were moved to 2:00 p.m., there was no
other choice for management but to change the employees' work schedule as there was no work to be
done in the morning. Evidently, the adjustment in the work schedule of the employees is justified.
While the CBA provided for a schedule, it also reserved expressly to management the right to change
existing methods or facilities to change the schedules of work. The CBA also grants respondent the
prerogative to relieve employees from duty because of lack of work. No diminution of benefits The CBA
does not guarantee overtime work for all the employees but merely provides that "all work
performed in excess of seven (7) hours work schedule and on days not included within the work week
shall be considered overtime and paid as such."
Respondent was not obliged to allow all its employees to render overtime work everyday for the whole
year, but only those employees whose services were needed after their regular working hours and only
upon the instructions of management. The overtime pay was not given to each employee consistently,
deliberately and unconditionally, but as a compensation for additional services rendered. Thus, overtime
pay does not fall within the definition of benefits under Article 100 of the Labor Code on prohibition
against elimination or diminution of benefits.

G.R. No. 162994 September 17, 2004
DUNCAN ASSOCIATION OF DETAILMAN-PTGWO and PEDRO A. TECSON, petitioners,
vs.
GLAXO WELLCOME PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondent.
Facts: Petitioner Pedro A. Tecson (Tecson) was hired by respondent Glaxo Wellcome Philippines, Inc.
(Glaxo) as medical representative on October 24, 1995, after Tecson had undergone training and
orientation.
Thereafter, Tecson signed a contract of employment which stipulates, among others, that he agrees to
study and abide by existing company rules; to disclose to management any existing or future
relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees of competing drug companies
and should management find that such relationship poses a possible conflict of interest, to resign from
the company.
The Employee Code of Conduct of Glaxo similarly provides that an employee is expected to inform
management of any existing or future relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or
employees of competing drug companies. If management perceives a conflict of interest or a potential
conflict between such relationship and the employees employment with the company, the
management and the employee will explore the possibility of a "transfer to another department in a
non-counterchecking position" or preparation for employment outside the company after six months.
Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxos products in the Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales
area.
Issue: whether there was validation to the policy of Glaxo.
Held: As noted earlier, the challenged policy has been implemented by Glaxo impartially and
disinterestedly for a long period of time. In the case at bar, the record shows that Glaxo gave Tecson
several chances to eliminate the conflict of interest brought about by his relationship with Bettsy. When
their relationship was still in its initial stage, Tecsons supervisors at Glaxo constantly reminded him
about its effects on his employment with the company and on the companys interests. After Tecson
married Bettsy, Glaxo gave him time to resolve the conflict by either resigning from the company or
asking his wife to resign from Astra. Glaxo even expressed its desire to retain Tecson in its employ
because of his satisfactory performance and suggested that he ask Bettsy to resign from her company
instead. Glaxo likewise acceded to his repeated requests for more time to resolve the conflict of
interest. When the problem could not be resolved after several years of waiting, Glaxo was constrained
to reassign Tecson to a sales area different from that handled by his wife for Astra. Notably, the Court
did not terminate Tecson from employment but only reassigned him to another area where his home
province, Agusan del Sur, was included. In effecting Tecsons transfer, Glaxo even considered the
welfare of Tecsons family. Clearly, the foregoing dispels any suspicion of unfairness and bad faith on the
part of Glaxo.


G.R. No. 118978 May 23, 1997
PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANY, * petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and GRACE DE GUZMAN, respondents.
Facts: Grace de Guzman was initially hired by petitioner as a reliever, specifically as a
"Supernumerary Project Worker," for a fixed period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991 vice
one C.F. Tenorio who went on maternity leave.
1
Under the Reliever Agreement which she signed with
petitioner company, her employment was to be immediately terminated upon expiration of the agreed
period. Thereafter, from June 10, 1991 to July 1, 1991, and from July 19, 1991 to August 8, 1991, private
respondent's services as reliever were again engaged by petitioner, this time in replacement of one
Erlinda F. Dizon who went on leave during both periods.
2
After August 8, 1991, and pursuant to their
Reliever Agreement, her services were terminated.
On September 2, 1991, private respondent was once more asked to join petitioner company as a
probationary employee, the probationary period to cover 150 days. In the job application form that was
furnished her to be filled up for the purpose, she indicated in the portion for civil status therein that she
was single although she had contracted marriage a few months earlier, that is, on May 26, 1991.
3

It now appears that private respondent had made the same representation in the two successive
reliever agreements which she signed on June 10, 1991 and July 8, 1991. When petitioner supposedly
learned about the same later, its branch supervisor in Baguio City, Delia M. Oficial, sent to private
respondent a memorandum dated January 15, 1992 requiring her to explain the discrepancy. In that
memorandum, she was reminded about the company's policy of not accepting married women for
employment.
4

In her reply letter dated January 17, 1992, private respondent stated that she was not aware of PT&T's
policy regarding married women at the time, and that all along she had not deliberately hidden her true
civil status.
5
Petitioner nonetheless remained unconvinced by her explanations. Private respondent was
dismissed from the company effective January 29, 1992,
6
which she readily contested by initiating a
complaint for illegal dismissal, coupled with a claim for non-payment of cost of living allowances (COLA),
before the Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor RelationsCommission in Baguio City.
Issue: whether or not the policy is valid
Held: In the case at bar, petitioner's policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any
woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination,
afforded all women workers by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution. Contrary to
petitioner's assertion that it dismissed private respondent from employment on account of her
dishonesty, the record discloses clearly that her ties with the company were dissolved principally
because of the company's policy that married women are not qualified for employment in PT & T, and
not merely because of her supposed acts of dishonesty.
That it was so can easily be seen from the memorandum sent to private respondent by Delia M. Oficial,
the branch supervisor of the company, with the reminder, in the words of the latter, that "you're fully
aware that the company is not accepting married women employee (sic), as it was verbally instructed to
you."
21
Again, in the termination notice sent to her by the same branch supervisor, private respondent
was made to understand that her severance from the service was not only by reason of her concealment
of her married status but, over and on top of that, was her violation of the company's policy against
marriage ("and even told you that married women employees are not applicable [sic] or accepted in our
company.")
22
Parenthetically, this seems to be the curious reason why it was made to appear in the
initiatory pleadings that petitioner was represented in this case only by its said supervisor and not by its
highest ranking officers who would otherwise be solidarily liable with the corporation.
23

Verily, private respondent's act of concealing the true nature of her status from PT & T could not be
properly characterized as willful or in bad faith as she was moved to act the way she did mainly because
she wanted to retain a permanent job in a stable company. In other words, she was practically forced by
that very same illegal company policy into misrepresenting her civil status for fear of being disqualified
from work. While loss of confidence is a just cause for termination of employment, it should not be
simulated.
24
It must rest on an actual breach of duty committed by the employee and not on the
employer's caprices.
25
Furthermore, it should never be used as a subterfuge for causes which are
improper, illegal, or unjustified.


Star Paper Corp. vs. Simbol
[G.R. No. 164774. April 12, 2006]
Facts: Star Paper Corporation is engaged in trading of paper products. The company policies stated that:
New applicants will not be allowed to be hired if in case he/she has [a] relative, up to [the] 3rdIn case of
two of our employees (both single, one male and another female) developed a friendly relationship
during the course of their employment and then decided to get married, one of them should resign to
preserve the policy stated above. degree of relationship, already employed by the company. The
complainants alleged that when they married co-employees, they were compelled to resign because of
the company policy. Arguing that said policy is illegal, they lodged a complaint for illegal dismissal and
unfair labor practice.
Issue: whether the policy of the employer banning spouses from working in the same company violates
the rights of the employee under the Constitution and the Labor Code or is a valid exercise of
management prerogative
Held: The case at bar involves Article 136 of the Labor Code which provides: It shall be unlawful for an
employer to require as a condition of employment or continuation of employment that a woman
employee shall not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that upon getting married a woman
employee shall be deemed resigned or separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge, discriminate or
otherwise prejudice a woman employee merely by reason of her marriage. Two types of employment
policies involve spouses: no-spouse employment policies - policies banning only spouses from working in
the same company anti-nepotism employment policies - those banning all immediate family members,
including spouses, from working in the same company In the US, there is what they call as bona fide
occupational qualification exception, that is, unless the employer can prove that the reasonable
demands of the business require a distinction based on marital status and there is no better available or
acceptable policy which would better accomplish the business purpose, an employer may not
discriminate against an employee based on the identity of the employees spouse. And to justify a bona
fide occupational qualification, the employer must prove two factors: (1) that the employment
qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved; and (2) that there is a
factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification would be unable
to properly perform the duties of the job. In the Philippines we employ the standard of reasonableness
of the company policy which is parallel to the bona fide occupational qualification requirement. This was
illustrated in the cases of Duncan Association of Detailman vs. Gaxo Wellcome us that the requirement
of reasonableness must be clearly established to uphold the questioned employment policy. The
employer has the burden to prove the existence of a reasonable business necessity. In the case at bar,
there is no a reasonable business necessity. The employees were hired after they were found fit for the
job, but were asked to resign when they married a co-employee. Star Paper failed to show how the
marriages of the employees could be detrimental to its business operations. The policy is premised on
the mere fear that employees married to each other will be less efficient.


G.R. No. L-10712 August 10, 1916
ANSELMO FERRAZZINI, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CARLOS GSELL, defendant-appellant.
Facts: This action was brought to recover damages for an alleged wrongful discharge of the plaintiff,
who had been employed by the defendant for an indefinite time to work in the latter's industrial
enterprises in the city of Manila. The defendant admitted that he discharged the plaintiff without giving
him the "written advice of six months in advance" as provided in the contract, but alleged that the
discharge was lawful on account of absence, unfaithfulness, and disobedience of orders. The defendant
sought affirmative relief for a further alleged breach of the contract by the plaintiff after his discharge.
From a judgment in favor of the plaintiff the defendant appealed and now urges that the trial court
erred (1) in finding that the plaintiff's discharge was not justified and (2) in declining to consider the
counterclaim and enter judgment in accordance therewith.
1. The plaintiff engaged his "skilled service" to the defendant for the entire existence "of this
agreement" at a fixedmonthly salary and agreed "to devote his entire time and efforts to the best of
his knowledge and skill exclusively in carrying out in the most satisfactory manner possible all of the
work which may be entrusted to him during the existence of this contract and undertaking, furthermore,
to exercise a strict discretion in all matters pertaining to the work so entrusted to him and the whole
thereof, . . . ."
Issue: whether the contract is valid.
Held: It needs no argument to show that an agreement or contract entered into for the purpose of
accomplishing any of the prohibited acts mentioned in the above cited provisions of the Penal Code or in
Act No. 98 would be unenforcible as being in violation of positive law. Those falling within the provisions
of articles 542 and 544 of the Penal Code and Act No. 98 would clearly be agreements or contracts in
undue or unreasonable restraint of trade. The meaning given to the word "trade" would determine the
question whether those coming within the provisions of article 543 would or would not be the same. If
the commercial meaning of the word should govern, and in this sense t has reference to the business of
selling or exchanging some tangible substance or commodity for money, or the business of dealing by
way of sale in commodities, it would appear that such would not be contract in restraint of trade. This
may be the most common significance of the word "trade." but it is not the only one, nor the most
comprehensive meaning in which the word is properly used. In the broader sense, it is any occupation or
business carried on for subsistence or profit. Anderson's Dictionary of Law gives the following definition:
"Generally equivalent to occupation, employment, or business, whether manual or mercantile; any
occupation, employment or business carried on for profit, gain, or livelihood, not in the liberal arts or in
the learned professions." In Abbott's Law Dictionary the word is defined as "an occupation, employment
or business carried on for gain or profit." Among the definitions given in the Encyclopaedic Dictionary is
the following: "The business which a person has learnt, and which he carries on for subsistence or profit;
occupation; particularly employment, whether manual or mercantile, as distinguished from the liberal
arts or the learned professions and agriculture." Bouvier limits the meaning to commerce and traffic and
the handicraft of mechanics. (In re Pinkney, 47 Kan., 89.) We are inclined to adopt and apply the broader
meaning given by the lexicographers.




G.R. No. L-21127 February 9, 1924
ALFONSO DEL CASTILLO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
SHANNON RICHMOND, defendant-appellee.
Facts: This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Albay on the 18th day
of October, 1922. Its purpose was to have declared null and of no effect the following contract executed
and delivered on the 20th day of July, 1915. The plaintiff alleges that the provisions and conditions
contained in the third paragraph of said contract constitute an illegal and unreasonable restriction upon
his liberty to contract, are contrary to public policy, and are unnecessary in order to constitute a just and
reasonable protection to the defendant; and asked that the same be declared null and void and of no
effect. The defendant interposed a general and special defense. In his special defense he alleges "that
during the time the plaintiff was in the defendant's employ he obtained knowledge of his trade and
professional secrets and came to know and became acquainted and established friendly relations with
his customers so that to now annul the contract and permit plaintiff to establish a competing drugstore
in the town of Legaspi, as plaintiff has announced his intention to do, would be extremely prejudicial to
defendant's interest." The defendant further, in an amended answer, alleges "that this action not having
been brought within four years from the time the contract referred to in the complaint was executed,
the same has prescribed."
During the trial of the cause an effort was made to sustain the allegations of the complaint that
paragraph 3 of the said contract constituted an illegal and unreasonable restriction upon the right of the
plaintiff to contract and was contrary to public policy. The lower court found that it was unnecessary to
pass upon the question of prescription presented by the defendant.
Issue: whether the contract is valid.
Held: In that case we held that a contract by which an employee agrees to refrain for a given lenght of
time, after the expiration of the term of his employment, from engaging in a business, competitive with
that of his employer, is not void as being in restraint of trade if the restraint imposed is not greater than
that which is necessary to afford a reasonable protection. In all cases like the present, the question is
whether, under the particular circumstances of the case and the nature of the particular contract
involved in it, the contract is, or is not, unreasonable. Of course in establishing whether the contract is a
reasonable or unreasonable one, the nature of the business must also be considered. What would be a
reasonable restriction as to time and place upon the manufacture of railway locomotive engines might
be a very unreasonable restriction when imposed upon the employment of a day laborer.




Rivera vs. Solidbank
[G.R. No. 163269. April 19, 2006]
Facts:
Rivera applied for retirement under the Special Retirement Program. Solidbank approved the
application and Rivera was entitled to receive the net amount of P
However in 1995 Solidbank discovered that Equitable Bank employed Rivera as Manager of its
Credit Investigation and Appraisal Division of its Consumers Banking Group. Solidbank then
informed Rivera that he had violated the Undertaking and demanded the return of all the monetary
benefits he received. When Rivera refused to return the amount demanded within the given period,
Solidbank filed a complaint for recovery of sum of money.
963,619.28. He signed an undated
Release, Waiver and Quitclaim, which was notarized on March 1, 1995. Rivera acknowledged receipt
of the net proceeds of his separation and retirement benefits and promised that "[he] would not, at
any time, in any manner whatsoever, directly or indirectly engage in any unlawful activity prejudicial to
the interest of Solidbank, its parent, affiliate or subsidiary companies, their stockholders, officers,
directors, agents or employees, and their successors-in-interest and will not disclose any information
concerning the business of Solidbank, its manner or operation, its plans, processes, or data of any kind.
Issue:
whether the employment ban incorporated in the Undertaking which petitioner executed upon his
retirement is unreasonable, oppressive, hence, contrary to public policy
Held:
In determining whether the contract is reasonable or not, the trial court should consider the
following factors:
(a) whether the covenant protects a legitimate business interest of the employer;
(b) whether the covenant creates an undue burden on the employee;
(c) whether the covenant is injurious to the public welfare;
(d) whether the time and territorial limitations contained in the covenant are reasonable; and
(e) whether the restraint is reasonable from the standpoint of public policy.
At first glance, the post-retirement competitive employment ban is unreasonable because it has no
geographical limits; respondent is barred from accepting any kind of employment in any competitive
bank within the proscribed period. Although the period of one year may appear reasonable, the
matter of whether the restriction is reasonable or unreasonable cannot be ascertained with finality
solely from the terms and conditions of the Undertaking, or even in tandem with the Release, Waiver
and Quitclaim.
However, a distinction must be made between restrictive covenants barring an employee to accept a
post-employment competitive employment (restraint on trade) and restraints on post-retirement
competitive employment in pension and retirement plans. A restriction in the contract which does not
preclude the employee from engaging in competitive activity, but simply provides for the loss of
rights or privileges if he does so is not in restraint of trade.
The strong weight of authority is that forfeitures for engaging in subsequent competitive
employment included in pension and retirement plans are valid even though unrestricted in time or
geography. The reasoning behind this conclusion is that the forfeiture, unlike the restraint included in
the employment contract, is not a prohibition on the employees engaging in competitive work but is
merely a denial of the right to participate in the retirement plan if he does so engage.
A post-retirement competitive employment restriction is designed to protect the employer against
competition by former employees who may retire and obtain retirement or pension benefits and, at
the same time, engage in competitive employment.
Moreover, the Undertaking and the Release, Waiver and Quitclaim do not provide for the automatic
forfeiture of the benefits petitioner received under the SRP upon his breach of said deeds. Thus, the
post-retirement competitive employment ban incorporated in the Undertaking of respondent does
not, on its face, appear to be unreasonable. The terms of the Undertaking merely states that any
breach by petitioner of his promise would entitle respondent to a cause of action for protection in the
courts of law.


G.R. NO. 146779 January 23, 2006
RENATO S. GATBONTON, Petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, MAPUA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY and JOSE
CALDERON,Respondents.
Facts: Petitioner Renato S. Gatbonton is an associate professor of respondent Mapua Institute of
Technology (MIT), Faculty ofCivil Engineering. Some time in November 1998, a civil engineering student
of respondent MIT filed a letter-complaint against petitioner for unfair/unjust grading system, sexual
harassment and conduct unbecoming of an academician. Pending investigation of the complaint,
respondent MIT, through its Committee on Decorum and Investigation placed petitioner under a 30-day
preventive suspension effective January 11, 1999. The committee believed that petitioners continued
stay during the investigation affects his performance as a faculty member, as well as the students
learning; and that the suspension will allow petitioner to "prepare himself for the investigation and will
prevent his influences to other members of the community."
3

Thus, petitioner filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal suspension, damages and attorneys
fees,
4
docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 01-00388-99.
Petitioner questioned the validity of the administrative proceedings with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila in a petition forcertiorari but the case was terminated on May 21, 1999 when the parties entered
into a compromise agreement wherein respondent MIT agreed to publish in the school organ the rules
and regulations implementing Republic Act No. 7877 (R.A. No. 7877) or the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act;
disregard the previous administrative proceedings and conduct anew an investigation on the charges
against petitioner. Petitioner agreed to recognize the validity of the published rules
and regulations, as well as the authority of respondent to investigate, hear and decide the
administrative case against him.
Issue: whether preventive suspension is valid
Held: Preventive suspension is a disciplinary measure for the protection of the companys property
pending investigation of any alleged malfeasance or misfeasance committed by the employee. The
employer may place the worker concerned under preventive suspension if his continued employment
poses a serious and imminent threat to the life or property of the employer or of his co-
workers.
10
However, when it is determined that there is no sufficient basis to justify an employees
preventive suspension, the latter is entitled to the payment of salaries during the time of preventive
suspension.
11

R.A. No. 7877 imposed the duty on educational or training institutions to "promulgate rules and
regulations in consultation with and jointly approved by the employees or students or trainees, through
their duly designated representatives, prescribing the procedures for the investigation of sexual
harassment cases and the administrative sanctions therefor."
12
Petitioners preventive suspension was
based on respondent MITs Rules and Regulations for the Implemention of the Anti-Sexual Harassment
Act of 1995, or R.A. No. 7877. Rule II, Section 1 of the MIT Rules and Regulations provides:
Section 1. Preventive Suspension of Accused in Sexual Harassment Cases. Any member of the
educational community may be placed immediately under preventive suspension during the pendency
of the hearing of the charges of grave sexual harassment against him if the evidence of his guilt is strong
and the school head is morally convinced that the continued stay of the accused during the period of
investigation constitutes a distraction to the normal operations of the institution or poses a risk or
danger to the life or property of the other members of the educational community.


G.R. No. 150660 July 30, 2002
CALS POULTRY SUPPLY CORPORATION and DANILO YAP, petitioners,
vs.
ALFREDO ROCO and CANDELARIA ROCO, respondents.
Facts: CALS Poultry Supply Corporation is engaged in the business of selling dressed chicken and
other related products and managed by Danilo Yap.
1

On March 15, 1984, CALS hired Alfredo Roco as its driver. On the same date, CALS hired Edna Roco,
Alfredo's sister, as a helper in the dressing room of CALS.
2
On May 16, 1995, it hired Candelaria Roco,
another sister, as helper,
3
also at its chicken dressing plant on a probationary basis.
On March 5, 1996, Alfredo Roco and Candelaria Roco filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against CALS
and Danilo Yap alleging that Alfredo and Candelaria were illegally dismissed on January 20, 1996 and
November 5, 1996, respectively.
4
Both also claimed that they were underpaid of their wages.
5
Edna
Roco, likewise, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, alleging that on June 26, 1996, she was reassigned
to the task of washing dirty sacks and for this reason, in addition to her being transferred from night
shift to day time duties, which she considered as management act of harassment, she did not report for
work.
6

According to Alfredo Roco, he was dismissed on January 20, 1996 when he refused to accept P30,000.00
being offered to him by CALS' lawyer, Atty. Myra Cristela A. Yngcong, in exchange for his executing a
letter of voluntary resignation. On the part of Candelaria Roco, she averred that she was terminated
without cause from her job as helper after serving more than six (6) months as probationary employee.
The Labor Arbiter on April 16, 1998, issued a decision dismissing the complaints for illegal dismissal for
lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter found that Alfredo Roco applied for and was granted a leave of absence
for the period from January 4 to 18, 1996. He did not report back for work after the expiration of his
leave of absence, prompting CALS, through its ChiefMaintenance Officer to send him a letter on March
12, 1996 inquiring if he still had intentions of resuming his work. Alfredo Roco did not respond to the
letter despite receipt thereof, thus, Alfredo was not dismissed; it was he who unilaterally severed his
relation with his employer.
7

Issue: whether CALS properly terminated its employee.
Held: CALS argues that the Court of Appeals' computation of the 6-month probationary period is
erroneous as the termination of Candelaria's services on November 15, 1995 was exactly on the last day
of the 6-month period.
We agree with CALS' contention as upheld by both the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that Candelaria's
services was terminated within and not beyond the 6-month probationary period. In Cebu Royal v.
Deputy Minister of Labor,
13
our computation of the 6-month probationary period is reckoned from the
date of appointment up to the same calendar date of the 6
th
month following.


Alcira vs. NLRC G. R. No. 149859, June 9, 2004
Facts: The petitioner, Radin Alcira, was hired by the respondent Middleby Philippines Corporation as
engineering support services supervisor under probationary status for 6 months. Afterwards, the service
of the petitioner was terminated by the respondent on the ground that the latter was not satisfied on
the performance of the former. As a result, the petitioner filed a complaint foe illegal dismissal in the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) against the respondent.

Petitioner contended that his termination in the service tantamount to illegal dismissal since he attained
the status of a regular employee as of the time of dismissal. He presented the appointment paper
showing that he was hired on May 20, 1996, consequently, his dismissal on November 20, 1996 was
illegal because at that time, he was already a regular employee since the 6-month probationary period
ended on November 16, 1996.

The respondent, on the other hand, asserted that during the petitioners probationary period, he
showed poor performance on his assigned tasks, was late couple of times and violated the companys
rule. Thus, the petitioner was terminated and his application to become a regular employment was
disapproved. The respondent also insisted that the removal of the petitioner from office was within the
probationary period.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint on the ground that the dismissal of the petitioner was done
before his regularization because the 6- month probationary period, counting from May 20, 1996 shall
end on November 20, 1996. The NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of NLRC. Hence, the present recourse.

Issue: Whether the petitioner was already a regular employee in respondents company at the time of
his dismissal from the service

Held: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The status of the petitioner at the time of his
termination was still probationary. His dismissal on November 20, 1996 was within the 6- month
probationary period. Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of years, months,
and days and nights, it shall be understood that years are of 365 days, months of 30 days, days of 24
hours and nights are from sunset to sunrise. Since, one month is composed of 30 days, then, 6 months
shall be understood to be composed of 180 days. And the computation of the 6- month period is
reckoned from the date of appointment up to the same calendar date of the 6th month following. Since,
the number of days of a particular month is irrelevant, petitioner was still a probationary employee at
the time of his dismissal. Wherefore, the petition is dismissed.


Mitsubishi Motors vs Chrysler Philippines Labor Union
G.R. No. 148738
June 29, 2004
Petitioner: Mitsubishi Motors Philippines Corporation
Respondents: Chrysler Philippines Labor Union and Nelson Paras
FACTS: Private respondent Nelson Paras first worked with Mitsubishi Philippines as a shuttle bus driver
on March 19, 1976. He resigned on June 16, 1982 because he went to Saudi Arabia and worked there as
a diesel mechanic and heavy machine operator from 1982 to 1993. Upon his return, Mitsubishi
Philippines re-hired him as a welder-fabricator at a tooling shop from November 1, 1994 to March 3,
1995.
On May 1996, Paras was re-hired again, this time as a probationary manufacturing trainee at the Plant
Engineering Maintenance Department. He had an orientation on May 15, 1996 and afterwhich, with
respect to the companys rules and guidelines, started reporting for work on May 27, 1996.
Paras was evaluated by his immediate supervisors after six months of working. The supervisors rating
Paras performance were Lito R. Lacambacal and Wilfredo J. Lopez, as part of the MMPCs company
policies. Upon this evaluation, Paras garnered an average rating.
Later, respondent Paras was informed by his supervisor, Lacambacal, that he received an average
performance rating but it is a rate which would still qualify him to be regularized. But as part of the
company protocols, the Division Managers namely A.C. Velando, H.T. Victoria and Dante Ong reviewed
the performance evaluation made on Paras. Despite the recommendations of the supervisors, they
unanimously agreed that the performance was unsatisfactory. As a consequence, Paras was not
considered for regularization.
Paras received a Notice of Termination on November 26, 1996 which was dated November 25, 1996.
This letters intent is to formally relieve him off of his services and position effective the date since he
failed to meet the companys standards.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Paras termination was legal or not.
HELD: The Court holds that a company employer may indeed hire an employee on a probationary basis
in order to determine his fitness to perform work. The Court stresses the existence of the statements
under Article 281 of the Labor Code which specifies that the employer must inform the employee of the
standards they were to meet in order to be granted regularization and that such probationary period
shall not exceed six (6) months from the date the employee started working, unless specified in the
apprenticeship agreement.
Respondent Paras was employed on a probationary basis and was apprised of the standards upon which
his regularization would be based during the orientation. His first day to report for work was on May 27,
1996. As per the company's policy, the probationary period was from three (3) months to a maximum of
six (6) months. Applying Article 13 of the Civil Code, the probationary period of six (6) months consists of
one hundred eighty (180) days. The Court conforms with paragraph one, Article 13 of the Civil Code
providing that the months which are not designated by their names shall be understood as consisting of
thirty (30) days each. This case, the Labor Code pertains to 180 days. Also, as clearly provided for in the
last paragraph of Article 13, it is said that in computing a period, the first day shall be excluded and the
last day included. Thus, the one hundred eighty (180) days commenced on May 27, 1996, and ended on
November 23, 1996. The termination letter dated November 25, 1996 was served on respondent Paras
only at 3:00 a.m. of November 26, 1996. The Court held that by that time, he was actually already a
regular employee of the petitioner under Article 281 of the Labor Code. His position as a regularized
employee is thus secured until further notice.