Wiener - Quentin Skinner S Hobbes

Sage Publications, Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Political Theory.
http://www.jstor.org
Quentin Skinner's Hobbes
Author(s): Jonathan M. Wiener
Source: Political Theory, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Aug., 1974), pp. 251-260
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/190779
Accessed: 13-08-2014 23:34 UTC
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.
For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
This content downloaded from 146.155.94.33 on Wed, 13 Aug 2014 23:34:08 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
POLITICAL THOUGHT AND
POLITICAL ACTION:
A
Symposium
on Quentin Skinner
1. QUENTIN SKINNER'S HOBBES
JONATHAN M. WIENER
University
of California (Irvine)
OR A LONG TIME it has seemed to
many
that Hobbes must
be understood in the context of social and
political change
m seventeenth-
century England, particularly
in relation to the Civil
War,
which so
frightened
and
preoccupied
him.
Aubrey
wrote that Hobbes's interest in
politics
and the war was so
great
that "for ten
years altogether
his
thoughts
were
much,
or almost
altogether, unhinged
from the mathemat-
ics,"
and Hobbes himself
wrote,
"if in time as in
place,
there were
degrees
of
high
and
low,
I
verily
believe the
highest
of time would be that which
passed
betwixt 1640 and 1660."'
While
many
have considered the links between Hobbes's
thought
and
his
time,
a recent senes of articles
by Quentin
Skinner has made an
important
contribution to the
argument.
Sklnner has
placed
Hobbes's
political thought
in the context of
mid-seventeenth-century English
political
and intellectual
history, arguing
that those who have not done
so-particularly
Warrender-have come to
"historically
absurd"
interpreta-
tions of the
texts,
and that those who
previously
made the effort have
seriously exaggerated
the extent of Hobbes's isolation from his
contempo-
raries.
EDITORS' NOTE. This
Symposium
was
organized by Professor
Benamin
Barber,
at
the time our Modern Political
Theory Editor,
now an editor
Political Theory,
Vol. 2 No.
3, August 1974, ?
1974
Sage Publications,
Inc.
[2511
[2521 POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1974
Skinner's most recent article
begins
with the
political
situation m 1649
The
king
had been
executed,
the House of Lords
abolished,
and Cromwell
declared head of the new
Commonwealth;
the new
government's
first task
was to
persuade
moderate and hostile
groups
that the revolution was
really
over. That
is,
Cromwell needed a
theory
of
political obligation
which
could
persuade Presbyterians
and
Royalists
to abandon their sworn
obligations
to
protect
the life of the
king,
take the oath of
allegiance
to
the
Commonwealth,
and
obey
what
they
considered to be a
usurping
power.
Such a
theory
was formulated
by
a
group
of moderate
intellectuals,
first uncovered
by Zagornn
and often called the
"Engagers",
in their own
day, many
were considered
"Hobblsts,"
but their relations with Hobbes
were
virtually
unknown until Skinner's studies.2 For
Skinner,
this
group
"provides the context within which the main alms and several of the most
characteristic doctrines of Hobbes's
political philosophy
can best be
understood."3
The earliest form of their
argument
was that the Pauline
injunction
to
obey
the
powers
that be as ordained
by
God was valid even for
usurping
powers.
But
Royalists
and
Presbyterians
could
argue
on
good scriptural
authority
that God never ordains but often
permits
the wicked to
rule,
and
that the
Apostle
does not
require
that
tyranny
not be resisted.
The
politically necessary reply
to this
argument
was formulated first
by
Anthony
Ascham,
not
by
Hobbes. Ascham wrote in
1649,
shortly
before
Leviathan was
published,
that men were
obligated
to
obey
whatever
power
existed,
simply
because it was
protecting
them from each
other,
which was
its essential
duty,
and that the alternative was a war of all
against
all. This
argument
was then taken
up by
Marchamont Nedham and a series of
intellectuals Skinner identifies and
discusses,
all of whom
managed
to
"avoid
questions
about
providence by focusing
instead on the
question
of
what
political society
is
for,
and
answenng
that it is
essentially
a
product
of
necessity
and a means to secure
peace
and
protection,"
and that such
protection required
absolute
power.4
But while these "de facto" theonsts as Skinner calls
them,
made their
new
theory
of
obligation explicit,
"none of them
argued
for it in a
very
systematic way,
and few of them ever
stated,
except
in a
very fragmentary
manner,
the
pessirmstic
view of man's
political
nature
upon
which the
theory depended." Only one,
in
fact, managed
to
"elirmnate
all invoca-
tions of God's
providence,
and to
predicate
a de
facto theory
of
political
obligation entirely
on an account of the
political
nature of man."5 That
man was Thomas Hobbes.
Wiener / SYMPOSIUM [2531
Between
February
1650 and the middle of
1651,
five of Hobbes's
political
works were
published,
the last of which was
Levauthan.
According
to
Shknner,
"they
were
immediately recognized by
the other
lay
defenders
of de
facto powers
as
giving
the most authoritative
presentation
of a view
of
at which
they
had all
independently
arnved."
Hobbes,
in Skinner's
view,
"endorses all the most characterstic claims of
the de
facto theorists",
his doctrines
represent
"a somewhat belated
though highly important
contribution to the
lay
defense of
'engage-
ment.' "6 And it was Hobbes's
explicit
intention to
provide
such a
defense, Slknner wntes, pointing
to Hobbes's
proud
claim in 1656 that the
Levtathan
"framed the minds of a thousand
gentlemen
to a conscientious
obedience to
present government,
which otherwise would have wavered on
that
point,"
and to the conclusion of
Leviathan,
where Hobbes wrote that
his book was motivated
by
the
discovery
that "the civil wars have not
yet
sufficiently taught
men in what
point
of time it is that a
subject
becomes
obliged
to the
conqueror;
nor what is
conquest;
nor how it comes
about,
that it
obliges
men to
obey
its laws."7
"There is
nothing
unusual or even
particularly onginal
about Hobbes's
most characteristic
political
beliefs,"
Skinner concludes. Yet the
'Hobblsts'
of the 1650s were second- and third-rate
thinkers,
the
ideological troops
who
forged
the intellectual
weapons
for Cromwell's
cause,
whose own
work is
distinctly
unmemorable. Does Skiner mean to reduce Hobbes to
their level? On the
contrary;
Skinner's conclusion is that Hobbes's
"special
status as a
political
writer" is a
consequence
of his
method,
"the reasons
he
gave
for
holding
his
political
beliefs,
rather than in the beliefs
themselves."8
The
question
then becomes whether Skinner's historical
perspective
on
Hobbes
changes
our
reading
of his
political thought,
or whether it
provides
simply
"another
dimension,"
one of interest to
political
and intellectual
historians,
but not
necessarily
to
political
theorists and
philosophers.
Skinner takes his
analysis
to indicate that the
interpretation
offered
by
Taylor, Warrender,
and F C.
Hood,
who
depend exclusively
on a close
reading
of the texts to
argue
that Hobbes saw the laws of nature as
commands of
God,
can be shown to be
"historcally
absurd."9 The
understanding
of
texts,
Skinner
writes,
"presupposes
the
grasp
both of
what
they
were intended to
mean,
and how this
meaning
was intended to
be taken." The social context
provides
"an ultimate framework" for this
"recovery
of intentions."'0 If Warrender's
interpretation
of Hobbes is
correct,
then
"every contemporary-every follower, every opponent, every
sympathizer-all equally
missed the
point
of his
theory
All of
them,
(254] POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1974
moreover
(surely
an
astounding coincidence),
were mistaken in
exactly
the
same
way,"
since
every single contemporary
cited Hobbes as
having
"located the
grounds
of
in the
paramount
need for
protection,"
itself a
consequence
of man's
nasty
and brutish nature.
1
If Warrender's
interpretation
is
correct,
Hobbes himself must be seen as
having presented
"a traditional
type
of natural law
theory
in a manner so
convoluted that it was
everywhere
taken for the work of a
complete
utilitarian," yet
Hobbes "failed
altogether
either to disown the
alarmungly
radical writers who cited hLs
authority,
or to disarm his innumerable critics
by pointing
out their
misconceptions
of his intentions." To
prove
this
point,
Skinner has
published
a
previously
unknown
manuscript
of
Hobbes's,
his
only
known
reply
to a
critic,
in which he reiterates the
preeminent place
of self-interest in his
theory
of
obligation.i
2
Skinner's work thus constitutes a most
impressive
demonstration of the
argument
that "the
question
of what Hobbes's
theory
is" is neither
"prior
to" nor
separate
from the
question
of its historical
location;
Warrender's
demand for an exclusive adherence to the text should be
rejected
because
it has led to
"historically
absurd" conclusions about the intentions of
everyone present, including Hobbes;
we need "less
philosophy,
and more
history"
in the
study
of Hobbes.1
3
From this
perspective,
MacPherson's work on Hobbes is
plausible
but
incomplete.
His method for
uncovering
the
assumptions governing
Hobbes's
thinking
is the same as Warrender's: a closer
reading
of the text.
But,
Skinner
argues,
if MacPherson is to
prove
that certain social
conditions influenced and limited Hobbes's
assumptions
about
man,
he
must
go
outside the text and
provide
historical evidence that a
"possessive
market"
society actually
existed m Hobbes's
day
and therefore could have
determined Hobbes's
assumptions.1
4
Skinner sees S. I. Mintz's
Hunting of
Leviathan as the most
important
recent
interpretive
work because it
goes
outside Hobbes's text to locate
him "within
contemporary
ethical debate." The
problem
with Mintz is
that he is
simply wrong
in
supporting
the conventional
interpretation
of
Hobbes as
having
been
important
m his time
only
for the "intense
opposition"
he
provoked.!
His influence,
Skinner shows
conclusively,
was not
entirely negative,
and he was not an isolated
figure.
Here Skinner
presents
some
fascinating
evidence that Hobbes was
widely
read in his
day,
apparently
a best-seller. Skinner cites a
catalogue
of "the most vendible
books in
England"
for 1658 which lists Hobbes as the third
biggest-selling
writer, surpassed only by
Bacon and
Raleigh.
Samuel
Pepys
as late as 1668
found Leviathan "so
mightily
called for" that he had to
spend
three times
the
original
price
to
get
a
copy,
even
though
two additional editions had
been
published
that
year.
Hobbes was
widely enough
known so that the
"Hobbist" became a familiar
figure
on the Restoration
stage.
6
But Mintz's
problem
is not
just
his
conclusions;
his method too is
faulty
Skinner observes that Mintz's concern is
exclusively
for the
reactions of other intellectuals to
Hobbes,
rather than his relations with
them;
Mintz fails to "include some account of
political theory
as a social
activity
"'
7
But it is at
precisely
this
point
that Skinner's own
analysis
is least
complete.
His
conception
of
"political theory
as a social
activity"
is
restricted too
narrowly
to the
political positions
of the intellectuals on the
issues of the
early 1650s,
without
considering
their location in the
larger
society,
their own
experience
of social
change
and
political
unrest,
and
their relations to
particular
social classes and
political groups.
Skinner
shows
convincingly
that Hobbes is
part
of a
group
of
ideologists,
but he
never
says precisely
whose
ideology
it is-whether their
particular
defense
of the Commonwealth was based on the world view of a small circle of
rootless
intellectuals,
unrelated to
any
of the
significant
social and
political
forces of the
time,
or whether
they represented particular groups.
A
study dealing
with these
questions
would
require
a
knowledge
of the
political sociology
of
seventeenth-century England;
such a
study
is
possible
now more than ever before. We now
possess
a substantial
body
of
secondary
literature on the
relationship among politics,
social
structure,
and social
change
m
seventeenth-century England,
more than we have on
any
other historical
period.i
8
We not
only
have some of the
necessary secondary sources;
we also
have some models for how the
necessary ideological analysis
could be
carried out. If we are to take
seriously
Skinner's claim that Hobbes's
theory
was not the work of an isolated
individual,
but rather the mutual
creation of a self-conscious
group
of
intellectuals,
then we should consider
that
group
m the terms set
by
Lucien Goldmann's
study
of the Jansenists
and Michael Walzer's work on the Puritan
clergy;
both writers deal with
the
ways
small
groups
of self-conscious itellectuals create new world
views out of
particular experiences
of social
change,
which
bnng
them to
distinctive
political positions.'
9
Skinner's focus on Hobbes's intentions m
publishing
Leviathan m 1651
puts
his
political theory
in too narrow a historical context. Skinner shows
convincingly
what those intentions
were;
but Leviathan was not
only
a
defense of the Commonwealth. The
argument
m it is
remarkably
close to
that of the Elements
of
Law and De
Cive,
which were written much
[256]
POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1974
earlier,
and
published
in 1640 and
1642;
Hobbes's
political philosophy
seems to have been worked
out,
not at all as a
response
to the
engagement
controversy,
but much
earlier,
in the
1630s,
and it seems to have been
substantially complete
before he 'fled'
England.
Hobbes
In
the 1630s could not have been
intending
to
provide
a
philosophical
defense of future
regicides.
Even in terms of Skinner's own
rather narrow interest in
"intentions,"
it is
necessary
to look at Hobbes in
a broader historical context and to examine at least the
political
character
of his
philosophy
in the 1630s. It was first of all
absolutist,
a defense of
the recent moves toward absolutism
by Elizabeth, James,
and Charles-a
theory
of absolutism
distinguished by
an absence of
religious
content;
a
theory perhaps
informed
by
Hobbes's
knowledge
of continental absolut-
ism,
which he observed on his travels to France in the 1630s.
Skinner touches on some of these
separate points,
but never
puts
them
together.
He observes that the "need for absolute
power"
was the "most
notable feature" of Hobbes's
theory
in its
day;
he uncovers
impressive
evidence in Hobbes's
correspondence
that uhs
political
ideas were
"widely
accepted"
on the
continent,
particularly among
French
scientists,
who
"recognized
and
sympathized
with his most ambitious
hopes
for a Science
of Politics."20 More
precisely,
it was Hobbes's science of absolutism that
aroused the enthusiasm of French
scientists; they
seem to have
recognized
the intellectual
importance
of
replacing
the Divine
Right justification
of
the French absolute state with a more modern and rational one. Further
study
of Hobbes's relations with French
society
and
politics
would
illuminate this
point.
The view of Hobbes as
having orginally developed
his
philosophy
as a
defense of
absolutism,
particularly
that of James and
Charles,
is not at all
incompatible
with Skinner's
picture
of Hobbes in 1651
arguing
for
Cromwell,
as R S. Peters has
suggested.
He sees Hobbes as
arguing
that,
since Charles's move toward absolutism had been
defeated,
the next best
thing
for
England
was an absolute
government
headed
by
Cromwell-who
"should become
king by
common consent and
dispense
with
incompetent
Parliamentarians."2
1
If we are to have a full account of the creation of this science of
absolutism "as a social
activity,"
we need to examine the
relationship
between Hobbes's own
experience
in
society
and his distinctive world
view,
to determine whether there is an identifiable social
position
from
which he
gaied
his
particular perspective
on
politics
and
society
Skinner
does an
outstanding job
on Hobbes's intellectual milieu in the
1650s,
but
he does not consider Hobbes's relations with
society
in the first
fifty years
of uhs
life,
the
penod
before 1640 when he was
developing
his science of
absolutism as a member of the household of the
great
aristocratic and
royalist family
of the Cavendishes. Hobbes had been "one of the common
people,"
as he himself
admitted,
before
entering
the Cavendish
household;
in exile after
1640,
he tutored the future Charles
II,
and later the Earl of
Clarendon wrote of Hobbes's close
relationship
with the
"nobility, by
whose bread he hath been
always
sustained."22
Thus Hobbes's own social
position,
at least to the time he was
fifty,
was
that of a common-bor intellectual who "made it" into the heart of
aristocratic and
royalist
circles. He was as close as
any
commoner could be
to the
top
of
English society;
this
position
must have
played
a
significant
role in the formation of his ideas about man's
nasty
and
competitive
nature,
and about the
resulting
need for absolute
power.
A clearer
conception
of the
relationship
between social class and absolutism in this
period
would
clarify
Hobbes's
position considerably
23
An alternative to
viewing
Hobbes
primarily
in terms of his
relationship
to the
top
of
English society
is to consider his own
experience
of social
mobility
in a time of
rapid
social
change
and
widespread political
unrest.
Such an
interpretation
of Hobbes is
suggested
in Michael Walzer's
Revolution
of
the Saints. Walzer
suggests
that Hobbes's science of
absolutism can best be
interpreted
as an
"ideology
of transition" which
"met the human needs that arise whenever traditional controls
give way
and hlerarcuhcal status and
corporate privilege
are called into
question."
Hobbes
responded
to social "unsettledness"
by calling
for an absolute
central
power,
on the one
hand,
and a
narrowing
of
people's
energies
from
political
to economic
competition,
on the other. In this
view,
Hobbes was
responding
not so much to
particular
elements of the traditional
order,
such as the
monarchy
and its
interests,
as he was to the "disorder of the
transition
period."
The old order was
only
a
part,
and not the most
important part,
of his
experience;
he lived most of his life amid the
breakdown of that order and in exile from that breakdown. The
advocacy
of absolutism can be seen as one of the
ways
in which some men seek to
cope
with their
experience
of the breakdown of the old
order;
Puritan
sainthood is another
way
24
In Slknner's work on
Hobbes, then,
he has considered the
methodolog-
ical
problem
of the
relationship
of
political thought
to
history
and
argued
that
political
ideas cannot be understood
apart
from their historical
context. His studies of Hobbes's
relationship
to the
engagement
controver-
sy
of the 1650s can be considered a case
study
of the method he is
advocating
for the
history
of
political theory
as a whole. These
studies,
it
[258] POLITICAL THEORY /AUGUST 1974
seems to
me,
identify conclusively
the
contemporary political
and
intellectual context of Leviathan and demonstrate that an exclusive
reliance on textual
analysis
leads to a
faulty understanding, particularly
of
Hobbes's
theory
of
obligation.
Skinner has thus made an
important
contribution to the
study
of
Hobbes.
However,
his
conception
of the "historical context" must be
broadened-from a focus on the
political
intentions of the Hobbist
intellectuals in relation to the
Commonwealth,
to a concern for the social
origins
of Hobbes's
philosophy
before the Civil
War,
and more
generally
to
the relations between social
change,
the new
science,
and the
politics
of
absolutism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This would
appear
to
require
a
way
of
doing history
rather different from Skinner's-one tied
less
exclusively
to the intellectual
history
of the
1650s,
one
explicitly
comparative, speculative,
and theoretical.
NOTES
1. John
Aubrey, Brief Lives,
ed. A. Clark,
2 vols.
(Oxford, 1898), I, 333; The
English
Works
of
Thomas Hobbes,
ed. W
Molesworth, 11
vols.
(London, 1839), VI,
165.
2. Perez
Zagorn,
A
History of
Political
Thought
in the
English
Revolution
(London, 1954).
3.
Quentin Skinner, "Conquest
and Consent: Thomas Hobbes and the
Engage-
ment
Controversy,"
in G. E.
Aylmer (ed.),
The
Interregnum:
The
Quest for
Settlement,
1646-1660 (London, 1972),
80. This
group
is also discussed
by Skmner
in
"History
and
Ideology
in the
English
Revolution," Historical Journal 8
(1965),
151-178,
and "The
Ideological
Context of Hobbes's Political
Thought,"
Historical
Journal 9
(1966), 287-317;
this article has been revised: "The Context of Hobbes's
Theory
of Political
Obligation,"
in Maurice Cranston and Richard S. Peters
(eds.),
Hobbes and Rousseau (Garden City, N.Y., 1972),
109-142.
4.
"Conquest
and Consent," 88,
91.
5.
"Conquest
and
Consent,"
94.
6.
"Conquest
and
Consent," 94, 95,
96.
7 EW VII, 335-336,
Thomas
Hobbes, Leviathan, ed.,
C. B. MacPherson
(Baltimore, 1968),
719.
8.
"Conquest
and Consent,"
97-98.
9. "Context of Hobbes's
Theory," 142;
A. E.
Taylor,
"The Ethical Doctrine of
Hobbes," Philosophy
103
(1938), 109;
H. Warrender,
The Political
Philosophy of
Hobbes
(Oxford, 1957);
F C.
Hood,
The Devine Politics
of
Thomas Hobbes (Oxford,
1964).
Hood is
important,
Skinner
writes,
for
making "only
the most colorful and
least
plausible
contribution to a
type
of
study
which is itself misconceived." Skinner,
"Hobbes's
Leviathan,"
Historcal Journal 7
(1964),
322.
10.
Quentin
Skinner,
"Meaning
and
Understanding
m the
History
of Ideas,"
History
and
Theory
8
(1969),
48-49
Theory,"
137-138.
Theory," 141, Skinner, "Hobbes on
Sovereignty
An
Unknown
Discussion,"
Political Studies 13
(1965),
213-218.
13. "Hobbes's Levtathan," 333.
14. C. B.
MacPherson,
The Political
Theory of
Possessive Individualism
(Oxford,
1964);
"Hobbes's Leviathan," 323.
15. Samuel 1.
Mintz,
The Hunting of
Leviathan
(Cambridge, 1962),
155. This is
the
analysis
of
virtually
all commentators until
Skinner;
for references see "Context
of Hobbes's
Theory,"
109-110.
Theory,"
113, 115-116.
17 "Hobbes's
Leviathan,"
333.
18. The most
important
works include Lawrence
Stone, Causes
of
the
English
Revolution, 1529-1642
(New York, 1972),
and Criss
of
the
Aristocracy,
1558-1641
(Oxford, 1965);
R. H.
Tawney,
"The Rise of the
Gentry,"
Economic
History
Review
11
(1941), 1-38;
H. R.
Trevor-Roper,
"The General Crisis of the Seventeenth
Century,"
Past and Present 16
(1959), 31-64, Christopher
Hill,
Century of
Revolution
1603-1714
(London, 1961);
Patrick
Collinson,
The Elizabethan Puritan Movement
(Berkeley, 1967);
Robert
Brenner,
"The Civil War Politics of London's Merchant
Community,"
Past and Present 58
(February, 1973).
19. Luclen Goldmann,
The Hidden God
(New York, 1964);
Michael
Walzer,
Revolution
of
the Saints
(Cambridge, 1965).
20.
"Conquest
and
Consent," 92; Quentin Skiner,
"Thomas Hobbes and His
Disciples
in France and
England," Comparative
Studies in
Society
and
History
8
(1965-66),
164. For Hobbes's relations with
English scientists,
see
Skinner,
"Thomas
Hobbes and the Nature of the
Early Royal Society,"
Historical Journal 12
(1969),
217-239. Skinner does not
place
the
seventeenth-century
French scientists with
whom Hobbes associated in their own
political context;
for
instance,
the
patron
of
Mersenne's circle was
Richelieu,
who
played
a definitive role m the
development
of
French absolutism. Hobbes's influence on
subsequent
continental absolutist
theory
has been noted
by Skinner;
"the
apologists
for absolutism in France
accepted
the
relevance of Hobbes's doctrine."
"Ideological Context,"
289
21. Richard S.
Peters,
Hobbes
(London, 1967),
35.
22. Cited In
Christopher Hill,
The World Turned
Upside
Down
(London, 1972),
313. The Cavendish
family
is discussed
frequently
m
Stone, Crisls of Aristocracy.
23. The
starting point
for a consideration of social class in relation to absolutism
is
Barrington Moore, Jr.,
Social
Origins of Dictatorship
and
Democracy (Boston,
1966), esp.
chs. 1, 2,
7
24.
Walzer,
Revolution
of Saints,
312-313.
Selected Works
by Quentin
Skinner
"Conquest
and Consent: Thomas Hobbes and the
Engagement Controversy,"
in G. E.
Aylmer (ed.),
The
Interregnum:
The
Quest for Settlement,
1646-1660
(London,
1972).
[260] POLITICAL THEORY / AUGUST 1974
"The Context of Hobbes's
Theory
of Political
Obligation,"
in Maurice Cranston and
Richard S. Peters
(eds.),
Hobbes and Rousseau (Garden City, N.Y., 1972),
109-142.
"History
and
Ideology
in the
English Revolution,"
(1965),
151-178.
"Hobbes's
Leviathan,"
(1964),
321-333.
"Hobbes on
Soverelgnty
An Unknown
Discussion,"
Political Studies 13
(1965),
213-218.
"The
Ideological
Context of Hobbes's Political
Thought,"
Historcal Journal 9
(1966),
286-317
"The Limits of Historical
Explanations," Philosophy
41
(1966),
199-215.
"Meaning
and
Understanding
in the
History
of
Ideas," History
and
Theory
8
(1969),
3-53.
"Thomas Hobbes and His
Disciples
in France and
England," Comparative
Studies in
Society
and
History
8 (1965-66),
153-167
"Thomas Hobbes and the Nature of the
Early Royal Society,"
(1969),
217-239.

Wiener - Quentin Skinner S Hobbes

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Wiener - Quentin Skinner S Hobbes

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Sage Publications, Inc. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Political Theory.

You might also like