VIA U.P.S. No.

1Z64589FP291602502 August 21, 2014

Email: davidt@flcourts.org
Thomas A. "Tad" David cc: J ohn F. Harkness, Executive Director
General Counsel The Florida Bar, jharkness@flabar.org
Office of the State Courts Administrator
Supreme Court Building cc: J ohn A. Tomasino, Clerk, Florida
500 South Duval Street Supreme Court, tomasino@flcourts.org
Tallahassee, FL 32399
RE: Cost of records; your letter J uly 30, 2014; WFTV, Inc. v. Wilken, 675 So. 2d 674,
676 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Roesch v. State, supra).
Dear Mr. David:
Thank you for your letter of J uly 30, 2014. You wrote, The Florida courts have held that
"charging a fee for copying judicial records does not interfere with [the requester's]
constitutionally protected right to access." WFTV, Inc. v. Wilken, 675 So. 2d 674, 676 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1996) (citing Roesch v. State, supra).
Okay, fine. If I agree to pay a fee for records, I object to the amount charged as unreasonable.
Footnote 1 in WFTV, Inc. v. Wilken, We do not address appellants' contention that the charge of
$1.00 per page is unreasonable because this point was not raised in the trial court. The case was
submitted to the trial court on a set of stipulated facts. A copy of the case is enclosed.
You wrote, if you want to select to receive a portion of the records you requested, you may pay
only the charges for that portion on the invoice. We could provide the selected records to you,
and you would incur a much lower cost. Okay fine, show me how to incur a much lower cost.
Please include the amount charged for the records.
WFTV, Inc. v. Wilken, is an old case from a technology standpoint. In 1996 few ordinary people
had a computer with a PDF program, and sufficient Internet service to get records electronically.
I do not require paper copies of records, electronic PDF records are fine. You may provide PDF
records at little or no cost. I request disability accommodation shown on OSCAs website.
http://www.flcourts.org/administration-funding/court-administration/accessibility-statement.stml
Section 508 now establishes requirements for electronic and information technology
developed, maintained, procured, or used by the Federal government. Section 508
requires Federal electronic and information technology to be accessible to people with
disabilities, including employees and members of the public.
If you require a disability application from me, I will provide one, just tell me what you want.
It does not appear that WFTV, Inc. v. Wilken is on point with my request for equal disability
access to courts. The records requested show how and why the Supreme Court discriminates in
Thomas A. "Tad" David, General Counsel August 21, 2014
Office of the State Courts Administrator Page - 2
its treatment of disabled persons. The Supreme Court personally intervened to assist a young
attractive female lawyer with access a Bar social event, even before the lawyer was admitted to
practice. However ordinary people attending court hearings, not social events, do not get
personal intervention by the Supreme Court. Therefore I believe Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S.
509 (2004) is a better case to consider. The Supreme Court of the United States found a valid
exercise of Congress's enforcement powers under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment for
ADA accommodation, and abrogation of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.
The public, including me, has a right to know, in writing (public records) why the Supreme
Court has a two-tiered disability accommodation policy. So this is a policy matter, not records.
WFTV, Inc. v. Wilken, is not a disability access to court case. This lawsuit arose when the Clerk
of the Palm Beach County Circuit Court commenced charging $1.00 per page for copies of court
records, asserting that this charge was in accordance with subsection 28.24(8)(a), Florida
Statutes (1995). Appellants challenge the legality of the $1.00 per page charge. We affirm the
trial court's entry of summary judgment because we find that the principles of Times Publishing
Co. v. Ake, 660 So.2d 255 (Fla.1995), are not violated by the legislative determination of
applicable charges for copies of court records and further that the charges set forth in subsection
28.24(8)(a) are applicable to all court records.
Otherwise WFTV, Inc. v. Wilken is wrong in the extreme with its holding that $1 per page for
records is constitutional. In fact, in Roesch v. State, 633 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla.1993), our supreme
court found that an incarcerated indigent defendant denied free copies of public records is not
deprived of any constitutional right to access but is simply "in the same position as anyone else
seeking public records who cannot pay the copying costs and who cannot afford the trip to
personally examine the records." Well, a law-abiding indigent person who cant afford public
records in a civil case does not have access within the meaning of the Constitution either. The
ability to examine the record is not very useful. A copy of the record is needed to memorialize
the information on the record, and to submit the copy of the record to court if needed.
PACER has been the standard for Public Access to Electronic Court Records for the past twenty
five years. PACER is an electronic public access service of United States federal court
documents. It allows users to obtain case and docket information from the United States district
courts, United States courts of appeals, and United States bankruptcy courts. The system is
managed by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts in accordance with the
policies of the J udicial Conference, headed by the Chief J ustice of the United States. As of 2013,
it holds more than 500 million documents. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PACER_%28law%29
The United States Congress has given the J udicial Conference of the United States authority to
impose user fees for electronic access to case information. All registered agencies or individuals
are charged a user fee. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PACER_%28law%29
The fee, as of April 1, 2012, to access the web-based PACER systems is $0.10 per page. Prior
to that the fee was $0.08 per page and prior to J anuary 1, 2005, the fee was $0.07 per page. The
per page charge applies to the number of pages that results from any search, including a search
that yields no matches with a one page charge for no matches. The charge applies whether or not
pages are printed, viewed, or downloaded. There is a maximum charge of $3.00 for electronic
disabled
Thomas A. "Tad" David, General Counsel August 21, 2014
Office of the State Courts Administrator Page - 3
access to any single document other than name searches, reports that are not case-specific, and
transcripts of federal court proceedings. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/PACER_%28law%29
You wrote, The Supremacy Clause is implicated only when there is a direct conflict between
the state law and federal law and only when the state is clearly subject to the provisions of the
federal law. Here there is a direct conflict between the state law and federal law, PACER.
You wrote, there is no right to access to public records under the United States Constitution.
None is needed under the Ninth Amendment: The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
Here in Marion County where I live, and have an active civil case, there is no public access
through the Florida Courts E-filing Portal. PACER is available in the federal court
1
situated right
behind the Marion County Court. There is a direct conflict between the state law and federal
law, Florida Courts E-filing Portal and PACER. Therefore the Supremacy Clause is implicated.
Unfortunately you did not respond the crime spree perpetrated in my situation by the courts and
the Attorney General of Florida, Pam Bondi, and her coconspirators: (and my former lawyers)
Enclosed is my motion February 6, 2014 to proceed in forma pauperis in the petition for
rehearing of SCOTUS Petition No. 13-7280. See page 7,
This petition and rehearing is extraordinarily expensive because of fraud or impairment
of Petition No. 12-7747 by the Florida Attorney General et al who conspired with the
Thirteenth J udicial Circuit to falsely show that I did not serve my petition as show on the
Rule 29 proof of service. This required shipping to a broader audience in an effort to
deter the AG and coconspirators from further obstruction of justice. The increased cots
shown below amount to $2,442.02, and include $100 for process serving to the AG who
refused to provide basic service of process information, some of which I later found on
the AGs website...I also commenced a so-far unsuccessful Go-Fund-Me crowd funding
drive that did not get any donations as of this IFP motion.
http://www.gofundme.com/STOP-wrongful-Foreclosure
See, RULE 4-8.3 REPORTING PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT
(a) Reporting Misconduct of Other Lawyers. A lawyer who knows that another lawyer
has committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial
question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other
respects shall inform the appropriate professional authority.
(b) Reporting Misconduct of J udges. A lawyer who knows that a judge has committed a
violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct that raises a substantial question as to the
judge's fitness for office shall inform the appropriate authority.

1
U.S. District Court, Middle District of Florida, Ocala Division.
Thomas A. "Tad" David, General Counsel August 21, 2014
Office of the State Courts Administrator Page - 4
Thank you in advance for the courtesy of a response.
Sincerely,
Neil J . Gillespie
8092 SW 115th Loop
Ocala, Florida 34481
Telephone: 352-854-7807
Email: neilgillespie@mfi.net
Enclosures: WFTV, Inc. v. Wilken, 675 So. 2d 674, 676 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (citing Roesch
v. State, supra).
Letter of Thomas A. Tad David, General Counsel, OSCA, J uly 30, 2014, RE: Public Records
Request -dated May 27, 2014
JorgeLabarga
Patricia(PK)Jameson
Chief Justice
StateCourtsAdministrator
OfficeoftheStateCourtsAdministrator
TbomasA. David
GeneralCounsel
Phone: (850)922-5109 Fax: (850)410-5301
e-mail:davidt@flcourts.org
July30,2014
Mr.NeilJ. Gillespie ViaElectronicMailOnly
8092 SW 115thLoop atneilgilJespieCq1nlti.net
Ocala,Florida34481
RE: PublicRecordsRequest- datedMay27,2014
DearMr. Gillespie:
ThisletterisinresponsetoyourletterdatedJuly30,2014,deliveredbyelectronicmail
tomeonthesamedate.
Youquotedmyemailassayingthe"court'sinvoicewasonly$87.63total." You,then,
pointed out that $87.63 was a substantial amount to you, which missed the point ofmy
reference. ThereasonIcitedtheamountoftheCourt'sinvoiceandmodifieditwiththeword
"only"isthatyourletterdidnotcitetheamountchargedbytheCourtandcontainedreferences
only to the much more substantial amount charge by The Florida Bar. While this issue is
renderedmootwithinthecontextofyourlatestletteraskingforallchargestobewaived,Iwant
toensureyouthatIrespecteverypennythisofficechargessomeoneforpublicrecords.
Noone,indigentornot,hasarighttofree publicrecordsunderRule2.420,Fla.R. Jud.
Admin., whichrequires paymentoffees pursuantto Section 119.07,Fla. Stat. See Roesch v.
State, 633 So.2d 1(Fla. 1993). TheFloridacourtshaveheldthat"charginga fee for copying
judicial records does not interfere with [the requester's] constitutionally protected right to
access." WFTV, Inc. v. Wilken, 675 So. 2d674, 676(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)(citingRoesch
v. State, supra).
The Supremacy Clause is implicated only when there is a direct conflict betweenthe
state law and federal law and only when the state is clearly subjectto the provisions ofthe
federal law. Thefederal FreedomofInformationAct(FOIA), byitsterms, is applicableonly
to executive agencies ofthe Federal Government. FOIA is inapplicableto state government
publicrecords.Additionally,thereisnorighttoaccesstopublicrecordsundertheUnitedStates
Constitution.Therefore,theSupremacyClausedoesnotapplyinthissituation.
Atthistime, itwouldnotbeprudentformetowaivethefees indicatedontheinvoice.
AsIstatedinmypreviousemail,ifyouwanttoselecttoreceiveaportionoftherecordsyou
SupremeCourtBuilding

SOO SouthDuval Street

TaJIahassee, Florida32399-1900

http://www.flcourts.org
Mr.NeilGillespie
July30,2014
Page2
requested,youmaypayonlythechargesforthatportionontheinvoice. Wecouldprovidethe
selectedrecordstoyou,andyouwouldincuramuchlowercost. Ifyouchoosetodoso,please,
makeanycheckormoneyorderpayabletothe StateofFlorida,and include"publicrecords
costs"inthememoline.
Respectfully,
ThomasA. David
TAD/
Cc: JohnA. Tomasino,Clerk
FloridaSupremeCourt
tonlasinoCij)flcourts.org
JohnF. Harkness,Jr.,ExecutiveDirector
TheFloridaBar
iharkness(tl{tlabar.org
675 So.2d 674 (1996)
WFTV, INC., d/b/a Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc., Sun-Sentinel Company, Inc. and
Miami Herald Publishing Company, Appellant,
v.
Dorothy H. WILKEN, Clerk of the Court, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, Palm Beach County,
Appellee.
No. 95-2352.
J une 19, 1996.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
*675 L. Martin Reeder, J r., and Cristina M. Simon of Steel Hector & Davis, West Palm Beach, for appellants.
675
Charles F. Schoech and Bill Corley of Caldwell & Pacetti, Palm Beach, for appellee.
Lorence J on Bielby of Greenberg Traurig Hoffman Lipoff Rosen & Quentel, P.A., for Amicus Curiae Florida
Association of Court Clerks, Inc.
PARIENTE, J udge.
This lawsuit arose when the Clerk of the Palm Beach County Circuit Court commenced charging $1.00 per
page for copies of court records, asserting that this charge was in accordance with subsection 28.24(8)(a),
Florida Statutes (1995). Appellants challenge the legality of the $1.00 per page charge. We affirm the trial
court's entry of summary judgment because we find that the principles of Times Publishing Co. v. Ake, 660
So.2d 255 (Fla.1995), are not violated by the legislative determination of applicable charges for copies of
court records and further that the charges set forth in subsection 28.24(8)(a) are applicable to all court
records.
[1]
*676 In Ake, our supreme court approved the decision of the second district that:
676
The clerk, when acting in the exercise of his duties derived from article V is acting as an arm of
the court and, as such, is immune from the supervisory authority of the legislature. Thus, chapter
119 does not apply to the clerk in such capacity and the access to judicial records under his
control is governed exclusively by rule 2.051 [of the Rules of J udicial Administration].
660 So.2d at 257 (quoting Times Publishing Co. v. Ake, 645 So.2d 1003, 1005 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)). Ake
stands for the proposition that access to judicial records under the clerk's control is governed exclusively by
the supreme court.
Contrary to appellants' position, charging a fee for copying judicial records does not interfere with appellants'
constitutionally protected right to access. In fact, in Roesch v. State, 633 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla.1993), our supreme
court found that an incarcerated indigent defendant denied free copies of public records is not deprived of
any constitutional right to access but is simply "in the same position as anyone else seeking public records
who cannot pay the copying costs and who cannot afford the trip to personally examine the records." Id. See
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3205353107592716263
also Yanke v. State, 588 So.2d 4 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), review denied, 595 So.2d 559 (Fla.), cert. denied, 503
U.S. 973, 112 S.Ct. 1592, 118 L.Ed.2d 309 (1992).
Our supreme court emphasized in Ake that it had directly addressed its responsibility concerning access to
court records by adopting In re Amendments to Rule of Judicial Administration 2.051-Public Access to
Judicial Records, 651 So.2d 1185 (Fla.1995), in which it "implemented article I, section 24, of the Florida
Constitution, by setting forth the openness of court records, the standards for exemptions, and, in an
extensive commentary, an explanation of the rule's application." Ake, 660 So.2d at 257. In adopting the
comprehensive provisions of rule 2.051 governing access to court records, our supreme court did not adopt
any provisions dealing with the costs to be charged to obtain copies of those records.
In fact, in Amendments to Rule 2.051, our supreme court rejected certain language urged by Times
Publishing Company, stating: "We choose not to accept these suggestions because to do so could have
fiscal ramifications...."
[2]
651 So.2d at 1186. We do not find that the reasoning in Ake, which dealt with the
exclusive jurisdiction of the supreme court to exercise supervisory authority over the judicial branch,
precludes the legislature from setting fees for copies of court records. See also Bauer v. Resolution Trust
Corp., 621 So.2d 521, 522 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (clerk of court required to charge fees specified by section
28.24(13)).
As an alternative argument, appellants contend that if the legislature has the authority to mandate the fees
charged for copying court records, then the $.15 per page charge set forth in subsection 119.07(1)(a)
applies, rather than subsection 28.24(8). Section 28.24 establishes a comprehensive fee schedule for
services provided by the clerk,
[3]
and specifically, section 28.24(8)(a) provides for a service charge by the
Clerk of the Circuit Court of $1.00 per page for the making of copies by photographic process for "any
instrument in the public records" consisting of pages not more than 14 inches by 8 1/2 inches. Appellants
argue that subsection *677 28.24(8) does not apply to all court records because all court records are not
included within the phrase "any instrument in the public records."
677
While section 28.24 sets forth the mandatory amounts to be charged by the clerk of court for a
comprehensive list of specific services, subsection 119.07(1)(a) is a general statute applicable to all
custodians of public records. Subsection 119.07(1)(a) requires the custodian of a public record to furnish a
copy
upon payment of the fee prescribed by law or, if a fee is not prescribed by law, for duplicated
copies of not more than 14 inches by 8 inches, upon payment of not more than 15 cents per
one-sided copy, and for all other copies, upon payment of the actual cost of duplication of the
record.
(Emphasis supplied).
If court records are not encompassed by subsection 28.24(8), there would be no fee prescribed by law, and
subsection 119.07(1)(a) would apply. This is because there is no other subsection within chapter 28 dealing
with the copying of court records and no other statute specifically pertaining to charges for court records.
The focus of our statutory analysis is the phrase "instrument in the public records." The term "public records"
has been defined by statute, see 28.001(2), Fla. Stat. (1995); the term "instrument" has not. As we stated
in Arthur Young & Co. v. Mariner Corp., 630 So.2d 1199, 1202 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994):
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When courts are required to interpret statutory language, "a statute should be construed and
applied so as to give effect to the evident legislative intent, regardless of whether such
construction varies from the statute's literal meaning." Nevertheless, that intent is determined
primarily from the language of the statute. "When the language of a statute is clear and
unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the
rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute itself must be given its plain and
obvious meaning."
(Citations omitted). See also Green v. State, 604 So.2d 471, 473 (Fla.1992).
"One of the most fundamental tenets of statutory construction requires that we give statutory language its
plain and ordinary meaning, unless the words are defined in the statute or by the clear intent of the
legislature." Green, 604 So.2d at 473. See also Southeastern Fisheries Ass'n v. Department of Natural
Resources, 453 So.2d 1351 (Fla.1984). If necessary, the plain and ordinary meaning of the word can be
ascertained by reference to a dictionary. Green; Gardner v. Johnson, 451 So.2d 477 (1984).
The ordinary meaning of the term "instrument" can include those documents having independent legal
significance such as contracts, deeds, wills, bonds, or leases as well as a more expansive definition of
"[a]nything reduced to writing, a document of a formal or solemn character, a writing given as a means of
affording evidence." See Black's Law Dictionary 801 (6th ed.1990).
[4]
Whether or not an "instrument"
includes all court records maintained by the clerk depends on whether a restrictive or expansive definition of
"instrument" is employed.
*678 In a J uly 11, 1994 opinion, the Florida Attorney General opined that the term "instrument" within section
28.24(8) included only those documents having independent legal significance, such as contracts, deeds,
wills, bonds, or leases.
[5]
See 94-60 Op. Att'y Gen. (1994). The Florida Attorney General utilized only part of
Black's dictionary definition and ascribed the narrowest construction to the term. Appellants urge us to adopt
this construction or to utilize an even narrower definition restricting "instruments" to only those documents
that are recorded.
678
A statutory term should not be read in isolation, but rather in context. See C.S. & J.S. v. S.H. & K.H., 671
So.2d 260, 268 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Arthur Young, 630 So.2d at 1202. Interpreting the phrase "instruments
in the public records" as limited to recorded documents would be inconsistent with section 28.001, which
defines "official records" and "public records":
(1) "Official records" means each instrument that the clerk of the circuit court is required or
authorized to record in the series of books called "Official Records" as provided for in s. 28.222.
(2) "Public records" has the same meaning as in s. 119.011
[6]
and includes each official record.
(Emphasis supplied). Because public records encompass both recorded and unrecorded documents, if the
legislature had intended to restrict the $1.00 charge to recorded documents only, it would have utilized the
phrase "instrument in the official records." See 28.24(15)(c). Therefore, an "instrument in the public
records" must include unrecorded, as well as recorded, instruments.
The next issue for our determination is whether the legislature intended to limit the term "instrument" to a
narrow class of court records, consistent with the Attorney General's opinion. A phrase must be viewed in the
context of the entire statutory section. See Jackson v. State, 634 So.2d 1103, 1104 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994);
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Arthur Young, 630 So.2d at 1202. A review of other subsections within section 28.24 supports the
conclusion that the legislature intended to use the term "instrument" expansively. Subsection 28.24(4)
requires a $2.00 per "instrument" charge for preparing, numbering, and indexing an original "record" of
appellate proceedings. If the term "instrument" were limited in the manner appellants suggest, this subsection
would be rendered meaningless and there would be virtually no charge for preparing the record on appeal.
See Weber v. Dobbins, 616 So.2d 956, 958 (Fla.1993) (literal interpretation of language of statute need not
be given when to do so would lead to unreasonable or ridiculous conclusion).
Other examples of the expansive use of the term "instrument" within section 28.24 are as follows:
(5): For certifying copies of any instrument in the public records ... $1.00 per page
* * * * * *
(10): For copying any instrument in the public records by other than photographic process, per
page ... $4.00.
If the term "instrument" were limited to recorded documents, there would be no charge established for
certifying copies of all other court documents. In view of the fact that section 28.24 encompasses a
comprehensive schedule of services and the corresponding charges, it is logical to conclude that the
legislature intended to set charges for all court records and not only a very limited class of documents. See
Arthur Young, 630 So.2d at 1202.
*679 A statutory phrase should also be viewed not only in its internal context within the section, but in
harmony with interlocking statutes. See C.S., 671 So.2d at 268; Arthur Young, 630 So.2d at 1202. Section
28.231, Florida Statutes (1995), sets forth that the clerks of any state appellate or county or state trial court
"shall receive as compensation for similar services the same charges as provided in this chapter for the clerk
of the circuit court." Since the appellate court clerks do not handle any recorded court records, the appellate
court clerk's current practice of charging $1.00 per page, derived from reading section 28.231 in pari materia
with subsection 28.24(8)(a), would be without statutory authority.
679
Finally, we note that section 25.241, Florida Statutes (1995), requires the clerk of the supreme court to
collect a fee of at least $1.00 for the copying of "opinions, records, papers, or other instruments." (Emphasis
supplied). The use of the term "other" in the phrase "or other instruments" indicates that opinions, records,
and papers are included in the term "instruments" for purposes of that statute. Because the subject matter of
sections 25.241 and 28.24(8) is closely related, i.e., the copying of public records, it follows that the term
"instrument" should be interpreted consistently in the two sections. See Florida State Racing Comm'n v.
McLaughlin, 102 So.2d 574, 576 (Fla.1958) (whether statute being construed is consistent with closely
related statute is a factor in statutory construction).
A reading of section 28.24 as a whole and in pari materia with similar statutes governing court records leads
us to the conclusion that there is no legal distinction in section 28.24 between the term "instrument" and the
term "document," and court records are thus included within "any instrument in the public records" subject to
subsection 28.24(8)(a) copying charges. Accordingly, the summary judgment is affirmed.
KLEIN and SHAHOOD, J J ., concur.
[1] We do not address appellants' contention that the charge of $1.00 per page is unreasonable because this point was not raised in the trial
court. The case was submitted to the trial court on a set of stipulated facts.
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[2] Times Publishing Company suggested substitute language to address its concerns about copyright protection, confidentiality, and the
statement that the closing of court proceedings requires prior notice while the closing of court records does not. In re Amendments to Rule
of Judicial Administration 2.051Public Access to Judicial Records, 651 So.2d 1185, 1186 (Fla. 1995).
[3] Examples of the services covered and fees charged by the clerk of court under section 28.24 include the following: court attendance by
each clerk at $75.00 per day; court minutes at $5.00 per page; verifying any instrument presented for certification prepared by someone
other than the clerk at $2.00 per page; and recording, indexing, and filing any instrument not more than 14 inches by 8 1/2 inches at $5.00
for the first page and $4.00 per each additional page.
[4] Black's Law Dictionary 801 (6th ed.1990) contains the following definition of "instrument":
A formal or legal document in writing, such as a contract, deed, will, bond, or lease. A writing that satisfies the requisites of negotiability
prescribed by U.C.C. Art. 3. A negotiable instrument (defined in U.C.C. 3-104), or a security (defined in U.C.C. 8-102) or any other
writing which evidences a right to the payment of money and is not itself a security agreement or lease and is of a type which is in ordinary
course of business transferred by delivery with any necessary indorsement or assignment.
Anything reduced to writing, a document of a formal or solemn character, a writing given as a means of affording evidence. A document or
writing which gives formal expression to a legal act or agreement, for the purpose of creating, securing, modifying, or terminating a right. A
writing executed and delivered as the evidence of an act or agreement. Anything which may be presented as evidence to the senses of the
adjudicating tribunal.
Incomplete instrument. A paper whose contents show, at the time of signing, that it is intended to become an instrument but that is not an
instrument because a necessary element is missing.
(Citations omitted).
[5] This narrow definition of the term"instrument" led the Florida Attorney General to conclude that chapter 28 does not require the clerk of
the circuit court to charge $1.00 per page for all public records. Op. Att'y Gen. Fla. 94-60 (1994). We note that the opinion of the Attorney
General is not binding on a court, although it is entitled to careful consideration and generally should be regarded as highly persuasive. See
State v. Family Bank of Hallandale, 623 So.2d 474, 478 (Fla.1993).
[6] According to section 119.011, Florida Statutes (1995):
(1) "Public records" means all documents, papers, letters, maps, books, tapes, photographs, films, sound recordings, data processing
software, or other material, regardless of the physical form, characteristics, or means of transmission, made or received pursuant to law or
ordinance or in connection with the transaction of official business by any agency.
Save trees - read court opinions online on Google Scholar.
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=3205353107592716263
VIA Email only: davidt@flcourts.org August 22, 2014
Thomas A. "Tad" David cc: J ohn F. Harkness, Executive Director
General Counsel The Florida Bar, jharkness@flabar.org
Office of the State Courts Administrator
Supreme Court Building cc: J ohn A. Tomasino, Clerk, Florida
500 South Duval Street Supreme Court, tomasino@flcourts.org
Tallahassee, FL 32399
RE: Addendum to cost of records response letter August 21, 2014
Dear Mr. David:
This is an addendum to my cost of records response letter to you August 21, 2014.
Please find attached the August 4, 2014 letter of Leslie J acobs, Public Records Coordinator for
the Florida Attorney General, and an image of the envelope and a CD-ROM providing 196 pages
of records at no charge. Please advise if you want the records, and I will send the file to you. Or
you may view the file without charge on Scribd, http://www.scribd.com/doc/236438789/
It appears the Attorney Generals decision to provide records at no charge is a controlling legal
authority. See attached, The Role and Function of the Attorney General.
Thank you in advance for the courtesy of a response.
Sincerely,
Neil J . Gillespie
8092 SW 115th Loop
Ocala, Florida 34481
Telephone: 352-854-7807
Email: neilgillespie@mfi.net
Enclosures:
PAMBONDI
ATTORNEYGENERAL
STATEOFFLORIDA
OFFICEOFTHEATTORNEYGENERAL
ExecutiveStaff
PL-O1TheCapitol
Tallahassee,FL32399-1050
Phone(850)414-3990 Fax(850)487-2564
http://www.myj1orida/ega/.com
August4, 2014
Mr.NeilJ. Gillespie
8092 SW115
th
Loop
Ocala,FL34481
DearMr. Gillespie:
ThiswillrespondtoyourJuly28,2014letterinwhich,pursuanttoCh. 119,F.S.,you
makethefollowingrequestforpublicrecords:
1. Recordsof thepersonnelfileofSandraL. BurgeasaparalegalspecialisttoDiana
R. Esposito,ChiefAssistantAttorneyGeneral,TampaCivilDivision.
2. Recordsfor SandraL. Burgeandhercurrentposition,ifany,withtheOfficeof
theAttorneyGeneral.
3. RecordsforSandraL. Burgeforanyothercurrentorpastemploymentwiththe
StateofFlorida.
4. RecordsshowingthecurrentemploymentofSandraL. Burgeorhercurrent
employer'smailingaddress.
5. RecordsofSandraL. Burge'sfraudandimpairmentof yourPetitionNo. 12-7747
totheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesduringheremploymentasaparalegal
assistant to DavidA. Rowland, General Counselof the 13
th
Judicial Circuit,
includingrecordsofanyinquirythereofbyaninvestigativelawenforcement
agency,oranyothergovernmentagency.
Enclosedpleasefindpublicrecordsresponsivetoyourrequest. PleasenotethatSections
817.568and817.569,FloridaStatutes,imposecriminalpenaltiesfortheunauthorizeduse
of personalidentificationinformationforfraudulentorharassmentpurposes,andforthe
criminaluseof apublicrecordorpublicrecords' information. Shouldyouhaveany
questionsorconcerns,pleasedonothesitatetocontactourofficeat850-245-0140.
Sincerely,
t ~ ~ ~
LeslieJacobs
PublicRecordsCoordinator
016H26525733
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OfficeoftheAttorneyGeneral
PL01,TheCapitol
400 SouthMonroeStreet
Tallahassee, FL32399-1050
Mr.Neil1. Gillespie
8092 SW l1S
th
Loop
Ocala,FL34481
The Role and Function of the Attorney General
The Attorney General is the statewide elected official directed by the Florida Constitution to serve as the chief
legal officer for the State of Florida. The Attorney General is responsible for protecting Florida consumers
fromvarious types of fraud and enforcing the states antitrust laws. Additionally, the Attorney General protects
her constituents in cases of Medicaid fraud, defends the state in civil litigation cases and represents the people
of Florida when criminals appeal their convictions in state and federal courts.
Within the Attorney Generals Office is the Office of Statewide Prosecution that targets widespread criminal
activities throughout Florida including identity theft, drug trafficking and gang activity. The Attorney
General's Office also conducts various programs to assist victims of crime.
The Attorney General defends the constitutionality of statutes duly enacted by the Legislature and is
authorized to issue formal legal opinions at the request of various public officials on questions relating to the
application of state law. The Office of the Attorney General houses the Florida Commission on the Status of
Women and the Council on the Social Status of Black Men and Boys. Also housed within the Attorney
Generals Office is the Office of Civil Rights, which investigates and takes legal action against violations of
Floridians civil rights.
The Attorney General serves as a member of the Florida Cabinet along with the Chief Financial Officer and
the Commissioner of Agriculture. As a Cabinet member, the Attorney General serves on the Clemency Board
and as a member of the various Cabinet boards and commissions that address state lands, state investments, and
rules pertaining to insurance and financial regulation. Also as a Cabinet member, the Attorney General serves,
collectively as agency head for the Departments of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles, Law Enforcement,
Revenue and Veterans Affairs.
Frequently Asked Questions
AG Services and Units
Addresses, phone numbers and fax numbers for divisions and branch offices
Maps with directions for visiting our offices
Contact us
Florida Toll Free Numbers:
- Fraud Hotline 1-866-966-7226
http://myfloridalegal.com/pages.nsf/Main/F06F66DA272F37C885256CCB0051916F