Digest # 17 (1994)

KOSOVA

THE CONVENTION OF SILENCE AND APPLAUSE

by BATON HAXHIU, ASTRIT SALIHU & DUKAGJIN GORANI/Prishtina

The Central Council of the LDK decided to organize the LDK elections from Sept. 1 to Oct.
15 of 1993. The elections at the lowest levels, in branches and sub-branches, were evaluated
as successful, and it was expected that the Second Convention of the LDK would take place
immediately. From then and until July 14 of this year, when the Second Convention of the
LDK took place, almost a year passed, and during all this time the requests of the
membership for the celebration of the Convention were not respected at all. Nobody knows
the reasons for the delay, but it is sure that the postponement created many rumours and
gossips which were at times correct, and at times speculations, and which decreased the
political authority of this party, stated delegate Berat Luzha on the speech stand of the SHOW
Restaurant.

The non celebration of the LDK Convention, has according to some indicators considerably
reduced the seriousness of the political action, because the presentation of the national policy
and issue has been restricted to political exclusiveness and monopolization of the national
policy by one political structure. Since the plural political life has been given up, which is,
according to some members of the presidency of the LDK, good in these circumstances, then
the new Convention of the LDK should have determined, at least, the basic political and
juridical regulator in Kosovan policy, because the Albanians, for the first time in their history,
have started feeling the immunization of the serious political situation which has started
getting elements of political desertion regarding the created situation. This is the conviction
of a number of delegates, who even being conscious of the existence of these problems,
delivered no statements at all.

The serious political situation and serious problems in Kosova were amortized to the extreme
by the organizers of this Convention who, with a perfectly directed elegance as well as
gastrological and musical spectacle, eliminated all discussions on evident problems. This
elimination was not conditioned, but all delegates were lying down before the personality and
the political authority of the presidency of labors. The whole Convention, with over 200
delegates, remained without a single discussion. Dr. Sabri Hamiti tried to animate the mass of
delegates by saying "We all love Ibrahim Rugova and respect him, but we are not gathered
here today to only elect him president, but to also discuss about our problems". But this was
unsuccessful too, because the mass was exalted with all what was happening inside the Show
Restaurant. Not even that Hamiti's sentence could push the conscience of the delegates to
discuss about the non-constituted Parliament, the Government which is not functioning, about
the "three percent" and finances, about the privatization of the national policy, about the
difficult life in schools and the difficult situation of the professors, about the meetings of the

The weekly Koha (The Times) was published in Prishtina (Kosovo) between 1994 and 1997. Edited by Veton
Surroi, a young Kosovar journalist and one of the pioneers of democratisation in former Yugoslavia, Koha
soon became a symbol of quality among the region's media. In 1997 it started to be published daily under the
name of Koha Ditorë. W ith the kind permission of Mr. Surroi, Koha digests were originally posted on
http://koha.estudiosbalcanicos.org.
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president and delegations of the LDK with foreign delegations, about the institutionalization
of the political life in Kosova as well as a list of other problems. Instead, the LDK
Convention was fetishized so much that all problems were solved by acclamation. The not
discussed problems will have incomparable consequences because all Albanian political
groupings want to measure their work with that of this one, whilst the others have heard the
voice of the Albanians through this party. Therefore, as Sabri Hamiti said, the mandate that
the LDK has taken in the parliamentarian and presidential elections two years ago, only
increase the importance of the tasks that this party has taken on itself, in order to take Kosova
to the final act in the path towards the independence. "Independent and democratic Kosova
can be built and institutionalized only having it's Parliament and Government in Prishtina",
said Hamiti. "There where the people are, there should be the representatives and its
Government. Albanians as such will be respected by themselves and the others", concluded
the lonely voice of this Convention.

What really happened, and how were the problems relativized?

The regular convention should have had started at 10 o'clock. Because of organization
proceedings, which, honestly, was very good, but aiming at wasting time and was successful
at this, the Convention started at noon when President Rugova arrived, in a full presidential
ritual. For the first time, since the political continuity if Kosova was established, all elements
of state-hood were re-established in the 1.400 squared meters of the SHOW Restaurant. That
day, Kosova applied its state-hood in that territorial space, of course that much as the Serbian
occupier had given it. The reception with flowers, the bodyguards, "the police control" of the
journalists with magnetized devices, the good organization of the Press Center, the
improvisation of TV broadcasting, etc.

The Convention started five minutes after noon with the national anthem, which was a
satisfaction and emotion for all. Dr. Rugova's speech was short and it was hoped that this was
done in order to give the delegates more time for discussions and proposals in respect to the
gathered problems. The second item of the agenda, the adoption of the Statute, which in
essence determines the conditions for the reinstallment of a political structure which would be
the leadership in the four next years, which doesn't mean that the Convention should be
celebrated every four years, but will have the present continuity - two years. The reaction of
Hamiti was not even noticed, and the delegates adopted the Statute with no votes against. The
most important item of the agenda were the discussions. After three discussions, those of
Sabri Hamiti, Bardhyl Qaushi and Berat Luzha, which were clearly trying to give the
Convention a serious attribute and at the same time intended to open the discussions about
the created problems, faded and were relativized very quickly. In fact, something very
unexpected, happened. The stereotypical sentence "Let's first elect the General Board
(Council) and afterwards we can discuss" was this time, again, a directorial masterpiece
which allowed the relativization of all the created problems and, later, enabled this item to be
concluded fully and not allow the delegates to discuss at all - and the discussions were the
reason of their attendance.

First came lunch which lasted two hours and a half. This gastrological ritual balanced the,
anyways, spectacular and visually beautiful situation. This was a psychological moment in
which all delegates, satisfied with the spectacle and gastrology, started speaking of how good
all of this was and that there was no use for discussion at all. After the President's proposal of
the candidates for the Board, for the first time, a voice stating that to elect 55 people there
must be at least 100 candidates, was heard. Many, not many, too many, not so many - and it

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was voted for the 100 quota. Out of 35 of the proposed in the list, 34 of them were of the
former political prisoner "profession". None of the ones who made the proposals didn't speak
of the professional merits of the proposed, but all of them spoke of the time they had spent in
jail and their patriotic merits. After this, instead of continuing with the discussions and have
the Convention work normally, someone suggested that while the votes were being counted,
the choir should entertain the public. The votes could have been counted without any music
and in the meantime the discussion could have taken place. The concert lasted one hour.

Then here comes the most important moment. While the votes were being counted on the
other side of the room, and the results were still unknown, the chairman of the Convention,
Hydajet Hyseni, proposed: "Let's go back to the item of the agenda - the discussions".
Somebody in the room: "Hey, we voted for ourselves but he haven't elected the president".
Applause. The chairman of the Convention proposed the discussions to continue and have the
president elected by acclamation. The presidency of the Convention has a consultation break.
Hydajet Hyseni: "Honored delegates, let's elect the President by acclamation". The whole
room stands up, the applause is long and the President of the LDK is elected by acclamation.

However, this is not all. The tone of the participants, after this act, is exalted again and as if
they were forgetting that they had come to the Convention to fight back the problems in the
branches and regions where they came from. Another voice from the public: "We have no
need to discuss. This is a great satisfaction". Upset with all what was going on, Hamiti, the
only person of principle, took the stand again stating: "We all love Ibrahim Rugova and we
respect him, but we are not gathered here only to elect him, but to discuss about our
problems". The chairman of the Convention Hydajet Hyseni, became brave enough to ask the
delegates to vote on the proposal. Unbelievable but true. The public, in one voice, declares
itself in favor of the non-discussions. This is all from this Convention.

Taking into account all what has happened on July 14th, not discussing about the silenced
problems, then without doubt there will be still a mixture of competencies, which is the past
period have gotten defeating dimensions. This party should also hold the responsibility for
many unfinished processes which are connected more to the negligence in action, than the
lack of determination of the membership or the people declared in favor of independence.
This party holds the responsibility of the non-constitution of the Parliament, the
non-functioning of the Government, the privatization of the meetings with foreign delegations
which in reasonable circumstances would bring consequences.

It must not be forgotten that the only space in which the Albanians could communicate
amongst themselves was the national political space, which has been concentrated within this
party which, honestly, has been considered to have attributes of a national movement. For a
discriminated people this was understandable. But, as the following years this was the only
way of communication without any creativity, at least politically visual, then its
bastardization, as in the last LDK Convention, will slowly eliminate the national and political
homogeneity because of the created circumstances. The expressed homogeneity in the eyes of
the people will be conserved, but not to the extreme which will endanger the national cause
because of political actions or non actions. The homogeneity of the membership was
conserved during this Convention too, because the amortizing factor was there, the person of
president Rugova. The question arising is whether this authority will be enough in the future,
and whether such a Convention has helped such an authority?

This Convention adopted a Political Declaration, which is almost identical to the one adopted

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in the last Convention. This Convention did not explain what happened with the realization of
the old one. Maybe we'll have to wait for a new Convention. Who knows when it will take
place.

DEMOCRATIC "BUJKU"

Out of 55 members of the General Board of the LDK, 25 are new members. It is interesting
to state that apart from Fadil Hysa, who didn't want to be member of the Board, all the
other members of the Presidency are also members of the Board. Hydajet Hyseni and
Blerim Reka, Editor in Chief and Deputy Editor in Chief of "Bujku" are also members of
the Board. Even formally, there is a lot to talk about the objectivity and autonomy of
"Bujku".

From now on, it will be even more independent.

INTERVIEW

DR. MARK WHEELER, Professor at the School for Slav and Eastern European Studies of
the London University

THE SERB CONTRIBUTION TO GREATER ALBANIA

Interviewed by DUKAGJIN GORANI/Strugë

KOHA: Dr. Wheeler, what do you understand by "the national socialism of its kind" which is
holding power in Serbia?

WHEELER: Maybe the most adequate would be to call it shortly: Fascism! The
"national-socialism" syntagma is used here only to illustrate more clearly the ill-famed
political-populist fusion. Without any doubt, Milosevic's regime is fascist. There is no
dilemma about it.

I must say that Milosevic is a politician devoted to power, he is a merciless personality and a
brilliant manipulator in politics. In the past years, his struggle for political survival, along
with the populist euphoria, created such a crazy and tense atmosphere, that paradoxically it
could be concluded that these days, Milosevic represents and oasis of reason, compared to the
political level and disposition of his followers or destructive elements such as Seselj, Arkan
and many others.

KOHA: The skill to develop the strategy to create a myth out of Kosova and victimize the
Serbs can't be denied...

WHEELER: There is no doubt that he had a lot a material he could work on! But, I believe
that this strategy could have been applied in any of the Balkans states of that and this time.
The majority of the people in the Balkans tend to see themselves in the frame of being victims
of the others, thus finding explanations for all the evil they might have caused or are planning
to cause the others. Taking this as a starting point, the Serbian nationalism as well as the

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Albanian one, regarding the issue of Kosova, are only reflections of each other, where one
nationalism considers the other one to be its conqueror for ages which deserves all the
revenges of this world. In this context, there is doubt that the Albanian problem much more
realistic, whilst the political approach until now has been evaluated as the just one.

KOHA: You mean opting for a political solution?

WHEELER: Yes! From the lack of political power, Albanians have created political profit.
This is valid until the Albanians are able to keep the collective discipline in their political
orientation.

KOHA: About the Serbian opposition...

WHEELER: Pathetic! The opposition was close to oust Milosevic only during Draskovic's
1991. Draskovic tried, disguised as a charismatic leader, to oust Milosevic by claiming that
"he was the real Father of the nation", much bigger than Milosevic. In this game, Milosevic
was always a step ahead. And even now, Draskovic and the others seem to have forgotten the
lesson: they can't win the war against Milosevic in this way. The last elections in Serbia
clearly proved this. But as long as the Serbian opposition keeps on playing according to the
rules set by Milosevic, this will always turn to be a sure defeat for them. As the things are
now, the opposition will come to power only when Milosevic will disappear. And this could
happen only if a bloody coup takes place, and this opposition is not able to perpetrate it. The
only ones who could do it, would be his most fresh opponents as Seselj and those of his kind.
You wouldn't need many details to imagine what kind of a coup would this be, and what
would the situation in Serbia be afterwards. The Serbian opposition has not a bright future
ahead. I don't foresee a change of the situation in Serbia. In short, I do not deny the existence
of Serbs with democratic orientations, as well as of enclaves of reason inside Serbia, but we
should know that they won't win as long as they are flirting with the actual regime, which is
diametrally opposite, and as long as they continue to present themselves as super-patriotic and
super-nationalistic forces.

KOHA: It seems as if in Serbia, power can't be reached without playing with the "nationalist
interest". It also seems that the roots of such a concept are much deeper than it was thought...

WHEELER: I understand this as a truth of the moment. Regarding the deep roots of
nationalism, I believe that what really has deep roots is the myth about the great leader and
the unconditioned faith in him as the saviour of the nation, which is characteristic for the
region. But, this concept is dead as soon as the leader takes the people to a dead end.
However it might be, right now, nationalism is an indivisible part of the political discourse in
Serbia. There is no doubt about this. But this doesn't make me think that the nationalist
concept will forever be the key element to design the daily policy in Serbia.

KOHA: It is evaluated that the international community didn't successfully face the tragedies
of this region.

WHEELER: I think the contrary, and I would add that the international community has not
only faced the problems but has also exerted great influence in the political scene of the
Fromer Yugoslavia. But it has done it with such an unbelievable stupidity and ignorance,
which is so fascinating that it is hard to escape the impression that there was no strategy in it.
However, the international community can't be blamed for the crimes that have happened and

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are happening. Unfortunately, if these terrors are put inside the historic context, and
especially the memories from WWII, it comes out that these are a continuance and tragic
consequences of the Serbian program on Greater Serbia.

KOHA: There are theories that claim that the pseudo-Communist system served only as an
instrument for hibernation, to freeze the national position and tendencies for over 50 years...

WHEELER: Much of this is true. The frustrations of those who couldn't accomplish their
purposes in 1945, as well as of those who remained at the bottom of the Communist
hierarchy, turned into a sole purpose: "This time we will finished the unfinished business,
once and for all!". This explains all the failures of the pro-Yugoslav movements in the
nineties. Seselj's maps which illustrated the Serbian version of the division of Yugoslavia and
the creation of Greater Serbia were in reality the same maps elaborated by Draza Mihailovic
and Stevan Moljevic fifty years ago. The same thing goes for Paraga, who manipulates with
Ante Pavelic's program and the option of Croatia "up to Zemun and Novi Pazar".

KOHA: From the international aspect, do you thing something which is defined as "the
Albanian issue" really exists?

WHEELER: Yes, of course! Even more, after the dismantlement of Yugoslavia. The
Albanians were not the ones that destroyed Yugoslavia even though they thought of it as their
prison. However, the threat coming from Albanians, was only a thing that forced the Serbs to
do it, who in their agony started the irreversible destruction of Yugoslavia based on the fear
from Albanians. They thought that the recipe for the Serbian unification could be applicable
in the rest of Yugoslavia too.

KOHA: Kosova was a good means to achieve this goal...

WHEELER: Kosova was used brilliantly! There are analysts who consider that Milosevic is
the first Yugoslav politician who celebrated Tito's death.

With his arrival to power, the political rules of Yugoslav Communism, as were the consensus
of the republics in the federation, etc. etc., became unimportant. The times of authentic
enthusiasm over Tito's authentic revolution were over. Times of personal interests and the
self-regulation of the political establishment had come. Milosevic was among the first ones
who noticed this space for manoeuvre and made excellent use of it.

KOHA: The problem of Macedonia. Do you think Macedonia is threatened by Serbia?

WHEELER: Yes, even though the threat is not strong yet. During negotiations in Athens,
when Owen and Vance were about to press Karadzic against the wall, the political debacle
offered to the Serbs could have turned into a political-military diversion which would animate
the people. At that time, Macedonia seemed to be the right spot for this. Even more, a
"blitz-krieg" aiming at ethnic cleansing could have been undertaken in Kosova. As long as
these have not happened and until they don't happen, I am convinced that Milosevic is certain
about his victory in Bosnia. This is also proven by the minimal pressure Serbia exerts along
the Macedonian border, and Macedonia is considered by Milosevic as part of Serbia that he
imagines to create. The pressure applied from time to time, serves only as warning to the
Macedonians, and to prove them that their security depends on his will.

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KOHA: Do you think that the existence of Macedonia is an expression of the international
political will?

WHEELER: I understand it more as an expression of its international inability to face its

neighbors, as are the Bulgarians and especially the Greeks who pay no attention to the
paternal warnings of the West.

KOHA: Do you think that Macedonia, as it is, has any future?

WHEELER: I hope so. I must use the Serbian vocabulary and state that however artificial
might this creature be, and however artificial might the national consciousness as well as the
Macedonian nationalism after WWII be, the case of Macedonia serves as a basic example to
prove the theory that the national and nationalism are conscious and collective constructions
and that at the end of this century it is possible to construct and design people as entities. This
means that the Macedonian people, as such, exists. This must be taken as a fact. The
problems with new people, such are the Macedonian Slavs, are that they are intolerant,
inpatient and eventually, they tend to take negative postures against Albanians, who had been
mistreated and oppressed even before, and which compose the second largest population in
Macedonia.

It is indicative that this negative posture is taken by Macedonians in a very cold-blooded

fashion, much more than when Macedonia was only a republic of the Yugoslav federation.
The fear from the destruction of Macedonia from the outside should be much smaller than
that of the destruction from the inside.

KOHA: At one stage, it was thought that the natural allies of the Albanians and Albania
would be the Macedonians and Macedonia...

WHEELER: Logically, yes. The Albanians make up the largest minority in Macedonia, which
is so large that it could never be subjugated by the authorities. This is why this is a minority
which should be taken as a partner in the formulation of government and the future state. This
means that the proportional division of government should take place, and this might be a
very sensitive issue for the young and proud Macedonian government, but it is very clear that
Macedonia won't have any calm, as long as the Albanians do not fully and equally participate
in government. If this doesn't happen, we will have the Kosova scenario repeated, meaning
that the Albanians are given no other options rather than full independence or even
unification to Albania.

The Macedonian Slavs are facing the same challenge Yugoslavia was facing in the beginning
of the eighties; If they would have been clever in their attitude towards the Albanians, the
later would have had full equality and freedom and would have become an element of
stability which would have evaded this terror or eventually would have reduced it.

KOHA: Then the Albanians sought for equality in the Federation, which was illustrated with
the insistence on the creation of the Republic of Kosova.

WHEELER: We must not forget that there were also secessionist tendencies. If we take into
account the situation of the Albanians then and now, they Albanians would have been fools
not to insist on that. However, it seems as if the Yugoslav authorities, especially the Serbian
ones contributed greatly to come to the option: secession or secession! There is no doubt that

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such a stand point of the Albanians was used as a brilliant justification by the Serbs to claim
that Albanians are people with terrorist tendencies and that the Serbs are victims of that same
terror...

KOHA: Many in Kosova would agree with what you said.

WHEELER: Well you see, I finally believe that Greater Albania is a project that will be
accomplished.

KOHA: !?

WHEELER: Yes. The Slavs in Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro will come to a stage in
which they will blame it all on their politics, if it comes to the realization of this Greater
Albania of great influence. I say this having in mind Albania's geo-strategic position, which
means that it could become the largest state with the largest population in the Balkans.

KOHA: The five decades long division have caused many cultural, political and other
differences among the Albanians.

WHEELER: Yes. The experiences of the Albanians in the Former Yugoslavia and those in
Albania were not very promising.

But the people's will for unification, exists. This I understand as a tragedy for the Serbia and
the other people surrounding Albanians who must become aware of their unfair and brutal
treatment of Albanians, who even with differences are willing to unite and even more,
understand this as a normal event to take place in history. On the other hand, it is well known
that the part of the people in the diaspora always has the tendency towards unification with
the fatherland. However, the present political will in Serbia is such that it would be willing to
sacrifice its victories in Croatia and even the Serbian Republic in Bosnia, in order not to let
go on Kosova. This mania has nothing to do with logical reasoning.

KOHA: From what has been done until now, it comes out that Milosevic's regime has pushed
the Serbian people to criminality and the compulsory collaboration with the government...

WHEELER: Very true. The combination of a totalitarian government and the propagated
justifications on the Serb victimization and just path, along with the ridiculous theories on the
anti-Serb conspiracy of the CIA, the Vatican, "Maçons sans forntieres", etc. etc. - forced the
Serbs to, in the beginning of their national renewal campaign, identify themselves with, for
example, the Israeli state and the fate of the Jews in the Holocaust. However, the Serbian case
proves that when nationalism reaches its peak and turns into anti-Semitism - the degeneration
of the national movement starts. Nevertheless, this policy of Milosevic, has been proven as
excellent. The "we are in this together, we should stick together" is a magnificent concept,
which has caused so many victims.

KOHA: It is believed that this was one of the reasons which weakened the opposition, since
the majority of the population was blackmailed by the authorities...

WHEELER: Yes, because the created situation availed Milosevic the right to declare any
leader of the opposition, who didn't fit within the luggage of the Serbian national interest, a
traitor and an apatride.

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This is a normal phenomenon in Eastern Europe. The national solidarity and the general
sphere of the national and nationalism seems to be the main criteria to determine the value of
the individual and the institution.

The Serbs are a typical example os such manipulation...

KOHA: Do you think that Montenegro and its initiatives towards a "para-secessionist"
attitude, will become a very serious problem to this Yugoslavia?

WHEELER: You mean the political postures of associations such as the Liberal League of
Montenegro...

KOHA: Yes.

WHEELER: I agree. The Montenegrins are slowly coming to the position of the mice who are
trying to desert the ship which is drowning. I am in no position to foresee how will this
escapade look like, but I am convinced that it will happen. It seems that Serbia will slowly be
reduced to the borders it had in 1912. Thus Montenegro could become an independent state,
but by all means integrated in a creature that will replace fromer Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The same thing could easily happen with Vojvodina. What is clearly seen in the horizon of
the present Yugoslavia, are the contours of the relicts of the Habsburg Empire, which will try
to coexist in a federal or confederal manner... This doesn't mean that it's name will be
Yugoslavia. In this context, Montenegro could join this creature by first becoming
independent. This could even be attractive for Macedonia, but not for Albania.

KOHA: This would mean that Serbia would be reduced to the "Belgrade Pashaluk"?

WHEELER: Yes, this could happen.

KOHA: Doesn't seem to be a bright future...

WHEELER: Absolutely not. I agree. But I believe that people in Kosova, and journalists like
you, have strong reasons to make as many efforts as possible to alarm the Serbian government
about the catastrophic tendencies of the purposed disintegration of Yugoslavia which they
will suffer the most on their skin.

KOHA: It is believed that unification with the Serbian republic of Bosnia will mean that the
responsibility for war and war crimes will be transferred to Serbia.

WHEELER: It is true. It will also be a huge economic problem, which they will not be able to
face. Who is the fool that could financially assist the Serbian Krajina?

During his rule in the Soviet Union, Gorbachev thought that the disastrous economic situation
of the members of the Warsaw Pact was an enormous shame to the USSR. The same thing
goes for Serbia. Krajina and the Serbian Republic will be the biggest shame of Serbia.

KOHA: There have been opinions, coming from the modest opposition circles in Serbia, that
Kosova is an unnecessary burden to Serbia...

WHEELER: Yes. The Albanians in Kosova make up more than 90% of the population in that

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region. It has been and it is Albanian territory. There is nothing to discuss about that. The
problem is the separation of Kosova from Serbia. Starting from this, I see that the possible
conversations regarding the creation of the conditions for the realization of the gradual
detachment of Kosova from Serbia are much more positive than their attempts to have a new
bloodshed which would mobilize all the Albanians around, which would again cause the loss
of war, and many unnecessary victims.

KOHA: The Kosova Albanians didn't consider themselves to be secessionists...

WHEELER:...But the Serbs didn't offer them another solution but secession, which seemed to
be the only way out for them. Even if Milosevic is replaced by someone much more tolerant
and reasonable; even if the regime is Serbia would be ready to talk about the full autonomy
and the matter of the borders, not even then, would the Albanians accept to stay within the
Serbian federation. There are many ways and methods of state regulations which could hide
the truth about the gradual, but secure, detachment of Kosova. I think that this moment is not
faraway. I believe that Kosova will follow the path it has chosen.

KOHA: What do you think about the postures of the Albanians or their political parties, so
far?

WHEELER: It is clear that Rugova's determination for peace is an accurate step until now. In
fact, the international community thinks that the Albanians have acted greatly by evading the
Serb provocations. The problem is that the occupied people can't be served forever the option
of the solution from abroad, whilst on the other hand the international public is willing to
hold this stalemate for a long, long time, by saying "if you are calm now, later you will be
rewarded". It is hard to believe that the political institutions in Kosova will be able to control
the people much longer.

KOHA: Do you think that after the eventual solution of the Bosnian problem, Kosova will be
next?

WHEELER: One thing I am sure of, and that is that the international community is not
willing to see itself involved in more problems of the Balkans, after its experience in Bosnia.
The misfortune of Kosova is that the world is getting tired of what is happening in Former
Yugoslavia and thus is very less interested to undertake something in this respect. On the
other hand, the presence of the Americans in Macedonia, has almost calmed the situation
there.

I think that the intention of the USA is to solve the issue of Former Yugoslavia as soon as
possible, and take off the burden from the international public.

KOHA: Do you think that the solution will come by itself, as a result of the political and
military erosion?

WHEELER: If you mean that war will end when people won't have the will to fight any
longer, the I fully agree. It seems as if this were the international formula which is trying to
applied on this ocassion. In the past four or five months we see minimal engagement of the
international community in Bosnia. I am almost certain that the French and British with
withdraw their forces from Bosnia, if a peaceful agreement is not reached by autumn. In this
case the arms embargo will be lifted, and the situation will develop according to the victories

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in war. Maybe the new Croat-Muslim Federation will achieve to do something and get back
territories from the Serbs, but I think that the final solution will be sought in battles.

KOHA: This means that the victories of war will determine the final borders...

WHEELER: There are no victories that could cause satisfaction. The lost territories are hard
to get back, because the results of ethnic cleansing can't be changed. I don't believe that
forced-out people, especially the youngsters will be willing to go back to their homeland
which is now ethnically cleansed.

KOHA: About the possible conflict in Kosova...

WHEELER: It is very close, really. People's requests cost a lot, whilst bloodshed caused for
their sake, has almost converted into a national principle. I must say that while Milosevic is in
power in Serbia, Kosova is not threatened by war. But if the failures in Bosnia oust Milosevic
and he is replaced by a more radical person, as Seselj for example, then we could speak of a
possible new bloodshed, where Kosova is, unfortunately, at the top of the list. For the time
being, war in Kosova is not on the agenda, but is also something very hard to foresee.

EDITORIAL

THE DINOSAURS SYNDROME

by VETON SURROI

One person had declared, some time ago and in a cynical way, that the LDK suffered from the
Dinosaurs Syndrome. That is, that it had a large body but a small head. The analogy could be
shocking, especially having in mind that the Kosovan political scene doesn't know any other
relevant political force of such a political relevance. In consequence, admitting that this
analogy has some truth in it, means that this is to admit that the Albanians in Kosova, as a
political entity, are facing the same problem of the large dispersion of the collective body and
the small dimensions of the capacities of thought.

A great contribution to this analogy was given last week by the participants of the LDK
convention. With political ornaments of Eastern congresses, with children greeting the
President with flowers, with elections by acclamation, with the elaboration of a long list of
successes, with the next day's report published in the organ's newspaper - reminded us of the
pattern of the massive organizations in times of Communism. And in those, if we haven't
forgotten, the members served as a numeric basis for the construction of the decision-making
pyramid. At the peak of the pyramid were the comrades who knew what was happening and
what was to happen. The delegates of the LDK convention acted the same way, as discussions
were completely lacking in this event.

I don't think there is any place for surprise. The LDK even with a totally opposite platform, in
one way is heir to the Socialist League of Working People of Kosova as well as the
Communist League of Kosova (with all their collective and individual members) and has not
had the time and conditions to radically change the way of thinking and acting. Four years of
efforts, it is sure, can't overcome the other fifty spent to develop monism. And, on the other

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hand, the repression of the Serbian state in Kosova has also influenced the way of making
decisions in the Albanian policy in Kosova to go more towards the "revolutionary
effectiveness" than towards democratic consensus. There are always explanations to be found
for this: for example, we can't tolerate the expression of disagreements, when we are under
occupation. Consequently, the LDK Convention only proves the fusion of these two elements
in their drastic forms: the effectiveness of the scenarios of the League of Communists'
conferences and the proof of the "revolutionary unity", which occurs when applause replaces
the speech.

In this dimension, it could be said that this is the last LDK Convention of this kind: The
"revolutionary unity" will seek for other forms of expression apart from applause, whilst the
scenery effectiveness of the League of Communists will not be impressive any longer for an
environment which finally understands that after Kim Il Sung's death there are no reasons to
claim that Communism is alive.

Will the Dinosaurs Syndrome be overcome? Not, if thinking is being done inside the frames
of the political pre-history.

MONTENEGRO

THE TECHNOLOGY OF MANIPULATIONS

by RAJKO CEROVIC/AIM/Podgorica

How was the so called anti-bureaucratic revolution prepared and accomplished in

Montenegro- is the topic of the book written by two journalists from Podgorica, Vojcic and
Koprivica. This is the first book of the kind published in Yugoslavia.

Why was the export of the "revolution" to Montenegro important for Milosevic? The
confused leadership in Montenegro asked for assistance from Milosevic, while he was
secretly visiting Montenegro and organizing the putsch. How were the participants and
collaborators of the "revolution" rewarded afterwards? Several days ago, the Montenegrin
journalists Branko Vojcic and Veseljko Koprivica published the book "The Coup '89"
comprised of a compilation of documents, speeches, public appearances and possible police
files connected to the complete replacement of the leadership in Montenegro on Jan. 10, 1989
done with the populist wave of massive meetings, which destroyed Montenegro, starting in
August of 1988. In 380 pages and illustrated with many photographs, the authors published
what they had stated and the notes they had taken during the events.

According to many people, the events in Montenegro represented the prologue to the tragedy
with captivated the Former Yugoslavia. The massive gatherings in Montenegro were the
events in which first requests for weapons were made and when bloody messages were
conveyed to Albanians, Slovenes and Croats.

Muslim were not on the benches of the accused at that time.

For those who are studying the reasons of the destruction of the joint state and the technology
of the initiation of the civil war, this book is inevitable material, because this event broke

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down one republic of the federation, which regardless of its population and it economic
strength, represented one of the foundations of the Yugoslav federation.

The events in Novi Sad, which preceded the coup in Montenegro, having in mind that this
was an autonomous province within the Socialist Republic of Serbia, were not of the same
importance and consequences. When the Montenegrin leadership was falling, the federation
was paralyzed, in which the ratio of votes (four to four) enabled Milosevic to undermine
anything that didn't suit him.

The authors of this book, primarily, briefly and precisely illustrate the political situation and
the economic psychology of the former mutual state, and later continue with the methodology
of the replacement of the Montenegrin leadership, which was politically and medially
prepared in details. The book reveals how the postures of the Montenegrin leadership
regarding the "Kosova crisis" were concealed for a long time by the Belgrade media, in order
to use them later as proof of treason of the Serbian national interests in the southern province.

Part of the concrete preparations of the planned coup against the Montenegrin government,
was Milosevic's secrete visit to Viljuse, close to Niksic, just before the so called Meeting of
Solidarity with the Serbs and Montenegrins, which took place in former Titograd, on Aug. 20,
1988. In Viljuse, in the house of Slobodan Vucetic's parents, one of Milosevic's key persons
and the present President of the Constitutional Court of Serbia, Milosevic met with the
political and economic leadership of Niksic. The Montenegrin leadership was not informed
about this meeting, not even through the channels of the Secret Police, which was an
unwritten but a very strong rule in cases when leaders of certain republics visited other
republics. In Viljuse, the Director of the Niksic steel-mill, Branislav-Banjo Bulajic promised
Milosevic that he would take out his workers to the assembly, which he did. Bulajic became
Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, even though he speaks no foreign language and has no
diplomatic experience, as a sign of Milosevic's gratitude. The other directors of other
economic giants and enterprises in Montenegro, who assisted the "revolution" were rewarded
in the same way. They took out their workers to the street to request social rights and the
defense of Yugoslavia. It is very interesting that later, when the pensions were not higher
than 2 DEM or when the workers were forced to go on compulsory leave, no social uprisings
or public dissatisfactions occurred.

The films shot by the police, of statements of different leaders of the "revolution", Miroslav
Solevic, Kosta Bulatovic and others, prove that the Montenegrin leadership was classified
into people who should be eliminated immediately or during different stages; they also prove
that the posters were written as dictated from Belgrade, and that Belgrade ordered the
journalists what they should and what they should not quote. The journalists of some media in
Belgrade were so much involved in the organization and the strategy of the meetings, that the
function of reporting from the spot was only one of their engagements. The most outstanding
case was that of "Politika's" journalist Dragoljub Becirevic, who was one the liaison to
Miroslav Solevic and his bases in Montenegro.

This book also makes us aware of the fact that the, then, Communist leadership of
Montenegro, was confused by the force and brutality of the actions of their political
colleagues from Serbia, and approached Milosevic and the Serbian leadership to ask for
assistance to get rid of Solevic and his "revolution exporting" followers, which according to
the evaluation of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia represented a
big danger to the inter-ethnic relations in the Federation. The Serbian leadership responded

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that it was helpless, but that it will do everything within their possibilities. In the meantime
the Secret Police of Kosova informed its colleagues in Montenegro that the Kosovan Council
for meetings had not only close links with the Serbian leadership, but that also does not do a
thing without its knowledge.

Some Montenegrins from Belgrade, with a lot of influence over some intellectual circles,
such as Batric Jovanovic, Jovan Strikovic, Gavro Perazic, Radomir Saranovic, Miodrag
Bulatovic, Matija Beckovic, Veljko Radovic and others, were especially used to oust the
Montenegrin leadership. Their task was to, among others, make use of the special column of
the "Politika" newspaper called "Echoes and Reactions".

Regardless of what people might think of the ousted leadership, one thing is very certain: that
leadership would have never voted in favor of the attack of the Yugoslav people's Army
against any of the Yugoslav republics, or in favor of the destruction of Vukovar.

This book doesn't end with the description of the events that took place on Jan. 10, 1989, but
it also continued following the first steps of the new leadership for over a year, including the
Congress of the Communist League of Montenegro and the adoption or the pretentious
document "The New Philosophy of Development", which is not mentioned at all nowadays.
The book ends with the celebration of the anniversary of the coup and the establishment of
the Democratic Forum, which was rapidly manipulated by the actual leadership, and with the
division of the "first anti-bureaucratic squadron" when people as Ljubisa Stankovic, Srdjan
Darmanovic, Vujica Lazovic and others chose their own path.

The topic, which was systematically and intelligently presented in the book, which contains
the necessary authors' comments to explain the connections between personalities and events,
serves not only the domestic analysts, but also those who, from a long distance, will study the
destruction of the Communist system, the birth of nationalism and fascism in multi-national
states of the post-Communist societies, the role of the intellectuals and the media in processes
which, for the time being, have appeared only in the former Yugoslav space.

BOSNIA

THE GOOD PLAN WHICH NOBODY LIKES

by VISAR REKA/Geneva

A French high ranked military official, stated in Sarajevo: "Try to explain to the Serbian
soldier that he has to withdraw from the occupied territories by war and forget the won
battles, and try to explain to the Muslim soldier that he has to give up on the plan to go back
to where he was expelled from".

It is a totally different issue whether one could consider as war or as a won battle, the march
inside Muslim villages with tanks and massacring the unprotected civilian population.

The French officer is not uninformed, but the logic of the military doesn't deal with history
and unfortunately, his statement looked upon from this moment, expresses the reality and not
only his opinion, but also the policy of different governments of world powers, which by

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defining this war as "civil", equalled the aggressor and the victim. The direct consequence of
the policy was trying to find a peaceful solution for Bosnia, an attempt which was
characterized with a historical cynicism which, in modern history, can be compared only to
the Munich Meeting of 1938.

The combination of many years on unscrupulous propaganda, history folklore, hunger for
power, nationalistic schizophrenia and "sljivovica", has caused its consequences. The Serbian
peasant, with a weapon in arms and Greater Serbia in his heart, is convinced that he is
fighting a just war for his national cause, whilst his Croat and Muslim homologues, angry
down to the bottom, are just awaiting for the moment to pay him back all the debts. The
French officer remains in between.

Adorers of theories on the international conspiracy in the Former Yugoslavia, will be

disappointed to find out that the actions are generally reactions to the circumstances created
by the former Yugoslavs proper. Naturally, the affinities of some countries towards
determined groups have existed and will exist always, however, the main reasons for the
tragedy of Bosnia and the Bosnians (minus Karadzic's Serbs) since the beginning, were the
totally unsuitable international and domestic circumstances: in the USA, it was the year of the
election of the President, and the elected was a person who had evaded military draft; the
main European governments, either because of their pro-Serbs disposition or Yugo-nostalgia,
fear from the imagined fundamentalism or simply of their inability, showed no interest to
defend the basic principles which serve as foundations to their societies; the mother of all
Orthodox Slavs, Russia, put its Serb Orthodox children to the market and asked a very high
price for them, a price that no one, until recently, was willing to pay, and finally, the
innocence of the Boshnyak leaders and the calculating (and yellow) posture of their logical
allies in the Former Yugoslavia. Their opponents, armed with a beforehand prepared strategy
in the form of the Memorandum and enough weapons, had it easy to conquer 70% of the
territories of Bosnia, and at the same time completely ethnically cleanse it from non-Serb
population.

The last peace plan which has been presented as an ultimatum which seeks a determined
answer - yes or no- was elaborated after many failures of the international diplomacy to end
one of the bloodiest wars of the recent European history. Therefore the question arises: what
can be expected from this plan which, even though not identical to the other failed plans,
because of the same reasons that appear to be the obstacles this time too, is very similar to
them, and that the situation in the field, after hundreds of unsuccessful truces, can't give much
hope. The map which determines 51% of the territories for the Croat-Muslim Federation and
49% to the Serbs is very similar to the plan elaborated by Vance and Owen, and even more
similar to the first plan made by the Portuguese Coutilheiro before war started, and which was
signed by the same people which now, after hundreds of thousands of victims and terrible
destructions, are expected to adopt it.

The situation in Bosnia is such, that it promises war rather than peace.

The Boshnyaks who were forced to retreat before the military superiority of the Serbs have
more self-confidence, and a strong reason for that. After the agreement reached with the
Croats and opening the corridor which allowed the penetration of serious heavy armament,
they achieved several victories and their army is becoming more and more organized. Morale
is also on their side, and against them stand the Serbs who seek the consolidation of the
conquests and the end of war. Even though Izetbegovic was realistic enough to say that "...we

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are not so strong as to reach a quick victory", the Commander in Chief of the Bosnian Army,
Rasim Delic said that "...time has come to start the liberation war".

As an element which makes the doubts even deeper, is the damaged credibility of the
mediators and the warring parties. That of the mediators, mainly because of the many
unsuccessful bluffs in the past (air-strike threats, for example) and the disagreements among
the Great Powers, and as of that of Karadzic, Milosevic and their generals there is not much
to be said. Also, we must not forget that some representatives of the Croat-Muslim Federation
didn't show much consequence in applying the signed documents.

Even though many analysts are of the opinion that this plan, which was also adopted by G-7
in Naples, is the cleverest up to now, it is very clear that it is not liked by anyone, although it
has a new quality, according to some, and this is that it has been supported unanimously by
all important international factors.

The unanimous standpoint combined with the ultimatum was proven to be effective in the
case of the exclusion zone over Sarajevo, and this gives some hope.

As the things stand right now, the Boshnyaks are closer to accept the plan than the Serbs.
However, even in case the Serbs adopt the plan, they will do this for manoeuvre and will do
everything possible not to attain to the plan. They will probably resist the return of important
parts of the territories. The tactics of provoking conflicts, which automatically means a reason
to stall the application of the plan, is a way to evade its fulfilment. At the same time, Karadzic
will try to gain something on the diplomatic plan, insisting the sanctions to be softened or
lifted, which has been foreseen as a reward if the plan is accepted. The authors of the plan,
who are at the same time its executors, face another serious problem which could appear if
the Serbs approved the plan. The situation in the Clinton Administration is such, that it is
very probable that he will not gain the support of the public to send troops which are
indispensable to back-up the agreement. This Administration has not proven to be capable of
getting the support of its public for any dangerous military actions. Therefore, in order to have
the GI's and Marines in Bosnia, full security conditions must be assured. According to the
representative of the State Department, such conditions would be: a political agreement
among all parties, a stable truce which would last a considerable time and the serious
determination for the respect of the agreement.

Not many believe that such a situation will be created soon. This is well known by all the
involved and this might cause serious problems which might lead to the failure of the plan.

In this case, the credibility of the NATO, which is acting as an umbrella for the American
participation on land, will decrease even more than in times of the "air strikes".

If the Serbs refuse the plan, new complications are foreseen, not only for Bosnia but
elsewhere too. British and French foreign ministers Hurd and Juppé, who visited the
decision-making centers, Belgrade, Zagreb and Sarajevo, one week before the deadline
expired, were very eloquent about the possible consequences which a Serbian "no", would
cause. They concentrated on the consequences that Serbia and its satellites in Bosnia and
Croatia could suffer: harsher economic sanctions, the exclusion of Serbia for a longer period
of time from the international community, lifting up the arms' embargo, withdrawal of their
troops from Bosnia, etc.

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The suspension of the arms' embargo will not change the military situation as much as it is
supposed. The legal importation of weapons could have effects, but much time would needed
to train people and break down the logistic superiority of the Serbs who are in control of
many strategic positions. This could have an effective political influence upon the Boshnyaks,
because this action would further affirm the legal status of their state. This would also harm
the Serbs, politically more than militarily. Some Americans think that this would be the best
solution, because in this way they would take off all responsibility for Bosnia. The requests of
the Congress and Senate would be fulfilled as well that of the Bosnian leadership. For the
British and French, lifting up the embargo would mean a new wave of problems, bigger than
ever in Bosnia. Military strengthening of both sides, where everybody has tanks and heavy
cannons would mean that their soldiers would be in the middle of the fire, and would force
the urgent withdrawal of all blue-helmets.

However, withdrawing troops from Bosnia is much easier to say that do, and this because of a
simple reason: the Serbs won't let them, because the retreat would mean that NATO could
air-strike the Serbian positions after every attack of the Serbs against the "security zones"
declared by the UN.

As long as the blue-helmets are on the field, these air-strikes will be avoided because the
international community fears that the Serbs would take revenge.

Second, if the international community decides to withdraw its troops, then NATO would
once again be used to protect them while retreating.

The first signs that prove that the Serbs are not happy about the possible withdrawal of the
UN troops were seen in Gorazde, last week, when some British soldiers were not allowed to
come out of the 3 kilometers wide security zone. To make the situation even more
complicated, the Turks have announced that they will not withdraw their forces, even in case
that the others do.

The possibility of the expansion of the conflict in the Former Yugoslavia can't be excluded. If
the war is renewed and the Serbs start to lose, the open intervention of the Yugoslav army
could be very probable. And in this case, not even the greatest experts could with certainty
say where would the war end.

MACEDONIA

CHAIRMAN TILL THE ELECTIONS

by IBRAHIM MEHMETI/Shkup

On Saturday last, only a day after the dramatic session of the Parliament in which the
Government obtained the vote of confidence, and which was characterized with the
sensational comeback of the Albanian parliamentarians, the eyes of the public were turned
towards Tetova, where the Third Convention of the PPD was celebrated.

The reason why this Convention was convened (so unexpectedly), was the irrevocable
resignation of its president Xheladin Murati.

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Murati's statement, published last Thursday, that his "resignation was a personal act and has
no background", caused much scepticism among the public opinion especially at the lowest
levels of decision-making of this Party.

Speculations regarding the discrepancies and disagreements in the leadership of this party,
were partially proven to be true in the Convention.

Immediately after the adoption of the agenda, Murati took the stand and stated: "You are
expecting me to say something big, but once again I stress that I have taken this step for
personal reason", and thus verified his resignation.

However, the reasons of the president remain hidden deep inside him, even though rumors
claim that the reasons for his resignation are to be found in his new job as professor of the
Pedagogic Academy or his revolt after the publication of the decision of the Presidency on the
withdrawal of the Albanian MP's from the Parliament, which was done without his consent.

According to the Statute of the PPD, there is no discussion about the resignations, the Council
only confirms it, stated the Secretary of the PPD Naser Zyberi, but this didn't stop the
members of the largest Albanian political party in Macedonia to try and convince the
Chairman to retreat his resignation "at least until the next elections", which must take place in
November of the current year. There were also requests for the Chairman to explain his
reasons "for desertion" and to explain the "background" of this whole matter.

Chairman Murati, however, didn't accept the challenges, and at the end of the Convention,
only repeated what he had said at the beginning, wishing the PPD plenty of luck.

After his words, Secretary Zyberi could only ascertain the act of resignation of the Chairman,
who lead the party for a short period of time.

According to many analysts, Murati was the only person capable of playing the role of
"amalgam" and consolidate the party after the fatal Congress in february last. According to
rumors, he did not accept the post willingly, but took it as a party obligation, as a task
everybody was running away from.

Immediately afterwards, the Convention turned into an electing assembly of Murati's

successor.

Zyberi read an information of the Cadres' Commission of the Party, which proposed
Abdyrrahman Haliti as the only candidate for president, whilst Ilir Luma and Muhamed Halili
were proposed as candidates for one vacant post in the Central Presidency, adding a clause,
that after these two have reached and agreement (!), the number would be reduced to one.
This caused much exaltation in the room, and evidently proved that there were many
disagreements in the leadership of the Party, which apparently have been going on for a long
time. This information "erected" the "star" of the Convention: Muhamed Halili, who was
revolted by the fact that there was only one candidate for Chairman and two for the
Presidency. He asked how was that possible, and added that this was done purposely to
"eliminate him, because some ministers were afraid of him becoming Chairman of the PPD",
concretely mentioning ministers Beqir Zhuta and Servet Avziu.

Zyberi tried to explain that there were also going to be two candidates for president, and that

- 18 -
the name would be known as soon as the Tetova branch would present his candidate. Halili,
dissatisfied with the answer, gave up on the candidacy for member of Presidency, which
automatically meant that he gave up running for Chairman.

All of what happened discovered the games in the couloirs. It seems as if Halili was to be one
of the serious candidates for Chairman, but since he is not a member of the Central
Presidency, the only way he could come to the post, was becoming a Member of the
Presidency first, and this, he didn't like much. After the withdrawal of Halili, Luma remained
as the sole candidate, and with 31 votes in favor became member of the Presidency and
potential candidate for Chairman.

The third part of the Convention, that of the election of the president came afterwards. Taking
advantage of his right to propose, Abdyrrahman Haliti presented Ilir Luma as his
counter-candidate, but the proposal did not get sufficient votes, which created much space for
doubts. Apparently conscious of this fact, Haliti took the stand once again, and stated that
since he was the only candidate, he would like to have a secret vote, because "otherwise he
would have to reconsider whether he should accept the candidacy or not". The voting was
secret, and out of 39 delegates, 37 voted in his favor and 2 were against. His vice-chairmen
will be Xhemail Hajdari from Gostivar and Muedin Bajrami from Kërçovë.

Who is Abdyrrahman Haliti?

We can only say that this election will mean the continuation of the "post-Nevzatian" process,
which is characterized by the dismantlement of the cult of the leader and the policy grounded
on the political program of the party and not that of "this or that person", as the newly elected
chairman claims.

Regarding the relations with other Albanian parties in the Former Yugoslavia and the
Democratic Party of Albania, Haliti stated that "...the relations will be continue developing
normally. Regarding the Democratic Party of Albania, my personal wish would be to have a
normalization of relations with this party".

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