VERBA LEGIS

If the language of the statute is plain and free from ambiguity,

and express a single, definite, and sensible meaning, that
meaning is conclusively presumed to be the meaning which
the legislature intended to convey.
STARE DECISIS
It is the doctrine that, when court has once laid down a
principle, and apply it to all future cases, where facts are
substantially the same, regardless of whether the parties and
properties are the same.
Stare Decisis. Follow past precedents and do not disturb what
has been settled. Matters already decided on the merits cannot
be relitigated again and again.
Stare decisis et non quieta movere (follow past precedents
and do not disturb what has been settled.
G.R. No. 115245 July 11, 1995
JUANITO C. PILAR, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court assailing the Resolution dated April
28, 1994 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in
UND No. 94-040.
I
On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his
certificate of candidacy for the position of member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela.
On March 25, 1992, petitioner withdrew his certificate of
candidacy.
In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 dated November 3, 1993
and February 13, 1994 respectively, the COMELEC imposed
upon petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00)
for failure to file his statement of contributions and
expenditures.
In M.R. No. 94-0594 dated February 24, 1994, the
COMELEC denied the motion for reconsideration of
petitioner and deemed final M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065
(Rollo, p. 14).
Petitioner went to the COMELEC En Banc (UND No. 94-
040), which denied the petition in a Resolution dated April 28,
1994 (Rollo, pp. 10-13).
Hence, this petition for certiorari.
We dismiss the petition.
II
Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 entitled "An Act Providing for
Synchronized National and Local Elections and for Electoral
Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other
Purposes" provides as follows:
Statement of Contributions and Expenditures: Effect
of Failure to File Statement. Every candidate and treasurer of
the political party shall, within thirty (30) days after the day of
the election, file in duplicate with the offices of the
Commission the full, true and itemized statement of all
contributions and expenditures in connection with the election.
No person elected to any public office shall enter
upon the duties of his office until he has filed the statement of
contributions and expenditures herein required.
The same prohibition shall apply if the political party
which nominated the winning candidate fails to file the
statement required herein within the period prescribed by this
Act.
Except candidates for elective barangay office,
failure to file the statements or reports in connection with
electoral contributions and expenditures as required herein
shall constitute an administrative offense for which the
offenders shall be liable to pay an administrative fine ranging
from One Thousand Pesos ( P1,000.00) to Thirty Thousand
Pesos (P30,000.00), in the discretion of the Commission.
The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days from
receipt of notice of such failure; otherwise, it shall be
enforceable by a writ of execution issued by the Commission
against the properties of the offender.
It shall be the duty of every city or municipal election
registrar to advise in writing, by personal delivery or
registered mail, within five (5) days from the date of election
all candidates residing in his jurisdiction to comply with their
obligation to file their statements of contributions and
expenditures.
For the commission of a second or subsequent
offense under this Section, the administrative fine shall be
from Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) to Sixty Thousand
Pesos (P60,000.00), in the discretion of the Commission. In
addition, the offender shall be subject to perpetual
disqualification to hold public office (Emphasis supplied).
To implement the provisions of law relative to
election contributions and expenditures, the COMELEC
promulgated on January 13, 1992 Resolution No. 2348 (Re:
Rules and Regulations Governing Electoral Contributions and
Expenditures in Connection with the National and Local
Elections on
May 11, 1992). The pertinent provisions of said Resolution
are:
Sec. 13. Statement of contributions and expenditures:
Reminders to candidates to file statements. Within
five (5) days from the day of the election, the Law
Department of the Commission, the regional election
director of the National Capital Region, the
provincial election supervisors and the election
registrars shall advise in writing by personal delivery
or registered mail all candidates who filed their
certificates of candidacy with them to comply with
their obligation to file their statements of
contributions and expenditures in connection with the
elections. Every election registrar shall also advise all
candidates residing in his jurisdiction to comply with
said obligation (Emphasis supplied).
Sec. 17. Effect of failure to file statement. (a) No
person elected to any public office shall enter upon
the duties of his office until he has filed the statement
of contributions and expenditures herein required.
The same prohibition shall apply if the political party
which nominated the winning candidates fails to file
the statement required within the period prescribed
by law.
(b) Except candidates for elective barangay office,
failure to file statements or reports in connection with
the electoral contributions and expenditures as
required herein shall constitute an administrative
offense for which the offenders shall be liable to pay
an administrative fine ranging from One Thousand
Pesos (P1,000) to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000),
in the discretion of the Commission.
The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days from
receipt of notice of such failure; otherwise, it shall be
enforceable by a writ of execution issued by the
Commission against the properties of the offender.
For the commission of a second or subsequent
offense under this section, the administrative fine
shall be from Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000) to Sixty
Thousand Pesos (P60,000), in the discretion of the
Commission. In addition, the offender shall be
subject to perpetual disqualification to hold public
office.
Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file
a statement of contributions and expenditures because he was
a "non-candidate," having withdrawn his certificates of
candidacy three days after its filing. Petitioner posits that "it is
. . . clear from the law that candidate must have entered the
political contest, and should have either won or lost" (Rollo, p.
39).
Petitioner's argument is without merit.
Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that "every candidate" has
the obligation to file his statement of contributions and
expenditures.
Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not
distinguish, courts should not distinguish, Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos (Philippine British
Assurance Co. Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 150
SCRA 520 [1987]; cf Olfato v. Commission on Elections, 103
SCRA 741 [1981]). No distinction is to be made in the
application of a law where none is indicated (Lo Cham v.
Ocampo, 77 Phil. 636 [1946]).
In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or
qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his
candidacy or withdrew the same, the term "every candidate"
must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued
his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy.
The COMELEC, the body tasked with the enforcement and
administration of all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and
recall (The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines,
Art. IX(C), Sec. 2[1]), issued Resolution No. 2348 in
implementation or interpretation of the provisions of Republic
Act No. 7166 on election contributions and expenditures.
Section 13 of Resolution No. 2348 categorically refers to "all
candidates who filed their certificates of candidacy."
Furthermore, Section 14 of the law uses the word "shall." As a
general rule, the use of the word "shall" in a statute implies
that the statute is mandatory, and imposes a duty which may
be enforced , particularly if public policy is in favor of this
meaning or where public interest is involved. We apply the
general rule (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 757 [1988];
Diokno v. Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, 91 Phil. 608
[1952]).
The state has an interest in seeing that the electoral process is
clean, and ultimately expressive of the true will of the
electorate. One way of attaining such objective is to pass
legislation regulating contributions and expenditures of
candidates, and compelling the publication of the same.
Admittedly, contributions and expenditures are made for the
purpose of influencing the results of the elections (B.P. Blg.
881, Sec. 94; Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 1). Thus, laws and
regulations prescribe what contributions are prohibited (B.P.
Blg. 881, Sec. 95, Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 4), or unlawful
(B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 96), and what expenditures are authorized
(B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 102; R.A. No. 7166, Sec. 13; Resolution
No. 2348, Sec. 7) or lawful (Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 8).
Such statutes are not peculiar to the Philippines. In "corrupt
and illegal practices acts" of several states in the United
States, as well as in federal statutes, expenditures of
candidates are regulated by requiring the filing of statements
of expenses and by limiting the amount of money that may be
spent by a candidate. Some statutes also regulate the
solicitation of campaign contributions (26 Am Jur 2d,
Elections 287). These laws are designed to compel publicity
with respect to matters contained in the statements and to
prevent, by such publicity, the improper use of moneys
devoted by candidates to the furtherance of their ambitions (26
Am Jur 2d, Elections 289). These statutes also enable voters
to evaluate the influences exerted on behalf of candidates by
the contributors, and to furnish evidence of corrupt practices
for annulment of elections (Sparkman v. Saylor [Court of
Appeals of Kentucky], 180 Ky. 263, 202 S.W. 649 [1918]).
State courts have also ruled that such provisions are
mandatory as to the requirement of filing (State ex rel.
Butchofsky v. Crawford [Court of Civil Appeals of Texas],
269 S.W. 2d 536 [1954]; Best v. Sidebottom, 270 Ky. 423,109
S.W. 2d 826 [1937]; Sparkman v. Saylor, supra.)
It is not improbable that a candidate who withdrew his
candidacy has accepted contributions and incurred
expenditures, even in the short span of his campaign. The evil
sought to be prevented by the law is not all too remote.
It is notesworthy that Resolution No. 2348 even contemplates
the situation where a candidate may not have received any
contribution or made any expenditure. Such a candidate is not
excused from filing a statement, and is in fact required to file a
statement to that effect. Under Section 15 of Resolution No.
2348, it is provided that "[i]f a candidate or treasurer of the
party has received no contribution, made no expenditure, or
has no pending obligation, the statement shall reflect such
fact."
Lastly, we note that under the fourth paragraph of Section 73
of the B.P. Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code of the
Philippines, it is provided that "[t]he filing or withdrawal of
certificate of candidacy shall not affect whatever civil,
criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may
have incurred." Petitioner's withdrawal of his candidacy did
not extinguish his liability for the administrative fine.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
G.R. No. 110898 February 20, 1996
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUDGE ANTONIO C. EVANGELISTA, as
Presiding Judge of Branch XXI, 10th Judicial Region,
RTC of Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City, and
GRILDO S. TUGONON, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J .:
Private respondent Grildo S. Tugonan was charged with
frustrated homicide in the Regional Trial Court of Misamis
Oriental (Branch 21), the information against him alleging
That on or about the 26th day of May, 1988, at more
or less 9:00 o'clock in the evening at Barangay
Publican+.3, Municipality of Villanueva, Province of
Misamis Oriental, Republic of the Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused with intent to kill and with the
use of a knife, which he was then conveniently
provided of, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously assault, attack and stab Roque T.
Bade thereby inflicting upon him the following
injuries, to wit:
Stab wound, right iliac area,
0.5 cm. penetrating non
perforating lacerating posterior
peritoneum, 0,5 cm.
thus performing all the acts of execution which
would produce the crime of Homicide as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce
it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
accused, that is by timely medical attendance which
prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO and in violation of Article 249 in
relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code.
After trial he was found guilty and sentenced to one year of
prision correccional in its minimum period and ordered to pay
to the offended party P5,000.00 for medical expense, without
subsidiary imprisonment, and the costs. The RTC appreciated
in his favor the privileged mitigating circumstances of
incomplete self-defense and the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender.
On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed private respondent's
conviction but modified his sentence by imposing on him an
indeterminate penalty of 2 months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to 2 years and 4 months of prision correccional, as
maximum.
1

On December 21, 1992, respondent Judge Antonio C.
Evangelista of the RTC set the case for repromulgation on
January 4, 1993.
On December 28, 1992, private respondent filed a petition for
probation,
2
alleging that (1) he possessed all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications for probation under P.D. No.
968, as amended; (2) the Court of Appeals has in fact reduced
the penalty imposed on him by the trial court; (3) in its
resolution, the Court of Appeals took no action on a petition
for probation which he had earlier filed with it so that the
petition could be filed with the trial court; (4) in the trial
court's decision, two mitigating circumstances of incomplete
self-defense and voluntarily surrender were appreciated in his
favor; and (5) in Santos To v. Pao,
3
the Supreme Court
upheld the right of the accused to probation notwithstanding
the fact that he had appealed from his conviction by the trial
court.
On February 2, 1993, the RTC ordered private respondent to
report for interview to the Provincial Probation Officer. The
Provincial Probation Officer on the other hand was required to
submit his report with recommendation to the court within 60
days.
4

On February 18, 1993, Chief Probation and Parole Officer
Isias B. Valdehueza recommended denial of private
respondent's application for probation on the ground that by
appealing the sentence of the trial court, when he could have
then applied for probation, private respondent waived the right
to make his application. The Probation Officer thought the
present case to be distinguishable from Santos To v. Pao in
the sense that in this case the original sentence imposed on
private respondent by the trial court (1 year of imprisonment)
was probationable and there was no reason for private
respondent not to have filed his application for probation then,
whereas in Santos To v. Pao the penalty only became
probationable after it had been reduced as a result of the
appeal.
On April 16, 1993 Valdehueza reiterated
5
his "respectful
recommendation that private respondent's application for
probation be denied and that a warrant of arrest be issued for
him to serve his sentence in jail."
The RTC set aside the Probation Officer's recommendation
and granted private respondent's application for probation in
its order of April 23, 1993,
6
Hence this petition by the
prosecution.
The issue in this case is whether the RTC committed a grave
abuse of its discretion by granting private respondent's
application for probation despite the fact that he had appealed
from the judgment of his conviction of the trial court.
The Court holds that it did.
Until its amendment by P.D. No. 1990 in 1986, it was possible
under P.D. No. 986, otherwise known as the Probation Law,
for the accused to take his chances on appeal by allowing
probation to be granted even after an accused had appealed his
sentence and failed to obtain an acquittal, just so long as he
had not yet started to serve the sentence.
7
Accordingly, in
Santos To v. Pao, it was held that the fact that the accused
had appealed did not bar him from applying for probation
especially because it was as a result of the appeal that his
sentence was reduced and made the probationable limit.
The law was, however, amended by P.D. No. 1990 which took
effect on January 15, 1986
8
precisely to put a stop to the
practice of appealing from judgments of conviction even if the
sentence is probationable for the purpose of securing an
acquittal and applying for probation only if the accused fails in
his bid. Thus, as amended by P.D. No, 1990, 4 of the
Probation Law now reads:
4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of
this Decree, the trial court may, after it shall have
convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon
application by said defendant within the period for
perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the
sentence and place the defendant on probation for
such period and upon such terms and conditions as it
may deem best; Provided, That no application for
probation shall be entertained or granted if the
defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment
of conviction.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence
imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine only. An
application for probation shall be filed with the trial
court. The filing of the application shall be deemed a
waiver of the right to appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be
appealable. (Emphasis added).
Since private respondent filed his application for probation on
December 28, 1992, after P.D. No. 1990 had taken effect,
9
it is
covered by the prohibition that "no application for probation
shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected
the appeal from the judgment of conviction" and that "the
filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right
to appeal," Having appealed from the judgment of the trial
court and having applied for probation only after the Court of
Appeals had affirmed his conviction, private respondent was
clearly precluded from the benefits of probation.
Private respondent argues, however, that a distinction should
be drawn between meritorious appeals (like his appeal
notwithstanding the appellate court's affirmance of his
conviction) and unmeritorious appeals. But the law does not
make any distinction and so neither should the Court. In fact if
an appeal is truly meritorious the accused would be set free
and not only given probation. Private respondent's original
sentence (1 year of prision correccional in its minimum
period) and the modified sentence imposed by the Court of
Appeals (2 months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to 2 years
and 4 months of prision correccional, as maximum) are
probationable. Thus the fact that he appealed meant that
private respondent was taking his chances which the law
precisely frowns upon. This is precisely the evil that the
amendment in P.D. No. 1990 sought to correct, since in the
words of the preamble to the amendatory law, "probation was
not intended as an escape hatch and should not be used to
obstruct and delay the administration of justice, but should be
availed of at the first opportunity by offenders who are willing
to be reformed and rehabilitated."
The ruling of the RTC that "[h]aving not perfected an appeal
against the Court of Appeals decision, [private respondent] is,
therefore, not covered by [the amendment in] P.D. 1990" is an
obvious misreading of the law. The perfection of the appeal
referred in the law refers to the .appeal taken from a judgment
of conviction by the trial court and not that of the appellate
court, since under the law an application for probation is filed
with the trial court which can only grant the same "after it
shall have convicted and sentenced [the] defendant, and upon
application by said defendant within the period for perfecting
an appeal. "Accordingly, in Llamado v. Court of Appeals,
10
it
was held that the petitioner who had appealed his sentence
could not subsequently apply for probation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the order of
April 23, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis
Oriental (Branch 21) granting probation to private respondent
Grildo S. Tugonon is SET ASIDE.
G.R. No. L-33140 October 23, 1978
J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., JOSE M. TUASON,
NICASIO A. TUASON, TERESA TUASON, CELSO S.
TUASON and SEVERO A. TUASON, petitioners,
vs.
HON. HERMINIO C. MARIANO, Presiding Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal MANUELA AQUIAL,
MARIA AQUIAL, Spouses JOSE M. CORDOVA and
SATURNINA C. CORDOVA, respondents.
Sison Law Office and Senensio O. Ortile for petitioners.
Hill & Associates Law Office for respondents Aquials.
Antonio E. Pesigan for respondents Cordovas.

AQUINO, J .:
This is another litigation regarding the validity of the much
controverted Original Certificate of Title No. 735 covering the
Santa Mesa and D Estates of the Tuason mayorazgo or Entail
with areas of 877 (879) and 1,625 hectares, respectively
(Barrette vs. Tuason, 50 Phil. 888; Benin case, infra).
On October 1, 1965, Manuela Aquial and Maria Aquial filed a
complaint in forma pauperis in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal Pasig Branch X, wherein they prayed that they be
declared the owners of a parcel of land located at Balara,
Marikina, Rizal (now Quezon City) and bounded on the north
by Sapang Mapalad, on the south by the land of Eladio,
Tiburcio on the east by Sapang Kolotkolotan, and on the west
by Sapang Kuliat The land, which has an area of three
hundred eighty-three quiones was allegedly acquired by their
father by means of a Spanish title issued to him on May 10,
1877 (Civil Case No. 8943).
They alleged that sometime in 1960, or after J. M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. had illegally entered upon that land, they discovered
that it had been fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT
No. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal and that it was
registered in the names of defendants Mariano, Teresa, Juan,
Demetrio and Augusta all surnamed Tuason pursuant to a
decree issued on July 6. 1914 in Case No. 7681 of the Court of
Land Registration.
They further alleged that transfer certificates of title, derived
from OCT No. 735, were issued to defendants J. M. Tuason &
Co., Inc., University of the Philippines and National
Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (Nawasa) which leased a
portion of its land to defendant Capitol Golf Club.
Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No. 735 and the titles
derived therefrom be declared void due to certain irregularities
in the land registration proceeding. They asked for damages.
Defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss
on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, improper venue,
prescription, laches and prior judgment. The plaintiffs opposed
that motion. The lower court denied it. The grounds of the
motion to dismiss were pleaded as affirmative defenses in the
answer of defendants Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
They insisted that a preliminary hearing be held on those
defenses.
On January 25, 1967, the spouses Jose M. Cordova and
Saturnina C. Cordova, who had bought eleven hectares of the
disputed land from the plaintiffs, were allowed to intervene in
the case.
On September 5, 1970, the lower court issued an order
requiring the parties the Register of Deeds of Rizal to produce
in court on October 16, 1970 OCT No. 735 and certain
transfer certificates of title derived from that first or basic title.
Later, the court required the production in court of the plan of
the land covered by OCT No. 735 allegedly for the purpose of
determining whether the lands claimed by the plaintiffs and
the intervenors are included therein.
On February 11, 1971, the Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. filed the instant civil actions of certiorari and prohibition
praying, inter alia, that the trial court be ordered to dismiss the
complaint and enjoined from proceeding in the said case.
After the petitioners had filed the proper bond, a writ of
preliminary injunction was issued. Respondents Aquial and
Cordova answered the petition. The parties, except the
Aquials, filed memoranda in lieu of oral argument.
The issue is whether OCT No. 735 and the titles derived
therefrom can be questioned at this late hour by respondents
Aquial and Cordova. The supposed irregularities in the land
registration proceeding, which led to the issuance of the
decree upon which OCT. No. 735 was based, are the same
issues raised in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 of the
lower court. The 1965 decision of Judge Eulogio Mencias in
those cases, in validating OCT No. 735, is annexed to the
complaint of the Aquials. It is cited by them to support their
support their action and it might have encouraged them to
ventilate their action in court.
On appeal to this Court, that decision was reversed and the
validity of OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom was
once more upheld. (Benin vs. Tuason, L-26127, Alcantara vs.
Tuason, L-26128 and Pili vs. Tuason, L-26129, all decided on
June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 531).
The ruling in the Benin, Alcantara and Pili cases was applied
in Mara, Inc. vs. Estrella, L-40511, July 25, 1975, 65 SCRA
471. That ruling is simply a reiteration or confirmation of the
holding in the following cases directly or incidentally
sustaining OCT No. 735: Bank of the P. I. vs. Acua, 59 Phil.
183; Tiburcio vs. PHHC, 106 Phil. 447; Galvez and Tiburcio
vs. Tuason y de la Paz, 119 Phil. 612; Alcantara vs. Tuason,
92 Phil. 796; Santiago vs. J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. 110 Phil.
16; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Bolaos, 95 Phil. 106; J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Santiago, 99 Phil. 615; J. M. Tuason &
Co., Inc. vs. De Guzman, 99 Phil. 281; J. M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. vs. Aguirre, 117 Phil. 110; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs.
Macalindong, 116 Phil. 1227; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs.
Magdangal, 114 Phil. 42; Varsity Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro, L-
30889, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 503, and People's
Homesite and Housing Corporation vs. Mencias, L-24114,
August 16, 1967, 20 SCRA 1031.
Considering the governing principle of stare decisis et non
quieta movere (follow past precedents and do not disturb what
has been settled) it becomes evident that respondents Aquial
and Cordova cannot maintain their action in Civil Case No.
8943 without eroding the long settled holding of the courts
that OCT No. 735 is valid and no longer open to attack.
It is against public policy that matters already decided on the
merits be relitigated again and again, consuming the court's
time and energies at the expense of other litigants: Interest rei
publicae ut finis sit litium." (Varsity Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro,
supra).
Finding the petition for certiorari and prohibition to be
meritorious, the trial court is directed to dismiss Civil Case
No. 8943 with prejudice and without costs. No costs.
SO ORDERED.