Subject: Oral Defamation or Slander

Crimes Against Honor:

1. A persons name, honor and reputation, is as sacred to him as his very life. Title 13 seeks to give
protection thereto by defining certain acts injurious to a persons name and reputation as crimes
and prescribing penalties therefore.
2. These crimes, hich are in the nature of character assassination, are classified according to the manner
of their commission into the folloing!
a" #ibel hich is by making use of the mass media and literary forms or literary outlets
b" $ral %efamation hich is by the use of oral utterances
c" &lander by %eed hich is by performing an act intended to cast dishonor, disrespect or contempt
upon a person
d" 'ncriminatory machinations hich may either be!
(i" 'ncriminating an innocent person in the commission of a crime by planting evidence
(ii" 'ntriguing against honor by resorting to any scheme, plot, design, but not by direct spoken ords,
to destroy the reputation of another
3. )lements common to crimes against honor
a" That there be a matter, oral ritten or in hatever form, or of an act, hich is defamatory toanother
b" That there is publicity of the defamatory matter
c" That there be malice on the part of the accused
d" That the person defamed is identifiable
*. The foregoing crimes cannot be committed by negligence because all re+uire the element of malice.
,. Title 13, especially the article on libel constitutes another limitation to the freedom of speech and of the
press as these to freedoms can not be alloed to be used to destroy the good name of an
innocent person.
Kinds and Definition of Slander or Oral Defamation:
%efinition! &peaking of base and defamatory ords that tend to prejudice another in his reputation, office,
trade, business or means of livelihood.

To kinds of oral or verbal defamation!
(1" -rave &lander
(2" &imple &lander

A. .actors to consider!
1. The e/pression used including their sense, grammatical significance and accepted ordinary
meaning
2. The personal relations of the accused and the offended party, as hen both are bitter enemies
3. The special circumstances of the case and its antecedents, such as the time, place and occasion of
the utterances, persons present
*. The social standing and position of the offended party

0. 1ords uttered in the heat of anger or in a +uarrel, ith some provocation on the part of the victim, is
simple slander.
2 The victim may not have heard the ords, it is enough that a third person heard them.
2 1ords uttered in one occasion and place and directed at several persons not mentioned
individually constitute only one offense.
2 1ords used as e/pletives (to e/press anger, displeasure, are not defamatory"
Articles:

Art. 3,3. &lander. 4 $ral defamation shall be punished by arresto mayor in its ma/imum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period if it is of a serious and insulting nature5
otherise, the penalty shall be arresto menor or a fine not e/ceeding 266 pesos.
Article 76. Prescription of crime. - 8rimes punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or reclusion
temporal shall prescribe in tenty years. 8rimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in
fifteen years. Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten years5 ith the e/ception
of those punishable by arresto mayor, hich shall prescribe in five years. The crime of libel or other
similar offenses shall prescribe in one year. The crime of oral defamation and slander by deed shall
prescribe in si/ months. #ight offenses prescribe in to months. 1hen the penalty fi/ed by la is a
compound one, the highest penalty shall be made the basis of the application of the rules contained in the
first, second and third paragraphs of this article. (As amended by 9epublic Act :o. *;;1, approved <une
17, 17;;."
Cases:
As cited in the case of Daniel Victorio and Exequiel Victorio v. The Hon. Court of Appeals and The People
of the Philippines!
To determine hether the offense committed is serious or slight oral defamation, the 8ourt adopted the
folloing guidelines!
. . . 1e are to be guided by a doctrine of ancient respectability that defamatory ords ill
fall under one or the other, depending upon, as =iada puts it, >...upon their sense and
grammatical meaning judging them separately, but also upon the special circumstances of
the case, antecedents or relationship beteen the offended party and the offender, hich
might tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time! ... 0alite v.
?eople, !id." +uoting =iada, Codi#o Penal, @uinta edicion, page *7*".
Thus, in the same case cited here scurrilous ords imputed to the offended party the crime of estafa, the
8ourt ruled!
The scurrilous ords imputed to the offended party the crime estafa. The language of the
indictment strikes deep into the character of the victim5 Ae >has sold the union5 he >has
sindled the money of the vendees5 he >received bribe money in the amount of
?16,666.66 ... and another ?;,666.66>5 Ae >is engaged in racketeering and enriching
himself ith the capitalists>5 Ae >has spent the funds of the union for his personal use.>
:o amount of sophistry ill take these statements out of the compass of grave oral
defamation. They are serious and insulting. :o circumstances need to be shon to
upgrade the slander. . . .
'n another case here a oman of violent temper hurled offensive and scurrilous epithets including ords
imputing unchastity against a respectable married lady and tending to injure the character of her young
daughters, the 8ourt ruled that the crime committed as grave slander!
The language used by the defendant as deliberately applied by her to the complainant.
The ords ere uttered ith evident intent to injure complainant, to ruin her reputation,
and to hold her in public contempt, for the sake of revenge. $ne ho ill thus seek to
impute vice or immorality to another, the conse+uences of hich might gravely prejudice
the reputation of the person insulted, in this instance apparently an honorable and
respectable lady and her young daughters, all prominent in social circles, deserves little
judicial sympathy. 8ertainly, it is time for the courts to put the stamp of their disapproval
on this practice of vile and loud slander. (B.&. v. Tolosa, 3C ?hil. 1;; D171CE".
'n a case here the accused, a priest, called the offended party a gangster, in the middle of a sermon, the
court affirmed the conviction of the accused for slight slander (?eople v. Arcand ;3 ?hil. ;61 D1737E".
There as no imputation of a crime nor a vice or immorality in said case.
'n the instant case, appellantFpetitioner admitted having uttered the defamatory ords against Atty.
=ivencio 9uiG. Among others he called Atty. 9uiG, HestapadorH, hich attributes to the latter the crime of
estafa, a serious and insulting imputation. As stated by the 8ourt in $alite v. People, supra" Hno amount of
sophistry ill take these statements out of the compass of grave oral defamation . . . :o circumstances
need to be shon to upgrade the slander.H
%efamatory ords uttered specifically against a layer hen touching on his profession are libelous per
se. Thus, in %lee!er# v. &ipser '171 :I 3*, D173*E", it as held that Hhere statements concerning
plaintiff in his professional capacity as attorney are susceptible, in their ordinary meaning, of such
construction as ould tend to injure him in that capacity, they are libelous per se and (the" complaint,
even in the absence of allegation of special damage, states cause of action.H $ral statements that a certain
layer is >unethical,> or a false charge, dealing ith office, trade, occupation, business or profession of a
person charged, are slanderous per se (Jraushaar v. #a=in, *2 :.I.&. 2d 3,C D17*3E5 Kains v. 1hiting
*7 :1 ,,7 D1371E5 -reenburg v. %e &alvo, 21; &o. 2d ;33 D17;3E".
'n Pollard v. (yon (71 B& 22, D13C;E", the court there had occasion to divide oral slander, as a cause of
action, into several classes, as follos!
(1" 1ords falsely spoken of a person hich impute to the party the commission of some
criminal offense involving moral turpitude for hich the party, if the charge is true, may
be indicted and punished5
(2" 1ords falsely spoken of a person hich impute that the party is infected ith some
contagious disease, here, if the charge is true, it ould e/clude the party from society5
(3" %efamatory ords falsely spoken of a person hich impute to the party unfitness to
perform the duties of an office or employment, or the ant of integrity in the discharge of
the duties of such office or employment5
(*" %efamatory ords falsely spoken of a party hich prejudice such party in his or her
profession or trade5 and
(," %efamatory ords falsely spoken of a person, hich, though not in themselves
actionable, occasion the party special damage.H
'n the instant case, appellantFpetitioner imputed the crime of estafa against a prominent layer oneFtime
<ustice of the ?eace and member of the ?rovincial 0oard of :ueva )cija, a professor of la and for
sometime a president of the :ueva )cija 0ar Association. As the scurrilous imputation strikes deep into
the character of the victim, no special circumstance need be shon for the defamatory ords uttered to be
considered grave oral defamation $alite v. People, supra. 'n addition, the fact that the offended party is a
layer, the totality of such ords as HkayabangH, Htuna ang utakH, Hsapang at estapadorH, imputed
against him has the import of charging him ith dishonesty or improper practice in the performance of his
duties, hence, actionable per se. ?etitioner argues that this 8ourt in People v. Doronila (*6 $.-. :o. 1,,
&upp. 11, p. 231 D17*1E" and People v. )odesto (*6 $.-. :o. 1,, &upp. 11, p. 123 D17*1E" ruled that
defamatory ords uttered in the heat of anger could only give rise to slight oral defamation (9ono, p. 13".
'n *eyes vs. People,
1*
e ruled that the e/pression Hputang ina moH is a common enough utterance in the
dialect that is often employed, not really to slender but rather to e/press anger or displeasure. 'n fact,
more often, it is just an e/pletive that punctuates one>s e/pression of profanity. 1e do not find it seriously
insulting that after a previous incident involving his father, a drunk 9ogelio ?ader on seeing Atty.
)scolango ould utter ords e/pressing anger. $bviously, the intention as to sho his feelings of
resentment and not necessarily to insult the latter. 0eing a candidate running for vice mayor, occasional
gestures and ords of disapproval or dislike of his person are not uncommon.+,-phi+.n.t
'n Cru/ v. Court of Appeals,
D36E
petitioner and complainant, a Kunicipal <udge, ere ne/t door
neighbors. Animosity gre beteen their to families because of some disputes. ?etitioner resented the
practice of complainant of throing garbage and animal e/crement into her premises. There as also a
boundary dispute beteen petitioner>s mother and complainant, hich as the subject of a civil suit for
H9ecovery of ?ossession, $nership, )nforcement of #egal )asement and Abatement of :uisanceH filed
by the mother before the 8ourt of .irst 'nstance of 'loilo against complainant. Additionally, petitioner>s
mother had previously instituted an administrative complaint against the complainant before the &upreme
8ourt, but the same as dismissed. There as a pentFup feeling of being aggrieved, resentment, anger,
and ve/ation on petitioner>s part, culminating in her outburst against complainants. .or having called the
complainant judge Hland grabber,H HshamelessH and Hhypocrite,H petitioner as charged and subse+uently
convicted by the 8ourt of .irst 'nstance of three separate offenses of -rave $ral %efamation committed
on ,, ; and 8 August 1976. $n appeal, the 8ourt of Appeals affirmed the verdicts of conviction. $n
revie, hoever, e held that although the abusive remarks may ordinarily be considered as serious
defamation, under the environmental circumstances of the case, there having been provocation on
complainant>s part, and the utterances complained of having been made in the heat of unrestrained anger
and obfuscation, petitioner is liable only for the crime of &light $ral %efamation. ?etitioner as
sentenced to pay a fine of ?266.66 in each of the criminal cases, ith subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.