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Scott Keenan 200811075

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Lions led by donkeys. How accurate a view of the British Armys
performance on the Western Front in 1915 is this?

The First World War in British popular memory is one of futility, squalor and the
needless massacre of many thousands of British men; promised a short war they were sent
into the trenches with little or no training and then ordered into no mans land to be mown
down by German machine gun fire again and again in pointless attacks. This massive waste
of life was put down to Generals who were thought to be the worst sort of incompetent;
unable to grasp or, even worse, care that thousands of their men were being killed by their
refusal to adapt to new conditions. Whether this stupidity was down to their background - a
large majority of the so-called donkeys came from the upper-class echelons of society - or
lack of initiative or even a callous brand of the stiff upper lip school of thought, the fact
remains: they sat in their chateaus miles from the fighting oblivious to the death they were
causing and went on planning the next offensive. Moreover, a war thought to be over in a
couple of months ended up continuing for the next four years, this was again thought to be
due to the generals and their inability to fight a decisive battle, instead insisting on a strategy
of attrition that prolonged the war far beyond what it should have lasted.

This view that the British public has of the First World War, one that has been
supported by historians such as Alan Clark in his book The Donkeys
1
and A. J. P Taylor
who described the Generals as staring at the line of trenches, impotently and without

1
A. Clark, The Donkeys, (London, 1961).
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understanding. They went on staring for nearly four years
2
. Views like this were the defining
ones that dominated intellectual discussions on the First World War for many decades after
its conclusion. This perspective has been challenged in recent years by many revisionist
historians such as Gary Sheffield, who proposed that the Generals did the best that they could
under the circumstances
3
. Changing technology, political considerations and lessons from
previous wars all had an impact on the way the First World War was conducted and altered it
in a way that no one could have foreseen or anticipated. This challenge to conventional
wisdom revealed that the emotional wounds the war inflicted on the British populace ran
deep. Sheffield remarks that in voicing his ideas initially he received very angry and
passionate letters claiming he was being misleading or disrespecting of the dead
4
. It is
perhaps the fact that the losses in the First World War were so great that the public needed a
scapegoat, someone to blame to help them deal with this national wound. The Generals can
be said to easily fill this need; they ordered their men forward and came up with the plans that
killed off a generation of British men. However, this essay aims to support the claims of
revisionist historians insofar that other factors were greater contributors to the cause of the
war being conducted the way it was. While it is certain that soldiers, on all sides of the
conflict, earned the title, Lions, it is not so that the Generals deserve to be classed as,
Donkeys.


2
A. J. P. Taylor, The First World War: An Illustrated History (London, 1963), p. 34.
3
Sheffield explores all of these circumstances in his book: G. Sheffield, Forgotten Victory: The First World War:
Myths and realities, (London, 2001).
4
Ibid, p. xviii.
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This essay will look at the how the war developed into the stalemate of 1915 after the
initial war of movement in 1914; it will also look at major battles the British army was
involved in during 1915, such as Neuve Chappelle and Loos, examining why these attacks
failed and what was the cause of that failure. Next it will look at overarching factors that
meant the war was conducted the way it was; changes in technology, previous wars and their
lessons and the cult of the offensive. It is hoped that in examining these other factors that
an accurate view of the British armys performance on the Western Front in 1915 can be
obtained.

In 1914, there had been a brief period of mobile warfare; as the seven initial
German armies swung in their large arc through Belgium and then into France. This arc had
been stronger in force and wider in frontage than the Entente had planned for and it forced
them to retreat, lest they be cut off from the other French armies. In falling back the British
Expeditionary Force (BEF) conducted several defensive actions; the most notable being at
Mons on the 23
rd
of August and three days later at La Cateau on the 26
th
of August. Although
losing several thousand men, 1600 at Mons and 7000 at La Cateau
5
, these battles were a
success against a much larger foe and had the added pressure of needing to pull back without
starting a rout. The Commander in charge of these battles was General Sir Horace Smith-
Dorrien, who can be credited for organising the defence and indeed stopping the rout and
destruction of the BEF, his coolness and intrepidness under fire saved Le Cateau from

5
S. C. Tucker, The Great War 1914-18, (London, 1998), p. 29.
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becoming a rout
6
. This example from early on in the war demonstrates that the Generals
were not all incompetent and were able to deal with high stress tactical situations.

This general retreat continued until the Battle of Marne on the 5
th
of September when
the Germans were halted and the race to the sea had begun. This period saw the development
of the trench lines that were to remain practically the same until four years later. The war of
movement finished, the war of stalemate begun.
Before the major battles of 1915 can be analysed, it is necessary to examine the
impact of coalition warfare in the First World War and how it affected the decisions of the
British Generals. The Triple Entente was made up of Russia, Britain and France; each had
their own strategic aims and problems. Britain was undoubtedly the junior partner in the
Entente, having the smallest army and therefore the smallest initial commitment to the war;
Britain initially had six infantry and one cavalry division in action, while France had sixty-
two infantry and ten cavalry divisions
7
. This large disparity in army size meant that Britain
was seen to be doing less than her fair share in the fighting, and in 1915 the French
commander Joffre demanded that the BEF take over more lines of trenches and support
French attacks with attacks of their own
8
. Kitchener noted to the Cabinet that they: could
not without serious and perhaps fatal injury to the Alliance refuse the cooperation which
Joffre expected
9
.

6
S. J. Corvi, Haigs Generals, (Barnsley, 2006), p. 199.
7
G. Sheffield, Forgotten Victory, p. 115.
8
J. Keegan, The First World War, (London, 1998), p. 208-9.
9
Quoted in N. Ferguson, The Pity of War 1914-1918, (Great Britain, 1998), p. 304.
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Moreover, Russia had suffered massive defeats on the Eastern Front; the Battle of
Tannenberg was decisive and looked as though it may force Russia into making peace
terms
10
. Kitchener again commented, he was: doubtful how much longer (the Russian
army) could withstand the German Blows
11
. These events combined to force Britain into
taking actions that it did not want to but had to; to keep relations cordial with the French and
to keep Russia in the war and Germany fighting on two fronts. The major battles of 1915
therefore have to be looked at through the lens of the demands of Allied cooperation. The
battle of Neuve Chappelle was fought to prove to the French that the BEF was taking on its
fair share of the fighting; whilst the Battle of Loos was fought with the French deciding
where the attack was going to take place
12
. So in 1915, at a strategic level, these attacks were
not really the fault of the Generals, so for evidence of them being Donkeys, the battles
themselves will have to be studied.

The Battle of Neuve Chappelle started on the 10 March 1915 and followed a plan that
Field Marshal Haig devised himself with meticulous precision. Over 500 artillery pieces were
to bombard the German positions that had been ranged secretly over the previous three
weeks
13
. The barrage lasted half an hour and took the German forces completely by surprise,
the British following after the barrage found little or no resistance in the first objective of
German trench lines, and therefore pushed on to the second. The soldiers encountered no
resistance; the Germans having retreated to strong points beyond Neuve Chappelle. This was

10
S. C. Tucker, The Great War, p. 43.
11
Quoted in N. Ferguson, The Pity of War, p. 304.
12
G. Sheffield, Forgotten Victory, p. 125.
13
S. C. Tucker, The Great War, p. 60.
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a success in terms of ground captured however the real problem would be in holding these
gains. The bombardment moved ahead of the troops at Neuve Chappelle, who recognised that
further gains could be made; it was here that problems arose. The infantry was held back
from going further by the bombardment hemming them in (it was supposed to hinder a
German counter-attack) and the inability to communicate the tactical situation to the
commanders miles behind the lines. Keegan sums up the difficulties faced:

The Corps Commander in some room five miles or more from the battle had to make
a decision on the flimsiest and often false information, and the necessary orders had
then to travel back, along the same chain, to be considered and written out in greater
detail at each stage (divisional headquarters, brigade headquarters, battalion
headquarters), till finally they reached the front-line companies
14
.

The delays in sending messages back and receiving a reply meant that five hours were
wasted with no movement at all, moreover the reserves waiting to come up and keep the
advance going were stalled in the assembly area and their numbers created a jam that
hampered their effective movement to the front. By the time orders were received and
clarified the situation had changed and the Germans were organising a counter-attack. The
BEF had extreme difficulty in fighting off this attack as they could not communicate to their

14
Quoted in J. Keegan, The First World War, p. 211.
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artillery where the concentrations of Germans were and eventually had to fall back; the BEF
lost 11 652 men in this attack
15
.

The Battle of Loos on the 25
th
of September followed a similar pattern; the artillery
barrage, lasting four days, was followed by an infantry attack; chlorine gas was used to
compensate for fewer artillery pieces. The infantry attack made massive gains, for a five mile
frontage they advanced 4000-5000 yards
16
. However, they faced similar problems to the
attack at Neuve Chappelle in that they could not communicate effectively with the artillery
and fight off German counter-attacks. The Generals did not continue to make the same
mistakes however; the attack frontage was increased to five miles to help combat the
congestion with the reserves at the rear. They did take the wrong lesson from the artillery
barrage at Neuve Chappelle though, instead of focussing on short, sharp barrages that
maintained the element of surprise they increased it to concentrate on destroying defences
instead of disrupting them. This oversight is partly to blame on the impact of the Russo-
Japanese war of 1904-5 on tactics, however that will be discussed in a later section. The
important point is that the Generals were changing and adapting their plans to try and
overcome problems they faced in the battles of 1915.

A common feature of the 1915 battles was the fact that a breakthrough was almost
always achieved; the main problem in each was exploiting that breakthrough. The technology
level of army communications meant that reserves or artillery fire could not be directed

15
J. Keegan, The First World War, p. 212.
16
S. C. Tucker, The Great War, p 69.
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efficiently enough, and even if they were they were employed in the wrong place or time.
Problems with communications can be said to be one of the main problems of warfare in
1915 and, cannot be overestimated as an explanation for high casualties on the attacking
side
17
. This lack of communications meant that as soon as troops were launched on an attack
their position was unknown. The problems of commanders and Generals is apparent here,
with phone lines easily cut by artillery the most effective way to pass messages forward was
by a runner who was as vulnerable to the perils of the battlefield as anyone else. Moreover
the size of the battlefield had increased dramatically; the battle of Waterloo was fought in a
three mile square of terrain where the commander could ride to any part of the battlefield and
issue orders, whereas the battlefields of the First World War could stretch to as much as fifty
miles or more, involving hundreds of thousands of men and their logistical support. The
commander in this modern battlefield had to remain far behind the front lines so he could
gain the best overview of the entire situation. A trench radio was in development from the
early stages of the war however it was too large to be of any practical use, requiring twelve
men to carry it
18
. This unfortunately left a large gap between orders being received, verified
and acted upon; during this time the tactical situation may have changed leading to many
losses, futile attacks and unexploited opportunities. Therefore the Generals of the 1915 BEF
were severely restricted with what they could achieve, and the many errors and strategic
mistakes that were made were down to the fact that communication technology lagged far
behind weapons technology and the BEF suffered as a result.


17
N. Ferguson, The Pity of War, p. 304.
18
J. Keegan, The First World War, p. 342.
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Another factor that perhaps contributed to the 1915 offensives being conducted the
way they were was the impact of previous wars, which ultimately dictated the decisions and
tactics taken on by the Generals. Since the Franco-Prussian war military theorists had seen
the need for a way to counteract the rapid developments in firepower that favoured the
defender in any attack
19
. The way that was seen to combat this was the establishment of the
offensive spirit, the will in the army to go and attack the enemy and drive them out with the
accompaniment of heavy firepower. This was seen in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5,
where at the start there was a period of open manoeuvre followed by trench warfare, where
the bayonet and artillery and constant attacks proved the key to winning the battle, followed
by another period of open warfare
20
. This idea that the stalemate in the trenches was only
temporary and that the idea of persistent attacks to retain the initiative can be seen to have
had an impact on the way the Generals conducted the battles of 1915. In this regard the
General cannot be blamed for not perceiving how the war would pan out; indeed they could
only base their ideas on the lessons of past wars.

In conclusion, the Generals of World War One over the past several decades have
been much maligned. They have been blamed for everything that went wrong in 1915, but as
this essay has demonstrated, this blame can be said to be misplaced. The demands of
coalition warfare and politics meant that attacks had to be made that were not on the most
favourable terms to the BEF. Moreover, when these attacks did go forward, they all followed
the same pattern; an artillery bombardment followed by an infantry attack that was successful

19
A. J. Echevarria, The Cult of the Offensive Revisited: Confronting Technological Change before the Great
War, in Journal of Strategic Studies, (2002, vol. 25 (1)), p. 200.
20
Ibid, p. 201
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but ultimately failed due to the difficulties in communication over the vast distances of the
modern battlefield. The revolution in firepower that occurred creating machine guns and vast
artillery pieces meant that the attacker was at a disadvantage in every situation. This
revolution did not occur in the area of communications, leaving commanders in the dark as to
how their troops were progressing or regarding developments in the tactical situation; which
meant that failing attacks continued and the ability to exploit gains was lost. While it can be
certain that at least a small percentage of British Commanders were indeed incompetent, this
can be said of any conflict throughout history. One of the commanders identified as such was
Field Marshal French who was eventually removed from his post. The British army expanded
rapidly in response to the needs of fighting a continental war; as a result many commanders
were pushed up a rank to compensate for the lack of trained officers. While this can be seen
as a recipe for disaster these commanders are the people who eventually led the British army
to become the equal, if not greater, than the armies of Germany in 1918. As to the earlier
period of 1915, while the casualties were very high, the critics of Haig and the Generals of
the BEF need to realise, to indict him successfully for incompetence and waste of British
life, it is necessary to show how things could have been done better. Attempts at this have
been unconvincing
21
. So 1915 remains a hard, yet necessary step on the learning curve that
the British army faced in the advent of this modern war. To blame the failure and
performance of the BEF solely on the Generals is not an accurate view of the war in 1915 on
the Western Front.

21
P. Harris and S. Marble, The Step-by-Step Approach: British Military Thought and Operational Method on
the Western Front, 1915-1917, in War in History, (2008, vol. 15 (1)), p18.
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Bibliography
Books
Clark, A, The Donkeys, (London, 1961).
Corvi, S. J, Haigs Generals, (Barnsley, 2006), pp. 183-207.
Ferguson, N, The Pity of War 1914-1918, (Great Britain, 1998).
Keegan, J, The First World War, (London, 1998).
Sheffield, G, Forgotten Victory: The First World War: Myths and Realities, (London,
2002).
Taylor, A.J.P, The First World War: An Illustrated History, (London, 1963).
Tucker, S. C, The Great War 1914-18, (London, 1998).
Journals
Echevarria, J, The Cult of the Offensive Revisited: Confronting Technological
Change before the Great War, in Journal of Strategic Studies, (2002, vol. 25 (1)), pp.
199-214.
Harris, P. and Marble, S, The Step-by-Step Approach: British Military Thought and
Operational Method on the Western Front, 1915-1917, in War in History, (2008, vol.
15 (1)), p17-42.

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