Source: India International Centre Quarterly, Vol. 33, No. 1 (SUMMER 2006), pp. 1-15 Published by: India International Centre Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/23005931 . Accessed: 30/07/2014 06:34 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. . India International Centre is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to India International Centre Quarterly. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 103.225.100.51 on Wed, 30 Jul 2014 06:34:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Bhikhu Parekh Defining India s Identity* I Identity refers to how we understand and define ourselves. Our sense of identity or who we think we are informs our values, guides our small and large choices, and gives our lives a sense of direction and coherence. It is a product of the constant conscious and unconscious interaction between the range of alternatives offered by the wider society and our self-understanding. In a traditional society or one that is relatively stable, our self-understanding is generally in harmony with the way our society encourages us to think of ourselves. We grow up with a reasonably clear and stable conception of who we are and how we should structure our lives, and navigate our lives without critically reflecting on or even becoming aware of it. A new situation arises when our customary self-understanding including our assumptions about the world proves inadequate, or is jolted. This can happen when we come in close contact with other societies and begin to question our own, or our familiar world undergoes rapid and extensive changes, or we are confronted with unexpected problems or can no longer continue to make choices as before. We feel confused and disoriented, and are not quite sure how to organise our lives. We are then led to reflect on ourselves and ask who we really are and what we want to be. What happens to individuals also happens to societies. They generally rely on their *Adapted from the D.M. Singhvi Memorial Lecture 2006, Exploring India's Identity, delivered at the IIC on February 1, 2006. This content downloaded from 103.225.100.51 on Wed, 30 Jul 2014 06:34:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 2 / India International Centre Quarterly traditions, customs, and historically inherited self-understanding to structure their lives and define their goals. When they undergo rapid industrialisation, become part of a globalising world, face new problems, find strange people living in their midst and cannot rely on unspoken conventions to regulate their relations with them, or are in danger of losing their familiar landmarks, they feel troubled, bewildered, disorientated and ask themselves who they are, how they are changing and what they wish to become. National identity is about national self-definition, that is, about its values, goals, the kind of country and people it wants to be. It cannot be defined in the abstract but only in the light of the country's history, present circumstances and self-understanding, hopes for the future, and its assessment of the kind of world that is beginning to emerge and with which it has to cope. A country cannot be whatever it wants to be, for it is limited by its history and the way it has been shaped by it. It needs to explore and critically evaluate its intellectual and moral resources, so that it knows where it needs to change consistently with its grain. Those who ignore their history as well as those who remain trapped in it are condemned to repeat and pay for it. Like personal identity, national identity involves a delicate and judicious balance of continuity and change. National self-definition requires and must emerge out of a vigorous national debate. It must be inclusive and take full account of the variety of views to be found in every society. If it excluded some of these, it would be partial and divisive. It must obviously be based on a broad consensus, and that too can only emerge from a public debate. And it cannot command widespread loyalty unless ordinary men and women are willing to own and identify with it, which they can do only if they are actively involved in its formulation. The definition of personal or national identity has an inescapable pathos. It becomes necessary when the individual or society feels destabilised, unhinged, disoriented. But that is precisely the time when they are least able to reflect on it with the required degree of detachment and perspective. Furthermore, since they are overwhelmed by a particular set of problems, the latter are likely to dominate their attention and cloud their views. Unless they can summon up a sense of historical balance and powers of critical self reflection, the way they resolve the problem of identity is likely to prove unsatisfactory and store up problems for the future. This content downloaded from 103.225.100.51 on Wed, 30 Jul 2014 06:34:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Bhikhu Parekh/ 3 India first faced the agonised question of national self-definition in the course of its anti-colonial struggle. We were engaged in the great historical task of creating a new India, and naturally we asked what we meant by India and what it referred to. Was it a territorial unit bounded in a certain way? Or a society with a certain kind of structure? Or a set of institutions? Or a people with a certain history and set of intellectual and moral characteristics? Or was it a civilisation? The question was extensively debated for nearly a hundred years, by some of our finest minds, and generated the broad consensus that India basically referred to a civilisation and that it was distinguished by a particular view of the world and set of values. There were deep disagreements about what this view and values were. Ram Mohan Roy, Vivekananda, Aurobindo, Ranade, Gokhale, Tagore, Gandhi, Nehru and others articulated them differently in their writings. By and large, they were all agreed that the Indian civilisation was plural, and included different currents of moral and philosophical thought ranging from polytheism to atheism and from crude materialism to the highest form of idealism. In spite of their occasional quarrels and periods of intolerance, these bodies of ideas enjoyed considerable freedom of expression, engaged in a critical dialogue, challenged or borrowed each other's ideas to create a distinct and internally differentiated composite culture. Leaders of our independence struggle recognised that over the centuries India's intellectual and moral life had become static and frozen; that its society had become fragmented, rigid and deeply divided; and that the Indian civilisation had lost its creativity and intellectual vitality. They were nevertheless convinced that it still had enough energy and resources left in it to form, after suitable revitalisation, the basis of a new India. The leaders of our independence struggle felt strongly that India had something unique to offer to the world, and that its age, rich history, size and talents entitled it to a major role in it. India was not and could not be just a society or a country like any other. It stood for important values and represented a distinct world view, and owed it to itself and to the world to make its voice heard. Sadly it had been bypassed by history, and that had to be set right once it became independent. The passionate conviction that India was unique, had once contributed greatly to human civilisation, and should once again resume its rightful place in the world was widely This content downloaded from 103.225.100.51 on Wed, 30 Jul 2014 06:34:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 4 / India International Centre Quarterly shared, and has since then remained an integral part of our national self-consciousness. lthough this civilisational view of India persisted after independence, inescapably it underwent important changes. We now had a state of our own, the like of which we never had before, and it naturally became the centre of our collective life. We faced economic, political, and other problems, and only the state was in a position to address them. The Indian civilisation had to be revitalised, and here too the state had a role. For these and other reasons, the leaders of independent India under the stewardship of Nehru defined India not as a civilisational entity but as a nation state. The civilisation was certainly there, but as a kind of a background that was to be selectively appropriated. Defining India as a nation state meant a number of things. India belonged to its people who collectively constituted the nation. 'We the people', as the Constitution puts it in its striking opening phrase, own the country, underpin the state, and can alone decide what kind of country they wished to create. The idea of democracy was not an add on, but inherent in the idea of India as a nation state. If Indians were to take charge of their collective destiny, they needed to develop a common sense of belonging and become a reasonably cohesive political community. This required a shared identity, based on a shared conception of what their country stood for. There was an extensive debate on this, first in the Constituent Assembly and then during the early years of independence. The result was what Nehru called the 'national philosophy of India'. It included individual liberty, equality of opportunity, social justice, secularism, the spirit of rational inquiry or what Nehru called a scientific temper, independence of action and judgement in world affairs of which non-alignment was a contingent expression, and so on. India's acute poverty had to be tackled and that required economic development, but the latter was not an end in itself but a means to a democratic, just, egalitarian and humane society. The founding fathers and mothers of the Indian republic were convinced that India could not be a cohesive nation state so long as it continued to be scarred by vast economic and social inequalities. It is worth II This content downloaded from 103.225.100.51 on Wed, 30 Jul 2014 06:34:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Bhikhu Parekh / 5 noting that the Directive Principles of the Constitution have a strong egalitarian thrust, with almost half of them concerned with the distribution of wealth and preventing concentration of the means of production in a few hands. The idea of the nation state implied not only democracy but also equality and social justice. The symbols of the Indian republic were meant to be evocative of our plural civilisation and to give the new state a historical depth and continuity. The national motto, Satyameva Jayate, is drawn from the Mahabharata, and it reiterates the central importance given to the variously interpreted idea of satya in our tradition, and connects with Gandhiji's emphasis on truth, truthfulness and satyagraha. The national emblem refers to Ashoka and the confluence of Hindu and Buddhist influences. The colours of the national flag have a historical and cultural resonance to symbolise our religious pluralism. Our national anthem is a wonderful statement of our identity, and could not be more different from those of other countries. It is non triumphalist, unlike that of France, Britain and many other countries. It sketches the territorial boundary of the Indian state in such a way that the latter refers both to the country's natural landscape and ethnic diversity. It sacralises the territorial space by invoking the blessings of the architect (vidhata) of the country's destiny. Rather strikingly the reference to vidhata can be read in several different ways, including the secular. It appeals not to vishwavidhdta, which is clearly religious and refers to a transcendental deity, but to Bharatbhagya vidhata, which could be a transcendental deity, an unspecified local deity of the kind that abounds in Hindu mythology, or simply an idealised masculine version of the more familiar figure of Bharatmata. Its indeterminacy has led some to suggest that Tagore had King George VI in mind, but that is absurd. None of the subsequent invocations, such as gaye tava yashgdtha, and tava shubhajishish mage, could apply to the British monarch, and Tagore himself thought the interpretation beneath contempt. The fact that such a charge could be levied at all, however, shows that Bharatbhagyavidhata is not necessarily religious or even denominational, and could be read in secular terms. As India's first Prime Minister, Nehru threw all his weight behind his vision of India. He toured the country with indefatigable energy, used every conceivable occasion to tell his countrymen what their country stood for, wrote long letters to chief ministers, and This content downloaded from 103.225.100.51 on Wed, 30 Jul 2014 06:34:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 6 / India International Centre Quarterly symbolised his national philosophy in his actions and way of life. He won all the elections he fought, and each of these tested, reaffirmed and legitimised his vision. He took keen interest in Indian culture, especially through not exclusively the classical, and set up several academies. He had a clear vision of the kind of world he wished to see and India's role in it. He gave India a distinct moral voice on the world stage, and backed it up by the unique moral authority derived from its great anti-colonial struggle and Gandhi's leadership of it. Nehru's vision had its characteristic strengths and weaknesses. It was inclusive, secular, culturally sensitive, based on the ethnic and cultural plurality of India, and could be owned by all Indians. It gave democratic institutions deep roots in Indian self consciousness, held the country together during its critical period, nurtured dissent and disagreement, inspired millions, and gave India a distinct international presence that it desperately craved for. Its limitations were just as great. It was statist, elitist, did little to speed up India's economic development and tackle poverty, paid only limited attention to primary education, healthcare and other basic needs of the masses, and was insufficiently sensitive to rural India and the religious aspirations of its people. Although Nehru's successors tinkered with his vision and modified it in important respects, none of them provided a well thought out alternative that retained its virtues and freed it of its weaknesses. The Hindutva movement claimed to offer one, but its vision was too narrow, religiously and culturally exclusive, casteist, and culturally confused to carry much conviction. It had no coherent response to globalisation, which it could not reconcile with the swadeshi spirit. It talked of making India great, but had no idea of how to bring this about other than through military power. It had no coherent strategy on tackling poverty, reducing growing economic inequalities, integrating minorities, giving India a distinct international voice, and addressing the long-recognised weaknesses of Indian society and civilisation. For these and other reasons it could not enjoy the intellectual and political hegemony that Nehru's vision did. Although the frustrated electorate gave the BJP a chance, they never fully trusted it with political power, and increasingly saw through its contradictionswhich became particularly stark after its defeat at the last election. This content downloaded from 103.225.100.51 on Wed, 30 Jul 2014 06:34:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Bhikhu Parekh / 7 III Not surprisingly, India has been experiencing an agonising crisis of identity for the past few years. The visions of Nehru and the BJP are widely challenged, alternatives are not in sight, and there is an intellectual vacuum. The frustrations of the Indian people are beginning to boil over. Poverty remains, inequalities are increasing, India counts for little in the world, and China, its point of reference since the 1980s, is by comparison making huge strides on all fronts. It is in this context that a new view of India's identity has begun to be canvassed by an influential body of people cutting across the usual ideological and political divide. This view, tentatively mooted in the late 1980s and gathering momentum since, is assumed to be so self-evident that its criticism is limited to a few 'unpatriotic' fringe groups. This new view of India's identity is largely a reaction against Nehru's, and holds him responsible for setting off independent India in a wrong direction. We would expect this line of criticism from the Nehruphobic Sangh Parivar; but it is also shared by Nehruphiles and his erstwhile associates and followers who, though less sweeping and self-righteous, nevertheless feel that he was perhaps right for his time, but is no longer relevant today. In any case the argument is that Nehru's India was poor, an economic embarrassment, given to moralising and preaching to the rest of the world while ignoring its vital defence and other interests, isolated by its non-alignment, and counted for little in international affairs. It is time to break with him and concentrate on the two vital economic and military areas that he had ignored. According to this new view of Indian identity, India should see itself not as a civilisation or even as a culturally embedded nation state, but as a state like any other. It should learn the art of realpolitik, acquire political power which alone commands the world's respect, and use it to promote national interest. Political power comes from economic and military strength, and India must aim to become a great economic and military power. This is what China is supposed to be doing, and India must follow suit. Poverty must of course be eliminated, but that is best done by a combination of the trickle down effect, some forms of rural and urban employment schemes, rural industrialisation, further extension of reservations, globalisation, etc. Inequalities and injustice will remain and even increase, but that This content downloaded from 103.225.100.51 on Wed, 30 Jul 2014 06:34:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 8 / India International Centre Quarterly should not matter; and in any case it is neither the state's business nor in its power to do anything about them. It is argued that if we are to be a great economic and military power, we must be integrated into the global economy, open up our markets, liberalise and deregulate our economy, and in general do all that is needed to ensure a free inward flow of capital and goods. We should also forge close ties with great powers, above all the US with its control of or decisive influence in all major international institutions, and its ability to meet our nuclear ambitions. As Condoleezza Rice put it with a shrewd understanding of India's driving ambition, the US will "make you great". Some of our leaders and most of our media enthusiastically welcomed this patronising and even perhaps offensive remark. Hardly any of them bothered to ask how greatness can be given by others; and whether a country that acquires it in this way does not remain perpetually mortgaged to them. It would seem that some of our leaders see nothing wrong in becoming America's 'poodle', an expression frequently used to describe Tony Blair's Britain, if that is the price to pay to realise our ambition. Others think that if we can play the game of realpolitik smartly, we will get as much out of the US as it gets out of us, and eventually we will emerge out of its shadow. This view of India is propagated by a coalition of different groups. It has the active support of the globalised and cosmopolitan techno-managerial elite. It is supported by large Indian business houses with global markets in sight, and the ambitious middle classes who want foreign consumer goods, benefit from outsourcing, welcome the prospect of working abroad, and feel elated at India's international status. It is also shared by influential sections of the Sangh Parivar who swear by the policy of dam, bheda, and danda and hope that this will inaugurate Hindu India's long delayed suvarnayuga. This vision of India also enjoys great popularity among large sections of the media, and almost all the major groups of NRIs. The fact that several influential individuals in the government and bureaucracy have worked in international institutions, or were closely associated with them and have a managerial background, lends this vision friendly ears. It is important to note how radically this view of India differs from those of Nehru and the leaders of our independence struggle. Unlike them it places economy at the centre of national life, promotes military strength and militarisation of the Indian psyche, ignores This content downloaded from 103.225.100.51 on Wed, 30 Jul 2014 06:34:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Bhikhu Parekh! 9 the moral core of Indian civilisation, has no sense of history and no appreciation of India's ability to introduce a note of sanity in a world dominated by new forms of imperialism. Like them it too is born out of a desperate desire to be internationally recognised, but its methods could not be more different. It seeks international recognition by conforming to others' norms, whereas Nehru and others deeply valued India's autonomy and capacity to set its own norms. No wonder, directly or indirectly, advocates of this new view of India's identity dismiss Gandhi as a maverick who never understood power, Nehru as a moralising fool, Tagore as a sentimental romantic with little to say about anything other than literature, and so on. The appeal of this vision of India as a strong, united and widely respected economic and military power is easy to understand especially to a proud and talented people who feel undervalued, bitterly resent their centuries of subjugation and marginalisation in world affairs, and envy the way their big but equally backward neighbour has managed to turn the corner. In some of my moods I too feel the pull of it. However one must ask if this vision is sufficiently inspiring and noble, and does justice to our history and contemporary reality. The answer is a qualified no. Global integration is fine if it is of the right kind and serves emancipatory, rather than repressive purposes. And we should of course be friends with every country, especially the sole superpower, provided that this does not damage our autonomy, use us as a foil to China, foreclose our options, and prevent us from fighting for a just and non-hegemonic world order. IV I feel troubled by this vision, for several interrelated reasons. First, it is born out of fear and frustration: the fear of being bypassed by history and overtaken by China; frustration at not being recognised and respected by others. It is other-determined, and does not spring from autonomous choices based on a careful assessment of the available alternatives. Secondly, unlike the earlier definitions of our national identity, this vision has not emerged from a vigorous and extensive public debate. We are bounced, even perhaps frightened and blackmailed into it by false fears and skilful propaganda. It is striking that we This content downloaded from 103.225.100.51 on Wed, 30 Jul 2014 06:34:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 10/ India International Centre Quarterly have not been told the full details and implications of the agreement we have recently signed with the US on nuclear matters; and that our experts are deeply divided about its long-term consequences. Not surprisingly, this vision does not enjoy widespread support in the country, and even arouses deep suspicions than are bound to increase as its consequences become clearer. No view of national identity can be built on such a basis. Consider the recent strong reaction against the appointment of foreign experts on the advisory committees of the Planning Commission. The reaction was understandable because of the widespread feeling that such appointments betrayed a lack of national self-confidence, and were part of the larger project of compromising national autonomy to reassure international institutions. At another level this too betrayed the same lack of self confidence. Nehru's India had the confidence to ask Mountbatten to stay on and help clear up the mess he had partly created. Sardar Patel asked British ICS officers to stay on to help stabilise the country. In recent years successive governments have asked NRI businessmen and professionals for advice, and there is no reason why brown foreigners should be more acceptable than white. China has been inviting American CEOs and university presidents to run its universities and industries without worrying about the loss of national autonomy or pride. If our political establishment were to inspire greater confidence and be more transparent, and if its critics were to be less nationalistic, the role of foreign experts, advisers and even managers would hardly deserve to be a subject of agonised discussion. Thirdly, suppose we did become a great economic and military power by 2020, or at least 2050. So what? Military power is always relative, and cannot guarantee security beyond a certain point. We would eliminate acute poverty, and that is to be warmly welcomed, though poverty is relative and will always emerge in new forms. But if inequalities increase or persist in their current form as they certainly will, should we be willing to pay that price, especially as they impact unevenly in our religiously, ethnically, linguistically and socially divided society? In other words, economic development cannot be an end in itself. It is a means, and requires a clear moral vision of what we intend to do with it. The dream of becoming another America with all its economic and social problems that This content downloaded from 103.225.100.51 on Wed, 30 Jul 2014 06:34:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Bhikhu Parekh! 11 drives many of our middle classes can easily degenerate into a political nightmare. Fourthly, the proposed vision leaves unanswered the question as to the kind of people we wish to be. Unlike most Western societies in which middle classes played a socially and culturally revolutionary role, ours remain intellectually superficial with limited interest in ideas, culturally dilettante and politically apathetic to the plight of their underprivileged countrymen. Recent surveys suggest that the reading habits of most of them remain disappointingly shallow. Few read serious literature even in their own languages and patronise the arts, and many of them find even the newspaper editorials and the declining group of serious columnists intellectually challenging. Few display a strong social conscience, the constant complaint of the leaders of our independence struggle, and are embarrassed by the widespread practice of untouchability and the mindless display of wealth. According to recent surveys of Gujarat and Tamil Nadu, over three quarters of the villages deny Dalits access to wells and temples, and harass them in all conceivable ways. The story in the rest of the country is just as shameful. Dhirubhai Ambani had 450 kilograms of pure sandalwood for his funeral pyre. Crores of rupees were spent on Sharad Pawar's sixtieth birthday. Amitabh Bachchan's birthday celebrations were just as extravagant. Theme weddings with huge canvas replicas of the Sistine Chapel and palaces of Udaipur costing crores are fairly common among affluent middle classesin utter contempt of the acute poverty that surrounds them, and without the slightest desire to contribute even a fraction of this money to its alleviation. When President K.R. Narayanan in his Republic Day Speech spoke of "vulgar indulgence in conspicuous consumption" shadowed by "sullen resentment among the millions", one would have expected a national debate on what has happened to us: why we have become so coarse and insensitive, why we are not outraged by poverty and degradation. Instead the Indian Express lambasted him for his "usual lamentations", and The Times of India dismissed it in six inches; and most other papers did not even take notice of it. A vision of India that does little to encourage a sense of social justice, compassion, an active concern for the less well-off, a vibrant culture and maturity of taste has little to be said for it. This content downloaded from 103.225.100.51 on Wed, 30 Jul 2014 06:34:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 12/ India International Centre Quarterly Finally, this vision of India as marching single-mindedly towards an economic and military superpower is narrow and exclusive. It has no place for large sections of Indians, is consumerist in its orientation, morally uninspiring, and lacks shared values on which to unite all Indians. It is hardly surprising that it relies on the state as the sole source of unity and order. The poor and the underprivileged cannot count on the state to redress their heart rending grievances, nor on their morally insensitive fellow-citizens to campaign for them. They either suffer and decay quietly or direct their fury against the state, which predictably responds with violence. Since the state is widely perceived to be corrupt and in thrall to vested interests, they respond to its violence with their own. The state, urged on by the frightened middle classes, resorts to even greater repressive violence. Such a vicious cycle of violence, underplayed by some of the complicit media, has been the pattern for the past few years in many parts of India, and augurs ill but for its stability and democracy. V The idea that India's overarching aim should be to become an economic and military superpower then is deeply flawed. We are not as bereft of imagination as it assumes, nor as devoid of alternatives as it implies; nor so desperate for international respect and a seat at the top table that we should abandon our autonomy to fall for what a coalition of interested indigenous and foreign groups wants to sell us. The cynical world of great powers does not respect mimics; and it has its own agenda. What then should we do? We need a clear vision of the kind of country we wish to be, and of our place in the world. That vision must have a moral core, and should embody the principles of individual liberty, social justice, equal opportunity, and fraternity or a sense of community that are articulated in the Preamble of our Constitution. Our economic development should realise and be judged and guided by these goals. This calls for a democratic, not a neo-liberal state that we are bent on becoming; carefully monitored global integration; and a regular assessment of the quality of life available to all our citizens, especially the poor. The state must guarantee basic welfare provisions to all its This content downloaded from 103.225.100.51 on Wed, 30 Jul 2014 06:34:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Bhikhu Parekh! 13 citizens as a matter of right, develop their capacities to take charge of their lives, give them a stake in the country's development, and greater participatory control over their work places, and legislate against their increasing exploitation and vulnerability. While we must be able to defend ourselves against those who wish us ill and equip ourselves accordingly, we need to make a clear and objective assessment of the likely sources of threat; we should appreciate that a sensible and generous foreign policy devoted to cultivation of friends, regional cooperation, and giving a voice to the poor and oppressed people of the world is a better form of national defence than military power, or dubious global alliances. The way in which we are beginning to internalise the American terms of discourse and way of seeing the world is deeply damaging to our identity; it serves neither our interests nor those of the US and the world at large. We led the greatest anti-imperialist movement in history, and well know how imperialism strikes roots and harms both its victims and alleged beneficiaries. We should ensure that no country is in a position to dictate to the world, and should work with others to build up powerful global institutions and a system of international balance of power. While our current fears and frustrations are understandable, our diagnosis of their causes and our prescription of their remedies are flawed. Nehru's vision had its weaknesses but it also had its great strengths. We need to incorporate its abiding insights into a more satisfactory vision of India. Going a step further, we need to undertake a critical and careful assessment of our civilisational resources. No society can altogether break with its past, certainly not ours in which the past is a constant present. We have much to be ashamed of in our civilisation but also much to be proud of; and as a people we have both great strengths and weaknesses. Our strengths include our openness to the world (as symbolised in ano bhadra kritavo yantu vishvatah); our pluralist attitude to life (as symbolised in ye yatha mam prapadyante tarn tathaiva bhajamyaham); our capacity to take a relaxed view of and live with multiple identities; our composite culture that has resulted from the unplanned dialogue and day-to-day negotiations of the various cultures and religion that come to our land; and our aesthetic, erotic and philosophical heritage that is so rich that few currents of thought in the world do not have analogues in ours. This content downloaded from 103.225.100.51 on Wed, 30 Jul 2014 06:34:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 14 / India International Centre Quarterly Our weaknesses include our relatively rigid social order, weak social conscience in passive tolerance that allows different cultures and relations to coexist in peace but without much critical engagement; and our inegalitarian and hierarchical self consciousness that finds it difficult to detach individuals from their social status and nurture the spirit of equality. We need to take a calm and critical look at all this, consolidate and build on our strengths, finds ways of overcoming our weaknesses, and construct a new vision of India on that basis. We realised the vital importance of this great cultural task of self-transformation over a century and a half ago, and made some progress in that direction. Sadly we have neglected it in recent decades, and need to return to it with a renewed sense of urgency. Any new national self-definition must also take full account of the Indian diaspora, which received little attention before or even after independence. The diaspora of over twenty million, spread out in over forty countries and precipitates of different periods of our history, is a standing reminder that for centuries Indians have reached out to the world and it to them. Our karmabhumi is in India as well as outside it, and India is to be found not only in its territorial boundary but also in the little Indias dotted all over the globe. The diaspora gives us both a unique vantage point from which to re-examine our past, and a bridge to almost every part of the world. The alternative view of our identity that I am advocating cannot be fashioned in seminar rooms, the prime minister's office, the planning commission, or an official advisory body. It can only grow out of a vigorous public debate. Democracy is not just about voting in an election nor about protesting against injustices. It is also about deciding what kind of country we wish to live in. If people are not involved in the process of national self-definition, or if their deliberations are distorted by misinformation and false fears, the very basis of democracy is undermined. Political freedom is not just about choice between available alternatives, it is also about determining the range of these alternatives. We must reclaim the country from those who seek to hijack it allegedly in our interest, and ask ourselves what kind of economic development we want, whether becoming a great economic and military power should really matter much to us; what values we cherish and would like to project to the global moral conversation; This content downloaded from 103.225.100.51 on Wed, 30 Jul 2014 06:34:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Bhikhu Parekh /15 how we want to position ourselves in the world and shape it; and how we are to create a free, just, egalitarian and inclusive society to which the founding fathers and mothers of our republic committed us in that tryst with destiny which Nehru so movingly invoked. I am grateful to my good friend Dr. Laxmimall Singhvi for inviting me to deliver the lecture, and to Justice Lahoti, Ashis Nandy, Upendra Baxi, Pratap Mehta and Thomas Pantham for their helpful comments on it. This content downloaded from 103.225.100.51 on Wed, 30 Jul 2014 06:34:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions