The Soviet Presence in Africa: An Analysis of Goals

Author(s): Robert D. Grey

Reviewed work(s):
Source: The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Sep., 1984), pp. 511-527
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/160458 .
Accessed: 03/09/2012 11:38
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
.
Cambridge University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The
Journal of Modern African Studies.
http://www.jstor.org
The
Journal of
Modern
African Studies, 22, 3 (1984),
pp.
511 I-527
The Soviet Presence in Africa:
an
Analysis
of Goals
by
ROBERT D. GREY*
IN the middle
1970s,
scholars and
politicians agree,
the Soviet Union
began
a
major
effort to
penetrate
Africa.1 After a decade of relative
indifference to African
developments,
Soviet arms and
advisers,
in
support
of Cuban
troops, poured
into
Angola
and
Ethiopia.
Involve-
ment in these two countries was
supplemented by
further transfers of
arms to a number of other African
regimes,2
and this seemed to
signal
a
dramatically heightened
interest in the continent.
Data offer some
support
for this view. While the Soviet Union
massively
accelerated its
supply
of arms
throughout
the world in the
last half of the
I970s,
the increase to Africa was
especially
dramatic:
in the decade
1967-76,
the
average
annual value of such transfers was
$2,200 million,
whereas
during
the half-decade
1976-80
the
comparable
figure
was
$7,700 million,
a
multiple
of
3.5
- see Table i. The Third
World in
general
received a
higher
share of this
vastly
increased flow
than it had
earlier,
as did Africa with
$400
million worth of arms
annually during 1967-76,
as
against $2,400
million
throughout
the next
four
years,
a
multiple
of 6.
In certain
senses,
the Soviet Union had a new African
policy.
The
Russians were
willing
to
supply
far
larger quantities
of arms to Africa
than
they
had
previously, including
such
sophisticated weapons
as
Soviet
Migs, tanks,
armoured
personnel carriers,
and Sam missiles. For
several
years
now there has been a
major
debate
among
western
observers as to the
meaning
of this thrust into Africa.
However,
it is not clear that there was a
policy
for the continent as
a whole. In neither
period
did a
majority
of African
governments
receive Soviet arms.
During 1976-80, only 23
of
52
states did
so,
a mere
increase of two over the
previous
decade
-
see Table 2.
Moreover,
even
among
the
recipients
of Soviet
arms,
transfers were
highly
concentrated.
*
Associate Professor of Political
Science,
Grinnell
College,
Iowa.
1
Among
the relevant works are: David
Albright (ed.),
Communism in
Africa (Bloomington,
1980);
Milene
Charles,
The Soviet Union and
Africa (Washington, D.C., 1980);
Mark
Katz,
The
Third World in Soviet
Military
Thought (Baltimore, 1982);
and
Stephen
T. Hosmer and Thomas
W.
Wolfe,
Soviet
Policy
and Practice Toward Third World
Conflicts (Lexington, Mass., I983).
2
See, especially,
Bruce E.
Arlinghaus,
Arms
for Africa (Lexington, Mass., 1983).
fTs MOA 22
ROBERT D. GREY
TABLE I
Soviet Arms Transfers
by Value, I967-76
and
1976-80o
$ million
Recipient 1967-76
% of World
1976-80
% of World
World
22,053 38,600
Third World
I5,490 70 32,900 85
Africa
4,416
20
11,320 29
TABLE 2
Soviet
Military
Clients in
Africa, I967-80
$ million
Value of Arms Transferred
by
Rank Order
I967-76 1976-80
0o
years
5
years
I
Egypt
2,365
I
Libya 5,500
2
Libya
1 ,005
2
Ethiopia
I
,900
3 Algeria 315 3 Algeria
1,800
4 Angola
190 4 Angola 550
5
Somalia 181 5
Tanzania 320
6
Nigeria
70
6 Zambia 220
7
Sudan
65 7 Mozambique
I80
8
Uganda 65
8 Somalia
I50
9
Guinea
50
9 Mali II0
Io
Tanzania
30
Io
Nigeria 90
II Mali
25
II
Congo
60
12
Mozambique
I5
12
Madagascar
60
13 Congo
Io
I3 Cape
Verde
50
14
Morocco Io
14
Guinea
50
15
Zambia Io
15 Uganda
40
i6 Chad
5
I6 Guinea-Bissau
30
I7
Guinea-Bissau
5
I7
Benin 20
I8
Equatorial
Guinea
5
I8
Egypt
20
19
Benin
I
19
Burundi Io
20 Central African R. I 20
Equatorial
Guinea I0
21I
Madagascar
I 21
Sudan Io
22 Chad
5
23
Morocco
5
Total 4,424
I I,90
1 Data for this and
subsequent
Tables are derived from U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency,
World Military
Expenditures
and Arms
Transfers, i967-I976 (Washington,
D.C., 1978),
pp.
I57-9,
and World
Military Expenditures
and Arms
Transfers, g976-i980
(Washington,
D.C., 1983),
p. I117.
5I
2
THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN AFRICA
Thus in both
periods
the five
leading recipients
received over
go per
cent of all arms transfers to
Africa,
while the
remaining
states
obtained
only very
small amounts. The Soviet Union
supplied
arms neither
to
all African states nor to all of its clients
equally.
As shall be clear
later,
it is this
very selectivity
which makes
possible
an assessment of
Soviet
motives.
Analysts
have offered various
explanations
for these
phenomena.
Some have focused on Soviet
geo-political competition
with the
western
world for
strategic
sites
and/or
vital raw
materials,1
while others
have
suggested
a Soviet desire for
political
influence.2
Although
it has
been
unfashionable in recent
years
to treat
seriously
Soviet claims that
their
behaviour is based on
Marxism-Leninism,
there are those who
regard
an
ideological
commitment as
explaining,
at least in
part,
Soviet
activities.3 A final
possibility
is that a
major component
of the
Kremlin's
policy may
be the somewhat 'unsocialist' desire to make
money,
particularly
hard
currency,
out of a
very profitable
arms
trade.4
THE WORLD STRUGGLE WITH THE UNITED STATES
Most
important
as a motive for the Soviet
presence,
so assert a
majority
of western
analysts,
is the effort to increase the
strength
of the
Soviet Union and its
allies,
while
weakening
both the N.A.T.O. alliance
and China.5 At its
crudest,
such an
analysis
sees Africa
merely
as a
geographical space
on the
globe,
which
happens
to block western access
to the oil of the Persian
gulf.
From this
perspective,
Africa can
provide
or
deny ports and/or
airfields from which the
major powers
can
protect
or attack the
oil-shipping
lanes. Thus the Soviet
military presence
is seen
purely
as an effort to
acquire
effective bases for
cutting
off the flow of
oil to
Europe
and North America.
A recent addition to the
geo-political argument
is the contention that
1
An
emphasis,
for
instance,
of W. Scott
Thompson,
'African-American Nexus in Soviet
Strategy',
in
Albright (ed.), op.
cit.
pp.
2
I5-18,
or Robert
Legvold,
'The Soviet Union's
Strategic
Stake in
Africa', inJennifer Seymour
Whitaker
(ed.), Africa
and the United States (New
York,
1978),
pp. I53--86.
2 A
major proponent
of this view is
Christopher Stevens,
The Soviet Union and Black
Africa
(London, 1976).
t?
Among others,
see Crawford
Young, Ideology
and
Development
in
Africa (New
Haven and
London, 1982), pp. 253-96;
David F.
Albright,
'Moscow's African
Policy
of the
1970's',
in
Albright (ed.), op.
cit.
pp.
42-6;
and Seth
Singleton,
'Soviet
Policy
and Socialist
Expansion
in
Asia and
Africa',
in Armed Forces and
Society (Cabin
John, Md.), 6,
Spring, I980,
pp.
342-8.
4
The C.I.A. is somewhat sensitive to this dimension of Soviet motivation. Cf. National Foreign
Assessment
Center,
Central
Intelligence Agency,
Communist Aid Activities in NJon-Communist Less
Developed Countries,
1979
and
i954-i979
(Washington, D.C., I980), pp. I-5.
Also see Andrew
J. Pierre,
The Global Politics
of
Arms Sales
(Princeton,
I982),
pp.
72-83.
1 See Adam B.
Ulam, Dangerous
Relations: the Soviet Union in
worldpolitics, I970-1982 (New
York
and
Oxford,
1983),
pp.
145-208.
5I3
ROBERT D. GREY
the nations of the West in
general,
and the United States in
particular,
are
becoming increasingly dependent upon
raw materials which can
only
be
acquired
in Africa. This
vulnerability provides
a
motive,
it is
claimed,
for the Soviets to utilise their
military presence
to
attempt
to
deny
these resources to the West.1 The obverse of this
argument
holds
that the Soviet
Union,
previously
considered self-sufficient in natural
resources,
is covetous of access to Africa's mineral wealth
because,
like
the
West,
it is
likely
to run short of certain crucial stocks.2
More
typical
is the
political explanation
for Russian involvement in
the
continent;3 namely,
that the Soviet Union seeks friends and
allies,
and
conversely
aims to undermine the links established with African
states
by
the West
and/or
by China, particularly
those considered
'important'.
While this
general policy
is not tied
narrowly
or
directly
to such concrete
goals
as access to bases or mineral
wealth,
it
could,
of
course,
in the
long
run,
promote
such a
strategy.
IDEOLOGY AND SOVIET ARMS TRANSFERS
Communist leaders tend to see the world in
fairly
subtle terms.
Countries are classified
according
to the nature of their
ruling
class,
and
by
their
progress along
what is seen as an
inevitable,
albeit
gradual, path
towards
socialism,
as well as
by
their attitudes towards the
capitalist
states and the socialist
bloc,
respectively.4
While Soviet
ideologists
have
been
sympathetic
to most of the
political
leaders of the Third World
since the decolonisation movement
began
to accelerate in the late
I950s,
they
have been under few illusions that these
'revolutionary
democrats'
were interested
in,
or
likely
to
successfully promote,
socialism as
understood from a Marxist-Leninist
perspective.
Nevertheless
they
assumed that these new nations
might
be hostile to their former
colonisers,
and somewhat
friendly
to the socialist world.
They
were
willing
to make this more
likely by military
assistance and economic
1
Geoffrey Kemp,
'U.S.
Strategic
Interests and
Military Options
in Sub-Saharan
Africa',
in
Whitaker
(ed.), op.
cit.
pp. 120-52,
stresses America's stakes.
2
Christopher
Croker
argues
that for the Soviet
Union,
and even more so for its eastern bloc
allies,
Africa is a
potential
source of vital resources that are
getting
scarce in their own territories.
'Adventurism and
Pragmatism:
the Soviet
Union, Comecon,
and relations with African
states',
in International
Affairs (London), 57, 4, Autumn, I98I, pp. 6I8-33.
3
David E.
Albright,
'Soviet
Policy',
in Problems
of
Communism
(Washington, D.C.), xxviI, I,
January-February I978, pp. 20-39,
and Colin
Legum,
'The African
Environment',
in ibid.
pp.
1-19, agree
on the
multiplicity
and
high political
salience of Soviet
goals,
as well as the need to
analyse
the interaction of these
goals
and
capabilities
with African realities.
4
For an extended eastern bloc
analysis
of these
trends,
see Oriental Institute in
Academia,
The
Most Recent Tendencies in the Socialist Orientations
of
Various
African
and Arab Countries
(Prague, 1979).
5I4
THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN AFRICA
515
aid to such
politically significant
countries as
Egypt,
India, Indonesia,
and,
in sub-Saharan
Africa, Ghana, Guinea,
and Mali.
In
1961, however,
Cuba
promulgated
a Marxist-Leninist
political
system and, by doing so, suggested
that the Soviet Union had been
unduly pessimistic
about the
possibilities
for an
expansion
of the socialist
world. In the
I970S
in Africa a number of other countries also
opted
for Marxist-Leninism.1 While Soviet thinkers have been
quite sceptical
of the
validity
of these
claims,
they
have created a new
ideological
pigeonhole
for 'states of socialist
orientation',2
in the
hope
that
they
might eventually
become full members of the socialist
commonwealth,
as did Cuba.
During
the
I970s,
Marxist
analysts
considered that
Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Benin, Congo,
and Somalia
belonged
to this
category.
To the extent that the Soviets considered it
important
to
protect
the world-wide
gains
of
socialism,
they
were anxious to
provide assistance,
especially arms, against
the
possible enemies,
internal
or
external,
of these revolutions.
To
argue
that there
may
well have been such an
ideological
component
to the
presence
of the Soviets in Africa is not to insist that
this was their
only
motivation.
Support
for the states of socialist
orientation
may
not have been
prompted solely by ideological goals.
Nevertheless,
the consistent
supply
of
arms,
especially
in
large quantities,
for such
regimes
would
imply
that
ideology
has some
weight
in Soviet
decision-making,
while the absence of such assistance would
justify
those
who see Soviet
policy
as dominated
by
the
geo-political struggle
with
the United States.
THE SOVIET UNION AND AFRICA S WEALTH
Although
the Soviet Union
may
wish to derive economic benefit from
its activities in
Africa,
the direct utilisation of the continent's minerals
will not be the sole source of
profit.
A rather more
complicated process
seems to be at work. A number of African states that have sold oil and
other natural assets to the West have
spent
a substantial
portion
of that
wealth
buying
Soviet arms. From such
sales,
the Soviet Union has
1
For an
analysis
and evaluation of this
phenomenon,
see
Young, op. cit.;
Carl G.
Rosberg
and
Thomas M.
Callaghy,
Socialism in Sub-Saharan
Africa:
a new assessment
(Berkeley, 1979);
and David
and Marina
Ottaway, Afrocommunism (New
York and
London,
1981).
2
Unfortunately,
the U.S.S.R. has never
published
a definitive list of which countries are 'of
socialist orientation'. A
perusal
of The Most Recent Tendencies in the Socialist Orientation
of
Various
African
and Arab Countries makes it clear that it is a
very amorphous concept. Nevertheless,
in
Africa,
Angola, Benin, Congo, Ethiopia, Mozambique,
and until its
split
with the U.S.S.R. in
1978,
Somalia,
most clearly fell into this
category.
acquired
'hard
currency'
in order to
buy
western
grain, technology,
and
other
products.
Soviet
policy may, then,
be motivated to some extent
by
economic
gains,
and hence
relatively
indifferent to
ideological
or
political goals.1
As
already suggested,
there is
nothing
exclusive about these
hypo-
thetical
goals,
since the Soviet Union has
undoubtedly
tried to
promote
a mix of some or all of them in a
particular
situation.
Nevertheless,
it
would be useful to determine which were
primary
or
secondary,
as well
as which
they pursued aggressively
and which were attractive 'side
benefits'.
METHODOLOGY
There is a
belief, among
some
analysts,
that the Soviet Union is a
'rational
actor',
with a
single
set of
goals, agreed upon by
all its
leaders,
and
pursued vigorously through
the vicissitudes of international politics.2
A modified variant of this
perspective
holds
that,
while the aims are
shared,
there are
disagreements
as to the most effective or
appropriate
means to secure their achievement.3 I would
go
a further
step
and
assume a lack of
unanimity
even about
goals. Thus,
to
pose
the
question,
what does the U.S.S.R. want of Africa? is to ask what
perspectives
do
various
individuals, groups,
or institutions have in or about Africa?
Unfortunately, my
basic
assumption
cannot be
tested,
nor can this
central
question
be
easily
answered. The inevitable differences of
opinion among
the Soviet leaders are not
openly
articulated in the
Russian
media,
important
documents are not leaked to the
press,
and
few
revealing
memoirs are
published by
those who have retired.
Kremlinologists
have
fascinating techniques
for
discovering
who has
power,
and who is
climbing
and
falling
in the Soviet
hierarchy,
but
they
are not
very good
at
gaining
real
insights
into internal
disagreements,
especially
when the
policies
involved are as
relatively unimportant
as
arms transfers to Africa.4
1 The relative character of that indifference
should,
of
course,
be
emphasised.
In its relations
with
any
other
country,
the U.S.S.R.
presumably attempts
to maximise a number of
goals.
2
Ulam, op.
cit. is
particularly guilty
of
this,
as are most of those who have been labelled
'globalists' by Henry Bienen; 'Perspectives
on Soviet Intervention in
Africa',
in Political Science
Quarterly (New York), 95, I, Spring I980.
For the intellectual difficulties inherent in the rational
actor
model,
see Graham T.
Allison,
Essence
of
Decision
(Boston, 1971).
3
For a discussion of
disagreements
within the Soviet
leadership,
see Peter Vanneman and
MartinJames, 'Shaping
Soviet African
Policy',
in
Africa Insight (Pretoria), 0o, I, 1980, pp. 4-10,
and Jiri
Valenta,
'Soviet
Decision-Making
on the Intervention in
Angola',
in
Albright (ed.), op.
cit.
pp. 93-I 117
4
It must be remembered that of all Soviet arms transfers from
I976
to
1980, only
10
per
cent
went to sub-Saharan
Africa,
of which 90
per
cent was received
by
five countries.
516
ROBERT D. GREY
THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN AFRICA
It is useful to examine whatever has been
published, particularly,
in
this
case, military
documents. But
they
tend to consist of
arguments by
specialists designed
to
influence,
among
others,
the
generalists
in the
Politburo who make the
decisions,
and
give
us no clue as to whether
or not
they
have been
accepted by
the
key
leaders.
Moreover,
much
of the
published
material tends to
emphasise ideological categories,
a
convention in Soviet
writing,
but not
necessarily
in Soviet decision-
making.
In the absence of more
satisfactory data,
I have been forced to
rely
on a search for
patterns
in Soviet arms assistance to African
countries,
hoping
that
they
would reveal
something
about the
'package'
of Soviet
motives.
Obviously, given
this
method,
I will not be able either to
specify
the
identity
of Soviet
participants
in the debate over African
policy,
or to characterise their
goals
or
perspectives.
That
is,
the method
seems
predicated
on a ' rational actor' model of Soviet behaviour. While
I
conceptualise
Soviet relations with African states as the
compromise
policies
which have
emerged
out of
disagreements
inside the
Kremlin,
I can neither
prove
this nor discuss the nature of the conflict.
Hopefully
we can discern the
'winning goals'.
SOVIET ARMS TO AFRICA
The clearest
pattern
in Soviet arms transfers to Africa is what
may
be classified as the
Middle-East/North-African
nexus.1 Between
I974
and
I979,
some
75 per
cent of total Soviet
military
aid to the Third
World went to countries in the line from Mauritania to Iran. The
shipment
of
weapons
to the three North African
states, Algeria, Libya,
and until
1976, Egypt,
with minor assistance to
Morocco,
seem
part
of
a Middle Eastern rather than an African
strategy,
so I have omitted
these states and Tunisia from the
following analysis.
In sub-Saharan
Africa,
I have
attempted
to ascertain the
weight
of
the various
goals
identified above.
Thus,
to determine if
geo-political
considerations
figured heavily
in Soviet
thinking,
I examined the
differential arms transfers to African states with
ports,
in contrast to
those that are land-locked. While there are other
aspects
of
any
geo-political strategy,
access to
docking
facilities is
generally
the most
important.
When the data are
examined,
there seems to be
very
limited
support
for the contention that the U.S.S.R. is
seeking
such bases
-
see
Table
3.
Thus
15 per
cent of African nations with
ports
received
high
quantitites ($150
million
worth,
or
more)
of Soviet
arms,
as
against only
1
C.I.A., op.
cit.
pp. 27-33-
5
I
7
ROBERT D. GREY
TABLE
3
African Ports and Soviet
Military
Transfers
by Value, I976-80
High
Moderate Low
($I50m. +) ($50-149m.) ($5-49m.)
None Total
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
N N
States with
ports 15 5 15 5
I2
4
58 I9
33
States without
ports 7
I
7
I 21
3 64
9 14
Total" 6 6
7
28
47
a
Data calculated for
47
sub-Saharan and island
states,
as also for Tables
4-6.
7 per
cent of those without such assets.
Similarly, 15 per
cent of the
former received moderate amounts
($50
to
$I49 million),
while
only
7 per
cent of the latter did so. The Soviet Union did concentrate its
transfers to some extent on the littoral
states,
as those who
push
the
geo-political
case would
argue. However,
the
relationship
is
clearly very
weak.
I
similarly
tested 'the
political argument' by examining
the relation-
ship
between the Soviet arms transfers and
(i)
the
population
size of
African
countries,
and
(2)
their G.N.P. While both measures have
drawbacks as indicators of
political importance, they
seem to be the
most
useful,
albeit
crude,
indicators of that
amorphous quality.
As the
figures
in Table
4
make
clear,
there is
only
a
slight relationship
between
size of
population
and the
quantity
of arms received. While
3
of the I
3
biggest
sub-Saharan states with 8 million or more inhabitants received
large quantities
of
arms,
none of the
I
9
smallest states did
so; moreover,
46
per
cent of the
former,
as
against 79 per
cent of the
latter,
received no
Soviet arms. Here
again,
the data
support
this
argument,
but
weakly.'
The same is true if G.D.P. is used as the measure of
importance2
- see
1 Given the small number of
recipients
of Soviet
arms,
the use of more
sophisticated
statistical
techniques
to
analyse
these data seemed
inappropriate.
2
While evidence for this
proposition
is
weak,
it is nevertheless
important
to note that there is
some
support
for it. In the
only
earlier
study
I can find that also tries to
determin's
Soviet motivations
empirically,
Abbot A.
Brayton,
'Soviet Involvement in
Africa',
in The
Journal of
Modern
African
Studies
(Cambridge), 17, 2, June 1979, pp. 253-69, wrongly
concludes that the U.S.S.R. had a
policy
of
deliberately attempting
to
penetrate poor,
weak states. The author can have come to
this conclusion
only by ignoring
certain Soviet
clients,
whom he
labels,
on
grounds
that are never
clear,
as 'colonial
penetrations',
and
'leverage
states'. He focuses
entirely
on what he calls
'targeted
states' -
Benin, Congo, Ethiopia, Mali, Somalia, Sudan,
and
Uganda
- and thus deals
with seven rather than
my
19 states. If all Soviet clients in sub-Saharan Africa are
compared
to
those
regimes
not in this
category,
and if
aggregate,
rather
thanper capita,
data are
used,
it becomes
apparent
that the U.S.S.R. somewhat
disproportionately supplies
arms to
relatively 'large'
and
'high
G.D.P.'
states,
rather than those that are
'poor'.
5i8
THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN AFRICA
TABLE
4
Population
and Soviet
Military
Transfer
by Value, I976-8o1
High
Moderate Low
($I 50m.+) ($50-149m.) ($5-49m-)
None Total
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
N N
States with
large
population (8m. +) 23 3 15
2
15
2
46
6
13
States with moderate
population (3-8m.)
20
3 I3
2 20
3 47 7 15
States with low
population (-3m-)
o o I 2 I I 2
79 I5
19
Total 6 6
7
28
47
TABLE
5
G.D.P. and Soviet
Military
Transfers
by
Value, I976-80o2
High
Moderate Low
($150om. +) ($50- 49m. ) ($5-49m-.)
None Total
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
N N
States with
high
G.D.P.
($2,500m. +) 3I 5
6
I 13
2
50
8
16
States with moderate
G.D.P.
($50o-2,499m-)
o 0
25 4 13
2
63
Io i6
States with low
G.D.P.
($-500) 7
I
7
I 20
3 67
IO
15
Total 6 6
7
28
47
Table
5.
Of those I6 countries with
'large' ($2,500
million or
more)
economies,
five received
high quantitites
of Soviet
arms,
as
against only
one with less than
$500
million. The
utility
of this measure is
qualified,
however,
by
the fact
that,
for the most
part,
the Soviet Union
requires
that its customers
pay
either
immediately,
or
through taking
out
long-term loans,
for the arms
they
receive. While there is some assurance
that the 'wealthiest'
governments
can meet these
terms,
the likelihood
is
great
that the
poorest
cannot.
Thus,
for a state as
poor
as
Somalia,
whose G.D.P. in
I975
was
only $492 million,
to be
provided
with the
vast
quantity
of arms
($I50
million
worth)
it obtained from
1976
to
1978,
when it broke with the
Russians,
is
highly
unusual.
By way
of contrast the data
provide
far
stronger support
for the
1 Source: U.NJ.
Demographic
Yearbook, 1981
(New York,
I98I), p. I83.
2
Source: U.NJ. Statistical
Yearbook, 1979/80 (New York,
1981), pp. 693-4.
5I9
ROBERT D. GREY
TABLE 6
Ideology
and Soviet
Military
Transfers
by
Value,
1976-80
High
Moderate Low
($I5om. +) ($50-I49m.) ($5-49m-)
None Total
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
N N
Marxist-Leninist
67 4 17
I
17
I 0 0 6
states"
Socialist statesb 20 2
40 4
20 2 20 2 IO
Other states o o
3
I
I3 4 84
26
31
Total 6 6
7
28
47
a
Angola, Benin, Congo, Ethiopia, Mozambique,
Somalia.
b
Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Madagascar,
Mali,
Sao
Tome,
Tanzania, Zambia,
Zimbabwe.
ideological argument
- see Table 6. If we take the six states
which,
by
the late
I970s,
described themselves as Marxist-Leninist and seemed to
be
accepted by
the U.S.S.R. as 'states of socialist orientation
',
we find
that
they
had been
supplied
with arms
during
the
five-year period
1976-80
to the
following
value:
Ethiopia (about $2,000 million),
Angola ($500 million), Mozambique ($i80 million),
Somalia
($I50
million), Congo ($60 million),
and Benin
($20 million).
In other
words,
the Soviet Union
poured
in
military equipment
to these
ideologically
sympathetic regimes.
A second
group
of African states also describe
themselves as
'socialist', namely: Cape
Verde, Equatorial
Guinea,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar,
Mali,
Sao
Tome, Tanzania,
Zambia,
and Zimbabwe.2 These
ten,
while less
clearly
or
consistently
in
ideological harmony
with the Soviet
Union,
are
certainly
'anti-
imperialist',
at least
rhetorically,
in
approach
to international
politics:
six of them received Soviet arms to the value of
$50
million or more
from
1976
to
I980,
while the
only
two with no transfers recorded
during
these
years
were Zimbabwe
(not yet independent)
and Sao Tome
(too
small?).
Of the
remaining 31
non-socialist
states,
26 or
84 per
cent
received no Soviet arms. In
short,
the differences
among
Marxist-
Leninist, socialist,
and non-socialist
regimes
are
quite sharp,
far more
so than
comparable
differences
reflecting
and
testing
the
strategic
and
G.D.P.
arguments.
1 See The Most Recent Tendencies in the Socialist Orientation
of
Various
African
and Arab
Countries,
and
Sylvia
W.
Edgington,
"'The State of Socialist Orientation" as Soviet
Development Politics',
Annual
Meeting
of the American Political Science
Association, Washington, D.C.,
1980.
2
Young, op.
cit.
pp. 97-182,
labels these as
'populist
socialist' states. Zimbabwe declared itself
a Marxist-Leninist state in
September 1984,
much too
late,
of
course,
to be considered in this
study.
520
THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN AFRICA
521
A final
argument
is
untestable,
viz. that the Soviet Union distributes
arms because these are its best or
perhaps
its
only quality export.
In
part,
this is so because data are not
readily
available on whether such
transfers are
paid
for
immediately, thereby suggesting
a
strong economic
motive,
or
by
a 'free'
grant
or a 'soft'
loan,
with the
implication
of at
least some non-economic benefits. The fact that
Libya
and
Algeria
are
two of the three
largest
African customers for Soviet arms and
can,
as
wealthy oil-producing states,
pay
for
them,
is
suggestive.
Of the
$ 1
I,300
million in arms
provided
to all of Africa from
I976
to
I980,
these two
states
bought 65 per cent,
namely $7,300
million of hard
currency
for
the Soviet
economy.'
My analysis up-to-now
has been based on the flawed
methodological
assumption
that the leaders of the U.S.S.R. have first determined what
objectives they
wished to
promote
in Africa and have then
decided,
in
pursuit
of these
goals,
to which states
they
wished to offer
arms,
as well
as what
types
and values. I have further taken it for
granted
that the
U.S.S.R. could then make these
'target
states' such attractive offers that
they
could
not,
or would
not,
refuse them. If these
assumptions
were
true,
then the method I have used so far would
provide
a reasonable
test of Soviet
motivations,
in the absence of better data.
Unfortunately,
these
assumptions
are not true.2 The
U.S.S.R.,
as one
of the few
large
arms
suppliers
in the
world,
can and does make its
exports
as attractive as
possible
to
potential buyers by offering high
quality weapons
at reasonable
prices.3 Yet,
to borrow from the
language
of
micro-economics,
the Russians lack
'goodwill'
for
many possible
customers. A
large
number of African
states,
long-term recipients
of
British, French, American,
or West German
arms,
would not think of
acquiring weapons
from the
East,
and there is no deal that could be
offered from that direction which
they
'could not refuse'.
Thus,
the
Soviets can
realistically provide
arms
only
to those who seek or are
ideologically
prepared
to
accept
arms from
them,
and almost the
only
states which do so are Marxist-Leninist or socialist.
Thus,
in the
years
from
1976
to
1980,
of the
19
sub-Saharan states
which
acquired
Soviet
arms,
only
five were not
socialist, and,
of
these,
only
one received
large quantities.
Other than this
case, only
Burundi
1
As trade with the West has
increased,
Soviet needs for hard
currency
to finance that trade
have risen
commnensurately.
See
Pierre, op.
cit.
pp.
72-83.
2
Brayton,
loc. cit. is
guilty
of the same false
assumptions.
3
C.I.A., op.
cit.
pp.
4-6.
ROBERT D. GREY
($
o
million),
Chad
($5 million),
the Sudan
($Io million),
and
Uganda
($40 million,
a
relationship
which ended with Amin's overthrow in
1979)
were non-socialist
recipients
of Soviet arms.
Given the limited
pool
of
potential
customers,
it
might
still be
possible
to discover the motives of the Russians if we knew
(i)
whom
they
offered
arms
to,
and
(ii)
who
requested
arms from
them, including
what
types
and amounts.
By adding
the former to
positive
decisions on the
latter,
we would
really
know those African countries in which the Soviets
wished to establish a
presence
and the
magnitude
of that desire.
Although
it is
impossible
to
get
such
information,
the
resulting
difficulties
need not be
insuperable.
If certain
assumptions
are
accepted,
it
may
be feasible to use available data to
crudely
determine Moscow's motives.
Thus,
I have assumed
(i)
that the Soviet Union made no offers of arms
which were
rejected, (2)
that in their
negotiations
with the Soviet
leaders those
requesting
arms were able to set the minimum
(but
not
the
maximum) acceptable
level and
types
of
weapons, (3)
that the flow
or lack thereof of hard
currency payments
did not exercise much
weight
in the Soviet
decision-making process,
and
(4)
that the value of arms
transferred
-
or, particularly, any
increases - can therefore be con-
sidered as a crude indicator of the
importance
to the U.S.S.R. of its
presence
in a client
country.
Table
7
lists all 20 sub-Saharan states that received arms from the
Soviet Union at
any
time between
1967
and
I980,
rank ordered
by
the
amount of increases from
1967-76
to
I976-80.
Thus
Ethiopia,
which
had
acquired
no Soviet arms in the first
period
and
$I,900
million in
the
latter,
heads the
list,
while
Equatorial
Guinea,
which
jumped
from
$5
million to
$Io million,
is at the bottom of those states which had
increases. Chad and Guinea received
equal
amounts
during
the two
periods,
while the Sudan fell
sharply
from
$65
million to
$io
million
and the Central African
Republic
from
$I
million to zero.
Ethiopia
alone absorbed
56 per
cent of the increase in arms
shipped
to black
Africa,
while the
top
five states received 86
per
cent of the total
increase.
Thus,
what at first
glance
-
e.g.
in Table i -
might appear
a
generalised
commitment of the U.S.S.R. to extend and
deepen
its
presence
in Africa
through
massive increases in arms
transfers,
now
appears
limited to the North African littoral and to the five sub-Saharan
states of
Ethiopia, Angola,
Tanzania, Zambia,
and
Mozambique.
Increases in the
provision
of arms to these
preferred
clients was offset
by,
and,
perhaps
in
part,
motivated
by,
the loss of other clients.
Egypt
had been the Soviet Union's
largest
and most
important
African
purchaser
of arms from
1967
to
1975, acquiring
as such as
$2,400
million
522
523
THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN AFRICA
TABLE
7
Recipients
of Soviet
Arms, I967-801
$ million
Increases in
Value of Arms
Transferred
by
Rank Order from
States with...
Port(s) Populationa
G.D.Pb
IdeologyC 1967-76
to
I976-80
Ethiopia
+ + + + + ++ 1,900
I
Angola
+ + + + ++ 360 2
Tanzania + + + + + +
290 3
Zambia -+ ++ + 2IO
4
Mozambique
+ + + + + + +
I65
5
Mali + + +
85
6
Madagascar
+ + + + +
59 7
Cape
Verde + - - + 50
8
Congo
+ - + +
50 9
Guinea-Bissau + - - +
25
10
Nigeria
+ + - + - 20 II
Benin + + + + + I9
12
Burundi -+ 4-
- 0
13
Equatorial
Guinea +
- - +
5 14
Chad -+ - - o
I5
Guinea + + + + o i6
Central African R. + -I
17
Uganda
+ + + + -
-25
8
Somalia + + - ++
-3I 19
Sudan + + + ++
-
-55
20
a +
+ = 8 million or
more,
+
= 3-8
million,
-
=
below
3
million.
b
+ + =
$2,500
million or
more;
+
=
$500
to
$2,499 million;
-
=
below
$500
million.
c
+ + = 'states of socialist
orientation'; +
=
other socialist
states;
-
=
non-socialist states.
worth in that
period,
but this
relationship
with the U.S.S.R. was ended
in
I976.
Somalia had ranked fifth
among
Soviet clients in Africa
during
the first
decade,
and continued to receive
large quantities
of arms until
I978,
when it also fell out with the Soviet Union. The Sudan tied with
Uganda
for seventh
position,
and then both broke with the U.S.S.R.
in the late
I970s.
Certain
patterns leap
out of the data
immediately.
Foremost,
again,
is the
ideological impact.
Of the five sub-Saharan
regimes
which
received the
largest
increases in arms
(72 per cent), Ethiopia, Angola,
and
Mozambique
are all declared Marxist-Leninist states.
However,
and this is
equally striking,
the Soviet
Union,
in
providing
such massive
1 Sources: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency,
World
Military
Expenditures
and Arms
Transfers, I967-76, pp. I57-9,
and
i976-ig80, p. 117.
supplies
of
weaponry
to these
ideological sympathisers,
did not have to
sacrifice other
possibly important goals,
since all three had
ports,
and
were
among
the
larger
and
strategically
most
significant
states of Africa.
In
sharp
contrast are the
shipments
of arms to Tanzania and
Zambia,
since
Julius Nyerere
has
gone
to
great lengths
to
distinguish
his
country's
variant of African socialism from
Marxist-Leninism,
while the
African humanism of Kenneth Kaunda is even further removed from
orthodox 'socialist orientation'. Not
only
are these two states somewhat
ideologically
distant from the
U.S.S.R.,
but the
presence
of the Soviets
there does little to
promote
their
geo-political goals,
at least as
understood in this
analysis
so far. Zambia is
land-locked,
and
although
Tanzania has the
major port
of Dar es
Salaam, Nyerere,
as a leader
of the
non-aligned
movement,
has made it
quite
clear that this will be
unavailable to
any power.
Political
goals
make more sense. The leaders of both Tanzania and
Zambia are still influential in the Third
World,
and both countries can
act as
important
Soviet 'friends' in
Africa,
perhaps
more
effectively
for
not
being part
of the Marxist-Leninist
camp. They
can be
legitimately
portrayed
as 'disinterested'
sympathisers
with the Soviet Union.
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS
Two other
possible interpretations
of Soviet behaviour have been
offered
by
scholars. The 'crisis' school
regards
the U.S.S.R.
as,
to use
an African
image,
a
hyena, eager
to take
advantage
of the troubles of
others.1
Thus,
these
analysts
hold that the
frequency
of
coups,
civil
wars,
and external invasions
provide
occasions for Soviet involvement. The
frequent
increase in desire for arms which such incidents
provoke,
combined with the
willingness
to
supply sophisticated weapons,
raises
the likelihood of a
growing
Soviet
presence.
The second
school,
related
to the
first, emphasises
that the U.S.S.R. has interests in certain crucial
areas of the continent which it
pursues vigorously, notably
in the Horn
of Africa and Southern Africa.
Crises in the continent
may,
indeed,
increase demands for arms
by
African
leaders, and,
to the extent that the Soviet Union is
willing
to
supply
them and the West is
not, they
will be
bought
from the U.S.S.R.
1
Emphasising
this
'hyena-like'
behaviour of the U.S.S.R. are Colin
Legum,
'Communal
Conflict and International Intervention in
Africa',
in
Legum,
I. William
Zartman,
Steven
Langdon,
and
Lynn
K.
Mytelka, Africa
in the
I980's:
a continent in crisis
(New York, 1979),
pp.
23-58; Timothy
M.
Shaw,
'Africa in the World
System:
towards more uneven
development?',
in Shaw and 'Sola
Ojo (eds.), Africa
and the International Political
System (Washington, D.C., 1982),
pp. 104-38;
and Hosmer and
Wolfe, op.
cit.
524
ROBERT D. GREY
THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN AFRICA
The cases of
Ethiopia,
Zambia,
and Tanzania all involve states which
had not
previously
been customers for Soviet
arms,
but
which,
under
strain,
and unable to
get adequate
arms from their
previous suppliers,
turned to the Soviet Union.
However,
stresses did not
always
work to
the latter's
advantage.
As
previously
mentioned,
in the middle and late
I97os, Egypt,
Somalia,
and the Sudan all broke their
relationship
with
the Soviet Union.
So,
to a lesser
extent,
did
Guinea,
Equatorial
Guinea,
and
Uganda.
While Moscow is not adverse to
taking advantage
of
crises,
neither are the western
powers,
and the
greater willingness
of the
U.S.S.R. to
provide
arms does not seem to
give
it a distinct
advantage.
Moreover,
focus on
opportunities
does not
always explain
motives.
As
regards any purported geo-political interests,
these too seem to be
a matter of coincidence and
opportunity,
rather than
planning
and
goals.
The Soviet Union has had a number of
significant
clients in
North-East Africa
during
the
early
I
70s
-
Egypt,
the
Sudan,
Uganda,
and Somalia - but lost them all in the last
decade, having acquired,
instead,
Ethiopia.
It is clear that the Russians wanted to continue their
presence
in the area. The loss of
Egypt
and the
Sudan,
and the
possibility
of
acquiring Ethiopia
as well as -
or,
if need
be,
in
place
of-
Somalia,
led to the rush of Soviet assistance to
Ethiopia
in the late
1970s.
In Southern
Africa,
the
collapse
of the
Portuguese
empire,
long
supported by
the
West,
and its
replacement by
Marxist-Leninist
regimes
under continuous
pressure
from both domestic
opponents
and
South
Africa,
created ideal conditions for Soviet influence. Leaders
sympathetic
to socialism needed arms and would not turn to the West.
The Soviets were both
eager
to
support
these
states, and,
in order to
sustain declared
Marxist-Leninists,
forced to do so. Strife has continued
in the area as black Africans
fought
for self-rule in
Zimbabwe, Namibia,
and South
Africa,
and white
minority governments
resisted. These
battles
brought
immense
pressure
not
only
on
Angola
and
Mozambique,
but on Tanzania and Zambia as well. Since the West would not arm
the latter to defend themselves
against
their
white-minority enemies,
they
turned to the U.S.S.R.
In
short,
in Southern
Africa,
as in the
Horn,
the
willingness
of the
U.S.S.R. to meet the needs of African
states,
coupled
with the
corresponding 'unhelpfulness'
of the
West,
led to an increased Soviet
influence.1
However, any analysis
which focuses
only
on
opportunities
explains
neither motives nor
goals.
1
See
Legum,
'The African
Environment',
for a
parallel analysis.
525
ROBERT D. GREY
CONCLUSIONS
How can we
explain
the
large
increase in arms transfers to Africa
during
the late
I97os? Certainly,
the motives can
only
be understood
in the
light
of both the context and the constraints
operating during
this
period.
The Soviet Union had for a number of
years
been
expanding
its arms
production,
and
by
the middle
1970s began
to
export
sophisticated
and
expensive military equipment,
such as
jet fighters,
tanks,
and armoured
personnel
carriers.
Arms, however,
were
virtually
the
only products
sold
by
the Russians outside the communist bloc.
Moreover, although they
did
provide
economic assistance to other
countries in various
forms,
the number of
recipients
and
quantity
of
money
involved were limited.
Thus,
the transfer of arms became the
major foreign policy
tool available to the U.S.S.R.
At the same
time,
western
leaders, particularly
President Carter of
the United
States,
became somewhat more hesistant to act as an arms
supplier
to the world.
Thus,
at a time when demand for arms was
rising,
the Soviet Union was
put
in an
extremely advantageous
sales
position.
Nevertheless,
the Soviet Union was
severely
constrained in its
ability
to use this tool of
foreign policy.1
First of
all,
a substantial number of
countries did not want arms
(or,
at
least,
in
only very
small
quantities).
Secondly,
others
strongly preferred
to have their needs satisfied
by
the
West, including
some
governments
who so distrusted the Russians that
they
would never ask for such assistance. The Soviet Union could
only
supply
arms to those countries which
requested
them
and/or
which
were
ideologically
and
politically willing
to have them so
supplied.
The middle and late
I970S
saw a new
development
in
Africa,
the
emergence
of a number of Marxist-Leninist states. The Soviet Union
played
a
significant
role in the
triumph
of the M.P.L.A. in
Angola,
and
since the Afro-Communists in
Mozambique, Ethiopia,
Benin,
and the
Congo
saw the Russians as their natural
protectors,
their
regimes
turned
to them for arms. The Kremlin seems to have viewed this
largely
as a
positive phenomenon, although
to the extent that it was then the
responsibility
of the Soviet
Union,
and its Cuban
ally,
to
protect
these
states,
it became
something
of a burden as well.
Nevertheless,
the
extensive Soviet
presence
in
Ethiopia, Angola,
and
Mozambique
1
See Edward
J. Laurence,
'Soviet Arms Transfer in the
ig80's: declining
influence in
Sub-Saharan
Africa',
in
Arlinghaus (ed.), op.
cit.
pp. 39-77; Singleton,
loc.
cit.; RobertJ. Lilley,
'Constraints on
Superpower
Intervention in Sub-Saharan
Africa',
in Parameters
(Carlisle
Barracks,
Pennsylvania),
xII, 3, September 1982,
pp. 63-75;
and Zaki
Leidi,
'Les Limites de la
penetration
sovietique
en
Afrique',
in
Defense
nationale
(Paris), 34,
December
1978,
pp.
I9-23.
526
THE SOVIET PRESENCE IN AFRICA
527
maximised a number of
important goals, notably
the
spread
of inter-
national
socialism,
as well as
potential
access to bases and influential
political
friends.
The
unwillingness
of the West to
compete
in
supplying
arms was
instrumental both in
Ethiopia's
transition to Marxism-Leninism and in
its
becoming
a Soviet client.' That same reluctance led Tanzania and
Zambia to turn to the U.S.S.R. for
arms,
if not for
ideological
brotherhood. Arms sales to these two countries
may
have won the Soviet
Union little in the short
run,
but has established for it a
strong presence
in Southern Africa.
In the late
I970s,
the Soviet Union made
very large military
transfers
to
Libya
and
Algeria
in North
Africa,
as well as to
Ethiopia, Angola,
Mozambique,
Zambia,
and Tanzania. It also
supplied
small
quantities
of arms to an additional
14
sub-Saharan
states,
as a low-cost
way
of
promoting
its
multiple objectives. Although
these
policies
reflect no
simple
commitment to one
over-arching goal,
the evidence of this
study
indicates that the main aim of the Soviet
presence
in Africa has been
to
help
defend the threatened 'states of socialist orientation'.
1
The literature on Soviet intervention in this
part
of the continent is substantial. For a
sampling,
see Marina
Ottaway,
Soviet and American
Influence
in the Horn
of Africa (New York, 1982);
Robert
Gorman,
Political
Conflict
on the Horn
of Africa (New York, 1981);
Colin
Legum
and Bill
Lee,
The
Horn
of Africa
in
Continuing
Crisis
(New York, 979);
Bereket Habte
Selassie, Conflict
and Intervention
in the Horn
of Africa (New York, I980).
Robert D.
Grey, 'Dependency
- A Political
Economy
Model:
post-imperial foreign policy',
in Robert Hess
(ed.), Proceedings of
the
Fifth
International
Conference of Ethiopian Studies,
Session B.
(Chicago, 1980),
stresses the
unwillingness
of the United
States to meet the
growing
needs of
Ethiopia,
and hence that
regime's
somewhat reluctant turn
to the U.S.S.R.