This paper introduces the notion of stigma as an essentially moral issue. It hypothesizes that stigma exerts its core effects by threatening the loss or diminution of what is most at stake. By identifying how stigma is a moral experience, new targets can be created for anti-stigma intervention programs and their evaluation.
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Original Title
Moral Experience and Stigma Paper- SSM 2007- Published
This paper introduces the notion of stigma as an essentially moral issue. It hypothesizes that stigma exerts its core effects by threatening the loss or diminution of what is most at stake. By identifying how stigma is a moral experience, new targets can be created for anti-stigma intervention programs and their evaluation.
This paper introduces the notion of stigma as an essentially moral issue. It hypothesizes that stigma exerts its core effects by threatening the loss or diminution of what is most at stake. By identifying how stigma is a moral experience, new targets can be created for anti-stigma intervention programs and their evaluation.
Culture and stigma: Adding moral experience to stigma theory
Lawrence Hsin Yang a, , Arthur Kleinman b , Bruce G. Link a , Jo C. Phelan c , Sing Lee d , Byron Good e a Department of Epidemiology, Columbia University, 722 West 168th Street, Room 1610, NY, NY 10032, USA b Department of Anthropology and Social Medicine, Harvard University, USA c Department of Sociomedical Sciences, Columbia University, USA d Department of Psychiatry, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong e Department of Anthropology and Social Medicine, Harvard University, USA Available online 22 December 2006 Abstract Denitions and theoretical models of the stigma construct have gradually progressed from an individualistic focus towards an emphasis on stigmas social aspects. Building on other theorists notions of stigma as a social, interpretive, or cultural process, this paper introduces the notion of stigma as an essentially moral issue in which stigmatized conditions threaten what is at stake for sufferers. The concept of moral experience, or what is most at stake for actors in a local social world, provides a new interpretive lens by which to understand the behaviors of both the stigmatized and stigmatizers, for it allows an examination of both as living with regard to what really matters and what is threatened. We hypothesize that stigma exerts its core effects by threatening the loss or diminution of what is most at stake, or by actually diminishing or destroying that lived value. We utilize two case examples of stigmamental illness in China and rst-onset schizophrenia patients in the United Statesto illustrate this concept. We further utilize the Chinese example of face to illustrate stigma as having dimensions that are moral-somatic (where values are linked to physical experiences) and moral-emotional (values are linked to emotional states). After reviewing literature on how existing stigma theory has led to a predominance of research assessing the individual, we conclude by outlining how the concept of moral experience may inform future stigma measurement. We propose that by identifying how stigma is a moral experience, new targets can be created for anti-stigma intervention programs and their evaluation. Further, we recommend the use of transactional methodologies and multiple perspectives and methods to more fully capture the interpersonal core of stigma as framed by theories of moral experience. r 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. Keywords: Stigma; Theory; Measurement; China; Moral experience; Mental illness; USA Introduction The construct of stigma has generated extensive theoretical and empirical research, and as the literature has expanded, so too has reasoning about what the concept entails. We trace the development of the stigma concept, paying particular attention to an evolution in its denition from a construct ARTICLE IN PRESS www.elsevier.com/locate/socscimed 0277-9536/$ - see front matter r 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2006.11.013
Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 212 305 4747;
fax: +1 212 342 5169. E-mail addresses: laryang@attglobal.net (L.H. Yang), kleinman@wjh.harvard.edu (A. Kleinman), bgl1@columbia.edu (B.G. Link), jcp13@columbia.edu (J.C. Phelan), singlee@cuhk.edu.hk (S. Lee), byron_good@hms.harvard.edu (B. Good). largely grounded in the individual to one rooted in social space. Next we examine theoretical models describing how stigma affects people, focusing on how these models have identied stigmas social aspects. This examination of the limited manner in which current denitions and theoretical models address the social dimensions of stigma reveals a need for an expanded conceptual lens that incorpo- rates moral experience, or what is most at stake for actors in a local social world. We provide several examples of stigma as moral experience, focusing on mental illness in China as an illustration of stigma as a dynamic psychocultural process. We conclude by describing the impact of current stigma theory upon measurement, and detail how consideration of moral experience will encourage innovative means of measuring stigma. Denitions of stigma We rst examine how existing stigma denitions have delineated this construct, with a particular focus on how stigmas social elements have been conceptualized. Goffman (1963), in his classic formulation, denes stigma as an attribute that is deeply discrediting and proposes that the stigma- tized person is reduced from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one (p. 3). Goff- man views processes of social construction as central; he describes stigma as a special kind of relationship between an attribute and a stereotype (p. 4) and avers that stigma is embedded in a language of relationships (p. 3). In Goffmans view, stigma occurs as a discrepancy between virtual social identity (how a person is character- ized by society) and actual social identity (the attributes really possessed by a person) (p.2). Emphasizing Goffmans idea of stigma as an attribute, Jones et al.(1984) use the term mark to describe a deviant condition identied by society that might dene the individual as awed or spoiled. Although Jones et al. describe the stigmatizing process as relationali.e., the social environment denes what is deviant and provides the context in which devaluing evaluations are expressedthese authors also emphasize impression engulfment a psychological process located within the indivi- dualas the essence of stigma (p. 9). Other social psychological formulations have further located stigma as a characteristic of the individual. Crocker, Major, and Steele (1998) also dene stigma as occurring when an individual is believed to possess what they describe as an often objective attribute or feature that conveys a devalued social identity within a social context. This identity is then socially constructed by dening who belongs to a particular social group and whether a characteristic will lead to a devalued social identity in a given context. Like Goffman, Crocker et al. propose that stigma at its essence is a devaluing social identity (p. 505). Yet the authors observe that stigma is not located entirely within the stigmatized person, but occurs within a social context that denes an attribute as devaluing. Also, these authors cite briey the inuence of power in determining ones susceptibility and possible response to stigma. These social psychological denitions agree that stigma: (1) consists of an attribute that marks people as different and leads to devaluation; and (2) is dependent both on relationship and contextthat stigma is socially constructed (Major & OBrien, 2005). In conjunction with the insights provided by a perspective based on evolutionary psychology (Kurzban & Leary, 2001), these conceptualizations capture many important aspects of stigma. How- ever, these frameworks have also been criticized as neglecting the stigmatized persons viewpoint and as focusing too narrowly on forces located within the individual rather than on the myriad societal forces that shape exclusion from social life (Parker & Aggleton, 2003). Out of these critiques, Link and Phelan (2001) proposed a sociological denition of stigma as a broad umbrella concept that links interrelated stigma components. Similar to the social psycholo- gical denitions, the rst four components of their denitionlabeling, stereotyping, cognitive separa- tion, and emotional reactions (added in Link, Yang, Phelan, & Collins, 2004)identify social processes that take place within the sociocultural environment whose effects can be observed within the individual. Yet the fth component of Link and Phelans denitionstatus loss and discriminationalso includes structural discrimination (when institu- tional practices disadvantage stigmatized groups). Also unique to the conceptualizations considered is Link and Phelans idea that the stigma process depends on the use of social, economic, and poli- tical power that imbues the preceding stigma components with discriminatory consequences. Link and Phelans denition thus represents a critical step towards viewing stigma as processual and created by structural power. This becomes ARTICLE IN PRESS L.H. Yang et al. / Social Science & Medicine 64 (2007) 15241535 1525 further illustrated by Das, Kleinman, Lock, Mam- phela, and Reynolds (2001) who, amongst others, showed that the issue of power is often lodged in the apparatus of the State, whose agents and agencies can stigmatize entire groups. Social components of the theoretical models of stigma Just as stigma denitions have increasingly articulated the construct as one based on social processes, models of how stigma exerts its negative effects have progressively emphasized its social aspects. Examining models of stigma, including identifying whether these models classify outcomes as individualistic or social, further illustrates how the social domain has been conceptualized in how stigma works. In contrast to the paucity of stigma denitions, there is a comparatively large literature describing how stigma affects people; we review this briey (for further reviews, see Hinshaw, 2005; Major, McCoy, Kaiser, & Quinton, 2003; Schmitt & Branscome, 2002; Stangor et al., 2003; Steele, Spencer, & Aronson, 2002). Several social psychologists have described stigma as a situational threat; stigma results from being placed in a social situation that inuences how one is treated. Jones et al. (1984) conceptualized stigma based on the processes of cognitive categorization i.e., stigma takes place when the mark links an individual via attributional processes to undesirable characteristics that lead to discrediting. Subsequent social psychological models further incorporate the response of individuals to stigma. Crocker et al (1998) included not only the role of social context in shaping identity, but also how individuals cogni- tively maintain integrity of the self and actively construct social identity. Major and OBrien (2005) integrate an identity threat modeli.e., a transac- tional analysis of stress and coping strategies enacted by the individual (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984)with stigma. The social elements of Major and OBriens theory consist of the immediate situational cues (which convey risk of being devalued) and collective representations (knowledge of cultural stereotypes) that inuence appraisal of threat to ones well-being. At the heart of these latter two formulations is the concept that stigma predisposes individuals to poor outcomes by threa- tening self-esteem, academic achievement, and mental or physical health. Other social psychologists have described stigma as a specic application of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination research (Ottati, Bodenhausen, & Newman, 2005). Here, the social elements of stigma consist of socially shared cognitive repre- sentations that inaccurately associate individuals with mental illness with certain negative character- istics. Further, the negative emotional reactions (prejudice) or negative behaviors (discrimination) of stigmatizers can be seen to derive from social others. Paralleling this community model, Corri- gan and Watson (2002) present a social-cognitive model of personal response to stigma that initiates when individuals with mental illness know of the negative cultural images that characterize their group (self-stereotyping), which then leads to self- prejudice and self-discrimination. Further, in deter- mining the individuals personal response to stigma, Corrigan and Watson identify social elements such as collective representations (cultural stereotypes, perceived social hierarchies, and sociopolitical ideology) activated by cognitive primes (informa- tion from the situation) that inuence whether the stigma encountered is appraised as legitimate or illegitimate. Like the other social psychological models, Corrigan and Watson locate the primary effects of stigma on the individuals emotional response and self-esteem. Although the full scope of these social psycholo- gical models are too intricate to review here, these models have greatly advanced our understanding of how an individuals stigmatized social identity is constructed through cognitive, affective and beha- vioral processes. Because these models derive from social psychological theory, each focuses on current social or situational determinants of stigma. Another important emphasis is that stigmatized individuals actively copei.e., through construal, appraisal or other cognitive strategieswith stigmatizing circum- stances. However, an analysis of these models reveals that they primarily regard the social aspects of stigma as a psychological variable (i.e., social identity as applied to an individual), as an environmental stimulus that the individual appraises or responds to, or as societal or cultural stereotypes. Further, these models restrict the range of coping responses to the stigmatized individuals reactions (e.g., cognitive coping strategies) and the harmful outcomes of stigma to individual self-processes (e.g., psychologi- cal well-being). These models suffer from limiting conceptualization of the social to those environmen- tal elements of stigma that impinge upon the individual sufferer, who is then viewed as the primary locus in which stigma processes take place. ARTICLE IN PRESS L.H. Yang et al. / Social Science & Medicine 64 (2007) 15241535 1526 Goffman (1963) did not appear to emphasize such an individualistic focus when he described stigma as a process based on the construction of social identity. Rather, stigma occurs through what Goffman terms a moral career (p. 32): when a stigmatized person initially learns societys stand- point and gains a general idea of what it might be like to possess a particular stigma. Persons with mental illness (a non-visible stigma) thus pass from normal to discreditable status, and if they disclose their condition, a discredited status. Goffman describes transition from each status as resulting from control of identity information. Thus, in Goffmans view, stigma occurs as a new social identity is assumed through interaction (i.e., re-identifying) with socially constructed cate- gories. Other sociological models have also regarded stigma from a symbolic interactionist perspective. Scheff (1966) proposed a labeling theory of mental illness where the application of deviant labels to individuals led to changed self-perceptions and social opportunities. According to Scheff, mental illness stereotypes are learned during socia- lization and reinforced daily. Scheff proposes that once fully inculcated, the stereotyped patient role may then emerge as a master status due to its highly discrediting nature (Markowitz, 2005). Uni- form responses from others (such as social exclu- sion) then block attempts to return to normal social roles. Link, Cullen, Struening, Shrout, and Dohrenwend (1989) elaborated upon Scheffs claim that the labeling process was the primary cause of symptomatic behaviors by formulating a Modied Labeling Theory that proposed that labeling places individuals with mental illness at risk for negative outcomes that may exacerbate pre-existing mental disorders. According to Link et al., expectations of devaluation become personally relevant once ofcial labeling occurs during contact with treatment. Negative psychosocial consequences may stem from beliefs of anticipated rejection or the individuals response to stigma, which are then seen to increase vulnerability to future psychiatric relapse. Both Scheffs and Link et al.s models dene stigma as operating primarily in the social sphere the symbolic interactionist perspective proposes that objects in the social world (persons and actions) obtain meaning through social interaction (Mead, 1934). Thus, the meaning of behavior (and de- viance) is continuously interpreted through utiliza- tion of language and symbols. Social responses to behaviors are shaped by shared cultural meanings. Self-conceptions thus arise from perceptions of how others view and respond to the self as a social object (Markowitz, 2005). Role identities (e.g., being mentally ill) form when self-conceptions result in reied social positions that are accompanied with behavioral expectations. Despite the emphasis of these sociological models on the social and inter- active bases of stigma however, research utilizing these frameworks has largely continued to locate stigmas effect within the individual stigmatizer or recipient. A subsequent framework proposed by Corrigan, Markowitz, and Watson (2004) further expands the social mechanisms of stigma by describing the structural determinants of mental illness stigma that arise from economic, political, and historical sources. Intentional institutional discrimination occurs when the decision-making group of an institution intentionally implements policies that reduce opportunities for a particular group (e.g., state legislatures restricting people with mental illness from voting). A second type of structural discrimination takes place when policies limit the rights of people with mental illness in unintentional ways. For example, societal policies that limit public mental health care are typically motivated by arguments that increased mental health coverage would lead to prohibitively high health care costs. What is key in structural discrimination is that the decision to stigmatize does not take place at the interpersonal level. Rather, discriminatory policies exert their adverse effects via broader, systemic forces. 1 Moral experience and stigma Sociological approaches push us to conceive of stigma as a social process with multiple dimensions. Stigma is seen to be embedded in the interpretive ARTICLE IN PRESS 1 One other perspective articulated with respect to HIV/AIDS identies stigma in a broader framework of power and domination and as central to reproducing structures of hegemony and control. Parker and Aggleton (2003) draw from the work of philosophers and sociologists such as Foucault (1977) and Bourdieu (1977) who propose that forms of social control are embedded in established knowledge systems that legitimize structures of social inequality and thus limit the ability of marginalized peoples to resist these hegemonic forces. These authors argue that stigma is utilized by identiable social actors who legitimate their dominant societal positions by maintaining social inequality, and that stigma consequently occurs at the convergence of culture, power and difference. L.H. Yang et al. / Social Science & Medicine 64 (2007) 15241535 1527 engagements of social actors, involving cultural meanings, affective states, roles, and ideal types. A social dialectic of interpretation and response effectively ensures that marginalization is perpetu- ated, since others respond to a stigmatized indivi- dual as someone already burdened with shame, ambivalence, and low status. Macro-social structur- al forces also compound marginalization by limiting in advance the possibilities of other kinds of interactions or responses. These approaches are a large part of the reason that stigma is so prominent now and insights from this work are being used to address stigma in peoples lives. We seek to build on this body of work and to provide a new set of ideas that will contribute a novel perspective to the study of stigma. Anthropological or ethnographic approaches to stigma also emphasize its social dimensions, although these approaches impel us to even more deeply and robustly consider how stigma is embedded in the moral life of sufferers. This approach adopts the concepts of a broader perspec- tive on the social dimensions of illness (Kleinman 1988), social suffering (Kleinman, Das, & Lock 1997), and violence and trauma (Das et al., 2001). Here, the focus is on lived or social experience, which refers to the felt ow of engagements in a local world. A local world refers to a somewhat circumscribed domain within which daily life takes place. This could be a social network, an ethno- graphers village, a neighborhood, a workplace setting, or an interest group. What denes all local worlds is the fact that something is at stake. Daily life matters, often deeply. People have something to gain or lose, such as status, money, life chances, health, good fortune, a job, or relationships. This feature of daily life can be regarded as the moral mode of experience. Moral experience refers to that register of everyday life and practical engagement that denes what matters most for ordinary men and women (Kleinman, 1997, 1999, 2006). Early recognition of a moral component to stigma is found in the important contributions of Goffman (1963), Scott (1969), and Erikson (1966). Building on other theorists notions of stigma as a social, interpretive, or cultural process, anthropol- ogists have pushed us to conceive of stigma as a fundamentally moral issue in which stigmatized conditions threaten what really matters for suf- ferers. In turn, responses arise out of what matters to those observing, giving care, or stigmatizing; here, what matters to these social interlocutors can allay or compound conditions. In addition to compounding the experience of illness, stigma can intensify the sense that life is uncertain, dangerous, and hazardous. Stigmatizing someone is not solely a response to sociological determinants or a deeply interpretive endeavor played out in a cultural unconscious. It is also a highly pragmatic, even tactical response to perceived threats, real dangers, and fear of the unknown. This is what makes stigma so dangerous, durable, and difcult to curb. For the stigmatized, stigma compounds suffering. For the stigmatizer, stigma seems to be an effective and natural response, emergent not only as an act of self-preservation or psychological defense, but also in the existential and moral experience that one is being threatened. Here the dialectics that dened the sociological approach can be seen to be deepened or thickened. Responses are not only determined by cultural imperatives, meanings, or values, but refer to a real world of practical engagements and interpersonal dangers. Both the stigmatizers and the stigmatized are engaged in a similar process of gripping and being gripped by life, holding onto something, preserving what matters, and warding off danger. If recipients of stigma nd that what is held to be most dear may be seriously menaced or even entirely lost, these threats are also felt by non-stigmatized others and may lead them to respond to the threat embedded in the stigmatizing situation by discriminating against and marginalizing others. From a cross-cultural perspective, stigma appears to be a universal phenomenon, a shared existential experience (Link et al., 2004). Yet we must be careful not to collapse all forms of discrimination into a formulaic idea of stigma. Historically, Foucault (1977) and others (Farmer, 1992; Gussow, 1989; Shell, 2005) have demonstrated that stigma varies in degree and quality in distinctive epochs owing to different administrative and legal dis- courses. Across cultures, the meanings, practices, and outcomes of stigma differ, even where we nd stigmatization to be a powerful and often preferred response to illness, disability, and difference. A review of the research literature in China, for example, would lead one to conclude that stigma exerts its negative effects in a similar way to other communities. First, people with psychiatric illness are perceived, within their communities, as unpre- dictable and dangerous. In one study (Tsang, Tam, Chan, & Cheung, 2003), nearly 50% of 1007 Hong Kong community respondents described people ARTICLE IN PRESS L.H. Yang et al. / Social Science & Medicine 64 (2007) 15241535 1528 with mental illness as quick-tempered and a signicant proportion (28.9%) agreed that this group is dangerous no matter what. In another study, nearly 70% of 320 schizophrenia outpatients in Hong Kong (Lee, Lee, Chiu, & Kleinman, 2005) agreed that promotion at work would be affected and 59.7% anticipated their partner leaving him/her if the mental illness was revealed. This expectation of rejection in turn shaped patients coping responses. Over 50% of Lee et al.s (2005) sample deliberately concealed mental illness from co-work- ers and friends. From such studies we learn how people in a variety of cultures can anticipate discrimination, shunning, and bias when it comes to their illness experiences. The greatly pejorative stereotypes in China also appear to contribute to frequent direct discrimina- tion. Over a majority (60%) of 1,491 family members of schizophrenia patients in Mainland China reported experiencing moderate or severe effects of stigma on the patient (Phillips, Pearson, Li, Xu, & Yang, 2002), and a signicant percentage (44.5%) among the outpatients in Lee et al.s (2005) study also reported being laid off after disclosing their mental illness. Hence, the empirical research among Chinese individuals with mental illness demonstrates types of discrimination, rejection and loss of self-worth that converge with stigma reported in European and North American popula- tions (Phelan, Bromet, & Link, 1998; Wahl, 1999). Yet the above conclusion provides an incomplete understanding of how stigma effectively margin- alizes both individuals and entire social groups in China. A more comprehensive formulation can be reached by understanding how stigma threatens the moral experience of individuals and groups, such that responses arise out of feelings of danger, uncertainty, and preservation. For example, what is most at stake for the mentally ill in China is often the ways that stigma can devastate the moral life of a family (Phillips et al., 2002). Kinship ties are burdened where an individual is viewed as a temporary part of a timeless structure whose descendents have the responsibility to extend and make this structure prosper (Kleinman & Kleinman, 1993). Stigma in Chinese society quickly moves from affected individuals to his/her family, largely due to shared etiological beliefs about mental illness that assign a moral defect to sufferers and their families (Yang & Pearson, 2002). Family members suffer so much from stigmatizing attitudes that 59.6% of Lee et als (2005) outpatient sample reported that family members wished to conceal the illness and 41.1% reported unfair treatment towards family members. Stigmatizing the family thus threatens to break the vital connections (quanxi wang) that link the person to a social network of support, resources, and life chances. Especially threatened are the material and social opportunities for the patient to marry, have children, and perpetuate the family structure. Something crucial is missed when stigma is seen as affecting the individual only; in these examples from Chinese society, stigma is most grievously felt as its conditions reverberate across social networks, such that both the entire network is threatened or devalued and the individual sufferer is shunned, banned, or discriminated against within that net- work as a defensive response. The end result for individuals with mental illness and their families in China can be a kind of social death that threatens the very existence, value, and perpetuity of the family group. The concept of moral experience and its applica- tion to stigma is not limited to cross-cultural settings. Overarching core values in the US de- marcate individuals as full participants in social life or de-legitimate others as not quite integrated. Since de Tocqueville (1832 (1990)) analysis of democracy and American values in the early 1800s, the notion of individualismwhere an individuals freedom to exercise choice and self- reliance is obtained through sufcient education and fortune to chart ones lifehas been classied as supremely American. Since American society does not maintain hereditary wealth or class distinctions, de Tocqueville also identied labor as ythe necessary, natural and honest condition and even held by the whole community to be an honorable necessity (pp. 152153). Such values have persisted to comprise present-day ofcial American values of tolerance, equality of opportu- nity, individual initiative, and freedom that have become embedded in US education and socializa- tion (Selznick & Steinberg, 1969). Violation of these core values leads to moral sanctions; such indivi- duals are cast as the moral othere.g., unem- ployed welfare recipients are characterized as undeserving persons reliant on overly generous government benets (Morone, 1997). In its most potent form, moral judgments can shape the denition of rights, the distribution of prestige, and the dispensation of social welfare benets in the US (Morone, 1997, p. 998). ARTICLE IN PRESS L.H. Yang et al. / Social Science & Medicine 64 (2007) 15241535 1529 How such core lived values are affected in the lived experiences and moral lives of sufferers depends not just upon the particular illness, but also upon the concrete setting, social network, or situation of care in which the sufferer lives. For example, recent rst-break schizophrenia patients in a particular locale will have different things at stake than chronic patients who at a later illness and life stage may require family or govern- ment assistance for everyday living. An initial psychotic break will likely emerge in adolescence or early adulthood; illness onset greatly compro- mises ones ability to meet developmental demands essential to achieving self-reliance, such as complet- ing school, nding employment, and living inde- pendently. Psychiatric hospitalization may especially threaten the patients emergent sense of individual freedom as many basic rights and liberties may be suspended. If, as Erikson (1963) argued, the key developmental task of early adult- hood is to establish intimate bonds of love and friendship, which may be powerfully felt as desires for peer acceptance and normality, then this ambient individualist culture is further contested by the very practical setting in which people come of age. For rst-break schizophrenia patients, then, stigma arises and is felt most directly in these essential life domains. At very early stages of development, personal growth, and socialization, what matters most is threatened not by an intrusion but by denition. The ambivalence of an uneven, difcult, and threatened development would be part of the socialization itself, such that stigma comes to dominate the moral experience of the sufferer, threatening the process of achieving a balance between self-reliance and retaining a sense of normalcy. The focus on moral experience also allows a reconceptualization of how the so-called others constitute the world of stigma. These are the ones doing the stigmatizing, but they can also be members of a peer group, social network, or system of care (e.g., parents, doctors). The anthropological approach sees all of these people as inhabiting shared social space. Not just positioned differently within structures of stigma, status, and prestige, they are bound together in getting things done, in the practice of addressing illness and stigma. What matters most to all these others interlaces with what matters to sufferers. The anthropological focus on moral experience further contributes to the study of stigma by framing this process as a sociosomatic one. The embodiment of sociosomatic processes is especi- ally well-exemplied in the Chinese experience of face and its loss. Face represents ones moral status in the local community. One has face, receives face, and gives face to respected others. When Chinese experience loss of face, they quite literally report the experience of humilia- tion as an inability to face others, as a physical crumbling of facial expression, a way of being faceless. Here, stigma is not just a discursive or interpretive process but a fully embodied, phy- sical, and affective process that takes place in the posture, positioning, and sociality of the sufferer. This linking of values to physical experiences is termed moral-somatic. Among Chinese, this physical sensation is inseparable from the emo- tion of humiliation, and that emotion in turn is directly tied to the social state and the moral value of being discredited (or discreditable). The linking of values to emotional states can be described as moral-emotional. The face complex is located simultaneously among physicalemotionalsocial cultural domains, or a sociosomatic reticulum (Kleinman, 1996; Kleinman & Kleinman, 1991). Stigma is such a closely related example that it may work through the same interconnection of physicalemotionalsociocultural bodies, at least among Chinese. Writings about stigma in the European and North American traditions of social thought have not adequately attended to its moral dimen- sions. Yet, we can today read Goffman as having had very much in mind moral status and its vicissitudes. We recommend that moral experience be brought back into denitions and models of stigma as a reticulum spanning the person (body- self-affect), the sufferers social network and condi- tions, and what is most at stake for sufferers and for their local world. Stigma, we hypothesize, threatens the loss or diminution of what is most at stake, or actually diminishes or destroys that lived value. Put differently, engagements and responses over what matters most to participants in a local social world shape the lived experience of stigma for both sufferers and responders or observers. The focus on moral experience allows us to adequately understand the behaviors of both the stigmatized and those doing the stigmatizing, for it allows us to see both as interpreting, living, and reacting with regard to what is vitally at stake and what is most crucially threatened. ARTICLE IN PRESS L.H. Yang et al. / Social Science & Medicine 64 (2007) 15241535 1530 Implications of previous stigma theory on measurement Stigma theories exert a direct inuence on measurement by determining the content of stigma assessments and thereby identifying what lies within the stigma construct. Further, each stigma model calls for the administration of measures to specic populations (e.g., Corrigan and Watsons (2002) theory of personal response to stigma requires sampling people with mental illness) to test its theory. In our view, the individualistic focus among prior stigma models has contributed to a predomi- nance of survey research conducted among certain groups. Our view is corroborated by an extensive methodological review of 109 stigma studies con- ducted from 19952003 (Link et al., 2004), which illustrates an emphasis on survey methodology (xed questions followed by Likert response scales); 60% of studies utilized survey methods, constituting the most frequently used methodology. Survey instruments with xed-item responses are especially suited to assessing stigma dimensions located within the individual (see Link et al., 2004, p. 517, Table 3). In terms of study populations, because existing stigma theories highlight the effect of community attitudes towards the individual, this has resulted in the most frequent sampling of general population groups (47% of studies; see also Link et al., 2004, p. 518, Table 4). To a lesser degree, studies that examine theories of how individuals experience and respond to stigma have also resulted in a signicant proportion of studies that sample people with mental illness, constituting the second-most sampled group (22% of studies). These methodolo- gical and sampling biases have resulted in an inordinate focus on individual actors as the sole source and recipient of stigma. In contrast, several of the sociological models suggest a more social, or less individualistic, view of the stigma process by emphasizing societal forces and larger-scale units of measurement. For example, Corrigan et al.s (2004) formulation of structural discrimination emphasizes measure- ment of collective and macro-level units (e.g., how government insurance systems may limit mental health benets) as the aggregate of individual units. This structural view focuses on larger-scale systems and promotes more complex assessment of stigma variables that captures both macro- (e.g., structural discrimination) and micro (e.g., loss of job opportunities)-level sources of stigma. From this perspective, increased side effects from con- ventional antipsychotic medications that are pre- scribed due to cost-saving guidelines, adverse experiences during psychiatric hospitalization that privilege social control over patients, and dispro- portionate allocation of funds towards staff salary as opposed to medical supplies (including medica- tions) in Hong Kong constitute valuable areas for stigma measurement (Lee, Chiu, Tsang, Chiu, & Kleinman, 2006). Although current stigma research appears to acknowledge the psychosomatic quality of stigma, little research has actually examined this topic. The same can be said of the interpersonal aspects of stigma. They are often included in studies but all too infrequently are prioritized. Hence, with a few interesting exceptions, most current research is limited by its methodological emphasis on indivi- dual psychological processes as well as collective biases. Contributions of moral experience to stigma measurement Several useful questions for research emerge from considering moral experience in relation to stigma processes: Stigma spans physical emotional social cultural domains By threatening what is at stake in the social world, stigma endangers what is most valued in ones innermost being. By proposing a means by which the social world (values) crosses over into the self (subjective experience of bodily states and emotions), our framework incorporates how stigma has psychobiological manifestations that occur out of awareness and that stigma takes place in intersubjective space. We propose that stigma has the following characteristics: Stigma is sociosomatic Norms and emotions are linked by mediating processes, which occur simultaneously through moral-somatic and moral-emotional forms. In mor- al-somatic processes, ones bodily states are linked with ones experience of societal norms and valuesi.e., the experience of the social world may be transduced to physiology. This process is illustrated by neurasthenia patients in China who embodied the tremendous social upheaval of the ARTICLE IN PRESS L.H. Yang et al. / Social Science & Medicine 64 (2007) 15241535 1531 Cultural Revolution as dizziness, headaches, fatigue and exhaustion (Kleinman, 1988). With stigma, distinct physical experiences may occur with loss of social position. For example, Chinese report dis- crete physical sensations (e.g., crumbling of facial expression), representing real dread that is experi- enced even more strongly than physical fear (Hu, 1944). With moral-emotional processes, social values are concurrently linked with an individuals experience of emotions. Symbolic forms of stigma, such as language and cultural images, connect the social world of values to the inner world of feelings. Chinese social life exemplies this process, where social connections are intertwined with affective dynamics in everyday interaction (renqing guanxi the feeling of moral relationships). In this context, the loss of social standing and weakening of social ties resulting from stigma become inseparable from feelings of overwhelming shame, humiliation and despair. While prior stigma theories have identied how societal valuations of mental illness are linked with the labeled individuals emotions (e.g., Link et al, 1989), our theory also emphasizes that stigma is moral-somatic. Although other stigma theories imply that physical processes within the stigma- tized individual occur through affect or involuntary stress responses (e.g., Major & OBrien, 2005), our theory also identies that stigma may be felt and sensed in the individuals bodily state yet not consciously acknowledged. This process is de- picted by people with mild mental retardation who preserve self-esteem and a sense of normality by adamantly rejecting the label of mental retarda- tion and its implied lack of basic competence (Edgerton, 1993). Edgerton describes these elabo- rate attempts to pass as normal and denial of ever being labeled mentally retarded as assuming a protective cloak of competence. Yet despite this apparently successful use of denial, such people continue to fundamentally sense or feel their difference and intellectual decits. How societal norms of devaluation come to be physically felt, even if consciously disavowed, may also occur among people with mental illness who nd the consequent shame too horrible and intolerable to acknowledge. Stigma is intersubjective Stigma occurs among interpersonal communica- tion and lived engagements. By taking place both outside and inside a person, stigma is a social and subjective process. Thus, stigma can be viewed as interpersonal, or relational in nature. We further suggest that much of stigma occurs in the inter- subjective space between people at the level of words, gestures, meanings, feelings, etc., during engagement with what matters most. To utilize the Chinese example, when severe mental illness occurs, shame engulfs each family member as well as the patient. Collectively, they may be ostracized from social networks and experience reduced social status. Yet can the experience of shame be accurately understood as residing in each aficted family member? Or can it also be understood as being located in the intersubjective spacein the interpersonal actions and communications that signal recognition of shamebetween patients and their closest family members? We thus recommend a shift from solely assessing stigma within the individual towards gauging interpersonal, or transactional, forms of stigma. Such a shift becomes essential if, as described above, intolerable shame may be disavowed by individuals when directly queried. Indeed, prior stigma research has utilized transactional analyses, such as evaluat- ing behavioral interactions between a perceiver and (falsely and unknowingly labeled) psychother- apy client (Sibicky & Dovidio, 1986). We are not, however, encouraging research approaches that use deception. We suggest returning to such observa- tional, or transactional, methodologies to more fully capture stigmas interpersonal aspects. This approach may aid examination of how structural discrimination works, as this type of stigma often consists of everyday, subtle forms of social interac- tions. Stigma threatens what matters most Stigma takes on its character of danger by threatening interpersonal engagements and what is most at stake. This perspective directly contributes to stigma measurement because what is most at stake for participants in a local world is empirically discoverable. How stigma threatens moral standing can be ascertained by eliciting the actual words used by informants to describe their stigma experiences. Further, one may inquire how those words relate to informants reports of what is most at stake and how stigma affects these lived values in everyday life activities. ARTICLE IN PRESS L.H. Yang et al. / Social Science & Medicine 64 (2007) 15241535 1532 Anthropology and moral theory contribute to the examination of stigma by articulating (e.g., through highly focused ethnography) where critical stigma processes exert their harmful effects. In particular contexts, stigma processes may occur during key times that inculcate patients (and family members) into stigmatized careers. These critical periods are likely to be interconnected among practical, everyday engagements with commonly held forms of status or power in local worlds, which may consist of other than economic or political types. For example, one study in Hong Kong reported that family members in addition to sharing the shame of mentally ill individuals, also may perpetuate stigma towards the patient (Lee et al., 2005). Lee et al. hypothesized that family members fears of social contamination and losing facea social status needed for interpersonal actionmotivated rela- tives to stigmatize (and sometimes abandon) their ill family members. For a newly labeled Chinese individual, potentially traumatizing interactions with closely bonded family members may initiate patients into a stigmatized role. Further, actions from health care professionals that convey a devalued status to patients are increasingly recog- nized as pivotal in stigma generation, particularly during initial psychiatric hospitalization (Lee et al., 2006). Upon identifying the stigma processes that threaten what makes life matter, these areas can then be targeted for anti-stigma intervention and evaluation of such programs. This perspective markedly contrasts with most anti-stigma inter- ventions to date, which have sought to modify public opinions through psychoeducation and have examined public attitude change as the primary outcome (Hinshaw & Cichetti, 2000). Although stigma may share features across contexts, what is most at stake in local settings constitutes the receptive eld that shapes how stigma is felt. Rather than prescribing interventions without knowledge of their local effects, focused interventions based on observation of the everyday lives and the actual difculties that stigmatized individuals face may better address how stigma threatens what is fundamentally at stake. Accordingly, the World Psychiatric Association has recently shifted its efforts to reduce stigma in over 20 countries from staging public attitude campaigns that had small and transient effects to tailoring interventions to the local stigma experiences of psychiatric patients (Sartorius & Schulze, 2005). Measuring stigma requires multiple perspectives and measures To fully describe how stigma affects what is most valued for local stakeholders, it becomes essential to obtain perspectives from multiple participants who comprise that social space. Multiple informants become necessary because stigmatized individuals may possess inadequate awareness of how commu- nity members view their condition. Second, stigma- tized individuals may not disclose concerns regarding stigma because it may be felt as too threatening. Although not immune to such inu- ences, close family members may be more attuned to and willing to report stigma experiences. How- ever, the stigmatized individuals (and family members) perspective remains essential because community members may also withhold stigmatiz- ing attitudes due to concerns of correctness or social desirability. In terms of moral experience theory, these other social actors are also vitally intertwined with the practical everyday engage- ments over what matters most to sufferers. The use of multiple vantage points and meth- odologies may reveal different or complementary perspectives on how stigma threatens to diminish what is held as most dear by local participants. Ethnographic methods (e.g., participant observa- tion) are especially suitable because: (1) many stigma-related topics may initially be avoided and may only emerge with prolonged ethnographic contact; (2) ethnographers may observe what conicts with what is explicitly stated by informants and; (3) other key informants perspectives (e.g., family) are considered essential. However, investi- gators may utilize an array of methodologies to supplement ethnography. For example, how do individuals reports of what matters most during stigma experiences compare with focus group reports, ethnographic interviews with community members, survey data, and the use of vignettes depicting stigmatized conditions with local groups? One such strategy would be to use quotes on stigma derived from patient interviews as a stimulus to elicit community members reactions. The commu- nity members responses may then conrm, dis- conrm, or elaborate upon how stigma is seen to diminish what is most valued to patients in a local world. Eliciting perspectives from stakeholders in differing social positions regarding how stigma threatens the labeled individuals moral standing may be especially suited to investigate how multiple ARTICLE IN PRESS L.H. Yang et al. / Social Science & Medicine 64 (2007) 15241535 1533 devalued statuses (e.g., being poor or an ethnic minority) interact to exclude individuals from a local worlds meaningful everyday activities. And the same sort of research may make the evaluation of stigma intervention programs more relevant to the local realities people negotiate. Conclusion Consideration of the practical engagements of preserving what matters most can greatly enliven our understanding of how stigma pervades the life worlds of the stigmatized. From the vantage of moral experience, both the stigmatized and stigma- tizers are seen as grappling with what makes social life and social worlds uncertain, dangerous, and terribly real. We hope that future use of this concept and its methodological applications to examine stigma will further illuminate how stigma is fundamentally tied to moral and existential experi- ence, and how efforts to value or prevent stigma may be enhanced by including this universally human, if culturally inected, condition. Acknowledgements Preparation of this manuscript was supported in part by NIMH grant K01 MH 73034-01 which has been awarded to the rst author. 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