The 8th Pok Rafeah Chair Public Lecture
Institute of Malaysian and International Studies (IKMAS), Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia delivered on 14 July 2011
The 8th Pok Rafeah Chair Public Lecture
Institute of Malaysian and International Studies (IKMAS), Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia delivered on 14 July 2011
The 8th Pok Rafeah Chair Public Lecture
Institute of Malaysian and International Studies (IKMAS), Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia delivered on 14 July 2011
The Pok Rafeah Chair Public Lecture Series J .H. Mittelman. 1997. Globalisation, Peace and Conflict. ISBN 967- 942-397-2 J .H. Mittelman. 1999. The Future of Globalisation. ISBN 967-942- 449-9 Yoshihara Kunio. 2001. Globalisation and National Identity. ISBN 967-942-540-1 Yoshihara Kunio. 2001. The Rise of China: Its Effect on East Asia. ISBN 967-942-595-9 J oan M. Nelson. 2007. Education in a Globalizing World: Why the Reach Exceeds the Grasp. ISBN 978-967-942-811-7 J .M. Nelson. 2007. Fast-Growing Nations, Globalization and Social Policy. ISBN 978-967-942-828-5 Anthony Milner. 2011. Malaysias Dominant Societal Paradigm: Invented, Embedded, Contested. ISBN 978-967-942-961-9 Anthony Milner. 2011. Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation. ISBN 978-967-942-994-7 Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 03:22 2 The 8 th Pok Rafeah Chair Public Lecture Institute of Malaysian and International Studies Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia delivered on 14 July 2011 PENERBIT UNIVERSITI KEBANGSAAN MALAYSIA BANGI 2011 http://www.penerbit.ukm.my Anthony Milner Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 3 Cetakan Pertama / First Printing, 2011 Hak cipta / Copyright Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2011 Hak cipta terpelihara. Tiada bahagian daripada terbitan ini boleh diterbitkan semula, disimpan untuk pengeluaran atau ditukarkan ke dalam sebarang bentuk atau dengan sebarang alat juga pun, sama ada dengan cara elektronik, gambar serta rakaman dan sebagainya tanpa kebenaran bertulis daripada Penerbit UKM terlebih dahulu. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from Penerbit UKM. Diterbitkan di Malaysia oleh / Published in Malaysia by PENERBIT UNIVERSITI KEBANGSAAN MALAYSIA 43600 UKM Bangi, Selangor D.E. Malaysia http://www.ukm.my/penerbit e-mel: penerbit@ukm.my Penerbit UKM adalah anggota / is a member of the PERSATUAN PENERBIT BUKU MALAYSIA / MALAYSIAN BOOK PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION No. Ahli / Membership No. 198302 Dicetak di Malaysia oleh / Printed in Malaysia by CARD INFORMATION SDN. BHD. 49, Jalan 31/10A Taman Perindustrian IKS, Mukim Batu 68100 Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. e-mel: cisb49@yahoo.com.my Perpustakaan Negara Malaysia Data-Pengkatalogan-dalam-Penerbitan / Cataloguing-in-Publication Data Milner, Anthony Malaysia monarchy and the bonding of the nation / Anthony Milner. 1. Monarchy--Malaysia. 2. Malaysia--Kings and rulers. I. Title. 352.2309595 ISBN 978-967-942-994-7 Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 4 Abstract A recent, major study on the development of Malay Kingship speaks of the socio-political revival of Malay monarchy that is currently taking place in this country. There is talk, says the book, of a rejection of the Westminster-style constitutional monarch and the advancing of another type of Southeast Asian monarchy perfected by the Ruler of Thailand. This lecture considers these propositions, and then examines Malaysian monarchy from three directions. The first concerns the powers of the Rulers, or rather how the Rulers powers have fared during the last two centuries. The second examines the changing ideology of Malaysian monarchy an important topic that has been much neglected. The third deals with the specific issue of whether the Malaysian Rulers ought best to be understood as Malay Rulers or Rulers. It is particularly in this last section of the Lecture that the issue of the bonding of the nation will be examined. This issue is of central importance in a research project being undertaken this year at IKMAS under the auspices of the Distinguished Pok Rafeah Chair in International Studies. Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 5 Abstrak Suatu kajian utama yang baru diterbitkan mengenai perkembangan Kerajaan Melayu menceritakan kebangkitan semula secara sosio- politik monarki Melayu yang sedang berlaku di negara ini. Buku tersebut menyentuh ura-ura penolakan sistem raja berperlembagaan gaya Westminster dan memajukan sistem jenis lain, iaitu monarki Asia Tenggara yang disempurnakan oleh Raja Negeri Thai. Syarahan ini membincangkan pandangan-pandangan ini, dan kemudian meneliti monarki Malaysia dari tiga sudut. Sudut pertama merujuk kepada kuasa Raja, dan khasnya tertumpu kepada penilaian perkembangan kuasa Raja sepanjang dua abad yang lalu. Sudut kedua meneliti perubahan ideologi monarki Malaysia suatu topik penting yang kurang diberi perhatian. Sudut ketiga membincang isu spesifik samada Raja-raja Malaysia perlu ditakrifkan sebagai Raja-raja Melayu ataupun Raja-raja sahaja. Pada bahagian akhir Syarahan ini khususnya, isu kesepaduan negara dibincangkan. Isu ini adalah amat penting kepada projek penyelidikan yang sedang dikendalikan oleh IKMAS tahun ini di bawah payung Kursi Kecemerlangan Pok Rafeah dalam bidang Kajian Antarabangsa. Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 6 The Honourable Vice Chancellor The Honourable Deputy Vice Chancellors Fellow Deans and Directors Fellow Professors, Associate Professors and Lecturers Fellow students Fellow dignitaries And respected audience A recently-published survey of the history of Malay Kingship Kobkua Suwannathat-Pians Palace, Political Party and Power (2011) has the potential to re-open a productive discussion about the present and possible future role of monarchy in Malaysia. It is a reminder too that Malaysia is characterized internationally not only by its classically plural society, but also by monarchy; by the structure of prerogatives, ranks and ceremonies that accompanies not one but nine Rulers. The significance of monarchy, and the way that significance has changed over time, is of course a topic that reaches beyond Malaysian studies and a topic that has attracted cultural anthropologists as well as historians and political scientists. One lesson emerging from this academic analysis is that an important distinction needs to be made between royal power and the socio-cultural role of the institution of monarchy. In the Malaysian case, aspects of this latter role, dating back to the pre- colonial history of this region, have the potential to assist modern monarchy in the task of building a sense of national community. It is well known that this task is at present a priority in Malaysia. In her new work, Kokbua, a senior, Malaysia-based historian who previously wrote a major study on Thai-Malay relations in the 17 th and 18 th centuries (1988) refers to a current socio- Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 7 8 / Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation political revival of Malay kingship (xxii), with the growing importance of proactive and participating constitutional rulers (391). She writes of the rejection of the idea of the Westminster- style constitutional monarch and the call for another type of constitutional monarchy a monarchy that is akin to the concept and practice of the Southeast Asian monarchy perfected by the Ruler of Thailand since the 1970s (408). Kobkuas observations will come as a surprise to many around the world who have taken an interest in Malaysian matters. Academics have buried Malaysian monarchy over and over again over the years. Before British intervention, particularly in the West-coast sultanates, rulers are seen to have failed to maintain order in the face of large-scale Chinese immigration (Cowan 1961; Trocki 2007: 162). Then, in the colonial period according to Rupert Emersons much-cited 1937 account the actual substance of power passed from the hands of the rulers to the British (1968: 211). The classic study on the pre-colonial state system on the Peninsula John Gullicks Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaya in a sense tempered the drama of this observation by arguing that in reality, on the eve of British control, the sultans role in his State had not consisted in the exercise of pre-eminent power (1965: 44). Some have argued that the Japanese did more damage than the British to the monarchy. Kobkua herself says the position and prestige of the rulers now went into steep decline (2011: 122; Cheah 1988: 20). According to Cheah Boon Kheng and others, the Malayan Union crisis that followed the Japanese Occupation was decisive in the fortunes of Malaysian monarchy; the Malay people now made their wishes and Will felt over their rulers (Cheah 1988: 26). According to Ariffin Omar, the Malayan Union events provoked a revolutionary change in Malay thinking. For a growing number of Malays, the sultanates were no longer the central point of the Malay world-view, and the interests of the rajas were subordinated to the demands of Malayism (Ariffin 1993: 52-53). The UMNO leadership now replaced the rulers as the real or substantive protector of the community (Chandra 1979: 64). The next stage of this apparent decline and here we might be beginning to wonder if there could be any further distance to Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 8 Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation / 9 fall is said to be the Federal Elections of 1955, in which the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and its allies won all but one seat a result that, according to Kokbua herself, meant the governing Malay party had now finally and convincingly replaced the rulers as true representatives of the Malays (Kobkua 2011: 281). There was, of course, a Constitutional confrontation between Parliament and Monarchy in 1983 and here again the rulers are often portrayed as the losers (e.g. Cheah 2002: 209). Finally, when the Federal Parliament abolished the royal immunity from suit in 1993, the legal historian Andrew Harding judged that the veil of mystique which has always surrounded royalty in Malaysia was drawn aside (Harding 1996: 61). The forces of populism had demonstrated amply their superiority to the forces of feudalism, and Harding noted the declining position of the Rulers in the Malaysian polity (79). Down the Rulers have tumbled, down and down, at least according to this narrative and yet now Kobkua challenges us with the argument that monarchy is enjoying a socio-political revival. In this lecture, I will respond to Kobkuas challenge by reviewing the role of monarchy from three different angles. First, I will discuss the issue of royal power and power is a word Kobkua uses often and in particular offer my own account of the historical context of current royal assertiveness. Secondly, I will examine the ideology of monarchy, or more precisely the dramatic ways in which the understanding and presentation of monarchy in Malaysia has changed over the last two centuries. This is a topic that has been neglected in Malaysian studies, including in Kobkuas book. My third and final concern to put the question succinctly will be to ask whether, when Malaysians are weighing up the usefulness or otherwise of their political heritage, too much attention is given to Malay monarchy rather than monarchy. This final issue brings me back to the topic of my first Pok Rafeah Lecture: the ideological challenge Malaysians face in their racially-divided, plural society: the task of bonding the nation. Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 9 10 / Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation Power The preoccupation with power in much historical and social- science writing can be analytically limiting as well as fruitful. Nevertheless, I shall attempt an historical overview that focuses on power, and it is a narrative that suggests there is really nothing new about the current royal activism in Malaysia. Emerson, as Ive said, described the British as taking the substance of power from the Rulers, leaving them to indulge only in pomp and ceremony (1968: 140). I shall return to the matter of ceremony, but the claim about the loss of power is repeated often by historians (including Kobkua) (see Milner 1986: 6; Kobkua 2011: 85). John Gullicks detailed research has produced a more nuanced analysis. He points out (as does Kokbua) that the Rulers of the Unfederated Malay States (Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganu, Johor) were able to maintain a greater independence from British officials, but even in the case of the Federated Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negeri Sembilan, Pahang) Rulers possessed a significant degree of agency. Gullick writes of a tacit bargain by which the colonial regime secured (the) support and advice of the Rulers (1992: vi): he notes, for instance, that at one point the Perak and Selangor Sultans had success in insisting (in a dispute over gambling farms) that the Governor did not possess the constitutional power to overrule their decisions (52-53). Rulers also made themselves heard in such areas as law and education. The Rulers appear as well to have retained their legal sovereignty in the British period. Legal cases involving the Sultan of Johor (in the 1890s), the Sultan of Kelantan (in the 1920s) and the Sultan of Pahang (in the 1930s) all confirmed that the Rulers were sovereign rulers of independent states and immune from jurisdiction in British courts (Mohamed Suffian 1972: 32-33). With respect to the people themselves, Kokbua goes so far as to insist that they continued to see their Rulers as the state supreme authority and believed the British were there because of royal wishes, and nothing else (Kobkua 2011: 85-86). This would seem to be an exaggeration, but there is evidence of various types to suggest continuing royal authority. In the State Councils of the colonial period, for instance, Malay members often proved Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 10 Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation / 11 reluctant to express an opinion before knowing the view of the Sultan (Smith 1995: 145). The testimony of opponents of royalty is also instructive. Thus, some Malay activists claimed that it was fear of the Rulers that deterred many Malays from engaging in politics (Roff 1994: 230; Milner 2002: 260-261). The Rulers were certainly active in religious administration for instance, in creating religious councils and regularizing legal systems. Some studies have seen such initiatives as a form of compensation for surrendering other powers (Yegar 1979: 264 Roff 1994: 72). After all, the original British agreements with the Rulers had specifically nominated religion and custom as areas in which they would not need to take British direction. Another interpretation, however, would stress that Rulers had paid close attention to religious issues long before British intervention, and that new developments in Islamic religious practice emerging in large part independently of the processes of British intervention required careful royal handling. As the legal historian, Abdullah Alwi, has explained; the colonial-period sultans were forced to adjust to a changing environment that included the threat of Wahhabism as well as the European advance (1980: 12; Milner 2002: 217-218). My impression, therefore, is that the Rulers were far from passive during the colonial period. However, it is hard to accept that the Malay masses were quite oblivious to the drastic change in administrative structure of their world and the political misfortunes suffered by their individual monarchs (Kobkua 2011: 85-86). One British official noted in 1891 that Malays had become far less submissive, and there were also reports that the people no longer squatted by the roadside when a ruler passed (Gullick 1987: 79). The capacity of Rulers to punish crime and formulate laws also began to be restricted in the opening decades of the British era (294). Cheah Boon Kheng has commented that in the colonial period there was a demystification of the Malay ruling class, especially of the Malay rulers (1988: 19): this would seem to me to suggest an alteration in the Rulers position that went beyond a reduction of power. Kobkuas stress on the impact of the Japanese Occupation does make sense. Cheah Boon Kheng has explained that the state Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 11 12 / Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation Councils set up in 1944 had the Sultans as mere vice-chairmen and advisers to the Japanese governors; and in general the Sultans found the loyalty of their subjects not as reliable as before the war (1988: 20). Although the Japanese eventually followed the earlier British administrative policy of working through royal courts, at the beginning of the Occupation they did seem prepared to remove traditional rulers in Southeast Asia (Kobkua 2011: 105). They also offered various administrative opportunities to the commoner Malay leaders who were beginning to be rivals of the Rulers (Kobkua 2011: 106; Milner 2011: 149-150). Following the Japanese victory, some of these activists swaggered about in the villages and in government offices, throwing their weight around as if they were the government: (Kratoska 1998: 110). Again the issue seems to be about appearance as well as real power. How would commoner Malays respond to the Johor Ruler being reprimanded for leaning on his stick before Japanese officers (Stockwell 1979: 11)? Kobkua conjectures that it would have been a cultural and political shocking experience for the average Malay to witness his Ruler performing self-demeaning exercises such as bowing in the direction of the Imperial palace as a mark of homage to the Emperor (2011: 109). As noted in the opening of this lecture, the narrative of the decline of royal power next tends to move to the dramatic Malayan Union period, in which a potent Malay movement developed in opposition to British plans to impose a new constitution on the country a constitution which many saw as sidelining both monarchs and Malays in the planning of a future independent Malayan state. The Rulers are often seen as weak in having submitted to the constitutional changes. Former Prime Minister Mahathir has recalled that many of us felt betrayed by our Rulers (2011: 109). In the political struggle that then led to the British back-down, the Rulers are likely to be portrayed as passive, simply realizing that their only choice was to back their peoples demand for a Federation in which Malay interests would be protected (Mahathir 2011: 140). Then UMNO which is described as taking over real leadership of the Malay community is given the credit for the decision to to retain the rulers as constitutional monarchs in the Constitution of the new, independent Malayan state (Cheah 1988: 26). Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 12 Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation / 13 Kobkua considers that the battering the Rulers received during the Japanese period may have been one factor influencing their willingness to surrender to British demands that they support the Malayan Union (125). However, her book also includes evidence that the Rulers were far from passive in this period as does Simon C. Smiths careful study of British relations with the Malay Rulers from 1930 to 1957 (Smith 1995; also Smith 2006). It is clear from the documentation that some of the Sultans struggled against the British demands from the outset, even though they faced the threat of being forcibly removed from their thrones (Smith 1995: chapter 3; Kobkua 2011: chapter 4). Their determined opposition clearly influenced the British decision makers and the Sultan of Perak even presented an alternative constitutional template, a federal scheme that anticipated the structure eventually adopted for the independent Malaya/Malaysia (Kobkua 2011: 149). In the period leading up to Independence (Merdeka) in 1957, the Rulers demonstrated political leadership in other areas also. Apart from fighting against Malayan Union in London as well as at home (Kobkua 2011: 176), they pressed the British on such matters as immigration (especially from China), and the timing of self government (Kobkua 2011: 219-221). The competition between Rulers and commoner politicians in the political arena was sometimes blatant. The Sultan of Kedah was especially determined to eradicate(e) UMNO influence from his state and sought to declare the organization illegal and dismiss its supporters from government service (Smith 1995: 176). The competition was acute between the Rulers and Dato Onn bin Jaafar (the first leader of UMNO), and in 1949 a meeting of Menteri Besar probably at the behest of the Rulers rebuked Onn for allowing this to be made public (Smith 1995: 177). Onn had gone so far as to speak (in 1949) of ways and means of ending feudal rule (Smith 1995: 176) and in resigning from the leadership of UMNO in 1950, he admitted that under his presidency any UMNO proposal would face royal opposition (179). It is possible too that opposition from the Rulers helped to defeat the new Independence of Malaya Party (IMP) which Onn initiated in 1951 (179). In forming a further party in 1954 (Party Negara), Onn changed his approach to monarchy, promising to uphold the Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 13 14 / Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation position of the Rulers in the future Malaya, and even presenting himself as their defender against UMNO (181). The new UMNO leader Tunku Abdul Rahman was more consistent in identifying the political advantage in supporting not undermining the Rulers. In later years he recalled that at all costs I wanted to avoid having a split with the Rulers (Smith 1995: 183). In the Malayan Union struggle, even left-wing Malay activists who might be expected to have been fundamentally anti-feudal found themselves in the anomalous position of rallying popular sentiment by demanding the restoration of royal sovereignty (Stockwell 1979: 76). The British certainly took the Rulers seriously as political protagonists in the years between the War and Independence. As one senior official put it in March 1946, we have not weaned the Rulers particularly in the Unfederated States from an active and dominating role in the political field (Smith 1995: 145). A principal theme in Simon Smiths study, in fact, is the effort made by Colonial Office officials in London to turn the Rulers into constitutional monarchs seeking to avoid, for instance, British governmental statements that admitted the restoration of their sovereign status after Malayan Union was replaced (70, 100- 101). Key officials in Malaya tended to see things differently, warning that the Sultans were determined on the issue, and if they were not satisfied Malays of every walk of life and political colour would range themselves behind the rulers (97; 105). The Sultans, it should be said, won their point with the British (109) as they did on other matters such as a proposed Prisoners Removal Act, legislation over gambling, and the determining of ethnic components in the public service (107-113). In 1951, the Legal Adviser of the Colonial Office in London gave the opinion that the Rulers were not yet constitutional rulers and that such an outcome could only be achieved in gradual stages and by persuasion on the political rather than the purely legal merits (Smith 1995: 146). The Ruler and the Constitution I have noted the suggestion that the great UMNO victory of 1955 removed the Rulers as the true representatives of the Malays. Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 14 Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation / 15 There is plenty of evidence (presented by Kokbua and others), however, that the Rulers remained politically potent in the years and decades after 1955 and this record is important if we wish to establish the historical context of royal activism of today. The UMNO leadership has tended to suggest, for instance, that the Rulers only achieved the role they possess in the Independence Constitution as a result of UMNO generosity, including the UMNO pledge to protect their interests and to uphold their role prerogatives (Tunku Abdul Rahman, cited in Kobkua 2011: 279; see also 319, 322; Cheah 1988: 26). However, detailed records now available of the process leading up to the 1957 Constitution indicate that the Rulers were often effective political actors. Royal contributions to the deliberations of the Reid Commission established in 1956 to draw up proposals for the Independence Constitution stressed the very real tie between Ruler and subject. The Rulers legal representative also argued that the Conference of Rulers (first established in 1948) should be given executive powers recognizing the Rulers political importance including powers to deal with boundary issues (Smith 1995: 152). The Reid Commission resisted this, but Smiths study gives the impression that it never fully came to grips with the role of the Rulers failing even to include the Conference of Rulers in the draft constitution (158). The Rulers were far more successful in dealing with the Working Party appointed to deal with unresolved issues in the Reid Report. This group, which included political, Government and Rulers representatives, advised that the Rulers remain heads of Islam in their states (158); also, despite resistance from both the British administration and the UMNO leadership, the Working Party supported the Rulers proposals for the role of the Conference of Rulers, including giving the Conference powers relating to State borders, the position and privileges of the Rulers themselves, and the appointment of Supreme Court judges and members of the Election and Public Services Commissions. The Conference, the Working Party agreed, could also deliberate on matters of national policy, though the Rulers constitutional advisers were expected to be present (Smith 1995: 159; Fernando 2007: 169-170). Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 15 16 / Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation Joseph Fernandos recent monograph on the making of the Malayan Constitution provides a fine illustration of the Rulers tenacity in these negotiations. When the deliberations in the post- Reid Commission Working Party turned to financial provisions, for instance, UMNO and its political allies refused to meet the Sultans demands regarding revenue provisions for the States in the new Federal arrangement. The Rulers then announced they would not attend future Working Party meetings, and the Alliance leaders were so shocked by the boycott that they agreed to a compromise, granting the States a greater degree of financial autonomy than the original Reid proposals would have allowed (Fernando 2007: 172-4). It is this type of detailed archival research that brings to light the degree of royal agency in the constitution-making process. Former prime minister Mahathirs recent account of this period is also revealing of what was seen to have been at stake in a real contest between monarch and commoner politician. If the issues of protocol and status of the Rulers had not been settled to (the Rulers) satisfaction, observed Mahathir, a confrontation might have erupted, and there were feudalists among the rakyat (subjects) who would throw their weight behind the Rulers at any price (2011: 149). As to the Constitution itself, I am not qualified to make a legal analysis, but certain aspects do strike me as significant. In particular, I have the impression that the role of a Ruler goes well beyond that of the British monarch, or an Australian governor. Apart from giving the Rulers the power of choosing one of their number as King (or Yang di-Pertuan Agong), the Constitution makes clear that no proceedings shall be brought in any court against the Ruler of a State in his personal capacity. The Rulers also continued to possess the power of pardon, and at both State and Federal levels legislation is said to require the assent of the Ruler (Smith 1995: 159). The Constitution recognizes the right of a Ruler to act in his discretion in the appointment of a Menteri Besar, and in any function as head of the Muslim religion or relating to the customs of the Malays (Mohamed Suffian 1972: 275). Members of the Conference of Rulers are also able to act in their discretion in relation to certain state boundary issues, and Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 16 Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation / 17 in the advising on any appointment [Constitution Article 38 (6)]. The Conference may in addition deliberate on matters of national policy, although in doing so the Rulers are supposed to be accompanied by the Prime Minister and Menteri-Menteri Besar [Article 38 (3)]. Finally, no law directly affecting the privileges, position, honours or dignities of the Rulers is allowed to be passed without the consent of the Conference of Rulers [Article 38 (4)]. Listed in this way, the provisions of the Constitution would seem to envisage genuine substance in the role of the Ruler (Azlan Shah 1986: 79). In the negotiations over the Constitution in 1956 Tunku Abdul Rahman had urged that the Rulers be given no political functions (Smith 1995: 150), but he reflected in 1981 that they now enjoyed more rights than they had once enjoyed in British colonial days, at least as far as the former Federated Malay States are concerned (quoted in Azlan Shah 1986: 81). In this respect, legal scholar H.P. Lee has pointed out that, like it or not, the constitutional system in Malaysia simply does not accord with present-day notions of parliamentary democracy (1995: 37). The legal language of the Constitution at least for a non- lawyer tends to be opaque, and explanatory essays can therefore be helpful in understanding the practical implications of what is written. To take just two dimensions of the Rulers role, Professor Ahmad Ibrahim pointed out long ago that in practice Sultans have a great deal of influence on the appointment of religious officials, especially the Mufti, and the direction of religious affairs in the State, including in the issue of fatwas or rulings on the Muslim religion and law (Ahmad Ibrahim 1978: 59). Secondly, with regard to advising on senior public appointments (including legal and military appointments), the former Lord President of the Federal Court of Malaysia, Raja Azlan Shah, has explained that one can safely say that the views of the Rulers play a very important role (Azlan Shah 1986: 88). Two further matters in the Constitution interest me. The first concerns an amendment of 1971 that makes it necessary to have the consent of the Conference of Rulers before changing in any way the constitutional provisions relating to national language and to the special position of the Malays [Article 153 (1)], (Harding 2007: 121-122). Much has been written on the Constitutions Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 17 18 / Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation specific provisions for the Malays (and also the natives of Sabah and Sarawak), and the inter-communal negotiations and compromises that lay behind these provisions. The 1971 amendment seems significant at several levels. As former Lord President Raja Azlan Shah has pointed out, by insisting that not just a Parliamentary vote but also the consent of the Conference of Rulers would be necessary to alter these provisions, the Malays feel safe (1986: 88). However, the amendment also seems to have implications for the role of the Rulers, enhancing their authority. True, the Constitution itself bestows this responsibility on the Rulers, but there is a hint too of an extra-constitutional significance. As the former Lord President explained, the Rulers Conference ought to act on advice in these matters, but their agreement to a change would not be obtained easily, and any government trying to force these issues on the Rulers would be courting trouble as the Malay masses would definitely back the Rulers when it comes to the question of preserving their special privileges (1986: 88). The second matter that strikes me in the Constitution is Article 181 (1), which states that subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the sovereignty, prerogatives, powers and jurisdiction of the Rulers as hitherto had and enjoyed shall remain unaffected [Article 181 (1); Gillen 1994: 7]. The legal scholar, Andrew Harding, has warned against concentrating on important prerogatives outside the constitution, noting that many aspects of the Rulers powers under the Constitution are still imperfectly understood (1996: 72). However, this clause is a reminder that although the Constitution may place limits on Malaysian monarchy it does not encapsulate that institution. Monarchy is clearly assumed to be something more than the provisions in this Constitution. In the words of Former Lord President Raja Azlan Shah, it is a mistake to think that the role of a King, like that of a President, is confined to what is laid down by the Constitution. His role far exceeds those constitutional provisions (Azlan Shah 1986: 89). I shall return to the perplexing issue of what is the real nature of this monarchy. But the question clearly reaches beyond legal formulations as Clive Kessler (1992: 144) and Mumammad Kamil Awang (1998: 314), and others, have noted. It recalls, for Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 18 Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation / 19 instance, former Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahmans suggestion that the throne is the symbol of divinity on earth and whoever occupies it is the chosen one of God (cited in Kobkua 2011: 334), or the recent comment of former Prime Minister Mahathir that Malays are still very feudal in their thinking (2011: 452). Rulers, Mahathir suggests, wield considerable influence, being backed by strong Malay traditions or adat (2011: 564). Even when a Prime Minister or Menteri Besar disagrees with the request of a Ruler he like other Malays tends to find it difficult to say no to (his) Rulers (2011: 452-453). Tunku Abdul Rahman, it should be added, made similar observations (Harding 1996: 76n). Probing the extra-constitutional dimension of monarchy in Malaysia, I think next of the genealogical links some sultanates are said to possess with the great emperor of Srivijaya (based in South Sumatra from the 7 th century), who was believed to wield magical powers. The word daulat suggesting supernatural power is still sometimes associated with the Rule and his royal regalia. We may recall too the influence of Indian (including Buddhist) traditions of kingship, and the range of Islamic (including Persian) thinking about the spiritual dimension of monarchy that began to gain influence in the 14th century. Rajas may not always have been liked as individuals subjects would sometimes abandon an unpopular Ruler to become the subject of another but in some Malay writings, as I will discuss at a later point, a royal subject appears to be presented almost as a portion of the body of the Ruler. It is possible that the maxim the Ruler and Subject can never be divided which continues to be employed in some quarters today reflects this ancient sentiment (Gullick 1965; Milner 1981; Milner 1982; Muhammad Kamil 2000; Ariffin 1993: 52). Royal Assertiveness Considerations about the extra-constitutional dimension of monarchy are of obvious importance when we come to discussing the ideology of Malaysian monarchy but they are clearly significant too in trying to pin down the real powers and influence Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 19 20 / Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation of these Rulers. Since 1957 numerous developments indicate that the attempt to convert the Rulers into constitutional monarchs in which the British Colonial Office engaged has not been effective. Crises, of course, have received most attention in accounts of the exercise of royal power. Rulers have appointed Menteri Besar who have not been the first choice of the governing party; other Menteri Besar have resigned after losing a Rulers confidence. Legislation has been rejected; senior public appointments (including at the highest levels of the legal system) have been changed because of royal opposition (Azlan Shah 1986; Smith 1995: 205; Kobkua 2011: 346-347; 349-350; Lee 1995: 39 n.8). In Selangor, in 1992 the Ruler and the Menteri Besar clashed over the nomination of individuals for royal titles a contest which the Ruler won (Kobkua 2011: 351-352). In Kelantan, the last Sultan made a number of seemingly-effective interventions in the political process, including in 2002 (Kobkua 2011: 352-353; Harding 1996: 76). What we know less about is the informal and often quiet influence that the Rulers exercise. Former Lord President Raja Azlan Shah has commented that one cannot deny the role played by the Rulers behind the scene (1986: 79). It is well known, he says, that in submitting a candidate for appointment as Menteri Besar the party always takes into consideration his acceptability to the Ruler. Party leaders, in fact, should be complimented for their willingness to give in to avoid and to solve major constitutional crises with Rulers (81). In some instances, Rulers have communicated their moral confidence in speaking of the exercise of such influence. While the king acts on the advice of the head of government, explains the now Sultan Azlan Shah, he should not grant any approval if the advice given does not reflect justice. In the spirit of a constitutional monarch, he adds, a king has a role in giving advice and opinion, offering encouragement and motivation, and giving reminder and rebuke (Kobkua 2011: 386n). A royal moral authority is sometimes expressed in very public ways. Just as the Council of Rulers can deliberate on major national issues, so Rulers speak out on these matters. Over many decades, speeches by Rulers at their own Birthday celebrations, and other Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 20 Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation / 21 public events, have been reported in the media. In recent times, the Sultan of Selangor has talked about corruption, emphasizing the damage it does to the attractiveness of Malaysia for foreign investors (Kobkua 2011: 380-381). The Sultan of Trengganu has been a pioneer in establishing (and funding) the Sultan Mizan Royal Foundation, which has parallels with the Royal Thai Foundation, and is designed to alleviate poverty, undertake research and publication on history, culture and religion, as well as promote education and heritage crafts (Mohamed Anwar et al. 2009: 376, 396; Kobkua 2011: 399-400). Kobkua draws attention to the particular contributions of the Raja Muda (Crown Prince) of Perak, Raja Nazrin Shah, who has commented on such issues as judiciary reform, national unity, the supremacy of the constitution, Islam, the sanctity of citizenship for both Malays and non-Malays alike, and of course, the role and significance of the monarchy in Malaysia (Kobkua 2011: 381-382). The Raja Muda, who makes clear that the Rulers do not seek executive power, has also spoken of them as a source of reference in times of crisis among the rakyat (Kobkua 2011: 385; Nazrin Shah 2011). Tabling these decades of royal assertiveness and influence is, first, a reminder that there is nothing new about the current royal activism detailed in Kobkuas book. Such royal behaviour might best be understood as an integral part of the Malaysian governmental system. The role of the Rulers might not accord with present-day notions of parliamentary democracy, but it is strongly supported in influential quarters. A later Lord President, Tun Haji Mohd. Salleh Abas, for instance, has commended the idea of a Ruler taking action if a Menteri Besar is known to be corrupt. Under such circumstances, he says, no Ruler could be expected to remain silent, as he has a clear moral duty to perform to protect the public (Mohd. Salleh 1986: 5). The presence of strong royal sympathies in the wider community is alluded to again by former Prime Minister Mahathir, in his comment this year that politicians feel constrained because any overt show of disrespect for the Malay Rulers would cause a lot of Malays to be resentful to them (the politicians) (2011: 454). Clashes between various Prime Ministers and monarchy, however, are well-known and go back to the time of Tunku Abdul Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 21 22 / Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation Rahman (e.g. Kobkua 2011: 341, 387-388; Mahathir 2011: 453). The Mahathir Government engaged in two quite dramatic attempts to limit royal powers. First, there was the 1983 constitutional crisis, when the King refused to sign government legislation that would in particular affect the powers of both the Yang di-Pertuan Agong and the State Rulers to block legislation. The atmosphere was tense. Rallies were held on behalf of both Prime Minister and Rulers and some Rulers even refused to fly the national flag. Media articles supporting the Prime Minister ridiculed the Sultans and their dynasties (Milner 1991: 108). The eventual compromise would seem to have offered some satisfaction to the Rulers. The clauses of the Governments Amendment which were designed to limit the powers of State Rulers were dropped, and the limits on the powers of the King were softened. The King, it is true, can now only delay rather than block legislation, but he has the opportunity to contribute to the legislative process by giving his reasons for delay (where the Bill is not a money Bill). Also, in the view of H.P. Lee, the King might even have obtained an enhanced role at a time when the Government fails to obtain a two-thirds majority (Lee 1995: 32-33). In 1992, the Mahathir Government tackled royal legal immunity. For the Government in Kobkuas words the unspoken buzzword seemed to be control (2011: 364). The 1957 Constitution had stated that the King shall not be liable to any proceedings whatsoever in any court and that no court proceedings could be brought against the Ruler of a State in his personal capacity (Gillen 1994: 7). The Government now proposed constitutional amendments that would limit the Rulers personal legal immunity, and also their powers of pardon, and in addition qualify the restrictions on freedom of expression with respect to accusations against a Ruler. A special court would also be created to deal with cases involving Rulers. The Rulers refused to consent to these constitutional changes, and a public struggle then took place, with the Government drawing attention to a list of allegations against Rulers (Kobkua 2011: 361), while opponents of the changes including the Opposition Parti Semangat 46 insisted that the whole institution of monarchy was in danger. Eventually, the Rulers agreed to compromise. A Special Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 22 Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation / 23 Court was created to try cases concerning a Ruler but proceedings may only be taken against a Ruler in his private capacity (Harding 1996: 78). The compromise included the provision that a Ruler charged with an offence in the proposed special court would cease to exercise his functions as Ruler. Also, if convicted and sentenced to more than one days imprisonment, he would cease to be the Ruler of the State (Gillen 1994: 15). One legal specialist has described these modifications as relatively minor (16), but presumably they were aimed at insuring the continued sovereignty of the Ruler, in institutional if not personal terms. Andrew Harding has judged that in this 1992 crisis, the standing of the Rulers was considerably reduced (1996: 79). As we have noted, however, Kobkuas new book speaks of a current socio-cultural revival of monarchy, and there has been plenty of other evidence that royal assertion of power so evident in the 1940s and 1950s, and in later decades has continued in the last few years. Thinking back in particular to the comments of the former Lord Presidents and Prime Ministers, I am reminded again of the extra-constitutional dimension of monarchy the sovereignty, prerogatives, powers and jurisdiction of the Rulers that is limited by but not defined in the Constitution. Did the constitutional reforms of 1984 and 1992, one might ask, have a significant impact on this extra-constitutional authority, or on that informal influence that allows Rulers at times to play a critical part in key public appointments and even decisions? What this discussion of power brings home, I think, is that the current royal activism in Malaysia is nothing new. Even in the colonial period there is plenty of evidence of Rulers taking initiatives to influence public policy. They were far from passive in the face of British determination to impose the Malayan Union and they were strategic and effective in the deliberations that led to the Merdeka Constitution. Since Independence, Rulers have made many decisive interventions in the political process and their continuing, informal influence in public affairs is strongly attested to. To use Kobkuas phrase again, proactive and participating constitutional rulers are not a new phenomenon. They are an established feature of the Malaysian governmental system. Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 23 24 / Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation Ideology In considering this exercise of royal power I come back again and again to the question of what this kingship really is. The term power often seems inadequate. Kobkuas analysis makes this plain, but she does not develop the discussion. She does not focus on the idea of kingship and how it may have changed over time. At one point Kobkua writes of the decline of the powers and position of the Malay monarchs during the British period (2011: 85); at another she refers to the foundation of traditional Ruler-subjects relations having survived under the British residential system (Kobkua 2011: 114). The foundation, then, is something distinct from powers and she goes on to say this foundation was undermined during the Japanese period (114). By foundation, I think she is referring here to the socio-cultural role the institution of the Ruler played in the life of the royal subject, and it is certainly difficult to sum this up in terms of the quantification of power. A British official in 1927 may have been thinking along similar lines when he observed that the Rulers were a real and to my mind essential asset. But for the Rulers, he suggested, the Malays would become a mob (Ghosh 1977: 304). Similarly, at one point Tunku Abdul Rahman argued that without the protecting influence of these Rulers the Malays would lose whatever semblance of belonging they might have in the land of their birth (cited in Kobkua 2011: 264n). Again, much more is going on in this sentence than a consideration of degrees of political power. Academic analysis over the last few decades has reminded us of the social and cultural significance of monarchy in Southeast Asia and elsewhere in the world stressing in some cases that even when the Ruler himself/herself may seem weak, the royal institution can be vitally important in the life of the community (e.g. Geertz 1980; Milner 1982: Thongchai 1994; Fujitani 1998; Drakard 1999; Cannadine 2001; Day 2002; Peleggi 2002; Bellah 2003). The Emperor of post-Meiji Restoration Japan, for instance, lived above the clouds leaving others to exercise real power but he was also understood to be the axis of the state (Bellah 2003: 34-35; Fujitani 1998: chapter 6). In the Malaysian case the view has already been noted that a sultan of pre-colonial times Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 24 Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation / 25 often did not exercise pre-eminent power. We will examine the character of this pre-modern kingship, but what I also wish to stress is the far-reaching change that has taken place in Malaysian monarchy over the last 200 years. It is misleading, I will suggest, to speak of monarchy today as a traditional institution. It has pre-colonial features, but also quite modern (certainly colonial- period) dimensions. It is a complex institution, but its complexity may be helpful in considering how useful monarchy might be in the future planning of this country. Let us consider, therefore, just a few dimensions of the kingship or kingdom that operated on the Peninsula in say, 1800. My observations are based primarily on the writings produced in the royal courts, supplemented sometimes by descriptions from foreigner outsiders. In certain cases, Rulers did give the impression of exercising considerable power; often they did not. But the social and what we might today call the psychological significance of the monarch was fundamental. The word that most approximated to kingdom was kerajaan, and it meant literally the condition of having a raja. The Ruler was the linchpin of the community. He was the head of religion in his community; custom (adat) was said to rest in his hands. The laws of the polity were seen to come down to us via the ruling family (Milner 2002: 148). The politys historical writings constructed the past in the idiom of the raja and his genealogical heritage. The subject the rakyat seems to have been conceptualized almost as a part of the Raja. A community without a Ruler was said to be in a condition of utter confusion (huru-hara). The maxim the Ruler and subject can never be divided, it might be argued, possesses a literal truth within the kerajaan ideology (Gullick 1965; Milner 1982; Milner 2011: chapter 3). This observation is underlined too when we consider that the Ruler was a Ruler a focus of community and identity in himself not the Ruler of a state, a territorially-defined state. He did not describe himself in his letters, for instance, as the Sultan of Perak. The rakyat was the subject of a Ruler not a State. The kerajaan was conceptualized in terms of the personal relationship between Ruler and rakyat not Ruler and a specific race and foreigners were often surprised by how uninterested Rulers seemed in the Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 25 26 / Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation physical dimensions of their kingdom. In this kerajaan paradigm for all its lack of stress on geographic definition the various hierarchical relations between ruler and subject were carefully defined in the position a subject took at ceremonies or the clothes he or she wore. Status was determined in relation to the Ruler, and some court writings convey the assumption that status in this world (nama, pangkat) could influence ones fortunes in the hereafter (Milner 2011: chapter 3). Such Rulers have been denigrated by outsiders and by historians for their preoccupation with mere ceremony (see citations in Milner 2002: chapter 1). This observation conveys a total misunderstanding as does the downplaying of the significance of ceremony in a good deal of invention of tradition writing (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). If we understand ceremony as the defining of the status of the subject the marking out of hierarchies then it was fundamental to the kerajaan, as important as the policing of territorial borders and state citizenship today. A Rulers involvement in ceremony was in fact called his work (kerja), and the correct performance of ceremony (including the naming, addressing and positioning of a Rulers subjects) was a vital concern. It is not surprising that the court texts of the old kingdoms often praised a Raja in terms of his perfect manners, his refined speech his capacity to treat people appropriately (Drakard 1990: 78; Milner 1982: 41). Also, in the reported negotiations (in the Malay Annals) between a famous Ruler and his new subjects, the specific request made by the latter is that they should never be reviled with evil words (Winstedt 1938: 56-57). This concern for ceremony (and language), then, is far more than theatre. When the anthropologist, Clifford Geertz employed the expression Theatre State (1980), he was successful in capturing how a kerajaan-type polity might appear to an outsider. Theatre is a useful metaphor. But from the inside, the kerajaan was about something more earnest than theatre: today we might say it was about identity. The concern for ceremony for the public defining and ordering of the Rulers subjects also had implications for economic life. Within a kerajaan hierarchy, material wealth had to be aligned with status. Sumptuary laws controlled the way people Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 26 Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation / 27 of one status or another might be housed or clothed. Wealth was conceived as flowing from the Ruler, as a product of patronage. Wealth was not seen as an end in itself, but one way of accumulating subjects. In this kerajaan economics, the accumulation of independent, private wealth was perceived by the royal court as a political threat, and was necessarily discouraged among the Rulers rakyat. It is thus not surprising to find that sultans were often described by foreigners as the great traders in their polities, or that foreigners sometimes complained about the plundering of would- be rich subjects by the Rajas men. They did not understand that the aligning of status and material wealth in the kerajaan was a duty of the Ruler (Milner 2003[a]). When we think about the kingdom or kerajaan of 1800 in these terms, it seems to me that it is just not tenable to assert, as Kobkua does, that the foundation of traditional Ruler-subjects relations was maintained during the colonial period; or to stress, as Roger Kershaw has done, the importance of continuity of the monarchy itself (2001: 18; see also Roff 1994: 256; Muhammad Kamil 1998: 314). Elements survived as I will suggest; but the ancien regime came under sustained attack, and the royal courts themselves undertook far-reaching, ideological renovation. I have written in the past about this transformation of Malaysian monarchy (Milner 2003) and about the importance of acknowledging the occurrence of epistemic rupture in Malaysian and other history (2002) but should emphasise here that the British brought to the Malay Peninsula powerful new concepts of state, government, race, progress, time and so forth. They endorsed a new, colonial knowledge and this knowledge project has attracted much scholarly interest (e.g. Shamsul 1998; Milner 2002). Within a few decades the royal courts were employing the new thinking to remodel the sultanate. In Johor and Perak, for instance, they began to constitute the state as a specific territorial entity. Surveying or mapping of territory was important in this and described as a novel enterprise in court-related writings of the time. In Johor a state constitution was created (in 1895), and an interesting aspects of this text is the way it translates constitution as undang-undang tuboh kerajaan. The word tuboh conveys body, in the anatomical sense. The constitution seems therefore to be conceptualized as Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 27 28 / Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation giving body to the kerajaan, and presumably the State of Johor. In this way it becomes possible to think of the state as an entity independent of the Ruler a truly revolutionary transition, at least from the perspective of the old kerajaan ideology (Milner 2002: 215-216). In such a state the Ruler could no longer be the linchpin, the centre around which all else is articulated. The ceremonies that define the Ruler-subject relation also had to lose some of their urgency. In certain ways ceremonies were actually elaborated during the colonial period (partly under the influence of British royal practice) (Gullick 1987: 33, 347; Gullick 1992: 236), but they could not have the meaning they once possessed. One Malay author in 1925 noted that nowadays the royal ceremonial and sumptuary regulations are fading (cited in Milner 2003: 183). The Rulers work was to move into new areas: he began to be praised in new ways, judged for the contribution he made to his State. In texts from early 20 th century Johor and Perak, Rulers were now complimented for introducing modern institutions, for modernizing education, for improving the lives of their subjects, for caring for the different races in their State, and for helping to unite the Malay race. They were praised for being careful and conscientious in their administration. Such key terms or expressions as government, modernity, and administrative diligence and energy and soon development and progress begin to contribute to a new royal discourse, and to challenge the dominance of a language concerned largely about ceremonial, custom, language, manners and status (Milner 2003; Milner 2002: chapters 8 and 9). As represented in the new royal court writings, the Rulers of the late 19 th and early 20 th century were impressive administrators and often subtle diplomats. They were reformers, claiming leadership of their State community (with its component races) in a time of challenge a time when the Rulers had to deal with British administrative and ideological demands, new religious thinking from the Middle East, and increasing immigration numbers. There is a suggestion here of a performance-based monarchy some royal texts could now be read almost as election manifestos. These new Rulers, the product of a fresh epistemic Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 28 Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation / 29 era, may not have had the same pivotal, ideological role in their subjects lives and mentality as their kerajaan predecessors possessed. But in considering Kobkuas claim that there is currently in Malaysia an attempt to revive the monarchs role giving Rulers active participation in the affairs of the nation (xxiii) the story of the reconstruction of Malayan monarchy during the colonial period is vital. To a large extent the new participating constitutional monarchs, whom Kobkua describes as gaining support today, are the heirs not of the traditional rajas or sultans of 1800, but of the colonial period, new Rulers. It is for this reason that we should be wary of using the word traditional in reference to Malaysian monarchs today (Muhammad Kamil 1998: 314), or of placing too much stress on the continuity of the institution. During the colonial period, the Rulers could not be said to have maintained their position at the very centre of all aspects of life in the state (Kobkua 2011: 85-86). Their centrality at the end of that time was by no means the centrality they held in 1800. What we can ask, however, is whether there ways in which that old kerajaan ideology continues to shape modern Malaysia? Does it assist us to understand the sovereignty, prerogatives, powers and jurisdiction of the Rulers which the Federal Constitution promises to respect? Does it throw light on the informal power or influence which Rulers are reported as exercising in matters of state? Such questions bring us back to an issue raised in my first Pok Rafeah lecture whether we should now accept that colonial knowledge is the real baseline knowledge for modern Malaysia (Shamsul 1998: 49), or are some concepts from the pre-colonial era still potent? The historian, Muhammad Yusoff Hashim, has suggested that the element of spirituality in royal sovereignty today only exists as a belief amongst a small section of the community (1991: 281). Few are likely to fear the supernatural wrath of the Rulers daulat. But when Tunku Abdul Rahman wrote of the semblance of belonging which the Rulers continue to give their people, then we do get a sense of the 1800 Ruler as linchpin, holding a defining role in his community. We do so again, when the Raja Muda of Perak refers today to the unifying role of monarchy, and its capacity to provide a sense of historical identity and continuity (Smith 2006: 134; Kobkua 2011: Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 29 30 / Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation 384). I shall return to the issue of precisely how unifying that monarchical role can be. Before probing further the matters of unity and identity, however, it should be noted that the influence today of the old kerajaan ideology is not necessarily restricted to the possible shaping of current conceptualizations of monarchy. What sometimes is termed feudal thinking has been seen to influence attitudes to political authority in general. Syed Hussain Alatas (1972), Chandra Muzaffar (1979), Shaharuddin Maaruf (1984) and Clive Kessler (1992) all pioneers in this line of investigation have examined the impact of royal tradition in shaping attitudes toward loyalty, followership, heroism and ceremony. In my own work, I have been interested in the influence of old kerajaan ideas on current Malay approaches to entrepreneurialism, so-called money politics, top-down political leadership, the concept of the plural society, and the manner in which the bangsa Melayu has been propagated as a focus of identity and loyalty (Milner 2011: chapters 7 and 8; Milner 2003a; see also Johnson and Milner 2005). The continuing importance of reputation (nama, and related terms) in Malay thinking seems also to warrant closer attention (Karim 1992: 7). In the case of modern monarchy itself, the old kerajaan influence is to be encountered naturally in the continued prominence of royal titles and royal ceremonies in Malaysia by most international standards, this country really is marked by its elaborate monarchialism but perhaps most of all, I would suggest, in the depicting of Rulers as a focus of identity and community. Former Lord President Salleh Abas calls the King, the Yang di- Pertuan Agong, a symbol of unity (1986: 4). The Ruler of Pahang has been described as a symbol of the unity of the people of his State (Shariff Ahmad 1983: xvii, 32). Symbol (simbol) is a relatively new word, and its use here is a reminder of how far removed we are today from the kerajaan of 1800. The kerajaan Ruler of that time was not conceived a symbol his claim was to be the real basis of unity, the actual centre around which all else was articulated. But the claim to symbolic unity is still a strong one, and the question I wish to turn to now is how comprehensive is this unity which the Ruler is expected to promote. It can be Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 30 Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation / 31 argued, I think, that the kerajaan ideology was race blind: how far has modern Malaysian monarchy, we might ask, inherited that aspect of the old tradition? Malay Rulers or Rulers? Time and again we encounter the words Malay Rulers. Kobkua uses the expression herself in the title of her book. But although she often points to the specific role of monarchy with respect to the Malay community and calls the Rulers the living symbols of Malay sovereignty (393) she does note the way the present Sultan of Selangor has stressed that Malaysia belongs to all Malaysians (387), and the insistence by the Raja Muda of Perak that monarchy has the capacity to give both Malays and non-Malays a sense of common identity (384). The tension here between Ruler and Malay Ruler, given the anxiety about national unity in modern Malaysia, should not be neglected in the discussion of the ideology of monarchy in this country. I introduced this issue in my first Pok Rafeah Chair Public Lecture (Milner 2011[a]), and will examine it in further detail here. If we go back to pre-colonial times again, I think there is a case for speaking of Rulers though monarchy is very often assumed to be in historical terms essentially Malay (see Nazrin Shah 2004: 17; Mahathir 2011: 100). It is, in fact, particularly in the British era that monarchy began increasingly to be constituted as Malay. Before that time, the term Malay, as far as I can see, was not actually used by the Archipelago people to describe the range of polities on Sumatra, the Peninsula and Borneo which were so often called Malay in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. I have argued recently that the use of the expression Malay world is misleading for the pre-colonial period, and it might be more accurate to speak of a kerajaan world or the Archipelago sultanates (Milner 2011: chapter 4). Considering first the specifically social identity of the rulers themselves, the Melaka royal line claims descent from Alexander the Great; the Sultan of Deli in Sumatra traces his genealogy back to an Indian who had earlier been an official in the sultanate of Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 31 32 / Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation Aceh; and the Rulers of Pontianak and Perlis possess Arab origins. Even in the clothing they wore, rulers displayed a flexibility regarding ethnic identification. In the early nineteenth century, Johor ruler Husain dressed his sons in Tamil fashion, wearing wide trousers and Indian gowns (Abdullah 2009: 275); and Sultan Abdul Hamid of Kedah (1882-1943) almost invariably wore western-style suites in preference to Malay dress, though on ceremonial occasions he tended to dress in a Siamese-style uniform (Sheppard 2007: 4; 8-9). With respect to high officials in the kerajaan, at the opening of the seventeenth century the Dutch Admiral Matelieff reported that a Peguan (from present-day Burma) was one of the highest councilors to the Ruler of Kedah (Commelin 1969: 46). An eighteenth-century Kedah ruler had as his Kings merchant, a deep cunning villainous Chuliah, who was given the title Datoo Sri Raja (Steuart 1901: 15, 18). In mid-nineteenth century Kedah the ruler gave a noble title to a Hakka leader, who was accorded a high place on State Functions (Gullick 1992: 372-373); later in the century Kedahs Sultan Abdul Hamid appointed a well-known and much-respected Chinese businessman as State Treasurer, with a royal office sited in an extension to the palace (Sheppard 2007: 4-5). In Pahang about the same time, a Tamil Indian was the treasurer and tax collector (Gullick 1965: 52), and earlier in the nineteenth-century, Johor Sultan Husain had an influential Indian advisor called Abdul Kadir bin Ahmad Sahib, who was given the title Tengku Muda and sometimes dressed in the Tamil manner, and sometimes in Malay attire (Abdullah 209: 275). As to the subjects of the rulers, they tended to be described just as rakyat rather than as members of races or ethnic groups. The self-classification Malay used to refer to a trans-sultanate racial unity is a relatively modern innovation in Island Southeast Asia. Its growing use was particularly influenced by the propagation of European thinking about race from the end of the 18 th century Milner 2011: chapters 4 and 5). The term Malay, of course, had long been associated with the Melaka polity, and the sultanates connected with Melaka, but the idea of a specific Malay race a race with which one identifies, and to which one owes loyalty was something that emerged primarily in the colonial period. The Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 32 Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation / 33 subjects of the pre-colonial Ruler would in some situations identify with a geographic location, usually a river calling themselves, for instance, orang Kemaman or orang Muar; but the larger community with which they identified was not a race but a specific kerajaan. It was possible to live outside the kerajaan; and I have suggested elsewhere that the formation of communities from China in particular communities that lived separately from the Rulers subjects, and did not operate by kerajaan rules in their social and economic lives are in a sense a precursor of the plural society configuration that was consolidated in colonial Malaya (Milner 2003a). Nevertheless, the kerajaan itself does not appear to have been conceptualized in specifically racial or ethnic terms. Even in the British period many subjects of rulers on the Peninsula continued to call themselves Minangkabau, Bugis, Baweyan or Javanese. Apart from Orang Asli and others, Chinese might also be subjects of a ruler. We continue to see this in the colonial period, when people of many backgrounds were either British subjects (if born in Melaka or Penang) or a subject of a Ruler (Mohamed Suffian 1972: 207; Emerson 1964: 509). They continued to be considered subjects of rulers right up to the period of nation-state building following the Second World War (Ratnam 1965: 72). In a 1931, legal case involving a Chinese man (Ho Chick Kwan), whom the British wanted the Sultan of Selangor to banish, Ho was described as a natural born subject of the Ruler of the State of Negri Sembilan, and his adopted mother (Lui Ho) described herself as owing true allegiance to His Highness the Sultan of Selangor (Ho Chick Kwan v The Honble British Resident Selangor, criminal appeal no. 11 of 1931). British racializing of the Sultanates was evident even in the early 19 th century, when the official British presence was limited to Penang. Thomas Stamford Raffles and John Leiden at that time planning Britains future role in the Archipelago conceptualized the different Sultanates as members of a general Malay league that might be placed under the protection of a British governor (Raffles 1991: 25). When British intervened administratively in the Peninsular Sultanates, commencing with Perak in 1874, they identified a special Malay responsibility for the Rulers. The new British advisers or Residents were to be Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 33 34 / Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation powerful, but the areas of Malay Religion and Custom were to be left to the Rulers (Gullick 1992: 2). British officials also cooperated with the Sultans in the formulation of policies specifically designed to benefit The Malay Race in the FMS, to quote the title of a memo written in 1906 (Burns 1971: 5). Pronouncements from the royal courts themselves in the colonial period, it should be noted, continued to stress the responsibility of the Ruler toward all his subjects. An early 20 th century Johor text the Hikayat Johor lauds Johors Sultan Abu Bakar (1885-1895) for looking after the Chinese subjects living in the state. There is also mention of Chinese and Indians welcoming him home from an overseas journey (Milner 2002: 214). In a later Perak coronation document, again we see a Ruler reaching out to non-Malays, stressing in a speech that he had not forgotten the help that other races in the state had given in making Perak wealthy and prosperous. At the coronation itself, not only Malays but also Chinese, Ceylonese, Indians and Japanese made formal declarations of loyalty to the new Ruler. Sultan Abdul Aziz, so the text stresses, does not distinguish between his subjects (Milner 2002: 243-244). In a valuable, somewhat left-wing account of British Malaya on the eve of the Japanese invasion, the activist Ibrahim Yaacob referred to a Kelantan Ruler bestowing a prestigious title on a Chinese merchant and observed that the Johor state council building looked like a Chinese audience hall because it was decorated with Chinese writing. When Ibrahim Yaacob asked what the writing was about, he was told that it recorded the personal service of wealthy Chinese people to the Ruler (Milner 2002: 261). Ibrahim was sympathetic neither to Rulers nor to the influx of Chinese and Indians, whom he saw as pressuring the Malays in economic and other areas (263). He would have known that Rulers could form alliances with these groups. John Gullick, in his detailed historical research on the Rulers in the colonial period, has described how business activities with both Chinese and Europeans tended to draw Rulers into the non-Malay, official and business world, which was beginning, by the 1920s if not before, to dominate Malaya (1992: 213-214; 131 n. 125). Apart from provoking Ibrahim Yaacob, this personal experience would have reinforced a Rulers sincerity Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 34 Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation / 35 in thanking these races for the help they gave to making his State wealthy and prosperous. Despite such royal affirmations of inclusiveness, however, the royal courts were also positioning themselves with respect to the Malay movement. The Hikayat Johor, mentioned above, stresses the Sultans special concern for his subjects of the Malay race (Milner 2003: 179); the later Perak text indicates the Perak Rulers concern about uniting our race (bangsa), and about the Malays being left behind by other races in the development of the Perak state (Milner 2002: 242-243). There is a claim to leadership being conveyed in such statements, and it should be understood in the context of a general royal wariness. The Rulers appear to have understood well that those promoting the bangsa Melayu were advocating a focus of identity and loyalty that could compete with monarchy; race also carries an implicit egalitarianism that has the potential to rival the essential hierarchy of monarchy. It is certainly the case that some prominent advocates of race proponents of the bangsa Melayu right back to Abdullah bin Abdul Kadir in the early 19 th century, were determined critics of specific Rulers and even of the institution of monarchy (Milner 2002: 15; Ibrahim Yaacob 1941: 6, 58). Ibrahim Yaacobs pre-War survey of British Malaya refers to royal opposition to the Malay movement. Some royal courts held firmly to the old feeling and strongly oppose the new desire to unify the Malay people. In Kedah, members of the ruling elite had opposed the formation of a Malay association on the ground that Kedah possesses a raja; in Perak royal opposition initially discouraged the use of the term Malay in the name of an association intended to promote unity (Milner 2002: 269-270). In Selangor, there was certainly a Selangor Malay Association, but it was led by a member of royalty and was utterly deferential toward the ruler (Smith 2006: 128). Looking to sultanates beyond the Peninsula, D.E.Browns study of Brunei notes that Sultanates suspicion of ethnic distinctions, and the insistence that all indigenous groups enjoyed the common status of subject of the Sultan (Brown 1970: 4, 9). In mid-20 th -century East Sumatra, it was reported that the kerajaan leadership (in such sultanates as Deli, Langkat and Asahan) never cared for the suku Melayu (the Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 35 36 / Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation Malay ethnic group), fearing competition from potentially- influential Malay associations (Ariffin Omar 1993: 78). How best then to handle the growing Malay movement? Discourage it, or position oneself in a leadership role? These were questions Rulers faced. It was in the immediate post-war years, in the struggle against the Malayan Union, that they were pressed most strongly to identify with the Malay movement. At that time more than ever before, it can be argued, monarchy was racialized. The Japanese Occupation had sharpened further the tension between Malays and Chinese in particular, and the movement against the Malayan Union was perceived to be fundamentally Malay. The Rulers, as suggested already, were far from passive in the struggle against the British, and Daulat Tuanku (Power to the Ruler) continued to be a rallying cry (Stockwell 1979: 71). But Cheah Boon Kheng (1988) and Ariffin Omar (1993) have demonstrated how strongly Malayism began to compete with monarchy in the process of the Malayan Union debate, and how popular the declaration Hidup Melayu (Long Live the Malays) became. While some Sultans continued to take the Malay movement head on we have noted the determination of the Kedah Ruler to eradicate(e) UMNO influence from his State the Sultan of Pahang spoke of we Malays and the Sultan of Perak declared that he spoke as a Malay not as a Sultan (Ariffin 1993: 104). In the period leading up to Independence, at the time the Rulers were determined to help shape the constitution for the new nation, they also took pains to advocate a range of Malay causes. They spoke up on such topics as Asian immigration, Malay land reserves, and the protection of Malay economic interests (Kobkua 2011: 149-150, 152). In 1951, during the Malayan Emergency when the British were concerned to improve the living conditions for Chinese who might potentially join the terrorists the Rulers warned that it is very essential to reassure the Malays that they are not being neglected and forgotten (Smith 1995: 111, 113, 116). In these and other ways the Rulers presented themselves (in Kobkuas words) as credible and respectable champions and guardians of the Malays (183). The 1957 Federal Constitution itself conveys the impression of allocating the Rulers a specific Malay role. In Article 153 (1), Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 36 Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation / 37 the King is given the responsibility to safeguard the special position of the Malay (and natives of Sabah and Sarawak), and also the legitimate interests of other communities. This might appear ethnically even-handed, but public focus has tended to be placed on the Malay dimension probably because the establishing of the Malay special privileges is often considered the most unusual feature of the Malaysian Constitution (Harding 2007: 120). The amendments to the Constitution in 1971 (which I have already discussed from another angle) reinforced the impression of a privileged Ruler-Malay community linkage, in that any change to the Malay special position requires the consent of the Conference of Rulers, as well as a two-thirds parliamentary majority. The stress on Malay interests rather than the interests of other communities in discussing this royal power (see, for example, Malaysian Mirror, 21 October 2010) is not helpful to the promotion of royal inclusiveness. Nor is the fact that press statements on this issue, issued by the Conference of Rulers, tend to refer to the Rulers only as Malay Rulers (Kobkua 2011: 424-426). The racializing the Malayizing of the Rulers can be seen in many other areas in the post-War public discourse of Malaysia. It takes place when Rulers are described as the symbol or cement assisting to hold the Malay race or racial feeling together (Ariffin 1993: 53, 102; ); or (in the 1980s) when the senior Malaysian legal official, Tun Haji Mohd. Salleh bin Abas, writes of Malay rulership as the nub of Malay custom (1986: 13). The racializing is happening again in current school history texts, which describe all the old Peninsular sultanates as kerajaan Melayu despite the fact that none of the early royal court writings use the phrase, and in these writings the term Melayu would appear to be linked essentially to Melaka and sultanates closely linked with the Melaka ruling family (Ahmad Fawzi 2010: 123, 129; Malay Concordance Project http://mcp.anu.edu.au/). We also see the Malayizing of the Ruler in royal statements. When the Sultan of Perak spoke as a Malay not as a Sultan, he said too that we are Malays and must not lose our customs and religious practices, which are our prized possessions (Ariffin 1993: 104). Customs and religion which in the past, as I have noted, were presented as being in the hands of the ruler (Milner 2002: Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 37 38 / Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation 101) would now appear to have been recognized by the Ruler himself as being grounded in the Malay race. The point is made with even more clarity in a coronation document of 1971 from the royal court of Pahang. Here the Pahang monarchys customs and ceremonial which once would have been of vital importance merely because they were royal customs and ceremonial are now presented as significant because they are a branch of Malay culture and a reflection of the national characteristics of the Malay people (bangsa Melayu) (Anon 1971; see also Milner 2003b: 188-189). Trans-Racial Residue Although the Rulers are referred to frequently as Malay Rulers even, as I have said, in pronouncements from the Conference of Rulers it must also be said that the residue of an earlier trans- racial substance has survived. Looking back half a century, we see this residue when the Rulers favoured a multilingual system of school education, and not just the learning of Malay and English (Kobkua 2011: 216); or when Chinese people recall that in May 1969 at a time of acute inter-racial crisis the Sultan of Terengganu and other Rulers took steps to protect their non-Malay subjects. We see it in a different sphere when new Malay commoner entrepreneurs express resentment at having to compete in business with Rulers who act through Chinese intermediaries (Kobkua 2011: 364). There is an important political gesture toward the trans-racial again in a special press statement from the Conference of Rulers in October 2008. Here the Rulers explain that the institution of the Rulers is a protective umbrella ensuring impartiality among the citizens. The statement explains the Rulers constitutional role respecting the so-called Social Contract between Malays and non-Malays, and assures non-Malays that there is no need to harbour any apprehension or worry over their genuine rights (Kobkua 2011: 425-426). To be even-handed in politics or business is important in reaching beyond the Malaysian race divide, but perhaps even more important is evidence that the institution of monarchy itself can Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 38 Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation / 39 still be racially-blind. The fact that the Federal Constitution itself uses the term Rulers not Malay Rulers (though the present-day Constitutions of the different States require Rulers to be Malay) (Legal Research 1998) ought to be reason for optimism. It is also a positive sign when a Sultan is described by his supporters in the case of Pahang as a symbol of the unity of the people (rakyat) (and not just the Malay race, or bangsa) (Shariff Ahmad 1983: xvii, 32); or, in the case of Kelantan, as the umbrella sheltering the people (rakyat) (Mohd. Zain Saleh 1987: 14; also, in Perak, Nazrin Shah 2011). The term rakyat used again by the Sultan of Selangor when he speaks of his States citizens, regardless of ethnic background and faith (New Straits Times, 7 Jan 2011) may convey to some a memory of feudal times, but it is without doubt racially inclusive. It denotes now as it did 200 years ago a community bonded together through subjecthood. Here we might return to the matter of ceremony. In pre- colonial times, as we have seen, ceremony titles, sumptuary laws, elaborate and lengthy public ceremonies was vital in defining the kerajaan hierarchy, giving each person a place. Today, policing by the immigration and citizenship administration of the nation state is the first concern. Nevertheless, the Malaysian community as I have noted continues to be characterized by formalized hierarchy and public ritual. Nine Rulers, an elaborate structure of Tun, Tan Sri, Dato Sri and Dato, and vast numbers of lower awards and medals such an array of titles and distinctions, combined with an immensely busy calendar of public occasions and celebrations at Federal and State level, all convey this striking monarchialism. And just as the word rakyat conveys both hierarchy and inclusiveness, so the royal ceremony has a capacity to bond. The birthday celebrations for the different Rulers are perhaps the time when the continued trans-racial character of monarchy is most evident. Thus, at the Sultan of Peraks Celebration in April 2011 the recipients of the high honours included a leading businessman whose father was Goanese and a wide range of Chinese and Indian people from academia, the media and the arts, as well as the business community (Chandra Sagaran, Sultan heads Perak honours list, New Straits Times, 19 April 2011). Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 39 40 / Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation I am speaking here of course of the bonding of the nation: an issue that has been of central concern in a research project under way at IKMAS this year. In taking note of the great tenacity of the race-based societal paradigm in Malaysia, we have examined a series of attempts to introduce alternative social concepts that might transcend race. These attempts typically turn out to become entangled in racial or communal thinking. In considering the historical heritage of ideas in this country, in fact, the old kerajaan turns out to be one of the few societal paradigms that have a claim to the attention of those hoping to build a more inclusive Malaysia. In the last century, as I have discussed, monarchy has become embroiled in race issues, but it also contains an ideological residue if we can disassemble ideology in that way that is racially inclusive or, perhaps more accurately, racially blind. Conclusion In this lecture, I have examined monarchy, first, in terms of the power rulers have wielded over time. I noted here that in post- Independence Malaysia the proactive and participating constitutional (of whom Kokbua writes) are not a recent development; they have been more or less the norm. Whether or not this conforms to the principles of Westminster democracy, such a monarchical role seems to be an established part of the system in this country. Secondly, I have suggested that in ideological terms modern monarchy is a fundamentally different institution from the kerajaan polity of some 200 years ago. The heirs of the modern participating constitutional rulers, I argue, are really the performance-based administrator royals of the colonial period, rather than the pre-colonial, traditional Sultans. When we reach back to pre-colonial times to consider the possible current relevance of the historical heritage, we see that the importance of the kerajaan ruler did not rest on the wielding of administrative power. In this sense, one might reflect, historical origins provide no particular justification for authoritarianism. Nevertheless, the identity-giving function of the pre-colonial ruler as the linchpin of his community in the most profound sense Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 40 Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation / 41 does reinforce monarchys claim to present-day relevance. When we think in socio-cultural terms, the great continuing theme of monarchy in this country reaching back to the earliest Malay- language records is its capacity to provide what one prominent royal spokesman has referred to as social glue (Nazrin Shah 2004: 6). In the final section of this lecture I have asked whether there is historical support for believing that this unifying role of kingship can transcend ethnic division. Here my analysis has diverged somewhat from the views of others. I argue that Malaysias monarchy is not in historical terms a narrowly Malay institution. The stress on its Malayness is really a product of the colonial period and the decolonization process. The kerajaan of pre-colonial times was not racially defined in this way, and it could therefore provide a solid foundation for giving monarchy today an even stronger role in the bonding of the nation. Given the current importance of identifying ideological substance that might support a 1Malaysia vision, this is no mean claim. Acknowledgment I am grateful for advice from the following (though I have not always taken their advice): Abdul Rahman Embong, Peter Borschberg, Michael Coper, Philip Koh, Lee Kam Hing, Lee Poh Ping, Claire Milner, Abdul Halim Ali, Mohd. Annuar Zaini, Ng Tze Shiung and Helen Ting. Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 41 4 Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 42 References Abdullah Alwi. 1980. Kelantan: Islamic Legal History before 1909. Malaysia in History, 23: 10-30. Abdullah bin Abdul Kadir. 2009. The Hikayat Abdullah. Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society. Ahmad Ibrahim. 1978. The Position of Islam in the Constitution of Malaysia, in Mohamed Suffian, H.P. Lee and F.A.Trindade (eds.), The Constitution of Malaysia: Its Development 1957- 1977. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press. Ahmad Fawzi bin Mohd. Basri et al. 2010. 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The Constitutional Position of the Yang Di- Pertuan Agong, in Tun Mohamed Suffian, H.P. Lee and F.A.Trindade (eds), The Constitution of Malaysia: its development: 1957-1977. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press. Trindade, F.A. and H.P.Lee (eds). 1988. The Constitution of Malaysia: Further Perspectives and Developments. Petaling Jaya: Fajar Bakti. Trocki, Carl A. 2007. Prince of Pirates: The Temenggongs and the Development of Johor and Singapore, 1784-1885. Singapore: NUS Press. Winstedt, Richard (ed). 1938. The Malay Annals; or Sejarah Melayu, JMBRAS, XVI: 1-226. Yegar, M. 1979. Islam and Islamic Institutions in British Malaya. Jerusalem: Magnes Press. Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 48 Anthony Milner Anthony Milner is the 4 th holder of the Distinguished Pok Rafeah Chair in International Studies at the Institute of Malaysian and International Studies (IKMAS), Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia. He is Basham Professor of Asian History at the Australian National University, and a Professorial Fellow at the University of Melbourne. He is a Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia. His books on Southeast Asia include The Malays (Wiley-Blackwell, 2008, revised, paperback edition, 2011; Czech translation, 2010), The Invention of Politics in Colonial Malaya (Cambridge University Press, 1995, revised, paperback edition, 2002), Kerajaan: Malay Political Culture on the Eve of Colonial Rule (The Association for Asian Studies, 1982; Thai translation, 2008), and (co-ed) Southeast Asia in the 9th to 14th Centuries (1986). His other publications include co-editing Australia in Asia (3 volumes, Oxford University Press, 1996-2001) and Reviewing the Orient; Artists, Scholars, Appropriations (Harwood Press, 1994). Professor Milner has held visiting appointments at The Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, the National University of Singapore (as Raffles Visiting Professor of History), Tokyo University of Foreign Studies and Humboldt University. He is International Director and Board Member at Asialink, University of Melbourne, and Co-Chair of the Australian Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific. He is a member of the Advisory Council of the Australian Governments Australia-Malaysia Institute and has held previous government appointments on the Foreign Affairs Council and the Australia- Thailand Institute, and as a Panel Member for the Australian Research Council. Professor Milners academic roles have included Dean of Asian Studies at the Australian National University (1996-2005), Member of the University Council (2000-2002), and Director of Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 49 50 / Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation the Australia-Asia Perceptions Project of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia (1992-1995) as well as Chair of the Research Committee of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, Editor of the Asian Studies Review of the Asian Studies Association of Australia, and Editor of the Southeast Asian Publication Series of the same association. His public lectures have included the Cunningham Lecture (the annual lecture of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia), the Golay Lecture (Cornell University), the Raffles Lecture (National University of Singapore), and the Fourth Asia- Pacific Lecture (Australian Broadcasting Commission). He delivered The 7 th Pok Rafeah Chair Public Lecture entitled, Malaysias Dominant Societal Paradigm: Invented, Embedded, Contested (Penerbit UKM, 2011) organised by the Institute of Malaysian and International Studies (IKMAS), UKM on 27 January 2011. Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 50