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Anthony Milner.

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The Pok Rafeah Chair
Public Lecture Series
J .H. Mittelman. 1997. Globalisation, Peace and Conflict. ISBN 967-
942-397-2
J .H. Mittelman. 1999. The Future of Globalisation. ISBN 967-942-
449-9
Yoshihara Kunio. 2001. Globalisation and National Identity. ISBN
967-942-540-1
Yoshihara Kunio. 2001. The Rise of China: Its Effect on East Asia.
ISBN 967-942-595-9
J oan M. Nelson. 2007. Education in a Globalizing World: Why the
Reach Exceeds the Grasp. ISBN 978-967-942-811-7
J .M. Nelson. 2007. Fast-Growing Nations, Globalization and Social
Policy. ISBN 978-967-942-828-5
Anthony Milner. 2011. Malaysias Dominant Societal Paradigm:
Invented, Embedded, Contested. ISBN 978-967-942-961-9
Anthony Milner. 2011. Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the
Nation. ISBN 978-967-942-994-7
Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 03:22 2
The 8
th
Pok Rafeah Chair Public Lecture
Institute of Malaysian and International Studies
Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia
delivered on 14 July 2011
PENERBIT UNIVERSITI KEBANGSAAN MALAYSIA
BANGI 2011
http://www.penerbit.ukm.my
Anthony Milner
Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 3
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Milner, Anthony
Malaysia monarchy and the bonding of the nation / Anthony Milner.
1. Monarchy--Malaysia. 2. Malaysia--Kings and rulers. I. Title.
352.2309595
ISBN 978-967-942-994-7
Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 4
Abstract
A recent, major study on the development of Malay Kingship
speaks of the socio-political revival of Malay monarchy that is
currently taking place in this country. There is talk, says the book,
of a rejection of the Westminster-style constitutional monarch
and the advancing of another type of Southeast Asian monarchy
perfected by the Ruler of Thailand. This lecture considers these
propositions, and then examines Malaysian monarchy from three
directions. The first concerns the powers of the Rulers, or rather
how the Rulers powers have fared during the last two centuries.
The second examines the changing ideology of Malaysian
monarchy an important topic that has been much neglected. The
third deals with the specific issue of whether the Malaysian Rulers
ought best to be understood as Malay Rulers or Rulers. It is
particularly in this last section of the Lecture that the issue of the
bonding of the nation will be examined. This issue is of central
importance in a research project being undertaken this year at
IKMAS under the auspices of the Distinguished Pok Rafeah Chair
in International Studies.
Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 5
Abstrak
Suatu kajian utama yang baru diterbitkan mengenai perkembangan
Kerajaan Melayu menceritakan kebangkitan semula secara sosio-
politik monarki Melayu yang sedang berlaku di negara ini. Buku
tersebut menyentuh ura-ura penolakan sistem raja berperlembagaan
gaya Westminster dan memajukan sistem jenis lain, iaitu monarki
Asia Tenggara yang disempurnakan oleh Raja Negeri Thai.
Syarahan ini membincangkan pandangan-pandangan ini, dan
kemudian meneliti monarki Malaysia dari tiga sudut. Sudut pertama
merujuk kepada kuasa Raja, dan khasnya tertumpu kepada
penilaian perkembangan kuasa Raja sepanjang dua abad yang lalu.
Sudut kedua meneliti perubahan ideologi monarki Malaysia suatu
topik penting yang kurang diberi perhatian. Sudut ketiga
membincang isu spesifik samada Raja-raja Malaysia perlu
ditakrifkan sebagai Raja-raja Melayu ataupun Raja-raja sahaja.
Pada bahagian akhir Syarahan ini khususnya, isu kesepaduan
negara dibincangkan. Isu ini adalah amat penting kepada projek
penyelidikan yang sedang dikendalikan oleh IKMAS tahun ini di
bawah payung Kursi Kecemerlangan Pok Rafeah dalam bidang
Kajian Antarabangsa.
Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 6
The Honourable Vice Chancellor
The Honourable Deputy Vice Chancellors
Fellow Deans and Directors
Fellow Professors, Associate Professors and Lecturers
Fellow students
Fellow dignitaries
And respected audience
A recently-published survey of the history of Malay Kingship
Kobkua Suwannathat-Pians Palace, Political Party and Power
(2011) has the potential to re-open a productive discussion about
the present and possible future role of monarchy in Malaysia. It is
a reminder too that Malaysia is characterized internationally not
only by its classically plural society, but also by monarchy; by the
structure of prerogatives, ranks and ceremonies that accompanies
not one but nine Rulers. The significance of monarchy, and the
way that significance has changed over time, is of course a topic
that reaches beyond Malaysian studies and a topic that has
attracted cultural anthropologists as well as historians and political
scientists. One lesson emerging from this academic analysis is that
an important distinction needs to be made between royal power
and the socio-cultural role of the institution of monarchy. In the
Malaysian case, aspects of this latter role, dating back to the pre-
colonial history of this region, have the potential to assist modern
monarchy in the task of building a sense of national community. It
is well known that this task is at present a priority in Malaysia.
In her new work, Kokbua, a senior, Malaysia-based historian
who previously wrote a major study on Thai-Malay relations in
the 17
th
and 18
th
centuries (1988) refers to a current socio-
Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 7
8 / Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation
political revival of Malay kingship (xxii), with the growing
importance of proactive and participating constitutional rulers
(391). She writes of the rejection of the idea of the Westminster-
style constitutional monarch and the call for another type of
constitutional monarchy a monarchy that is akin to the concept
and practice of the Southeast Asian monarchy perfected by the
Ruler of Thailand since the 1970s (408). Kobkuas observations
will come as a surprise to many around the world who have taken
an interest in Malaysian matters. Academics have buried Malaysian
monarchy over and over again over the years. Before British
intervention, particularly in the West-coast sultanates, rulers are
seen to have failed to maintain order in the face of large-scale
Chinese immigration (Cowan 1961; Trocki 2007: 162). Then, in
the colonial period according to Rupert Emersons much-cited
1937 account the actual substance of power passed from the
hands of the rulers to the British (1968: 211). The classic study on
the pre-colonial state system on the Peninsula John Gullicks
Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaya in a sense
tempered the drama of this observation by arguing that in reality,
on the eve of British control, the sultans role in his State had not
consisted in the exercise of pre-eminent power (1965: 44). Some
have argued that the Japanese did more damage than the British to
the monarchy. Kobkua herself says the position and prestige of
the rulers now went into steep decline (2011: 122; Cheah 1988:
20). According to Cheah Boon Kheng and others, the Malayan
Union crisis that followed the Japanese Occupation was decisive
in the fortunes of Malaysian monarchy; the Malay people now
made their wishes and Will felt over their rulers (Cheah 1988:
26). According to Ariffin Omar, the Malayan Union events
provoked a revolutionary change in Malay thinking. For a
growing number of Malays, the sultanates were no longer the
central point of the Malay world-view, and the interests of the
rajas were subordinated to the demands of Malayism (Ariffin
1993: 52-53). The UMNO leadership now replaced the rulers as
the real or substantive protector of the community (Chandra
1979: 64).
The next stage of this apparent decline and here we might
be beginning to wonder if there could be any further distance to
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Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation / 9
fall is said to be the Federal Elections of 1955, in which the
United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and its allies won
all but one seat a result that, according to Kokbua herself, meant
the governing Malay party had now finally and convincingly
replaced the rulers as true representatives of the Malays (Kobkua
2011: 281). There was, of course, a Constitutional confrontation
between Parliament and Monarchy in 1983 and here again the rulers
are often portrayed as the losers (e.g. Cheah 2002: 209). Finally,
when the Federal Parliament abolished the royal immunity from
suit in 1993, the legal historian Andrew Harding judged that the
veil of mystique which has always surrounded royalty in Malaysia
was drawn aside (Harding 1996: 61). The forces of populism
had demonstrated amply their superiority to the forces of
feudalism, and Harding noted the declining position of the Rulers
in the Malaysian polity (79).
Down the Rulers have tumbled, down and down, at least
according to this narrative and yet now Kobkua challenges us
with the argument that monarchy is enjoying a socio-political
revival. In this lecture, I will respond to Kobkuas challenge by
reviewing the role of monarchy from three different angles. First,
I will discuss the issue of royal power and power is a word
Kobkua uses often and in particular offer my own account of the
historical context of current royal assertiveness. Secondly, I will
examine the ideology of monarchy, or more precisely the
dramatic ways in which the understanding and presentation of
monarchy in Malaysia has changed over the last two centuries.
This is a topic that has been neglected in Malaysian studies,
including in Kobkuas book. My third and final concern to put
the question succinctly will be to ask whether, when Malaysians
are weighing up the usefulness or otherwise of their political
heritage, too much attention is given to Malay monarchy rather
than monarchy. This final issue brings me back to the topic of
my first Pok Rafeah Lecture: the ideological challenge
Malaysians face in their racially-divided, plural society: the task
of bonding the nation.
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Power
The preoccupation with power in much historical and social-
science writing can be analytically limiting as well as fruitful.
Nevertheless, I shall attempt an historical overview that focuses
on power, and it is a narrative that suggests there is really nothing
new about the current royal activism in Malaysia. Emerson, as
Ive said, described the British as taking the substance of power
from the Rulers, leaving them to indulge only in pomp and
ceremony (1968: 140). I shall return to the matter of ceremony,
but the claim about the loss of power is repeated often by historians
(including Kobkua) (see Milner 1986: 6; Kobkua 2011: 85). John
Gullicks detailed research has produced a more nuanced analysis.
He points out (as does Kokbua) that the Rulers of the Unfederated
Malay States (Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganu, Johor) were able to
maintain a greater independence from British officials, but even
in the case of the Federated Malay States (Perak, Selangor, Negeri
Sembilan, Pahang) Rulers possessed a significant degree of agency.
Gullick writes of a tacit bargain by which the colonial regime
secured (the) support and advice of the Rulers (1992: vi): he notes,
for instance, that at one point the Perak and Selangor Sultans had
success in insisting (in a dispute over gambling farms) that the
Governor did not possess the constitutional power to overrule their
decisions (52-53). Rulers also made themselves heard in such areas
as law and education.
The Rulers appear as well to have retained their legal
sovereignty in the British period. Legal cases involving the Sultan
of Johor (in the 1890s), the Sultan of Kelantan (in the 1920s) and
the Sultan of Pahang (in the 1930s) all confirmed that the Rulers
were sovereign rulers of independent states and immune from
jurisdiction in British courts (Mohamed Suffian 1972: 32-33). With
respect to the people themselves, Kokbua goes so far as to insist
that they continued to see their Rulers as the state supreme
authority and believed the British were there because of royal
wishes, and nothing else (Kobkua 2011: 85-86). This would seem
to be an exaggeration, but there is evidence of various types to
suggest continuing royal authority. In the State Councils of the
colonial period, for instance, Malay members often proved
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Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation / 11
reluctant to express an opinion before knowing the view of the
Sultan (Smith 1995: 145). The testimony of opponents of royalty
is also instructive. Thus, some Malay activists claimed that it was
fear of the Rulers that deterred many Malays from engaging in
politics (Roff 1994: 230; Milner 2002: 260-261).
The Rulers were certainly active in religious administration
for instance, in creating religious councils and regularizing legal
systems. Some studies have seen such initiatives as a form of
compensation for surrendering other powers (Yegar 1979: 264 Roff
1994: 72). After all, the original British agreements with the Rulers
had specifically nominated religion and custom as areas in which
they would not need to take British direction. Another
interpretation, however, would stress that Rulers had paid close
attention to religious issues long before British intervention, and
that new developments in Islamic religious practice emerging in
large part independently of the processes of British intervention
required careful royal handling. As the legal historian, Abdullah
Alwi, has explained; the colonial-period sultans were forced to
adjust to a changing environment that included the threat of
Wahhabism as well as the European advance (1980: 12; Milner
2002: 217-218).
My impression, therefore, is that the Rulers were far from
passive during the colonial period. However, it is hard to accept
that the Malay masses were quite oblivious to the drastic
change in administrative structure of their world and the political
misfortunes suffered by their individual monarchs (Kobkua 2011:
85-86). One British official noted in 1891 that Malays had become
far less submissive, and there were also reports that the people
no longer squatted by the roadside when a ruler passed (Gullick
1987: 79). The capacity of Rulers to punish crime and formulate
laws also began to be restricted in the opening decades of the British
era (294). Cheah Boon Kheng has commented that in the colonial
period there was a demystification of the Malay ruling class,
especially of the Malay rulers (1988: 19): this would seem to
me to suggest an alteration in the Rulers position that went beyond
a reduction of power.
Kobkuas stress on the impact of the Japanese Occupation
does make sense. Cheah Boon Kheng has explained that the state
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12 / Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation
Councils set up in 1944 had the Sultans as mere vice-chairmen
and advisers to the Japanese governors; and in general the Sultans
found the loyalty of their subjects not as reliable as before the
war (1988: 20). Although the Japanese eventually followed the
earlier British administrative policy of working through royal
courts, at the beginning of the Occupation they did seem prepared
to remove traditional rulers in Southeast Asia (Kobkua 2011: 105).
They also offered various administrative opportunities to the
commoner Malay leaders who were beginning to be rivals of the
Rulers (Kobkua 2011: 106; Milner 2011: 149-150). Following the
Japanese victory, some of these activists swaggered about in the
villages and in government offices, throwing their weight around
as if they were the government: (Kratoska 1998: 110). Again the
issue seems to be about appearance as well as real power. How
would commoner Malays respond to the Johor Ruler being
reprimanded for leaning on his stick before Japanese officers
(Stockwell 1979: 11)? Kobkua conjectures that it would have been
a cultural and political shocking experience for the average
Malay to witness his Ruler performing self-demeaning exercises
such as bowing in the direction of the Imperial palace as a mark of
homage to the Emperor (2011: 109).
As noted in the opening of this lecture, the narrative of the
decline of royal power next tends to move to the dramatic Malayan
Union period, in which a potent Malay movement developed in
opposition to British plans to impose a new constitution on the
country a constitution which many saw as sidelining both
monarchs and Malays in the planning of a future independent
Malayan state. The Rulers are often seen as weak in having
submitted to the constitutional changes. Former Prime Minister
Mahathir has recalled that many of us felt betrayed by our Rulers
(2011: 109). In the political struggle that then led to the British
back-down, the Rulers are likely to be portrayed as passive, simply
realizing that their only choice was to back their peoples
demand for a Federation in which Malay interests would be
protected (Mahathir 2011: 140). Then UMNO which is described
as taking over real leadership of the Malay community is given
the credit for the decision to to retain the rulers as constitutional
monarchs in the Constitution of the new, independent Malayan
state (Cheah 1988: 26).
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Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation / 13
Kobkua considers that the battering the Rulers received during
the Japanese period may have been one factor influencing their
willingness to surrender to British demands that they support the
Malayan Union (125). However, her book also includes evidence
that the Rulers were far from passive in this period as does Simon
C. Smiths careful study of British relations with the Malay
Rulers from 1930 to 1957 (Smith 1995; also Smith 2006). It is
clear from the documentation that some of the Sultans struggled
against the British demands from the outset, even though they faced
the threat of being forcibly removed from their thrones (Smith
1995: chapter 3; Kobkua 2011: chapter 4). Their determined
opposition clearly influenced the British decision makers and
the Sultan of Perak even presented an alternative constitutional
template, a federal scheme that anticipated the structure eventually
adopted for the independent Malaya/Malaysia (Kobkua 2011: 149).
In the period leading up to Independence (Merdeka) in 1957,
the Rulers demonstrated political leadership in other areas also.
Apart from fighting against Malayan Union in London as well as
at home (Kobkua 2011: 176), they pressed the British on such
matters as immigration (especially from China), and the timing of
self government (Kobkua 2011: 219-221). The competition
between Rulers and commoner politicians in the political arena
was sometimes blatant. The Sultan of Kedah was especially
determined to eradicate(e) UMNO influence from his state and
sought to declare the organization illegal and dismiss its supporters
from government service (Smith 1995: 176). The competition
was acute between the Rulers and Dato Onn bin Jaafar (the first
leader of UMNO), and in 1949 a meeting of Menteri Besar
probably at the behest of the Rulers rebuked Onn for allowing
this to be made public (Smith 1995: 177).
Onn had gone so far as to speak (in 1949) of ways and means
of ending feudal rule (Smith 1995: 176) and in resigning from
the leadership of UMNO in 1950, he admitted that under his
presidency any UMNO proposal would face royal opposition (179).
It is possible too that opposition from the Rulers helped to defeat
the new Independence of Malaya Party (IMP) which Onn initiated
in 1951 (179). In forming a further party in 1954 (Party Negara),
Onn changed his approach to monarchy, promising to uphold the
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14 / Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation
position of the Rulers in the future Malaya, and even presenting
himself as their defender against UMNO (181). The new UMNO
leader Tunku Abdul Rahman was more consistent in identifying
the political advantage in supporting not undermining the Rulers.
In later years he recalled that at all costs I wanted to avoid having
a split with the Rulers (Smith 1995: 183). In the Malayan Union
struggle, even left-wing Malay activists who might be expected
to have been fundamentally anti-feudal found themselves in the
anomalous position of rallying popular sentiment by demanding
the restoration of royal sovereignty (Stockwell 1979: 76).
The British certainly took the Rulers seriously as political
protagonists in the years between the War and Independence. As
one senior official put it in March 1946, we have not weaned
the Rulers particularly in the Unfederated States from an
active and dominating role in the political field (Smith 1995:
145). A principal theme in Simon Smiths study, in fact, is the
effort made by Colonial Office officials in London to turn the Rulers
into constitutional monarchs seeking to avoid, for instance,
British governmental statements that admitted the restoration of
their sovereign status after Malayan Union was replaced (70, 100-
101). Key officials in Malaya tended to see things differently,
warning that the Sultans were determined on the issue, and if they
were not satisfied Malays of every walk of life and political colour
would range themselves behind the rulers (97; 105). The Sultans,
it should be said, won their point with the British (109) as they
did on other matters such as a proposed Prisoners Removal Act,
legislation over gambling, and the determining of ethnic
components in the public service (107-113). In 1951, the Legal
Adviser of the Colonial Office in London gave the opinion that
the Rulers were not yet constitutional rulers and that such an
outcome could only be achieved in gradual stages and by
persuasion on the political rather than the purely legal merits
(Smith 1995: 146).
The Ruler and the Constitution
I have noted the suggestion that the great UMNO victory of 1955
removed the Rulers as the true representatives of the Malays.
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Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation / 15
There is plenty of evidence (presented by Kokbua and others),
however, that the Rulers remained politically potent in the years
and decades after 1955 and this record is important if we wish to
establish the historical context of royal activism of today. The
UMNO leadership has tended to suggest, for instance, that the
Rulers only achieved the role they possess in the Independence
Constitution as a result of UMNO generosity, including the UMNO
pledge to protect their interests and to uphold their role
prerogatives (Tunku Abdul Rahman, cited in Kobkua 2011:
279; see also 319, 322; Cheah 1988: 26). However, detailed records
now available of the process leading up to the 1957 Constitution
indicate that the Rulers were often effective political actors.
Royal contributions to the deliberations of the Reid
Commission established in 1956 to draw up proposals for the
Independence Constitution stressed the very real tie between
Ruler and subject. The Rulers legal representative also argued
that the Conference of Rulers (first established in 1948) should be
given executive powers recognizing the Rulers political
importance including powers to deal with boundary issues
(Smith 1995: 152). The Reid Commission resisted this, but Smiths
study gives the impression that it never fully came to grips with
the role of the Rulers failing even to include the Conference of
Rulers in the draft constitution (158). The Rulers were far more
successful in dealing with the Working Party appointed to deal
with unresolved issues in the Reid Report. This group, which
included political, Government and Rulers representatives, advised
that the Rulers remain heads of Islam in their states (158); also,
despite resistance from both the British administration and the
UMNO leadership, the Working Party supported the Rulers
proposals for the role of the Conference of Rulers, including giving
the Conference powers relating to State borders, the position and
privileges of the Rulers themselves, and the appointment of
Supreme Court judges and members of the Election and Public
Services Commissions. The Conference, the Working Party agreed,
could also deliberate on matters of national policy, though the
Rulers constitutional advisers were expected to be present (Smith
1995: 159; Fernando 2007: 169-170).
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16 / Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation
Joseph Fernandos recent monograph on the making of the
Malayan Constitution provides a fine illustration of the Rulers
tenacity in these negotiations. When the deliberations in the post-
Reid Commission Working Party turned to financial provisions,
for instance, UMNO and its political allies refused to meet the
Sultans demands regarding revenue provisions for the States in
the new Federal arrangement. The Rulers then announced they
would not attend future Working Party meetings, and the Alliance
leaders were so shocked by the boycott that they agreed to a
compromise, granting the States a greater degree of financial
autonomy than the original Reid proposals would have allowed
(Fernando 2007: 172-4).
It is this type of detailed archival research that brings to light
the degree of royal agency in the constitution-making process.
Former prime minister Mahathirs recent account of this period is
also revealing of what was seen to have been at stake in a real
contest between monarch and commoner politician. If the issues
of protocol and status of the Rulers had not been settled to (the
Rulers) satisfaction, observed Mahathir, a confrontation might
have erupted, and there were feudalists among the rakyat
(subjects) who would throw their weight behind the Rulers at any
price (2011: 149).
As to the Constitution itself, I am not qualified to make a
legal analysis, but certain aspects do strike me as significant. In
particular, I have the impression that the role of a Ruler goes well
beyond that of the British monarch, or an Australian governor.
Apart from giving the Rulers the power of choosing one of their
number as King (or Yang di-Pertuan Agong), the Constitution
makes clear that no proceedings shall be brought in any court
against the Ruler of a State in his personal capacity. The Rulers
also continued to possess the power of pardon, and at both State
and Federal levels legislation is said to require the assent of the
Ruler (Smith 1995: 159). The Constitution recognizes the right of
a Ruler to act in his discretion in the appointment of a Menteri
Besar, and in any function as head of the Muslim religion or
relating to the customs of the Malays (Mohamed Suffian 1972:
275). Members of the Conference of Rulers are also able to act in
their discretion in relation to certain state boundary issues, and
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Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation / 17
in the advising on any appointment [Constitution Article 38 (6)].
The Conference may in addition deliberate on matters of national
policy, although in doing so the Rulers are supposed to be
accompanied by the Prime Minister and Menteri-Menteri Besar
[Article 38 (3)]. Finally, no law directly affecting the privileges,
position, honours or dignities of the Rulers is allowed to be passed
without the consent of the Conference of Rulers [Article 38 (4)].
Listed in this way, the provisions of the Constitution would
seem to envisage genuine substance in the role of the Ruler (Azlan
Shah 1986: 79). In the negotiations over the Constitution in 1956
Tunku Abdul Rahman had urged that the Rulers be given no
political functions (Smith 1995: 150), but he reflected in 1981
that they now enjoyed more rights than they had once enjoyed in
British colonial days, at least as far as the former Federated Malay
States are concerned (quoted in Azlan Shah 1986: 81). In this
respect, legal scholar H.P. Lee has pointed out that, like it or not,
the constitutional system in Malaysia simply does not accord
with present-day notions of parliamentary democracy (1995: 37).
The legal language of the Constitution at least for a non-
lawyer tends to be opaque, and explanatory essays can therefore
be helpful in understanding the practical implications of what is
written. To take just two dimensions of the Rulers role, Professor
Ahmad Ibrahim pointed out long ago that in practice Sultans have
a great deal of influence on the appointment of religious officials,
especially the Mufti, and the direction of religious affairs in the
State, including in the issue of fatwas or rulings on the Muslim
religion and law (Ahmad Ibrahim 1978: 59). Secondly, with regard
to advising on senior public appointments (including legal and
military appointments), the former Lord President of the Federal
Court of Malaysia, Raja Azlan Shah, has explained that one can
safely say that the views of the Rulers play a very important role
(Azlan Shah 1986: 88).
Two further matters in the Constitution interest me. The first
concerns an amendment of 1971 that makes it necessary to have
the consent of the Conference of Rulers before changing in any
way the constitutional provisions relating to national language and
to the special position of the Malays [Article 153 (1)], (Harding
2007: 121-122). Much has been written on the Constitutions
Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 17
18 / Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation
specific provisions for the Malays (and also the natives of
Sabah and Sarawak), and the inter-communal negotiations and
compromises that lay behind these provisions. The 1971
amendment seems significant at several levels. As former Lord
President Raja Azlan Shah has pointed out, by insisting that not
just a Parliamentary vote but also the consent of the Conference
of Rulers would be necessary to alter these provisions, the Malays
feel safe (1986: 88). However, the amendment also seems to have
implications for the role of the Rulers, enhancing their authority.
True, the Constitution itself bestows this responsibility on the
Rulers, but there is a hint too of an extra-constitutional significance.
As the former Lord President explained, the Rulers Conference
ought to act on advice in these matters, but their agreement to a
change would not be obtained easily, and any government trying
to force these issues on the Rulers would be courting trouble as
the Malay masses would definitely back the Rulers when it comes
to the question of preserving their special privileges (1986: 88).
The second matter that strikes me in the Constitution is Article
181 (1), which states that subject to the provisions of this
Constitution, the sovereignty, prerogatives, powers and
jurisdiction of the Rulers as hitherto had and enjoyed shall
remain unaffected [Article 181 (1); Gillen 1994: 7]. The legal
scholar, Andrew Harding, has warned against concentrating on
important prerogatives outside the constitution, noting that
many aspects of the Rulers powers under the Constitution are
still imperfectly understood (1996: 72). However, this clause is
a reminder that although the Constitution may place limits on
Malaysian monarchy it does not encapsulate that institution.
Monarchy is clearly assumed to be something more than the
provisions in this Constitution. In the words of Former Lord
President Raja Azlan Shah, it is a mistake to think that the role of
a King, like that of a President, is confined to what is laid down by
the Constitution. His role far exceeds those constitutional
provisions (Azlan Shah 1986: 89).
I shall return to the perplexing issue of what is the real nature
of this monarchy. But the question clearly reaches beyond legal
formulations as Clive Kessler (1992: 144) and Mumammad
Kamil Awang (1998: 314), and others, have noted. It recalls, for
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Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation / 19
instance, former Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahmans suggestion
that the throne is the symbol of divinity on earth and whoever
occupies it is the chosen one of God (cited in Kobkua 2011: 334),
or the recent comment of former Prime Minister Mahathir that
Malays are still very feudal in their thinking (2011: 452). Rulers,
Mahathir suggests, wield considerable influence, being backed
by strong Malay traditions or adat (2011: 564). Even when a
Prime Minister or Menteri Besar disagrees with the request of a
Ruler he like other Malays tends to find it difficult to say no
to (his) Rulers (2011: 452-453). Tunku Abdul Rahman, it should
be added, made similar observations (Harding 1996: 76n).
Probing the extra-constitutional dimension of monarchy in
Malaysia, I think next of the genealogical links some sultanates
are said to possess with the great emperor of Srivijaya (based in
South Sumatra from the 7
th
century), who was believed to wield
magical powers. The word daulat suggesting supernatural power
is still sometimes associated with the Rule and his royal regalia.
We may recall too the influence of Indian (including Buddhist)
traditions of kingship, and the range of Islamic (including Persian)
thinking about the spiritual dimension of monarchy that began to
gain influence in the 14th century. Rajas may not always have
been liked as individuals subjects would sometimes abandon an
unpopular Ruler to become the subject of another but in some
Malay writings, as I will discuss at a later point, a royal subject
appears to be presented almost as a portion of the body of the
Ruler. It is possible that the maxim the Ruler and Subject can
never be divided which continues to be employed in some
quarters today reflects this ancient sentiment (Gullick 1965;
Milner 1981; Milner 1982; Muhammad Kamil 2000; Ariffin 1993:
52).
Royal Assertiveness
Considerations about the extra-constitutional dimension of
monarchy are of obvious importance when we come to discussing
the ideology of Malaysian monarchy but they are clearly
significant too in trying to pin down the real powers and influence
Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 19
20 / Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation
of these Rulers. Since 1957 numerous developments indicate that
the attempt to convert the Rulers into constitutional monarchs
in which the British Colonial Office engaged has not been
effective. Crises, of course, have received most attention in
accounts of the exercise of royal power. Rulers have appointed
Menteri Besar who have not been the first choice of the governing
party; other Menteri Besar have resigned after losing a Rulers
confidence. Legislation has been rejected; senior public
appointments (including at the highest levels of the legal system)
have been changed because of royal opposition (Azlan Shah 1986;
Smith 1995: 205; Kobkua 2011: 346-347; 349-350; Lee 1995: 39
n.8). In Selangor, in 1992 the Ruler and the Menteri Besar clashed
over the nomination of individuals for royal titles a contest which
the Ruler won (Kobkua 2011: 351-352). In Kelantan, the last Sultan
made a number of seemingly-effective interventions in the political
process, including in 2002 (Kobkua 2011: 352-353; Harding 1996:
76).
What we know less about is the informal and often quiet
influence that the Rulers exercise. Former Lord President Raja
Azlan Shah has commented that one cannot deny the role played
by the Rulers behind the scene (1986: 79). It is well known, he
says, that in submitting a candidate for appointment as Menteri
Besar the party always takes into consideration his acceptability
to the Ruler. Party leaders, in fact, should be complimented for
their willingness to give in to avoid and to solve major
constitutional crises with Rulers (81). In some instances, Rulers
have communicated their moral confidence in speaking of the
exercise of such influence. While the king acts on the advice of
the head of government, explains the now Sultan Azlan Shah,
he should not grant any approval if the advice given does not
reflect justice. In the spirit of a constitutional monarch, he
adds, a king has a role in giving advice and opinion, offering
encouragement and motivation, and giving reminder and rebuke
(Kobkua 2011: 386n).
A royal moral authority is sometimes expressed in very public
ways. Just as the Council of Rulers can deliberate on major national
issues, so Rulers speak out on these matters. Over many decades,
speeches by Rulers at their own Birthday celebrations, and other
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Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation / 21
public events, have been reported in the media. In recent times,
the Sultan of Selangor has talked about corruption, emphasizing
the damage it does to the attractiveness of Malaysia for foreign
investors (Kobkua 2011: 380-381). The Sultan of Trengganu has
been a pioneer in establishing (and funding) the Sultan Mizan Royal
Foundation, which has parallels with the Royal Thai Foundation,
and is designed to alleviate poverty, undertake research and
publication on history, culture and religion, as well as promote
education and heritage crafts (Mohamed Anwar et al. 2009: 376,
396; Kobkua 2011: 399-400). Kobkua draws attention to the
particular contributions of the Raja Muda (Crown Prince) of Perak,
Raja Nazrin Shah, who has commented on such issues as judiciary
reform, national unity, the supremacy of the constitution, Islam,
the sanctity of citizenship for both Malays and non-Malays alike,
and of course, the role and significance of the monarchy in Malaysia
(Kobkua 2011: 381-382). The Raja Muda, who makes clear that
the Rulers do not seek executive power, has also spoken of them
as a source of reference in times of crisis among the rakyat
(Kobkua 2011: 385; Nazrin Shah 2011).
Tabling these decades of royal assertiveness and influence
is, first, a reminder that there is nothing new about the current
royal activism detailed in Kobkuas book. Such royal behaviour
might best be understood as an integral part of the Malaysian
governmental system. The role of the Rulers might not accord
with present-day notions of parliamentary democracy, but it is
strongly supported in influential quarters. A later Lord President,
Tun Haji Mohd. Salleh Abas, for instance, has commended the
idea of a Ruler taking action if a Menteri Besar is known to be
corrupt. Under such circumstances, he says, no Ruler could
be expected to remain silent, as he has a clear moral duty to perform
to protect the public (Mohd. Salleh 1986: 5). The presence of
strong royal sympathies in the wider community is alluded to again
by former Prime Minister Mahathir, in his comment this year that
politicians feel constrained because any overt show of disrespect
for the Malay Rulers would cause a lot of Malays to be resentful
to them (the politicians) (2011: 454).
Clashes between various Prime Ministers and monarchy,
however, are well-known and go back to the time of Tunku Abdul
Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 21
22 / Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation
Rahman (e.g. Kobkua 2011: 341, 387-388; Mahathir 2011: 453).
The Mahathir Government engaged in two quite dramatic attempts
to limit royal powers. First, there was the 1983 constitutional
crisis, when the King refused to sign government legislation that
would in particular affect the powers of both the Yang di-Pertuan
Agong and the State Rulers to block legislation. The atmosphere
was tense. Rallies were held on behalf of both Prime Minister and
Rulers and some Rulers even refused to fly the national flag.
Media articles supporting the Prime Minister ridiculed the Sultans
and their dynasties (Milner 1991: 108). The eventual compromise
would seem to have offered some satisfaction to the Rulers. The
clauses of the Governments Amendment which were designed to
limit the powers of State Rulers were dropped, and the limits on
the powers of the King were softened. The King, it is true, can
now only delay rather than block legislation, but he has the
opportunity to contribute to the legislative process by giving his
reasons for delay (where the Bill is not a money Bill). Also, in the
view of H.P. Lee, the King might even have obtained an enhanced
role at a time when the Government fails to obtain a two-thirds
majority (Lee 1995: 32-33).
In 1992, the Mahathir Government tackled royal legal
immunity. For the Government in Kobkuas words the
unspoken buzzword seemed to be control (2011: 364). The 1957
Constitution had stated that the King shall not be liable to any
proceedings whatsoever in any court and that no court proceedings
could be brought against the Ruler of a State in his personal
capacity (Gillen 1994: 7). The Government now proposed
constitutional amendments that would limit the Rulers personal
legal immunity, and also their powers of pardon, and in addition
qualify the restrictions on freedom of expression with respect to
accusations against a Ruler. A special court would also be created
to deal with cases involving Rulers.
The Rulers refused to consent to these constitutional changes,
and a public struggle then took place, with the Government drawing
attention to a list of allegations against Rulers (Kobkua 2011: 361),
while opponents of the changes including the Opposition Parti
Semangat 46 insisted that the whole institution of monarchy was
in danger. Eventually, the Rulers agreed to compromise. A Special
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Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation / 23
Court was created to try cases concerning a Ruler but proceedings
may only be taken against a Ruler in his private capacity (Harding
1996: 78). The compromise included the provision that a Ruler
charged with an offence in the proposed special court would cease
to exercise his functions as Ruler. Also, if convicted and sentenced
to more than one days imprisonment, he would cease to be the
Ruler of the State (Gillen 1994: 15). One legal specialist has
described these modifications as relatively minor (16), but
presumably they were aimed at insuring the continued sovereignty
of the Ruler, in institutional if not personal terms. Andrew Harding
has judged that in this 1992 crisis, the standing of the Rulers
was considerably reduced (1996: 79). As we have noted,
however, Kobkuas new book speaks of a current socio-cultural
revival of monarchy, and there has been plenty of other evidence
that royal assertion of power so evident in the 1940s and 1950s,
and in later decades has continued in the last few years.
Thinking back in particular to the comments of the former
Lord Presidents and Prime Ministers, I am reminded again of the
extra-constitutional dimension of monarchy the sovereignty,
prerogatives, powers and jurisdiction of the Rulers that is limited
by but not defined in the Constitution. Did the constitutional
reforms of 1984 and 1992, one might ask, have a significant impact
on this extra-constitutional authority, or on that informal influence
that allows Rulers at times to play a critical part in key public
appointments and even decisions? What this discussion of power
brings home, I think, is that the current royal activism in Malaysia
is nothing new. Even in the colonial period there is plenty of
evidence of Rulers taking initiatives to influence public policy.
They were far from passive in the face of British determination to
impose the Malayan Union and they were strategic and effective
in the deliberations that led to the Merdeka Constitution. Since
Independence, Rulers have made many decisive interventions in
the political process and their continuing, informal influence in
public affairs is strongly attested to. To use Kobkuas phrase again,
proactive and participating constitutional rulers are not a new
phenomenon. They are an established feature of the Malaysian
governmental system.
Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 23
24 / Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation
Ideology
In considering this exercise of royal power I come back again and
again to the question of what this kingship really is. The term
power often seems inadequate. Kobkuas analysis makes this
plain, but she does not develop the discussion. She does not focus
on the idea of kingship and how it may have changed over time. At
one point Kobkua writes of the decline of the powers and position
of the Malay monarchs during the British period (2011: 85); at
another she refers to the foundation of traditional Ruler-subjects
relations having survived under the British residential system
(Kobkua 2011: 114). The foundation, then, is something distinct
from powers and she goes on to say this foundation was
undermined during the Japanese period (114). By foundation, I
think she is referring here to the socio-cultural role the institution
of the Ruler played in the life of the royal subject, and it is certainly
difficult to sum this up in terms of the quantification of power. A
British official in 1927 may have been thinking along similar lines
when he observed that the Rulers were a real and to my mind
essential asset. But for the Rulers, he suggested, the Malays
would become a mob (Ghosh 1977: 304). Similarly, at one point
Tunku Abdul Rahman argued that without the protecting influence
of these Rulers the Malays would lose whatever semblance of
belonging they might have in the land of their birth (cited in
Kobkua 2011: 264n). Again, much more is going on in this sentence
than a consideration of degrees of political power.
Academic analysis over the last few decades has reminded
us of the social and cultural significance of monarchy in Southeast
Asia and elsewhere in the world stressing in some cases that
even when the Ruler himself/herself may seem weak, the royal
institution can be vitally important in the life of the community
(e.g. Geertz 1980; Milner 1982: Thongchai 1994; Fujitani 1998;
Drakard 1999; Cannadine 2001; Day 2002; Peleggi 2002; Bellah
2003). The Emperor of post-Meiji Restoration Japan, for instance,
lived above the clouds leaving others to exercise real power
but he was also understood to be the axis of the state (Bellah
2003: 34-35; Fujitani 1998: chapter 6). In the Malaysian case the
view has already been noted that a sultan of pre-colonial times
Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 24
Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation / 25
often did not exercise pre-eminent power. We will examine the
character of this pre-modern kingship, but what I also wish to stress
is the far-reaching change that has taken place in Malaysian
monarchy over the last 200 years. It is misleading, I will suggest,
to speak of monarchy today as a traditional institution. It has
pre-colonial features, but also quite modern (certainly colonial-
period) dimensions. It is a complex institution, but its complexity
may be helpful in considering how useful monarchy might be in
the future planning of this country. Let us consider, therefore, just
a few dimensions of the kingship or kingdom that operated on the
Peninsula in say, 1800. My observations are based primarily on
the writings produced in the royal courts, supplemented sometimes
by descriptions from foreigner outsiders.
In certain cases, Rulers did give the impression of exercising
considerable power; often they did not. But the social and what
we might today call the psychological significance of the monarch
was fundamental. The word that most approximated to kingdom
was kerajaan, and it meant literally the condition of having a
raja. The Ruler was the linchpin of the community. He was the
head of religion in his community; custom (adat) was said to rest
in his hands. The laws of the polity were seen to come down to
us via the ruling family (Milner 2002: 148). The politys
historical writings constructed the past in the idiom of the raja
and his genealogical heritage. The subject the rakyat seems to
have been conceptualized almost as a part of the Raja. A
community without a Ruler was said to be in a condition of utter
confusion (huru-hara). The maxim the Ruler and subject can never
be divided, it might be argued, possesses a literal truth within the
kerajaan ideology (Gullick 1965; Milner 1982; Milner 2011:
chapter 3).
This observation is underlined too when we consider that the
Ruler was a Ruler a focus of community and identity in himself
not the Ruler of a state, a territorially-defined state. He did not
describe himself in his letters, for instance, as the Sultan of Perak.
The rakyat was the subject of a Ruler not a State. The kerajaan
was conceptualized in terms of the personal relationship between
Ruler and rakyat not Ruler and a specific race and foreigners
were often surprised by how uninterested Rulers seemed in the
Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 25
26 / Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation
physical dimensions of their kingdom. In this kerajaan paradigm
for all its lack of stress on geographic definition the various
hierarchical relations between ruler and subject were carefully
defined in the position a subject took at ceremonies or the clothes
he or she wore. Status was determined in relation to the Ruler, and
some court writings convey the assumption that status in this world
(nama, pangkat) could influence ones fortunes in the hereafter
(Milner 2011: chapter 3).
Such Rulers have been denigrated by outsiders and by
historians for their preoccupation with mere ceremony (see
citations in Milner 2002: chapter 1). This observation conveys a
total misunderstanding as does the downplaying of the
significance of ceremony in a good deal of invention of tradition
writing (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). If we understand ceremony
as the defining of the status of the subject the marking out of
hierarchies then it was fundamental to the kerajaan, as important
as the policing of territorial borders and state citizenship today. A
Rulers involvement in ceremony was in fact called his work
(kerja), and the correct performance of ceremony (including the
naming, addressing and positioning of a Rulers subjects) was a
vital concern. It is not surprising that the court texts of the old
kingdoms often praised a Raja in terms of his perfect manners, his
refined speech his capacity to treat people appropriately (Drakard
1990: 78; Milner 1982: 41). Also, in the reported negotiations (in
the Malay Annals) between a famous Ruler and his new subjects,
the specific request made by the latter is that they should never be
reviled with evil words (Winstedt 1938: 56-57). This concern
for ceremony (and language), then, is far more than theatre. When
the anthropologist, Clifford Geertz employed the expression
Theatre State (1980), he was successful in capturing how a
kerajaan-type polity might appear to an outsider. Theatre is a
useful metaphor. But from the inside, the kerajaan was about
something more earnest than theatre: today we might say it was
about identity.
The concern for ceremony for the public defining and
ordering of the Rulers subjects also had implications for
economic life. Within a kerajaan hierarchy, material wealth had
to be aligned with status. Sumptuary laws controlled the way people
Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 26
Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation / 27
of one status or another might be housed or clothed. Wealth was
conceived as flowing from the Ruler, as a product of patronage.
Wealth was not seen as an end in itself, but one way of accumulating
subjects. In this kerajaan economics, the accumulation of
independent, private wealth was perceived by the royal court as a
political threat, and was necessarily discouraged among the Rulers
rakyat. It is thus not surprising to find that sultans were often
described by foreigners as the great traders in their polities, or that
foreigners sometimes complained about the plundering of would-
be rich subjects by the Rajas men. They did not understand that
the aligning of status and material wealth in the kerajaan was a
duty of the Ruler (Milner 2003[a]).
When we think about the kingdom or kerajaan of 1800 in
these terms, it seems to me that it is just not tenable to assert, as
Kobkua does, that the foundation of traditional Ruler-subjects
relations was maintained during the colonial period; or to stress,
as Roger Kershaw has done, the importance of continuity of the
monarchy itself (2001: 18; see also Roff 1994: 256; Muhammad
Kamil 1998: 314). Elements survived as I will suggest; but the
ancien regime came under sustained attack, and the royal courts
themselves undertook far-reaching, ideological renovation. I have
written in the past about this transformation of Malaysian monarchy
(Milner 2003) and about the importance of acknowledging the
occurrence of epistemic rupture in Malaysian and other history
(2002) but should emphasise here that the British brought to the
Malay Peninsula powerful new concepts of state, government, race,
progress, time and so forth. They endorsed a new, colonial
knowledge and this knowledge project has attracted much
scholarly interest (e.g. Shamsul 1998; Milner 2002). Within a few
decades the royal courts were employing the new thinking to
remodel the sultanate. In Johor and Perak, for instance, they began
to constitute the state as a specific territorial entity. Surveying or
mapping of territory was important in this and described as a
novel enterprise in court-related writings of the time. In Johor a
state constitution was created (in 1895), and an interesting aspects
of this text is the way it translates constitution as undang-undang
tuboh kerajaan. The word tuboh conveys body, in the anatomical
sense. The constitution seems therefore to be conceptualized as
Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 27
28 / Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation
giving body to the kerajaan, and presumably the State of Johor.
In this way it becomes possible to think of the state as an entity
independent of the Ruler a truly revolutionary transition, at least
from the perspective of the old kerajaan ideology (Milner 2002:
215-216).
In such a state the Ruler could no longer be the linchpin,
the centre around which all else is articulated. The ceremonies
that define the Ruler-subject relation also had to lose some of their
urgency. In certain ways ceremonies were actually elaborated
during the colonial period (partly under the influence of British
royal practice) (Gullick 1987: 33, 347; Gullick 1992: 236), but
they could not have the meaning they once possessed. One Malay
author in 1925 noted that nowadays the royal ceremonial and
sumptuary regulations are fading (cited in Milner 2003: 183).
The Rulers work was to move into new areas: he began to be
praised in new ways, judged for the contribution he made to his
State. In texts from early 20
th
century Johor and Perak, Rulers
were now complimented for introducing modern institutions, for
modernizing education, for improving the lives of their
subjects, for caring for the different races in their State, and for
helping to unite the Malay race. They were praised for being
careful and conscientious in their administration. Such key terms
or expressions as government, modernity, and administrative
diligence and energy and soon development and progress
begin to contribute to a new royal discourse, and to challenge the
dominance of a language concerned largely about ceremonial,
custom, language, manners and status (Milner 2003; Milner 2002:
chapters 8 and 9).
As represented in the new royal court writings, the Rulers of
the late 19
th
and early 20
th
century were impressive administrators
and often subtle diplomats. They were reformers, claiming
leadership of their State community (with its component races) in
a time of challenge a time when the Rulers had to deal with
British administrative and ideological demands, new religious
thinking from the Middle East, and increasing immigration
numbers. There is a suggestion here of a performance-based
monarchy some royal texts could now be read almost as election
manifestos. These new Rulers, the product of a fresh epistemic
Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 28
Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation / 29
era, may not have had the same pivotal, ideological role in their
subjects lives and mentality as their kerajaan predecessors
possessed. But in considering Kobkuas claim that there is currently
in Malaysia an attempt to revive the monarchs role giving
Rulers active participation in the affairs of the nation (xxiii)
the story of the reconstruction of Malayan monarchy during the
colonial period is vital. To a large extent the new participating
constitutional monarchs, whom Kobkua describes as gaining
support today, are the heirs not of the traditional rajas or sultans
of 1800, but of the colonial period, new Rulers.
It is for this reason that we should be wary of using the word
traditional in reference to Malaysian monarchs today (Muhammad
Kamil 1998: 314), or of placing too much stress on the continuity
of the institution. During the colonial period, the Rulers could not
be said to have maintained their position at the very centre of all
aspects of life in the state (Kobkua 2011: 85-86). Their centrality
at the end of that time was by no means the centrality they held in
1800. What we can ask, however, is whether there ways in which
that old kerajaan ideology continues to shape modern Malaysia?
Does it assist us to understand the sovereignty, prerogatives,
powers and jurisdiction of the Rulers which the Federal
Constitution promises to respect? Does it throw light on the
informal power or influence which Rulers are reported as exercising
in matters of state? Such questions bring us back to an issue raised
in my first Pok Rafeah lecture whether we should now accept
that colonial knowledge is the real baseline knowledge for
modern Malaysia (Shamsul 1998: 49), or are some concepts from
the pre-colonial era still potent? The historian, Muhammad Yusoff
Hashim, has suggested that the element of spirituality in royal
sovereignty today only exists as a belief amongst a small section
of the community (1991: 281). Few are likely to fear the
supernatural wrath of the Rulers daulat. But when Tunku Abdul
Rahman wrote of the semblance of belonging which the Rulers
continue to give their people, then we do get a sense of the 1800
Ruler as linchpin, holding a defining role in his community. We
do so again, when the Raja Muda of Perak refers today to the
unifying role of monarchy, and its capacity to provide a sense of
historical identity and continuity (Smith 2006: 134; Kobkua 2011:
Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 29
30 / Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation
384). I shall return to the issue of precisely how unifying that
monarchical role can be.
Before probing further the matters of unity and identity,
however, it should be noted that the influence today of the old
kerajaan ideology is not necessarily restricted to the possible
shaping of current conceptualizations of monarchy. What
sometimes is termed feudal thinking has been seen to influence
attitudes to political authority in general. Syed Hussain Alatas
(1972), Chandra Muzaffar (1979), Shaharuddin Maaruf (1984) and
Clive Kessler (1992) all pioneers in this line of investigation
have examined the impact of royal tradition in shaping attitudes
toward loyalty, followership, heroism and ceremony. In my own
work, I have been interested in the influence of old kerajaan ideas
on current Malay approaches to entrepreneurialism, so-called
money politics, top-down political leadership, the concept of the
plural society, and the manner in which the bangsa Melayu has
been propagated as a focus of identity and loyalty (Milner 2011:
chapters 7 and 8; Milner 2003a; see also Johnson and Milner 2005).
The continuing importance of reputation (nama, and related terms)
in Malay thinking seems also to warrant closer attention (Karim
1992: 7).
In the case of modern monarchy itself, the old kerajaan
influence is to be encountered naturally in the continued
prominence of royal titles and royal ceremonies in Malaysia by
most international standards, this country really is marked by its
elaborate monarchialism but perhaps most of all, I would suggest,
in the depicting of Rulers as a focus of identity and community.
Former Lord President Salleh Abas calls the King, the Yang di-
Pertuan Agong, a symbol of unity (1986: 4). The Ruler of Pahang
has been described as a symbol of the unity of the people of his
State (Shariff Ahmad 1983: xvii, 32). Symbol (simbol) is a
relatively new word, and its use here is a reminder of how far
removed we are today from the kerajaan of 1800. The kerajaan
Ruler of that time was not conceived a symbol his claim was to
be the real basis of unity, the actual centre around which all else
was articulated. But the claim to symbolic unity is still a strong
one, and the question I wish to turn to now is how comprehensive
is this unity which the Ruler is expected to promote. It can be
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Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation / 31
argued, I think, that the kerajaan ideology was race blind: how far
has modern Malaysian monarchy, we might ask, inherited that
aspect of the old tradition?
Malay Rulers or Rulers?
Time and again we encounter the words Malay Rulers. Kobkua
uses the expression herself in the title of her book. But although
she often points to the specific role of monarchy with respect to
the Malay community and calls the Rulers the living symbols
of Malay sovereignty (393) she does note the way the present
Sultan of Selangor has stressed that Malaysia belongs to all
Malaysians (387), and the insistence by the Raja Muda of Perak
that monarchy has the capacity to give both Malays and non-Malays
a sense of common identity (384). The tension here between Ruler
and Malay Ruler, given the anxiety about national unity in modern
Malaysia, should not be neglected in the discussion of the ideology
of monarchy in this country. I introduced this issue in my first Pok
Rafeah Chair Public Lecture (Milner 2011[a]), and will examine
it in further detail here.
If we go back to pre-colonial times again, I think there is a
case for speaking of Rulers though monarchy is very often
assumed to be in historical terms essentially Malay (see Nazrin
Shah 2004: 17; Mahathir 2011: 100). It is, in fact, particularly in
the British era that monarchy began increasingly to be constituted
as Malay. Before that time, the term Malay, as far as I can see,
was not actually used by the Archipelago people to describe the
range of polities on Sumatra, the Peninsula and Borneo which were
so often called Malay in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
I have argued recently that the use of the expression Malay world
is misleading for the pre-colonial period, and it might be more
accurate to speak of a kerajaan world or the Archipelago
sultanates (Milner 2011: chapter 4).
Considering first the specifically social identity of the rulers
themselves, the Melaka royal line claims descent from Alexander
the Great; the Sultan of Deli in Sumatra traces his genealogy back
to an Indian who had earlier been an official in the sultanate of
Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 31
32 / Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation
Aceh; and the Rulers of Pontianak and Perlis possess Arab origins.
Even in the clothing they wore, rulers displayed a flexibility
regarding ethnic identification. In the early nineteenth century,
Johor ruler Husain dressed his sons in Tamil fashion, wearing
wide trousers and Indian gowns (Abdullah 2009: 275); and Sultan
Abdul Hamid of Kedah (1882-1943) almost invariably wore
western-style suites in preference to Malay dress, though on
ceremonial occasions he tended to dress in a Siamese-style uniform
(Sheppard 2007: 4; 8-9). With respect to high officials in the
kerajaan, at the opening of the seventeenth century the Dutch
Admiral Matelieff reported that a Peguan (from present-day
Burma) was one of the highest councilors to the Ruler of Kedah
(Commelin 1969: 46). An eighteenth-century Kedah ruler had as
his Kings merchant, a deep cunning villainous Chuliah, who
was given the title Datoo Sri Raja (Steuart 1901: 15, 18). In
mid-nineteenth century Kedah the ruler gave a noble title to a Hakka
leader, who was accorded a high place on State Functions
(Gullick 1992: 372-373); later in the century Kedahs Sultan Abdul
Hamid appointed a well-known and much-respected Chinese
businessman as State Treasurer, with a royal office sited in
an extension to the palace (Sheppard 2007: 4-5). In Pahang about
the same time, a Tamil Indian was the treasurer and tax
collector (Gullick 1965: 52), and earlier in the nineteenth-century,
Johor Sultan Husain had an influential Indian advisor called Abdul
Kadir bin Ahmad Sahib, who was given the title Tengku Muda
and sometimes dressed in the Tamil manner, and sometimes in
Malay attire (Abdullah 209: 275).
As to the subjects of the rulers, they tended to be described
just as rakyat rather than as members of races or ethnic groups.
The self-classification Malay used to refer to a trans-sultanate
racial unity is a relatively modern innovation in Island Southeast
Asia. Its growing use was particularly influenced by the propagation
of European thinking about race from the end of the 18
th
century
Milner 2011: chapters 4 and 5). The term Malay, of course, had
long been associated with the Melaka polity, and the sultanates
connected with Melaka, but the idea of a specific Malay race a
race with which one identifies, and to which one owes loyalty
was something that emerged primarily in the colonial period. The
Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 32
Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation / 33
subjects of the pre-colonial Ruler would in some situations identify
with a geographic location, usually a river calling themselves,
for instance, orang Kemaman or orang Muar; but the larger
community with which they identified was not a race but a specific
kerajaan. It was possible to live outside the kerajaan; and I have
suggested elsewhere that the formation of communities from China
in particular communities that lived separately from the Rulers
subjects, and did not operate by kerajaan rules in their social and
economic lives are in a sense a precursor of the plural society
configuration that was consolidated in colonial Malaya (Milner
2003a). Nevertheless, the kerajaan itself does not appear to have
been conceptualized in specifically racial or ethnic terms.
Even in the British period many subjects of rulers on the
Peninsula continued to call themselves Minangkabau, Bugis,
Baweyan or Javanese. Apart from Orang Asli and others,
Chinese might also be subjects of a ruler. We continue to see this
in the colonial period, when people of many backgrounds were
either British subjects (if born in Melaka or Penang) or a subject
of a Ruler (Mohamed Suffian 1972: 207; Emerson 1964: 509).
They continued to be considered subjects of rulers right up to the
period of nation-state building following the Second World War
(Ratnam 1965: 72). In a 1931, legal case involving a Chinese man
(Ho Chick Kwan), whom the British wanted the Sultan of Selangor
to banish, Ho was described as a natural born subject of the Ruler
of the State of Negri Sembilan, and his adopted mother (Lui Ho)
described herself as owing true allegiance to His Highness the
Sultan of Selangor (Ho Chick Kwan v The Honble British
Resident Selangor, criminal appeal no. 11 of 1931).
British racializing of the Sultanates was evident even in the
early 19
th
century, when the official British presence was limited
to Penang. Thomas Stamford Raffles and John Leiden at that
time planning Britains future role in the Archipelago
conceptualized the different Sultanates as members of a general
Malay league that might be placed under the protection of a
British governor (Raffles 1991: 25). When British intervened
administratively in the Peninsular Sultanates, commencing with
Perak in 1874, they identified a special Malay responsibility for
the Rulers. The new British advisers or Residents were to be
Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 33
34 / Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation
powerful, but the areas of Malay Religion and Custom were to
be left to the Rulers (Gullick 1992: 2). British officials also
cooperated with the Sultans in the formulation of policies
specifically designed to benefit The Malay Race in the FMS, to
quote the title of a memo written in 1906 (Burns 1971: 5).
Pronouncements from the royal courts themselves in the
colonial period, it should be noted, continued to stress the
responsibility of the Ruler toward all his subjects. An early 20
th
century Johor text the Hikayat Johor lauds Johors Sultan Abu
Bakar (1885-1895) for looking after the Chinese subjects living
in the state. There is also mention of Chinese and Indians
welcoming him home from an overseas journey (Milner 2002: 214).
In a later Perak coronation document, again we see a Ruler reaching
out to non-Malays, stressing in a speech that he had not forgotten
the help that other races in the state had given in making Perak
wealthy and prosperous. At the coronation itself, not only Malays
but also Chinese, Ceylonese, Indians and Japanese made formal
declarations of loyalty to the new Ruler. Sultan Abdul Aziz, so the
text stresses, does not distinguish between his subjects (Milner
2002: 243-244).
In a valuable, somewhat left-wing account of British Malaya
on the eve of the Japanese invasion, the activist Ibrahim Yaacob
referred to a Kelantan Ruler bestowing a prestigious title on a
Chinese merchant and observed that the Johor state council building
looked like a Chinese audience hall because it was decorated with
Chinese writing. When Ibrahim Yaacob asked what the writing
was about, he was told that it recorded the personal service of
wealthy Chinese people to the Ruler (Milner 2002: 261). Ibrahim
was sympathetic neither to Rulers nor to the influx of Chinese and
Indians, whom he saw as pressuring the Malays in economic and
other areas (263). He would have known that Rulers could form
alliances with these groups. John Gullick, in his detailed historical
research on the Rulers in the colonial period, has described how
business activities with both Chinese and Europeans tended to draw
Rulers into the non-Malay, official and business world, which
was beginning, by the 1920s if not before, to dominate Malaya
(1992: 213-214; 131 n. 125). Apart from provoking Ibrahim Yaacob,
this personal experience would have reinforced a Rulers sincerity
Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 34
Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation / 35
in thanking these races for the help they gave to making his State
wealthy and prosperous.
Despite such royal affirmations of inclusiveness, however,
the royal courts were also positioning themselves with respect to
the Malay movement. The Hikayat Johor, mentioned above,
stresses the Sultans special concern for his subjects of the Malay
race (Milner 2003: 179); the later Perak text indicates the Perak
Rulers concern about uniting our race (bangsa), and about the
Malays being left behind by other races in the development of
the Perak state (Milner 2002: 242-243). There is a claim to
leadership being conveyed in such statements, and it should be
understood in the context of a general royal wariness. The Rulers
appear to have understood well that those promoting the bangsa
Melayu were advocating a focus of identity and loyalty that could
compete with monarchy; race also carries an implicit egalitarianism
that has the potential to rival the essential hierarchy of monarchy.
It is certainly the case that some prominent advocates of race
proponents of the bangsa Melayu right back to Abdullah bin
Abdul Kadir in the early 19
th
century, were determined critics of
specific Rulers and even of the institution of monarchy (Milner
2002: 15; Ibrahim Yaacob 1941: 6, 58).
Ibrahim Yaacobs pre-War survey of British Malaya refers to
royal opposition to the Malay movement. Some royal courts held
firmly to the old feeling and strongly oppose the new desire to
unify the Malay people. In Kedah, members of the ruling elite
had opposed the formation of a Malay association on the ground
that Kedah possesses a raja; in Perak royal opposition initially
discouraged the use of the term Malay in the name of an
association intended to promote unity (Milner 2002: 269-270). In
Selangor, there was certainly a Selangor Malay Association, but
it was led by a member of royalty and was utterly deferential toward
the ruler (Smith 2006: 128). Looking to sultanates beyond the
Peninsula, D.E.Browns study of Brunei notes that Sultanates
suspicion of ethnic distinctions, and the insistence that all
indigenous groups enjoyed the common status of subject of the
Sultan (Brown 1970: 4, 9). In mid-20
th
-century East Sumatra, it
was reported that the kerajaan leadership (in such sultanates as
Deli, Langkat and Asahan) never cared for the suku Melayu (the
Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 35
36 / Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation
Malay ethnic group), fearing competition from potentially-
influential Malay associations (Ariffin Omar 1993: 78).
How best then to handle the growing Malay movement?
Discourage it, or position oneself in a leadership role? These were
questions Rulers faced. It was in the immediate post-war years, in
the struggle against the Malayan Union, that they were pressed
most strongly to identify with the Malay movement. At that time
more than ever before, it can be argued, monarchy was racialized.
The Japanese Occupation had sharpened further the tension
between Malays and Chinese in particular, and the movement
against the Malayan Union was perceived to be fundamentally
Malay. The Rulers, as suggested already, were far from passive
in the struggle against the British, and Daulat Tuanku (Power to
the Ruler) continued to be a rallying cry (Stockwell 1979: 71).
But Cheah Boon Kheng (1988) and Ariffin Omar (1993) have
demonstrated how strongly Malayism began to compete with
monarchy in the process of the Malayan Union debate, and how
popular the declaration Hidup Melayu (Long Live the Malays)
became. While some Sultans continued to take the Malay
movement head on we have noted the determination of the Kedah
Ruler to eradicate(e) UMNO influence from his State the Sultan
of Pahang spoke of we Malays and the Sultan of Perak declared
that he spoke as a Malay not as a Sultan (Ariffin 1993: 104).
In the period leading up to Independence, at the time the
Rulers were determined to help shape the constitution for the new
nation, they also took pains to advocate a range of Malay causes.
They spoke up on such topics as Asian immigration, Malay land
reserves, and the protection of Malay economic interests (Kobkua
2011: 149-150, 152). In 1951, during the Malayan Emergency
when the British were concerned to improve the living conditions
for Chinese who might potentially join the terrorists the Rulers
warned that it is very essential to reassure the Malays that they
are not being neglected and forgotten (Smith 1995: 111, 113, 116).
In these and other ways the Rulers presented themselves (in
Kobkuas words) as credible and respectable champions and
guardians of the Malays (183).
The 1957 Federal Constitution itself conveys the impression
of allocating the Rulers a specific Malay role. In Article 153 (1),
Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 36
Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation / 37
the King is given the responsibility to safeguard the special
position of the Malay (and natives of Sabah and Sarawak), and
also the legitimate interests of other communities. This might
appear ethnically even-handed, but public focus has tended to be
placed on the Malay dimension probably because the establishing
of the Malay special privileges is often considered the most
unusual feature of the Malaysian Constitution (Harding 2007:
120). The amendments to the Constitution in 1971 (which I have
already discussed from another angle) reinforced the impression
of a privileged Ruler-Malay community linkage, in that any change
to the Malay special position requires the consent of the Conference
of Rulers, as well as a two-thirds parliamentary majority. The
stress on Malay interests rather than the interests of other
communities in discussing this royal power (see, for example,
Malaysian Mirror, 21 October 2010) is not helpful to the promotion
of royal inclusiveness. Nor is the fact that press statements on this
issue, issued by the Conference of Rulers, tend to refer to the
Rulers only as Malay Rulers (Kobkua 2011: 424-426).
The racializing the Malayizing of the Rulers can be
seen in many other areas in the post-War public discourse of
Malaysia. It takes place when Rulers are described as the symbol
or cement assisting to hold the Malay race or racial feeling
together (Ariffin 1993: 53, 102; ); or (in the 1980s) when the senior
Malaysian legal official, Tun Haji Mohd. Salleh bin Abas, writes
of Malay rulership as the nub of Malay custom (1986: 13).
The racializing is happening again in current school history texts,
which describe all the old Peninsular sultanates as kerajaan
Melayu despite the fact that none of the early royal court writings
use the phrase, and in these writings the term Melayu would
appear to be linked essentially to Melaka and sultanates closely
linked with the Melaka ruling family (Ahmad Fawzi 2010: 123,
129; Malay Concordance Project http://mcp.anu.edu.au/).
We also see the Malayizing of the Ruler in royal statements.
When the Sultan of Perak spoke as a Malay not as a Sultan, he
said too that we are Malays and must not lose our customs and
religious practices, which are our prized possessions (Ariffin 1993:
104). Customs and religion which in the past, as I have noted,
were presented as being in the hands of the ruler (Milner 2002:
Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 37
38 / Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation
101) would now appear to have been recognized by the Ruler
himself as being grounded in the Malay race. The point is made
with even more clarity in a coronation document of 1971 from the
royal court of Pahang. Here the Pahang monarchys customs and
ceremonial which once would have been of vital importance
merely because they were royal customs and ceremonial are now
presented as significant because they are a branch of Malay
culture and a reflection of the national characteristics of the
Malay people (bangsa Melayu) (Anon 1971; see also Milner
2003b: 188-189).
Trans-Racial Residue
Although the Rulers are referred to frequently as Malay Rulers
even, as I have said, in pronouncements from the Conference of
Rulers it must also be said that the residue of an earlier trans-
racial substance has survived. Looking back half a century, we see
this residue when the Rulers favoured a multilingual system of
school education, and not just the learning of Malay and English
(Kobkua 2011: 216); or when Chinese people recall that in May
1969 at a time of acute inter-racial crisis the Sultan of
Terengganu and other Rulers took steps to protect their non-Malay
subjects. We see it in a different sphere when new Malay
commoner entrepreneurs express resentment at having to compete
in business with Rulers who act through Chinese intermediaries
(Kobkua 2011: 364). There is an important political gesture toward
the trans-racial again in a special press statement from the
Conference of Rulers in October 2008. Here the Rulers explain
that the institution of the Rulers is a protective umbrella ensuring
impartiality among the citizens. The statement explains the Rulers
constitutional role respecting the so-called Social Contract
between Malays and non-Malays, and assures non-Malays that
there is no need to harbour any apprehension or worry over their
genuine rights (Kobkua 2011: 425-426).
To be even-handed in politics or business is important in
reaching beyond the Malaysian race divide, but perhaps even more
important is evidence that the institution of monarchy itself can
Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 38
Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation / 39
still be racially-blind. The fact that the Federal Constitution itself
uses the term Rulers not Malay Rulers (though the present-day
Constitutions of the different States require Rulers to be Malay)
(Legal Research 1998) ought to be reason for optimism. It is also
a positive sign when a Sultan is described by his supporters in
the case of Pahang as a symbol of the unity of the people
(rakyat) (and not just the Malay race, or bangsa) (Shariff Ahmad
1983: xvii, 32); or, in the case of Kelantan, as the umbrella
sheltering the people (rakyat) (Mohd. Zain Saleh 1987: 14; also,
in Perak, Nazrin Shah 2011). The term rakyat used again by the
Sultan of Selangor when he speaks of his States citizens,
regardless of ethnic background and faith (New Straits Times, 7
Jan 2011) may convey to some a memory of feudal times, but it
is without doubt racially inclusive. It denotes now as it did 200
years ago a community bonded together through subjecthood.
Here we might return to the matter of ceremony. In pre-
colonial times, as we have seen, ceremony titles, sumptuary laws,
elaborate and lengthy public ceremonies was vital in defining
the kerajaan hierarchy, giving each person a place. Today, policing
by the immigration and citizenship administration of the nation
state is the first concern. Nevertheless, the Malaysian community
as I have noted continues to be characterized by formalized
hierarchy and public ritual. Nine Rulers, an elaborate structure of
Tun, Tan Sri, Dato Sri and Dato, and vast numbers of lower awards
and medals such an array of titles and distinctions, combined
with an immensely busy calendar of public occasions and
celebrations at Federal and State level, all convey this striking
monarchialism. And just as the word rakyat conveys both
hierarchy and inclusiveness, so the royal ceremony has a capacity
to bond. The birthday celebrations for the different Rulers are
perhaps the time when the continued trans-racial character of
monarchy is most evident. Thus, at the Sultan of Peraks
Celebration in April 2011 the recipients of the high honours
included a leading businessman whose father was Goanese and a
wide range of Chinese and Indian people from academia, the
media and the arts, as well as the business community (Chandra
Sagaran, Sultan heads Perak honours list, New Straits Times, 19
April 2011).
Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 39
40 / Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation
I am speaking here of course of the bonding of the nation:
an issue that has been of central concern in a research project under
way at IKMAS this year. In taking note of the great tenacity of the
race-based societal paradigm in Malaysia, we have examined a
series of attempts to introduce alternative social concepts that might
transcend race. These attempts typically turn out to become
entangled in racial or communal thinking. In considering the
historical heritage of ideas in this country, in fact, the old kerajaan
turns out to be one of the few societal paradigms that have a claim
to the attention of those hoping to build a more inclusive Malaysia.
In the last century, as I have discussed, monarchy has become
embroiled in race issues, but it also contains an ideological residue
if we can disassemble ideology in that way that is racially
inclusive or, perhaps more accurately, racially blind.
Conclusion
In this lecture, I have examined monarchy, first, in terms of the
power rulers have wielded over time. I noted here that in post-
Independence Malaysia the proactive and participating
constitutional (of whom Kokbua writes) are not a recent
development; they have been more or less the norm. Whether or
not this conforms to the principles of Westminster democracy, such
a monarchical role seems to be an established part of the system in
this country. Secondly, I have suggested that in ideological terms
modern monarchy is a fundamentally different institution from
the kerajaan polity of some 200 years ago. The heirs of the modern
participating constitutional rulers, I argue, are really the
performance-based administrator royals of the colonial period,
rather than the pre-colonial, traditional Sultans.
When we reach back to pre-colonial times to consider the
possible current relevance of the historical heritage, we see that
the importance of the kerajaan ruler did not rest on the wielding
of administrative power. In this sense, one might reflect, historical
origins provide no particular justification for authoritarianism.
Nevertheless, the identity-giving function of the pre-colonial ruler
as the linchpin of his community in the most profound sense
Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 40
Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation / 41
does reinforce monarchys claim to present-day relevance. When
we think in socio-cultural terms, the great continuing theme of
monarchy in this country reaching back to the earliest Malay-
language records is its capacity to provide what one prominent
royal spokesman has referred to as social glue (Nazrin Shah
2004: 6).
In the final section of this lecture I have asked whether there
is historical support for believing that this unifying role of kingship
can transcend ethnic division. Here my analysis has diverged
somewhat from the views of others. I argue that Malaysias
monarchy is not in historical terms a narrowly Malay institution.
The stress on its Malayness is really a product of the colonial period
and the decolonization process. The kerajaan of pre-colonial times
was not racially defined in this way, and it could therefore provide
a solid foundation for giving monarchy today an even stronger
role in the bonding of the nation. Given the current importance of
identifying ideological substance that might support a 1Malaysia
vision, this is no mean claim.
Acknowledgment
I am grateful for advice from the following (though I have not
always taken their advice): Abdul Rahman Embong, Peter
Borschberg, Michael Coper, Philip Koh, Lee Kam Hing, Lee Poh
Ping, Claire Milner, Abdul Halim Ali, Mohd. Annuar Zaini, Ng
Tze Shiung and Helen Ting.
Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 41
4
Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 42
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Anthony Milner
Anthony Milner is the 4
th
holder of the Distinguished Pok Rafeah
Chair in International Studies at the Institute of Malaysian and
International Studies (IKMAS), Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia.
He is Basham Professor of Asian History at the Australian National
University, and a Professorial Fellow at the University of
Melbourne. He is a Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences
in Australia. His books on Southeast Asia include The Malays
(Wiley-Blackwell, 2008, revised, paperback edition, 2011; Czech
translation, 2010), The Invention of Politics in Colonial Malaya
(Cambridge University Press, 1995, revised, paperback edition,
2002), Kerajaan: Malay Political Culture on the Eve of Colonial
Rule (The Association for Asian Studies, 1982; Thai translation,
2008), and (co-ed) Southeast Asia in the 9th to 14th Centuries
(1986). His other publications include co-editing Australia in Asia
(3 volumes, Oxford University Press, 1996-2001) and Reviewing
the Orient; Artists, Scholars, Appropriations (Harwood Press,
1994).
Professor Milner has held visiting appointments at The
Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, the National University
of Singapore (as Raffles Visiting Professor of History), Tokyo
University of Foreign Studies and Humboldt University. He is
International Director and Board Member at Asialink, University
of Melbourne, and Co-Chair of the Australian Committee of the
Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific. He is a
member of the Advisory Council of the Australian Governments
Australia-Malaysia Institute and has held previous government
appointments on the Foreign Affairs Council and the Australia-
Thailand Institute, and as a Panel Member for the Australian
Research Council.
Professor Milners academic roles have included Dean of
Asian Studies at the Australian National University (1996-2005),
Member of the University Council (2000-2002), and Director of
Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 49
50 / Malaysian Monarchy and the Bonding of the Nation
the Australia-Asia Perceptions Project of the Academy of the Social
Sciences in Australia (1992-1995) as well as Chair of the
Research Committee of the Australian Institute of International
Affairs, Editor of the Asian Studies Review of the Asian Studies
Association of Australia, and Editor of the Southeast Asian
Publication Series of the same association.
His public lectures have included the Cunningham Lecture
(the annual lecture of the Academy of the Social Sciences in
Australia), the Golay Lecture (Cornell University), the Raffles
Lecture (National University of Singapore), and the Fourth Asia-
Pacific Lecture (Australian Broadcasting Commission). He
delivered The 7
th
Pok Rafeah Chair Public Lecture entitled,
Malaysias Dominant Societal Paradigm: Invented, Embedded,
Contested (Penerbit UKM, 2011) organised by the Institute of
Malaysian and International Studies (IKMAS), UKM on 27 January
2011.
Anthony Milner.pmd 06/08/32, 11:48 50

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