Safety History

of
International LNG Operations








Prepared by ~
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The LNG Specialists

Baltimore Office Houston Office
1341 Ashton Road, Suite A 1221 McKinney, Suite 3325
Hanover, MD 21076 Houston, TX 77010
410-691-9640 713-964-6775

CHIV International Document: TD-02109, Rev. 13
Originally Published: J uly 2, 2002
Date of Revision: March 2, 2014

LNG
LNG
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INTRODUCTION:

LNG (Li quefi ed Natural Gas) has been a vi abl e form of energy and safel y handl ed for
many years. The i ndustry i s not wi thout i ts i nci dents and acci dents, but i t mai ntai ns
an envi abl e modern-day
1
safety record. The process of natural gas l i quefacti on,
storage and vapori zati on i s not a new technol ogy. Earl i est patents i nvol vi ng
cryogeni c l i qui ds date back i nto the mi d-1800s. The fi rst patent di rectl y for LNG was
awarded i n 1914. I n 1939, the fi rst commerci al LNG peak-shavi ng pl ant was bui l t i n
West Vi rgi ni a. There are now over 120 peakshavi ng and LNG storage faci l i ti es
2

worl dwi de, some operati ng si nce the mi d-1960s. I n addi ti on, there are about 96
i mport (regasi fi cati on) termi nal s worl dwi de and more than 28 base-l oad l i quefacti on
(LNG export) faci l i ti es i n vari ous countri es i ncl udi ng Abu Dhabi , Al geri a, Angol a,
Austral i a, Brunei , Egypt, Equatori al Gui nea, I ndonesi a, I ran (2012), Li bya, Mal aysi a,
Ni geri a, Norway, Oman, Peru, PNG (2014), Qatar, Russi a, Tri ni dad, Y emen and U.S.
(Al aska) currentl y i n operati on. LNG i s transported by a fl eet of more than 360 LNG
Carri ers of varyi ng si zes from 7,500 M
3
(cubi c meter) to 265,000 M
3
. Thi s fl eet of
LNG shi ps del i vers to recei vi ng termi nal s i n countri es i ncl udi ng: Argenti na, Bel gi um,
Brazi l , Canada, Chi l e, Chi na, Domi ni can Republ i c, France, Greece, I ndi a, I tal y,
J apan, Korea, Kuwai t, Mexi co, Netherl ands, Portugal , Spai n, Tai wan, Thai l and,
Turkey, the U.K. and, of course, the U.S., i ncl udi ng Puerto Ri co. I n recent years
there are an ever i ncreasi ng number of LNG vehi cl e fuel i ng stati ons bei ng i nstal l ed
al ong the i nterstate hi ghway system to serve the Cl ass 8 Trucki ng i ndustry,
parti cul arl y i n the U.S. and Canada. Whi l e these faci l i ti es have fai rl y smal l quanti ti es
of LNG (10,000 to 20,000 gal l ons at each refuel i ng stati on) thi s means an i ncreasi ng
number of LNG trai l ers travel l i ng over the road to del i ver the LNG to an ever greater
number of l ocati ons. The near future l ooks to expand the use of LNG as a fuel for
l arge horsepower engi nes to i ncl ude the rai l roads and mari ne vessel s.

The l arger, l ow pressure LNG storage tanks at the export, i mport and peakshavi ng
faci l i ti es are typi cal l y constructed of an i nteri or cryogeni c contai ner, usual l y made of
9% ni ckel steel , stai nl ess steel , al umi num or other cryogeni c al l oy. The outsi de wal l
i s usual l y made of carbon steel or rei nforced concrete. A thi ck l ayer of an i nsul ati ng
materi al such as Perl i te or cel l ul ar gl ass bl ock separates the two wal l s.

For l and-based faci l i ti es; si ngl e contai nment tank desi gns have a secondary earthen or
concrete contai nment wi th a mi ni mum capaci ty exceedi ng the capaci ty of the LNG
tank(s), and surrounds the LNG tank(s). When a tal l concrete wal l havi ng an i nternal
di ameter sl i ghtl y greater than the outsi de wal l of the LNG tank, i s used, thi s i s known
as a doubl e contai nment desi gn for the LNG tank. When the outer tank wal l and roof
are of rei nforced concrete then the tank i s consi dered to be a ful l contai nment type.
For smal l er storage vol umes, vacuum j acketed bul l et type pressure vessel s l ocated

1
Modern Day Post mid-1950s - Cryogenic technologies came of age during the late 1950s and early 1960s with
the development of the U.S. space program where cryogenic fuels such as liquid hydrogen and liquid oxygen had
to be routinely and safely handled.
2
This does not include dozens of small LNG vehicle fueling stations and industrial LNG fuel facilities.
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above ground are used. I n al l cases, the obj ecti ve i s to mi ni mi ze the ri sks and
exposure of the publ i c associ ated wi th fai l ure of the LNG pri mary contai nment based
on a cat ast rophi c t ank f ai l ure
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scenari o. Many newer tanks are equi pped wi th top
tank penetrati ons onl y, i .e., no bottom or si de wal l penetrati ons, thus, even i n the
unl i kel y event of an external pi pi ng fai l ure, tank contents remai n i n pl ace.

Wi th a few excepti ons, LNG storage and handl i ng faci l i ti es have accumul ated an
excepti onal l y superi or safety record when compared to refi neri es and other
petrochemi cal i ndustri es. Wi th the excepti on of the 1944 Cl evel and Di saster, al l
LNG-rel ated i nj uri es and/or fatal i ti es, however devastati ng, have been l i mi ted to pl ant
or contractor personnel . There have been no LNG shi pboard LNG rel ated deaths.
There has not been a member of the publ i c i nj ured by an i nci dent i nvol vi ng LNG si nce
the fai l ure of the i mproperl y desi gned/constructed Cl evel and faci l i ty. Smal l LNG
vapor rel eases and mi nor fi res have al so been reported, but i mpact was l i mi ted to the
pl ant and the hazard was promptl y handl ed by pl ant personnel . Other acci dents have
occurred duri ng the constructi on and repai r of LNG faci l i ti es. Some

of these
acci dents have been used to tarni sh the excepti onal safety record of LNG, but as no
LNG was di rectl y i nvol ved i n the i nci dent, these acci dents can onl y trul y be cal l ed
constructi on acci dents. Damage has al ways been l i mi ted to the pl ant proper.

The fol l owi ng three secti ons di scuss l and-based, LNG shi p, and over-the-road LNG
transport i nci dents respecti vel y. Each secti on references an appendi x l i sti ng the
vari ous i nci dents.
SAFETY RECORD OF LAND-BASED LNG FACILITIES
The fi rst commerci al faci l i ty for produci ng or uti l i zi ng LNG was a peakshavi ng pl ant
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that began operati ons i n 1941 i n Cl evel and, Ohi o. Si nce then, more than 120 other
peakshavi ng pl ants have been constructed worl dwi de (approxi matel y one-hal f of these
are satel l i te faci l i ti es that have no l i quefacti on capabi l i ty). I n addi ti on, 28 l arge base-
l oad natural gas l i quefacti on pl ants (export faci l i ti es) and more than 96 l arge LNG
i mport termi nal s have been constructed and are currentl y produci ng.
There have been fi ve i nci dents i n operati ng LNG faci l i ti es di rectl y attri butabl e to the
LNG process that resul ted i n one or more fatal i ti es Ski kda, Al geri a 2004; P. T.
Badak (Bontang, I ndonesi a), 1983; Cove Poi nt Maryl and, 1979; Arzew, Al geri a, 1977;
and Cl evel and, Ohi o, 1944. There were two other LNG i nci dents (Portl and 1968
and Staten I sl and 1973) i nvol vi ng worker deaths, but these correctl y shoul d be
cl assi fi ed as constructi on acci dents as no LNG was present. See Appendi x A for
more detai l s on these i nci dents and a compl ete l i sti ng of l and-based LNG faci l i ty

3
There has never been a catastrophic tank failure with any LNG, or similarly designed, storage tank fabricated of
the proper cryogenic alloys.
4
A peakshavi ng pl ant l i quefi es natural gas when customer demand for gas i s l ow and then
vapori zes the LNG when demand i s hi gh, thus handl i ng peri ods of peak demand that
cannot be met by exi sti ng gas pi pel i nes.
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i nci dents.
The acci dent at East Ohi o Gas Company s peakshavi ng pl ant i n Cl evel and, Ohi o, i s
the onl y i nci dent that i nvol ved i nj uri es or fatal i ti es to persons not empl oyed by the
LNG faci l i ty or by one of i ts contractors. Thi s acci dent i s often used as an exampl e of
the danger or ri sk i nvol ved i n the LNG i ndustry. However, the LNG i ndustry has
changed dramati cal l y si nce 1944, as has vi rtual l y every other technol ogy. Modern
LNG pl ants are desi gned and constructed i n accordance wi th stri ct codes and
standards that woul d not have been met by the Cl evel and pl ant. For exampl e, the
al l oy used i n Cl evel and for the i nner vessel of the LNG storage tank i s now forbi dden
for use at LNG temperatures and each LNG tank must now be l ocated wi thi n a di ke
capabl e of contai ni ng at l east 110% of the tank s capaci ty. Further, the Nati onal
Associ ati on of State Fi re Marshal s concl uded i n thei r May 2005 report,
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Had t he
Cl evel and t ank been bui l t t o current codes, t hi s acci dent woul d not have happened.
Al though Appendi x A i s i ntended to be a comprehensi ve l i sti ng of i nci dents that have
occurred i n l and-based LNG faci l i ti es; i t does not i ncl ude al l of the mi nor, but
reportabl e i nci dents. For exampl e, the outer roofs or domes of a few conventi onal
doubl e-wal l LNG tanks have suffered smal l cracks as a resul t of l ow temperature
embri ttl ement i ni ti ated by l eaks of LNG from over-the-top pi pi ng. These cracks
al l owed LNG vapor (i .e., natural gas) to escape from the tanks. I n each case, the
tanks were safel y repai red wi thout bei ng taken out of servi ce. Si mi l arl y, the i nner
tanks of several conventi onal LNG storage tanks (i .e., cryogeni c metal i nner tank and
carbon steel outer tank) have been cracked as a resul t of frost heave brought on by
i nadequate or i noperati ve bel ow-tank heaters. These tanks have been safel y entered,
repai red and put back i nto servi ce.
SAFETY RECORD OF LNG SHIPS (ALSO KNOWN AS LNG CARRIERS)
The fi rst transportati on of LNG by shi p took pl ace earl y i n 1959 when the Met hane
Pi oneer (an ex-Li berty shi p that had been extensi vel y modi fi ed) carri ed 5,000 M
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(cubi c meters) of LNG from Lake Charl es, Loui si ana, to Canvey I sl and, near London,
Engl and. Commerci al transportati on of LNG by shi p began i n 1964 when LNG was
transported from Arzew, Al geri a to Canvey I sl and i n two purpose-bui l t shi psthe
Met hane Pri ncess and the Met hane Progress.
The overal l safety record compi l ed by LNG shi ps duri ng the forty ni ne-year peri od
1964 - 2013 has been remarkabl y good. Duri ng thi s peri od, the LNG Carri er shi p fl eet
has del i vered consi derabl y more than 30,000 shi pl oads of LNG, and travel ed more
than 100 mi l l i on mi l es whi l e l oaded (and a si mi l ar di stance on return bal l ast voyages).
I n al l of these voyages and associ ated cargo transfer operati ons (l oadi ng/unl oadi ng),
no fatal i ty has ever been recorded for a member of any LNG shi p s crew or member of
the general publ i c as a resul t of hazardous i nci dents i n whi ch the LNG was i nvol ved.

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Liquefied Natural Gas: An Overview of the LNG Industry for Fire Marshals and Emergency Responders
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I n fact, there i s no record of any fi re occurri ng on the deck or i n the cargo hol d or
cargo tanks of any operati ng LNG shi p.
Accordi ng to the US Department of Energy, over the l i fe of the i ndustry, ei ght mari ne
i nci dents worl dwi de have resul ted i n spi l l age of LNG wi th some hul l s damaged due to
col d fracture, but no cargo fi res have occurred. Seven i nci dents not i nvol vi ng spi l l age
were recorded, two from groundi ngs and several shi p col l i si ons but wi th no si gni fi cant
cargo l oss.
Among LNG i mport and export termi nal personnel , onl y one death can be even
remotel y l i nked to the l oadi ng or unl oadi ng of LNG shi ps. (I n 1977, a worker i n the
LNG Export Faci l i ty at Arzew, Al geri a was ki l l ed duri ng a shi p-l oadi ng operati on
when a l arge-di ameter val ve ruptured and the worker was sprayed wi th LNG. Hi s
death was the resul t of contact wi th the very col d LNG l i qui d; the spi l l ed LNG di d not
i gni te. (See I tem 6 i n Appendi x A.)
Appendi x B summari zes the hi stori cal record of LNG shi p i nci dents. Al though a
maj or effort was made to ensure the record presented i s compl ete, i t i s possi bl e that
some i nci dents have been mi ssed. However, i t i s very unl i kel y that a maj or i nci dent
has been omi tted. Fi rstl y, nearl y every shi ppi ng i nci dent that resul ts i n an i nsurance
cl ai m wi l l be publ i shed i n Ll oyd s Li st. Secondl y, even i f the shi p owners are sel f-
i nsured, news of maj or i nci dents travel s qui ckl y through the LNG i ndustry because i t
i s composed of a rel ati vel y smal l number of shi p and termi nal operators that often
share experi ences through i ndustry associ ati ons such as SI GTTO (the Soci ety of
I nternati onal Gas Tanker and Termi nal Operators).
Al so i ncl uded at the end of Appendi x B i s a descri pti on of a mari ne i nci dent i nvol vi ng
a l i qui d petrol eum gas (LPG) tanker whi ch i s of si mi l ar desi gn to many LNG shi ps.
The i nci dent provi des some i nsi ght i nto the i ntegri ty of the product storage systems on
these shi ps.
OVER-THE ROAD LNG TRANSPORT ACCIDENTS

Appendi x C provi des a parti al compi l ati on of over-the-road trucki ng i nci dents. I t i s
not i ntended to be comprehensi ve as reports of these i nci dents are mai ntai ned i n
di fferent ways from state to state and i nternati onal l y. However, much as wi th LNG
shi ps, i t i s very unl i kel y that a maj or i nci dent has been omi tted. The l i sts do provi de
exampl es of the wi de range of potenti al vehi cl e acci dents that can occur. Most
notabl e, not a si ngl e person outsi de the dri ver of the transport was seri ousl y i nj ured
and rarel y di d product spi l l and far more rarel y di d i t i gni te. I t i s al so i mportant to
note that many i nci dents reported by the medi a to i nvol ve LNG are often, i n fact, LPG
that i s a di fferent product and not at cryogeni c temperatures.
SUMMARY

The vari ous i nci dents di scussed, when taken on a case-by-case basi s, attests to LNG s
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safety record. The fact that most LNG opponents ci te Cl evel and and Staten I sl and as
exampl es of the dangers of LNG, cl earl y i ndi cate that there i s l i ttl e el se to make thei r
poi nt. As devastati ng as both Cl evel and and Staten I sl and were, they have no
rel evance when di scussi ng the desi gn and operati on of today s modern LNG faci l i ti es.

LNG i s cryogeni c; i t i s a l i qui d; and i ts vapors are fl ammabl e. I t i s not wi thout i ts
safety concerns and ri sks. I t, however, can be produced, transported and revapori zed
as safel y, and i n most cases, more safel y, than other l i qui d energy fuel s.



For more i nformati on on LNG safety, pl ease see CH I V s websi te, parti cul arl y:
http://www.CH-IV.com/lng/lngsafty.htm


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APPENDIX A
Chronological Summary of Incidents Involving Land-Based LNG Facilities


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1. October, 1944 Cl evel and, Ohi o, USA ~ The Cl evel and Di sast er
LNG Peakshavi ng Faci l i ty
Any ti me the topi c of LNG i s i ntroduced to a new audi ence the Cl evel and
Di sast er i s bound to surface. I t was i ndeed tragi c, but an unbi ased revi ew
wi l l show j ust how far the i ndustry has come si nce that horri fi c i nci dent. The
East Ohi o Gas Company bui l t the fi rst commerci al LNG peakshavi ng
faci l i ty i n Cl evel and i n 1941. The faci l i ty was run wi thout i nci dent unti l
1944, when a l arger new tank was added. As stai nl ess steel al l oys were
scarce because of Worl d War I I , the new tank was bui l t wi th a l ow-ni ckel
content (3.5%) al l oy steel . Shortl y after goi ng i nto servi ce, the tank fai l ed.
LNG spi l l ed i nto the street and storm sewer system. The resul tant fi re ki l l ed
128 peopl e, setti ng back the embryoni c LNG i ndustry substanti al l y. The
fol l owi ng i nformati on i s extracted from the U.S. Bureau of Mi nes report
6
on
the i nci dent:

On October 20, 1944, the tanks had been fi l l ed to capaci ty i n readi ness for the
comi ng wi nter months. About 2:15 PM, the cyl i ndri cal tank suddenl y fai l ed
rel easi ng al l of i ts contents i nto the nearby streets and sewers of Cl evel and.
The cl oud promptl y i gni ted and a fi re ensued whi ch engul fed the nearby
tanks, resi dences and commerci al establ i shments. After about 20 mi nutes,
when the i ni ti al fi re had nearl y di ed down, the sphere nearest to the
cyl i ndri cal tank toppl ed over and rel eased i ts contents. 9,400 gal l ons of LNG
i mmedi atel y evaporated and i gni ted. I n al l , 128 peopl e were ki l l ed and 225
i nj ured. The area di rectl y i nvol ved was about three-quarters of a square mi l e
(475 acres) of whi ch an area of about 30 acres was compl etel y devastated.

The Bureau of Mi nes i nvesti gati on showed that the acci dent was due to the
l ow temperature embri ttl ement of the i nner shel l of the cyl i ndri cal tank. The
i nner tank was made of 3.5% ni ckel steel , a materi al now known to be
suscepti bl e to bri ttl e fracture at LNG storage temperature (mi nus 260F). I n
addi ti on, the tanks were l ocated cl ose to a heavi l y travel ed rai l road stati on
and a bombshel l stampi ng pl ant. Excessi ve vi brati on from the rai l road
engi nes and stampi ng presses probabl y accel erated crack propagati on i n the
i nner shel l . Once the i nner shel l ruptured, the outer carbon steel wal l woul d
have easi l y fractured upon contact wi th LNG. The acci dent was aggravated
by the absence of adequate di ki ng around the tanks, and the proxi mi ty of the
faci l i ty to the resi denti al area. The cause of the second rel ease from the
spheri cal tank was the fact that the l egs of the sphere were not i nsul ated
agai nst fi re so that they eventual l y buckl ed after bei ng exposed to di rect
fl ame contact.
Further, i t shoul d be noted that the i gni ti on of the two unconfi ned vapor

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Report on the Investigation of the Fire at the Liquefaction, Storage, and Regasification Plant of the East Ohio
Gas Co., Cleveland, Ohio, October 20, 1944, U.S. Bureau of Mines, February, 1946.
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cl ouds of LNG i n Cl evel and di d not resul t i n expl osi ons. There was no
evi dence of any expl osi on overpressures after the i gni ti on of the spi l l from
ei ther the cyl i ndri cal tank or the sphere. The onl y expl osi ons that took pl ace
i n Cl evel and were l i mi ted to the sewers where LNG ran and vapori zed before
the vapor-ai r mi xture i gni ted i n a rel ati vel y confi ned vol ume. The U.S.
Bureau of Mi nes concl uded that the concept of l i quefyi ng and stori ng LNG
was val i d i f proper precauti ons are observed.

The Cl evel and Di saster put an end to any further LNG devel opment i n the
Uni ted States for many years. I t was not unti l the earl y si xti es that LNG
began to be taken seri ousl y through constructi on of LNG peakshavi ng
faci l i ti es. A number of el ements came together to bri ng LNG back; these
i ncl uded:
The advent of the space program and i ts associ ated cryogeni c technol ogi es
Successful l arge-scal e fi re and vapor cl oud di spersi on demonstrati ons
Extensi ve cryogeni c materi al compati bi l i ty studi es
Constructi on and operati on of l i quefacti on pl ants i n Al geri a and recei vi ng
termi nal s i n France and Engl and.

2. May, 1965 Canvey Isl and, Essex, Uni ted Ki ngdom
LNG I mport Termi nal
A smal l amount of LNG spi l l ed from a tank duri ng mai ntenance. The spi l l
i gni ted and one worker was seri ousl y burned. No other detai l s have been
made avai l abl e.

3. March, 1968 Portl and, Oregon, USA
LNG Peakshavi ng Faci l i ty - Const ruct i on Acci dent , no LNG present
Four workers i nsi de an unfi ni shed LNG storage tank were ki l l ed when natural
gas from a pi pel i ne bei ng pressure tested i nadvertentl y entered the tank as a
resul t of i mproper i sol ati on, and then i gni ted causi ng an expl osi on. The LNG
tank was 120 feet i n di ameter wi th a 100-foot shel l hei ght and a capaci ty of
176,000 barrel s and damaged beyond repai r. Nei ther the tank nor the process
faci l i ty had been commi ssi oned at the ti me the acci dent occurred. The LNG
tank i nvol ved i n thi s acci dent had never been commi ssi oned; thus, i t had
never contai ned any LNG.

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APPENDIX A
Chronological Summary of Incidents Involving Land-Based LNG Facilities


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4. 1971 La Spezi a, Ital y
LNG I mport Termi nal - Fi rst document ed LNG Rol l over i nci dent
The LNG carri er Esso Brega had been i n the harbor for about a month before
unl oadi ng i ts cargo of heavy LNG i nto the storage tank. Ei ghteen hours
after the tank was fi l l ed, the tank devel oped a sudden i ncrease i n pressure
causi ng LNG vapor to di scharge from the tank safety val ves and vents over a
peri od of a few hours. The roof of the tank was al so sl i ghtl y damaged. I t i s
esti mated that about 100 mmscf of LNG vapor (natural gas) fl owed out of the
tank. No i gni ti on took pl ace. Thi s acci dent was caused by a phenomenon
cal l ed rol l over,
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where two l ayers of LNG havi ng di fferent densi ti es and
heat content are al l owed to form. The sudden mi xi ng of these two l ayers
resul ts i n the rel ease of l arge vol umes of methane vapor.

5. January, 1972 Montreal , Canada
LNG Peakshavi ng Faci l i ty - Al t hough an LNG f aci l i t y, LNG was not i nvol ved
On J anuary 27, 1972 an expl osi on occurred i n the LNG l i quefacti on and peak
shavi ng pl ant of Gaz Mtropol i tai n i n Montreal East, Quebec. The acci dent
occurred i n the control room due to a back fl ow of natural gas from the
compressor to the ni trogen l i ne. Ni trogen was suppl i ed to the recycl e
compressor as a seal gas duri ng defrosti ng operati ons. The val ves on the
ni trogen l i ne that were kept open duri ng defrosti ng operati on were not cl osed
after compl eti ng the operati on. Thi s resul ted i n the over-pressuri zati on of the
compressor wi th up to 250 - 350 psi g of natural gas. Natural gas entered the
ni trogen header, whi ch was at 75 psi g. The pneumati cal l y control l ed
i nstruments were bei ng operated wi th ni trogen due to the fai l ure of the
i nstrument-ai r compressor. The i nstruments vented thei r contents i nto the
atmosphere at the control panel . Natural gas entered the control room through
the ni trogen header and accumul ated i n the control room, where operators
were al l owed to smoke. The expl osi on occurred whi l e an operator was tryi ng
to l i ght a ci garette.

6. February, 1973 Staten Isl and, New York, USA
LNG Peakshavi ng Faci l i ty - Const ruct i on Acci dent , no LNG present
Proper precauti ons have been common pl ace i n al l of the LNG faci l i ti es bui l t
and pl aced i n servi ce ever si nce Cl evel and (1944). Between the mi d-1960s
and mi d-1970s more than 60 LNG faci l i ti es were bui l t i n the Uni ted States.
These peak-shavi ng pl ants have had an excel l ent safety record. Thi s
constructi on acci dent has consi stentl y been used by opponents of LNG as a
case-i n-poi nt to depi ct the danger of LNG, after al l , 40 persons l ost thei r
l i ves at an LNG faci l i ty.

7
See Section 3.1 of CHIVs Introduction to LNG Safety, Short Course on LNG Rollover.
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Here s the story
One of Texas Eastern Transmi ssi on Corporati on s (TETCO) LNG storage
tanks on Staten I sl and had been i n servi ce for over three years when i t was
taken out of servi ce for i nternal repai rs. The tank was warmed, purged of the
remai ni ng combusti bl e gases wi th i nert ni trogen and then fi l l ed wi th fresh
reci rcul ati ng ai r. A constructi on crew entered the tank to begi n repai r work
i n Apri l of 1972. Ten months l ater, i n February of 1973, an unknown cause
i gni ted the Myl ar l i ner and pol yurethane foam i nsul ati on i nsi de the tank.
I ni ti al standard operati ng procedures cal l ed for the use of expl osi on-proof
equi pment wi thi n the tank, however non-expl osi on proof i rons and vacuum
cl eaners were bei ng used for seal i ng the l i ner and cl eani ng i nsul ati on debri s.
I t i s assumed that an el ectri cal spark i n one of the i rons or vacuum cl eaners
i gni ted the Myl ar l i ner. The rapi d ri se i n temperature caused a correspondi ng
ri se i n pressure i nsi de the tank. The pressure i ncrease l i fted the tank s
concrete dome. The dome then col l apsed ki l l i ng the 40 constructi on workers
i nsi de.

The subsequent New Y ork Ci ty Fi re Department i nvesti gati on
8
concl uded that
the acci dent was cl earl y a constructi on acci dent and not an LNG acci dent.
Thi s has not prevented LNG s opponents from cl ai mi ng that si nce there may
have been l atent vapors from the heavy components of the LNG that was
stored i n the tank, then i t was i n fact an LNG i nci dent.

7. March, 1977 Al geri a
LNG Export Faci l i ty
A worker at the Camel pl ant was frozen to death when he was sprayed wi th
LNG, whi ch was escapi ng from a ruptured val ve body on top of an i n-ground
storage tank. Approxi matel y 1,500 to 2,000 m
3
of LNG were rel eased, but the
resul ti ng vapor cl oud di d not i gni te. The val ve body that ruptured was
constructed of cast al umi num. The current practi ce i s to provi de val ves i n
LNG servi ce that are made wi th stai nl ess steel .

8. March, 1978 Das Isl and, Uni ted Arab Emi rates
LNG Export Faci l i ty
A bottom pi pe connecti on of an LNG tank fai l ed resul ti ng i n an LNG spi l l
i nsi de the LNG tank contai nment. The l i qui d fl ow was stopped by cl osi ng the
i nternal val ve desi gned for j ust such an emergency. A l arge vapor cl oud
resul ted and di ssi pated wi thout i gni ti on. No i nj uri es or fatal i ti es were
reported.

8
"Report of Texas Eastern LNG Tank Fatal Fire and Roof Collapse, February 10, 1973," Fire Department of
the City of New York, July, 1973
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9. October, 1979 Cove Poi nt, Maryl and, USA
LNG I mport Termi nal
The Cove Poi nt LNG Recei vi ng Termi nal i n Maryl and began operati ons i n the
spri ng of 1978. By the fal l of 1979, Cove Poi nt had unl oaded over 80 LNG
shi ps. I n 1979, a tragi c acci dent occurred at Cove Poi nt that took the l i fe of
one operator and seri ousl y burned another.
Around 3:00 AM on October 6, 1979, an expl osi on occurred wi thi n an
el ectri cal substati on at Cove Poi nt. LNG had l eaked through an i nadequatel y
ti ghtened LNG pump el ectri cal penetrati on seal , vapori zed, passed through
200 feet of underground el ectri cal condui t and entered the substati on. Si nce
natural gas was never expected i n thi s substati on, no gas detectors had been
i nstal l ed i n the bui l di ng. The natural gas-ai r mi xture was i gni ted by the
normal arci ng contacts of a ci rcui t breaker, resul ti ng i n an expl osi on. The
expl osi on ki l l ed one operator i n the bui l di ng, seri ousl y i nj ured a second and
caused about $3 mi l l i on i n damages.
The Nati onal Transportati on Safety Board (NTSB) found
9
that the Cove Poi nt
Termi nal was desi gned and constructed i n conformance wi th al l appropri ate
regul ati ons and codes. I t further concl uded that thi s was an i sol ated i nci dent,
not l i kel y to recur el sewhere. The NTSB concl uded that i t i s unl i kel y that
any pump seal , regardl ess of the l i qui d bei ng pumped, coul d be desi gned,
fabri cated or i nstal l ed to compl etel y precl ude the possi bi l i ty of l eakage.
Wi th that concl usi on i n mi nd, bui l di ng codes pertai ni ng to the equi pment and
systems downstream of the pump seal were changed. Before the Cove Poi nt
Termi nal was restarted, al l pump seal systems were modi fi ed to meet the new
codes and gas detecti on systems were added to al l bui l di ngs.

10. Apri l , 1983 Bontang, Indonesi a
LNG Export Faci l i ty - Mai nt enance Acci dent , no LNG present
A maj or i nci dent occurred on Apri l 14, 1983 i n Bontang, I ndonesi a. The mai n
l i quefacti on col umn (l arge verti cal , spi ral wound, heat exchanger) i n Trai n B
ruptured due to over-pressuri zati on caused by a bl i nd fl ange l eft i n a fl are
l i ne duri ng start-up. Al l the pressure protecti on systems were connected to
thi s l i ne. The exchanger experi enced pressures three ti mes i ts desi gn pressure
before rupturi ng. Debri s and coi l secti ons were proj ected some 50 meters
away. Shrapnel from the col umn ki l l ed three workers. The ensui ng fi re was
exti ngui shed i n about 30 mi nutes. Thi s i nci dent occurred duri ng dry-out and
purgi ng of the exchanger wi th warm natural gas pri or to i ntroduci ng any LNG
i nto the system, so no LNG was actual l y i nvol ved or rel eased.

9
Columbia LNG Corporation Explosion and Fire; Cove Point, MD; October 6, 1979" National Transportation
Safety Board Report NTSB-PAR-80-2, April 16, 1980
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11. August, 1985 Pi nson, Al abama, USA
LNG Peakshavi ng Faci l i ty
The wel ds on an 8 i nch by 12 i nch patch pl ate on a smal l al umi num vessel
(3 feet i n di ameter by 7 feet tal l ) fai l ed as the vessel was recei vi ng LNG
whi ch was bei ng drai ned from the l i quefacti on col d box. The pl ate was
propel l ed i nto a bui l di ng that contai ned the control room, boi l er room and
offi ces. Some of the wi ndows i n the control room were bl own i nward and
natural gas escapi ng from the fai l ed vessel entered the bui l di ng and i gni ted.
Si x empl oyees were i nj ured.

12. 1987 Mercury, Nevada, USA
Department of Energy Test Faci l i ty
An acci dental i gni ti on of an LNG vapor cl oud occurred at the DOE, Nevada
Test Si te on August 29, 1987. The l arge-scal e tests i nvol vi ng spi l l s of LNG
on water were sponsored by the Department of Energy and Gas Research
I nsti tute to study the effecti veness of vapor fences i n reduci ng the extent of
downwi nd di spersi on of LNG vapor cl ouds. The cl oud acci dental l y i gni ted
duri ng Test #5 j ust after a sequence of rel ati vel y strong rapi d phase
transi ti ons (RPTs) whi ch damaged and propel l ed pol yurethane pi pe i nsul ati on
outsi de the fence.

The offi ci al expl anati on was that a spark generated by stati c el ectri ci ty
approxi matel y 76 seconds after the spi l l was the most l i kel y source of
i gni ti on. An i ndependent i nvesti gati on on behal f of Gas Research I nsti tute
showed that a more l i kel y source of i gni ti on was oxygen enri chment between
the surface of the LNG pi pe and the combusti bl e pol yurethane foam
i nsul ati on. Oxygen enri chment occurred duri ng the l ong cool -down peri od
wi th l i qui d ni trogen that preceded the LNG test. Such enri chment had been
previ ousl y observed duri ng tests carri ed out by an LNG tank desi gn and
manufacturi ng company. I mpacts duri ng the RPTs may have i gni ted the
i nsul ati on but not the nearby fuel -ri ch vapor cl oud. However, when a
smol deri ng i nsul ati on fragment was propel l ed outsi de the fence by an RPT, i t
i gni ted the porti on of the cl oud that was wi thi n the fl ammabl e l i mi ts. The
durati on of the fi re was 30 seconds. The fl ame l ength was about 20 feet
above the ground.

There have been other acci dental i gni ti ons i nvol vi ng LNG duri ng l arge-scal e
tests.
One occurred i n Engl and duri ng l arge-scal e fi re tests bei ng carri ed out by
Bri ti sh Gas Corporati on. Stray currents from a nearby radar stati on were
bl amed for prematurel y i gni ti ng the pri mer that was eventual l y to be used
to i gni te the LNG cl oud.
Another occurred i n J apan duri ng si mi l ar l arge-scal e tests carri ed out by
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J apan Gas Associ ati on. The i gni ti on mechani sm was not expl ai ned.
Duri ng a test at a research faci l i ty near San Cl emente, Cal i forni a, a sudden
change i n wi nd di recti on caused the vapor cl oud to encounter a tractor that
was movi ng some of the test equi pment. The tractor i gni ted the vapor
cl oud, badl y burni ng the dri ver. A researcher was al so i n the vapor cl oud
at the ti me of i gni ti on. He was abl e to get out of the vapor cl oud before
the fl ame front reached hi m by runni ng crosswi nd and was not i nj ured.

13. 1988 Everett, Massachusetts, USA
LNG I mport Termi nal
Approxi matel y 30,000 gal l ons of LNG were spi l l ed through bl own fl ange
gaskets duri ng an i nterrupti on i n LNG transfer at Di stri gas. The cause was
l ater determi ned to be condensati on i nduced water hammer.
10
The spi l l was
contai ned i n a smal l area, as desi gned. The sti l l ni ght prevented the
movement of the vapor cl oud from the i mmedi ate area. No one was i nj ured
and no damage occurred beyond the bl own gasket. Operati ng procedures,
both manual and automati c, were modi fi ed as a resul t.

14. 1989 Thurl ey, Uni ted Ki ngdom
LNG Peakshavi ng Faci l i ty
Whi l e cool i ng down the vapori zers i n preparati on for sendi ng out natural gas,
l ow-poi nt drai n val ves were opened on each vapori zer. One of these drai n
val ves had not been cl osed when the pumps were started and LNG entered the
vapori zers. As a resul t, LNG was rel eased i nto the atmosphere as a hi gh-
pressure j et. The resul ti ng vapor cl oud i gni ted about thi rty seconds after the
rel ease began. The fl ash fi re covered an area approxi matel y 40 by 25 m.
Two operators recei ved burns to thei r hands and faces. The source of i gni ti on
was bel i eved to be the pi l ot l i ght on one of the other submerged combusti on
vapori zers.

15. December 9, 1992 Bal ti more, Maryl and, USA
LNG Peakshavi ng Faci l i ty
A rel i ef val ve on LNG pi pi ng near one of the three LNG tanks fai l ed open and
rel eased LNG i nto the LNG tank contai nment for over 10 hours, resul ti ng i n
an esti mated l oss of over 25,000 gal l ons i nto the LNG tank contai nment. The
LNG al so i mpi nged on the LNG tank causi ng embri ttl ement fractures on the
outer shel l . The LNG tank was taken out of servi ce and repai red. No pl ant
personnel were i nj ured, no vapor was i gni ted and none travel ed outsi de the
pl ant area.


10
See description in Section 3.1 of CHIVs Introduction to LNG Safety

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16. 1993 Bontang, Indonesi a
LNG Export Faci l i ty
An LNG l eak occurred i n the open run-down l i ne duri ng a pi pe modi fi cati on
proj ect i n Trai n E. LNG entered an underground concrete oi l y-water sewer
system and underwent a rapi d vapor expansi on that over-pressured and
ruptured the sewer pi pes. No i gni ti on of the vapor occurred, but the sewer
system and some nearby equi pment was damaged. There were no i nj uri es.

17. September, 2000 Savannah, Georgi a, USA
LNG I mport Termi nal
I n September 2000, a 580-foot shi p, the Sun Sapphi re, l ost control i n the
Savannah Ri ver and crashed i nto the LNG unl oadi ng pi er at El ba I sl and. The
El ba I sl and faci l i ty was undergoi ng reacti vati on but had no LNG i n the pl ant.
The Sun Sapphi re, carryi ng al most 20,000 tons of pal m and coconut oi l ,
suffered a 40-foot gash i n her hul l . The poi nt of i mpact at the termi nal was
the LNG unl oadi ng pl atform. Al though the LNG faci l i ty experi enced
si gni fi cant damage, i ncl udi ng the need to repl ace fi ve 16" unl oadi ng arms,
there was no i ndi cati on that had LNG been present i n the pi pi ng that there
woul d have been a rel ease. Gi ven the geometry of the Savannah Ri ver at El ba
I sl and, i t i s doubtful that had an LNG shi p been present that a si mi l ar
rammi ng coul d have penetrated the doubl e hul l and rel eased any LNG.

18. August 16, 2003 Bi ntul u, Mal aysi a
LNG Li quefacti on and Export Faci l i ty
A maj or fi re occurred i n the exhaust system of the propane compressor gas
turbi ne i n the fi rst trai n (trai n 7) of the MLNG Ti ga proj ect. A crack had
devel oped i n the j oi nt between the tube and header of the regenerati on gas
coi l i n the waste heat recovery uni t (WHRU). Thi s l eakage went undetected.
The propane compressor and turbi ne experi enced a tri p that was unrel ated to
the gas l eakage. The procedure was then for the turbi ne to go i nto a sl ow
rotati on of 6 rpm usi ng the barri ng motor, whi ch successful l y occurred.
Because of the rotati on of the turbi ne bl ades and the chi mney effect of the
turbi ne exhaust stack, ai r was drawn i n through the turbi ne and i nto the
exhaust duct. The natural gas escapi ng from the regenerati on coi l crack
mi xed wi th the ai r i nsi de the WHRU that was sti l l at a very hi gh temperature,
near the normal operati ng exhaust temperature of 570C. When the gas ai r
mi xture reached i ts l ower fl ammabi l i ty l i mi t and auto i gni ti on temperature of
537 C, an expl osi on i nsi de the WHRU resul ted. The i nci dent caused damage
to the WHRU ducti ng, hot oi l and regenerati on coi l s gas turbi ne and
compressors, as wel l as superfi ci al damage to the compressor bui l di ng. No
i nj ury occurred to any personnel . Whi l e the i nci dent i nvol ved natural gas and
was i n an auxi l i ary system for one of the maj or pi eces of the refri gerati on
system i t di d not di rectl y i nvol ve LNG or any part of the cryogeni c systems.

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19. January 19, 2004 Ski kda, Al geri a
LNG Li quefacti on and Export Faci l i ty
A leak in the hydrocarbon refrigerant system formed a vapor cloud that was drawn into
the inlet of a steam boiler. The increased fuel to the boiler caused rapidly rising
pressure within a steam drum. The rapidly rising pressure exceeded the capacity of the
boiler's safety valve and the steam drum ruptured. The boiler rupture was close enough
to the gas leak area to ignite the vapor cloud and produce an explosion due to the
confined nature of the gas leak and an ensuing fireball. The fire took eight hours to
extinguish. The explosions and fire destroyed a portion of the LNG plant and caused
27 deaths and injury to 72 more. No one outside the plant was injured nor were the
LNG storage tanks damaged by the explosions. A joint report
11
by the U.S. Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
was issued in April 2004. The findings in the report indicate that there were local
ignition sources, a lack of typical automatic equipment shutdown devices and a lack
of hazard detection devices.

20. 2009 Tangguh, Indonesi a
LNG Li quefacti on and Export Faci l i ty
A leak occurred at the manifold on the LNG storage tank platform when the LNG was
being pumped from the storage tank. As a result, LNG hit the carbon steel tank roof
plates causing cracks and methane gas to leak out in several places. It was speculated
by knowledgeable sources that the leak was the result of incorrect torque being applied
to various flange bolts and incorrect pipe spring hanger settings during the cool-down
process. Facilities had only been in operation for a short time and this may have been
the initial cooling down of the tank pump discharge piping.

21. 2010 Northwestern Austral i a
LNG Li quefacti on and Export Faci l i ty
A report of a serious accident during loading operations of the Northwest Shelf Project
Ship, the 127,492 cbm Sea Eagle, at the Withnell Bay Facility in Australia.
Approximately 2,000 to 4,000 liters of LNG is reported to have spilled, resulting in one
worker experiencing serious cryogenic burns. No other injuries were reported and no
further information was given as to the cause of the leak.

22. 2011(Exact Date Unknown), Pyeongtaek, South Korea
LNG I mport Faci l i ty
A minor leak was experienced following the scheduled overhaul of the three unloading
arms at the Pyeongtaek LNG Terminal. The leak occurred during the unloading

11
Report of the U.S. Government Team Site Inspection of the Sonatrach Skikda LNG Plant in Skikda, Algeria,
March 12-16, 2004
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operation of the 127,500 cbm Northwest Sandpiper. The vessel disconnected, seals and
ball valves were replaced on the leaking arm, and unloading commenced with the
remaining two arms. No details were provided as to the exact nature or cause of the
leak.

23. March 11, 2011 Sendai Ci ty, Japan
LNG I mport Faci l i ty
First Tsunami flooding of an LNG Facility occurred at the Minato LNG Import
Terminal as a result of the Great East J apan Earthquake of March 2011. During the
initial earthquake event, which was the largest ever recorded in J apan, the commercial
power supply was shut-down and the back-up power supply of the facility turned on
and the operation of the facility was safely suspended. The facility suffered almost no
damage due to the earthquake, and preparations were being made to resume operations
when the Tsunami struck. Attempts to restart the facility were then abandoned, and the
LNG storage tank and other emergency shut-off valves were closed remotely to prevent
secondary damages. Flooding continued for about 1 hour and at one point the entire
facility was submerged in seawater.

Damages were most extensive to plant structures and equipment not supported on pile
foundations, such as the piping framework, while facilities supported on pile
foundations were not damaged significantly. There was no damage to the receiving
facilities, LNG storage tanks, and LNG vaporizers. There was no loss of life at the
LNG facility and there was no LNG released. The facility was shut down for repairs
and began receiving LNG imports again as of November 2011.

24. September 8, 2011, Rotterdam, Netherl ands
LNG I mport Termi nal
During maintenance works on one of the jetties of Gate terminal a small amount of
natural gas was released. This caused a visible white cloud at the jetty. The
condensation of air humidity following the contact with the cold gas caused this cloud.
The cloud itself does not contain any toxic substances and there was no danger for the
nearest residential neighborhood. In coordination with the authorities the port stopped
ship movements for a while in the immediate surroundings of the terminal at the
Maasvlakte. The release of gas was stopped and ship movements resumed shortly
afterwards. The cause of the release was determined to be human error; a worker
opened a valve through which cold natural gas was allowed to escape. Additional
measures have been taken to prevent this in the future.

25. Apri l 15, 2013, Angol a
LNG Li quefacti on and Export Faci l i ty
J ust hours before the Angola LNG facility was to begin production for the first time, an
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electrical fire broke out when a high voltage cable was overloaded. There were no
reported injuries, and as production had not yet started, no LNG was present. The fire
delayed the start of production until J une 2013.



26. December 6, 2013, Bal haf, Yemen
LNG Li quefacti on and Export Faci l i ty
A rocket-launched explosive hit the grounds of the Yemen LNG facility and detonated.
There were no injuries and only slight damage to non-essential property. Even though
hundreds of non-essential staff were evacuated from the site, the LNG facility
production and export operations were never impacted by the incident.

27. January 5
t h
, 2014, Snohvi t, Norway
LNG Li quefacti on and Export Faci l i ty
A gas leak occurred at the Hammerfest LNG Plant due to a pump failure at the
production facility. No details were provided as to the nature of the gas that had
leaked. The system was subsequently depressurized in line with standard plant
procedures while the problem was resolved. No LNG was released and there were no
injuries. The plant resumed production on J anuary 8
th
.




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1. 1964/ 1965
25,500 M
3
Jul es Verne
Whi l e l oadi ng LNG i n Arzew, Al geri a, l i ghtni ng struck the forward vent ri ser
of the shi p and i gni ted vapor, whi ch was bei ng routi nel y vented through the
shi p venti ng system. Loadi ng had been stopped when a thunderstorm broke
out near the termi nal but the vapor generated by the l oadi ng process was bei ng
rel eased to the atmosphere. The shore return pi pi ng had not yet been i n
operati on. The fl ame was qui ckl y exti ngui shed by purgi ng wi th ni trogen
through a connecti on to the ri ser.

A si mi l ar event happened earl y i n 1965 whi l e the vessel was at sea shortl y
after l eavi ng Arzew. The fi re was agai n exti ngui shed usi ng the ni trogen purge
connecti on. I n thi s case, vapor was bei ng vented i nto the atmosphere duri ng
shi p transi t, as was the normal practi ce at that ti me.

2. May, 1965
27,400 M
3
Met hane Pri ncess
The LNG l oadi ng arms were di sconnected before the l i qui d l i nes had been
compl etel y drai ned, causi ng LNG to pass through a l eaki ng cl osed val ve and
i nto a stai nl ess steel dri p pan pl aced underneath the arms. Seawater was
appl i ed to the area. Eventual l y, a star-shaped fracture appeared i n the deck
pl ati ng i n spi te of the appl i cati on of the seawater.

3. May, 1965
25,500 M
3
Jul es Verne
On the fourth l oadi ng of J ul es Verne at Arzew i n May 1965 an LNG spi l l ,
caused by overfl owi ng of Cargo Tank No.1, resul ted i n the fracture of the
cover pl ati ng of the tank and of the adj acent deck pl ati ng. The cause of the
over-fi l l has never been adequatel y expl ai ned, but i t was associ ated wi th the
fai l ure of l i qui d l evel i nstrumentati on and unfami l i ari ty wi th equi pment on the
part of the cargo handl i ng watch offi cer.

4. Apri l 11, 1966
27,400 M
3
Met hane Progress
Cargo l eakage reported. No detai l s.

5. September, 1968
5,000 M
3
Ari st ot l e
Ran aground off the coast of Mexi co. Bottom damaged. Bel i eved to be i n
LPG servi ce and not carryi ng LNG when thi s occurred. No LNG rel eased.
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6. November 17, 1969
71,500 M
3
Pol ar Al aska
Sl oshi ng of the LNG heel i n No. 1 tank caused part of the supports for the
cargo pump el ectri c cabl e tray to break l oose, resul ti ng i n several perforati ons
of the pri mary barri er. LNG l eaked i nto the i nterbarri er space. No LNG rel eased.

7. September 2, 1970
71,500 M
3
Arct i c Tokyo
Sl oshi ng of the LNG heel i n No. 1 tank duri ng bad weather caused l ocal
deformati on of the pri mary barri er and supporti ng i nsul ati on boxes. LNG
l eaked i nto the i nterbarri er space at one l ocati on. No LNG rel eased.

8. Late 1971
50,000 M
3
Descart es
A mi nor faul t i n the connecti on between the pri mary barri er and the tank dome
al l owed gas i nto the i nterbarri er space. No LNG rel eased.

9. June, 1974
27,400 M
3
Met hane Pri ncess
On J une 12, 1974 the Met hane Pri ncess was rammed by the frei ghter Tower
Pri ncess whi l e moored at Canvey I sl and LNG Termi nal and created a 3-foot
gash i n the outer hul l . No LNG rel eased.

10. Jul y, 1974
5,000 M
3
Barge Massachuset t s
LNG was bei ng l oaded on the barge on J ul y 16, 1974. After a power fai l ure
and the automati c cl osure of the mai n l i qui d l i ne val ves, a smal l amount of
LNG l eaked from a 1-i nch ni trogen-purge gl obe val ve on the vessel s l i qui d
header. The subsequent i nvesti gati on by the U.S. Coast Guard found that a
pressure surge caused by the val ve cl osure i nduced the l eakage of LNG
through the bonnet and gl and of the 1-i nch val ve. The val ve had not l eaked
duri ng the previ ous seven or more hours of l oadi ng. Several fractures
occurred i n the deck pl ates where contacted by the LNG spi l l . They extended
over an area that measured about one by two meters. The amount of LNG
i nvol ved i n the l eakage was reported to be about 40 gal l ons. As a resul t of
thi s i nci dent, The U.S. Coast Guard banned the Barge Massachusetts from
LNG servi ce wi thi n the U.S. I t i s bel i eved that the Barge Massachusetts i s
now worki ng overseas i n l i qui d ethyl ene servi ce.

11. August, 1974
4,000 M
3
Eucl i des
Mi nor damage was reported due to contact wi th another vessel . No LNG rel eased.
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12. November, 1974
4,000 M
3
Eucl i des
Ran aground at La Havre, France. Damaged bottom and propel l er.
No LNG rel eased.

13. 1974
27,400 M
3
Met hane Progress
The shi p ran aground at Arzew, Al geri a. Damaged rudder. No LNG rel eased.

14. September, 1977
125,000 M
3
LNG Aquari us
Duri ng the fi l l i ng of Cargo Tank No. 1 at Bontang on September 16, 1977,
LNG overfl owed through the vent mast servi ng that tank. The i nci dent may
have been caused by di ffi cul ti es i n the l i qui d l evel gauge system. The hi gh-
l evel al arm had been pl aced i n the overri de mode to el i mi nate nui sance al arms.
Surpri si ngl y, the mi l d steel pl ate of whi ch the cargo tank cover was made di d
not fracture as a resul t of thi s spi l l .

15. August 14, 1978
124,890 M
3
Khannur
Col l i si on wi th a cargo shi p, Hong Hwa, i n the Strai t of Si ngapore was
reported. Mi nor damage was i ndi cated.
No LNG rel eased.

16. Apri l , 1979
125,000 M
3
Most ef a Ben Boul ai d
Whi l e di schargi ng cargo at Cove Poi nt, Maryl and on Apri l 8, 1979, a check
val ve i n the pi pi ng system of the vessel fai l ed rel easi ng a smal l quanti ty of
LNG. Thi s resul ted i n mi nor fractures of the deck pl ati ng. Thi s spi l l was
caused by the escape of LNG from a swi ng-check val ve i n the l i qui d l i ne. I n
thi s val ve, the hi nge pi n i s retai ned by a head bol t, whi ch penetrates the wal l
of the val ve body. I n the course of operati ng the shi p and cargo pumpi ng
system, i t appears that the vi brati on caused the bol t to back out, rel easi ng a
shower of LNG onto the deck. The vessel was taken out of servi ce after the
i nci dent and the structural work renewed. Al l of the check val ves i n the shi p s
l i qui d system were modi fi ed to prevent a recurrence of the fai l ure. A l i ght
stai nl ess steel keeper was fashi oned and i nstal l ed at each bol t head. Shortl y
after the shi p returned to servi ce, LNG was noti ced l eaki ng from around one
bol t head, the keeper for whi ch had been stri pped, agai n probabl y because of
vi brati on. More substanti al keepers were i nstal l ed and the val ves have been
free from troubl e si nce that ti me.
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17. Apri l , 1979
87,600 M
3
Pol l enger
Whi l e the Pol l enger was di schargi ng LNG at the Di stri gas termi nal at Everett,
Massachusetts on Apri l 25, 1979, LNG l eaki ng from a val ve gl and apparentl y
fractured the tank cover pl ati ng at Cargo Tank No. 1. The quanti ty of LNG
that spi l l ed was probabl y onl y a few l i ters, but the fractures i n the cover
pl ati ng covered an area of about two square meters.

18. June 29, 1979
125,000 M
3
El Paso Paul Kayser
The Carri er ran aground at 14 knots whi l e maneuveri ng to avoi d another vessel
i n the Strai t of Gi bral tar. Bottom damaged extensi vel y. Vessel refl oated and
cargo transferred to si ster shi p, the El Paso Sonat rach. No LNG rel eased.

19. December 12, 1980
125,000 M
3
LNG Taurus
Ran aground i n heavy weather at Mutsure Anchorage off Tobata, J apan.
Bottom damaged extensi vel y. Vessel refl oated, proceeded under i ts own power
to the Ki ta Kyushu LNG Termi nal , and cargo di scharged. No LNG rel eased.

20. Earl y 1980s
125,000 M
3
El Paso Consol i dat ed
Mi nor rel ease of LNG from a fl ange. Deck pl ati ng fractured due to l ow
temperature embri ttl ement.

21. Earl y 1980s
129,500 M
3
Larbi Ben MHi di
Vapor rel eased duri ng transfer arm di sconnecti on. No LNG rel eased.

22. December, 1983
87,600 M
3
Norman Lady
Duri ng cool down of the cargo transfer arms, pri or to unl oadi ng at Sodegaura,
J apan, the shi p suddenl y moved astern under i ts own power. Al l cargo transfer
arms sheared and LNG spi l l ed. No i gni ti on.

23. 1985
35,500 M
3
Isabel l a
LNG rel eased as a resul t of overfi l l i ng a tank. Deck fractured due to l ow
temperature embri ttl ement.
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24. 1985
35,500 M
3
Annabel l a
Reported as pressuri zed cargo tank. Presumabl y, some LNG rel eased from
the tank or pi pi ng. No other detai l s are avai l abl e.

25. 1985
126,000 M
3
Ramdane Abane
Col l i si on whi l e l oaded. Port bow affected. No LNG rel eased.

26. February, 1989
40,000 M
3
Tel l i er
Wi nd bl ew shi p from i ts berth at Ski kda, Al geri a. Cargo transfer arms
sheared. Pi pi ng on shi p heavi l y damaged. Cargo transfer had been stopped.
Accordi ng to some verbal accounts of thi s i nci dent, LNG was rel eased from
the cargo transfer arms.

27. Earl y 1990
125,000 M
3
Bachi r Chi hani
A fracture occurred at a part of the shi p structure, whi ch i s prone to the hi gh
stresses that may accompany the compl ex defl ecti ons that the hul l encounters
on the hi gh seas. Fracture of the i nner hul l pl ati ng l ed to the i ngress of
seawater i nto the space behi nd the cargo hol d i nsul ati on whi l e the vessel was
i n bal l ast.
No LNG rel eased.

28. May 21, 1997
125,000 M
3
Nort hwest Swi f t
Col l i ded wi th a fi shi ng vessel about 400 km from J apan. Some damage to hul l ,
but no i ngress of water. No LNG rel eased.

29. October 31, 1997
126,300 M
3
LNG Capri corn
Struck a moori ng dol phi n at a pi er near the Senboku LNG Termi nal i n J apan.
Some damage to hul l , but no i ngress of water. No LNG rel eased.

30. September 6, 1999
71,500 M
3
Met hane Pol ar
Engi ne fai l ure duri ng approach to Atl anti c LNG j etty (Tri ni dad and Tobago).
Struck and damaged Petrotri n pi er. No i nj uri es. No LNG rel eased.
31. December 2002
87,000 M
3
Norman Lady
A U.S. nucl ear submari ne, the U.S.S. Okl ahoma Ci ty, rai sed i ts peri scope i nto
the shi p necessi tati ng her wi thdrawal bri efl y from servi ce for repai rs due to
penetrati on of outer hul l al l owi ng l eakage of seawater. No LNG rel eased
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TD-02109 Page 22 of 27
32. December 15, 2009
126,500 M
3
Mat t hew
The 920-foot Norwegi an LNG tanker Matthew was grounded, hal f a mi l e
southeast of Cayo Cari be near Guayani l l a, Puerto Ri co. The crew shi fted some
of the cargo and the vessel was refl oated after about three hours wi th the hel p
of two tugboats. The Matthew proceeded to the EcoEl ectri ca Punta Guayani l l a
LNG termi nal to di scharge and recei ve surveys. Authori ti es say i nvesti gators
found no si gns of a spi l l or other envi ronmental damage from the groundi ng.
No LNG rel eased
33. 2010
145,000 M
3
Bl uesky
The TMT-control l ed carri er was damaged at GDF Suez s Montoi r de Bretagne
termi nal i n France when a val ve was by-passed and l i qui d passed i nto the gas
take-off l i ne duri ng di scharge operati ons. The damage sustai ned extended to
part of the shi p s mani fol d and i ts feed l i nes wi thout damage to the shore-si de
systems. No LNG rel ease was report ed

34. March 1, 2010
126,500 M
3
LNG Edo
Duri ng l oadi ng operati ons at the Bonny LNG termi nal i n Ni geri a, LNG Edo
took a si gni fi cant l i st. Cargo l oadi ng operati ons were suspended. The cause
of the l i st was found to be abnormal bal l ast water di stri buti on i n the shi p s
tanks. The di stri buti on i n the bal l ast tanks was returned to normal and l oadi ng
was compl eted i n a normal manner on March 4th. There were no i nj uri es to
personnel nor was there any pol l uti on or damage to ei ther the vessel or the
j etty. The vessel subsequentl y di scharged cargo at Si nes, Portugal , on March
13th and 14th wi thout i nci dent.
No LNG rel eased
35. December 28, 2013
215,500 M
3
Al Gharraf a
Whi l e transi ti ng the Si ngapore Strai t en route to J apan, the Qatari -chartered Al
Gharaf f a col l i ded wi th the Greek Control l ed, 10,114-teu Hanj i n It al y. The
LNG Carri er suffered severe bow damage, however there were no i nj uri es, no
damage to the contai nment system, and no LNG was rel eased. The abi l i ty of
the vessel to sai l was not compromi sed, and the shi p was safel y anchored
shortl y after the i nci dent. Between J anuary 10 and 13,

2014, the LNG from the
Al Gharraf a was successful l y transferred to the Al Ghashami ya.
No LNG Rel eased

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TD-02109 Page 23 of 27

Yuyo Maru No. 10
The following information pertains to a liquid petroleum gas tanker (LPG) which has a similar
construction to an LNG tanker. The information was obtained from a Japanese marine registry
record. The annotations [text] were added by the authors for clarity. This incident is included in
this document to help illustrate the integrity of LNG tanks onboard LNG ships. There is much
discussion today around the impact of a terrorist attack perpetrated on an LNG tanker.

The Motorship Yuyo Maru No. 10 (gross tonnage of 43,723), laden with 20,831 MT of light
naphtha, 20,202 MT of propane and 6,443 MT of butane, left Ras Tanura, in the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, for Kawasaki, and the port of Keihin on October 22, 1974. While the vessel was sailing
northward along the Naka-no Se Traffic Route in Tokyo Bay on November 9, she collided with the
Motorship Pacific Ares (gross tonnage of 10,874), manned with a Taiwanese Master and 28 crew
members, laden with 14,835 MT of steel products, en route from Kisarazu for Los Angeles, USA.
The collision occurred about 13:37 hours on the same day slightly northward of the boundary line
of the Naka-no Se Traffic Route.

As a result of the collision, the Yuyo Maru No. 10 suffered a large hole at the point of collision,
with her cargo naphtha [The naphtha was carried in its outer ballast tank (between the insulated
LPG tanks and the hull of the ship). This is effectively what makes up the double hull with LNG
ships. The LPG cargo tank was not penetrated. LNG tankers never carry anything other than air or
ballast (water) in these tanks.] instantly igniting into flames. As a result of the outflow of naphtha
overboard, the sea surface on her starboard side literally turned into a sea of fire. The Pacific
Ares showered with fire burst into flames in the forecastle and on the bridge. While explosions
occurred one after another [naphtha, not propane], attempts were made to tow the Yuyo Maru No
10, outside the bay, but she ran aground in the vicinity of Daini Kaiho. She was successfully
towed out of Tokyo Bay and sunk south of Nojima Saki on the afternoon of November 27 [Thirty-
six days after the original collision.] by cannon, air bomb and torpedo attacks staged by the Maritime
Self-Defense Force. [Please note cannon, air bomb and torpedo attacks were required to sink the
ship. Other reports indicate that these attacks lasted one and a half days. The author has seen a
black and white film of these attacks. It appeared that the LPG tanks were for the most part fully in
tact prior to the attacks. The ships LPG vent stacks were melted down to just above the decks and
on fire indicating that LPG remained within the storage tanks.]

On board the Yuyo Maru No. 10, five crew members were killed and seven others injured by this
accident. The Pacific Ares, whose forward section was completely crushed and superstructures
burned down, was later repaired. Her crew members were all killed except one person, who was
injured but rescued.

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Date Locati on LNG Carri er

TD-02109 Page 24 of 27

1. June 1971 Waterbury, VT Capi tol
Bl owout, hi t rocks by road, tore hol e i n tank, 20% spi l l ed, no fi re, remai nder
dumped.

2. August 1971 Warner, NH Gas, Inc.
Dri ver fati gue, drove off road, rol l over cracked fi tti ngs, smal l gas l eak, no fi re.

3. October 1971 N. Whi tehal l , WI Indi anhead
Head-on col l i si on wi th truck. Gasol i ne and ti re fi re, no cargo l ost.

4. October 1973 Raynham, MA Andrews & Pi erce
Truck si de swi ped parked car; brakes l ocked and trai l er overturned. No cargo on-
board, no fi re

5. 1973 Rt. 80 & 95 JCT, NJ Chemi cal Leaman
Dri ver coul dn t negoti ate turn off. Rol l over demol i shed tractor and severe
damage to trai l er. No fi re. $40,000 damage to trai l er.

6. February 1974 New Jersey Turnpi ke Gas, Inc.
Faul ty brakes caused wheel fi re. Check val ve cracked 5% l eaked out. No fi re.

7. February 1974 McKee Ci ty, NJ Gas, Inc.
Loose val ve l eaked LNG duri ng transfer operati on.

8. January 1976 Chattanooga, TN LP Transport
Rol l over, no fi re, caused by oi l spi l l on exi t ramp. Truck ri ghted and conti nued
del i very of cargo.

9. November 1975 Dal ton, GA LP Transport
Rol l over, no fi re. Dri ver swerved to avoi d pedestri an, hi t guardrai l and rol l ed
over and down an 80 foot bank. $18,000 damage to trai l er.

10. September 1976 Pawtucket, RI Andrews & Pi erce
Car hi t trai l er at l andi ng wheel s, rol l over, no LNG l oss or fi re.

11. Apri l 1977 Connecti cut Turnpi ke Chemi cal Leaman
Truck parked (wi th bl owout) hi t by a tow truck i n rear. No l eak or fi re.

12. Jul y 1977 Waterbury, CT LP Transport
Si ngl e Wal l Lubbock hi t i n rear by tractor-trai l er, axl e knocked off. Rol l over.
No l oss of cargo.

13. December 1977 I5 & I10, Los Angel es Western Gi l l et/ SDG
Rol l over wi th l i ttl e product l oss, no vacuum l oss, no fi re. Dri ver had 3 broken
ri bs.

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14. February 1981 Barnagat, NJ LP Transport
Dri ver fai l ed to negoti ate turn due to excessi ve speed on country road. Dri ver not
hurt seri ousl y. Loss of some product through rel i ef val ve resul ted i n seri ous
damage to transport.

15. September 1981 Lexi ngton, MA Andrews & Pi erce
Rol l over, no fi re, no product l oss (empty), dri ver not seri ousl y hurt. Extensi ve
damage to transport. Cause: rai n and poor road condi ti ons.

16. October, 1993 Everett, MA TransGas
Trai l er sl i de off fi fth wheel j ust before enteri ng hi ghway. No fi re, no product
l oss

17. May 1994 Revere, MA TransGas
Trai l er over turned when tryi ng to negoti ate a traffi c ci rcl e at too hi gh of speed.
No product l oss, no fi re. Trai l er empti ed i nto second trai l er wi thout i nci dent.

18. October 1998 Woburn, Ma TransGas
Trai l er travel i ng at hi gh speed i s si deswi ped by car then careens i nto guardrai l
ri ppi ng open di esel fuel tanks. Ensui ng di esel fuel fi re traps dri ver i n cab where
he peri shes. Fi re engul fs LNG trai l er unti l exti ngui shed. No l oss of product
experi enced. LNG parti al l y transferred to second trai l er. Trai l er then upri ghted
and sent to transport yard to compl ete the transfer of product.

19. June 22, 2002 Tivissa, Catalonia, Spai n Not Avai l abl e
An LNG road tanker overturned and caught fi re on the C-44 road and subsequentl y
(about 20 mi nutes l ater) suffered a si gni fi cant LNG fi re, the fi rst such LNG-
rel ated trucki ng i nci dent reported. However, the desi gn of the trai l er i nvol ved
was very di fferent from that used i n the U.S. I t was si mpl y a pressure vessel
i nsul ated external l y wi th unprotected pol yurethane i nsul ati on, whereas cryogeni c
trai l ers i n the U.S. are doubl e-wal l ed, vacuum-j acketed pressure vessel s. When
the trai l er overturned the i nsul ati on was readi l y scraped off the pressure vessel
and di rectl y exposed to the fi re. I t i s uncl ear what actual l y caused the l eakage of
LNG, but U.S trai l ers i n addi ti on to havi ng the outer tank protecti on al so have
recessed protected pi pi ng further reduci ng the potenti al for l eakage due to
overturni ng. Due to severe nature of the acci dent, the dri ver di ed and a woman
who was reportedl y about 200m away from the truck suffered second degree
burns.

20. September 2003 Woburn, Ma TransGas
Trai l er travel i ng too fast on a hi ghway exi t ramp overturned. There was no
l eakage of cargo from the overturned truck. The truck dri ver was sl i ghtl y i nj ured
and recei ved a speedi ng ci tati on.
See Not e at end of next page.



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Date Locati on LNG Carri er

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21. September 14, 2005 Near Reno, NV Logi sti cs Express
The dri ver of an LNG tractor trai l er stopped at a truck stop on I -80 near Reno and
noti ced that LNG was l eaki ng from the fi rebl ock val ve. He noti fi ed the l ocal
emergency responders. Shortl y after thei r arri val the LNG vapor i gni ted. The on-
scene emergency responders deci ded to fi rst cl ose the I nterstate and evacuate
peopl e from l ocal busi nesses and resi dences and then expand the evacuati on area
for about three hours. When the fi re subsi ded, the evacuati on was cancel l ed. The
trai l er performed as desi gned and there was no l oss of vacuum on the trai l er
doubl e wal l system. The trai l er was removed from servi ce for mi nor damage
repai r and returned to servi ce wi thi n a week. Unfortunatel y, the emergency
responders di d not understand LNG or the desi gn of LNG trai l ers or they woul d
not have executed such a l arge evacuati on.

22. October 11, 2007 Provi nce of Cadi z, Spai n Not Reported
An LNG truck carryi ng a l oad of 19,200 Kg of LNG sl i d down a bank of about 3
meters at a cross road i n the provi nce of Cadi z i n Spai n. There was no LNG
rel eased or spi l l ed. Al though the acci dent caused smal l fi res from the burni ng
truck fuel , none were LNG rel ated. The truck dri ver who was trapped under the
damaged vehi cl e di ed. The cause of the acci dent was not reported.

23. August 23, 2011 Istanbul , Turkey Not Reported
A tanker truck l oaded wi th l i quefi ed natural gas (LNG) got stuck under a three-
and-a-hal f-meter-hi gh overpass i n st anbul . The i nci dent took pl ace i n Ataky,
Bak rky di st ri ct . The dri ver attempted to push through, but had to cal l pol i ce for
hel p once he real i zed that i t woul d not be possi bl e for hi m to pass underneath.
Pol i ce and fi re bri gade teams were abl e to di sl odge the vehi cl e. There was no
LNG spi l l .

24. October 20, 2011, Murcia, Spain Not Reported
An LNG Tanker Truck transporti ng 46,000 l i ters (12,150 gal ) of LNG crashed i nto
the rear of a fl at-bed tractor-trai l er whi l e travel i ng on Spai n s A-91 Hi ghway.
The fl atbed tractor-trai l er had parked on the shoul der approxi matel y 20 mi nutes
pri or to the acci dent. After col l i di ng wi th the tractor-trai l er, the dri ver of the
LNG Tanker l ost control and the Tanker ran through a crash-barri er and became
wedged i n a road-si de di tch, ti l ted agai nst an adj acent embankment. Accordi ng to
eye-wi tnesses, the Tanker Truck burst i nto fl ames shortl y after comi ng to a stop.
The Tanker Truck dri ver was trapped i n the cab between the tank and the
embankment, and was the onl y fatal i ty of the i nci dent. Authori ti es arri ved on the
scene and establ i shed an evacuati on zone of 600m and an i nterventi on zone of
200m around the tank. Shortl y after establ i shi ng these zones a BLEVE occurred
(total ti me from crash to expl osi on was 71 mi nutes). The resul ti ng pressure wave
caused substanti al damage to nearby bui l di ngs, i ncl udi ng broken gl ass and non-
foundati onal cracks. The heat of the expl osi on sparked fi res as far away as 141m,
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damagi ng a nearby ol i ve tree orchard, and wi tnesses reported feel i ng a fl ash of
heated ai r as far away as 600m.

I t i s specul ated by authori ti es that the fi re may have i ni ti al l y been caused by a
l eakage of LNG combi ned wi th an i gni ti on source such as the fri cti on of the
acci dent or the tanker s engi ne. The l eak may have been caused by damage to the
center-mounted val ve-contai ni ng porti on of the tanker, and subsequentl y the
pi pi ng, whi ch was housed near the center ri ght-hand si de of the tank and i s the
l ocati on where i t i s bel i eved i mpact wi th the fl atbed tractor-trai l er occurred. The
truck was a si ngl e-wal l stai nl ess steel tanker wi th pol y-urethane outer i nsul ati on
and an al umi num shel l (i nsul ati on cover), and the crash l ed to an al most-compl ete
l oss of the outer shel l al ong wi th some i nsul ati on. The i nvesti gati on i nto the
i nci dent l ed to the recommendati on to i mprove safety measures by usi ng onl y
doubl e-wal l ed tankers, or i mprovi ng si ngl e-wal l tankers by i nstal l i ng addi ti onal
safety devi ces on pi pel i nes whi ch communi cate LNG between the i nteri or and
exteri or.

25. October 27, 2011 Provi nce of Val enci a, Spai n Not Reported
A tanker truck overturned. No l eak of LNG; No i nj uri es reported. No other
detai l s reported.

26. Apri l 23, 2012 Spai n Not Reported
Smal l l eak of LNG after a truck broke through a traffi c barri er and overturned on
the opposi te si de of a hi ghway i n Spai n. Onl y the dri ver of the tanker was i nj ured.
The truck contents were transferred to another LNG tanker before the road was
cl eared.




Note: I nci dents 16, 17, 18 and 20 were reported on tel evi si on and/or
presented i n the l ocal Boston pri nt medi a. I n every case the medi a
attempted to create a di saster scenari o usi ng meani ngl ess phases such
as bl ast zone and pol i ce crui sers t urned of f l i ght s t o prevent
expl osi ons. I n one case a total l y mi si nformed fi re chi ef stated that
the si tuati on was pot ent i al l y a gi ant bomb. . . . An expl osi on woul d
devast at e a hal f -mi l e i n al l di rect i ons. One of the worst facts
reported was that wat er was hosed ont o t he t anker t o keep t he LNG
cool ! Unfortunatel y, the emergency responders near Reno, NV (as
detai l ed above i n i nci dent number 21) had the same mi sconcepti ons
about the expl osi ve nature of LNG.