MICHAEL BIGGS, 2001

PAGE 1
Distinctions and Research

Dr Michael A R Biggs
Faculty of Art and Design
University of Hertfordshire
College Lane
Hatfield, Herts. AL10 9AB
UK
e-mail m.a.biggs@herts.ac.uk
Abstract. Practice-based research in art and design generates both artefacts and written
material. However, the techniques of enquiry in each mode are quite different. The textual
mode has a long history that includes the familiar and respected technique of "compare and
contrast". This requires the establishment of differences or distinctions between ideas. This
process can be carried out independently of real-world manifestations of these distinctions,
leading to reification of concepts such as "aesthetic attitude" (Kant) and "knowing-in-
action" (Schn). These concepts rely for their belief on a shared system of education and
training that has a greater interest in making distinctions between those who understand the
concepts and those who do not, than in substantiating the distinction between the objects of
comparison themselves.
These two levels of distinction, the comparative technique and training in the comparative
technique, are both highlighted in the work of Bourdieu. The social result of controlling
both aspects generates the concepts of "academic and cultural capital." However, because
this phenomenon relies on an institutional theory of education, epitomised in the master-
apprentice or other elitist models, it stands in opposition to the outcomes of research-based
enquiry. It is definitive of research that outcomes can be validated and communicated. This
subjects its outcomes to a wider scrutiny than the elite circle of the traditional university.
This paper seeks to problematize the consequences of this institutional theory of education
for practice-based research in art and design. Practice-based research results in an academic
practice that is validated by a correspondence model rather than a coherence model. The
paper concludes with the identification of a new species of practice-based academic
researcher: homo generatoris, to complement Bourdieu's traditional homo academicus.

I am grateful for the critical comments of the staff and postgraduate research students of
Studio-e, Department of Theoretical and Applied Aesthetics, University of Lund, and of the
"Digital Bauhaus" at the School of Arts and Communication, University of Malm, on
earlier drafts of this paper.
MICHAEL BIGGS, 2001
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Contents
OBJECTIFICATION ......................................................................................... 3
DISTINCTION AND ARGUMENT....................................................................... 5
INTEREST AND DISINTEREST (KANT) ............................................................ 6
SENSUAL AND CULTURAL SATISFACTION (BOURDIEU)................................. 8
THINKING AND DOING (SCHN) .................................................................. 10
THE UNSAYABLE AND THE UNOBTAINABLE................................................. 13
THE PRACTICE-BASED RESEARCHER AS A NEW SPECIES ............................ 15
The deepest logic of the social world can be grasped only if one plunges
into the particularity of an empirical reality, historically located and dated,
but with the objective of constructing it as a "special case of what is
possible," as Bachelard puts it, that is, as an exemplary case in a finite
world of possible configurations
1
It is still quite common to submit a written thesis for examination at the end
of a research degree in art and design. However, I am pleased to say it is
becoming more common to submit artefacts as an integral part of the
examination too. The role that these artefacts play and the role they have in
the final examination is the subject of much discussion within the field
2
.
This paper concentrates on the written thesis because there are some issues
that arise from the submission of artefacts in addition to the written thesis
that problematize the written component itself.
The written thesis has to contain an argument. This argument will be
pursued using written language and will normally begin by identifying a
problem or research issue that arises within a specific context. The nature of
this context will identify the broad field of the research and the audience for
whom the outcomes of the research will be consequential. The written thesis
may be accompanied by artefacts that do not simply illustrate what is
written, but exemplify it. The result of this exemplification is that the
research will be grounded in real objects. This is perhaps a desirable
outcome of any empirical research but in this case it serves to emphasise
that the construction of a sophisticated linguistic argument in the written
thesis is not sufficient in itself. Creating taxonomies, categories, linguistic
speculations, proofs, etc., needs to be grounded in real-world outcomes that
are meaningful and consequential for the target audience.
MICHAEL BIGGS, 2001
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This paper addresses the philosophical and linguistic practice of creating
opposites for the purposes of conducting this argument. I propose that we
are unduly confident that there is a correspondence between opposites that
we find in the world and opposites that we create through the manipulation
of language. On the contrary, I propose that much discussion in aesthetics
and practical reason is conducted without the kind of clarity that
practitioners would expect regarding whether there are such objects and
distinctions corresponding to the terms used. After all, it is the task of artists
and designers to exemplify the linguistic distinctions that are made in the
argument of the thesis when they present artefacts for examination.
I will take examples from Kant, Schn, and Bourdieu, and discuss the effect
that the creation of binary opposites has on the prosecution of arguments in
creative practice. The outcome of this discussion will be to urge caution in
the use of this technique in research, commonly called "compare and
contrast", because the utility of the technique in argument belies the
difficulty of ensuring that such an argument can be exemplified through
objects and hence presented as grounded theory for practice-based research.
Objectification
Both artists and designers are broadly concerned with the manipulation of
materials and objects in order to create artefacts that have cultural, social, or
religious significance. In addition to considerations of significance are
considerations of functionality. Although both the signifying function and
mechanical functionality tend to emphasise the objective quality of
artefacts, not all artefacts stand out as particularly differentiated from their
contexts. The window frames of a window, or the windows of a building, or
the buildings of a city, do not stand out as differentiated objects unless we
attend to them particularly. For the window frame maker or the architect
some of these objects may always be clearly differentiated but this is owing
to a particular training. In the melee of vision our perception would be
overwhelmed if we were presented with thousands of differentiated objects
at every glance. Indeed, this variable concept of what constitutes the object
about which we are being objective has been the subject of discussion:
in its empirical meaning, the term whole is always only comparative
3
.
We expect the objects of design to exhibit both function and signification,
though designers differ in the emphasis they give each element. When
operating on the functional aspect of design it is clear that the designer will
exaggerate the objective qualities of the artefact. The artefact, or the
developing artefact, becomes a differentiated object as it acquires its new
identity through its [new] function. Furthermore, the act of refining its
function and of testing the artefact in use draws a clear boundary between
MICHAEL BIGGS, 2001
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the artefact and the other objects in the workshop. This clear boundary, or
this boundarying activity, may be compared with the fine art practice of
differentiating objets trouvs. In the latter case the objects are differentiated
by being selected by the artist. They are further differentiated by being
exhibited in a context, the gallery, that draws attention to their new function
as a signifier rather than to their original function.
The differentiation of the object from its context is undertaken by a
perceiving subject and this introduces a number of further difficulties. One
of these is implicit: that judgements pertaining to subjects will be subjective
and that judgements pertaining to objects will be objective. Both the words
"subjective" and "objective" are value laden. We think of objective
judgements as being those which carry some sort of neutral, disengaged,
universal assent; and we label judgements as subjective if we wish to
emphasise that they belong only to one individual: local, biased,
idiosyncratic. In this paper I will use the words in their non-value laden
philosophical sense where the subject is the simply the person who
perceives and the object is that which is perceived.
I wish to object to another connotation of the word "objective". It is the
implication that objective qualities may be measured and quantified. This
reinforces our idea that an objective judgement has some observer-
independent [scientific] basis because the judgement or its grounds can be
measured. This association of objective qualities with an empirical scientific
method is the cause of our association of subjective qualities with artistic or
creative approaches
4
. This in its turn reinforces the false attribution of value
to subjective judgements because they appear to embody preferences rather
than having quantifiable grounds. The final nail in the coffin of aesthetic
judgement is that, because aesthetic training is not widespread, those who
lack an aesthetic education do not recognise that there are any grounds upon
which to make aesthetic judgements.
I have speculated on the cultural basis for a lack of respect for aesthetic
judgement based on the division of subject and object, and a confusion of
these philosophical terms with their value laden counterparts. However, this
paper will criticise this distinction even in its philosophical sense. The
separation has a long history but for the present purpose it seems
appropriate to trace its origins to Descartes. By distancing himself from the
world of objects, Descartes was able to apply himself as a thinking, rational
subject, to the external problems of the nature of the world. This was the
precursor of the scientific method with its combination of empirical
observation and its hypothesising about the invisible underlying structure of
Nature.
It is a characteristic feature of the scientific method that there is a clear
distinction between the subject and the object. It is necessary because of the
MICHAEL BIGGS, 2001
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need of this largely mechanistic model to establish an independent world of
objects. It is part of the underlying philosophy that these independent
objects will continue in their causal relationships even if no one is
witnessing them. Because there is assumed to be an independent world of
objects, we can manipulate them and benefit from the outcomes.
We have therefore established, both in our practices and in our use of
language, a set of identifiable and distinct objects. We also differentiate
ourselves from the objects when we perceive them. Between these objects
and subjects we create relationships and give names to them. Our
classificatory and nominalistic tendencies lead to an objectification of the
world.
Distinction and argument
Amongst the relationships that we create between objects is the relationship
of opposition. Establishing opposites or polarities is a useful technique in
the construction of arguments. Consider the familiar instruction "compare
and contrast", and how much easier it is to make the contrast when the
things to be contrasted are as opposed as possible. Identifying, or even
fabricating, opposites is a fundamental technique of argument. But the
structuring of an argument is a conceptual or linguistic activity and one
must take care when arguing about the nature of the external world, that
there is something that corresponds to each of the linguistic polarities
created. So although it might be convenient for the sake of argument to
establish a polarity, one may not have achieved much in terms of the
advancement of practical understanding in so doing. Perhaps the boundary
between subject and object is more blurred?
This blurring can be invoked if one considers the interpretative role of the
perceiving subject. The subject is not disengaged, in the way that has been
suggested above. The subject brings an interpretational perspective to bear
upon the object. Although the scientific method benefits from
disengagement, it seems inappropriate if not impossible in the case of
artistic or cultural artefacts. Although we might say that the art object causes
a reaction in the viewer, it does not cause this reaction in the way that
causes operate in the scientific model. Rather it stimulates an interpretation
over which the originator does not have full control. For practitioners in the
arts this is not a problem nor does it arouse any anxiety. Indeed the plurality
of interpretation is often a reason why someone prefers arts to science.
However this plurality allows us an insight into the way in which an object
is constructed in part whenever it is perceived. At the point of interpretation
I negotiate my relationship with the object anew: significatio es percipi
5
.
MICHAEL BIGGS, 2001
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"Radical objectification" is therefore a discretionary act. It involves the
separating out of a particular experience from its experiential context. To
achieve this one must superimpose conceptual structures onto received
experiences. These are constrained by the limits of the natural language that
one uses, e.g. English. There are therefore at least two overlapping
positions, the imposition of conceptual structures and the imposition of
linguistic structures, that affect the conceptualisation of experience. Since
both of these contain a variable, i.e. alternative conceptual structures and
alternative linguistic structures, I assert that the conceptualisation of
experience is discretionary. For example, at the central point of Sartre's La
Nause, Roquentin becomes fatally alienated from his conceptualisation of
the roots of a tree. What he seeks is a pre-reflexive consciousness in which
the experience of the root of the tree can be unmediated. This ideal of "pure"
experience, or conceptual choice, may be contrasted with the reflexive
consciousness that is epitomised by Descartes and the scientific method.
Maintaining a pre-reflexive consciousness or immanent perception of an
object is an extremely difficult thing to do. It may be impossible. It requires
the suspension of all of our cognitive and conceptualising powers that
normally we are encouraged to exercise. It is all too easy to end up in "bad-
faith"
6
. All too often one recounts experience as a narrative to oneself and
thereby falsifies it. The immediacy of experience is just that, immediate and
experiential. How can that be captured and documented in the creative
process, and worse, how can one make a narrative report or thesis of that
process for someone else? The breaking down of the boundary between the
subject and the object is useful because it is a characteristic of design to
both construct objects and to construct meanings. Constructing new objects
changes existing meanings. The activity of design therefore requires a
dynamic concept of objects, not a static one.
Unfortunately the dominant model for aesthetic judgement is Kant's, whose
approach to philosophical aesthetics requires the separation of the
perceiving subject from the object of contemplation. In The Critique Of
Judgement he names this mode of contemplation "disinterestedness"
7
. It is
by obtaining an appropriate condition of disinterestedness that we can find
agreement in judgements of taste. And so even in the area of aesthetics,
where we might think that the engagement of the subject was important for
interpretation, we find a reinforcement of the idea that the separation of the
perceiving subject from the object of perception is advantageous
8
.
Interest and disinterest (Kant)
Let me unpack these ideas a little more. Kant said that our aesthetic
response to an object is our first-hand, direct, felt response to a particular
object. It is because we react to the object and not to some general rule of
MICHAEL BIGGS, 2001
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aesthetics that we find that people's aesthetic responses to objects differ
from one another. Kant distinguishes between this first-hand, direct, felt
response and judgements of taste. What he sought was a means of
describing and prescribing visual judgements as part of the political project
to validate certain visual judgements as correct judgements. It is these
"politically [in]correct" judgements that are judgements of taste. In order to
make pure judgements of taste one must achieve a uniform intellectual
vantage point and that implies a level of education and control. By
becoming disinterested one achieves a freedom from desire, practical
concern, and conceptual understanding. Only when one has achieved these
three conditions is one in a position to make a judgement of taste. We might
consider that these conditions will rarely be met and this explains why
agreement in judgements of taste is so rare.
It strikes the modern reader as surprising that aesthetic judgement should
boil down to a judgement of taste. It seems all the more surprising when one
discovers that a correct judgement of taste is taken to be universal whereas
aesthetic judgement may result in merely a personal satisfaction
9
. We tend
to use these words in the opposite sense, that taste is purely personal and
that aesthetic judgement is the larger, grander, and more universal form of
judgement: de gustibus non est disputandum. Similarly, we may feel less
inclined than Kant to attribute an ethical status to aesthetic outcomes, i.e. to
distinguish between the good and the agreeable
10
.
If we were to look at Kant's method from a contemporary point of view we
might say he was attempting a linguistic analysis of aesthetic judgement.
What constitutes aesthetic judgement is influenced by what he analyses to
be its constituent parts. These parts are differentiated by bearing different
names. Although he presents his project as though it were classificatory or
essentially one of giving names to things, one can also conceive of his
project as nominalistic: providing definitions or discriminations between
existing terms and hypothesising that there are substantives that correspond
to these terms. This analysis of linguistic usage has contemporary resonance
because in the twenty-first century we have less confidence that inspection
of the external world will reveal its latent structure. We are just as likely to
inspect our language and to be critical of the existence of these implied
substantives. The difference between the eighteenth century and the twenty-
first is that in the latter there is a scepticism about whether language and the
external world are necessarily connected.
There is one key difference between the type of linguistic analysis that Kant
undertakes and the type that would be undertaken today. In the terms of this
paper Kant is a radical nominalist. That is to say, he assumes a substantive
for every name and he compares and contrasts the entities to which the
names refer. This method is quite different from the approach of, for
example, Wittgenstein. Were Wittgenstein to undertake the same inquiry he
MICHAEL BIGGS, 2001
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might prefer to say that the names associated with aesthetic judgement form
a family, and our ability to use these names or words in an appropriate
context is quite independent of being able to provide a definition for each
11
.
In the same way, we may be able to use the different words associated with
aesthetic judgement and still not be able to define the difference between
them. Indeed there may not be one aspect that binds them all together. If one
approaches Kant's project from this direction one may not wish to assume
that there is a substantive that corresponds to the word "beautiful" or
"sublime", or to ethical and aesthetic satisfaction.
The nominalistic tendency has a long tradition in philosophy and it is even
tempting in ordinary conversation to ask questions such as "what-is-the-
meaning-of a word?", trying to take it out of context. But we cannot mean
anything by a word out of context, only a word in the context of a sentence
or an action
12
. We acquire provisional definitions based on a context where
there were no objections to a particular name or word been used in relation
to a particular practice. But this is the part that is missing from Kant. We do
not know the original context of the expressions "good", "satisfaction",
"beautiful", etc. Therefore we do not know whether we share a practical
context with Kant; we do not know whether we share a practical application
of this term with the user. Defining or redefining these terms will depend
upon a comparison with linguistic practice. It should also be recognised that
linguistic practice in the eighteenth century may have been different from
linguistic practice in the twenty-first century.
This objection to Kant's reification of the objects of aesthetic appreciation
has a parallel in my objection to the separation of the perceiving subject and
its objects. The establishment of a subject/object polarisation is attractive for
the purposes of argument and definition, but it also achieves the nominalist's
sleight of hand by reifying this distinction and arguing the separate
existence of both a subject and an object. While we might make a linguistic
distinction between subject and object and thereby discover a lot about how
we use these terms, this does not necessarily imply there is such a
corresponding distinction in the external world. Similarly we may find that
hypothesising the beautiful and the sublime gains little in the practical
business of doing and thinking in art and design.
Sensual and cultural satisfaction (Bourdieu)
The separation of desire, practical concern, and conceptual understanding
from art and design practice would have a considerable impact on theories
of commodification and design history. It would also surprise designers if
they were told that their work would be enhanced if they gave less
consideration to the practical and to conceptual understanding. Nor would
this difficulty be confined to designers, since the purchaser of a designed
MICHAEL BIGGS, 2001
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object normally exercises some practical concerns and once an object enters
into common use our interpretations of its significance are bound up with
our conceptual understanding of it.
One of the possible ways of discussing interest or desire is to consider how
that interest or desire could be satisfied. It is an important element of Kant's
critique that if an object exists and is present to our senses, then that
presence modifies our pleasure or satisfaction in it when compared with
objects that are only present in our minds. Naturally, our senses can only be
satisfied when an object is present, but there is also a form of satisfaction in
the imaginary or remembered. The kind of satisfaction that is available if
one has only objects of contemplation rather than objects before one,
emphasises the abstract and intellectual nature of the satisfaction. It is an
appreciation that is "independent of its content"
13
.
The ability to establish a distance from necessity is a mark of what Bourdieu
calls the possession of "cultural capital". Unfortunately this distance
separates the concept of pleasure and the sense-response that is its cause.
Both Kant and Bourdieu value this distance highly and use it to differentiate
the low-value sensual judgements of objects present to the senses, from the
high-value judgements of taste based on their absence. The notion of taste
is the separable, comparative aesthetic judgement that can be universalised,
but is only available to those who have benefited from an aesthetic
education: the possessors of cultural capital
14
. Those who do not possess
cultural capital are disabled in their ability to discuss aesthetic judgement
except in cases where the object under discussion, or its aesthetic properties,
are both present and manifested. They do not have a comprehensive
vocabulary of words and concepts because they have not had an appropriate
education. This explains why such discussions tend to be confined to likes
and dislikes. This distinction is further reinforced by the institutionalisation
of aesthetic discourse.
The educational system makes possible a more or less adequate symbolic
mastery of the practical principles of taste
15
.
Deficiency in judgement is just what is ordinarily called stupidity, and for
such a failing there is no remedy
16
.
If we accept Bourdieu's analysis that cultural capital is essentially a social
construct, that is, it is organised as much with reference to controlling its
participation as with its content, it becomes clearer that education, i.e.
"academic capital", is a prerequisite for the acquisition of cultural capital. It
is only those who are educationally equipped to identify the characteristic
distinctions of aesthetics, and to be satisfied by the insensuous nature of
these as stimuli, who are eligible for enfranchisement as cultural capitalists.
This is an institutionalisation of the Kantian model. The educational
MICHAEL BIGGS, 2001
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experience is also normally accompanied by the possession of economic
capital. Both the objects of culture and a cultural and aesthetic education are
expensive. They can further be seen as expensive since their results do not
have an economically productive application. The key is that economic
capital enables the acquisition of academic capital, and academic capital
enables cultural capital. It is important for the concept of art as something
culturally distinct and of value, that it is distinct from ordinary sensual
notions such as greed (economic capital) and pride (academic capital).
This certainly empowers some groups above others. The aesthetic
judgement that something is "just right" can only be made by someone
whose judgement we accept and in circumstances where the justification
that something is just right is not made against practical concern, disabling
"practicality" as a part of justification. Therefore if one's own judgement is
not accepted by those who hold cultural capital one is effectively disabled
from arguing in favour of it. The opportunity for an unspoken clique is now
very great. The in-crowd possess cultural capital are able to make
judgements without having to validate them in any other way than by appeal
to the consent of their peers. This has implications for the education of the
cultural classes and for the training of designers. In contemporary training
by the master-apprentice method, the concept of recognising what is "right"
is very prevalent.
Thinking and doing (Schn)
Unfortunately the maker of designed artefacts commonly adopts an
interested rather than a disinterested relationship with the artefact. When
one is designing, one is intimate with the object of one's creation. The
designer imbues the object with something of himself or herself. It becomes
an extension of the designer's self. This is particularly apparent in the
Romantic concept of fine art in which the artist consciously expresses
himself or herself through the object.
Donald Schn has examined the activities of the practitioner and attempted
to account for the ways in which practical decisions are made and evaluated
(reflection-in-action)
17
. In particular, he has attempted to account for the
way in which this empirical activity is translated into tacit knowledge
(knowledge-in-action). If such a transfer can be substantiated it would be of
importance to practice-based research because it would describe how one
could generate an outcome that was transferable and consequential for other
practitioners, without the intervention of linguistic structures.
One aspect of practice that is difficult to express in language is the process
of reflection that occurs at the time of implementation. These two activities
occur more-or-less simultaneously and the process is not necessarily
MICHAEL BIGGS, 2001
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explicitly conceptualised. Indeed, we have seen above that Sartre implicates
the process of narration in the falsification of experience (p.6). Schn calls
this non-linguistic reflection "reflection-in-action" and it is a familiar mode
of operation for practitioners. They will often say that they are responding to
the object: what Schn calls "back-talk" and Dewey calls "the dialogue with
the object"
18
. It is possible because at the moment of creation the object
moves from imagination to experience, thus becoming available for sensory
perception and response. In the studio one is constantly able to put the
design alternatives into a cycle of implementation and experiential
evaluation. It is the immediate availability of this cycle of implementation
and evaluation that gives power to reflection-in-action.
An example of reflection-in-action is somebody planing a piece of wood.
Here one has the combination of the structure of the timber, the sharpness of
the blade, the setting of the plane, the stance of the craftsperson, the sound
that the plane makes in use, the form of the shavings, etc. From a
combination of this sensory information the experienced craftsperson
modifies what he or she is doing without necessarily being able to identify
which of these indicators has been the key to the modification in the
performance. The experience consists of something like "when I last planed
a material of this sort successfully it sounded/smelt/felt like this, or more
like that". It is a feature of the reflection-in-action method that evaluation
occurs concurrently with implementation, which is not the case with
theoretical or linguistic evaluation.
In Schn's example of the architecture student, the student is puzzled about
how to approach the design of a building on a slope
19
. The intervention of
the experienced practitioner is to draw on the design sheets but at the same
time to express the advice that the slope needs to have a geometry imposed
on it. This was a response to the back-talk and was a method that the
experienced practitioner knew about, but the student didn't. The approach
was chosen by the experienced practitioner from a range of possible
solutions that he had as a result of experience. Not only are individual
alternatives available from this range of possibilities, but the experienced
practitioner also has experience of how several alternatives may be
combined in novel ways, and creative and stylistic factors that maintain
aesthetic coherence whilst enhancing functionality. It is a mixture of tacit
"knowing-in-action" and explicit "knowledge-in-action".
A feature of Schn's case studies is that although it is accepted that the ideas
are provisional, in the sense that the ideas could be further developed and
that they are an intermediate step, the proposals are also discretionary in the
sense that they are not the only solutions. A different practitioner with a
different vocabulary of solutions would come up with a different but equally
valid recommendation for the particular problem. To some extent this is
what makes them practical solutions as opposed to theoretical solutions.
MICHAEL BIGGS, 2001
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With the theoretical model, although one theory might be replaced by
another, there is more of a sense in which it is the best general solution for
the time being.
The key indicator of knowing-in-action is ineffability, the inability to put
this into words, not the disinclination to do so. Schn proposes a number of
key points
20
, the last of which is to say that the practitioner "gives an artistic
performance." The fact that it is expressed through action does not itself
determine that it could not be expressed through words. This is an important
issue for anyone who wishes to defend the role of practice, or the critical
content of reflection-in-action, in practice-based research. The defence
requires that there is some aspect of knowledge that cannot be identified
through language-based inquiry. In particular, that it makes it necessary to
conduct an argument through the use of artefacts rather than through the use
of words.
There are some important consequences for the application of knowing-in-
action to research in art and design. If one wants to train or educate an
apprentice one must either tell them how to do something or show them how
to do something. Telling them how obviously requires putting this
knowledge into words but the practitioner frequently objects that some
things cannot be put into words, or that it is undesirable to do so. Therefore
this leaves showing. However showing how one does something does not
reveal why one should do it this way. Indeed, although we can show how,
we cannot show why, we can only tell why. It is a fundamental requirement
of research that it is able to communicate not "know-how" but "know-why",
so that practice is not arbitrary but informed.
There seems to be very little difference between knowing-in-action and
knowing-in-theory. Both are concerned to identify assumptions that may
limit understanding. Schn's notion of reflection on fundamental methods
simply seems to be what any theorist does in stepping back from particular
theories but nonetheless staying within or identifying norms that are not
going to be changed
21
. Similarly research on the process of reflection-in-
action centres around the idea of identifying paradigms that one is shifting
and that therefore limit the scope of understanding action
22
. I suppose one of
my main criticisms concerns the idea that reflection-in-action is anything
other than the kind of inquiry undertaken by any researcher: it is a mixture
of theoretical thinking and practical doing and testing. None of this is
particular to art and design, or to practice-based research. The idea of
reflecting on fundamental methods shows that practitioners and theorists
work in a similar way: the practitioner is simply employing a different
approach as agent-experimenter (performative approach) to that of the
theorist (a linguistic approach), and the practitioner can learn from that
alternative approach. Even Schn's practitioner eventually asks "have I
made [the solution] congruent with my fundamental values and theories?"
23
,
MICHAEL BIGGS, 2001
PAGE 13
demonstrating the necessity of both theory and practice in practice-led
research. This practice-based activity is no different from the activity of the
theorist. Both are interested in an increase in answerability. Both compare
individual cases to model solutions that have been successful in the past and
identify individual elements that might be applicable to the new case.
The unsayable and the unobtainable
We have seen from Kant that it is possible to argue for a set of conditions
that allows agreement in aesthetic judgements. It is based on the ability to
adopt an appropriate aesthetic attitude, a relationship of disinterestedness to
the object of aesthetic appreciation. This attitude is the mark of someone
who has been appropriately educated, not only to understand and adopt this
attitude but also to be satisfied by the outcomes
24
. This kind of aesthetic
appreciation distances one's senses from the object and so the satisfaction is
sublimated. It is a curious outcome of Kant's theory that the most
appropriate aesthetic attitude denies sensual satisfaction and yet the term
"aesthetic" seems to imply the employment and enjoyment of the senses.
The kind of education that Kant is interested in is the kind of education
appropriate for a connoisseur. It assumes that the objects of aesthetic
appreciation are already created. Indeed, the very act of disinterestedness
militates against it as a possible theory of aesthetic production. Schn on the
other hand, is concerned to describe modes of thinking and doing that are
appropriate for creating the objects of aesthetic appreciation. However, there
is something that is similar in Schn's philosophy and Kant's. This shows
itself in the philosophy of the unsayable. Schn's theory values approaches
that are based on experience and passed on in a master-apprentice
relationship. However this does not explain how one might generate new or
novel solutions other than by trial and error. Indeed, trial and error are still
likely to have limited success because the continual process of evaluation
that occurs during practice will be conducted with reference to examples
that are already part of the practitioner's repertoire.
This limitation in Schn is perpetuated by the concept of "reframing the
question", which seems to be influenced more by possible alternatives than
by a fundamental analysis of the nature and possibilities of the question. The
possibility of reframing the question according to precedents restricts the
range of possible solutions even if it enables the student to escape from the
temporary trap in which he finds himself. The master-apprentice model does
not encourage radical change.
The problem of inherent conservatism is also central to Bourdieu, who
explicitly criticises the new aristocracy of cultural capital and the ways in
which society and education conspire to reinforce these differences. One of
MICHAEL BIGGS, 2001
PAGE 14
Bourdieu's criticisms is that those who do not possess cultural capital also
fail to possess the educational and particularly the linguistic tools by which
distinctions might be made and their cultural capital might be increased
25
.
Education, particularly that which does not offer a point of entry for the
dispossessed or clear economic benefits, is a tool of exclusion. This may be
compared with Kant, who denies the ability to share correct judgements of
taste with those who do not possess the ability to adopt an appropriately
insensuous aesthetic attitude. For different reasons Kant, Schn, and
Bourdieu all implicate education, and in particular the acquisition of
specialised language, as a tool for creating distinctions. It might be objected
that Schn's approach is explicitly practical and therefore less susceptible to
this linguistic criticism. However, as I have indicated above, there are two
key points at which "language" plays its part: (a) the reliance on the
vocabulary of options possessed by the master, (b) the technique of
reframing the question. We might say, in order to clarify the objection, in all
three cases: Kant, Schn and Bourdieu; a conservative form of education
that perpetuates the status quo is essential and those who are dispossessed of
such an education are excluded from possession of knowledge and its social
application. The restricted availability and conservative nature of this
education is perpetuated in the master-apprentice model. It polarises the
possession of academic capital from those without it, and reinforces
distinctions in its method of identifying and describing knowledge, i.e. the
method of compare and contrast.
The great difference between research and other forms of studio practice is
the extent to which the outcomes are transferable. This is why we refer to
the outcomes of research as knowledge. Knowledge is something that it
generally useful, not just useful in relation to a particular question. This has
parallels with the scientific method and the way that we talk about general
or universal rules or theories. Practice-based research is not likely to result
in generating rules because the context determines that it is generating
artefacts. The knowledge that arises from those artefacts must be
transferable into other contexts. Kant's aesthetic theory seemed to offer a
route by which we might disengage from the particular and thereby enhance
the transferability of our judgements. However this disengagement requires
a particular kind of training because we must attend less to the sensual
satisfaction of an object and more to its intellectual satisfaction. This kind of
intellectualised aesthetic appreciation is the preserve of the few. It is
particularly the preserve of the connoisseur. It is therefore a minority
possession associated with the educated classes and the possessors of power
and authority that has little application in the context of aesthetic
production.
Schn's educational programme also results in it becoming a minority
activity. This is not caused by it being a class-based activity but by the
inefficiencies of the master-apprentice model. The kind of one-to-one
MICHAEL BIGGS, 2001
PAGE 15
training that Schn requires results in a limited number of practitioners, but
these practitioners will have a very high level of familiarity with the
concepts and practices of their respective masters. It is therefore an
exclusive model of education that preserves and empowers judgements, and
makes it difficult for those who have not shared the educational experience
to understand the basis of these judgements. Because these judgements are
not put into language their grounds are not apparent or accessible.
The power basis of this institutionalisation of education has been theorised
by Bourdieu. In addition to conferring power and authority, such a theory
also preserves conservatism. This conservatism arises from the defensive
attitude of the process. Part of its function is to exclude the majority. It
therefore relies on a set of codes that are not freely available or on aesthetic
attitudes that are not common. The models of Kant, Schn and Bourdieu, or
at least the models of activity that Bourdieu describes, can be contrasted
with practice-based research. Because the outcomes of research must be
public and subject to scrutiny they must expose the basis of their
judgements. This may be made explicit in language or in practice.
The practice-based researcher as a new species
There is an issue here of both form and content. We have seen that
identifying or creating distinctions is a normal activity of those who possess
academic capital. That is to say, it is part of the process of academic
education to equip students with certain standard methodologies including
that of compare and contrast. These techniques are so familiar amongst
those who have had this educational experience that they become habits of
thought or normal modes of operation. The habituation to this method
encourages the reification of the outcomes. Thus we come to believe that
because we can draw distinctions in theory we can also draw these
distinctions in practice.
Such training is reinforced by the various modes of instruction implicit in
Kant and Schn. Kant's model perpetuates the activity by changing our
normal mode of interaction and appreciation of objects from an interested
mode to a disinterested mode. The training in making judgements involves
training in a certain attitude prior to making the judgement. Such an attitude
need not be regarded as natural, and it is an assumption of this paper that it
is unnatural. The particular training method of Schn is the master-
apprentice model which tends to pass on received opinion and is only
available to small numbers of participants. Both of these models create an
educational elite who are habituated into making distinctions that, although
coherent, are reified, giving rise to the false impression that there are
substantives that correspond to them.
MICHAEL BIGGS, 2001
PAGE 16
These are outcomes of content, but there are also outcomes of form, (though
I am prepared to concede that the distinction of form and content is itself a
distinction that only the professional academic

would make). The outcome
of form in Kant's model is related to its appropriateness as a training for the
connoisseur. It becomes a mode of judgement that is appropriate for
collectable objects. It is not a useful critical mode for the creation of
artefacts because the disinterested attitude precludes the engagement that the
maker has with the object of creation. This separates the maker from the
consumer of cultural artefacts, further polarising the possessed and
dispossessed, and the makers from the consumers. The formal outcome of
Schn's model is that aesthetic judgements are difficult or impossible to put
into words. This results in judgements about the "rightness" of objects
which can be only be made by those who have had an appropriate training
or have been elevated to the status of a master. These judgements are made
without explicit reference to their grounds.
The problematic outcome of form in the argument of both Kant and Schn,
is the creation of two classes of person in relation to aesthetic judgements,
and the separation of the grounds of aesthetic judgements from the objects
of aesthetic appreciation. Both of these separations are incompatible with
the nature of research in which there are the explicit concepts of
communicable outcomes together with the justified grounds for them. In
design, where the outcome of practice-based research may result in both
practical and theoretical components, one must ensure a continued
correspondence between the two elements. To achieve this, Kantian
aesthetic judgements would need to be moderated by Schn's engagement
with the artefact and Schn's ineffable "rightness" would need to be
moderated by a Kantian-style attempt to account for agreements in
judgements of taste. All this takes place in the context of the university
because it is principally homo academicus
26
who has sufficient academic
capital and who seeks to validate practice as research, or through a research
degree, rather than through professional or peer recognition.
In conclusion, there is a distinction that we might seek to maintain: the
distinction between form and content. The practitioner needs to reject the
distinctions of form in Schn and Kant but maintain the distinction of
content because of the context of the university. Homo academicus is no
longer alone there. There is a new species, the practice-based researcher:
homo generatoris. Homo generatoris also lives in the university and is
bound by the imperative to communicate the outcomes of its researches.
However homo generatoris makes its living in a different way. Rather than
living off the creation of distinctions, it lives off the creation of artefacts.
These artefacts may be regarded as distinct from their contexts, but in
making such a move we are beginning to make the transition from the
natural environment of homo generatoris to the environment of homo
academicus. Homo generatoris is interested in concepts that facilitate
MICHAEL BIGGS, 2001
PAGE 17
production rather than criticism. Homo generatoris is aware of the language
of distinctions that is the natural mode of homo academicus, but also critical
of some of its conservative consequences.
These two species validate their research in different ways. Homo
academicus employs the criterion of coherence. This means that the
outcome of its research is valid if it is coherent with the theories and
expectations that are found in the research context. This is an appeal to the
authority of the master in the master-apprentice model. On the other hand,
homo generatoris employs the criterion of correspondence. This means that
the outcome of its research is valid if it can be demonstrated at there is some
correspondence between the theoretical outcomes and the world of objects
or artefacts. This is an appeal to the authority of valid interpretation. In other
words the text-based outcomes are validated by comparison with the
artefact-based outcomes. This is the model required by practice-based
research.
Homo generatoris is an offspring of homo academicus and benefits from an
understanding of its predecessor's language. It is at home in the university
and regards many of the traditional subject disciplines as its natural
territory. The trivial difference between these two species is the physical
nature of their research outcomes. The substantial difference between these
two species is the method by which these research outcomes are validated.

1
Bourdieu, P. Practical Reason: on the theory of action Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998, 2
2
e.g. "Research into Practice" http://www.artdes.herts.ac.uk/res2prac/
3
Kant Critique Of Pure Reason translated by J.M.D. Meiklejohn. London: Dent, 1934
[1781], A483/B511
4
cf. Biggs, M.A.R. "On Method: the problem of objectivity" in: Durling, D. and K.
Friedman (eds.) Doctoral Education in Design: foundations for the future. Stoke-on-Trent,
UK: Staffordshire University Press, 2000, 209-214
5
a modification of Berkeley's esse es percipi in: A Treatise Concerning the Principles of
Human Knowledge London: Dent, 1972 [1710], I 3
6
cf. Sartre, J-P. Being and Nothingness Translated by Hazel Barnes. London: Methuen,
1969 [1943], 47ff.
7
uninteressiert (205) or ohne alle Interesse (211) in: Kant, I. The Critique of Judgement
translated by J.C. Meredith. London: Oxford University Press, 1952 [1790]. Original
German text taken from http://gutenberg.aol.de/kant/kuk/kuk.htm [accessed January 2001].
Page references are to the Akademie edition of Kant's works.
8
cf. Scruton "Judging architecture" in: Palmer, J. and M. Dodson Design and Aesthetics
London: Routledge, 1996, 21
9
Bourdieu, P. Distinction: a social critique of the judgement of taste translated by Richard
Nice. London: Routledge, 1984 [1979], 31, Kant Critique of Judgement, 211
10
Kant Critique of Judgement, 207
11
Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical Investigations amended second edition, translated by
G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1997 [1953] 23-38
12
cf. Austin, J.L. Philosophical Papers, London: Oxford University Press, 1961, 23ff.
13
Bourdieu Distinction 53, Kant Critique of Judgement, 281
14
Bourdieu Distinction 66, Kant Critique of Judgement, 281
MICHAEL BIGGS, 2001
PAGE 18

15
Bourdieu Distinction 67
16
Kant Critique Of Pure Reason A134/B173
17
Schn, D. The Reflective Practitioner Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 1991
18
ibid, 131, Dewey, J. Art as Experience New York: Minton Balch and Co., 1934, 106
19
Schn, D. The Reflective Practitioner, 79ff.
20
ibid. 129f.
21
Schn, D. The Reflective Practitioner Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 1991, 317
22
ibid., 320
23
ibid., 133
24
cf. Scruton "Judging Architecture" in: Palmer, J. and M. Dodson Design and Aesthetics
London: Routledge, 1996, 14
25
Bourdieu Distinction 50
26
Bourdieu's concept of the institutionalised academic in: Homo Academicus Cambridge:
Polity Press, 1988 [1984]