G.R. No.

80762 March 19, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FAUSTA GONZALES, AUGUSTO GONZALES, CUSTODIO GONZALES, SR., CUSTODIO GONZALES, JR., NERIO GONZALES
and ROGELIO LANIDA, accused, CUSTODIO GONZALES, SR., accused-appellant.

SARMIENTO, J.:
In a decision
1
dated October 31, 1984, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch XXXVIII (38), in Criminal Case No. 13661, entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Fausta Gonzales, Augusto Gonzales, Custodia Gonzales, Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales and
Rogelio Lanida," found all the accused, except Rogelio Lanida who eluded arrest and up to now has remain at large and not yet
arrained, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. They were
sentenced "to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months
of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased victim in the amount of P40,000.00, plus moral damages in the sum of
P14,000.00 and to pay the costs."
2
The victim was Lloyd Peacerrada, 44, landowner, and a resident of Barangay Aspera, Sara, Iloilo.
Through their counsel, all the accused, except of course Rogelio Lanida, filed a notice of appeal from the trial court's decision. During
the pendency of their appeal and before judgment thereon could be rendered by the Court of Appeals, however, all the accused-
appellants, except Custodio Gonzales, Sr., withdrew their appeal and chose instead to pursue their respective applications for parole
before the then Ministry, now Department, of Justice, Parole Division.
3

On October 27, 1987, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
4
on the appeal of Custodio Gonzales, Sr. It modified the appealed
decision in that the lone appellant was sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of Lloyd Peacerrada in the amount
of P30,000.00. In all other respect, the decision of the trial court was affirmed. Further, on the basis of our ruling in People
vs. Ramos,
5
the appellate court certified this case to us for review.
6

The antecedent facts are as follows:
At around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of February 21, 1981, Bartolome Paja, the barangay captain of Barangay Tipacla, Ajuy, Iloilo,
was awakened from his sleep by the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. Augusto informed Paja that his wife had just killed their
landlord, Lloyd Peacerrada, and thus would like to surrender to the authorities. Seeing Augusto still holding the knife allegedly used in
the killing and Fausta with her dress smeared with blood, Paja immediately ordered a nephew of his to take the spouses to the police
authorities at the Municipal Hall in Poblacion, Ajuy. As instructed, Paja's nephew brought the Gonzales spouses, who "backrode" on his
motorcycle, to the municipal building.
7
Upon reaching the Ajuy Police sub-station, the couple informed the police on duty of the
incident. That same night, Patrolman Salvador Centeno of the Ajuy Police Force and the Gonzales spouses went back to Barangay
Tipacla. Reaching Barangay Tipacla the group went to Paja's residence where Fausta was made to stay, while Paja, Patrolman
Centeno, and Augusto proceeded to the latter's residence at Sitio Nabitasan where the killing incident allegedly occurred.
8
There they
saw the lifeless body of Lloyd Peacerrada, clad only in an underwear, sprawled face down inside the bedroom.
9
The group stayed for
about an hour during which time Patrolman Centeno inspected the scene and started to make a rough sketch thereof and the
immediate surroundings.
10
The next day, February 22, 1981, at around 7:00 o'clock in the morning, Patrolman Centeno, accompanied
by a photographer, went back to the scene of the killing to conduct further investigations. Fausta Gonzales, on the other hand, was
brought back that same day by Barangay Captain Paja to the police substation in Ajuy. When Patrolman Centeno and his companion
arrived at Sitio Nabitasan, two members of the 321st P.C. Company stationed in Sara, Iloilo, who had likewise been informed of the
incident, were already there conducting their own investigation. Patrolman Centeno continued with his sketch; photographs of the
scene were likewise taken. The body of the victim was then brought to the Municipal Hall of Ajuy for autopsy.
The autopsy of Lloyd Peacerrada's cadaver was performed at about 11:20 a.m. on February 22, 1981; after completed, a report was
made with the following findings:
PHYSICAL FINDINGS
1. Deceased is about 5 ft. and 4 inches in height, body moderately built and on cadaveric rigidity.
EXTERNAL FINDINGS
1. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 9 cm. in length, located at the lower 3rd anterior aspect of the arm, right,
directed upward to the right axillary pit.
2. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the proximal 3rd, forearm right, posterior aspect with an entrance of 5 cm.
in width and 9 cm. in length with an exit at the middle 3rd, posterior aspect of the forearm, right, with 1 cm. wound
exit.
3. Stab wound, thru and thru, located at the middle 3rd, posterior aspect of the forearm right, 1 cm. in width.
4. Incised wound, 4 cm. long, depth visualizing the right lateral border of the sternum, 6th and 7th ribs, right located
1.5 inches below the right nipple.
5. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 10.5 cm. in depth, directed inward to the thoracic cavity right, located at the left
midclavicular line at the level of the 5th rib left.
6. Stab wound, 2 cm. in width, 9.5 cm. in depth directed toward the right thoracic cavity, located at the mid left
scapular line at the level of the 8th intercostal space.
7. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, located at the base of the left armpit directed toward the left thoracic cavity.
8. Puncture wound, 1 cm. in width, 11 cm. in length, directed toward the left deltoid muscle, located at the upper 3rd
axilla left.
9. Puncture wound, 3 cm in width, 11.5 cm in length, located at the anterior aspect, proximal 3rd arm left, directed
downward.
10. Stab wound, thru and thru, 2.5 cm. in width, and 5 cm. in length, medial aspect, palm right.
11. Stabwound, 4 cm.in width, iliac area, right, directed inward with portion of large intestine and mysentery coming
out.
12. Stab wound, 4 cm. in width, located at the posterior portion of the shoulder, right, directed downward to the
aspex of the light thoracic cavity.
13. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 10 cm. in length, located at the medial portion of the medial border of the right
scapula.
14. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 4.5 cm. in length, located at the posterior aspect of the right elbow.
15. Incised wound, 1 cm. in width, 2 cm. in length, located at the posterior portion, middle 3rd, forearm, right.
16. Lacerated wound at the anterior tantanelle with fissural fracture of the skull.
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. Stab wound No. 5, injuring the left ventricle of the heart.
2. Stab wound No. 6, severely injuring the right lower lobe of the lungs.
3. Stab wound No. 7, injuring the right middle lobe of the lungs.
4. Stab wound No. 11, injuring the descending colon of the large intestine, thru and thru.
5. Stab wound No. 12, severely injuring the apex of the right lungs (sic).
CAUSE OF DEATH:
MASSIVE HEMMORRHAGE DUE TO MULTIPLE LACERATED, STABBED (sic),
INCISED AND PUNCTURED WOUNDS.
JESUS
D.
ROJAS,
M.D.
Rural
Health
Physicia
n
Ajuy,
Iloilo
11

The autopsy report thus showed that Dr. Rojas "found sixteen (16) wounds, five (5) of which are fatal because they penetrated the
internal organs, heart, lungs and intestines of the deceased."
12

On February 23, two days after the incident, Augusto Gonzales appeared before the police sub-station in the poblacion of Ajuy and
voluntarily surrendered to Police Corporal Ben Sazon for detention and protective custody for "having been involved" in the killing of
Lloyd Peacerrada. He requested that he be taken to the P.C. headquarters in Sara, Iloilo where his wife, Fausta, was already detained
having been indorsed thereat by the Ajuy police force.
13

Based on the foregoing and on the investigations conducted by the Ajuy police force and the 321st P.C. Company, an information for
murder dated August 26, 1981, was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo against the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. The
information read as follows:
The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses FAUSTA GONZALES and AUGUSTO GONZALES of the crime of MURDER
committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of February, 1981, in the Municipality of Ajuy, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused with four other companions whose identities are still
unknown and are still at large, armed with sharp-pointed and deadly weapons, conspiring, confederating and helping
each other, with treachery and evident premeditation, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, and taking
advantage of their superior strength and number, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault, stab, hack, hit and wound Lloyd D. Peacerrada, with the weapons with which said accused were provided at
the time, thereby inflicting upon said Lloyd D. Peacerrada multiple wounds on different parts of his body as shown
by autopsy report attached to the record of this case which multifarious wounds caused the immediate death of said
Lloyd D. Peacerrada.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Iloilo City, August 26, 1981.
14

When arraigned on September 16, 1981, Augusto and Fausta both entered a plea of not guilty. Before trial, however, Jose
Huntoria
15
who claimed to have witnessed the killing of Lloyd Peacerrada, presented himself to Nanie Peacerrada, the victim's
widow, on October 6, 1981, and volunteered to testify for the prosecution. A reinvestigation of the case was therefore conducted by
the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo on the basis of which an Amended Information,
16
dated March 3, 1982, naming as additional accused
Custodio Gonzales, Sr. (the herein appellant), Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales, and Rogelio Lanida, was filed. Again, all the
accused except as earlier explained, Lanida, pleaded not guilty to the crime.
At the trial, the prosecution presented Dr. Jesus Rojas, the Rural Health physician of Ajuy who conducted the autopsy on the body of
the victim; Bartolome Paja, the barangay captain of Barangay Tipacla; Patrolman Salvador Centeno and Corporal Ben Sazon of the Ajuy
Police Force; Sgt. (ret) Nicolas Belicanao and Sgt. Reynaldo Palomo of the 321st P.C. Company based in Sara, Iloilo; Jose Huntoria; and
Nanie Peacerrada, the widow.
Dr. Jesus Rojas testified that he performed the autopsy on the body of the deceased Lloyd Penacerrada at around 11:20 a.m. on
February 22, 1981 after it was taken to the municipal hall of Ajuy.
17
His findings revealed that the victim suffered from 16 wounds
comprising of four (4) punctured wounds, seven (7) stab wounds, four (4) incised wounds, and one (1) lacerated wound. In his
testimony, Dr. Rojas, while admitting the possibility that only one weapon might have caused all the wounds (except the lacerated
wound) inflicted on the victim, nevertheless opined that due to the number and different characteristics of the wounds, the probability
that at least two instruments were used is high.
18
The police authorities and the P.C. operatives for their part testified on the aspect of
the investigation they respectively conducted in relation to the incident. Nanie Peacerrada testified mainly on the expenses she
incurred by reason of the death of her husband while Barangay Captain Bartolome Paja related the events surrounding the surrender of
the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales to him, the location of the houses of the accused, as well as on other matters.
By and large, the prosecution's case rested on Huntoria's alleged eyewitness account of the incident. According to Huntoria, who gave
his age as 30 when he testified on July 27, 1982,
19
at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon on February 21, 1981, he left his work at Barangay
Central, in Ajuy, Iloilo where he was employed as a tractor driver by one Mr. Piccio, and walked home;
20
he took a short-cut
route.
21
While passing at the vicinity of the Gonzales spouses' house at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, he heard cries for
help.
22
Curiosity prompted him to approach the place where the shouts were emanating. When he was some 15 to 20 meters away,
he hid himself behind a clump of banana
trees.
23
From where he stood, he allegedly saw all the accused ganging upon and takings turns in stabbing and hacking the victim
Lloyd Peacerrada, near a "linasan" or threshing platform. He said he clearly recognized all the accused as the place was then awash in
moonlight.
24
Huntoria further recounted that after the accused were through in stabbing and hacking the victim, they then lifted his
body and carried it into the house of the Gonzales spouses which was situated some 20 to 25 meters away from the
"linasan".
25
Huntoria then proceeded on his way home. Upon reaching his house, he related what he saw to his mother and to his
wife
26
before he went to sleep.
27
Huntoria explained that he did not immediately report to the police authorities what he witnessed
for fear of his life.
28
In October 1981 however, eight months after the extraordinary incident he allegedly witnessed, bothered by his
conscience plus the fact that his father was formerly a tenant of the victim which, to his mind, made him likewise a tenant of the latter,
he thought of helping the victim's widow, Nanie Peacerrada. Hence, out of his volition, he travelled from his place at Sitio Nabitasan,
in Barangay Tipacla Municipality of Ajuy, to Sara, Iloilo where Mrs. Peacerrada lived, and related to her what he saw on February 21,
1981.
29

Except Fausta who admitted killing Lloyd Peacerrada in defense of her honor as the deceased attempted to rape her, all the accused
denied participation in the crime. The herein accused-appellant, Custodio Gonzales, Sr., claimed that he was asleep
30
in his house
which was located some one kilometer away from the scene of the crime
31
when the incident happened. He asserted that he only
came to know of it after his grandchildren by Augusto and Fausta Gonzales went to his house that night of February 21, 1981 to inform
him.
32

The trial court disregarded the version of the defense; it believed the testimony of Huntoria.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, Custodia Gonzales, Sr., the lone appellant, contended that the trial court erred in convicting him on
the basis of the testimony of Jose Huntoria, the lone alleged eyewitness, and in not appreciating his defense of alibi.
The Court of Appeals found no merit in both assigned errors. In upholding Huntoria's testimony, the appellate court held that:
. . . Huntoria positively identified all the accused, including the herein accused-appellant, as the assailants of
Peacerrada. (TSN, p. 43, July 27, 1982) The claim that Huntoria would have difficulty recognizing the assailant at a
distance of 15 to 20 meters is without merit, considering that Huntoria knew all the accused. (Id., pp. 37-39) If
Huntoria could not say who was hacking and who was stabbing the deceased, it was only because the assailant were
moving around the victim.
As for the delay in reporting the incident to the authorities, we think that Huntoria's explanation is satisfactory. He
said he feared for his life. (Id., pp. 50-51, 65) As stated in People vs. Realon, 99 SCRA 442, 450 (1980): "The natural
reticence of most people to get involved in a criminal case is of judicial notice. As held in People v. Delfin, '. . . the
initial reluctance of witnesses in this country to volunteer information about a criminal case and their unwillingness to
be involved in or dragged into criminal investigations is common, and has been judicially declared not to affect
credibility.'"
It is noteworthy that the accused-appellant self admitted that he had known Huntoria for about 10 years and that he
and Huntoria were in good terms and had no misunderstanding whatsoever. (TSN, p. 33, July 18, 1984) He said that
he could not think of any reason why Huntoria should implicate him. (Id., p. 34) Thus, Huntoria's credibility. is
beyond question.
33

The Court of Appeals likewise rejected the appellant's defense of alibi.
34
The appellate court, however, found the sentence imposed by
the trial court on the accused-appellant erroneous. Said the appellate court:
Finally, we find that the trial court erroneously sentenced the accused-appellant to 12 years and 1 day to 17 years
and 4 months of reclusion temporal. The penalty for murder under Article 248 isreclusion temporal in its maximum
period to death. As there was no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the imposible penalty should be reclusion
perpetua. Consequently, the appeal should have been brought to the Supreme Court. With regard to the indemnity
for death, the award of P40,000.00 should be reduced to P30,000.00, in accordance with the rulings of the Supreme
Court. (E.g., People v. De la Fuente, 126 SCRA 518 (1983); People v. Atanacio, 128 SCRA 31 (1984); People v. Rado,
128 SCRA 43 (1984); People v. Bautista, G.R. No. 68731, Feb. 27, 1987).
35

The case, as mentioned earlier, is now before us upon certification by the Court of Appeals, the penalty imposed being reclusion
perpetua.
After a careful review of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, we find the same insufficient to convict the appellant of the crime
charged.
To begin with, the investigation conducted by the police authorities leave much to be desired. Patrolman Centeno of the Ajuy police
force in his sworn statements
36
even gave the date of the commission of the crime as "March 21, 1981." Moreover, the sketch
37
he
made of the scene is of little help. While indicated thereon are the alleged various blood stains and their locations relative to the scene
of the crime, there was however no indication as to their quantity. This is rather unfortunate for the prosecution because, considering
that there are two versions proferred on where the killing was carried out, the extent of blood stains found would have provided a
more definite clue as to which version is more credible. If, as the version of the defense puts it, the killing transpired inside the
bedroom of the Gonzales spouses, there would have been more blood stains inside the couple's bedroom or even on the ground
directly under it. And this circumstance would provide an additional mooring to the claim of attempted rape asseverated by Fausta. On
the other hand, if the prosecution's version that the killing was committed in the field near the linasan is the truth, then blood stains in
that place would have been more than in any other place.
The same sloppiness characterizes the investigation conducted by the other authorities. Police Corporal Ben Sazon who claimed that
accused Augusto Gonzales surrendered to him on February 23, 1981 failed to state clearly the reason for the "surrender." It would
even appear that Augusto "surrendered" just so he could be safe from possible revenge by the victim's kins. Corporal Sazon likewise
admitted that Augusto never mentioned to him the participation of other persons in the killing of the victim. Finally, without any
evidence on that point, P.C. investigators of the 321st P.C. Company who likewise conducted an investigation of the killing mentioned
in their criminal complaint
38
four other unnamed persons, aside from the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales, to have conspired in
killing Lloyd Peacerrada.
Now on the medical evidence. Dr. Rojas opined that it is possible that the sixteen wounds described in the autopsy report were caused
by two or more bladed instruments. Nonetheless, he admitted the possibility that one bladed instrument might have caused all. Thus,
insofar as Dr. Rojas' testimony and the autopsy report are concerned, Fausta Gonzales' admission that she alone was responsible for
the killing appears not at all too impossible. And then there is the positive testimony of Dr. Rojas that there were only five wounds that
could be fatal out of the sixteen described in the autopsy report. We shall discuss more the significance of these wounds later.
It is thus clear from the foregoing that if the conviction of the appellant by the lower courts is to be sustained, it can only be on the
basis of the testimony of Huntoria, the self-proclaimed eyewitness. Hence, a meticulous scrutiny of Huntoria's testimony is compelling.
To recollect, Huntoria testified that he clearly saw all the accused, including the appellant, take turns in hacking and stabbing Lloyd
Peacerrada, at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening, on February 21, 1981, in the field near a "linasan" while he (Huntoria) stood
concealed behind a clump of banana trees some 15 to 20 meters away from where the crime was being committed. According to him,
he recognized the six accused as the malefactors because the scene was then illuminated by the moon. He further stated that the
stabbing and hacking took about an hour. But on cross-examination, Huntoria admitted that he could not determine who among the six
accused did the stabbing and/or hacking and what particular weapon was used by each of them.
ATTY. GATON (defense counsel on cross-examination):
Q And you said that the moon was bright, is it correct?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And you would like us to understand that you saw the hacking and the stabbing, at that distance
by the herein accused as identified by you?
A Yes, sir, because the moon was brightly shining.
Q If you saw the stabbing and the hacking, will you please tell this Honorable Court who was
hacking the victim?
A Because they were surrounding Peacerrada and were in constant movement, I could not
determine who did the hacking.
ATTY. GATON:
The interpretation is not clear.
COURT:
They were doing it rapidly.
A The moving around or the hacking or the "labu" or "bunu" is rapid. I only saw the rapid
movement of their arms, Your Honor, and I cannot determine who was hacking and who was
stabbing. But I saw the hacking and the stabbing blow.
ATTY. GATON:
Q You cannot positively identify before this Court who really hacked Lloyd Peacerrada?
A Yes sir, I cannot positively tell who did the hacking.
Q And likewise you cannot positively tell this Honorable Court who did the stabbing?
A Yes sir, and because of the rapid movements.
Q I noticed in your direct testimony that you could not even identify the weapons used because
according to you it was just flashing?
A Yes, sir.
39

(Emphasis supplied)
From his very testimony, Huntoria failed to impute a definite and specific act committed, or contributed, by the appellant in the killing
of Lloyd Peacerrada.
It also bears stressing that there is nothing in the findings of the trial court and of the Court of Appeals which would categorize the
criminal liability of the appellant as a principal by direct participation under Article 17, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. Likewise,
there is nothing in the evidence for the prosecution that inculpates him by inducement, under paragraph 2 of the same Article 17, or by
indispensable cooperation under paragraph 3 thereof. What then was the direct part in the killing did the appellant perform to support
the ultimate punishment imposed by the Court of Appeals on him?
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides how criminal liability is incurred.
Art. 4. Criminal liability Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the
inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, one of the means by which criminal liability is incurred is through the commission of a felony. Article 3 of the Revised Penal
Code, on the other hand, provides how felonies are committed.
Art. 3. Definition Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies (delitos).
Felonies are committed not only by means of deceit (dolo) but also by means of fault (culpa).
There is deceit when the act is performed with deliberate intent; and there is fault when the wrongful act results
from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the elements of felonies in general are: (1) there must be an act or omission; (2) the act or omission must be punishable under
the Revised Penal Code; and (3) the act is performed or the omission incurred by means of deceit or fault.
Here, while the prosecution accuses, and the two lower courts both found, that the appellant has committed a felony in the killing of
Lloyd Peacerrada, forsooth there is paucity of proof as to what act was performed by the appellant. It has been said that "act," as
used in Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, must be understood as "any bodily movement tending to produce some effect in the
external world."
40
In this instance, there must therefore be shown an "act" committed by the appellant which would have inflicted any
harm to the body of the victim that produced his death.
Yet, even Huntoria, as earlier emphasized, admitted quite candidly that he did not see who "stabbed" or who "hacked" the victim. Thus
this principal witness did not say, because he could not whether the appellant "hacked or "stabbed" victim. In fact, Huntoria does not
know what specific act was performed by the appellant. This lack of specificity then makes the case fall short of the test laid down by
Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code previously discussed. Furthermore, the fact that the victim sustained only five fatal wounds out of
the total of sixteen inflicted, as adverted to above, while there are six accused charged as principals, it follows to reason that one of
the six accused could not have caused or dealt a fatal wound. And this one could as well be the appellant, granted ex gratia
argumenti that he took part in the hacking and stabbing alleged by Huntoria. And why not him? Is he not after all the oldest (already
sexagenarian at that time) and practically the father of the five accused? And pursuing this argument to the limits of its logic, it is
possible, nay even probable, that only four, or three, or two of the accused could have inflicted all the five fatal wounds to the
exclusion of two, three, or four of them. And stretching the logic further, it is possible, nay probable, that all the fatal wounds,
including even all the non-fatal wounds, could have been dealt by Fausta in rage against the assault on her womanhood and honor.
But more importantly, there being not an iota of evidence that the appellant caused any of the said five fatal wounds, coupled with the
prosecution's failure to prove the presence of conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt, the appellant's conviction can not be sustained.
Additionally, Huntoria's credibility as a witness is likewise tarnished by the fact that he only came out to testify in October 1981, or
eight long months since he allegedly saw the killing on February 21, 1981. While ordinarily the failure of a witness to report at once to
the police authorities the crime he
had witnessed should not be taken against him and should not affect his credibility,
41
here, the unreasonable delay in Huntoria's
coming out engenders doubt on his veracity.
42
If the silence of coming out an alleged eyewitness for several weeks renders his
credibility doubtful,
43
the more it should be for one who was mute for eight months. Further, Huntoria's long delay in reveiling what he
allegedly witnessed, has not been satisfactorily explained. His lame excuse that he feared his life would be endangered is too pat to be
believed. There is no showing that he was threatened by the accused or by anybody. And if it were true that he feared a possible
retaliation from the accused,
44
why did he finally volunteer to testify considering that except for the spouses Augusto and Fausta
Gonzales who were already under police custody, the rest of the accused were then still free and around; they were not yet named in
the original information,
45
thus the supposed danger on Huntoria's life would still be clear and present when he testified.
Moreover, Huntoria is not exactly a disinterested witness as portrayed by the prosecution. He admitted that he was a tenant of the
deceased. In fact, he stated that one of the principal reasons why he testified was because the victim was also his landlord.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, Mr. Huntoria, why did it take you so long from the time you saw the stabbing and hacking
of Lloyd Peacerrada when you told Mrs. Peacerrada about what happened to her husband?
A At first I was then afraid to tell anybody else but because I was haunted by my conscience
and secondly the victim was also my landlord I revealed what I saw to the wife of the victim.
46

xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis ours.)
At this juncture, it may be relevant to remind that under our socioeconomic set-up, a tenant owes the very source of his livelihood, if
not existence itself, from his landlord who provides him with the land to till. In this milieu, tenants like Huntoria are naturally beholden
to their landlords and seek ways and means to ingratiate themselves with the latter. In this instance, volunteering his services as a
purported eyewitness and providing that material testimony which would lead to the conviction of the entire family of Augusto
Gonzales whose wife, Fausta, has confessed to the killing of Lloyd Peacerrada, would, in a perverted sense, be a way by which
Huntoria sought to ingratiate himself with the surviving family of his deceased landlord. This is especially so because the need to get
into the good graces of his landlord's family assumed a greater urgency considering that he ceased to be employed as early as May
1981.
47
Volunteering his services would alleviate the financial distress he was in. And Huntoria proved quite sagacious in his choice of
action for shortly after he volunteered and presented himself to the victim's widow, he was taken under the protective wings of the
victim's uncle, one Dr. Biclar, who gave him employment and provided lodging for his family.
48
Given all the foregoing circumstances,
we can not help but dismiss Huntoria as an unreliable witness, to say the least.
At any rate, there is another reason why we find the alleged participation of the appellant in the killing of Lloyd Peacerrada doubtful
it is contrary to our customs and traditions. Under the Filipino family tradition and culture, aging parents are sheltered and insulated
by their adult children from any possible physical and emotional harm. It is therefore improbable for the other accused who are much
younger and at the prime of their manhood, to summon the aid or allow the participation of their 65-year old
49
father, the appellant,
in the killing of their lone adversary, granting that the victim was indeed an adversary. And considering that the appellant's residence
was about one kilometer from the scene of the crime,
50
we seriously doubt that the appellant went there just for the purpose of aiding
his three robust male sons (Custodia Jr., Nerio, and Augusta), not to mention the brother and sister, Rogelio and Fausta, in the killing
of Lloyd Peacerrada, even if the latter were a perceived enemy.
Finally, while indeed alibi is a weak defense,
51
under appropriate circumstances, like in the instant case in which the participation of
the appellant is not beyond cavil it may be considered as exculpatory. Courts should not at once look with disfavor at the defense of
alibi for if taken in the light of the other evidence on record, it may be sufficient to acquit the accused.
52

In fine, the guilt of the appellant has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the appellant is hereby ACQUITTED. Costs de
oficio.
SO ORDERED.

Criminal Law I-E Prof. Arreza
People vs GonzalesPeople of the Philippines, plaintiff-appelle, vs. Fausta Gonzales, Augusto Gonzales, CustodioGonzales
Sr., Nerio Gonzales, and Rogelio Lanida, accused; Custodio Gonzales Sr., accused-appellant
Doctrine: The commission of a felony under Art. 3 of the Revised Penal Code requires that an act apunishable act or omission
must be committed, and that it must be committed with deceit and/or fault.Keywords: murder, felony, criminal intent,
credibility of witnessNature: Appeal from the decision of the Court of AppealsDate: March 19, 1990Ponente: Justice Sarmiento
Facts
:The appellant is appealing to the court regarding his participation in the killing of a certain LolyPenacerrada. He claims that he
did not participate in the killing based on the claim that he was notpresent in the said act.The antecedent facts are as follows:-

At around 9:00 p.m. of February 21, 1981, Bartolome Paja, barangay captain of Brgy. Tipacla,Ajuy, Iloilo, was awakened by two of
the accused (Augusto and Fausta). Paja learns thatFausta killed their landlord, Lloyd Penacerrada, and would like to surrender to
authorities.
Knife used in killing was seen, and blood was found smeared on Faustas dress.
-

Paja immediately ordered a nephew to take spouses to the police at the Municipal Hall inPoblacon, Ajay, where the couple
informed the police on duty of the incident.-

Several patrolmen, along with Paja and Augusto proceeded to the residence at SitioNabitasan where the killing incident
allegedly occurred, and found the body of the deceased,clad in underwear, sprawled face down inside the bedroom.-

Group stayed for an hour in which the scene was inspected, and a rough sketch of the areawas made.-

The next day, a patrolman, accompanied by a photographer, went back to the scene forfurther investigations. Fausta was
brought back to the police station.-

The autopsy of the deceased was performed at 11:20 a.m. Report shows the following:
o

Sixteen wounds: five fatal as they penetrated the internal organs
o

Multiple puncture, stab, incision, and lacerated wounds-

The day after the autopsy, Augusto appeared before the sub-station and voluntarilysurrendered to Police Corporal Sazon for
detention and protective custody for having beeninvolved in the killing of the deceased. Augusto requests to be taken to
where Fausta wasalready detained.Based on the investigations conducted, an information for murder dated August 26, 1981, was
filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo against the spouses. However, they pleaded not guilty. Before the
trial, however, a certain Jose Huntoria presented himself to the wife of the deceased. Huntoria claims tobe a witness of
the killing, and on October 6, 1981, volunteers as a witness for the prosecution. Areinvestigation of the case was called, in which
several more were filed as accused, including theappellant. All the accused except for Lenida pleaded not guilty.

Criminal Law I-E Prof. ArrezaAt the trial, the prosecution presented Dr. Jesus Rojas, the physician who conducted the
autopsyon the body, Paja, the patrolmen and constabulary members who joined in the investigation, the widow,and Huntoria.Dr.
Rojas testified that he performed the autopsy at around 11:20 a.m. on Feb. 1981 after thedeceased was taken to the municipal
hall. He found 4 puncture wounds, 7 stab wounds, 4 incisions, and1 laceration; five of these were fatal wounds. Rojas admitted
one of two possibilities:-

Only one weapon might have caused all the wounds-

Multiple instruments were used due to the number and different characteristics
The brunt of the prosecutions case rested on Huntorias alleged eyewitness account of the
incident, which was as follows:-

Testified on July 27, 1982; at 5 pm on Feb. 21, 1981, he left his work at Brgy. Central, andwalked home, taking a short-cut.-

While passing at the vicinity of the Gonzales spouses home at around 8:00 pm, he heard
cries for help. Curiosity prompted him to approach the place where the shouts were from.-

15-20 m away from the scene, he hid himself behind a clump of banana trees, and saw allthe accused ganging upon the deceased
near a threshing platform. He said he clearlyrecognized all the accused as the place was awash in moonlight.-

After stabbing and hacking the victim, the accused lifted his body and carried it to the house.Huntoria then left home. Upon
reaching his house, he related what he saw to his wife andmother before going to sleep.-

Eight months after the incident, bothered by his conscience and the fact that his father wasa tenant of the deceased, he
thought of helping the widow. Out of his own volition, he
travelled to the widows houise, and related to her what he saw.
Except Fausta who admitted killing the deceased as he was trying to rape her, the rest deniedparticipation in the crime. The
appellant claimed that he was asleep in his house which was onekilometre away from the scene of the crime, and he knew of the
crime only when his grandchildrenwent to his house that night.
The trial court disregarded the version of the defense; it believed the prosecutions version.
Onappeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellant contended that the trial court erred in convicting him onthe basis of the
testimony of the lone witness, and in not appreciating his defense of alibi. The Courtfound no merit in the errors, and rejected
defense of alibi. Worsening this is that the appellate courtfound the sentence erroneous, and upgraded the penalty to that of
murder

reclusion temporal/death.The case is now brought upon certification by the Court of Appeals, hence the appeal.
Issue(s):
Whether or not the client, under the evidence presented, has committed the felony of murder.
Held
: No, he has not.
Ratio
:
Courts analysis of the evidence:
-

Investigation conducted left much to be desired. Centeno gave the date of commission asMarch 21, 1981. The sketch made was
troubling, as it did not effectively indicate the extentof the blood stains in the scenes of crime. This would have added a lot of
weight to any oneof the versi-

ons of the incident.

Criminal Law I-E Prof. Arreza-

Sazon, who claimed that Gonzales surrendered to him, failed to state clearly the reason forthe surrender. It may even
be possible that Augusto surrendered just so he could be safe
from the victims kin. Sazon also admitted that Augusto never mentioned to him the
participation of other persons in the killing.-

Rojas statement showed two possibilities for the killing. Faustas admission that she was
the only killer is plausible. Furthermore, there were only five fatal wounds, which will bediscussed later.-

Huntorias testimony, of which the prosecutions argument solely rests, needs to beexamined further. Huntorias claims in his testimony did not exact
ly match with those fromhis cross-examination. He first claimed that he recognized the people involved. However, inthe cross-
examination, he only saw flashes.
This implies that he may not have recognizedanyone at all.
As such, Huntorias testimony co
uld not place a definite act committed or contributed by theappellant in the killing of the deceased.On the criminal liability of
the appellant:-

There is nothing in the findings or the evidence that establishes the criminal liability of theappellant as a principal for direct
participation under Art. 17, para. 1 of the Revised PenalCode.-

Furthermore, there is nothing in the findings or evidence that inculpates him by inducement,under paragraph 2 of the
same article. Based on the definition of felonies in Art. 3 of the
Revised Penal Code, the prosecutions evidence could not establish intent nor fault. Recall
that the elements of felonies include:
o

An act or omission
o

Act or omission must be punishable
o

Act is performed or omission incurred by deceit or fault-

The lone witness could not properly establish any acts or omissions done by the appellant.He stated that he does not know who
hacked or stabbed the victim, thus implying that hedoes not know what the appellant did. With this, the essential elements of
felonies may noteven be present.-

Furthermore, the fact that there were five stab wounds and six accused would imply thatone of them may not have caused
a grave wound (especially given the statement of thephysician). This may have been the appellant, and given that there is no
evidence that the
appellant caused any of the wounds, coupled with the prosecutions failure to prove the
presence of conspiracy (that is, how many people actually took part in the killing), itweakens the arguments against
the appellant.On the lone witness:-

Huntorias credibility as a witness is tarnished by two points:

o

He came out eight months after the killing. He claims that he feared for his life, butthere was no proof that he was being
threatened, nor was the length of timereasonable given the circumstances.
o

He is not exactly a disinterested/neutral witness. He admitted to being a tenant of the deceased, and stated that one of the
reasons why he testified was because thevictim was his landlord.-

Under our socioeconomic set-up, a tenant owes the source of his livelihood from hislandlord. As such, they would do everything
to get the landlords to their favour. Posing as a witness would have been a convenient way to do this, especially as he ceased to
beemployed as early as May 1981.Finally, based on Philippine customs and traditions, it is unlikely for the appellant to be in
thescene of the crime, as under our family culture, aging parents are usually sheltered and insulated frompossible harm. It is
improbable for the accused to bring their aging father when they were clearly inbetter shape than he was, and it was unlikely
for the appellant to offer his services as they were more orless enough to handle what could have been a perceived
enemy.Although alibi is a weak defense, in cases like this where the participation of the appellant is notclear, it may be
considered. In light of the evidence on record, it may be sufficient for an acquittal.Decision of the CA is reversed and set
aside. Appellant acquitted. Costs de officio.
People vs. Puno (Crim1)
People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Isabelo Puno y Guevarra, alias "Beloy," and Enrique Amurao y Puno, alias "Enry," accused-
appellants


En Banc


Regalado, February 17, 1993


Topic: Mental Element (Mens rea) -- Deliberate intent (Dolo) -- General and specific intent


Facts:

January 13, 1988 in QC, at around 5:00 pm: the accused Isabelo Puno, who is the personal driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband (who was then away
in Davao purportedly on account of local election there) arrived at Mrs. Sarmiento's bakeshop in Araneta Ave, QC

He told Mrs. Sarmiento that her own driver Fred had to go to Pampanga on an emergency so Isabelo will temporarily take his place
When it was time for Mrs. Sarmiento to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig, she got into her husband's Mercedes Benz with Isabelo driving
After the car turned right on a corner of Araneta Ave, it stopped and a young man, accused Enrique Amurao, boarded the car beside the driver
Enrique pointed a gun at Mrs. Sarmiento as Isabelo told her that he needs to "get money" from her
Mrs. Sarmiento had P7,000 on her bag which she handed to the accused
But the accused said that they wanted P100,000 more
The car sped off north towards the North superhighway where Isabelo asked Mrs. Sarmiento to issue a check for P100,000
Mrs. Sarmiento drafted 3 checks: two P30,000 checks and one P40,000 check
Isabelo then turned the car around towards Metro Manila; later, he changed his mind and turned the car again towards Pampanga
According to her, Mrs. Sarmiento jumped out of the car then, crossed to the other side of the superhighway and was able to flag down a fish vendor's
van, her dress had blood because according to her, she fell down on the ground and was injured when she jumped out of the car
The defense does not dispute the above narrative of the complainant except that according to Isabelo, he stopped the car at North Diversion and
freely allowed Mrs. Sarmiento to step out of the car
He said he even slowed the car down as he drove away, until he saw that his employer had gotten a ride
He claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while running across the highway
Issue:
Whether or not the accused can be convicted of kidnapping for ransom as charged
Whether or not the said robbery can be classified as "highway robbery" under PD No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974)
Holding:
No.
No.
Ratio:
There is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive, nurtured prior to or at the time they committed the wrongful acts against
complainant, other than the extortion of money from her under the compulsion of threats or intimidation.
For this crime to exist, there must be indubitable proof that the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her liberty
In the case, the restraint of her freedom of action was merely an incident in the commission of another offense primarily intended by the offenders
This does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal detention
Jurisprudence reveals that during the early part of the American occupation of our country, roving bands were organized for robbery and pillage and
since the then existing law against robbery was inadequate to cope with such moving bands of outlaws, the Brigandage Law was passed (this is the
origin of the law on highway robbery)
PD No. 532 punishes as highway robbery only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any person or persons on Philippine
highways and not acts of robbery committed against only a predetermined or particular victim
The mere fact that the robbery was committed inside a car which was casually operating on a highway does not make PD No 532 applicable to the
case
This is not justified by the accused's intention
Accused-appellants convicted of robbery (indeterminate sentence of 4 years and 2 months or prision correccional, as minimum, to 10 years of prision
mayor. Accused to pay Mrs. Sarmiento P7,000 as actual damages and P20,000 as moral damages.)
G.R. No. 97471 February 17, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ISABELO PUNO y GUEVARRA, alias "Beloy," and ENRIQUE AMURAO y PUNO, alias "Enry," accused-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Edward C. Castaeda for accused-appellants.



REGALADO, J.:

The primal issue for resolution in this case is whether accused-appellants committed the felony of kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, as charged in the information; or a violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of
1974), as contended by the Solicitor General and found by the trial court; or the offense of simple robbery punished by Paragraph 5, Article 294 of
the Revised Penal Code, as claimed by the defense.

In an information dated and filed on May 31, 1989 in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103, as Criminal Case No. Q-57404 thereof,
appellants were charged with kidnapping for ransom allegedly committed in the following manner:

That on or about the 13th day of January, 1988 in Quezon City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
being then private individuals, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously kidnap and carry away one MARIA DEL SOCORRO SARMIENTO y MUTUC * for the purpose of extorting ransom, to the damage and
prejudice of the said offended party in such amount as may be awarded to her under the provisions of the Civil Code. 1

On a plea of not guilty when arraigned, 2 appellants went to trial which ultimately resulted in a judgment promulgated on September 26, 1990 finding
them guilty of robbery with extortion committed on a highway, punishable under Presidential Decree No. 532, with this disposition in the fallo
thereof:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused ISABELO PUNO and ENRIQUE AMURAO GUILTY as principals of robbery
with extortion committed on a highway and, in accordance with P.D. 532, they are both sentenced to a jail term of reclusion perpetua.

The two accused are likewise ordered to pay jointly and severally the offended private victim Ma. Socorro M. Sarmiento the sum of P7,000.00 as
actual damages and P3,000.00 as temperate damages. 3

Before us now in this appeal, appellants contend that the court a quo erred (1) in convicting them under Presidential Decree No. 532 since they were
not expressly charged with a crime therein; (2) in applying Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court since the charge under said presidential
decree is not the offense proved and cannot rightly be used as the offense proved which is necessarily included in the offense charged. 4

For the material antecedents of this case, we quote with approval the following counter-statement of facts in the People's brief 5 which adopted the
established findings of the court a quo, documenting the same with page references to the transcripts of the proceedings, and which we note are
without any substantial divergence in the version proffered by the defense.

This is a prosecution for kidnapping for ransom allegedly done on January 13, 1988 by the two accused (tsn, Jan. 8, 1990, p. 7).

Mrs. Maria Socorro Mutuc-Sarmiento owns a bakeshop in Araneta Avenue, Quezon City called Nika Cakes and Pastries. She has a driver of her own
just as her husband does (Ibid., pp. 4-6).

At around 5:00 in the afternoon of January 13, 1988, the accused Isabelo Puno, who is the personal driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband (who was
then away in Davao purportedly on account of local election there) arrived at the bakeshop. He told Mrs. Socorro that her own driver Fred had to go
to Pampanga on an emergency (something bad befell a child), so Isabelo will temporary (sic) take his place (Id., pp. 8-9).

Mrs. Socorro's time to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig came and so she got into the Mercedes Benz of her husband with Isabelo on (sic) the wheel.
After the car turned right in (sic) a corner of Araneta Avenue, it stopped. A young man, accused Enrique Amurao, boarded the car beside the driver
(Id., pp. 9-10).

Once inside, Enrique clambered on top of the back side of the front seat and went onto where Ma. Socorro was seated at the rear. He poke (sic) a gun
at her (Id., p. 10).

Isabelo, who earlier told her that Enrique is his nephew announced, "ma'm, you know, I want to get money from you." She said she has money inside
her bag and they may get it just so they will let her go. The bag contained P7,000.00 and was taken (Id., pp. 11-14).

Further on, the two told her they wanted P100,000.00 more. Ma. Socorro agreed to give them that but would they drop her at her gas station in
Kamagong St., Makati where the money is? The car went about the Sta. Mesa area. Meanwhile, Ma. Socorro clutched her Rosary and prayed.
Enrique's gun was menacingly storing (sic) at her soft bread (sic) brown, perfumed neck. He said he is an NPA and threatened her (Id., p.15).

The car sped off north towards the North superhighway. There Isabelo, Beloy as he is called, asked Ma. Socorro to issue a check for P100,000.00.
Ma. Socorro complied. She drafted 3 checks in denominations of two for P30 thousand and one for P40 thousand. Enrique ordered her to swallow a
pill but she refused (Id., pp. 17-23).

Beloy turned the car around towards Metro Manila. Later, he changed his mind and turned the car again towards Pampanga. Ma. Socorro, according
to her, jumped out of the car then, crossed to the other side of the superhighway and, after some vehicles ignored her, she was finally able to flag
down a fish vendors van. Her dress had blood because, according to Ma. Socorro, she fell down on the ground and was injured when she jumped out
of the car. Her dress was torn too (Id., pp. 23-26).

On reaching Balintawak, Ma. Socorro reported the matter to CAPCOM (Id., p. 27).

Both accused were, day after, arrested. Enrique was arrested trying to encash Ma. Socorro's P40,000.00 check at PCI Bank, Makati. (tsn, Oct. 18,
1989, pp. 10-13) 6

As observed by the court below, the defense does not dispute said narrative of complainant, except that, according to appellant Puno, he stopped the
car at North Diversion and freely allowed complainant to step out of the car. He even slowed the car down as he drove away, until he saw that his
employer had gotten a ride, and he claimed that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while running across the highway. 7

Appellants further testified that they brought the Mercedez Benz car to Dolores, San Fernando, Pampanga and parked it near a barangay or police
outpost. They thereafter ate at a restaurant and divided their loot. 8 Much later, when he took the stand at the trial of this case, appellant Puno tried to
mitigate his liability by explaining that he was in dire need of money for the medication of his ulcers. 9

On these relatively simple facts, and as noted at the start of this opinion, three theories have been advanced as to what crime was committed by
appellants. The trial court cohered with the submission of the defense that the crime could not be kidnapping for ransom as charged in the
information. We likewise agree.

Prefatorily, it is worth recalling an accepted tenet in criminal law that in the determination of the crime for which the accused should be held liable in
those instances where his acts partake of the nature of variant offenses, and the same holds true with regard to the modifying or qualifying
circumstances thereof, his motive and specific intent in perpetrating the acts complained of are invaluable aids in arriving at a correct appreciation
and accurate conclusion thereon.

Thus, to illustrate, the motive of the accused has been held to be relevant or essential to determine the specific nature of the crime as, for instance,
whether a murder was committed in the furtherance of rebellion in which case the latter absorbs the former, or whether the accused had his own
personal motives for committing the murder independent of his membership in the rebellious movement in which case rebellion and murder would
constitute separate offenses. 10 Also, where injuries were inflicted on a person in authority who was not then in the actual performance of his official
duties, the motive of the offender assumes importance because if the attack was by reason of the previous performance of official duties by the
person in authority, the crime would be direct assault; otherwise, it would only be physical injuries. 11

In the case at bar, there is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive, nurtured prior to or at the time they committed the wrongful acts
against complainant, other than the extortion of money from her under the compulsion of threats or intimidation. This much is admitted by both
appellants, without any other esoteric qualification or dubious justification. Appellant Puno, as already stated, candidly laid the blame for his
predicament on his need for funds for, in his own testimony, "(w)hile we were along the way Mam (sic) Corina was telling me "Beloy, I know your
family very well and I know that your (sic) not (a) bad person, why are you doing this?" I told her "Mam, (sic), because I need money and I had an
ulcer and that I have been getting an (sic) advances from our office but they refused to give me any bale (sic). . . ." 12

With respect to the specific intent of appellants vis-a-vis the charge that they had kidnapped the victim, we can rely on the proverbial rule of ancient
respectability that for this crime to exist, there must be indubitable proof that
the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her liberty, 13 and not where such restraint of her freedom of action was
merely an incident in the commission of another offense primarily intended by the offenders. Hence, as early as United States vs. Ancheta, 14 and
consistently reiterated thereafter, 15 it has been held that the detention and/or forcible taking away of the victims by the accused, even for an
appreciable period of time but for the primary and ultimate purpose of killing them, holds the offenders liable for taking their lives or such other
offenses they committed in relation thereto, but the incidental deprivation of the victims' liberty does not constitute kidnapping or serious illegal
detention.

That appellants in this case had no intention whatsoever to kidnap or deprive the complainant of her personal liberty is clearly demonstrated in the
veritably confessional testimony of appellant Puno:

Q At what point did Mrs. Sarmiento handed (sic) the bag containing the P7,000.00 to your nephew?

A Santo Domingo Exit.

Q And how about the checks, where were you already when the checks was (sic) being handed to you?

A Also at the Sto. Domingo exit when she signed the checks.

Q If your intention was just to robbed (sic) her, why is it that you still did not allow her to stay at Sto. Domingo, after all you already received
the money and the checks?

A Because we had an agreement with her that when she signed the checks we will take her to her house at Villa (sic) Verde.

Q And why did you not bring her back to her house at Valle Verde when she is (sic) already given you the checks?

A Because while we were on the way back I (sic) came to my mind that if we reach Balintawak or some other place along the way we might
be apprehended by the police. So when we reached Santa Rita exit I told her "Mam (sic) we will already stop and allow you to get out of the car." 16

Neither can we consider the amounts given to appellants as equivalent to or in the nature of ransom, considering the immediacy of their obtention
thereof from the complainant personally. Ransom, in municipal criminal law, is the money, price or consideration paid or demanded for redemption
of a captured person or persons, a payment that releases from captivity. 17 It can hardly be assumed that when complainant readily gave the cash and
checks demanded from her at gun point, what she gave under the circumstances of this case can be equated with or was in the concept of ransom in
the law of kidnapping. These were merely amounts involuntarily surrendered by the victim upon the occasion of a robbery or of which she was
summarily divested by appellants. Accordingly, while we hold that the crime committed is robbery as defined in Article 293 of the Code, we,
however, reject the theory of the trial court that the same constitutes the highway robbery contemplated in and punished by Presidential Decree No.
532.

The lower court, in support of its theory, offers this ratiocination:

The court agrees that the crime is robbery. But it is also clear from the allegation in the information that the victim was carried away and extorted for
more money. The accused admitted that the robbery was carried on from Araneta Avenue up to the North Superhighway. They likewise admitted that
along the way they intimidated Ma. Socorro to produce more money that she had with her at the time for which reason Ma. Socorro, not having more
cash, drew out three checks. . . .

In view of the foregoing the court is of the opinion that the crimes committed is that punishable under P.D. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway
Robbery Law of 1974) under which where robbery on the highway is accompanied by extortion the penalty is reclusion perpetua. 18

The Solicitor General concurs, with the observation that pursuant to the repealing clause in Section 5 of said decree, "P.D. No- 532 is a modification
of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, particularly Article 267 which
are inconsistent with it." 19 Such opinion and complementary submission consequently necessitate an evaluation of the correct interplay between and
the legal effects of Presidential Decree No. 532 on the pertinent Provisions of the Revised Penal Code, on which matter we are not aware that any
definitive pronouncement has as yet been made.

Contrary to the postulation of the Solicitor General, Presidential Decree No. 532 is not a modification of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code on
kidnapping and serious illegal detention, but of Articles 306 and 307 on brigandage. This is evident from the fact that the relevant portion thereof
which treats of "highway robbery" invariably uses this term in the alternative and synonymously with brigandage, that is, as "highway
robbery/brigandage." This is but in line with our previous ruling, and which still holds sway in criminal law, that highway robbers (ladrones) and
brigands are synonymous. 20

Harking back to the origin of our law on brigandage (bandolerismo) in order to put our discussion thereon in the proper context and perspective, we
find that a band of brigands, also known as highwaymen or freebooters, is more than a gang of ordinary robbers. Jurisprudence on the matter reveals
that during the early part of the American occupation of our country, roving bands were organized for robbery and pillage and since the then existing
law against robbery was inadequate to cope with such moving bands of outlaws, the Brigandage Law was passed. 21

The following salient distinctions between brigandage and robbery are succinctly explained in a treatise on the subject and are of continuing validity:

The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the formation of bands of robbers. The heart of the offense consists in the formation of a band
by more than three armed persons for the purpose indicated in art. 306. Such formation is sufficient to constitute a violation of art. 306. It would not
be necessary to show, in a prosecution under it, that a member or members of the band actually committed robbery or kidnapping or any other
purpose attainable by violent means. The crime is proven when the organization and purpose of the band are shown to be such as are contemplated by
art 306. On the other hand, if robbery is committed by a band, whose members were not primarily organized for the purpose of committing robbery
or kidnapping, etc., the crime would not be brigandage, but only robbery. Simply because robbery was committed by a band of more than three
armed persons, it would not follow that it was committed by a band of brigands. In the Spanish text of art. 306, it is required that the band "sala a los
campos para dedicarse a robar." 22 (Emphasis supplied).

In fine, the purpose of brigandage is, inter alia, indiscriminate highway robbery. If the purpose is only a particular robbery, the crime is only robbery,
or robbery in band if there are at least four armed participants. 23 The martial law legislator, in creating and promulgating Presidential Decree No.
532 for the objectives announced therein, could not have been unaware of that distinction and is presumed to have adopted the same, there being no
indication to the contrary. This conclusion is buttressed by the rule on contemporaneous construction, since it is one drawn from the time when and
the circumstances under which the decree to be construed originated. Contemporaneous exposition or construction is the best and strongest in the
law. 24

Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway robbery or brigandage only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately
against any person or persons on Philippine highways as defined therein, and not acts of robbery committed against only a predetermined or
particular victim, is evident from the preambular clauses thereof, to wit:

WHEREAS, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless elements are still committing acts of depredation upon the persons and
properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another, thereby disturbing the peace, order and tranquility of the
nation and stunting the economic and social progress of the people:

WHEREAS, such acts of depredations constitute . . . highway robbery/brigandage which are among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by
the penal statutes of all countries;

WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from perpetrating such acts of depredaions by imposing heavy penalty on the
offenders, with the end in view of eliminating all obstacles to the economic, social, educational and community progress of the people. (Emphasis
supplied).

Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery against a particular person chosen by the accused as their specific victim could be
considered as committed on the "innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another," and which single act of depredation
would be capable of "stunting the economic and social progress of the people" as to be considered "among the highest forms of lawlessness
condemned by the penal statutes of all countries," and would accordingly constitute an obstacle "to the economic, social, educational and community
progress of the people, " such that said isolated act would constitute the highway robbery or brigandage contemplated and punished in said decree.
This would be an exaggeration bordering on the ridiculous.

True, Presidential Decree No. 532 did introduce amendments to Articles 306 and 307 of the Revised Penal Code by increasing the penalties, albeit
limiting its applicability to the offenses stated therein when committed on the highways and without prejudice to the liability for such acts if
committed. Furthermore, the decree does not require that there be at least four armed persons forming a band of robbers; and the presumption in the
Code that said accused are brigands if they use unlicensed firearms no longer obtains under the decree. But, and this we broadly underline, the
essence of brigandage under the Code as a crime of depredation wherein the unlawful acts are directed not only against specific, intended or
preconceived victims, but against any and all prospective victims anywhere on the highway and whosoever they may potentially be, is the same as
the concept of brigandage which is maintained in Presidential Decree No. 532, in the same manner as it was under its aforementioned precursor in the
Code and, for that matter, under the old Brigandage Law. 25

Erroneous advertence is nevertheless made by the court below to the fact that the crime of robbery committed by appellants should be covered by the
said amendatory decree just because it was committed on a highway. Aside from what has already been stressed regarding the absence of the
requisite elements which thereby necessarily puts the offense charged outside the purview and intendment of that presidential issuance, it would be
absurd to adopt a literal interpretation that any unlawful taking of property committed on our highways would be covered thereby. It is an elementary
rule of statutory construction that the spirit or intent of the law should not be subordinated to the letter thereof. Trite as it may appear, we have
perforce to stress the elementary caveat that he who considers merely the letter of an instrument goes but skin deep into its meaning, 26 and the
fundamental rule that criminal justice inclines in favor of the milder form of liability in case of doubt.

If the mere fact that the offense charged was committed on a highway would be the determinant for the application of Presidential Decree No. 532, it
would not be farfetched to expect mischievous, if not absurd, effects on the corpus of our substantive criminal law. While we eschew resort to a
reductio ad absurdum line of reasoning, we apprehend that the aforestated theory adopted by the trial court falls far short of the desideratum in the
interpretation of laws, that is, to avoid absurdities and conflicts. For, if a motor vehicle, either stationary or moving on a highway, is forcibly taken at
gun point by the accused who happened to take a fancy thereto, would the location of the vehicle at the time of the unlawful taking necessarily put
the offense within the ambit of Presidential Decree No. 532, thus rendering nugatory the categorical provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972?
27 And, if the scenario is one where the subject matter of the unlawful asportation is large cattle which are incidentally being herded along and
traversing the same highway and are impulsively set upon by the accused, should we apply Presidential Decree No. 532 and completely disregard the
explicit prescriptions in the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of 1974? 28

We do not entertain any doubt, therefore, that the coincidental fact that the robbery in the present case was committed inside a car which, in the
natural course of things, was casually operating on a highway, is not within the situation envisaged by Section 2(e) of the decree in its definition of
terms. Besides, that particular provision precisely defines "highway robbery/brigandage" and, as we have amply demonstrated, the single act of
robbery conceived and committed by appellants in this case does not constitute highway robbery or brigandage.

Accordingly, we hold that the offense committed by appellants is simple robbery defined in Article 293 and punished under Paragraph 5 of Article
294 of the Revised Penal Code with prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period. Appellants have indisputably
acted in conspiracy as shown by their concerted acts evidentiary of a unity of thought and community of purpose. In the determination of their
respective liabilities, the aggravating circumstances of craft 29 shall be appreciated against both appellants and that of abuse of confidence shall be
further applied against appellant Puno, with no mitigating circumstance in favor of either of them. At any rate, the intimidation having been made
with the use of a firearm, the penalty shall be imposed in the maximum period as decreed by Article 295 of the Code.

We further hold that there is no procedural obstacle to the conviction of appellants of the crime of simple robbery upon an information charging them
with kidnapping for ransom, since the former offense which has been proved is necessarily included in the latter offense with which they are charged.
30 For the former offense, it is sufficient that the elements of unlawful taking, with intent to gain, of personal property through intimidation of the
owner or possessor thereof shall be, as it has been, proved in the case at bar. Intent to gain (animus lucrandi) is presumed to be alleged in an
information where it is charged that there was unlawful taking (apoderamiento) and appropriation by the offender of the things subject of the robbery.
31

These foregoing elements are necessarily included in the information filed against appellants which, as formulated, allege that they wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously kidnapped and extorted ransom from the complainant. Such allegations, if not expressly but at the very least by necessary
implication, clearly convey that the taking of complainant's money and checks (inaccurately termed as ransom) was unlawful, with intent to gain, and
through intimidation. It cannot be logically argued that such a charge of kidnapping for ransom does not include but could negate the presence of any
of the elements of robbery through intimidation of persons. 32

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE and another one is rendered CONVICTING accused-appellants Isabelo
Puno y Guevarra and Enrique Amurao y Puno of robbery as Punished in Paragraph 5 of Article 294, in relation to Article 295, of the Revised Penal
Code and IMPOSING on each of them an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten
(10) years of prision mayor, as maximum, and jointly and severally pay the offended party, Maria del Socorro M. Sarmiento, the amounts of
P7,000.00 as actual damages and P20,000.00 as moral damages, with costs.

SO ORDERED.