Canon 12 and 13 (Including Rules) - Illustrative Cases

Compiled by: | TINA SIUAGAN
1
LEGAL ETHICS ASSIGNED CASE READINGS
CANON 12 - GENERAL
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 6986 March 6, 2006
JULIUS V. AGUSTIN, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ENRIQUE S. EMPLEO, Respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
GARCIA, J.:
This is a complaint for disbarment
1
filed by
complainant Julius V. Agustin against respondent Atty. Enrique
S. Empleo for the latters failure to comply with a court
order while acting as the formers counsel, thereby resulting in
the outright dismissal of a case and the complainants
counterclaim therein.
Records reveal that complainant was the defendant in Civil
Case No. B-259 for Forcible Entry with Preliminary Mandatory
Injunction and Damages then pending before the 2nd
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC), Bindoy, Negros Oriental,
in which respondent was his counsel.
In the course of the proceedings in that case, the MCTC issued
an Order on September 25, 1998,
2
giving theparties to the case
a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof within which
to submit their compromise agreement or amicable settlement
for the approval of the court.
With no compromise agreement having been submitted by the
parties within the period thus given or thereafter, the MCTC,
some four (4) years later, or on August 5, 2002, issued an
Order
3
dismissing Civil Case No. B-259 and the counterclaim
therein for failure of the parties to prosecute.
Blaming his counsel for the dismissal of the case and his
counterclaim therein, complainant filed on October 18, 2004,
an administrative complaint against respondent with the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), thereat docketed as
CBD Case No. 04-1344.
Acting on the complaint, the IBP Director for Bar Discipline,
Atty. Rogelio A. Vinluan, required respondent to submit his
answer thereto, otherwise he will be considered as in default
and the case heard ex-parte.
4

In his answer,
5
respondent admits having been complainants
counsel in Civil Case No. B-259 and the dismissal of that case
by the MCTC for the parties failure to submit a compromise
agreement. He explained, however, that the non-submission of
the compromise agreement was due to complainants own


2
fault in not contacting him for the purpose of providing the
details of said agreement, pointing out that counsels merely
assist their clients and do not decide for them in a compromise
agreement. Respondent likewise averred that complainant was
not prejudiced by the dismissal of Civil Case No. B-259 for the
simple reason that the latter was no less the defendant therein
and it was the plaintiff who failed to prosecute the case for
a long period of time. In any event, respondent alleged that
the instant administrative complaint is simply complainants
reaction to his letter dated June 15, 2004
6
relative to his
(respondents) act of having withdrawn as complainants
counsel in a different case pending before another court.
Complainant, in his Reply-Affidavit,
7
countered that he
contacted respondent several times regarding the submission
of the compromise agreement in Civil Case No. B-259. The first
was on October 20, 1999 at respondents residence as the
latter was not at his office at that time, in compliance with
respondents letter requesting to see him. The second was on
April 19, 2000 when complainant went to respondents office
on account of another case, and there reminded the latter as
to the compromise agreement but respondent just made the
assurance that he will be the one to make the draft and/or
prepare the same. The third was on January 12, 2001, again at
the respondents office where, after being reminded as to the
compromise agreement, respondent told him not to be in a
hurry because the court can wait for the compromise
agreement and besides he is quite busy with other court cases.
Denying that the administrative complaint is his reaction to
respondents letter dated June 15, 2004, complainant asserted
that said letter concerns another case in connection with which
he is preparing another administrative case against
respondent.
In his Rejoinder,
8
respondent denied that complainant
contacted and reminded him about the subject compromise
agreement, averring that any communication that has
happened between him and the complainant pertains to
another case. Respondent further averred that complainant is
merely attempting to besmirch his unsullied reputation as a
legal practitioner since 1975.
After the termination of the mandatory preliminary conference,
the parties were required to submit their respective position
papers with documentary exhibits and affidavits of witnesses, if
any, within twenty (20) days from notice, after which the case
shall be submitted for resolution.
9

Eventually, on July 26, 2005, the IBP Investigating
Commissioner, Acerey C. Pacheco, submitted his Report and
Recommendation.
10
Said the Commissioner in his report:
It is a fact as established by the records that no compromise
agreement was submitted to the court despite the receipt of


3
the Order dated September 25, 1998. While it is true that as
counsel, respondent do not decide for the complainant to
enter into such kind of agreement, respondent is however,
duty bound to assist the court in the speedy disposition of
cases.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondents asseveration that he waited for the complainant
to provide him with details of the compromise agreement but
the latter failed to come does not inspire belief in the face of
the denials made by the complainant. Not even a piece of
paper or letter requesting the complainant to provide him with
the details of the agreement was presented to substantiate
such allegation.
And even assuming arguendo that respondent indeed asked
the complainant of such details, the period of almost four (4)
years from September 25, 1998 (date of the Order requiring
the submission of the compromise agreement) up to August 5,
2002 (date of the Order dismissing the case for failure to
submit the same) without doing anything to avoid the case
being left "hanging on the air" betrays respondents duty
towards the court. As an officer of the court whose primary
function is to assist the court in the impartial and speedy
adjudication of cases, respondent ought to be vigilant and
avoid any act or omission that only impedes and obstructs
speedy disposition of cases.
In the case at bar, the period of almost four (4) years of waiting
constitutes inaction that caused unnecessary delay in the
disposition of said cases. The fact that no damage or prejudice
was sustained by the complainant, he being the defendant in
that case, is of no moment.
Thus, the Commissioners recommendation:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully
recommended that herein respondent be reprimanded for his
inaction over the period of almost four (4) years without doing
anything and that a repetition of the same act to be dealt with
accordingly.
11

On October 22, 2005, the IBP Board of Governors passed
Resolution No. XVII-2005-90
12
adopting and approving the
afore-quoted report and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED
and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record
and the applicable laws and rules, and considering the almost


4
four years of inaction that caused delay in the disposition of
the cases, Atty. Enrique S. Empleo is hereby REPRIMANDED
and repetition of the same act shall be dealt with accordingly.
We are in full accord with the findings and recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner as adopted by the IBP Board
of Governors.
First and foremost among the duties of a lawyer is his duty to
the court. The chief mission of an attorney is to assist in the
administration of justice and to this end, his clients success in
the case is subordinate. As mandated in Canon 12 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility:
A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS
DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
Like the court itself, a lawyer is an instrument to advance its
ends: the speedy, efficient, impartial, correct and inexpensive
adjudication of cases and the prompt satisfaction of final
judgments.
13
A lawyer should not only help attain these
objectives but should likewise avoid any unethical or improper
practices that impede, obstruct or prevent their realization,
charged as he is with the primary task of assisting in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice.
14

True, a lawyer cannot enter into a compromise agreement
without his clients consent. Be it remembered, however, that a
lawyer is also an officer of the court with the correlative duty
to see to it that cases are disposed in the soonest possible
time.
Here, respondent, fully aware that there is a pending court
order for the submission of a compromise agreement, should
have taken pains to remind complainant about it and ascertain
the true intent of the latter regarding the same, so that he, as
complainants counsel, can make the necessary legal action in
order for the case not to be unduly delayed and appear not to
be indefinitely pending in the docket of the court concerned.
Moreover, by respondents inaction to the court order in Civil
Case No. B-259, he has very well violated his Attorneys Oath
to "obey the laws and legal orders of the duly constituted
authorities."
Lastly, we cannot but note that respondent's conduct relative
to the civil case in question likewise fell short of the diligence
required of his profession, in violation of Canon 18 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which demands that a lawyer
shall serve his client with competence and diligence. Rule 18.03
of said Canon further states that a lawyer shall not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.


5
As complainants counsel in Civil Case No. B-259, it was
incumbent upon respondent to invite his clients attention as
to the compromise agreement, especially so when there is a
pending court order for the submission of the same. There is
nothing in the record which shows that respondent did
anything in this respect, even when, as per his admission, he
and complainant were in communication at that time, albeit,
with regards to another case.
Thus, by just letting the court order for the submission of a
compromise agreement in Civil Case No. B-259 remain
unacted upon resulting in the pendency of that case for almost
four (4) years until its dismissal for the parties non-
compliance, respondent sorely failed to perform what is
required of him as a lawyer and a member of the Bar.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Enrique Empleo is hereby
REPRIMANDED with WARNING that a repetition of the same
or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

CANON 12 RULE 12.02
EN BANC
[A.C. No. 5469. August 10, 2004]
RICARDO A. FORONDA, complainant, vs. ATTY. ARNOLD V.
GUERRERO, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The instant disbarment case arose when Ricardo A. Foronda,
acting as attorney-in-fact for Ramona Patricia Alcaraz and
Concepcion D. Alcaraz, filed a verified Letter-Complaint
[1]
dated
June 29, 2001 with the Office of the Bar Confidant charging
Atty. Arnold V. Guerrero with abusing procedural rules to
defeat the ends of substantial justice by filing appeals,
complaints and petitions to frustrate and delay the execution
of a judgment.
The Antecedents
The complainant alleged that his principals, Ramona and
Concepcion Alcaraz, filed Civil Case No. Q-44134 entitled
Concepcion Alcaraz, et al. v. Romeo Coronel, et al. for specific
performance and damages before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 83. The case involved a parcel of land
which the defendants therein sold to the Alcarazes, and,


6
thereafter, while the case was pending, to Catalina Balais-
Mabanag. Assisted by her husband Eleuterio Mabanag, and
with the respondent as their lawyer, Catalina intervened in the
case.
On March 1, 1989, the RTC rendered a Decision
[2]
in favor of
the plaintiffs, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment for specific performance is hereby
rendered ordering defendant to execute in favor of plaintiffs a
deed of absolute sale covering that parcel of land embraced in
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 327403 (now
TCT No. 331582) of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City,
together with all the improvements existing thereon, free from
all liens and encumbrances and once accomplished, to
immediately deliver said document of sale to plaintiffs, and
upon receipt thereof, the plaintiffs are ordered to pay
defendants the whole balance of the purchase price
amounting toP1,190,000.00 in cash. Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 331582 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City in the
name of intervenor is hereby cancelled and declared to be
without any force and effect. Defendants and intervenor, and
all other persons claiming under them, are hereby ordered to
vacate the subject property and deliver possession thereof to
plaintiffs. Plaintiffs claim for damages and attorneys fees, as
well as the counterclaims of defendants and intervenors, are
hereby dismissed.
No pronouncement as to costs.
So ordered.
[3]

The Mabanag Spouses, through the respondent as their
counsel, appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 23000. In its
Decision
[4]
promulgated on December 16, 1991, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. Unsatisfied
with the judgment of the appellate court, the respondent
elevated the matter to this Court, docketed as G.R. No.
103577. The petition for review was dismissed, and the
judgment appealed from was, likewise, affirmed in toto in the
Courts Decision
[5]
dated October 7, 1996.
[6]
The Court found
that the questioned sale of the parcel of land between therein
petitioners and Mabanag on February 18, 1985 was correctly
upheld by both courts below.
Thereafter, according to the complainant, the respondent,
acting for and in behalf of his clients, the Mabanag Spouses,
filed several cases
[7]
questioning the ruling of the Court in G.R.
No. 103577. The complainant contended that the multiple
pleadings and actions pursued by the respondent indicate that
he violated his oath as an officer of the court and breached the
Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers. The
complainant thereafter prayed that the instant complaint be


7
referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for proper
investigation and action.
[8]

The Respondents Defense
The respondent, for his part, filed a Motion to Cite
Complainant and Counsel in Contempt Without Prejudice to
Disciplinary Action Against Counsel,
[9]
alleging that in an
attempt to cause disrepute, dishonor and to cast aspersion on
him, the complainants counsel virtually published and made
known publicly the instant administrative case against him by
filing a Manifestation in Civil Case No. Q-01-43396 before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80. According to
the respondent, this grossly violated the confidentiality in
administrative proceedings.
[10]

In his Comment,
[11]
the respondent did not deny that the
decision in Civil Case No. Q-44134 was already final and
executory, as it had already been affirmed by the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court in their respective
decisions. The respondent put forth the following arguments
to justify the dismissal of the instant complaint:
A. THE SUBSEQUENT CASES FILED INVOLVED LEGITIMATE
AND VALID RESORT TO JUDICIAL PROCESSES AND REMEDIES;
HENCE, THERE IS NO BASIS FOR THE CHARGE THAT THE
RESPONDENT COUNSEL HAS ABUSED PROCEDURAL
PROCESSES TO DEFEAT THE ENDS OF SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE.
B. THE COMPLAINT MUST AND SHOULD BE DISMISSED ON
THE GROUND OF FORUM SHOPPING AND VIOLATION OF
SECTION 5, RULE 7 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
C. THIS ADMINISTRATIVE CASE IS PREMATURE
CONSIDERING THAT THE MATTERS RAISED THEREIN ARE
STILL ISSUES TO BE RESOLVED IN PENDING CASES; HENCE, ITS
OUTRIGHT DISMISSAL IS APPROPRIATELY CALLED FOR AND
WARRANTED.
[12]

The respondent was vehement in denying that he abused legal
processes and remedies, as the issues raised in the subsequent
actions he filed were valid and meritorious, the resolution of
which were indispensable for the orderly administration of
justice. Thus:
It is basic that a counsel may resort to all legal reliefs and
remedies available and to invoke all pertinent provisions of the
law and rules, to protect the interest of a client in order that
justice may be done and duly administered. In fact, it is not
only the right of a counsel to do so but rather, it is his
bounden and sacred obligation as an officer of the court and
as an advocate who is tasked to protect the interest of a client
within the bounds of law.


8
Thus, in Civil Case No. Q-91-31268, with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, which is the first complaint, what was
challenged therein is the eligibility of Ramona Patricia Alcaraz,
to own urban commercial lands, within the ambit of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 185, considering that she is not a Filipino
citizen or at least, she does not appear nor was she alleged to
be so. Evidently, therefore, this is not intended to forestall the
execution of the judgment which must be executed, pursuant
to the rules that is, in accordance with the dispositive portion
thereof. Otherwise stated, the execution, if it must be
undertaken, must be made in accordance with and consistently
(sic) the dispositive portion thereof. It is well settled that
execution must conform to that ordained or decreed in the
dispositive portion of the decision.
As shown in the earlier narrations, the foregoing case is
presently on appeal with the Honorable Court of Appeals and
is still pending thereat, up to the present.
With regards to the petition for certiorari filed with the
Honorable Court of Appeals, docketed thereat as CA-G.R. SP
No. 4770 (sic), whereby a decision was already rendered and
such decision is already final and executory, the issues therein
disposed as raised, pertinently pertained to the questioned
and assailed Orders of the trial court which granted the writ of
execution, upon motion of parties who are purportedly the
principals of the complainant and his counsel. After the denial
of the said petition and the finality of the judgment of such
denial, partial execution ensued and was not of course, even
attempted to be forestalled by the herein respondent counsel
and his clients.
However, the execution being undertaken later on was shown
to have been exceeded when, despite the fact that there is no
showing that the parties who were supposed to execute a
deed of absolute sale pursuant to the dispositive portion of
the subject decision being sought to be implemented, had
refused or at least failed, after demand, to so execute and
perform the foregoing acts, the trial court ordered its branch
clerk of court to perform the said acts. In fact, it was pointed
out that it does not even appear that the other parties whose
acts are sought, were already served with the writ of execution;
hence, the trial courts act was without basis and/or
premature. Nevertheless, the trial courts branch clerk of court
notwithstanding, proceeded as in fact, executed the deed of
absolute sale in favor of the Alcarazes. This act of the trial
court, with due respect, unduly created chaos and confusion,
which are antithetical to its function for an orderly
administration of justice and the fair approximation thereof.
The matter was, thereafter, complicated further, when despite
the fact that the citizenships of the Alcarazes were not
indicated in the deed of absolute sale which appears to have
been presented with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, the


9
said Register of Deeds cancelled the title of the client of the
herein respondent counsel and issued a new title over the
subject property in favor of the Alcarazes and in order to
validate and to give a semblance of legality or color to the
validity of the issuance of the said title, by making it appear
that the Alcarazes are Filipino citizens, ALTHOUGH THERE IS
NO INDICATION OF THEIR CITIZENSHIP IN THE SUBJECT DEED
OF ABSOLUTE SALE, nevertheless, indicated in the new title
that the Alcarazes are Filipinos.
Thus, the herein respondent counsel, in behalf of his client and
to protect their interest, this time, was constrained to institute
a petition with the Honorable Court of Appeals, docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 55576, whereby they assailed the
jurisdiction of the trial judge in decreeing the foregoing
execution of acts not included in the disposition portion of the
decision being sought to be executed and to perform acts
within the exclusive competence and direction of the Register
of Deeds pursuant to Providential Decree No. 1529, otherwise
known as the Board Registration Decree. This case is still
pending with the Honorable Court of Appeals up to the
present; hence, it is misleading for the complainant to even
insinuate that a decision thereon is already final, which, of
course, as shown in the earlier discussions, are farthest from
the truth.
While all of the foregoing issues were still pending as they are
still pending up to the present, the complainant and counsel,
purportedly sold and transferred the subject property, using
the title being assailed and questioned in CA-G.R. SP No.
55576, to a third person, one Emelita Mariano, with the
purported deed of absolute sale being notarized by the same
counsel of the herein complainant, Atty. Oscar R. Ferrer, who is
representing the Alcarazes in the abovesaid cases; hence, he
cannot feign ignorance of the pendency of the said cases and
the issues involved therein which cast questions on the said
title and, thus, rendered the purported transfer or sale fatally
defective.
True to his duty to his client and as an officer of the court and
in order to maintain the integrity, dignity and orderliness in the
administration of justice, herein respondent counsel, filed in
behalf of his client, the Complaint in Civil Case No. Q-01-
43396, on February 15, 2001, with the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, for the annulment of the title issued in favor
of the third person, Emelita L. Mariano, for the annulment of
the Deed of Absolute Sale to her and Damages with prayer for
a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction.
When no temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction were issued by the trial court, herein
respondent counsel, in behalf of his client, availed of the


10
legally available remedy of a special civil action of certiorari,
assailing on jurisdictional/grave abuse of discretion grounds,
the refusal and/or failure of the trial court to issue the prayed
for preliminary injunctive reliefs, among others. Thus,
respondent, as counsel for his client, filed with the Honorable
Court of Appeals, on July 24, 2001, a petition for certiorari
and prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 65783, which is still pending resolution of the said
Honorable Court up to the present.
[13]

The respondent also alleged that the complainants failure to
disclose the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-01-43396 in the
certification against non-forum shopping in the case at bar
was in gross violation of Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. Because of this, the respondent reasoned, the
complaint should be dismissed.
Finally, the respondent averred that the instant administrative
case is premature, considering that there are still issues to be
resolved in the pending cases. As such, no cause of action
could accrue against him. The respondent prayed that the
complaint be dismissed for utter and palpable lack of merit.
In his Compliance and Comment,
[14]
the complainant asserted
that there was no malice nor inaccuracy resorted to in the
filing of the complaint against the respondent. The
complainant averred that he was constrained to file the instant
complaint out of exasperation, if not desperation, upon the
instruction of his principals, so as to stop the respondent from
continuing with his dilatory and obstructionist strategies to
deprive them of their rights already confirmed by the courts,
from the RTC to the Supreme Court. Thus:
In order to stall the execution of the favorable decision
obtained by my principals Concepcion Alcaraz and her
daughter Ramona Patricia Alcaraz as early as March 1, 1989, in
Civil Case No. Q-44134, respondent acting in behalf of his
clients, went to this Court three (3) times in said case and
several times also to the Court of Appeals on appeals, petitions
for certiorari, etc.
Although respondent admits the fact that the subject
decision of the court a quo is already final and executory, he
insists that the issues in the other cases are indeed different.
He argues in his comment that the issue in his petition (Annex
2 to Comment) pertained to the issuance of a writ of
execution to implement the abovesaid final and executory
decision. This is plain hair-splitting aimed to muddle the
issues and ultimately mislead the Honorable Court.
[15]

The Recommendation of the Integrated Bar Of
The Philippines (IBP)
Commission On Bar Discipline


11
On October 25, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed
Resolution No. XVI-2003-237, finding that the foregoing
recommendation of the Commissioner was fully supported by
the records, as well as the applicable laws. The Board found
that the respondent violated Rule 12.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and recommended his suspension
for one (1) year.
The Courts Ruling
At the outset, the Court would like to stress that administrative
cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own.
[16]
As we
held in the leading case of In re Almacen:
[17]

Neither purely civil not purely criminal, they do not involve a
trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the
Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being
intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu
proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real
question for determination is whether or not the attorney is
still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in
the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls
upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an
officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the
purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves
no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. .
[18]

As such, the instant complaint cannot be dismissed as prayed
for by the respondent.
We agree that the respondent is administratively liable.
The respondent, by his own admission, filed multifarious
petitions, motions and actions concerning the sale of the
property in question, after the Court already ruled in G.R. No.
103577 that the said sale was correctly upheld by both the trial
and appellate courts. He, thereafter, filed two other initiatory
pleadings before the RTC of Quezon City, namely, Civil Case
No. Q-97-31268 and Civil Case No. Q-01-43396. The same
matter subject of the original complaint was elevated to the
Court of Appeals no less than four (4) times: CA-G.R. CV No.
65124, CA-G.R. SP No. 65783, CA-G.R. CV No. 75911, and CA-
G.R. SP No. 55576. And from there, the matter was again
brought before this Court twice: G.R. No. 135820 and G.R. No.
153142.
[19]

We concur with the following observations made by IBP
Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala in her Report and
Recommendation dated October 3, 2003:


12
The issue being raised by the respondent on behalf of his
clients in all the complaints, appeals, petitions and motions he
has filed is the question of non-eligibility of Ramona Alcaraz to
acquire property in thePhilippines and the nullity of the sale
between Alcaraz and the Coronels. These issues have already
been passed upon and upheld by both the Court of Appeals
and the Supreme Court. In the case docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 65783, the First Division of the Court of Appeals observed
that Mabanags counsel, (respondent herein) has questioned
the non-eligibility of Ramona Alcaraz to acquire property in
the Philippines for the nth time although as early as 30 July
1998, the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 47710 had
already affirmed the lower courts ruling that the petitioner is
not the proper party to question the eligibility of Alcaraz to
own property in the Philippines. The petition for review on
certiorari before the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 135820 upheld
the right of Ramona Alcaraz as one of the vendees in the deed
of sale. The Supreme Court passed judgment on her capacity
to buy the property. The issue was recycled in CA-G.R. SP No.
55576, Entry of Judgment was already issued by the Supreme
Court on 2 January 1997. However, petitioner has succeeded
for more than five (5) years now to hold at bay the full
implementation of the judgment in point. Likewise, in
dismissing the complaint filed by respondent on behalf of his
client before RTC QC Branch 83 docketed as Case No. Q-97-
31268 entitled Mabanag vs. Patricia Ramona Alcaraz, et. al. to
declare Patricia Alcaraz ineligible to acquire real property, the
court observed that for failure of the plaintiffs to get a
favorable decision of the earlier case, they tried to prevent
the execution by disqualifying herein defendant.(Emphasis
ours).
In the case docketed as CA-G.R. SP [No.] 65783, a pertinent
portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads While lawyers
owe (sic) entire devotion to the interest of their clients right,
they should not forget that they are officers of the court
bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice they should not, therefore, misuse
the rules of procedure to defeat the ends of justice or unduly
delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse
the court processes (Eternal Gardens Memorial Park
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 293 SCRA 622).
[20]

It has, thus, been clearly established that in filing such
numerous petitions in behalf of his client, the respondent
thereby engaged in forum shopping. The essence of forum
shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same
parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or
successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable
judgment. It exists when, as a result of an adverse opinion in
one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another, or
when he institutes two or more actions or proceedings
grounded on the same cause to increase the chances of


13
obtaining a favorable decision. An important factor in
determining the existence of forum shopping is the vexation
caused to the courts and the parties-litigants by the filing of
similar cases to claim substantially the same reliefs.
[21]

Indeed, while a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, it
should not be at the expense of truth and the administration
of justice. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, a
lawyer has the duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice, and is enjoined from unduly delaying
a case by impeding execution of a judgment or by misusing
court processes.
[22]
Such filing of multiple petitions constitutes
abuse of the Courts processes and improper conduct that
tends to impede, obstruct and degrade the administration of
justice and will be punished as contempt of court. Needless to
add, the lawyer who files such multiple or repetitious petitions
(which obviously delays the execution of a final and executory
judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary action for
incompetence (for not knowing any better) or for willful
violation of his duties as an attorney to act with all good
fidelity to the courts, and to maintain only such actions as
appear to him to be just and are consistent with truth and
honor.
[23]

We note that while lawyers owe their entire devotion to the
interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their clients
right, they should not forget that they are, first and foremost,
officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice.
[24]

In filing multiple petitions before various courts concerning the
same subject matter, the respondent violated Canon 12 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that a
lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist
in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. He also
violated Rule 12.02
[25]
and Rule 12.04
[26]
of the Code, as well as
a lawyers mandate to delay no man for money or malice.
We find that the IBPs recommended penalty of one years
suspension from the practice of law is not commensurate to
the respondents transgression. He shall thus be meted a two-
year suspension from the practice of law, effective
immediately.
WHEREFORE, for trifling with judicial processes by resorting to
forum shopping, respondent Atty. Arnold V. Guerrero is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of Two (2)
Years. The respondent is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the
date of his receipt of this Decision. Let a copy of this Decision
be included in the respondents files which are with the Office
of the Bar Confidant, and circularized to all courts and to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.


14
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-
Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales,
Azcuna, Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on leave.

EN BANC

MANUEL S. SEBASTIAN,
Complainant,
A.C. No. 3731
Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
GARCIA,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.

ATTY. EMILY A. BAJAR, Promulgated:
Respondent. September 7, 2007

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - x


15
D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

On 18 October 1991, Manuel S. Sebastian (complainant)
filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Emily
A. Bajar (respondent) for obstructing, disobeying, resisting,
rebelling, and impeding final decisions of Regional Trial Courts,
the Court of Appeals and of the Honorable Supreme Court,
and also for submitting those final decisions for the review and
reversal of the DARAB, an administrative body, and for
contemptuous acts and dilatory tactics.

The Facts

Complainant alleged the following:

1. Respondent is a lawyer of the Bureau of Agrarian Legal
Assistance (BALA) of the Department of Agrarian Reform who
represented Fernando Tanlioco (Tanlioco) in numerous cases
which raised the same issues.
[1]
Tanlioco is an agricultural
lessee of a land owned by complainants spouse and sister-in-
law (landowners). The landowners filed an Ejectment case
against Tanlioco on the basis of a conversion order of the land
use from agricultural to residential. The Regional Trial Court
(RTC) rendered judgment
ordering Tanliocos ejectment subject to the payment of
disturbance compensation.
[2]
The RTCs judgment was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals
[3]
and the Supreme Court.
[4]

2. Respondent, as Tanliocos counsel, filed another case for
Specific Performance to produce the conversion order. The
RTC dismissed the complaint due to resjudicata and lack of
cause of action.
[5]

3. Respondent filed a case for Maintenance of Possession
with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board.
The case raised the same issues of conversion and disturbance
compensation.
[6]

4. Respondent has violated Rule 10.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility since she misused the rules of
procedure through forum-shopping to obstruct the
administration of justice.
[7]


16
On 18 November 1991, the Court issued a resolution
requiring respondent to comment on the complaint lodged
against her.
[8]

After a second Motion for Extension of Time to Submit
Comment,
[9]
respondent submitted her Comment alleging the
following:

1. Complainant is not the real party-in-interest. He is also
not authorized to prosecute the disbarment suit.
[10]

2. Respondent has fulfilled allegiance to the Attorneys
Oath and performed duties in accordance with Section 20 of
Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court.
[11]

3. Respondents client, Tanlioco, merely availed of all legal
remedies to obtain benefits secured for him by law.
[12]

On 10 March 1992, complainant filed his Reply.
Complainant alleged that respondent did not confront the
issues of her disbarment squarely but raised issues that were
decided upon with finality by the courts.
[13]

On 25 March 1992, the Court issued a Resolution
requiring respondent to file a Rejoinder within 10 days from
notice.
[14]

On 3 June 1992, complainant filed a Manifestation
dated 2 June 1992 stating that respondent failed to comply
with the 25 March 1992 Court Resolution to file a Rejoinder.
[15]

On 7 October 1992, the Court ordered respondent to
show cause why she should not be subjected to disciplinary
action for failure to comply with the Courts 25 March
1992 Resolution. The Court also required respondent to
Comment on the complainants 2 June 1992 Manifestation.
[16]

On 3 February 1993, respondent filed a Manifestation
alleging that she had substantially complied with the Courts
orders relative to her defenses. She advised the Court that she
had transferred to the Public Attorneys Office and since she
was no longer a BALA lawyer, the cases involved in this
proceeding had become moot and academic.
[17]

On 1 March 1993, the Court issued a Resolution stating
that the administrative case against respondent has not been
mooted and nothing set out in her Manifestation excuses her
failure to obey this Courts Resolutions of 25 March 1992 and 7
October 1992.
[18]
The Court had also resolved to impose a fine
of P500 or imprisonment of five days and to require
respondent to comply with the 25 March 1992 and 7 October
1992 Resolutions.
[19]


17

On 24 August 1993, complainant filed a Manifestation
stating that respondent had not complied with the Courts
orders.
[20]

On 29 September 1993, the Court issued a Resolution
ordering the arrest of respondent for detention at the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) for five days. The Court reiterated
that respondent should comply with the 25 March 1992 and 7
October 1992 Resolutions.
[21]

On 20 October 1993, the NBI arrested respondent. The
NBI detained respondent for five days and released her on 25
October 1993.
[22]

On 10 November 1993, the Court issued a Resolution
referring the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for hearing and decision.
[23]

On 11 November 1993, respondent filed a Rejoinder.
Respondent claimed that complainant had no legal personality
to file this case.
[24]
Respondent also alleged that she was
merely protecting the interest of Tanlioco as she was sworn to
do so in her oath of office. Respondent contended that she
had comported herself as [an] officer of the court, at the risk of
being disciplined by the latter if only to impart truth and
justice.
[25]

On 22 November 1995, Investigating
Commissioner Plaridel C. Jose (Investigating Commissioner
Jose) submitted his report and recommendation to the
IBP.Investigating Commissioner Jose enumerated respondents
violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility that
rendered her unfit to continue the practice of law:

1. Respondent appealed a case for purposes of delay
which amounted to an obstruction of justice.
[26]

2. Respondent abused her right of recourse to the courts.
The duplication or multiplication of suits should be
avoided,
[27]
and respondents acts were tantamount to forum-
shopping which is a reprehensible manipulation of court
processes and proceedings.
[28]

3. Respondent uttered disrespectful language and shouted
at everybody during the hearing on 25 May 1995.
[29]
The want
of intention is not an excuse for the disrespectful language
used.


18
On 4 October 1996, the IBP transmitted to the Court a
copy of IBP Resolution No. XII-96-149 dated 30 March 1996.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
Investigating Commissioner Joses recommendation that
respondent be SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY from the practice
of law for Unethical Practices and attitude showing her
propensity and incorrigible character to violate the basic tenets
and requirements of the Code of Professional Responsibility
rendering her unfit to continue in the practice of
law.
[30]
Governor Angel R. Gonzales recommended her
outright disbarment.
[31]

In its 20 January 1997 Resolution, the Court noted the
IBP Resolution suspending respondent indefinitely.
[32]

On 13 April 1999, the Court issued a Resolution directing
the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) to circularize the
resolution of the IBP dated 30 March 1996 suspending
respondent indefinitely from the practice of law.
[33]

On 7 June 1999, the OCA, through Court Administrator
Alfredo L. Benipayo, issued Circular No. 30-99 informing all
courts that respondent had been suspended indefinitely.

On 30 January 2003, respondent filed a Motion to
Consider the Case Closed and Terminated. Respondent
apologized for her demeanor and prayed that the suspension
be lifted.
[34]

On 16 June 2003, the Court issued a Resolution referring
the case to the IBP for report and recommendation.
[35]

On 29 August 2003, Investigating
Commissioner Demaree J.B. Raval (Investigating
Commissioner Raval) conducted a hearing. Respondent
claimed that she did not receive any notice of
the OCAs Circular on her indefinite
suspension.
[36]
Respondent alleged that the Court Resolution
which she received merely noted the IBPs Resolution on her
indefinite suspension.
[37]
Respondent claimed that she only
knew of the suspension when she filed an application for a
judicial position in Mandaluyong City.
[38]

In the hearing, respondent admitted that she continued
to practice law as a Prosecutor in Mandaluyong City despite
her suspension because she believed that a notation by the
Court in the 20 January 1997 Resolution did not mean an
implementation of the IBPs Resolution on her indefinite
suspension.
[39]


19
Due to the absence of complainant and his counsel,
another hearing was held on 19 September 2003.
Complainants counsel asserted that respondent had been
practicing law in the midst of her suspension and this
constituted a violation of the suspension order which she
wanted to be lifted.
[40]
Investigating Commissioner Ravalasked
respondent to present a valid ground to lift the suspension
order.
[41]
Respondent requested that her detention for five
days at the NBI be converted into a five-year suspension, one
year for every day of detention such that she would have
served five years of indefinite suspension.
[42]

Investigating Commissioner Raval then directed the
parties to file simultaneously their Verified Position Papers.
[43]

In his Position Paper and Comment, complainant posited
that respondents motion did not state valid grounds to
convince the Court to lift the suspension order. Complainant
stated that by continuing to practice law, she is flaunting her
defiance of the Supreme Court by showing that she can
hoodwink another branch of government.
[44]
Complainant also
prayed for respondents disbarment due to the gravity of her
offense.
[45]

In respondents Position Paper, she reiterated that
complainant is not the real party-in-interest since the property
that was litigated was owned by complainants wife. She
asserted that she never betrayed her clients cause, she was
never unfaithful to her oath, and it was complainant who filed
this case for harassment. Respondent prayed that the case be
considered closed and terminated due to lack of merit.
[46]

Respondent also sent a letter to Investigating
Commissioner Raval and attached a copy of a Resolution in a
Preliminary Investigation case which she handled. Respondent
contended that in this Preliminary Investigation case, she
recommended its dismissal because the offended party was
not the real party-in-interest.
[47]

Respondent insisted that complainant did not have the
personality to file the disbarment complaint against her; hence,
it should have been dismissed outright.
[48]

After the parties filed their position papers, the IBP Board
of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-229 dated 16
April 2004. The IBP adopted Investigating
Commissioner Ravals Report and Recommendation that
respondent be disbarred for her manifest flagrant misconduct
in disobeying the SC Order of her Indefinite Suspension.
[49]

As culled from the records, the Court had merely noted
IBP Resolution No. XII-96-149 which recommended


20
respondents indefinite suspension. The term noted means
that the Court has merely taken cognizance of the existence of
an act or declaration, without exercising a judicious
deliberation or rendering a decision on the matter it does
not imply agreement or approval.
[50]
Hence, the penalty of
indefinite suspension imposed by the IBP Board of Governors
has not attained finality. Section 12 of Rule 139-B provides:

Section 12. Review and Decision by the Board of Governors.
x x x
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total
membership, determines that the respondent should be
suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a
resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations
which, together with the whole record of the case, shall
forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final
action. (Emphasis supplied)

Necessarily, the Court will now give its final action on
this complaint.

The Ruling of the Court

After a careful review of the records, the Court finds the
evidence on record sufficient to support the IBPs
findings. However, the Court disagrees with the penalty
imposed on respondent.

Administrative proceedings against lawyers
are sui generis
[51]
and they belong to a class of their
own.
[52]
They are neither civil nor criminal actions but rather
investigations by the Court into the conduct of its
officer.
[53]
They involve no private interest and afford no
redress for private grievance.
[54]

A disciplinary action against a lawyer is intended to
protect the administration of justice from the misconduct of its
officers. This Court requires that its officers shall be
competent, honorable, and reliable men in whom the public
may repose confidence.
[55]
Lawyers must at all times faithfully
perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the courts, and to
their clients. Their conduct must always reflect the values and
norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility. On these considerations, the Court
may disbar or suspend lawyers for any professional or private
misconduct showing them to be wanting in moral character,
honesty, probity, and good demeanor or to be unworthy to
continue as officers of the Court.
[56]


21
Clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the
imposition of the penalty in disbarment or suspension
proceedings.
[57]

The evidence presented shows that respondent failed to
comply with the Courts lawful orders in two instances:

1. In the 25 March 1992 Court Resolution, respondent
was required to file a rejoinder within 10 days from notice.
However, she only submitted the rejoinder on 11 November
1993 after she was detained at the NBI for five days for failure
to heed the Courts order.

2. In the 7 October 1992 Court Resolution, respondent
was required to comment on complainants manifestation. She
instead submitted a manifestation on 3 February 1993 or
almost four months thereafter. In her manifestation,
respondent alleged that she had substantially complied with
the Courts orders. However, the Court in its 1 March 1993
Resolution stated that nothing set out in respondents
manifestation excused her failure to obey the Courts
Resolutions.

These acts constitute willful disobedience of the lawful
orders of this Court, which under Section 27, Rule 138
[58]
of the
Rules of Court is in itself a sufficient cause for suspension or
disbarment. Respondents cavalier attitude in repeatedly
ignoring the orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter
disrespect to the judicial institution.
[59]
Respondents conduct
indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. A Courts Resolution
is not to be construed as a mere request, nor should it be
complied with partially, inadequately, or
selectively.
[60]
Respondents obstinate refusal to comply with
the Courts orders not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in her
character; it also underscores her disrespect of the Courts
lawful orders which is only too deserving of reproof.
[61]

Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and
processes and respondents deference is underscored by the
fact that willful disregard thereof will subject the lawyer not
only to punishment for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions
as well. In fact, graver responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer
than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to
show respect to their processes.
[62]

Respondents failure to comply with the Courts directive
to file a Rejoinder and to file a Comment also constitutes gross
misconduct. The Court defined gross misconduct as any
inexcusable, shameful, flagrant, or unlawful conduct on the
part of the person concerned in the administration of justice
which is prejudicial to the rights of the parties or to the right
determination of a cause. It is a conduct that is generally


22
motivated by a premeditated, obstinate, or intentional
purpose.
[63]

In Bernal Jr. v. Fernandez,
[64]
the Court held that failure to
comply with the Courts directive to comment on a letter-
complaint constitutes gross misconduct and insubordination,
or disrespect. In Cuizon v. Macalino,
[65]
a lawyers failure to
comply with the Courts Resolutions requiring him to file his
comment was one of the infractions that merited his
disbarment.

Furthermore, respondents defenses are untenable.
Firstly, respondent contends that complainant is not the real
party-in-interest since the property that was litigated was
owned by complainants wife. The Court is not persuaded with
this defense.

The procedural requirement observed in ordinary civil
proceedings that only the real party-in-interest must initiate
the suit does not apply in disbarment cases. In fact, the person
who called the attention of the court to a lawyers misconduct
is in no sense a party, and generally has no interest in the
outcome.
[66]
A compromise or withdrawal of charges does
not terminate an administrative complaint against a lawyer.
[67]

In Heck v. Santos,
[68]
the Court held that any interested
person or the court motu proprio may initiate disciplinary
proceedings. The right to institute disbarment proceedings is
not confined to clients nor is it necessary that the person
complaining suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing.
Disbarment proceedings are matters of public interest and the
only basis for the judgment is the proof or failure of proof of
the charges.
[69]

Secondly, respondent avers that she merely availed of all
the legal remedies for her client. In Suzuki v. Tiamson,
[70]
the
Court enunciated that while lawyers owe their entire devotion
to the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their
clients rights, they should not forget that they are first and
foremost, officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to
assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice.
Respondents act of filing cases with identical issues in other
venues despite the final ruling which was affirmed by the Court
of Appeals and the Supreme Court is beyond the bounds of
the law. To permit lawyers to resort to unscrupulous practices
for the protection of the supposed rights of their clients is to
defeat one of the purposes of the state the administration
of justice.
[71]

Respondent abused her right of recourse to the courts.
Respondent, acting as Tanliocos counsel, filed cases for


23
Specific Performance and Maintenance of Possession despite
the finality of the decision in the Ejectment case which involves
the same issues. The Court held that an important factor in
determining the existence of forum-shopping is the vexation
caused to the courts and the parties-litigants by the filing of
similar cases to claim substantially the same reliefs.
[72]
Indeed,
while a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, it should
not be at the expense of truth and administration of justice.
[73]

Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
mandates lawyers to represent their clients with zeal but within
the bounds of the law. It is evident from the records that
respondent filed other cases to thwart the execution of the
final judgment in the Ejectment case. Clearly,
respondent violated the proscription in Canon 19.

The penalty of suspension or disbarment is meted out in
clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing
and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. In this
case, respondent has shown her great propensity to disregard
court orders. Respondents acts of wantonly disobeying her
duties as an officer of the court show an utter disrespect for
the Court and the legal profession. However, the Court will
not disbar a lawyer if it finds that a lesser penalty will suffice to
accomplish the desired end.

Respondents acts constitute gross misconduct and
willful disobedience of lawful orders of a superior
court. Respondent also violated Canon 19 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Her suspension is consequently
warranted.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Emily A. Bajar is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of THREE YEARS effective from notice, with a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the
Bar Confidant to be appended to respondents personal record
as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the
Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.


24
THIRD DIVISION

ATTY. GODOFREDO C. MANIPUD, A.C. No. 6943
Complainant,
Present:

Ynares-
Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Austria-Martinez,
Chico-Nazario,
Nachura, and
Peralta, JJ.
ATTY. FELICIANO M. BAUTISTA,
Respondent. Promulgated:

March 13, 2009
x -------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------- x
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On November 21, 2005, Atty. Godofredo C. Manipud
filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Feliciano M.
Bautista for alleged commission of forum shopping in violation
of his attorneys oath and in violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, and for improper
conduct.

Complainant narrated that he was a mortgagee of the
property allegedly owned by Jovita de Macasieb. When the
mortgagor failed to pay despite demands, he filed an
application for extra-judicial foreclosure of the said property
with the Clerk of Court and Ex-Officio Sheriff of the Regional
Trial Court in Dagupan City. Thereafter, a Notice of
Extrajudicial Sale was issued and the public auction was
scheduled on April 1, 2005.

However, on March 22, 2005, Atty. Bautista, as counsel
for the mortgagor, filed with the Regional Trial Court a verified


25
complaint for Annulment of Real Estate Mortgage and Notice
of Extrajudicial Sale with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order with Damages
which was docketed as Civil Case No. 2005-0107-D. The case
was raffled to Branch 41 which issued a TRO. On May 18,
2005, the trial court issued an order denying the prayer for
issuance of preliminary injunction.
Thus, upon application of complainant-mortgagee, the
sheriff caused another Notice of Extrajudicial Sale. The public
auction was scheduled on July 29, 2005. However, on July 20,
2005, Atty. Bautista filed another case for annulment of real
estate mortgage which was docketed as Civil Case No. 2005-
0253-D
According to complainant, the two complaints for
annulment of real estate mortgage filed by respondent
contained the same allegations, involved the same parties, the
same subject matter, the same facts, the same issues and
sought the same relief. Complainant argued that the act of
respondent of filing the two complaints constitutes a clear
case of forum shopping, an improper conduct which tends to
degrade the administration of justice, and a violation of Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
commands all lawyers to uphold at all times the dignity and
integrity of the legal profession.
Complainant also alleged that when his counsel filed a
Motion to Dismiss the second complaint on the ground of
forum shopping, respondent promptly filed a Motion to
Withdraw Complaint.
In his Comment, Atty. Bautista alleged that the filing of
the second complaint for annulment of the extrajudicial sale
was a desperate attempt on his part to restrain the sale of his
clients property; that he is not guilty of forum shopping
because he did not act willfully, maliciously and with ill-intent;
that he disclosed in the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping of
the second complaint the pendency of the first complaint, as
well as in paragraphs 18, 20 and 22 of the said second
complaint; that he filed the second complaint out of pity for
his client who was about to lose her family home due to the
unconscionably high monthly interest being charged by
complainant; and that his prompt filing of a motion to
withdraw the second complaint was indicative of his good
faith.
On January 29, 2007, the case was referred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation. The IBP then directed the parties to
attend a mandatory conference during which the admissions,
stipulation of facts and definition of issues, shall be taken
up. After the mandatory conference, the parties were heard


26
and thereafter directed to submit their respective position
papers.
In his Position Paper, complainant alleged that herein
respondent, Atty. Bautista, is a nephew of Jovita de Macasieb,
the registered owner of the mortgaged property. Although the
loans which were obtained in 2003 appeared to have been
received by Jovita de Macasieb, complainant learned,
particularly on October 3, 2006, that Jovita de Macasieb has
been dead since October 16, 1968.
Complainant alleged that respondent collaborated with an
impostor in filing the two complaints for annulment of extra-
judicial sale. Although the plaintiff in said complaints was
referred to as JOVITA DE MACASIEB, the complaints however
were signed by one JOVITA MACASIEB. Complainant argued
that respondent intentionally resorted to this ploy in order to
mislead the former. Since respondent was the one who
notarized both complaints hence, he should know that JOVITA
DE MACASIEB who was his aunt, and JOVITA MACASIEB who
signed both complaints, are two different
persons. Complainant averred that respondents act of
resurrecting a dead person not once but twice for the purpose
of unjustly enriching themselves demonstrates a character not
befitting a member of the legal profession.
In his Reply to complainants Position Paper, respondent
alleged that the only issue for resolution before the IBP is
whether he violated the rule on forum shopping; that
assuming the IBP could validly take cognizance of other issues,
still it was complainants fault that he transacted with an
impostor; and that he did not know the person of Jovita
Macasieb until the latter hired his services as lawyer.
In the Report and Recommendation of Investigating
Commissioner Atty. Lolita A. Quisumbing, she found that
respondent is not administratively liable for lack of showing
that the filing of the second complaint was done deliberately
and willfully to commit forum shopping. Thus:
To merit disciplinary action, forum shopping must be
willful and deliberate. Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court
requires that, should there be any pending action or claim
before any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency, a complete
statement of its status should be given.
In the present case, respondent explained his actions in
this wise:
In the second complaint the respondent called the
attention of the Court that there was a pending (sic) between
the parties, Civil Case No. 2005-178. Hence, the purpose is not
to obtain favorable decision, but to have the issue resolved in


27
Civil Case No. 2005-178. To bring home his point, the
respondent attached as Annex E the first complaint.
The respondent should not be blamed for the
institution of the second complaint. He was misled by the very
act of the complainant. Complainant had filed the application
for foreclosure on December 20, 2004. This was the subject of
Civil Case No. 178. All that he had to do was request the
sheriff with whom he had filed the application to proceed with
the foreclosure. There is absolutely no need for complainant
to make a second application. In making the second
application, it was impressed upon the mind of the respondent
that it was another foreclosure.
In sum, respondent acted in good faith in filing the
second complaint since it was established that it was his
immediate reaction upon finding out that a second application
for extrajudicial foreclosure was filed. If, indeed, there was
intent to commit forum-shopping, he would not have alleged
in the second complaint the fact of filing of the first complaint
and attached a copy of the same.
The objective of the rule against forum-shopping was
cited in Municipality of Taguig, et al vs. Court of Appeals. Said
the Supreme Court
What is truly important to consider in determining
whether forum shopping exists or not is the vexation caused
the courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks different
courts and/or administrative agencies to rule on the same or
related causes and/or grant the same or substantially the same
reliefs, in the process creating the possibility of conflicting
decisions being rendered by the different fora upon the same
issues.
In this case, no undue vexation was caused to the Court
and petitioner as the fact of filing of the first case was alleged
in the second complaint and secondly, soon thereafter,
inasmuch as both cases were raffled to the same branch, the
first case was dismissed by the said Court. Hence, there was
no danger of different courts ruling on the same issues.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully
recommended that the Complaint against respondent ATTY.
FELICIANO C. BAUTISTA be dismissed for lack of merit.
(Citations omitted)
The Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and
approved the findings and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner in a Resolution dated February 6,
2008.
On June 2, 2008, complainant filed before this Court
a Comment on the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors


28
with Motion for Reinvestigation. He claimed that forum
shopping was not the sole issue raised for resolution but also
respondents alleged violation of the Oath of Attorney in
relation to the Canons of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and for improper conduct. He argued that the
IBP should have also discussed and resolved respondents act
of allegedly resurrecting Jovita de Macasieb from the dead and
for allowing an impostor to impersonate the dead.
The Court notes that in paragraphs 1-10 of the complaint filed
by Atty. Manipud before this Court, he narrated the
antecedents which led to the filing of two complaints for
annulment of extrajudicial sale by herein respondent. Then, in
paragraphs 11-19, complainant concluded that respondents
acts amounted to forum shopping. Clearly, respondent is thus
being charged only with commission of forum shopping in
violation of his attorneys oath and in violation of Canon 1,
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and for
improper conduct.

Even assuming to be true complainants allegation that he only
learned on October 3, 2006, that the mortgagor, Jovita de
Macasieb, has been dead since 1968, still he failed to raise this
issue at the Mandatory Conference before the IBP where the
issues were defined. The transcript of stenographic notes
taken during the mandatory conference on September 13,
2007, long after complainant allegedly knew of the death of
Jovita de Macasieb, shows that respondents act of allegedly
resurrecting Jovita de Macasieb from the dead and for
allowing an impostor to impersonate the dead was never
raised as an issue, thus:
ATTY. DECANO:
The proceeding before this Honorable Commissioner is
whether there was a forum shopping.
COMM. QUISUMBING:
Yes, the issue so will determine the relevance of that if you
have any objection.

ATTY. DECANO:
There is therefore a relevant because it appears thru a
representation
COMM. QUISUMBING:
Yes, will be noted. State your objection.
ATTY. DECANO:
It is irrelevant, immaterial and is being of .


29
ATTY. MANIPUD:
Your Honor, I would like to mark as Exhibit D is the National
Statistics Office showing that the plaintiff which was the
counselrespondent is already dead in October 16, 1968 to
prove that the first complaint and the second complaint is
tainted with fraud, Your Honor, and in violation of this
attorneys oath of office.
ATTY. DECANO:
We object vigorously because that is not an issue before this
Honorable Commission.
COMM. QUISUMBING:
That is why paero we are here for admissions, stipulation of
facts, and definition of issues.

ATTY. MANIPUD:
Yes, but, Your Honor,
COMM. QUISUMBING:
We have to start first with the admissions and then we can
proceed with the stipulations and issues. We can stipulate
ultimately on what issue is before this Commission. It is not
for the Commission to rule on those matters that you are
presenting paero.

ATTY. MANIPUD:
But it will had include this, Your Honor, in order to avoid nor
filing of multiplicity of suit because if its that taken in this
forum then another case will be filed.

COMM. QUISUMBING:
It is not the proper forum, paero. We are only limited on the
issues that pertains to the conduct of among selves as a lawyer
so we may proceed with the admissions and stipulations of
facts and issues.
ATTY. MANIPUD:
I think the 2 complaints and the Motion to Dismiss are
documentary evidence to support forum shopping that I have
marked.
[1]

x x x x


30
ATTY. DECANO:
The other allegations in this proposed stipulation of facts for
being immaterial and irrelevant.

COMM. QUISUMBING:
Youre not stipulating that respondent and plaintiff Jovita de
Macasieb

ATTY. DECANO:
Because this is a new issue and the Supreme Court delegated
the Commissioner to subscribe only on the issues.
COMM. QUISUMBING:
Okay, that is the rule paero. You have already submitted your
stipulation of facts lets now go to the issues.

ATTY. MANIPUD:
Whether or not respondent violated the rule on forum
shopping.

COMM. QUISUMBING:
How about number 2?

ATTY. MANIPUD:
Whether or not he violated Rule 1, Section 1 of Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

ATTY. DECANO:
We have deny that because that is a .

ATTY. MANIPUD:
Whether or not respondent violated his attorneys oath?

ATTY. DECANO:
We deny that.

ATTY. MANIPUD:
Whether or not respondent shall be disbarred or
administratively

COMM. QUISUMBING:
Lets now proceed with the respondent.
[2]

x x x x
COMM. QUISUMBING:
You can discuss that later on in the position paper, we are
here for stipulation. How about the issues paero?

ATTY. DECANO:
The issue is, whether there is a forum shopping.

COMM. QUISUMBING:


31
Okay, so there is only one issue that to be resolved here,
paero, whether the respondent committed forum
shopping.
ATTY. DECANO:
The other issue that we would like to maintain is whether the
settlement of the case I think complainant and the respondent
has put an end to this case.

ATTY. MANIPUD:
With respect to the mortgagor, Your Honor, it is settled, Your
Honor, but with respect to this case, Your Honor, its not yet
settled.
COMM. QUISUMBING:
So, let us reiterate the 2 issues now. Counsel whether
there is forum shopping and number 2?
ATTY. DECANO:
Whether the settlement of the Civil Case No. 2005-0107
between Jovita Macasieb and Godofredo C. Manipud has put
an end to any controversy about whether there is forum
shopping already.
ATTY. MANIPUD:
No, the forum shopping is beside the issue, Your Honor, as
far as the indebtedness is concern it is a third.

COMM. QUISUMBING:
That is on record so there is only one issue to be resolve
here. Well, that concludes with the admissions, stipulation
of facts and definition of issues. x x x
[3]

Thus, since respondents act of allegedly resurrecting Jovita de
Macasieb from the dead and for allowing an impostor to
impersonate the dead was never raised as an issue before this
Court or the IBP, then complainant could not raise the same in
this late stage of the proceedings. Moreover, we note that
complainant, in his Comment on the Resolution of the IBP
Board of Governors with Motion for Reinvestigation filed
before this Court, failed to assail the findings and resolution of
the IBP with regard to the issue on forum shopping. As such,
we find no reason to disturb the same.

ACCORDINGLY, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-58 of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines DISMISSING the complaint
for alleged commission of forum shopping in violation of his
attorneys oath and in violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, and for improper conduct
filed by Atty. Godofredo C. Manipud against Atty. Feliciano M.
Baustista, is AFFIRMED.


32

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

JONAR SANTIAGO, A.C. No. 6252

Complainant,

Present:

Panganiban, J.,

Chairman,

- versus - Sandoval-
Gutierrez,

Corona, and
Carpio
Morales,
*
JJ
Promulgated:

Atty. EDISON V. RAFANAN,
Respondent. October 5, 2004

x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
-- -- -- x

DECISION
PANGANIBAN
, J.:
otaries public are expected to exert utmost care in the
performance of their duties, which are impressed with
public interest. They are enjoined to comply faithfully with the
solemnities and requirements of the Notarial Law. This Court
will not hesitate to mete out appropriate sanctions to those
who violate it or neglect observance thereof.

The Case and the Facts
Before us is a verified Complaint
[1]
filed by Jonar Santiago, an
employee of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology
(BJMP), for the disbarment of Atty. Edison V. Rafanan. The
Complaint was filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on January
16, 2001. It charged Atty. Rafanan with deceit; malpractice or
N


33
other gross misconduct in office under Section 27 of Rule
138
[2]
of the Rules of Court; and violation of Canons 1.01, 1.02
and 1.03
[3]
, Canon 5
[4]
, and Canons 12.07
[5]
and 12.08 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
In his Report, IBP Investigating Commissioner Leland R.
Villadolid Jr. summarized the allegations of the complainant in
this wise:
x x x. In his Letter-Complaint, Complainant alleged, among
others, that Respondent in notarizing several documents on
different dates failed and/or refused to: a)make the proper
notation regarding the cedula or community tax certificate of
the affiants; b) enter the details of the notarized documents in
the notarial register; and c) make and execute the certification
and enter his PTR and IBP numbers in the documents he had
notarized, all in violation of the notarial provisions of the
Revised Administrative Code.
Complainant likewise alleged that Respondent executed an
Affidavit in favor of his client and offered the same as evidence
in the case wherein he was actively representing his
client. Finally, Complainant alleges that on a certain date,
Respondent accompanied by several persons waited for
Complainant after the hearing and after confronting the latter
disarmed him of his sidearm and thereafter uttered insulting
words and veiled threats.
[6]

On March 23, 2001, pursuant to the January 19, 2001
Order of the CBD,[7] Atty. Rafanan filed his verified
Answer.[8] He admitted having administered the oath to the
affiants whose Affidavits were attached to the verified
Complaint. He believed, however, that the non-notation of
their Residence Certificates in the Affidavits and the Counter-
affidavits was allowed.
He opined that the notation of residence certificates applied
only to documents acknowledged by a notary public and was
not mandatory for affidavits related to cases pending before
courts and other government offices. He pointed out that in
the latter, the affidavits, which were sworn to before
government prosecutors, did not have to indicate the
residence certificates of the affiants. Neither did other notaries
public in Nueva Ecija -- some of whom were older practitioners
-- indicate the affiants residence certificates on the documents
they notarized, or have entries in their notarial register for
these documents.

As to his alleged failure to comply with the certification
required by Section 3 of Rule 112[9] of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, respondent explained that as counsel of the
affiants, he had the option to comply or not with the
certification. To nullify the Affidavits, it was complainant who
was duty-bound to bring the said noncompliance to the


34
attention of the prosecutor conducting the preliminary
investigation.
As to his alleged violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR,
respondent argued that lawyers could testify on behalf of their
clients on substantial matters, in cases where [their] testimony
is essential to the ends of justice. Complainant charged
respondents clients with attempted murder. Respondent
averred that since they were in his house when the alleged
crime occurred, his testimony is very essential to the ends of
justice.

Respondent alleged that it was complainant who had
threatened and harassed his clients after the hearing of their
case by the provincial prosecutor on January 4,
2001. Respondent requested the assistance of the Cabanatuan
City Police the following day, January 5, 2001, which was the
next scheduled hearing, to avoid a repetition of the incident
and to allay the fears of his clients. In support of his
allegations, he submitted Certifications[10] from the
Cabanatuan City Police and the Joint Affidavit[11] of the two
police officers who had assisted them.
Lastly, he contended that the case had been initiated for no
other purpose than to harass him, because he was the counsel
of Barangay Captain Ernesto Ramos in the cases filed by the
latter before the ombudsman and the BJMP against
complainant.
After receipt of respondents Answer, the CBD, through
Commissioner Tyrone R. Cimafranca, set the case for hearing
on June 5, 2001, at two oclock in the
afternoon. Notices[12] of the hearing were sent to the parties
by registered mail. On the scheduled date and time of the
hearing, only complainant appeared. Respondent was unable
to do so, apparently because he had received the Notice only
on June 8, 2001.[13] The hearing was reset to July 3, 2001 at
two oclock in the afternoon.
On the same day, June 5, 2001, complainant filed his
Reply[14] to the verified Answer of respondent. The latters
Rejoinder was received by the CBD on July 13, 2001.[15] It also
received complainants Letter-Request[16] to dispense with the
hearings. Accordingly, it granted that request in its
Order[17] dated July 24, 2001, issued through Commissioner
Cimafranca. It thereby directed the parties to submit their
respective memoranda within fifteen days from receipt of the
Order, after which the case was to be deemed submitted for
resolution.
The CBD received complainants Memorandum[18] on
September 26, 2001. Respondent did not file any.
The IBPs Recommendation


35
On September 27, 2003, the IBP Board of Governors issued
Resolution No. XVI-2003-172
[19]
approving and adopting the
Investigating Commissioners Report that respondent had
violated specific requirements of the Notarial Law on the
execution of a certification, the entry of such certification in the
notarial register, and the indication of the affiants residence
certificate. The IBP Board of Governors found his excuse for
the violations unacceptable. It modified, however, the
recommendation[20] of the investigating commissioner by
increasing the fine to P3,000 with a warning that any
repetition of the violation will be dealt with a heavier penalty.
The other charges -- violation of Section 27 of Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court; and Canons 1.01 to 1.03, 12.07 and 12.08 of the
CPR -- were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

The Courts Ruling
We agree with the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.
Respondents Administrative Liability
Violation of the Notarial Law
The Notarial Law is explicit on the obligations and duties of
notaries public. They are required to certify that the party to
every document acknowledged before them has presented the
proper residence certificate (or exemption from the residence
tax); and to enter its number, place of issue and date as part of
such certification.
[21]
They are also required to maintain and
keep a notarial register; to enter therein all instruments
notarized by them; and to give to each instrument executed,
sworn to, or acknowledged before [them] a number
corresponding to the one in [their] register [and to state
therein] the page or pages of [their] register, on which the
same is recorded.
[22]
Failure to perform these duties would
result in the revocation of their commission as notaries
public.
[23]

These formalities are mandatory and cannot be simply
neglected, considering the degree of importance and
evidentiary weight attached to notarized documents. Notaries
public entering into their commissions are presumed to be
aware of these elementary requirements.
In Vda. de Rosales v. Ramos,
[24]
the Court explained the value
and meaning of notarization as follows:
The importance attached to the act of notarization cannot be
overemphasized. Notarization is not an empty, meaningless,
routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest,
such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act
as notaries public. Notarization converts a private document
into a public document thus making that document admissible


36
in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. A notarial
document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its
face. Courts, administrative agencies and the public at large
must be able to rely upon the acknowledgment executed by a
notary public and appended to a private instrument.
For this reason, notaries public should not take for granted the
solemn duties pertaining to their office. Slipshod methods in
their performance of the notarial act are never to be
countenanced. They are expected to exert utmost care in the
performance of their duties,
[25]
which are dictated by public
policy and are impressed with public interest
It is clear from the pleadings before us -- and respondent has
readily admitted -- that he violated the Notarial Law by failing
to enter in the documents notations of the residence
certificate, as well as the entry number and the pages of the
notarial registry.
Respondent believes, however, that noncompliance with those
requirements is not mandatory for affidavits relative to cases
pending before the courts and government agencies. He
points to similar practices of older notaries in Nueva Ecija.
We cannot give credence to, much less honor, his claim. His
belief that the requirements do not apply to affidavits is
patently irrelevant. No law dispenses with these
formalities. Au contraire, the Notarial Law makes no
qualification or exception. It is appalling and inexcusable that
he did away with the basics of notarial procedure allegedly
because others were doing so. Being swayed by the bad
example of others is not an acceptable justification for
breaking the law.
We note further that the documents attached to the verified
Complaint are the Joint Counter-Affidavit of respondents
clients Ernesto Ramos and Rey Geronimo, as well as their
witnesses Affidavits relative to Criminal Case No. 69-2000 for
attempted murder, filed by complainants brother against the
aforementioned clients. These documents became the basis of
the present Complaint.
As correctly pointed out by the investigating
commissioner, Section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure expressly requires respondent as notary -- in the
absence of any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official
authorized to administer the oath -- to certify that he has
personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that
they voluntarily executed and understood their
affidavits. Respondent failed to do so with respect to the
subject Affidavits and Counter-Affidavits in the belief that -- as
counsel for the affiants -- he was not required to comply with
the certification requirement.


37
It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to
obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and
legal processes.
[26]
They are expected to be in the forefront in
the observance and maintenance of the rule of law. This duty
carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of the
existing laws and to keep abreast with legal developments,
recent enactments and jurisprudence.
[27]
It is imperative that
they be conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they
faithfully comply with such duty, they may not be able to
discharge competently and diligently their obligations as
members of the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to
committing mistakes.
Where notaries public are lawyers, a graver responsibility is
placed upon them by reason of their solemn oath to obey the
laws.
[28]
No custom or age-old practice provides sufficient
excuse or justification for their failure to adhere to the
provisions of the law. In this case, the excuse given by
respondent exhibited his clear ignorance of the Notarial Law,
the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the importance of his
office as a notary public.
Nonetheless, we do not agree with complainants plea to
disbar respondent from the practice of law. The power to
disbar must be exercised with great caution.
[29]
Disbarment
will be imposed as a penalty only in a clear case of misconduct
that seriously affects the standing and the character of the
lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the
bar. Where any lesser penalty can accomplish the end desired,
disbarment should not be decreed.
[30]
Considering the nature
of the infraction and the absence of deceit on the part of
respondent, we believe that the penalty recommended by the
IBP Board of Governors is a sufficient disciplinary measure in
this case.

Lawyer as Witness for Client
Complainant further faults respondent for executing before
Prosecutor Leonardo Padolina an affidavit corroborating the
defense of alibi proffered by respondents clients, allegedly in
violation of Rule 12.08 of the CPR: A lawyer shall avoid
testifying in behalf of his client.
Rule 12.08 of Canon 12 of the CPR states:
Rule 12.08 A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his
client, except:
a) on formal matters, such as the mailing,
authentication or custody of an instrument and the like;
b) on substantial matters, in cases where his
testimony is essential to the ends of justice, in which event he


38
must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case to
another counsel.
Parenthetically, under the law, a lawyer is not disqualified from
being a witness,
[31]
except only in certain cases pertaining to
privileged communication arising from an attorney-client
relationship.
[32]

The reason behind such rule is the difficulty posed upon
lawyers by the task of dissociating their relation to their clients
as witnesses from that as advocates. Witnesses are expected to
tell the facts as they recall them. In contradistinction,
advocates are partisans -- those who actively plead and
defend the cause of others. It is difficult to distinguish the
fairness and impartiality of a disinterested witness from the
zeal of an advocate. The question is one of propriety rather
than of competency of the lawyers who testify for their clients.
Acting or appearing to act in the double capacity of lawyer
and witness for the client will provoke unkind criticism and
leave many people to suspect the truthfulness of the lawyer
because they cannot believe the lawyer as disinterested. The
people will have a plausible reason for thinking, and if their
sympathies are against the lawyers client, they will have an
opportunity, not likely to be neglected, for charging, that as a
witness he fortified it with his own testimony. The testimony
of the lawyer becomes doubted and is looked upon as partial
and untruthful.
[33]

Thus, although the law does not forbid lawyers from being
witnesses and at the same time counsels for a cause, the
preference is for them to refrain from testifying as witnesses,
unless they absolutely have to; and should they do so, to
withdraw from active management of the case.
[34]

Notwithstanding this guideline and the existence of the
Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan in favor of his clients, we
cannot hastily make him administratively liable for the
following reasons:
First, we consider it the duty of a lawyer to assert every remedy
and defense that is authorized by law for the benefit of the
client, especially in a criminal action in which the latters life
and liberty are at stake.
[35]
It is the fundamental right of the
accused to be afforded full opportunity to rebut the charges
against them. They are entitled to suggest all those
reasonable doubts that may arise from the evidence as to their
guilt; and to ensure that if they are convicted, such conviction
is according to law.

Having undertaken the defense of the accused, respondent, as
defense counsel, was thus expected to spare no effort to save


39
his clients from a wrong conviction. He had the duty to
present -- by all fair and honorable means -- every defense
and mitigating circumstance that the law permitted, to the end
that his clients would not be deprived of life, liberty or
property, except by due process of law.
[36]

The Affidavit executed by Atty. Rafanan was clearly necessary
for the defense of his clients, since it pointed out the fact that
on the alleged date and time of the incident, his clients were at
his residence and could not have possibly committed the crime
charged against them. Notably, in his Affidavit, complainant
does not dispute the statements of respondent or suggest the
falsity of its contents.
Second, paragraph (b) of Rule 12.08 contemplates a situation
in which lawyers give their testimonies during the trial. In this
instance, the Affidavit was submitted during the preliminary
investigation which, as such, was merely inquisitorial.
[37]
Not
being a trial of the case on the merits, a preliminary
investigation has the oft-repeated purposes of securing
innocent persons against hasty, malicious and oppressive
prosecutions; protecting them from open and public
accusations of crime and from the trouble as well as expense
and anxiety of a public trial; and protecting the State from
useless and expensive prosecutions.
[38]
The investigation is
advisedly called preliminary, as it is yet to be followed by the
trial proper.
Nonetheless, we deem it important to stress and remind
respondent to refrain from accepting employment in any
matter in which he knows or has reason to believe that he may
be an essential witness for the prospective client. Furthermore,
in future cases in which his testimony may become essential to
serve the ends of justice, the canons of the profession
require him to withdraw from the active prosecution of these
cases.
No Proof of Harassment
The charge that respondent harassed complainant and uttered
insulting words and veiled threats is not supported by
evidence. Allegation is never equivalent to proof, and a bare
charge cannot be equated with liability.
[39]
It is not the self-
serving claim of complainant but the version of respondent
that is more credible, considering that the latters allegations
are corroborated by the Affidavits of the police officers and the
Certifications of the Cabanatuan City Police.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Edison V. Rafanan is found guilty of
violating the Notarial Law and Canon 5 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is herebyFINED P3,000 with a
warning that similar infractions in the future will be dealt with
more severely.
SO ORDERED.


40
CANON 13 - GENERAL
EN BANC
[A.C. No. 6084. September 3, 2003]
FELICITAS BERBANO, complainant, vs. ATTY. WENCESLAO
BARCELONA, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of
the legal profession. The trust and confidence necessarily
reposed by clients require in the attorney a high standard and
appreciation of his duty to his clients, his profession, the courts
and the public. The bar should maintain a high standard of
legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair
dealing. Generally speaking, a lawyer can do honor to the legal
profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the
bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end, nothing
should be done by any member of the legal fraternity which
might tend to lessen in any degree the confidence of the
public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the profession.
[1]

In a sworn Affidavit-Complaint dated March 11, 1999 filed
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), complainant
Felicitas Berbano seeks the disbarment of Atty. Wenceslao
Barcelona for Malpractice and Gross Misconduct Unbecoming
a Lawyer, Dereliction of Duty and Unjust
Enrichment.
[2]
Complainant alleges:
1. I am one of the heirs of Rufino Esteban Hilapo, owner of a
244-hectare lot situated at Alabang, Muntinlupa, which
property is being claimed by Filinvest Dev. Corp. in a case
pending with the Commission on the Settlement of Land
Problems (COSLAP), Quezon City. The heirs of REH has
appointed Mr. PORFIRIO DAEN as their attorney-in-fact giving
him authority to prosecute the case for and in their behalf.
2. On January 26, 1999, Mr. Porfirio Daen was arrested by a
Muntinlupa police on the strength of an expired warrant of
arrest-it was issued on February 1990-and subsequently
detained at the Muntinlupa City Jail, Tunasan, Muntinlupa City,
until his release on February 18, 1999.
3. Since Mr. Daen needed the assistance of a lawyer for his
release from incarceration, we tried to look for one. We told
our friend Naty Sibuya, about the predicament of Mr. Daen,
who recommended Atty. Wenceslao Barcelona to us, his wife
being Natys cousin/relative.
4. So on January 26, 1999, at about 10:30 in the evening, Atty.
Wenceslao Barcelona arrived at the Muntinlupa City Jail and
conferred with Mr. Daen. We learned later that Mr. Daen has
engaged the services of Atty. Barcelona for the latter to secure


41
the release of the former from prison. After their conversation,
Atty. Barcelona told us that if you could produce the amount
of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) Pesos he will cause the
release of Mr. Daen from prison the following day. I told him
that it was already late in the evening and I cannot any more
produce the amount. But he insisted that I must produce even
just a small amount. So, what I did was ask my relatives who
were with me at the time to contribute and we were able to
raise FIFTEEN THOUSAND SEVEN-HUNDRED (P15,700.00)
Pesos. In the meantime, Atty. Barcelona proceeded to
Chowking Restaurant which is just located across the city jail
where he waited for us there.
5. At the aforesaid restaurant, I handed to Atty. Barcelona the
amount who accepted the same. He reiterated his promise to
secure the release of Mr. Daen the following day. Before he
left, he asked us to meet him at Max Restaurant at around
12:00 noon at EDSA Crossing. He thereafter left because
according to him, he would go and see somebody, (a justice)
from the Supreme Court who could help the release of Mr.
Daen. It was already about 12:30 in the early morning of
January 27, 1999.
6. As agreed upon, I, together with Romana Soriano,
proceeded to Max Restaurant. We arrived at around 12:00
noon. Atty. Barcelona came at around 1:00 P.M. He even told
us that he just came from the Supreme Court where he fixed
the case of Mr. Daen. It surprised me though, that he did not
have with him any single document at the time. Then, I
handed him a pay-to-cash check for TWENTY-FOUR
THOUSAND (P24,000.00) Pesos, dated January 29, 1999. We
told him that the check may be encashed on the said
date. Although, he said that the Justices of the Supreme Court
do not accept check he nonetheless, accepted it saying that he
will have the same rediscounted. We thereafter left.
7. The following morning, January 28, 1999, at around 7:00
oclock Atty. Barcelona called me up by phone to say that since
he was unable to have the check rediscounted, I must produce
the amount of P5,000.00 and give the amount to him at Max
Restaurant at EDSA Crossing at around 12:00 noon. We were
unable to meet him because we arrived at about 1:00 oclock
already. Nonetheless, we waited for him until 3:00 in the
afternoon. Thereafter, I called him through his pager saying
that we were waiting for him at Max. I also called up our
house and inquire (sic) if a lawyer has called up. I was able to
talk to my husband who informed me that a certain Atty.
Barcelona called up. That Atty. Barcelona wanted to meet us at
McDonalds at Barangka Drive, Mandaluyong. So we rushed to
the place but he was not there. I again paged him informing
him that we were already at McDonalds and to return my call
through my cell phone. After a while, his wife called up to
inform us to proceed to their house which was just five houses


42
away from McDonalds. When we reached their house, we
were met by his daughter who called her mother. We were
ushered inside the house and after introducing ourselves, we
gave not only P5,000.00, but TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00)
Pesos in cash to his wife in the presence of his daughter. Then
we went to Putatan, Muntinlupa, hoping that he might be
there.
8. We arrived at Putatan, Muntinlupa at around 4:30 in the
afternoon and there we saw Atty. Barcelona. We informed him
that we left the P10,000.00 with his wife at their house. Since
Atty. Barcelona informed us that he could not secure the
release of Mr. Daen because the check had not been encashed,
Mr. Gil Daen, a nephew of Porfirio Daen, gave him FIFTEEN
THOUSAND (P15,000.00) Pesos in cash. I also gave him an
additional P1,000.00 for his gasoline expenses.
9. The next time that we saw Atty. Barcelona was on February
3, 1999, Wednesday at around 6:00 in the evening at Putatan,
Muntinlupa. He informed us that he just came from the city
jail where he had a conversation with Mr. Daen. He told us
that he is going to release Mr. Daen from prison tomorrow,
February 4, 1999. However, in the morning of February 4, we
learned from the wife of Atty. Barcelona when she returned my
call that her husband had left for Mindanao early that morning
on board a private plane owned by Chiongbian allegedly to
attend a peace talk with the Muslims.
10. After more than a week, I went to Putatan, Muntinlupa,
because I was informed by the son of Mr. Daen that he saw
Atty. Barcelona there. When I saw him, I confronted him about
his undertaking to release Mr. Daen from prison, but he only
advised us not to worry and promised (again) that he will
return the entire amount of P64,000.00 more or less, on
Thursday, February 18, 1999. But I never saw him again since
then. I have repeatedly paged him to return my call but he
never returned any of my calls.
[3]

In an Order dated April 15, 1999, Investigating Commissioner J.
Virgilio A. Bautista of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
IBP, required respondent to submit his answer to the
complaint, with a warning that he will be considered in default
and the case will be heard ex parte, if he fails to do
so.
[4]
Despite due notice,
[5]
respondent failed to file his
answer. Thus, complainant filed a motion to declare
respondent in default,
[6]
resolution of which was held in
abeyance by the Investigating Commissioner who required the
parties to appear for hearing before the Commission on
August 13, 1999.
[7]
On said date, respondent again failed to
appear despite due receipt of notice.
[8]
Commissioner Bautista
was thus constrained to consider respondent in default and
complainant was allowed to present her evidence ex
parte. Complainant testified and affirmed under oath the
truthfulness and veracity of her Affidavit-


43
Complaint.
[9]
Complainant also manifested that she will present
the check in the amount of P24,000.00
[10]
at the next date of
hearing.
Further hearings were set by the Commissioner, on October 1,
1999, November 19, 1999, October 12, 2001, December 14,
2001 and June 28, 2002, but both parties failed to appear on
said dates despite due notice.
[11]

Commissioner Bautista submitted his Final Report and
Recommendation on December 23, 2002 finding respondent
guilty of malpractice and serious breach of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and recommending that
respondent be disbarred and ordered to return to complainant
the amount of P64,000.00. The IBP Board of Governors
adopted Commissioner Bautistas findings but reduced the
penalty to suspension from the practice of law for six years.
The Court disagrees with the IBP Board of Governors in
reducing the penalty and upholds the findings and
recommendation of Commissioner Bautista. Under the facts
established by complainant, respondent should not only be
suspended, but disbarred from practice.
The object of a disbarment proceeding is not so much to
punish the individual attorney himself, as to safeguard the
administration of justice by protecting the court and the public
from the misconduct of officers of the court, and to remove
from the profession of law persons whose disregard for their
oath of office have proved them unfit to continue discharging
the trust reposed in them as members of the bar.
[12]

In In re Almacen, the Court expounded on the nature of
disbarment proceedings, viz.:
. . . Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui
generis . Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not
involve a trial of an action or a suit, but rather investigations
by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being
intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal
prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu
propio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real
question for determination is whether or not the attorney is
still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in
the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls
upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an
officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the
purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest
administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves
no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. . . .
[13]


44
As in the Ricafort case,
[14]
herein respondent chose to forget
that by swearing the lawyers oath, he became a guardian of
truth and the rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in
the fair and impartial administration of justice a vital function
of democracy a failure of which is disastrous to society.
[15]
In
disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary
powers, the case against the respondent must be established
by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof.
[16]
Considering the
serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a
member of the Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear
preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of
the administrative penalty.
[17]

Complainants evidence consists solely of her Affidavit-
Complaint and testimony before the Commission attesting to
the truth of the allegations laid down in her
affidavit. Commissioner Bautista and the IBP Board of
Governors found her testimony together with her affidavit
sufficient to support the finding that respondent committed
the acts complained of . The matter of assigning values to the
testimony of witnesses is best done by the investigating body
(which in this case is the Investigating Commissioner) because
unlike appellate courts, it can weigh such testimony in light of
the demeanor, conduct and attitude of the witnesses at the
trial.
[18]
Witnesses are weighed not numbered, and the
testimony of a single witness may suffice if trustworthy and
reliable.
[19]

The non-presentation of the check given to respondent does
not affect complainants case as it will merely serve to
corroborate her testimony and there is no law which requires
that the testimony of a single witness needs corroboration
except where the law expressly mandates such
corroboration
[20]
which is not so required in administrative
cases.
The act of respondent in not filing his answer and ignoring the
hearings set by the Investigating Commission, despite due
notice, emphasized his contempt for legal proceedings. Thus,
the Court finds no compelling reason to overturn the
Investigating Commissioners judgment.
Respondent is guilty of culpable violations of several Canons
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal
processes.
CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times upholds the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities
of the integrated bar.


45
CANON 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect
due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on
similar conduct by others.
CANON 16 A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client that may come into his possession.
Rule 16.01 A lawyer shall account for all money or property
collected or received for or from the client.
The Code exacts from lawyers not only a firm respect for law,
legal processes and the courts but also mandates the utmost
degree of fidelity and good faith in dealing with clients and the
moneys entrusted to them pursuant to their fiduciary
relationship. Instead of promoting respect for law and the
legal processes, respondent callously demeaned the legal
profession by taking money from a client under the pretext of
having connections with a Member of this Court.
The Court has taken into consideration the penalties imposed
in other administrative cases involving similar offenses, e. g.:
In Judge Angeles vs. Atty. Uy, Jr.,
[21]
the respondent was
suspended from the practice of law for one month for failing
to promptly report and remit the amount of P16,500.00 he
received on behalf of his client.
In Gonato vs. Atty. Adaza,
[22]
the respondent was suspended
from the practice of law for six months for charging his clients
the amount of P15,980.00 as filing fees when in fact no such
fees were due.
In Dumadag vs. Lumaya,
[23]
the Court ordered the indefinite
suspension of a lawyer for not remitting to his client the
amount of P4,344.00 that he had received pursuant to an
execution.
In Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc., vs. Atty.
Naldoza,
[24]
the respondent was disbarred for obtaining from
his client the amount of US$2,555.00 allegedly as cash bond in
an appealed case before this Court, when in fact no such
amount has been paid or that the Court required such
payment.
In the present case, respondent collected money from the
complainant and the nephew of the detained person in the
total amount of P64,000.00 for the immediate release of the
detainee through his alleged connection with a Justice of the
Supreme Court. He deserves to be disbarred from the practice
of law.
This is not the first time that respondent has been charged
with and found guilty of conduct unbecoming a lawyer. In Gil
T. Aquino vs. Atty. Wenceslao C. Barcelona,
[25]
respondent
misrepresented to the complainant that he could secure the


46
restructuring of the complainants loan with the PNB through
his connection with a certain Gonzalo Mericullo, legal assistant
in the PNB. Based on such misrepresentation, respondent
asked and received the amount of P60,000.00 from the
complainant allegedly to be paid to the PNB. It turned out
that there was no such employee in the PNB by the name
Gonzalo Mericullo and the complainants property was
eventually foreclosed. As in the present case, respondent did
not appear before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline
despite receipt of the notices sent and duly received by
him. After due proceedings, the IBP Board of Governors found
respondent guilty of professional misconduct, and
recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law
for six months and ordered to render the accounting and
restitute whatever remained of the P60,000.00 to the
complainant. The Court adopted such finding and
recommendation and respondent was ordered suspended
from the practice of law for six months, effective immediately.
Respondent has demonstrated a penchant for misrepresenting
to clients that he has the proper connections to secure the
relief they seek, and thereafter, ask for money, which will
allegedly be given to such connections. In this case,
respondent misrepresented to complainant that he could get
the release of Mr. Porfirio Daen through his connection with a
Supreme Court Justice. Not only that, respondent even had
the audacity to tell complainant that the Justices of the
Supreme Court do not accept checks.
In so doing, respondent placed the Court in dishonor and
public contempt. In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs.
Cloribel,
[26]
the Court expounded on a lawyers duty to the
courts, viz.:
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, like the court itself,
and instrument or agency to advance the ends of
justice. [People ex rel. Karlin vs. Culkin, 60 A.L.R. 851, 855]. His
duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to
which he owes fidelity, not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice. [In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, 602]. Faith
in the courts a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to
undermine the judicial edifice is a disastrous to the continuity
of the government and to the attainment of the liberties of the
people. [Malcolm Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1949 ed., p.
160]. Thus has it been said a lawyer that [a]s an officer of the
court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not
destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the
courts so essential to the proper administration of justice.
The Judiciary has been besieged enough with accusations of
corruption and malpractice. For a member of the legal
profession to further stoke the embers of mistrust on the
judicial system with such irresponsible representations is


47
reprehensible and cannot be tolerated. Respondent made a
mockery of the Judiciary and further eroded public confidence
in courts and lawyers when he ignored the proceedings in the
Aquino case and in the present case. More so, when he
misrepresented to complainant that he has connections with a
Member of the Court to accommodate his client and that
Justices of the Court accept money. Indubitably, he does not
deserve to remain a member of the Bar any minute longer.
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with
conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness,
maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful
compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the
conditions required for remaining a member of good standing
of the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. The
Supreme Court, as guardian of the legal profession, has
ultimate disciplinary power over attorneys. This authority to
discipline its members is not only a right but a bounden duty
as well . . . That is why respect and fidelity to the Court is
demanded of its members.
[27]

WHEREFORE, for gross misconduct, respondent Wenceslao C.
Barcelona is DISBARRED from the practice of law. His name is
ordered STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. He is further
directed to return to complainant Felicitas Berbano the
amount of Sixty Four Thousand Pesos (P64,000.00) within thirty
(30) days from notice of this Decision.
This Decision shall take effect immediately.
Let copies hereof be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant,
to be appended to respondents personal record; the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines; the Office of the President;
the Department of Justice; the Philippines Judges Association;
and all courts of the land for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr.,
Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Ynares-Santiago, and Carpio, JJ., on official
leave.
Vitug, J., I concur except for the civil award which, in my view,
should be taken apart from this administrative case.


48
SECOND DIVISION
ERLINDA I. BILDNER and MAXIMO K.
ILUSORIO,
Petitioners,
- versus -

ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, RAMON K.
ILUSORIO, MARIETTA K. ILUSORIO,
SHEREEN K. ILUSORIO, CECILIA A.
BISUA, and ATTY. MANUEL R.
SINGSON,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 157384

Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson, YNARES-
SANTIAGO,
*

VELASCO, JR.,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
**
and
BRION, JJ.

Promulgated:

June 5, 2009
x--------------------------------------------------------------------
---------------------x
D E C I S I O N
VELASCO, JR., J.:
In this petition filed directly with the Court in accordance with
Rule 71, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, Erlinda I. Bildner and
Maximo K. Ilusorio pray that respondents, one of them their
mother and three their siblings, be cited for indirect contempt
for alleged contemptuous remarks and acts directed against
the Court, particularly the then members of its First
Division. By motion dated June 5, 2003, petitioners pray that
the same petition be treated as a formal complaint for
disbarment or disciplinary action against respondent Atty.
Manuel R. Singson for alleged gross misconduct, among other
offenses.

The Undisputed Facts
Indirect Contempt
The resulting alleged contemptuous statements and actions
date back to proceedings before the Court, specifically in G.R.
Nos. 139789 and 139808 that were appeals from the decision
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 51689, denying
the petition for habeas corpus filed by respondent Erlinda K.
Ilusorio to have custody of her husband, Potenciano Ilusorio.
The appealed decision found Potenciano to be of sound mind
and not unlawfully restrained of his liberty. The CA, however,


49
granted Erlinda Ilusorio visitation rights, an accommodation
which the Court nullified in its Decision of May 12, 2000 in G.R.
Nos. 139789 and 139808.
[1]

This May 12, 2000 ruling spawned several incidents. First,
Erlinda Ilusorio moved for its reconsideration, reiterating her
basic plea for a writ of habeas corpus and that daughters
petitioner Bildner and Sylvia Ilusorio be directed to desist from
preventing her from seeing Potenciano. Erlinda Ilusorio
followed this motion with a Motion to Set Case for Preliminary
Conference, requesting that she and Potenciano be [allowed
to be] by themselves together in front of the Honorable
Court.
[2]
She reiterated this request in an Urgent
Manifestation and Motion dated August 25, 2000.

By Resolution of September 20, 2000, the Court set the case
for preliminary conference on October 11, 2000 but without
requiring the mandatory presence of theparties.
[3]
In another
resolution dated January 31, 2001, the Court denied Erlinda
Ilusorios manifestation and motion in which she prayed that
Potenciano be produced before, and be medically examined
by a team of medical experts appointed by, the
Court.
[4]
Erlinda Ilusorio sought reconsideration of the January
31, 2001 resolution.
On March 27, 2001, the Court denied with finality Erlinda
Ilusorios motion for reconsideration of the January 31, 2001
resolution.
[5]
Undaunted, she filed an Urgent Manifestation
and Motion for Clarification of the Courts January 31, 2001
resolution. On May 30, 2001, the Court merely noted the
urgent manifestation and motion for clarification.
[6]

By Resolution of July 19, 2001,
[7]
the Court denied Erlinda
Ilusorios motion for reconsideration of the Decision dated
May 12, 2000. Thereafter, in another resolution dated July 24,
2002, we resolved to expunge from the records her repetitive
motions, with the caveat that no further pleadings shall be
entertained.
[8]

Barely over a month after, Erlinda Ilusorio, this time
represented by Dela Cruz Albano & Associates, sought leave to
file an urgent motion for reconsideration of the July 24, 2002
resolution.
In relation to the above habeas corpus case, Erlinda Ilusorio
addressed two letters to then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
dated February 26, 2001 and April 16, 2001, respectively. In the
first, she sought assistance vis--vis her wish to see
Potenciano.
[9]
In the second, she chafed at what she considered
the Courts bent to adhere to forms and procedure and, at the
same time, urged the Court to personally see Potenciano.
[10]

Another letter of September 5, 2001 to Chief Justice Davide
drew attention to the Courts decision in G.R. No. 148985
entitled Ramon K. Ilusorio v. Baguio Country Club, in


50
which Erlinda Ilusorio tagged the decision as appalling,
unilaterally brazen, and unprecedented in the annals of
the Supreme Court decision-making process. In her words,
the decision denied and dismissed the petition of her son,
Ramon Ilusorio, through a four-page resolution by
unilaterally arguing and citing the arguments made by the
respondents in the case at the courts a quo, without even
giving the same respondents the proper hearing or
requiring a comment or a reply. In the same letter, she
made reference to the Court giving special treatment to
particular litigants.
[11]

To petitioners, Erlinda Ilusorios filing of redundant motions
and pleadings, along with her act of writing the
aforementioned letters, constitutes contemptuous disrespect
and disobedience or defiance of lawful orders of the Court.
On top of the foregoing circumstances, petitioners would also
have respondents cited for contempt in view of the publication
of On the Edge of Heaven, a book carrying Erlinda Ilusorios
name as author and which contained her commentaries on the
aforesaid habeas corpus case. In this book, published by PI-EKI
Foundation
[12]
whose board of directors is composed of
respondents Ramon, Marietta K. Ilusorio, Shereen K. Ilusorio,
and Cecilia A. Bisua, the following excerpts from the
Postscript section captionedWhere is Justice? appear
I pursued my case in the Supreme Court at Division I. There I
was heard by Justice Pardo, Davide, Puno, Kapunan,
and Santiago.
Just the same this highest court of the land did not heed to
my desperate pleas. Conveniently, they omitted the state of
my husbands true desires; dismissed the importance of
my husbands presence in the court; ignored the ultimate
need to check for themselves the true state of Nanoys
health; and after PIs recent death in June 28, 2001, easily
dismissed my case as moot and academic. My husband
was referred to as another subject. (On the Edge of
Heaven, p. 180)
[13]

In the same book, Erlinda Ilusorio denounced Justice Bernardo
P. Pardo, now retired, the ponente of the habeas corpus case,
the other members of the then First Division of the Court, and
the Court as a whole:
Where is justice?
Sadly, the Court of Appeals and, moreso, the Supreme Court
broke-up my family. Doesnt our Constitution, our Civil Code
and our Family Code protect the sanctity of marriage and the
family?


51
Was justice for sale? Was justice sold? Nasaan ang
katarungan?
x x x x
August 29, 2001
To the Supreme Court of the Philippines, Division One, Justice
Bernardo Pardo, Ponente on Case No. x x x

x x x x
You simply quoted an obiter dictum of the Court of
Appeals. There was no ruling on his mental condition as this
was not at issue at the habeas corpus. How could you have
made a ruling based on an obiter? All the doctors reports
submitted were totally disregarded. In reality it was his frailty,
not his mental competence that I raised. During the last five
years, he became increasingly frail, almost blind and could
barely talk. He was not able to read nor write for almost
twenty years. x x x Our separation, three years ago, cruel and
inhuman that it was, was made more painful by your ruling
that I may not even visit him.
x x x x
On May 30, 2001, you ruled that your decision
noted without action the questions of my lawyers, in effect
brushing aside the Motion for Clarification without any
answers whatsoever. Why?

x x x x

If your decision becomes res judicata havent you just
provided a most convenient venue to separate spouses
from each otherbased on individual rightsparticularly
when one spouse is ailing and prone to manipulation and
needs the other spouse the most? Why did you wait for
more than one year and after my husbands death to deny
my motion for reconsideration? Is it because it is easier to
do so now that it is academic? Does your conscience
bother you at all?
x x x x
I close by asking you: how can the highest court of our land
be a party to the break up of my family and, disregarding
the Family Code, not let me take care of my husband, permit
my husband to die without even heeding my desperate
pleas, if not for justice, at least your concern for a human
being?
x x x x


52
Looking back, I cannot fail to see thatif our courts can
render this kind of justice to one like myself because I have
lesser means, and lesser connections than my well-married
daughters, what kind of justice is given to those less
privileged? To the poor, with no meanswhat have they? I
cry for them
[14]
(Emphasis ours.)

Disbarment Complaint

The disbarment case against respondent Atty. Singson
stemmed from his alleged attempt, as counsel of Ramon in
Civil Case No. 4537-R, to exert influence on presiding Regional
Trial Court Judge Antonio Reyes to rule in Ramons favor. To
complainant-petitioners, the bid to influence, which allegedly
came in the form of a bribe offer, may be deduced from the
following exchanges during the May 31, 2000 hearing on
Ramons motion for Judge Reyes to inhibit himself from
hearing Civil Case No. 4537-R:
COURT: Do you have something to add to your motion?
ATTY. JOSE: The purpose of this representation basically, your
honor state the facts are already established as a basis for
tendency or a perception correctly or incorrectly that there is
already a possibility of partiality.

COURT: Who is your partner?

ATTY. JOSE: The counsel for the plaintiff is Law Office of
Singson and Associates and I am the associate of said Law
Office, your honor.

COURT: And you are aware that Atty. Manuel R. Singson is
your boss?
x x x x
ATTY. JOSE: Yes, your honor?
COURT: Has he been telling you the truth in this case?
ATTY. JOSE: Well, your honor my appearance here for the
purpose of having this motion duly heard.
COURT: That is why Im asking you the question, has he been
telling you the truth regarding this case?


53
ATTY. JOSE: Well, your honor in fact the actual counsel here is
Atty. Gepty and I have been

COURT: Are you aware of the fact that Atty. Singson has
been calling my residence in Baguio City for about 20 to
50 times already?

ATTY. JOSE: I have no knowledge already.
COURT: Are you aware that he has offered Atty. Oscar
Sevilla his classmate at Ateneo Law School P500,000.00 to
give it to me for the purpose of ruling in favor of your
client[?]
ATTY. JOSE: I have no knowledge your honor
COURT: Ask him that tell him to face the mirror and ask him if
he is telling the truth alright? I will summon the records of
PLDT. The audacity of telling me to inhibit myself here. It
has been him who has been trying to influence me.
x x x x
COURT: Tell him to look at his face in the mirror, tell me if
he is honest or not.
[15]

And to support their disbarment charge against Atty. Singson
on the grounds of attempted bribery and serious misconduct,
complainant-petitioners submitted an affidavit executed on
December 23, 2004 by Judge Reyes in which he pertinently
alleged:
2) That one of the cases I tried, heard and decided was
Civil Case No. 4537-R entitled Ramon K. Ilusorio v. Baguio
Country Club for the Declaration of Nullity of Limitations
and/or Injunction x x x;
3) That the very minute that the case was assigned by
raffle to the undersigned, Atty. Manuel Singson counsel of
plaintiff Ramon K. Ilusorio in the aforementioned case, started
working on his channels to the undersigned to secure a
favorable decision for his client;
4) That Atty. Singsons foremost link to the
undersigned was Atty. Oscar Sevilla, my family friend and who
incidentally was a classmate of Atty. Singson;
5) That Atty. Sevilla, being a close family friend,
immediately intimated to undersigned that Atty. Singson
wanted a favorable decision and that there was a not so
vague an offer of a bribe from him (Atty. Singson);


54
6) That I rejected every bit of illegal insinuations and
told Atty. Sevilla to assure Atty. Singson that I am duty bound
to decide every case on the merits no matter who the litigants
are
7) That even before the start of the hearing of the case,
Atty. Singson himself relentlessly worked on undersigned
by visiting him about three times in his office. And not
being satisfied with those visits, he (Atty. Singson) made more
than a dozen calls to
undersigneds Manila and Baguio residences, and worked
on Atty. Sevilla x x x by calling the latters cell phone even
when we were playing golf in Manila. These phone calls were
even admitted by Atty. Singson in a Manifestation he filed in
court citing several ridiculous, unbelievable and untruthful
reasons for his phone calls;
8) That when Ramon K. Ilusorios plea for injunctive
relief was submitted for resolution, Atty. Singson became more
unrelenting in throwing his professional ethics out of the
window and breached his lawyers oath by personally calling
many more times, some of which were even made late
evenings, just trying to convince undersigned to grant the
injunctive relief his client Ramon K. Ilusorio desperately needed
in the case;
9) That because of his inability to influence
undersigned x x x, Atty. Singson filed a motion to inhibit
alleging that facts have been established of undersigneds
partiality for his clients adversary, the defendant Baguio
Country Club;
10) That at the hearing on the motion to inhibit x x x I
declared in open court and in public the dishonest and
unprofessional conduct of Atty. Singson in trying to influence a
judge to favor his client, no matter how unmeritorious his
prayer for injunction was. In open court, undersigned scored
Atty. Singsons audacity of asking an inhibition when it has
always been him and him alone who wanted and tried to
influence the undersigned.
11) That on January 12, 2000, undersigned issued an
Order in Civil Case No. 4537-R x x x denying Atty. Singsons
clients prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction x x x;
12) That the undersigneds ruling against Atty.
Singsons client in the case was elevated to the [CA] in G.R. No.
59353 where x x x Atty. Singson never raised the issue of
undersigneds denial to inhibit;
13) That still unsatisfied with the [CAs] adverse ruling
against his client, Atty. Singson went on to the Supreme Court
in G.R. No. 148985 questioning the [CAs] affirmation of


55
undersigneds decision. The Supreme Court x x x dismissed the
appeal of Ramon K. Ilusorio and sustained undersigneds
decision.
[16]
(Emphasis ours.)
Complainant-petitioners also submitted Atty. Oscar Sevillas
affidavit to support the attempted bribery charge against Atty.
Singson. In its pertinent part, Atty. Sevillas affidavit reads:
That sometime in late October of 1999 x x x, I received a
call from Atty. Singson x x x and in the course of our
conversation, I learned that Ramon K. Ilusorio is his client who
has a civil case raffled to Judge Reyes;
That during said conversation, I mentioned to
Atty. Singson that Judge Reyes is a family friend and x x x is a
man of integrity;
That in the months that followed, Atty. Singson
made a call or two to my cellphone requesting if I could
mention to Judge Reyes that he (Atty. Singson) is my classmate
at the Ateneo and also a good friend;
That I remember having mentioned this to Judge
Reyes who told me that he always decides on the merits of all
cases x x x and to tell Atty. Singson that he need not worry if
he had a meritorious case.
[17]

In view of the foregoing considerations, petitioners prayed that
respondents be adjudged guilty of criminal contempt of court
and punished in accordance with Sec. 7, Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court. The censure of respondents was also sought for using
extrajudicial ways of influencing pending cases in court. Lastly,
petitioners asked for the disbarment or discipline of Atty.
Singson for attempted bribery and gross misconduct.
By separate resolutions, the Court directed respondents to
submit their comment on the contempt aspect of the petition
and Atty. Singson to submit his comment on petitioners
motion to consider the same petition as a formal complaint for
disbarment or other disciplinary action.

Respondents Comments
Respondents admitted the fact of filing by Erlinda Ilusorio of
the various manifestations and motions mentioned in the basic
petition for contempt, her authorship of On the Edge of
Heaven, and her having written personal letters to then Chief
Justice Davide. They contended, however, that the motions
and manifestations, couched in a very respectful
language,
[18]
can hardly be considered contemptuous,
interposed as they were in the exercise of the litigants right to
avail herself of all legal remedies under the Rules of
Court. Erlinda Ilusorios acts, so respondents claimed, were all


56
made in good faith, motivated by the desire to secure
custody x x x of her husband, [and] to provide [him] adequate
medical care x x x and to prevent him from being an unwitting
pawn to illegally dissipate the properties of the conjugal
properties of the spouses.
As to Erlinda Ilusorios letters to Chief Justice Davide and the
members of the Court, respondents stated that these letters,
far from being contemptuous, tend to improve the
administration of justice and encourage the courts to decide
cases purely on the merits.
And in traversal of the allegation that On the Edge of
Heaven contains actionable matters, respondents
claimed, inter alia, that the comments Erlinda Ilusorio made in
the book were no more than reasonable reactions from a
layperson aggrieved by what she considers an unjust Court
decision and who felt she had to write a book that would
rectify the erroneous findings of the Court and put forth the
truth about the so-called Ilusorio family feud.
[19]
What is more,
respondents said, sisters Marietta and Shereen as well as
Cecilia had no hand in the contents of the book and its
publication, as Erlinda Ilusorio, as Chairperson and President of
PI-EKI Foundation, is authorized to perform acts on behalf of
the foundation.
With regard to the bribery allegations against Atty. Singson,
respondents invited attention to the Manifestation in Civil Case
No. 4537-R to dispute the accusation of Judge Reyes. The
refutations, as reproduced in the respondents Memorandum,
run as follows:
(a) While it is true that Singson called Judge Reyes numerous
times the nature and purpose of said calls were proper and
above board. The reason why the phone calls were numerous
is because oftentimes, Judge Reyes was not in the places
where the calls were made.
(b) The phone calls were made either to request for a
postponement of a hearing of the case or to inquire about the
status of the incident on the issuance of the temporary
restraining order applied for in the case.
(c) It was Judge Reyes himself who furnished the telephone
numbers in his office and his residence
in Baguio City. Apparently, Judge Reyes did not find the
telephone calls improper as he answered most of them, and
that he never reported or complained about the said calls to
the appropriate judicial authorities or to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines if he had found the actuations of Singson in
violation of the provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.


57
(d) As to the alleged bribery attempt, there is absolutely no
truth to the same. If it is true that there was such an offer,
there is no reason why Singson could not have made the offer
himself, since he personally knows Judge Reyes. The
allegations of Judge Reyes [are] purely hearsay and
imaginary. If the bribery attempt had indeed happened, why
did Judge Reyes not report the matter to the Supreme Court
or to the IBP or even better, cite Atty. Sevilla and/or Singson in
contempt of court, or file a criminal case of attempted bribery
against them, or discipline them by himself in accordance with
the provisions of Rule 138 and 139 of the Revised Rules of
Court? The fact that Judge Reyes did not do any of the
foregoing clearly shows the falsity of his claims.
[20]

Respondents added that the bribery charge was based on a
hearsay account, since the alleged offer to Judge Reyes
emanated from Atty. Sevilla.

The Issues
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS ARE GUILTY OF INDIRECT
CONTEMPT OF COURT
WHETHER OR NOT ATTY. SINGSON SHOULD BE
ADMINISTRATIVELY DISCIPLINED OR DISBARRED FROM THE
PRACTICE OF LAW FOR ALLEGED GROSS MISCONDUCT IN
ATTEMPTING TO BRIBE JUDGE ANTONIO REYES

The Courts Ruling
Indirect Contempt
The Courts dignity and authority would always be prey to
attack were it to treat with abject indifference and look with
complacent eyes on serious breaches of ethics and denigrating
utterances directed against it. To preserve their authority and
efficiency, safeguard the public confidence in them, and keep
inviolate their dignity, courts of justice should not yield to the
assaults of disrespect
[21]
and must, when necessary, wield their
inherent power to punish for contempt, a power necessary for
their own protection against improper interference with the
due administration of justice.
[22]

Contempt, whether direct or indirect, may be civil or criminal,
depending on the nature and effect of the contemptuous
act.
[23]
Civil contempt is the failure to do something ordered by
the court for the benefit of the opposing party. Criminal
contempt, on the other hand, is conduct directed against the
dignity and authority of the court or a judge acting judicially; it
is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends
to bring the court into disrepute or disrespect.
[24]
On the basis


58
of the foregoing principles, it can be safely concluded that
under Sec. 3(d) of Rule 71 on contempt, any improper
conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice constitutes criminal
contempt. This is what petitioners obviously would have
respondents cited for.
The contempt power, however plenary it may seem, must be
exercised judiciously and sparingly with utmost self-restraint
with the end in view of utilizing it for correction and
preservation of the dignity of the court, not for retaliation or
vindication.
[25]
To be sure, courts and judges, as institutions, are
neither sacrosanct nor immune to public criticisms of their
conduct.
[26]
And well-recognized is the right of citizens to
criticize in a fair and respectful manner and through legitimate
channels the acts of courts or judges,
[27]
who in turn ought to
be patient and tolerate as much as possible everything which
appears as hasty and unguarded expression of passion or
momentary outbreak of disappointment at the outcome of a
case. Even snide remarks, as People v. Godoy teaches, do not
necessarily partake the nature of contumacious utterance
actionable under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
[28]

But as we have emphasized time and time again, [i]t is the
cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide,
and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A
wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on one hand, and
abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the
other.
[29]
Obstructing, by means of opprobrious words, spoken
or written, the administration of justice by the courts will
subject the abuser to punishment for contempt of court. And
regardless of whether or not the case of reference has been
terminated is of little moment. One may be cited for contempt
of court even after the case has ended where such punitive
action is necessary to protect the court and to vindicate it from
acts or conduct calculated to degrade, ridicule, or bring it into
disfavor and thereby erode public confidence in that
court.
[30]

In the case at bar, the various motions and manifestations filed
by Erlinda Ilusorio neither contained offensively disrespectful
language nor tended to besmirch the dignity of the Court. In
fact, the Court, mindful of the need to clear its docket of what
really is an unfortunate family squabble, considered and ruled
on each of her motions and manifestations. For the nonce, the
Court accords Erlinda Ilusorio the benefit of the doubt and is
inclined to think that her numerous pleadings that reiterate the
same issues were bona fide attempts to resuscitate and
salvage what she might have sanguinely believed to be a
meritorious case involving her marital rights. This is not to say,
however, that the Court views with unqualified approval the
obnoxious practice of filing pleadings after pleadings that only
substantially reiterate the same issues that had already been


59
passed upon and found to be unmeritorious. The Court, as a
matter of sound practice, will not allow its precious time and
resources to be eaten unnecessarily.
[31]
Accordingly, Erlinda
Ilusorio and/or counsel is put on notice against trying the
Courts patience and abusing its forbearance by continuing
with their taxing ways.
Erlinda Ilusorios personal letters to then Chief Justice Davide
were not contumacious in character. Neither do we find them
actionable, as a sleigh but sub-rosa attempt to influence the
letter-addressee, under the contempt provisions of the Rules
of Court. As we articulated in In Re: Wenceslao Laureta, letters
addressed to individual members of the Court, in connection
with the performance of their judicial functions, become part
of the judicial record and are a matter of concern for the entire
Court.
[32]
Although decisions of the Court are not based on
personal letters and pleas to individual justices, we
nonetheless discourage litigants from pursuing such
unnecessary extra-legal methods to secure relief. There are
adequate remedies for the purpose under the Rules of Court.
Unlike the contents of the pleadings and letters in question,
EKIs statements in On the Edge of Heaven, however, pose a
different threat to the Courts repute. For reference, the
following are the defining portions of what she wrote:

(1) The Supreme Court broke up my family.
(2) Was justice for sale? Was justice sold? Nasaan ang
katarungan?
(3) If your decision becomes res judicata havent you just
provided a most convenient venue to separate spouses from
each other x x x?
(4) Why did you wait for more than one year and after my
husbands death to deny my motion for reconsideration? Is it
because it is easier to do so now that it is academic? Does
your conscience bother you at all?
(5) How can the highest court of our land be a party to the
break up of my family and, disregarding the Family Code x x
x?
(6) [I]f our courts can render this kind of justice to one like
myself because I have lesser means, and lesser connections
than my well-married daughters, what kind of justice is given
to those less privileged?
Taken together, the foregoing statements and their reasonably
deducible implications went beyond the permissible bounds of
fair criticism. Erlinda Ilusorio minced no words in directly
attacking the Court for its alleged complicity in the break up of
the Ilusorio family, sharply insinuating that the Court


60
intentionally delayed the resolution of her motion for
reconsideration, disregarded the Family Code, and unduly
favored wealthy litigants. But the worst cut is her suggestion
about the Court selling its decisions. She posed the query,
Nasaan ang katarungan? (Where is justice?), implying that
this Court failed to dispense justice in her case. While most of
her statements were in the form of questions instead of
categorical assertions, the effect is still the same: they
constitute a stinging affront to the honor and dignity of the
Court and tend to undermine the confidence of the public in
the integrity of the highest tribunal of the land.
Erlinda Ilusorio explains that she is a layperson uninitiated in
legal matters, an aggrieved widow who just wants to be
relieved of pain caused by the injustice of the decision of this
Court. She felt she had to write a book that would rectify the
erroneous findings of the Court x x x.
[33]
Obviously she had
achieved her goal of self-expression but to the detriment of
the orderly administration of justice. To be sure, she could
have had adequately expressed her disagreement with the
Courts disposition in the habeas corpus case without taking
the low road, without being insulting, without casting a cloud
of suspicion on the reputation of the Court. In some detail, the
Court, inPeople v. Godoy,

set forth what is permissible and
when one is considered to have overstepped bounds:
Generally, criticism of a courts rulings or decisions is not
improper, and may not be restricted after a case has been
finally disposed of and has ceased to be pending. So long as
critics confine their criticisms to facts and base them on the
decisions of the court, they commit no contempt no matter
how severe the criticism may be; but when they pass beyond
that line and charge that judicial conduct was influenced by
improper, corrupt, or selfish motives, or that such conduct was
affected by political prejudice or interest, the tendency is to
create distrust and destroy the confidence of the people in
their courts.
But criticism should be distinguished from insult. A criticism
after a case has been disposed of can no longer influence the
court, and on that ground it does not constitute contempt. On
the other hand, an insult hurled to the court, even after a case
is decided, can under no circumstance be justified. Mere
criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness,
soundness or unsoundness of the decision of the court in a
pending case made in good faith may be tolerated; but to hurl
the false charge that the Supreme Court has been committing
deliberately so many blunders and injustices would tend
necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the
honesty and integrity of its members, and consequently to
lower or degrade the administration of justice, and it
constitutes contempt.
[34]


61
A becoming respect for the courts should always be the
norm. Litigants, no matter how aggrieved or dissatisfied they
may be of courts decision, do not have the unbridled freedom
in expressing their frustration or grievance in any manner they
want. Crossing the permissible line of fair comment and
legitimate criticism of the bench and its actuations shall
constitute contempt which may be visited with sanctions from
the Court as a measure of protecting and preserving its dignity
and honor.

We explained in Wicker v. Arcangel
x x x [T]he power to punish for contempt is to be exercised on
the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only
occasionally should it be invoked to preserve that respect
without which the administration of justice will fail. The
contempt power ought not to be utilized for the purpose of
merely satisfying an inclination to strike back at a party for
showing less than full respect for the dignity of the court.
[35]

As to the other members of the Board of Directors of the PI-
EKI Foundation, the publisher of On the Edge of Heaven, we
find no merit in the charge of indirect contempt against
them. True, except for Atty. Singson, respondents
Ramon, Marietta and Shereen Ilusorio, and Cecilia appear to
be officers of PI-EKI Foundation. There is no compelling
reason, however, to pierce, as petitioners urge, the veil of
corporate fiction in order to hold these officers liable,
especially in light of Erlinda Ilusorios assertion of being
authorized, as Chairperson and President of the said
foundation, to perform acts on behalf of the foundation
without prior board approval. Indirect contempt is a
deliberate act to bring the court or judge into disrepute. In
this case, proof of the participation of the board of directors
and officers to willfully malign the Court is utterly wanting. In
this regard, there is authority indicating that no one can be
amenable to criminal contempt unless the evidence makes it
abundantly clear that one intended to commit it.
[36]
It cannot
plausibly be assumed that the said officers shared Erlinda
Ilusorios ill regard towards the judiciary from the mere fact
that the PI-EKI Foundation published the book.

Disbarment
As to the complaint for disbarment, there is a well-grounded
reason to believe that Atty. Singson indeed attempted to
influence Judge Reyes decide a case in favor of Atty. Singsons
client. The interplay of the following documentary evidence,
earlier cited, provides the reason: (1) the transcript of the


62
stenographic notes of the May 31, 2000 hearing in the sala of
Judge Reyes in Civil Case 4537-R when the judge made it of
record about the attempt to bribe; (2) the affidavit of Judge
Reyes dated December 23, 2004 narrating in some detail how
and thru whom the attempt to bribe adverted to was made;
and (3) the affidavit of Atty. Sevilla who admitted having been
approached by Atty. Singson to intercede for his case pending
with Judge Reyes. Significantly, Atty. Singson admitted having
made phone calls to Judge Reyes, either in his residence or
office inBaguio City during the period material. He offers the
lame excuse, however, that he was merely following up the
status of a temporary restraining order applied for and
sometimes asking for the resetting of hearings.
The Court finds the explanation proffered as puerile as it is
preposterous. Matters touching on case status could and
should be done through the court staff, and resetting is usually
accomplished thru proper written motion or in open court.
And going by Judge Reyes affidavit, the incriminating calls
were sometimes made late in the evening and sometimes in
the most unusual hours, such as while Judge Reyes was
playing golf with Atty. Sevilla. Atty. Sevilla lent corroborative
support to Judge Reyes statements, particularly about the fact
that Atty. Singson wanted Judge Reyes apprised that they,
Singson and Sevilla, were law school classmates.
The highly immoral implication of a lawyer approaching a
judgeor a judge evincing a willingnessto discuss, in
private, a matter related to a case pending in that judges sala
cannot be over-emphasized. The fact that Atty. Singson did
talk on different occasions to Judge Reyes, initially through a
mutual friend, Atty. Sevilla, leads us to conclude that Atty.
Singson was indeed trying to influence the judge to rule in his
clients favor. This conduct is not acceptable in the legal
profession. Canon 13 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility enjoins it
Canon 13. A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause
and refrain from any impropriety which tends to influence or
gives the appearance of influencing the court.
At this juncture, the Court takes particular stock of the ensuing
statement Judge Reyes made in his affidavit: x x x Atty.
Sevilla, being a close family friend, immediately intimated
to [me] that Atty. Singson wanted a favorable decision and
that there was a not so vague an offer of a bribe from him
(Atty. Singson). Judge Reyes reiterated the bribe attempt
during the hearing on May 31, 2000, and made reference to
the figure PhP 500,000, the amount Atty. Singson offered
through Atty. Sevilla. As may be expected, Atty. Singson
dismissed Judge Reyes account as hearsay and questioned the
non-filing of any complaint for attempted bribery or


63
disciplinary action by Judge Reyes at or near the time it was
said to have been committed.
First, we must stress the difficulty of proving bribery. The
transaction is always done in secret and often only between
the two parties concerned. Indeed, there is no concrete
evidence in the records regarding the commission by Atty.
Singson of attempted bribery. Even Atty. Sevilla did not
mention any related matter in his affidavit. Nevertheless, Judge
Reyes disclosures in his affidavit and in open court deserve
some weight. The possibility of an attempted bribery is not far
from reality considering Atty. Singsons persistent phone calls,
one of which he made while Judge Reyes was with Atty. Sevilla.
Judge Reyes declaration may have been an emotional
outburst as described by Atty. Singson, but the spontaneity of
an outburst only gives it more weight.
While the alleged attempted bribery may perhaps not be
supported by evidence other than Judge Reyes statements,
there is nevertheless enough proof to hold Atty. Singson liable
for unethical behavior of attempting to influence a judge, itself
a transgression of considerable gravity. However, heeding the
injunction against decreeing disbarment where a lesser
sanction would suffice to accomplish the desired end, a
suspension for one year from the practice of law appears
appropriate.
WHEREFORE, Erlinda K. Ilusorio is
adjudged GUILTY of INDIRECT CONTEMPT and is ordered to
pay a fine of ten thousand pesos (PhP 10,000). Atty. Manuel
R. Singson is SUSPENDED for ONE (1) YEAR from the
practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this
Decision. Costs against respondents.

Let all the courts, through the Office of the Court
Administrator, as well as the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant be notified
of this Decision and be it duly recorded in the personal file of
respondent Manuel R. Singson.
SO ORDERED.


64
CANON 13 RULE 13.02
EN BANC

FOODSPHERE, INC.,
Complainant,

- versus -

ATTY. MELANIO L. MAURICIO, JR.,
Respondent.
A.C. No. 7199
[Formerly CBD 04-1386]

Present:

PUNO, C.J.
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CHICO-NAZARIO
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.

Promulgated:

July 22, 2009
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - x
D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Foodsphere, Inc. (complainant), a corporation engaged in the
business of meat processing and manufacture and distribution
of canned goods and grocery products under the brand name


65
CDO, filed a Verified Complaint
[1]
for disbarment before the
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Melanio L. Mauricio, Jr.,
popularly known as Batas Mauricio (respondent), a
writer/columnist of tabloids including Balitang Patas BATAS,
Bagong TIKTIK, TORO andHATAW!, and a host of a television
program KAKAMPI MO ANG BATAS telecast over UNTV and of
a radio program Double B-BATAS NG BAYAN aired over DZBB,
for (1) grossly immoral conduct; (2) violation of lawyers oath
and (3) disrespect to the courts and to investigating
prosecutors.

The facts that spawned the filing of the complaint are as
follows:

On June 22, 2004, a certain Alberto Cordero (Cordero)
purportedly bought from a grocery in Valenzuela City canned
goods including a can of CDO Liver spread. On June 27, 2004,
as Cordero and his relatives were eating bread with the CDO
Liver spread, they found the spread to be sour and soon
discovered a colony of worms inside the can.

Corderos wife thus filed a complaint with the Bureau of Food
and Drug Administration (BFAD). Laboratory examination
confirmed the presence of parasites in the Liver spread.

Pursuant to Joint DTI-DOH-DA Administrative Order No. 1,
Series of 1993, the BFAD conducted a conciliation hearing on
July 27, 2004 during which the spouses Cordero
demanded P150,000 as damages from
complainant. Complainant refused to heed the demand,
however, as being in contravention of company policy and, in
any event, outrageous.

Complainant instead offered to return actual medical and
incidental expenses incurred by the Corderos as long as they
were supported by receipts, but the offer was turned
down. And the Corderos threatened to bring the matter to the
attention of the media.

Complainant was later required by the BFAD to file its Answer
to the complaint. In the meantime or on August 6, 2004,
respondent sent complainant via fax a copy of the front page
of the would-be August 10-16, 2004 issue of the
tabloid Balitang Patas BATAS, Vol. 1, No. 12
[2]
which
complainant found to contain articles maligning, discrediting
and imputing vices and defects to it and its products.
Respondent threatened to publish the articles unless
complainant gave in to the P150,000 demand of the Corderos.
Complainant thereupon reiterated its counter-offer earlier
conveyed to the Corderos, but respondent turned it down.


66
Respondent later proposed to settle the matter
for P50,000, P15,000 of which would go to the Corderos
and P35,000 to his BATAS Foundation. And respondent
directed complainant to place paid advertisements in the
tabloids and television program.

The Corderos eventually forged a KASUNDUAN
[3]
seeking the
withdrawal of their complaint before the BFAD. The BFAD thus
dismissed the complaint.
[4]
Respondent, who affixed his
signature to the KASUNDUAN as a witness, later wrote in one
of his articles/columns in a tabloid that he prepared the
document.

On August 11, 2004, respondent sent complainant an
Advertising Contract
[5]
asking complainant to advertise in the
tabloid Balitang Patas BATAS for its next 24 weekly issues
at P15,000 per issue or a total amount of P360,000, and a
Program Profile
[6]
of the television program KAKAMPI MO ANG
BATAS also asking complainant to place spot advertisements
with the following rate cards: (a) spot buy 15-second TVC
at P4,000; (b) spot buy 30-second TVC at P7,700; and (c)
season buy [13 episodes, 26 spots] of 30-second TVC
for P130,000.

As a sign of goodwill, complainant offered to buy three full-
page advertisements in the tabloid amounting to P45,000
at P15,000 per advertisement, and three spots of 30-second
TVC in the television program at P7,700 each or a total
of P23,100. Acting on complainants offer, respondent relayed
to it that he and his Executive Producer were disappointed
with the offer and threatened to proceed with the publication
of the articles/columns.
[7]

On August 28, 2004, respondent, in his radio program Double
B- BATAS NG BAYAN at radio station DZBB, announced the
holding of a supposed contest sponsored by said program,
which announcement was transcribed as follows:

OK, at meron akong pa-contest, total magpapasko na o ha,
meron pa-contest si Batas Mauricio ang Batas ng Bayan. Ito
yung ating pa-contest, hulaan ninyo, tatawag kayo sa
telepono, 433-7549 at 433-7553. Ang mga premyo
babanggitin po natin sa susunod pero ito muna ang contest, o,
aling liver spread ang may uod? Yan kita ninyo yan, ayan
malalaman ninyo yan. Pagka-nahulaan yan ah, at sasagot kayo
sa akin, aling liver spread ang may uod at anong companya
ang gumagawa nyan? Itawag po ninyo sa 433-7549 st 433-
7553. Open po an[g] contest na ito sa lahat ng ating
tagapakinig. Pipiliin natin ang mananalo, kung tama ang
inyong sagot. Ang tanong, aling liver spread sa Pilipinas
an[g] may uod?
[8]
(Emphasis and italics in the
original; underscoring supplied)


67

And respondent wrote in his columns in the tabloids
articles which put complainant in bad light. Thus, in the
August 31- September 6, 2004 issue of Balitang Patas BATAS,
he wrote an article captioned KADIRI ANG CDO LIVER
SPREAD! In another article, he wrote IBA PANG PRODUKTO
NG CDO SILIPIN!
[9]
which appeared in the same publication in
its September 7-13, 2004 issue. And still in the same
publication, its September 14-20, 2004 issue, he wrote another
article entitled DAPAT BANG PIGILIN ANG CDO.
[10]

Respondent continued his tirade against complainant in
his column LAGING HANDA published in another
tabloid, BAGONG TIKTIK, with the following articles:
[11]
(a)Uod
sa liver spread, Setyembre 6, 2004 (Taon 7,
Blg.276);
[12]
(b) Uod, itinanggi ng CDO, Setyembre 7, 2004
(Taon 7, Blg.277);
[13]
(c) Pagpapatigil sa CDO,Setyembre 8,
2004 (Taon 7, Blg.278);
[14]
(d) Uod sa liver spread
kumpirmado, Setyembre 9, 2004 (Taon 7,
Blg.279);
[15]
(e) Salaysay ng nakakain ng uod, Setyembre 10,
2004 (Taon 7, Blg.280);
[16]
(f) Kaso VS. CDO
itinuloy, Setyembre 11, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.281);
[17]
(g) Kasong
Kidnapping laban sa CDO guards, Setyembre 14, 2004 (Taon
7, Blg.284);
[18]
(h) Brutalidad ng CDO guards, Setyembre 15,
2004 (Taon 7, Blg.285);
[19]
(i) CDO guards pinababanatan sa
PNP, Setyembre 17, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.287);
[20]
(j) May uod na
CDO liver spread sa Puregold binili, Setyembre 18, 2004
(Taon 7, Blg.288);
[21]
(k) Desperado na ang
CDO, Setyembre 20, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.290);
[22]
(l) Atty. Rufus
Rodriguez pumadrino sa CDO, Setyembre 21, 2004 (Taon
7,Blg. 291);
[23]
(m) Kasunduan ng CDO at Pamilya Cordero,
Setyembre 22, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 292);
[24]
(n) Bakit nagbayad
ng P50 libo ang CDO, Setyembre 23, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg.
293).
[25]

In his September 8, 2004 column Anggulo ng
Batas published in Hataw!, respondent wrote an
article Reaksyon pa sa uod ng CDO Liver Spread.
[26]

And respondent, in several episodes in September 2004
of his television program Kakampi Mo ang Batas aired over
UNTV, repeatedly complained of what complainant claimed to
be the same baseless and malicious allegations/issues
against it.
[27]

Complainant thus filed criminal complaints against
respondent and several others for Libel and Threatening to
Publish Libel under Articles 353 and 356 of the Revised Penal
Code before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City
and Valenzuela City. The complaints were pending at he time
of the filing of the present administrative complaint.
[28]


68
In the criminal complaints pending before the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, docketed as I.S. Nos. V-
04-2917-2933, respondent filed his Entry of Appearance with
Highly Urgent Motion to Elevate These Cases to the
Department of Justice,
[29]
alleging:

x x x x

2.N. The question here is this: What gives, Honorable (???)
Prosecutors of the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Valenzuela City?

x x x x

2.R. Can an ordinary person like Villarez simply be
tossed around, waiting for miracles to happen?

2.S. Why? How much miracle is needed to happen
here before this Office would ever act on his complaint?

x x x x

8. With a City Prosecutor acting the way he did in the
case filed by Villarez, and with an investigating prosecutor
virtually kowtowing to the wishes of his boss, the Chief
Prosecutor, can Respondents expect justice to be meted to
them?

9. With utmost due respect, Respondents have reason
to believe that justice would elude them in this Office of the
City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, not because of the injustice
of their cause, but, more importantly, because of the injustice
of the system;

10. Couple all of these with reports that many a
government office in Valenzuela City had been the willing
recipient of too many generosities in the past of the
Complainant, and also with reports that a top official of the
City had campaigned for his much coveted position in the past
distributing products of the Complainant, what would one
expect the Respondents to think?

11. Of course, not to be lost sight of here is the
attitude and behavior displayed even by mere staff and
underlings of this Office to people who dare complain against
the Complainant in their respective turfs. Perhaps, top officials
of this Office should investigate and ask their associates and
relatives incognito to file, even if on a pakunwari basis only,
complaints against the Complainant, and they would surely be
given the same rough and insulting treatment that


69
Respondent Villarez got when he filed his kidnapping charge
here;
[30]

And in a Motion to Dismiss [the case] for Lack of
Jurisdiction
[31]
which respondent filed, as counsel for his
therein co-respondents-staffers of the newspaper Hataw!,
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City,
respondent alleged:

x x x x

5. If the Complainant or its lawyer merely used even a little
of whatever is inside their thick skulls, they would have
clearly deduced that this Office has no jurisdiction over this
action.
[32]
(Emphasis supplied)

x x x x

Meanwhile, on October 26, 2004, complainant filed a civil case
against respondent and several others, docketed as Civil Case
No. 249-V-04,
[33]
before the Regional Trial Court, Valenzuela
City and raffled to Branch 75 thereof.
The pending cases against him and the issuance of a
status quo order notwithstanding, respondent continued to
publish articles against complainant
[34]
and to malign
complainant through his television shows.

Acting on the present administrative complaint, the
Investigating Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) came up with the following findings in his
October 5, 2005 Report and Recommendation:
[35]

I.
x x x x

In Civil Case No. 249-V-04 entitled Foodsphere, Inc. vs. Atty.
[Melanio] Mauricio, et al., the Order dated 10 December 2004
(Annex O of the Complaint) was issued by Presiding Judge
Dionisio C. Sison which in part reads:

Anent the plaintiffs prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order included in the instant plaintiffs motion, this
Court, inasmuch as the defendants failed to appear in court or
file an opposition thereto, is constrained to GRANT the said
plaintiffs prater, as it is GRANTED, in order to maintain
STATUS QUO, and that all the defendants, their agents,
representatives or any person acting for and in behalf are
hereby restrained/enjoined from further publishing, televising
and/or broadcasting any matter subject of the Complaint in


70
the instant case more specifically the imputation of vices
and/or defects on plaintiff and its products.

Complainant alleged that the above-quoted Order was served
on respondent by the Branch Sheriff on 13 December 2004.
Respondent has not denied the issuance of the Order dated 10
December 2004 or his receipt of a copy thereof on 13
December 2004.

Despite his receipt of the Order dated 10 December 2004, and
the clear directive therein addressed to him to desists [sic]
from further publishing, televising and/or broadcasting any
matter subject of the Complaint in the instant case more
specifically the imputation of vices and/or defects on plaintiff
and its products, respondent in clear defiance of this Order
came out with articles on the prohibited subject matter in his
column Atty. Batas, 2004 in the December 16 and 17, 2004
issues of the tabloid Balitang Bayan Toro (Annexes Q and
Q-1 of the Complaint).

The above actuations of respondent are also in violation of
Rule 13.03 of the Canon of Professional Responsibility which
reads: A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media
regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for
or against a party.

II.

x x x x

In I.S. No. V.04-2917-2933, then pending before the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, respondent filed his
Entry of Appearance with Highly Urgent Motion to Elevate
These Cases To the Department of Justice. In said pleading,
respondent made the following statements:

x x x x

The above language employed by respondent undoubtedly
casts aspersions on the integrity of the Office of the City
Prosecutor and all the Prosecutors connected with said Office.
Respondent clearly assailed the impartiality and fairness of the
said Office in handling cases filed before it and did not even
design to submit any evidence to substantiate said wild
allegations. The use by respondent of the above-quoted
language in his pleadings is manifestly violative of Canon 11 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: A
lawyer [s]hall [o]bserve and [m]aintain [t]he [re]spect [d]ue [t]o
[t]he [c]ourts [a]nd [t]o [j]udicial [o]fficers [a]nd [s]hould [i]nsist
[o]n [s]imilar [c]onduct [b]y [o]thers.


71
III.

The Kasunduan entered into by the Spouses Cordero
and herein complainant (Annex C of the Complaint) was
admittedly prepared, witnessed and signed by herein
respondent.

x x x x

In its Order dated 16 August 2004, the Bureau of Food
and Drugs recognized that the said Kasunduan was not
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and policy,
and this accordingly dismissed the complaint filed by the
Spouses Cordero against herein complainant.

However, even after the execution of the Kasunduan
and the consequent dismissal of the complaint of his clients
against herein complainant, respondent inexplicably launched
a media offensive intended to disparage and put to ridicule
herein complainant. On record are the numerous articles of
respondent published in 3 tabloids commencing from 31
August to 17 December 2004 (Annexes G to Q-1). As already
above-stated, respondent continued to come out with these
articles against complainant in his tabloid columns despite a
temporary restraining order issued against him expressly
prohibiting such actions. Respondent did not deny that he
indeed wrote said articles and submitted them for publication
in the tabloids.

Respondent claims that he was prompted by his sense
of public service, that is, to expose the defects of
complainants products to the consuming public. Complainant
claims that there is a baser motive to the actions of
respondent. Complainant avers that respondent retaliated for
complainants failure to give in to respondents request that
complainant advertise in the tabloids and television programs
of respondent. Complainants explanation is more credible.
Nevertheless, whatever the true motive of respondent for his
barrage of articles against complainant does not detract from
the fact that respondent consciously violated the spirit behind
the Kasunduan which he himself prepared and signed and
submitted to the BFAD for approval. Respondent was less than
forthright when he prepared said Kasunduan and then
turned around and proceeded to lambaste complainant for
what was supposedly already settled in said agreement.
Complainant would have been better of with the BFAD case
proceeding as it could have defended itself against the
charges of the Spouses Cordero. Complainant was helpless
against the attacks of respondent, a media personality. The
actuations of respondent constituted, to say the least, deceitful
conduct contemplated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
[36]
(Underscoring supplied)


72

The IBP Board of Governors, by Resolution No. XVIII-2006-114
dated March 20, 2006, adopted the findings and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner to
suspend respondent from the practice of law for two years.

The Court finds the findings/evaluation of the IBP well-taken.

The Court, once again, takes this occasion to emphasize the
necessity for every lawyer to act and comport himself in a
manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the
legal profession,
[37]
which confidence may be eroded by the
irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar.

By the above-recited acts, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates lawyers to
refrain from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. For, as the IBP found, he engaged in
deceitful conduct by, inter alia, taking advantage of the
complaint against CDO to advance his interest to obtain
funds for his BATAS Foundation and seek sponsorships and
advertisements for the tabloids and his television program.
He also violated Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which mandates:

A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media
regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for
or against a party.

For despite the pendency of the civil case against him and the
issuance of a status quo order restraining/enjoining further
publishing, televising and broadcasting of any matter relative
to the complaint of CDO, respondent continued with his
attacks against complainant and its products. At the same
time, respondent violated Canon 1 also of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which mandates lawyers to
uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes. For he defied
said status quo order, despite his (respondents) oath as a
member of the legal profession to obey the laws as well as
the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities.

Further, respondent violated Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandate, viz:

CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with
courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional
colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing
counsel.


73
Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional
dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise
improper,

by using intemperate language.

Apropos is the following reminder in Saberon v. Larong:
[38]

To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has
tempted members of the bar to use strong language in pursuit
of their duty to advance the interests of their clients.
However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with
vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of
offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with
countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful,
convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.

On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the
Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no
fact prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a party or
witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which
he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession, a lawyers language even in his pleadings must be
dignified.
[39]
(Underscoring supplied)

By failing to live up to his oath and to comply with the
exacting standards of the legal profession, respondent
also violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which directs a lawyer to at all times uphold
the integrity and the dignity of the legal profession.
[40]

The power of the media to form or influence public opinion
cannot be underestimated. In Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr.,
[41]
the
therein complainant engaged therein-herein respondents
services as she was impressed by the pro-poor and pro-justice
advocacy of respondent, a media personality,
[42]
only to later
find out that after he demanded and the therein complainant
paid an exorbitant fee, no action was taken nor any pleadings
prepared by him. Respondent was suspended for six months.

On reading the articles respondent published, not to mention
listening to him over the radio and watching him on television,
it cannot be gainsaid that the same could, to a certain extent,
have affected the sales of complainant.

Back to Dalisay, this Court, in denying therein-herein
respondents motion for reconsideration, took note of the fact
that respondent was motivated by vindictiveness when he filed
falsification charges against the therein complainant.
[43]


74

To the Court, suspension of respondent from the practice of
law for three years is, in the premises, sufficient.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Melanio Mauricio is, for violation of the
lawyers oath and breach of ethics of the legal profession as
embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility, SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three
years effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He
is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to his personal
record and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for
dissemination to all courts.
SO ORDERED.

Canon 12 and 13 (Including Rules) - Illustrative Cases

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