Sec 14.

Puyat V De Guzman
Facts: After an election for the Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) was held, one group,
the respondent Acero group, instituted at the SEC quo warranto proceedings, questioning the election. Justice
Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, entered his appearance as counsel for
respondent Acero to which the petitioner, Puyat group, objected on Constitutional ground that no Assemblyman
could appear as counsel before any administrative body, and SEC was an administrative body. Assemblyman
Fernandez did not continue his appearance for respondent Acero.

Assemblyman Fernandez had purchased 10 shares of IPI for P200.00 upon request of respondent Acero. Following
the notarization of Assemblyman Fernandez purchase, he filed a motion for interventionin the SEC case as the
owner of 10 IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC granted leave to intervene on the
basis of Fernandez ownership of the said 10 shares.


Issue: Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a stockholder of IPI, may intervene in the SEC case without
violating Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI) of the Constitution


Held: Ordinarily, by virtue of the motion for intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing
as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is joining the cause of the private
respondents. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of 10 shares of IPI in respect
of the matter in litigation.

However, certain salient circumstances militate against theintervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC
case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing 10 shares out of 262,843 outstanding
shares. He acquired them after the fact that is, after the contested election of directors, after the quo warranto
suit had been filed before the SEC and 1 day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC. And what is
more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as counsel for respondent Acero, but
which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to
intervene on the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation.

Under those facts and circumstances, the Court is constrained to find that there has been an
indirect appearance as counsel before anadministrative body. In the opinion of the Court, that is a circumvention of
the Constitutional prohibition contained in Sec. 11, Art. VIII (now Sec. 14, Art. VI). The intervention was an
afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity.
Sec 16 SANTIAGO V GUINGONA (OFFICERS)
Facts: During the first regular session of the eleventh Congress, Senator Fernan was declared the duly elected
President of the Senate by a vote of 20 to 2. Senator Tatad manifested that, with the agreement of Senator
Santiago, allegedly the only other member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He
explained that those who had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority, while only those who had voted for
him, the losing nominee, belonged to the minority. Senator Flavier manifested that the senators belonging to the
Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party numbering 7 and, thus, also a minority had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority
leader. Thereafter, the majority leader informed the body that he was in receipt of a letter signed by the 7 Lakas-
NUCD-UMDP senators, stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader. By virtue thereof,
the Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of the Senate. Senators
Santiago and Tatad filed a petition for quo warranto, alleging that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully
holding and exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully
belonged to Senator Tatad.


Issues:
(1) Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the petition
(2) Whether or not there is an actual violation of the Constitution


Held: Regarding the first issue, jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined by the allegations of
the complaint or petition, regardless of whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief asserted. In light of the
allegations of the petitioners, it is clear that the Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power
and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the
Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.

However, the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from the Constitution, the laws, the
Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House. The term majority, when referring to a certain
number out of a total or aggregate, it simply means the number greater than half or more than half of any total. In
effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number constituting
more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not vote for him
shall ipso facto constitute the minority, who could thereby elect the minority leader. No law or regulation states
that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.

While the Constitution is explicit in the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is, however,
dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says
under Art. VI, Sec. 16(1) is that each House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary. The
method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the prerogative
conferred by the said constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be prescribed by the Senate itself, not
by the Court.
Sec 16 Avelino V Cuenco (QUORUM)
On 18 Feb 1949, Senator Taada invoked his right to speak on the senate floor to formulate charges against the
then SenatePresident Avelino. He request to do so on the next session (21 Feb 1949). On the next session
however, Avelino delayed the opening of the session for about two hours. Upon insistent demand by Taada,
Cuenco and Sanidad and others, Avelino was forced to open session. He however, together with his allies initiated
all dilatory and delaying tactics to forestall Taada from delivering his piece. Motions being raised by Taada et al
were being blocked by Avelino and his allies and they even ruled Taada and Sanidad, among others, as being out
of order. Avelinos camp then moved to adjourn the session due to the disorder. Sanidad however countered and
they requested the said adjournment to be placed in voting. Avelino just banged his gavel and he hurriedly left his
chair and he was immediately followed by his followers. Senator Cabili then stood up, and asked that it be made
of record it was so made that the deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the Avelino, made it incumbent
upon Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz and the remaining members of the Senate to continue the session in
order not to paralyze the functions of the Senate. Tanada was subsequently recognized to deliver his speech. Later,
Arranz yielded to Sanidads Resolution (No. 68) that Cuenco be elected as the Senate President. This was
unanimously approved and was even recognized by the President of the Philippines the following day. Cuenco took
his oath of office thereafter. Avelino then filed a quo warranto proceeding before the SC to declare him as the
rightful Senate President.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC can take cognizance of the case.
HELD: By a vote of 6 to 4, the SC held that they cannot take cognizance of the case. This is in view of the
separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power
to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. The SC
should abstain in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affects only the Senators themselves who
are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must imply
to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall
not in the Supreme Court.
Supposed the SC can take cognizance of the case, what will be the resolution?
There is unanimity in the view that the session under Senator Arranz was a continuation of the morning session
and that a minority of ten senators (Avelino et al) may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other (Cuenco et al)
twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be
different had the resolution been approved only by ten or less.
**Two senators were not present that time. Sen. Soto was in a hospital while Sen. Confesor was in the USA.
Is the rump session (presided by Cuenco) a continuation of the morning session (presided by Avelino)?
Are there two sessions in one day? Was there a quorum constituting such session?
The second session is a continuation of the morning session as evidenced by the minutes entered into the journal.
There were 23 senators considered to be in session that time (including Soto, excluding Confesor). Hence, twelve
senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twenty three senators. When the Constitution declares that a
majority of each House shall constitute a quorum, the House does not mean all the members. Even a majority
of all the members constitute the House. There is a difference between a majority of all the members of the
House and a majority of the House, the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute
majority (12) of all the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for
the purpose of a quorum. Furthermore, even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered
the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum
then, and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco,
one against and one abstained.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (filed by Avelino on March 14, 1949)
Avelino and his group (11 senators in all) insist that the SC take cognizance of the case and that they are willing to
bind themselves to the decision of the SC whether it be right or wrong. Avelino contends that there is no
constitutional quorum when Cuenco was elected president. There are 24 senators in all. Two are absentee
senators; one being confined and the other abroad but this does not change the number of senators nor does it
change the majority which if mathematically construed is + 1; in this case 12 (half of 24) plus 1 or 13 NOT 12.
There being only 12 senators when Cuenco was elected unanimously there was no quorum.
The Supreme Court, by a vote of seven resolved to assume jurisdiction over the case in the light of subsequent
events which justify its intervention. The Chief Justice agrees with the result of the majoritys pronouncement on
the quorum upon the ground that, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, the constitutional requirement in
that regard has become a mere formalism, it appearing from the evidence that any new session with a quorum
would result in Cuencos election as Senate President, and that the Cuenco group, taking cue from the dissenting
opinions, has been trying to satisfy such formalism by issuing compulsory processes against senators of the Avelino
group, but to no avail, because of the Avelinos persistent efforts to block all avenues to constitutional processes.
For this reason, the SC believes that the Cuenco group has done enough to satisfy the requirements of the
Constitution and that the majoritys ruling is in conformity with substantial justice and with the requirements of
public interest. Therefore Cuenco has been legally elected as Senate President and the petition is dismissed.

SEC 16 OSMENA V PENDATUN (DISORDERLY BEHAVIOR)
Facts: Congressman Osmena, in a privilege speech delivered before the House of Representatives, made serious
imputations of bribery against President Garcia. Thereafter, a special committee of 15 members was created to
investigate the truth of the charges made by Congressman Osmena against the President. Osmena refused to
produce before the House Committee evidence to substantiate such imputations. For having made the imputations
and for failing to produce evidence in support thereof, Osmena was, by resolution of the House, suspended from
office for a period of 15 months for serious disorderly behavior.


Issue: Whether or not there is an infringement of Osmenas parliamentary privilege of speech


Held: Sec. 15 (now Sec. 11), Art. VI of the Constitution provides that for any speech or debate in Congress, the
Senators or Members of theHouse of Representatives shall not be questioned in any other place.

The Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every legislative
assembly of the democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without fear of
being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other forum outside of the
Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his
words and conduct are considered by the latter disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof.

On the question whether delivery of speeches attacking the Presidentconstitutes disorderly conduct for which
Osmena may be disciplined, the Court believes that the House of Representatives is the judge of what constitutes
disorderly behavior, not only because the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction upon it, but also because the
matter depends mainly on factual circumstances of which the House knows best but which can not be depicted in
black and white forpresentation to, and adjudication by the Courts. For one thing, if the Court assumed the
power to determine whether Osmenas conduct constituted disorderly behavior, it would have assumed appellate
jurisdiction, which the Constitution never intended to confer upon a coordinate branch of the government.

SEC 16 SEFERINO PAREDES VS SANDIGANBAYAN (DISCIPLINE OF MEMBERS)
On 23 Jan 1990, Gelacio, the then vice mayor of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur filed a case against Paredes (who
was then the governor of the same province), Atty. Sansaet (counsel of Paredes), and Honrada (the clerk of court).
The three allegedly conspired to falsify a copy of a Notice of Arraignment and of the Transcript of Stenographic
Notes. Gelacio claimed that, in fact, no arraignment has ever been issued against him in a criminal proceeding
against him. Gelacio was able to produce a certification from the judge handling the case himself that the criminal
case against him never reached the arraignment stage because the prosecution was dismissed. Atty. Sansaet on
his part maintained that there was indeed a Notice of Arraignment but he later retracted his testimonies. Paredes
claimed that Sansaet only changed his side because of political realignment. Subsequently, the Office of the
Ombudsman recommended that Paredes et al be charged with Falsification of Public Documents. Paredes appealed
but was eventually denied by the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE: Whether or not Paredes, now a member of Congress, be suspended by order of the Sandiganbayan.
HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the order of suspension of Congressman Paredes by the Sandiganbayan,
despite his protestations on the encroachment by the court on the prerogatives of congress. The SC ruled:
x x x. Petitioners invocation of Section 16 (3), Article VI of the Constitution which deals with the power of each
House of Congress inter alia to punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and suspend or expel a Member by a
vote of two-thirds of all its Members subject to the qualification that the penalty of suspension, when imposed,
should not exceed sixty days is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in
Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that
the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a Member of the House of Representatives.

SEC 16 US VS JUAN PONS (JOURNALS)
Apr 1914, the steamer Lopez y Lopez arrived at Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The said
barrels of wine were delivered to Beliso. Beliso subsequently delivered 5 barrels to Pons house. On the other hand,
the customs authorities noticed that the said 25 barrels listed as wine on record were not delivered to any listed
merchant (Beliso not being one). And so the customs officers conducted an investigation thereby discovering that
the 25 barrels of wine actually contained tins of opium. Since the ct of trading and dealing opium is against Act
2381, Pons and Beliso were charged for illegally and fraudulently importing and introducing such contraband
material to the Philippines. Pons appealed the sentence arguing that Act 2381 was not approved while the
Philippine Commission (Congress) was not in session. He said that his witnesses claim that the said law was
passed/approved on 01 March 1914 while the special session of the Commission was adjourned at 12MN on 28 Feb
1914. Since this is the case, Act 2381 should be null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine if Act 2381 was indeed
made a as law on 28 Feb 1914.
HELD: The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC refused to go beyond the
recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are conclusive on the Court and to inquire into the veracity of
the journals of the Philippine Legislature, when they are, as the SC have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate
both the letter and the spirit of the organiclaws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to
invade a coordinate and independent department of theGovernment, and to interfere with the legitimate powers
and functions of the Legislature. Pons witnesses cannot be given due weight against the conclusiveness of the
Journals which is an act of the legislature. The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on
February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the court did not err in declining to go behind these journals. The
SC passed upon the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case.

SEC 16 CASCO PHIL CHEMICAL CO V GIMENEZ (JOURNAL ENROLLED BILL)
FACTS: This is a petition for review of a decision of the Auditor General denying a claim for refund of petitioner
Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. The Central Bank issued Circulars fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on
foreign exchange transactions. The bank also issued memorandum establishing the procedure for the applications
for exemption from the payment of said fee as provided by RA 2609. CASCO is a manufacturing firm engaged in
the making of plywood and other similar items wherein one of their production inputs is UREA and
FORMALDEHYDE. In two of their import transactions, they paid the required margin fee. In both of their
transactions, they filed a request of refund to the Central Bank and the CB issued the vouchers but was refused by
the Auditor of the Bank. The refusal was also affirmed by the Auditor General. The refusal was based on the fact
that the separate importation of UREA and FORMALDEHYDE is not in accord with the provisions of RA#2609.
ISSUES: Whether or not the separate importation of UREA and FORMALDEHYDE is allowed under RA#2609.
HELD:
If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and
approved by the Executive on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of
powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system the remedy is by amendment or
curative legislation, not by judicial decree. Decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with cost against the
petitioner.
SC:
Said individual statements do not reflect the view of the Senate, much less the intentof the House. Furthermore, it
is settled that
the enrolled bill
which uses the term ureaformaldehyde instead of urea and formaldehyde
is conclusive upon the courts asregards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by thePresident.

SEC 16 PHIL JUDGES ASSOC V PRADO (JOURNAL )
It is a matter of record that the conference Committee Report on the bill in question was returned to and duly
approved by both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its
certification by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of Representatives
as having been duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It was then presented to and approved by President
Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.
Under the doctrine of separation powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill
from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez
7
laid down the rule that the
enrolled bill, is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the journals like
theyeas and nays on the final reading of the
bill).
8
The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but still valid) case
of U.S. vs. Pons,
9
where we explained the reason thus:
To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature when they are, as we have
said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the, letter and spirit of the organic laws by which
the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent
department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions, of the
Legislature.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an amendment was made upon
the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not
distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the
measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such
official assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a
becoming courtesy.
Facts;

Republic Act 7354 was passed into law stirring commotions from the Judiciary. Under its Sec 35 as implemented by
Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No.92-28. The franking privelege of the Supreme Court, COA,
RTCs, MTC, MTCC, and other government offices were withdrawn from them.

In addition, the petitioners raised the issue of constitutionality and the methods adopted prior it becoming a law.



Issues;

WON RA 7354 is unconstitutional.

- Violative of Art VI Sec 26(1) which says '"Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof."

- Violative of Art VI Sec 26(2) which says 'No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed
three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to
its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be
allowed, and the vote thereon
shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

- Violative of the Equal protection clause


Ruling:

The Supreme Court sustained as to the violation of Art VI Sec 26(1) ruling further that it's adoption is within the
terms prescribed by law saying that the title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to
be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure.

However, Sec 35 was ruled out to be in violation of the equal protection clause. The distinction made by the law is
superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the
grantees of the franking privilege.

Therefore, RA 7354 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
SEC 16 JOKER ARROYO V DE VENECIA (RULES)
Petitioners principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules
of the House; that these rules embody the constitutional mandate in Art. VI, 16(3) that each House may
determine the rules of its proceedings and that, consequently, violation of the House rules is a violation of the
Constitution itself. They contend that the certification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is
false and spurious.
After considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for holding that Congress
committed a grave abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is therefore dismissed.
First. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in the enactment of R.A.
No. 8240 are merely internal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the
enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, 26-27. Petitioners do not claim that there was no quorum but only that, by
some maneuver allegedly in violation of the rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from
questioning the presence of a quorum.
In this case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking
redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to this Court. We have no more power to look into the internal
proceedings of a House than members of that House have to look over our shoulders, as long as no violation of
constitutional provisions is shown.
Petitioners must realize that each of the three departments of our government has its separate sphere which
the others may not invade without upsetting the delicate balance on which our constitutional order rests. Due
regard for the working of our system of government, more than mere comity, compels reluctance on our part to
enter upon an inquiry into an alleged violation of the rules of the House. We must accordingly decline the invitation
to exercise our power.