Kyle Stone

German Idealism
Final Paper
5/7/05
The Aesthetic Paradigms of Kant and Schelling
We do injustice to another who does not perceive the worth or the beauty of what moves
or delights us, if we rejoin that he does not understand it. Here it does not matter so
much what the understanding comprehends, but what the feeling senses.
Immanual Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime

The first true formulation of an aesthetic paradigm for philosophy began with
Kants Critique of Judgment, during which he attempts to mend the gap his first two
critiques constructed between the noumenal and the phenomenal. Interestingly enough,
Kant only included aesthetics as a significant contributor to his philosophical workings in
one other text, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, which was
written years before his Critique of Judgment. These texts, as two of Kants more
important writings, gave the question of the role of aesthetics in philosophy independence
as a discipline distinct from other branches of philosophical inquiry. It was popularized
further by German Idealists and romanticists alike, culminating in Schelling, who
presented aesthetics as the pinnacle of his systemic philosophy valuing its role as one
above science/ modern scientific discourse, and even the philosophical concept in
general. Through an exploration of the aesthetic paradigms posited by Kant and
Schelling, perhaps a fuller understanding of the role of aesthetics as it pertains to
philosophy can be realized.
Kants Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime is the only
truly aesthetic text prior to the Critique of Judgment. Kant limits his discussion of
aesthetics to observations of the human scene; it is not until his Critique of Judgment
that he discusses aesthetics in terms of faculties that can be known empirically or
disclosed by transcendental logic. In order to analyze Observations in terms of its
aesthetic content, the beliefs embodied throughout the text must be considered as implicit
aspects of the human experience, rather than explicitly otherwise they would be
understandable through conceptualization, which is not possible for Kant, even in his
more empirically theorized Critique of Judgment. Hence, Kant writes of aesthetics in
terms of feelings of pleasurable experiences, rather than concepts. Once again, these
experiences are not sensuous (able to be conceptualized by sensual perceptions), but
rather immediate intuitions.
Though four sections, Kant attempts to establish a treatise between the realms of
the beautiful and the sublime, which he immediately distinguishes from one another in
the first section. The way in which Kant distinguishes between the beautiful and the
sublime is somewhat complex, in the sense that they are definitely opposed to one
another, but also capable of overlap. Though depicting Kants model as a spectrum
which runs from coarse to fine, it becomes clear that the degrees of pleasure associated
with feelings of beauty and sublimity are engendered relative to the individual, and
universally dissimilar throughout all beings.
1
Kant writes, The various feelings of
enjoyment or of displeasure rest not so much upon the nature of the external things that
arouse them as upon each persons own disposition to be moved by these to pleasure or
pain.
2

Admittedly, this is a somewhat problematic way of looking at Kants model,
especially since ones ability to enjoy either feelings of the beautiful or feelings of the
sublime separately is more hierarchical than the term spectrum hints at. Kant points out
that all beings enjoy coarse pleasures, but very few enjoy higher, more intellectual
pleasures.
Since Kant established the two aesthetic categories based on an analysis of the
response of the beholder of the feelings, Kant is, in a certain way, making claims about
human nature. Kant seems the reality of beauty as immanent, and assumes this objective
element as the basis for development of subjective taste a move made by both
rationalists and empiricists of the time. However, Kant differed from both of these
traditions, as well as from the neoclassicist tradition, in his view of beauty as a taste or
feeling, rather than something a priori and grounded in reason.
Kant begins by distinguishing between feelings of the beautiful and the sublime.
Beauty arouses joy, whereas sublimity arouses awe and admiration. Kant is not hesitant
to make the distinction between men, who are more inclined towards sublimity due to
their nobility, and women, who are more inclined towards beauty due to their fairness.
However, Kant uses this distinction in terms of emphasis and tendency, and does not by
any means exclude either sex from feelings of beauty or sublimity. In a similar fashion,
he argues that these finer feelings serve to improve the role of the sexes in marriage by
preserving love and esteem and creating attractive differences. Even more
problematically, he analyzes differences between National characteristics, relating the
English, Spanish, and German to the sublime, and the French and Italians to the beautiful,
and utterly excluding the Dutch, as well as Negroes from either category. Nonetheless, it
is important to consider these associations as pertaining to the current state of society of
which Kant was attempting to describe, and not to see them as permanent and severe
problems within his theory; after all, he still argues that the feeling of the sublime and the
beautiful were shared by all of human kind.
One of the more radical moves made by Kant was his characterization of the
sublime as being the most important aesthetic. This was likely done in tandem with the
notion that feelings of the sublime are important to the moral composition of a person.
Indeed, as aesthetic categories, both the beautiful and sublime can become guides for
human conduct, for Kant. Although judgments of taste cannot be brought under
speculative principles, moral conduct CAN be ordered among principles whereas tastes,
as well as the conduct arising from taste, can be exercised and improved. This helps to
explain why Kant hoped that education could help one to realize a finer taste for the
beautiful and sublime. Kant also explains that sublimity exerts the energy of the soul
more intensely, and therefore tires sooner.
As far as the simultaneous occurrence of feelings of sublimity and beauty, Kant
makes the following claim:
Those in whom both feelings join will find that the emotion of the sublime is stronger
than that of the beautiful, but that unless the latter alternates with or accompanies it, it
tires and cannot be so long enjoyed. The lively feelings to which the conversation in a
select company occasionally rises must dissolve intermittently in cheerful jest, and
laughing delights should make a beautiful contrast with the moved, earnest expression,
allowing both kinds of feelings to alternate freely.
3


Kant directs his focus away from things that require no thought, such as jovial
laughter at a crude joke, or an indolent man enjoying being read to before sleep. He
states, There is still another feeling of a more delicate sort, so described either because
one can enjoy it longer without satiation and exhaustion; or because it presupposes a
sensitivity of the soul, so the speak, which makes the soul fitted for virtuous impulses; or
because it indicates talents and intellectual excellences
4
Furthermore, he focuses more
specifically on the sensual feeling that MORE ordinary souls are capable of, rather than
what feelings high intellectual insight brings, as in Keplers case, who, as Kant points
out, would never have traded one of his discoveries for a princedom.
Kant characterizes the sublime as nighttime, the beautiful as daytime; he claims
that the sublime moves, and the beautiful charms. Whereas the sublime must always be
great, the beautiful can be small. Kant also argues that those with dark color and black
eyes tend to be more sublime, whereas those with blue eyes and blonde hair are beautiful.
Along the same lines, greater age is more equitable with sublime qualities, and youth is
more akin to beautiful qualities.
Kant divides the beautiful into two forms; the properly beautiful, which is internal
as well as external and contains a considerable amount of admixture with the sublime,
and the merely pretty, which is seen as outward only. He focuses his discussion on the
properly beautiful, and ultimately does not seem as interested in analyzing the merely
pretty. Kant dissects the sublime into three parts, namely, the terrifying sublime, the
noble, and the splendid. The terrifyingly sublime is accompanied by dread or
melancholy, the noble sublime in terms of quiet wonder, and the splendid sublime with
beauty pervading the sublimity of it. Kant uses his famous example of the St. Peters in
Rome to explain the splendid sublime more fully; its frame is large and simple, and
beauty is distributed within the gold and mosaic work of the design, yet the feeling of
sublime still accounts for the greatest effect; therefore the object is to be considered
splendid. He also claims that among similar classes of people, clerics must exhibit great
simplicity, whereas politicians and statesmen must exhibit the most grandeur. Yet Kant
seems to be working towards something outside of these somewhat dualistic
observations, as well. Namely, his inclusion of external circumstances, which he
introduces with the claim, but the paramour may adorn himself as he pleases.
5
He
continues:
There is also something in external circumstances which, at least according to the folly
of men, concerns these sensations. High birth and title generally find people bowed in
respect. Wealth without merit is honored even by the disinterested, presumably because
with its idea we associate projects of great actions which can be carried out by its means.
This respect falls occasionally to many a rich scoundrel, who will never perform such
actions and has no concept of the noble feeling that alone can make riches valuable.
What increases the evil of poverty is contempt, which cannot be completely overcome
even by merits, at least not before common eyes unless rank and title deceive this coarse
feeling and to some extent impose upon its advantage
6


This passage is interesting in that it highlights the power intrinsic to wealth, and
with a certain reading, can even be understood as identifying class struggle as possibly
empowering to the individual. Perhaps along a similar line of thought, Kant focuses on
the power held by negativity, claiming that depravities and moral failings often bear
feelings of the sublime or the beautiful, especially since these feelings often appear to
sensory feeling without any sort of reason. Furthermore, in Kants discussion of the
characteristics of negative feelings such as melancholy, he empowers solitude and the
efforts of hermits as noble and adventurous, especially if their separation from the world
comes from a legitimate feeling of weariness. Those who experience melancholy are
much more interested in sublime feelings, for those of the beautiful are seen as deceptive
charms. For Kant, feelings of melancholy are not to be understood as the lack of a joyous
life, nor grievance in a dark dejected state, but rather, because when his feelings are
aroused beyond a certain degree, or for various causes adopt a false direction, they are
more easily terminated in that than in some other condition.
7
The importance of these
passages is that they demonstrate Kants notions of beauty and sublimity much less
actively than following works by Schelling and Schlegel, and even Kants own work in
Critique of Judgment, which he writes much later.
Upon a further examination of these passages, it becomes clear that Kant is, once
again, raising the sublime above the beautiful, at least in these specific examples. Kant
uses the Greek literary figure of Alceste to elaborate beauty as a deceptive charm; Alceste
marries his wife because he treasures her beauty, affection, and cleverness yet how will
he be able to love her when she becomes stricken with illness, wrinkled, and grey? The
comparable Adraste, on the other hand, claims I will treat this person lovingly and with
respect, for she is my wife
8
a sentiment Kant views as noble and generous. Still, these
examples are somewhat problematic, in that they literally exemplify the opposite of
Kants previous claim, which stated that the sublime was fading and more draining on the
soul, whereas beauty was more infinite and long lasting.
Perhaps the most significant sections of this text are contained within his writings
on moral attributes of the feelings of sublimity and beauty. Indeed, Kant does some of
his boldest, most blatant rankings of different feelings among these sections. First, he
claims that, among these moral attributes, true virtue alone is the only sublime feeling.
There are nevertheless good moral qualities that are amiable and beautiful, and, so far as
they harmonize with virtue, will also be regarded as noble, although they cannot properly
be included within the virtuous disposition.
9
Kant distinguishes true virtue from virtue
occurring through some sort of accident, which, by the very nature of virtue, isnt
virtuous at all. At the same time good-natured passion may appear similar to virtue, but
is ultimately weak and blind. Kant elucidates this point in terms of feelings of
compassion and warmth, which may move one towards sympathizing for those who are
needy. If action of coming to their aid is placed ahead of the debts an individual needs to
pay to others, then it becomes impossible for one to fulfill the duty of justice, which Kant
sees as more powerful than compassion towards others. Thus the action could never
spring from a virtuous design; for such could not possible induce you to sacrifice a higher
obligation to this blind fascination.
10

Kant emphasizes that affection towards the human species in general may serve as
a principle under which one subordinates his/her actions, thus allowing love towards
those who are in need to remain as well. Yet this constitutes a higher standpoint, in
which these feelings are already placed in their true relation to ones total duty as an
individual. He continues by claiming:
Universal affection is a ground of your interest in his plight, but also of the justice by
whose rule you must now forbear this action. Now as soon as this feeling has arisen to its
proper universality, it has become sublime, but also colder. For it is not possible that our
heart should swell from fondness for every mans interest and should swim in sadness at
every strangers need; else the virtuous man, incessantly dissolving like Heraclitus in
compassionate tears, nevertheless with all this goodheatedness would become nothing but
a tender-hearted idler.

Hence, charitable impulses only bring about nobility, beauty, and virtue when
they are used proportionately, and subordinated under ones inclinations towards beauty
and virtue. Hence, Kant re-posits TRUE virtue as the feeling of the beauty and dignity
of human nature.
11
Adoptive virtues are similar to true virtues in the sense that they
result in the feeling of immediate pleasure through charity and generous action, yet differ
from true virtue mainly because they are not an immediate grounds for virtue, but rather
always to be seen in relation to true virtue, by which they are judged. Kant states that
true virtues are sublime and venerable, whereas adoptive virtues are beautiful and
charming.
Finally, Kant does include the notion of the genius in Observations, but only very
briefly when he notes that the genius acts freely in artistic endeavors. The inclusion of
such a statement is rather perplexing in lieu of the fact that Kant unquestioningly regards
beauty to be inherent in objects themselves, and outside of the mind. In another Pre-
Critical

work entitled Nature History and Theory of the Heavens, Kant reasons, It is
true that development, form, beauty, and perfection are relations of the elements and the
substances that constitute the matter of the universe, and this is perceived in the
arrangements which the wisdom of God adopts at all times. The question should be
posed, if beauty lies in the object, and not in the mind, than what is the relationship of the
genius to the aesthetics of beauty and sublimity, and what is the purpose of the genius?
This question remains largely unanswered until it is brought to the fore in Kants
Critique of Judgment. Here, Kant re-conceptualizes and perhaps expands on his previous
model by claiming that beauty belongs phenomenally to the object, while the feeling of
beauty, as experienced by the observer, is the signifier of harmony between the faculties
of the mind and the object to which the mind is paying attention. In this text, Kant not
only draws from his older works (Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the
Sublime is arguably the most significant, at least in terms of aesthetics) as well as 18
th

century figures committed to metaphysical rationalism such as Baumgarten and
Mendelssohn. He breaks away from these two thinkers, as well as the entire Leibnizian
tradition, since their rationalist systems do not leave any space for the autonomy or
freedom required to establish aesthetics as an independent philosophical tradition.
Whereas these thinkers may have set the stage for idealism through beginning to signify
the importance of aesthetics, Kant was the first to advance these ideas far enough to
account for what is often referred to as the first aesthetic paradigm.
Due to this fact, the Critique of Judgment is widely considered the single most
important text in the history of philosophical aesthetics yet at the same time, Kant is
also often considered the one thinker who attributed the least amount of importance to the
work of art. However, Kant did claim an importance for aesthetic judgment in general
that empowered it to the level of judgments of cognitive or moral natures. While these
notions may seem somewhat counter-intuitive, they be explained rather easily; for Kant,
aesthetic judgments do not refer exclusively to art, but actually are best understood as
judgments concerning nature. They are about beauty in natural objects, as well as our
experience of the sublime.
12

The differences between the Critique of Judgment and Kants pre-Critical work
can be accounted for by considering Observations as more of an anthropological and
psychological account of culture than a truly aesthetic text one that was ultimately
much less significant than his Critique of Judgment. It is important to note that the
Critique of Judgment was not written at some sort of a theory exclusive to art and beauty,
but actually took on a much larger project than this. In this text, Kant is attempting to
mend the overarching problem that plagued is first two Critiques; namely, that the
principles outlined in his Critique of Pure Reason and Critique of Practical Reason are
not identical with one another. Left unresolved, these two Critiques created a massive rift
between nature and freedom, respectively. Hence, the aesthetic paradigm employed by
Kant is meant to guarantee the unity of reason. It attempts to do so by advancing
aesthetic judgment as the mediating faculty between sensibility and understanding on the
one hand, and sensibility and moral action, or freedom, on the other. Through this
implementation of aesthetics, Kant is also putting to rest any skeptical claims which
would regard art as incapable of contributing any transcendental insight towards the
world in which we live.
Kant no longer operates within the traditional Platonic of aesthetics, wherein art
merely imitates eternal and unchanging objects that the artist finds in his environment a
position that even his own work in Observations may have still held. Even in 1766, less
than three decades earlier, Lessing writes, Truth is necessary for the soul; and it
becomes tyranny to exert and force upon it in respect to this vital need. The ultimate end
of the arts, however, is pleasure; and pleasure is dispensable.
13
Due to the popularity of
such positions, and its presence among those who were very influential to Kant such as
Baumgarten, Kant realized that the connection between art and cognition must be
severed; otherwise, art would always be devalued comparatively to reason, because
reason in its very nature was considered the HIGHEST potential for cognition. Both
must inhabit realms independent of each other: This is the aim of the Critique of
Judgment, namely, to establish our pronouncements on art and beauty not as an inferior
version of our judgments on truth or morality, but as independent of both, albeit related to
both and thus able to span their divergence.
14

These first movements made by Kant had tremendous affects on the history of
philosophy to follow in Kants wake. For one, his new definition of aesthetics as a
designation of taste which inquires into beauty and art outmoded the traditional
definition, which referred to the theory of sensual perceptions and experience (he himself
investigated this definition briefly in the prior Critique of Pure Reason). In addition, his
designation of art as relating first and foremost to morality rendered its relation to our
faculties of cognition much less important (as he intended it to in his advancement of the
notion that art has very little relation to truth). Yet, aesthetic judgment cannot be devoid
of any cognitive elements altogether, something of which Kant was well aware. This
very move has resulted in one of the ongoing projects of the continued aesthetic tradition
since Kant, namely, to challenge Kant by furthering the epistemic relevance of art, and
associate a greater ability to demonstrate truth to artwork.
As one would expect, Kant is strictly formal during his analysis of aesthetics, and
never goes into any technical details about specific works of art, nor did he have an
extensive education in art theory. Schelling and Fichte also mainly focus on the formal
aspects of aesthetics, and it is not until Hegel that significant thought is given to the
content of aesthetic products, rather than analysis of their formal structure.
Kant divides beauty from art in general, since he views beauty as a much wider,
more inclusive category that also includes beautiful objects found within nature. Kant
writes:
There are two types of beauty: free beauty (pulchritude vaga) or merely adherent beauty
(pulrichtudo adherens). The first does not presuppose any concept of what the object is
meant to be; the second presupposes such concept and the perfection of the object
according to it. The types of the former are called (independently existing) beauties of
this or that object; the other, as adherent to a concept, is attributed to objects that are
classed under the concept of a particular purpose.
15


Here, Kant is attempting to analyze judgments concerning the beauty of objects.
He is not classifying objects according to objective types of beauty which they may or
may not fulfill. In other words, beauty is always relative to the judgments and points of
view of those who are attempting to identify beauty. The beauty of a flower could be
judged as purposive by a botanist, rendering it adherently beautiful, while another man
could be standing right next to him and judge the flower as freely beautiful. Equally
important is the fact that this is not some sort of fallback into general relativism the
object is only properly analyzed when the discourse and context brought to bear on the
object are reflected upon as well. Although Kant gives no formal arguments as for why
consensus should be reached among individuals concerning the beauty of a given object,
he seems to indicate that it is reasonable to expect, since all human beings have the same
faculties of experience.
Kant further exemplifies his distinction, claiming that the beauty of a horse, a
building, and the human figure are all purposive, and therefore adherent beauty.
Judgment of adherent beauty is impure and applied; it operates with a sense of purpose,
as well as a concept of perfection. In his analysis of Kants judgment of taste,
Hammermeister writes, In order to find an architectural object or the body of man
beautiful, we need to connect the object to a concept of its purpose in the world, its telos,
and hence a sense of its usefulness.
16

These examples are some of the only ones where it seems that Kant is indicating a
superiority of the pure aesthetic judgment. All further discussions seem to rank the
purposive above the pure aesthetic, which becomes very important for a certain reading
of Kant. Since adherent beauty is purposive, it seems much more capable of creating
inspiration towards moral attributes. Furthermore, all of Kants examples are somewhat
laborious by their very nature, and all connected with concepts of human labor (a horse, a
church, a palace, a summer-house, etc.). Kant argues that there cannot be any objective
rule by which a conception of beauty can be realized, and seems to attach a certain value
to labor when he writes. It is only throwing away labor to look for a principle of taste
that affords a universal criterion of the beautiful by definite concepts; because what is
sought is a thing impossible and inherently contradictory.
17
It seems to be along these
lines that Kant accounts for the human body as the highest form of beauty. Because of
this, his definition of beauty as purposiveness without purpose is to be seen as aligning
more with free beauty, such as Kant exemplifies by a Tulip, which we meet with a
certain finality in its perceptionit is not referred to any end whatever.
Rather than read the association of the good and purposive with the beautiful as
infringing upon pure beauty in a damaging way, it seems more sensible to understand it
in terms of an aversification by which the purposive beautiful can be properly opposed to
free beauty. Indeed, much later in the text, in the section Beauty as the Symbol of
Morality, Kant very extensively characterizes the link between moral and aesthetic
judgment, which does not seem to touch upon any sort of a connection between free
beauty and morality. Hence, it is not enough to simply take pleasure in the beautiful. It
must be directed towards morality!
Therefore Kant separates the aesthetic judgment not only from strictly rational
judgment, but also from two other forms of pleasure, which Kant sees as only being
interested in the existence of the object. The pleasure of the agreeable is purely
subjective to the object, and has no ability to leave the object intact, but rather wants to
use the object to fulfill its desire. The other, the pleasure felt in encountering the good,
operates in the same fashion but is the opposite of the agreeable. This pleasure is always
dependant on the existence of the good, yet we cannot begin to think of something as
good without already wanted it to exist! Therefore, the only type of pleasure that does
not take a necessary interest in the existence of the object is the pleasure brought by
aesthetic judgment. Whereas the pleasure of the agreeable is purely subjective to the
object, the beautiful is not, because it is able to invite universal content.
Obviously, the aesthetic judgment cannot claim the type of conceptual
universality that rational judgments do. So, then, how are any claims towards
universality to be understood? Kant uses the term subjective universality, which can
perhaps be elaborated most effectively in terms of the three faculties Kant uses when he
IS describing conceptualization of true universality.
For Kant, there are three faculties involved in the type of knowledge that depends on
experience, the first being sensibility (the passive reception of sensory stimuli), the
second imagination (the ordering of the sensory manifold into a unity), and then third
understanding (the provision of a concept under which to subsume the results of
imaginations activity).
18


Kant describes these three faculties as being the three types of knowledge which
depend on experience. Kant claims that, due to the nature of the aesthetic judgment, it is
never possible for an aesthetic judgment to move from the second faculty, imagination,
fully into the third faculty, understanding. Were this possible, aesthetic judgments would
be capable of conceptualization, since only the faculty of understanding can provide
concepts. Hence, further steps must be taken in order to allow for aesthetic judgments to
transcend their subjectivity in order to make any sort of universal claims.
Kant is able to explain this universalizing claim of the aesthetic judgment through
recourse to prior sections, wherein he demonstrated the cohesion of aesthetic judgments
and the pleasure involved within them. This pleasure is not reliant on the ability of the
judgment to reach understanding, and become a concept; rather the nature of the aesthetic
pleasure IS the very attempt at moving from imagination to understanding, regardless of
the fact that it will never arrive there. No concept ever suffices to understand what the
aesthetic unity imagines possible to understand, and yet this effort to conceptualize what
is imagined mustnt be abandoned, and never ceases. Since this process is virtually
endless in that it can never be satisfied or completed, aesthetic pleasure therefore
continuously renews itself. This move was certainly observed by the later German
Idealists, to say the least, and was employed by Fichte in a very similar way within his
Lectures Concerning the Scholars Vocation, except in terms of society moving towards
perfection, but never reaching it, yet finding purpose in that very process.
Kant demonstrates here why we can gaze upon the most familiar painting over
and over again, or submit ourselves to listening to a symphony an infinite number of
times, and yet never satisfy our pleasure in these aesthetic experiences, since we are
unable to conceptualize such knowledge. Perhaps this is the lasting, unending beauty that
Kant had previously hinted at in his Observations. This idea is taken up again and again
by later philosophers, such as Schelling, Heidegger, and Adorno. Yet, in these later
forms ultimate un-interpretability of the object becomes more of a feature of the object
than a characterization of the aesthetic pleasure, which is felt by the subject.
19

One further elaboration must be made concerning beauty and the aesthetic
judgment. Kant has claimed that works of art and beautiful objects do not have ends
outside if themselves, since an end outside of itself would ultimately have to either be
seen in terms of a purpose, or finality. Purpose and finality, for Kant, are understood in
relation to a concept of perfection; therefore, is seems as if it would be logical to assume
Since beauty can never be conceptualized, no beautiful object can ever be thought to
have a purpose. Yet how can this be true, given the fact that beautiful objects are used to
fulfill particular functions, such as to allow for the feeling of pleasure to overcome an
individual? Beautiful objects therefore must be seen as existing independently from any
purposive association to the observer. Hence, in section 17, Ideal of Beauty, Kant states,
Beauty is the form of purposiveness in an object, insofar as it is perceived without the
representation of a purpose. Hammermeister summarizes Kants discussion of the
aesthetic judgment as such:
To sum up this discussion of the aesthetic judgment Kant settles the old dispute of
whether one can argue about taste or not by stating that it is certainly possible to do so,
but the argument can never be settled because neither party could give and universally
valid reason for its judgment. Although aesthetic judgments do not provide knowledge,
they are still related to the faculty of understanding, and thus they participate in
cognition. Since animals lack cognition as based on concepts, their world certainly
knows the agreeable, but it is devoid of all beauty.
20


Much like the pleasure of beauty, the qualification of an object as sublime is
related to an interpretation of the object, and is not a quality of the object itself. In
Critique of Judgment Kant considers sublimity to be the name given to what is
absolutely great, meaning that what is sublime extends beyond all comparison, and
cannot be an object of the senses or synthesized into a conceptual unity. In Definition of
the Term sublime, Kant writes:
If, now, I assert without qualification that anything is great, it would seem that I have
nothing in the way of a comparison present to my mind, or at least nothing involving an
objective measure, for no attempt is thus made to determine how great the object is. But,
despite the standard of comparison being merely subjective, the claim of the judgments is
none the less one to universal agreement; the judgments: "that man is beautiful" and "He
is tall", do not purport to speak only for the judging subject, but, like theoretical
judgments, they demand the assent of everyone.
21


Therefore, there are no sublime objects for Kant only sublime states brought
about through encounters with certain objects. Kant separates sublimity into the
mathematical sublime and the dynamic sublime. He explains the mathematical sublime
in terms of infinity, which we can never arrive at conceptually as an absolute totality by
means of sensual experience, or, the faculty of imagination. No matter what we postulate
infinity as conceptually, we can always add any number to it, and therefore lose any hope
of grasping it at all. However, even through possessing the ability to contemplate the
infinite, human beings are empowered with a faculty that is capable of transcending
experience, at least to a certain extent. Kant supplements, To merely be able to think the
given infinite without contradictions requires a faculty in the mind that is itself
supersensible.
22

Kant sees the dynamically sublime as being distinct in that it contains a moment
of anxiety which, in the case of a natural object, manifests itself as fear. The experience
of nature constitutes a source of fear because it is strong enough of a force to destroy us,
and upon encountering it, often experience intense displeasure, inferiority, and
vulnerability. Citing examples of thunderclouds, boundless rising oceans, and the
violence of volcanoes, Kant only sees forces of nature as sublime if they can be
experienced from a position of guaranteed security and safety. From this safe position,
the human power of resistance isnt as hopelessly trifling, and can even be raised to a
superior position to that of nature. As Hammermeister puts it, Encountering the forces
of nature allows us to discover within ourselves a power of resistance that stems from the
discovery that human freedom is not subject to natural destruction, but transcends the
sensory realm. Experiencing such phenomena allows for one to arrive at a sense of
pleasure resulting from the seemingly indestructible nature of human existence. Hence,
the sublime aspect of this experience is not the actual challenge presented by nature when
it threatens to destroy us, but the very independence we feel from nature.
Kants view of the sublime is that it is an expression of moral energy, unlike
beauty, which has a calming effect on an individual. Kant continues to oppose beauty
and sublimity, claiming that a sublime experience points towards the superiority of the
supersensory parts of the self over materiality and finitude, and that it aims at the
abandonment of sensory realms with the goal of moving towards reason. Beauty, on the
other hand, rests on the basis of the sensory experiences which are cast into doubt
sublimity. This does not suffice as an account for any sort of a connection between the
beautiful and the sublime, and is, in that sense, problematic. Schelling will attempt to
overcome this opposition by arguing that a unification of beauty and sublimity is
necessary, or else the self will remain divided between sensibility and morality.
Kants elaboration on his notion of the genius requires the revisiting of a problem
he already encountered in his transition from Observations to Critique of Judgment; in
this case, he has argued that beauty is not to be understood as the quality of an object, and
yet still makes statements regarding characteristics of the beautiful among the arts. He
claims that these comments are not scientific, but rather simple critiques. Kant stresses
the importance of the fine arts, which are not within themselves nature, but take on the
appearance of nature through the expert craftsmanship of the artist. The beauty of fine art
rests with its craftsmanship, not its color or shade, and therefore, only perceptible form
should enter the aesthetic judgment of fine art. The only possible way for an artistic
product to appear as natural requires the work of a genius, who Kant describes as an
outstanding person who is naturally endowed with this talent.
Kant claims that genius is the talent which gives rule to art, and that this is the
only way for rule to be attributed to art. In other words, fine art cannot self-excogitate
its own rules by which to evaluate its products. Kants explanation of the inner-workings
of the unfolding of these rules is somewhat unclear, yet he includes it within the natural
endowment of the genius artist to always know when rules are to be followed, and when
the alteration of rules will result in what will become judged as beauty.
Concerning the role of morality among aesthetic judgment, Kant has already
stated that aesthetic judgment invites agreement, and transcends the purely subjective
sphere, thus giving it a tendency to force us out of isolation, since it provides the grounds
for establishing contact with other individuals. Kant claims that, Empirically, the
beautiful only exists in society. And if we grant that the impulse to society is natural to
man and that fitness and liking for it, i.e. sociability, is a requirement for man as a social
being and a predicate of humanity, then it follows that taste as a faculty of judgment
through which we communicate our feeling to everyone else must be considered a means
of promoting that which everyones natural inclination calls for.
23
It seems fair to argue
that Kant sees fine works of art as powerfully able to advance culture and intelligence
through social communication, as well as establish community and enhance social ties.
As a whole, Kants Critique of Judgment established aesthetics as independent of
other philosophical disciplines, and worked towards linking theoretical and moral
importance to the beautiful and the sublime. Without making any general critiques of
Kants effort to mend the gap between nature and freedom, it is within the interest of this
paper to raise several important questions towards his aesthetic paradigm which left his
followers unsatisfied, and with a lot of work on their hands.
First, what can be said about the ontological status of the work of art within
Kants model? Though barring a direct relationship between the aesthetic judgment and
the object, Kant leaves room for beauty only in the eye of the beholder, at least as far as
ontology is concerned. Although Kant claims that beauty does not exist in the object, he
also claims that there are definitely objects that are not beautiful and yet he does not
advance these notions in terms of a distinction between objects that are capable and
incapable of being represented beautifully.
Second, is it necessary that we must not make any epistemic truth-claims
concerning art? The Kantian position leaves one unable to connect art and knowledge,
since art cannot be cognized. Hammermeister states, This is one of the legacies of
Kants aesthetics that turned out to be one of the greatest objects of contention in the
tradition oh philosophical theory on art from then on.
Lastly, what is the practical potential of art? As symbols of the morally good,
Kant claims that aesthetic judgments strengthen our efforts towards leading moral lives.
Yet at the same time, beautiful objects have no direct practical value, and are only
pleasurable in terms providing the means for reflective intuition.
Schellings System of Transcendental Idealism is arguably the summit of the
estimation of arts role in philosophy, in that it is the only major known philosophical text
to argue for aesthetics and the fine arts as the pinnacle and conclusive representation of
its insights.
24
Schelling, as a romantic philosopher of the late eighteenth century,
esteemed aesthetics above all as necessary for the completion of a system of
transcendental idealism. Schelling was much more strongly committed to systemic
philosophy in general than most of his fellow philosophers, who felt that systematic
philosophies focused too much synthesis on a single argumentation. Although he
admitted that, since Kant, totality could no longer represent the object of a
comprehensive philosophical discourse, he nonetheless took upon the somewhat Fichtean
project of describing a system which worked towards totality.
Following in the romantic tradition, Schelling believed that artistic creation was
somehow necessary in order for cognition to be possible. Artistic creation was
understood by Romanticists as primarily that of God, although individuals can respond to
this creation with poetic language. Poetic language is conceived of by the romanticists as
the translation of cognition based on sensuality. This is a very different than account
Kants somewhat genealogical understanding of rhetoric and poetry, which he
intentionally separates from his elaboration of aesthetics. Kant writes, Hence these
historical sciences, owing to the fact that they form the necessary preparation and
groundwork for fine art, and partly also owing to the fact that they are taken to comprise
even the knowledge of the products of fine art (rhetoric and poetry), have by a-confusion
of words, actually got the name of elegant sciences.
25

The significance of poetry is dramatically heightened by Schelling, who includes
it as a central aspect not only in his characterization of the art product, but also as the
means for imagination to be realized by the ego as an original, immediate intuition.
According the Schelling, poetry allows for far more insight into the being of God (i.e. the
creation of man) than is possible through speculative philosophy. David Simpson points
out that, indeed, Schelling has worked through all the primitive and developing stages of
self-consciousness in its positive of the not-self, or objective world, and the consequent
reflective intuition of self as free intelligence
26
within his System.
Ascribing to aspects of romanticism as well as Idealism, Schelling attempted to
respond to the still-operative Kantian dualism between nature and freedom (noumenal
and phenomenal). In realizing aesthetics as the absolute which remains unknowable by
conceptual means, Kant is borrowing from Hlderin, a figure often seen as a precursor to
Schelling.
27
Even Kant himself had already proposed that the faculty which allows one
to attribute various sensory pleasures to a single entity must be considered the highest
point of philosophy although he never took this to be the principle which could bridge
the noumenal and phenomenal. Schelling also borrowed from Fichte, who elevated the
ego to the position of the foundation of being and incorporated it romantic philosophy,
which claimed that only the symbolic, not reason, can make any claims towards the
grounds the foundation of being. This is precisely why Schelling and other romantic
thinkers attributed the function of disclosure of being to the work of art. Schelling moved
away from Fichte by attempting to supplement his writings on transcendental philosophy
with those on the philosophy of nature. In order to reconcile these two aspects he needed
to show nature and the transcendental as two sides of one coin. It is one aim of the
System to unite the philosophy of nature, which deduces the ideal from the real, with the
transcendental philosophy, which understands nature as a reflex of spirit.
28

Schelling posits nature and freedom as opposites, but immediately claims that
both nature and freedom point inward towards each other. Nature, as the unconscious
stage of development for freedom, begins in the unconscious and ends in the conscious.
The ego, on the other hand, which represents freedom in its establishment, must begin in
the consciousness and end in the unconsciousness. The ego is conscious in terms of
production, but unconscious as regards the product. Hence, the product of nature and the
product of freedom form the identity of consciousness and unconsciousness within the
ego, as well as a consciousness of this identity. Schelling states, in reference to the
intellectual intuition through which the ego is realized, If we know the product of
intuition, then we also know the intuition itself. We therefore need only deduce the
product in order to deduce the intuition.
29
In further elaborating his theory, Schelling
runs into a seeming contradiction as he states:
Conscious and unconscious activity are to be absolutely one in the product, just as they
are also in the organic product; but they are to be one in a different way both are one for
the ego itself. But this is impossible unless the ego is conscious of the production. But if
the ego is conscious of the production, then the two activities must separate, since this is
a necessary condition for consciousness of production. The two activities must therefore
be one, for otherwise there is no identity; the two must be separate, for otherwise there is
identity, but not for the ego.
30


So, then, how can the ego and the product, and the production of the ego be one
in the same, and yet also separate? Schelling realizes that a point must exist at where the
two activities fall together as one yet immediately upon reaching this point, the
production must cease to be free, and must cease ultimately. This is because production,
as such, is just the opposition of conscious and unconscious activity; at the point where
these two activities meet absolutely, there can no longer be any opposition, hence the
contradiction is resolved, and ends in what Schelling refers to as Intelligence. The
postulated product involved in this move, is the concept of the genius for Schelling, and
since genius is possible only in art, the product of art.
31

Schellings model is able to bring objective activity and conscious activity, which
are distinct and even may oppose one another, into an unexpected harmony; THIS is the
Absolute intuition, which contains the universal ground for the pre-established harmony
between the conscious and the unconscious. This is also Schellings definition of the
organism. It should be noted that what Schelling describes here, similar to Kants
established ideal between the imagination and the understanding, can never be fully
known conceptually, and eternally flees from itself. It is upon these grounds that
Schellings notion of the genius begins to truly take shape.
Schelling distinguishes more resolutely between products of art, and products of
non-art, although, like Kant, he approaches this topic from a formal perspective, and does
not specifically exemplify his reasoning. Concerning works of art, Schelling writes, So
it is with every work of art: each is susceptible of infinite interpretation, as through there
were an infinity of intentions within it, yet we cannot at all tell whether this infinity lay in
the artist himself or whether it resides solely in the art-work.
32
Non-art, or products
merely imitating the character of a work of out, is limited to the aesthetical rules of the
surface. Non intuition or insight occurs in non-art, and it is therefore not capable of any
relational use-value. Greek Mythology, in analogy to the art product, attempted to
describe infinite meaning to the ideas contained within its formulation, and was not
created with any finite conceptual purpose which could be grasped by any individual. In
this way, Schelling sees every aesthetic production as starting from an infinite separation
of conscious and unconscious activities, which become unified within the work of art.
Schelling equates this unity to the concept of beauty.
Schelling argues that conceptual knowledge cannot present access to the absolute
unity of the artwork, although this unity can still be grasped through intellectual intuition.
Kant termed this intuitive reason and restricted it to God, while Schelling argues that
intellectual intuition should be seen as an unmediated vision which reveals the freely
posited empirical self. For Schelling, the state of intellectual intuition is always
somewhat unaccountable, and is in this sense precarious. Much like contemplation on
the state of death, this mythical uncertainty leaves the individual to return to the state of
reflection, able to do no more than realize that the absolute unity which transcends all
concepts is observable within this death-like state.
Hopefully, now, Schellings definition of poetry as it pertains to the work of art
and the notion of the genius will become more readily understandable. Once again,
Schelling argues that, through genius, artwork is crafted among the interaction of two
distinctly different activities, namely, unconscious and conscious ones. Although the
genius can never be reduced to one side of the other, Schelling claims that the conscious
aspects of the production may be practiced and refined, and are able to be taught as well
as learned from others. In this sense, there is nothing truly special occurring within the
conscious production. The unconscious production, however, is mysterious, and cannot
be named. It cannot be gained, and must be endowed as a gift of nature. THIS is
precisely the role of poetry, for Schelling:
For though that which cannot be achieved by practice but is native with us is generally
considered the nobler of the two, the gods have so grimly tied the exercise of that original
power to painstaking human effort, to industry and deliberation, that without art, poetry,
even where it is innate, produces only products that appear lifeless, in which no human
understanding can take delight, and which repel all judgment and even intuition by the
completely blind force at work in them.
33


It becomes clear that Schelling, similarly to Kant, once again takes more interest
in this naturally endowed aspect of aesthetics than the content of the art product.
Further evidence to support this claim is also discovered within Schellings summation of
the faculty of imagination, which he posits as original poetic intuition. Schelling argues
that the imagination provides the sole capacity through which we are able to contemplate
what is contradictory or even to cognize in general!
Schelling regards beauty as the basic character of art, and claims that without
beauty, there is no art. Within this move, Schelling seems to be empowering the
beautiful over the sublime, although he claims that both still operate separately within an
artwork, and may either oppose each other or combine in an art product. Schelling
argues that the interaction between the two occurs at the level of the aesthetic object, and
in regard to the object rather than the subject of intuition. Furthermore, Schelling states:
For the difference between a beautiful and a sublime work of art rests only on the fact
that where beauty exists the infinite contradiction is resolved in the object itself, whereas
where sublimity exists the contradiction is not unified in the object itself but is merely
raised to a level at which it involuntarily removes itself in the intuition, which then is as
good as if it were removed from the object.
34


Not only do the beautiful and the sublime operate at the same level, but they also
rest on the same absolute contradiction. In the case of the sublime, the intuition is found
not within the artist of the sublime object, but within the intuiting subject itself, since the
sublime sets all the powers of the mind in motion in order to resolve the contradiction
that threatens ones entire intellectual existence.
Schelling also considers the existence of natural beauty in the world. He
considers natural beauty as solely an organic product of nature, because it has not been
processed by aesthetic production, and has therefore not been rendered conscious, even
partially. Hence, there is no infinite contradiction within natural beauty, because there is
no conscious activity which would account for the contradiction. Therefore any beauty
encountered in nature will always appear as accidental. Schelling points out that it is not
the merely accidentally beauty found in nature that gives the rule to art, but rather that
the perfection produced by art is to become the principle and the norm for judging the
beauty of nature.
In summary, the paradigm of aesthetics outlined by Schelling describes the
epistemic function of art as its most significant function. In doing so, Schelling places
the ontological or practical functions of art to its epistemological functioning. The effect
of this move is that art, now inclusive of philosophy, is established as precedent over
science, and becomes instantiated as the model by which science should aim to function.
One consequence is that, since science must always join art, Schelling leaves no room for
any notion of genius to operate in science, or anywhere outside of art. Hammermeister
elucidates, Art is cast in a role in which it is celebrated as that product of the human
spirit that reveals a kind of truth that is not only different from scientific truth, but is
instead its foundation. The truth of art precedes scientific truth and enables it, and
without the world-disclosing activity of art, no individual inquiry would be possible.
35

Within only roughly two years of finishing the System, Schelling rescinds the
place of art as the pinnacle of his system, and subjugates it under conceptual knowledge.
While his later works certainly still valued aesthetics as important, it was at best on par
with the philosophical concept, or resulting immediately from it a position that would
soon be occupied more fully by Hegel. Schellings model is certainly disappointing, in
that he postpones the metaphysical, ontological, and practical questions raised by Kants
critical works in favor of aesthetics which he eventually abandons as well! I am in full
agreement with Hammermeister when he writes, One cannot help but feel that
philosophy somehow gets shortchanged with the establishment of romantic aesthetics a
sense that led Hegel to a reversal of the hierarchy of philosophy and art as expressed by
the Schelling of the System.

1
Kant would have used the term man, which I prefer to avoid, especially since it would greatly obfuscate
my discussion of Kants distinction between men and women in terms of alignment with either beauty or
sublimity.
2
Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, University of California Press, 45
3
Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, University of California Press, 51-53
4
Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, University of California Press, 46
5
Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, University of California Press, 54

6
Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, University of California Press, 55
7
Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, University of California Press, 64
8
Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, University of California Press, 65
9
Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, University of California Press, 57
10
Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, University of California Press, 58
11
Kant, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime, University of California Press, 60

Meant as previous to his three critiques, not as not critical!

12
Hammermeister, The German Aesthetic Tradition, Cambridge University Press, 21
13
Hammermeister, The German Aesthetic Tradition, Cambridge University Press, 22
14
Hammermeister, The German Aesthetic Tradition, Cambridge University Press, 23
15
Kant, Critique of Judgment, Section 16
16
Hammermeister, The German Aesthetic Tradition, Cambridge University Press, 26
17
PG 17, Ideal of Beauty, C o J, Kant
18
Hammermeister, The German Aesthetic Tradition, Cambridge University Press, 29
19
Hammermeister, The German Aesthetic Tradition, Cambridge University Press, 31
20
Hammermeister, The German Aesthetic Tradition, Cambridge University Press, 32
21
Kant, Critique of Judgment, Section 25
22
Kant, Critique of Judgment, Section 26
23
Kant, Critique of Judgment, Section 41
24
David Simpson, Introduction to Schellings System of Transcendental Idealism, Cambridge University
Press, 119
25
Kant, Critique of Judgment, Section 44
26
David Simpson, Introduction to Schellings System of Transcendental Idealism, Cambridge University
Press, 119-120
27
Hammermeister, The German Aesthetic Tradition, Cambridge University Press, 64
28
Hammermeister, The German Aesthetic Tradition, Cambridge University Press, 67
29
Philosophy of German Idealism, Continuum, 203
30
Philosophy of German Idealism, Continuum, 205
31
Philosophy of German Idealism, Continuum, 206
32
Philosophy of German Idealism, Continuum, 209
33
Philosophy of German Idealism, Continuum, 208
34
Philosophy of German Idealism, Continuum, 210
35
Hammermeister, The German Aesthetic Tradition, Cambridge University Press, 67