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BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY
AN ANNOTATED TRANSLATION OF THE
TARKABHASA OF MOKSAKARAGUPTA
BY
YUICHI KAJIYAMA
CONTENTS
l. Introduction p. 1
2. Abbreviations p. 15
3. Contents of the Tarkabhii$ii p. 19
4. Translation with Annotations
Chapter I: Indetenninate knowledge p. 23
Chapter II: Detenninate knowledge p. 63
Chapter III : Syllogism and polemics p. 86
5. Appendix p. 151
6. Sanskrit Index p. 159
INTRODUCTION
1 The (The Language of Logic): The present work is
an annotated translation of the Tarkabhii$ii (TBh) of who
wrote it some time between 1050-1202 A. D. This TBh should be dis-
tinguished from two other works bearing the sam.e name, viz. the
Tarkabhii$a of Kesavamisra and the ]aina-tarkabha$a of Yasovijayaj
though these three share the same character of being a compendium of
the system of a particular Indian philosophical school. While the latter
two texts are devoted to the Naiyayika and the jaina philosophy respec-
tively, TBh forms a brief but excellent introduction to
Buddhist philosophy including epistemology and logic. This is the ear-
liest of the three texts and seems to have set an example for the other
two.
Apart from great works on Buddhist logic and epistemology such as
those by Dharmakirti, Prajiiakaragupta, jfianasrimitra etc., we know, so
far as Sanskrit originals are available, three compendiums which system-
atically describe bauddhanyaya, dividing it into the three chapters of
Pratyak$a, svarthanumiina, and pararthanumiina: Dharmakirti's Nyiiya-
hindu (NB) with Dharmottara's Tika (NBT), Vidyakarasanti's Tarka-
sopana (TSop), and our TBh. The latter two works of course owe
much to NB and NBT, but they have their own merits of incorporating
later developments of Buddhist philosophy which were not known to
Dharmottara. Most parts of NBT are concerned with the explanation of
formal logic and epistemology viewed from the standpoint of the Sautran-
tika, omitting elucidations of other topics which are very important in
Buddhist philosophy in general. TSop is a small book which is so much
indebted to Dhannottara that it looks like a digest of NBT, and in places
where it goes beyond the latter it probably owes much to TBh. Com-
pared with these two works, TBh is far richer in information, a large
portion of which has remained unknown to the scholarly world.
This quahty of TBh is due to the fact that based his work
on many texts which were not utilized by Dharmottara or Vidyakarasanti.
-1-
He refers to most of the important works of Dharmakirti and their
commentaries, and cites m.any passages from Prajfiakaragupta, jfiana-
srimitra and RatnakirtLThe third chapter of his work may be called an
abridgement of the theories of jfianasrimitra and Ratnakirti, and this fact is
valuable to us, since TBh forms a good introduction to the works of the
said two scholars which have not been well studied as yet.
To illustrate the said character of our text, it may not be irrelevant
here to refer to some of the important theories discussed by
gupta
i
In 4 where he establishes the Buddhist theory that valid cogni-
tion is of two kinds, indeterrn.inate (pratyak$a) and deterrn.inate know-
ledge (anumiina), he enters into the criticism of other means of know-
ledge maintained by different schools of Indian philosophy, i. e. sabda,
upamiina, arthiipatti and abhiiva, and criticises also the Carvaka's view
that pratyak$a alone is the means of valid knowledge. In this discussion
his main source is Ratnakirti's PramiilJiintarbhiivaprakara1Ja.For the
refutation of the connection of the word and the thing meant by it,
adopts the sam.e criticism. of connection which was put for-
ward by Dharmakirti in his Sambandhaparik$ii ( 4.2). When he dis-
cusses the Buddhist attitude towards the vexed problem of whether the
validity of knowledge is known by itself independently, or dependently
on another proof attesting it (svata/} priimii1Jyam or Parata/}), he follows
Santiraksita and Manorathanandin in saying that neither of the two
principles should be applied to knowledge in general, some kinds of
knowledge being known to be valid by themselves and others by another
proof ( 2.4). Special importance is attached by to the
theory of self-consciousness (svasainvedana), which he discusses in detail,
quoting from Dharmakirti, Prajfiakaragupta, and and criticis-
ing the objections of Kumarilabhatta and Trilocana ( 6.2).
A traditional doctrine of Buddhist logic says that the object of in-
determinate knowledge is the extrem.e particular (svalak$a1Ja). But
this theory entailed a difficult problem as to how universal concom.itance
or pervasion (vyiipti), which forms the basis of inference and which is
the relationship between two universals, can be grasped by pratyak$a.
i) The following illustrations are taken out of the content of the present work,
and for a detailed discussion and information the reader is referred to the section indicated
by 4, etc.
-2-
Following ]fianasrimitra and Ratnakirti, our author answers the question
by saying that a universal can (also) be an object of Pratyaka. For
this new interpretation, he takes advantage of the theory of two kinds
of exclusion (vyavaccheda), which was originally expounded by Dharm.a-
kirti in relation to another problem. An affirmative proposition t x is y ,
may be interpreted in two ways by putting on either x or Y a restric-
tion or stress which is expressed in Sanskrit by the particle eva. When
the proposition t A particular is the object of pratYaka ' is construed by
anyayogavyavaccheda, it means t A particular alone is the object of
Pratyaksa '; but when construed by ayogavyavaccheda the same sentence
means A particular is rightly included among the objects of Pratyaka'.
Once a universal was perm.itted to be grasped by indeterminate know-
ledge, it came to be classified under a universal of an individual which
is produced by the accumulation of many moments of the momentary
stream of a thing and whkh may be exem.plified by the idea of t this',
and a universal of a class which denotes all the members of a class, say,
jar. These two universals are respectively naIned urdhvatiilaka1Ja- and
tiryaglaksana-siimiinya. This classification is made by ]tUinasrirn.itra as
well as Ratnakirti, but seems to have orIginated from Mal).ikyanandin,
the ]aina author of the if he can be dated in the
9 th century A. D. (7.1).
Just as an affirmative proposition is construed in two ways, a nega-
tive proposition is also interpreted in two ways, this time by under-
standing the negation as of a term (paryudiisa-) and as of a proposition
(cf. n. 62). A proposition t x is not y , means t x
is a non-y or z ' when the negation is understood as ;
but if it is construed the same proposition means
only t It is false that x is y , without allowing a positive interpretation.
Among Buddhists, this theory of two kinds of negation was applied to
philosophy first by Madhyamikas such as Bhavaviveka. Buddhist logicians
followed them in adopting it for the explanation of their particular doc-
trines. According to Buddhist logic the non-cognition of a thing is
nothing but the cognition of the other things contained in the range of
one and the same cognition. That we do not see a jar here means that
we see here things other than the jar. This is an example of paryudiisa-
being applied to the explanation of non-cognition ( 13). The
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theory of apoha (discrimination) which was propounded by Dignaga and
Dharmakirti had found various interpretations by the tim.e of
gupta, who mentions three: nivrtlyapohaviida, vidhiviida and
vidhivada. The latter two were made possible by applying wholly or
partly to anyiipoha (negation of other things) ( 26).
In the second chapter dealing with formal logic,
follows mainly NB and NBT, though not without new information. The
most im.portant of the latter m.ay be his classification of negative inference
into 16 formulae. Dharmakirti him.self classified negative inference into
4 kinds with 4 subordinate forms in PV, 3 kinds in HB and 11 kinds in
NB. The classfication into 16 is found in the works of Durvekamisra,
and Vidyakarasanti. Durveka, the commenta-
tor on NBT, did know the classification into 16, but it is unlikely that
he borrowed it from our author, since he is usually supposed to have been
contemporary with )iianasrimitra who was older than
by more than two generations. Vidyakarasanti, the author of TSop pro-
bably owes the same to our author. Weare not informed of the person
who first proposed this classification, althou.gh we have a vagu.e clue
through which we might be permitted to ascribe it to )fianasrimitra
( 13.5).
Another important piece of information we get from TBh II consists
of two theories of how to determine a cau.sal relation (kiiryakiiranabhiiva).
)fianasrimitra was of the opinion that a causal relation is ascertained by
three cognitions - one perception and two non-perceptions or one non-
perception and two perceptions - and criticised Dharmottara who proclaimed
that at least five cognitions are necessary for the determination of a
causal relation. refers to these two theories without showing
a bias towards either of them ( 11.3).
In the third chapter discusses various topics which
form important problems of Buddhist philosophy: the proof of universal
momentariness ( 16.1); the refutation of the existence
of God ( 20. 1-2; 28-28.1) ; the problem of
solipsism (samtiiniintara) ( 20. 2. 4) ; the problem of how to ascertain
the universal concornitance of two terms and two theories about it, viz.
antarvyiipti and bahirvyiipti which are respectively represented by Rat-
nakarasanti and )fianasrimitra ( 22) ; the definitions and illustrations
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of prasanga, prasangaviparyaya and viparyayabddhakapramiit,ta, the
syllogistic fonns which played important roles in Buddhist polemics in
the later period ( 24); the problem of the import of the word (apoha),
of which our author clearly distinguishes between three interpretations
held by Dignagaand .Dharmakirti, and jiHinasrimitra
( 26); the refutation of recognition (pralyabhijilii) ( 28.2) ; the proof
of two kinds of omniscient beings (sarvajila and sarvasarvajila)( 29-29.1);
the proof of succession of lives ( 29.2) and so forth. Vacaspatimisra, as
well as his teacher Trilocana, appears often as an opponent in these
discussions. Following the method of Dharmakirti in PV,
inserted these topics as illustrations of particular logical rules, fallacies
and. confutations, and. he bases his opinions mostly on Jiianasrimitra
and Ratnakirti.
At the end of the third chapter, our author briefly reproduces the
main theories of the four Buddhist schools, Sautrantika,
Yogacarin and Madhyamika ( 30-33). This portion is particularly inter-
esting and important, since we do not have many descriptions of the
same kind in other Buddhist texts and since it became a model when
(and probably Madhava) wrote a summary of Buddhist doc-
trines in the Tarkarahasyadipikii (and the Sarvadarsanasamgraha).
representation of the theories of the four schools are
closely related also to the same kind of summary in the ]iliinasiirasamuc-
caya, falsely ascribed to Aryadeva, and its commentary by Bodhibhadra.
The verses 21, 22a-b, 23, 25, 26a-b and 27 of the ]iliinasiirasamuccaya
are found in TBh too. And Bodhibhadra's review of siikiiraviida and
niriikiiraviida of the Yogacarins finds a counterpart in TBh 32.1. Though
our author does not enter into a detailed discussion of the important
schisms among Yogacarins, he seems to have been well aware of the
siikiiraviida of Jiianasrimitra and the niriikiiraviida of Ratnakarasanti
( 32.1).
TBh was counted among ten great works of Buddhist philosophy
enumerated by who evidently owed much to
when writing the portion of the Bauddhadarsana in the Tarkarahasya-
dipikii. R. Iyengar points out another reference to our text in an un-
published Jaina work, the Nyiiyama1Jidipikii, a commentary on the Pra-
ii) TRD 47, 20; Iyengar's preface to M, iv.
-5-
meyaratnamiilii of Anantaviryaiii. qu.otes the passages of TBh
on universal momentariness, the succession of lives and other problems
in his Syiidviidamanjari
iv
As .stated above, TSop and the ]niinasiiro-:
samuccayanibandhana of Bodhibhadra have much to do with our text,
though we are not sure if these two Buddhist authors are posterior to
Moksakaragupta.
2 Date of the Author: In the colophon of TBh
is mentioned as a resident of the Mahajagaddhala-vihara
v
We know
from substantial evidence
vi
that the Jagaddhala (or Jagaddala) Vihara
existed in Varendri, the paternal land of the Pala dynasty, which might
be placed so as to include the junction. of the present Rajshahi, Bogra
and MaIda of Bengal and an u.nknown amount of territory to the north
vii
Since in this way the universal imagined by others does not withstand
scrutiny, the following has been settled: The universal, which is merely
an entity distinguished from the dissimilars and which is designated by
the word 'discrimination' (apoha), forms part of our verbal convention
according to our logical construction; this is quite immune from faults.
(56.14) The following syllogism should also be formulated in order
to refute the universal: 351
When a thing, being by nature perceptible, is not perceived at a
given place, it is the object to be judged as absent then and there,
as horns on the head of a horse;
The universal, in spite of [your supposition that] it is by nature
perceptible, is not perceived in the particulars which are actually
seen ;
[Therefore, it is not existent.]
This is formulated on the ground of the non-cognition of an entity itself
(svabhiiviinupalabdhi) .
No asswnption of the fallacy of illegitimacy (asiddhi) can be made
[concerning this inference], since, in spite of a thorough examination,
we do not find anywhere [a universal which isJ the second entity following
349. T, G vyavahiirakiira1}am krtvii for bhedam upiidiiya. T (gsal ba fr.id) for
.
350. verbaly follows RNA 59, 21-60, 3 : athedam jiitiprasiidhakam anumiinam
abhidhiyate. yathii da1}qijniinam; vi-
cedam gaur ayam ity hi
siddheti.
vii siidhyam vii.
dhii siidhaniivadhiinam anavakiisayati.
ca siimiinyahetur antare1}api darsaniit,
yathii svarupaviin gotvam siimiinyam iti vii, tu siddhasiidhanam, svarupa-
viin gha!a ityiidivat gotvajiitimiin Pi1}4a iti parikalpitam bhedam upiidiiya
agovyiivrttiinubhavabhiivitviid gaur ayam iti vyavahiirasya.
351. owes this inference to PaJ;lc;lita Asoka. Cf.
SBNT 97, 8-11: yad yad san nopalabhyate tat tad asad iti pre-
vyavahartavyam yathambariimburuham,. nopalabhyate
siimiinyam kvacid The same logic, however, is applied by Bud-
dhists to the negation of avayavin, see e. g. TSP 188, 5 ff.
-129-
[a particular], independent of the particular entity characterised by colour
and form. Nor is it tenable that it is, in spite of its invisibility, established
by Perception as in the case of knowledge. For, while knowledge, though
not grasped by visual cognition, is established by the proof of self-con-
sciousness (svasamvedana), this universal, being a quality of an object
of the senses (arthadharma), should be grasPed by visual cognition.
And in fact the opponent admits its Perceptibility. Thus the universal
fictitiously conceived by the opponent does not withstand scrutiny ; only an
entity which is [by logical constructionl discriminated from others is said
to be a universal. And it is settled that all things that are products are
void of such a universal as is imagined by others.
28. Refutation of God as the permanent agent. (57.7) It should
not be understood that [all produced things] are made by some intelligent
being. For if there were an operator of this world, he would be either
a pennanent being or an impermanent one. Of these, first, he cannot
be permanent, because when the operator is active permanently, the crea-
tion, preservation and destruction [of the world] would certainly occur
simultaneously. The very nature by which he is (said to beJ the operator
of preservation and destruction should continue to be present in him even
at the time of creation, and accordingly he would at the very time [of
creation] effect preservation and destruction. It may be contended that
he will not act so because he lacks auxiliary causes (sahakiirin) , but
this is not correct. For he is never dissociated from permanent auxiliary
causes which are always present with him; and again he is never dis-
sociated from impermanent auxiliary causes, since these must be depend-
ent on him for their origination. Therefore, it would follow that he
effects all l the three kinds of operations] at the same time
352