Course Outline

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATION

1. Effects and Application of Laws

Art. 1 to 18 (Civil Code)

Taada, L. M. et al vs. Hon. J.C. Tuvera et al.
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
En Banc

Facts:

Petitioners asked for the issuance of the Writ of mandamus to compel the respondents to publish in the Official
Gazette the unpublished Executive Issuances such as; Presidential Decrees, Proclamations, Executive Orders, general
orders, letters of implementation, and administrative orders. In defense, respondents stated that the petitioners have
no legal personality in the case citing sec. 3 of rule 65 of the Rules of Court which lays-out the requirement for filing for a
Writ of Mandamus. Petitioners contended that the issue touches the public and thereby does not require any special
circumstance to institute an action. On the other hand, respondents stated that publication of the mentioned issuances
is not a sine qua non requirement as the Law provides its own affectivity date as stated in Art. 2 of the Civil Code.

Issue:

Whether or not publication affects the validity of the Executive Issuances.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court in its decision, ordered the respondents to publish the Executive Issuances of general
application, and further stated that failure for publication would render the Issuances no binding force and effect.

It was explained that such publication is essential as it gives basis to the legal maxim known as ignorantia legis
non excusat. Thus, failure to publish would make create injustice as would it would punish the citizen for transgression
of the law which he had no notice.

The court declared that Presidential issuances with general application without publication would be inoperative
and null and void. However, some justices in their concurring opinions made a qualification stating that publication is
not an absolute requirement for the publication. As Justice Fernando stated that, publication is needed but it must not
only confined in the Official Gazette because it would make those other laws not published in the Official Gazette bereft
of any binding force or effect.

People vs. Jabinal
GR No. L-30061 (February 27, 1974)

FACTS:
Jabinal was found guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition.
The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition described in
the complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He, however, claimed to be entitled to exoneration because,
although he had no license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas
and an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly
carried with them the authority to possess and carry the firearm in question.

The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned appointments as Secret
Agent and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the prosecution, he was entitled
to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Courts decision in People vs. Macarandang(1959) and People vs. Lucero(1958)
and not on the basis of the latest reversal and abandonment in People vs. Mapa (1967).

ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant should be acquitted on the basis of the courts rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or
should his conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of the MAcarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa.

RULING:
Decisions of this Court, under Article 8 of the New Civil Code states that Judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system . The settled rule supported by
numerous authorities is a restatement of legal maxim legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet the interpretation placed
upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law.

Appellant was appointed as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant
to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero under which no criminal liability would attach to his
possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly,
appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable.
The appellant was acquitted.

Sanchez vs. CA, at. al.
[G.R. No. 108947. September 29, 1997]

Facts:

*Herein private respondent+ Rosalia S. Lugod is the only child of spouses Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca
while [herein private respondents] Arturo S. Lugod, Evelyn L. Ranises and Roberto S. Lugod are the legitimate children of
[herein private respondent] Rosalia.
[Herein petitioners] Rolando, Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna, all surnamed Sanchez, are the illegitimate children of
Juan C. Sanchez.

On October 30, 1969, however, [herein private respondent] Rosalia and [herein petitioners] assisted by their
respective counsels executed a compromise agreement (Annex D, Petition) wherein they agreed to divide the
properties enumerated therein of the late Juan C. Sanchez.

This compromise agreement was not approved by the probate court.

Issue:

Is the Compromise Agreement partitioning the property of the estate without approval of the probate court
valid?

Held:

Yes.
Petitioners contend that, because the compromise agreement was executed during the pendency of the probate
proceedings, judicial approval is necessary to shroud it with validity. They stress that the probate court had jurisdiction
over the properties covered by said agreement. They add that Petitioners Florida Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna were all
minors represented only by their mother/natural guardian, Laureta Tampus.

These contentions lack merit. Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise agreement as a contract
whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced.
Being a consensual contract, it is perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the parties. Judicial approval is not
required for its perfection. Petitioners argument that the compromise was not valid for lack of judicial approval is not
novel; the same was raised in Mayuga vs. Court of Appeals,] where the Court, through Justice Irene R. Cortes, ruled:

It is alleged that the lack of judicial approval is fatal to the compromise. A compromise is a consensual contract.
As such, it is perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the parties to the contract. (Hernandez v. Barcelon, 23 Phil. 599
[1912]; see also De los Reyes v. de Ugarte, 75 Phil. 505 [1945].) And from that moment not only does it become binding
upon the parties (De los Reyes v. De Ugarte, supra ), it also has upon them the effect and authority of res judicata (Civil
Code, Art. 2037), even if not judicially approved (Meneses v. De la Rosa, 77 Phil. 34 [1946]; Vda. De Guilas v. David, 132
Phil. 241, L-24280, 23 SCRA 762 [May 27, 1968]; Cochingyan v. Cloribel, L-27070-71 *April 22, 1977+, 76 SCRA 361).
(Italics found in the original.)

In the case before us, it is ineludible that the parties knowingly and freely entered into a valid compromise
agreement. Adequately assisted by their respective counsels, they each negotiated its terms and provisions for four
months; in fact, said agreement was executed only after the fourth draft. As noted by the trial court itself, the first and
second drafts were prepared successively in July, 1969; the third draft on September 25, 1969; and the fourth draft,
which was finally signed by the parties on October 30, 1969, followed. Since this compromise agreement was the result
of a long drawn out process, with all the parties ably striving to protect their respective interests and to come out with
the best they could, there can be no doubt that the parties entered into it freely and voluntarily. Accordingly, they
should be bound thereby. To be valid, it is merely required under the law to be based on real claims and actually agreed
upon in good faith by the parties thereto.

Indeed, compromise is a form of amicable settlement that is not only allowed but also encouraged in civil cases.
Article 2029 of the Civil Code mandates that a court shall endeavor to persuade the litigants in a civil case to agree
upon some fair compromise.

In opposing the validity and enforcement of the compromise agreement, petitioners harp on the minority of Florida
Mierly, Alfredo and Myrna. Citing Article 2032 of the Civil Code, they contend that the courts approval is necessary in
compromises entered into by guardians and parents in behalf of their wards or children.

It is also significant that all the parties, including the then minors, had already consummated and availed
themselves of the benefits of their compromise. This Court has consistently ruled that a party to a compromise cannot
ask for a rescission after it has enjoyed its benefits.By their acts, the parties are ineludibly estopped from questioning
the validity of their compromise agreement.


Carmel Craft vs NLRC
G.R. No. 90634-35
June 6, 1990


The Court is appalled by the degree of bad faith that has characterized the petitioners' treatment of their
employees. It borders on puredisdain. And on top of this, they now have the temerity to seek from us a relief to which
they are clearly not entitled. The petition must be dismissed.

The record shows that after its registration as a labor union, the Camelcraft Employees Union sought but did not
get recognition from the petitioners. Consequently, it filed a petition for certification election in June 1987. On July 13,
1987, Camelcraft Corporation, through its president and general manager, Carmen Yulo, announced in a meeting with
the employees that it would cease operations on August 13, 1987, due to serious financial losses. Operations did cease
as announced. On August 17, 1987, the union filed a complaint with the Department of Labor against the petitioners for
illegal lockout, unfair labor practice and damages, followed the next day with another complaint for payment of unpaid
wages, emergency cost of living allowances, holiday pay, and other benefits. On November 29, 1988, the Labor Arbiter
declared the shutdown illegal and violative of the employees' right to self-organization. The claim for unpaid benefits
was also granted. 1 After reviewing the decision on appeal, the respondent NLRC declared:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is modified. In addition to the underpayment in their
wages, emergency living allowance, 13th month pay, legal holiday pay and premium pay for holidays for a period of
three years, the respondents are ordered to pay complainants their separation pay equivalent to one-month pay for
every year of service, a fraction of six months or more shall be considered as one (1) whole year.

The rest of the disposition stand.

The act of the petitioners was an unfair labor practice prohibited by Article 248 of the Labor Code, to wit:

ART. 248. Unfair labor practices of employers.-It shall be unlawful for an employer to commit any of the following unfair
labor practice:

(a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization;


Even if voluntarily executed, agreements are invalid if they are contrary to public policy. This is elementary. The
protection of labor is one of the policies laid down by the Constitution not only by specific provision but also as part of
social justice. The Civil Code itself provides:

ART. 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs,
or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.

ART. 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem
convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.

The petitioners obviously regard the private respondents as mere servants simply because they are paid
employees. That is a mistake. Laborers are not just hired help to be exploited, without the right to defend and improve
their interest . The working class is an equal partner of management and should always be treated as such.

The more labor is prevented from pursuing its legitimate demands for its protection and enhancement, the more it is
likely to lose faith in our free institutions and to incline toward Ideologies offering a more if deceptive regime. One way
of disabusing our working men and women of this delusion is to assure them that under our form of government, the
interests of labor deserve and will get proper recognition from an enlightened and compassionate management, no less
than the total sympathy of a solicitous State.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the challenged decision is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner. It is
so ordered.







Bellis vs Bellis
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967


FACTS:
Amos G. Bellis had in first wife whom he divorced five legitimate children, by his second wife: three legitimate
children and finally, three illegitimate children. He was a citizen of the State of Texas and a domiciled therein at the time
of his death. The decedent executed a will in the Philippines dividing his estate into his seven legitimate children.Two of
the three illegitimate filed their oppositions to the said will, contending that they were deprived of their legitimes as
illegitimate children.

ISSUES:
(1)Whether or not the Philippine law governs the decedent's estate
(2)Whether or not the doctrine of renvoi arise

HELD:
NO.The Court ruled that the national law of the decedent (Texas law) since as provided in Art. 16 of the Civil
Code "intestate and testamentary successions...shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration". Under Texas law,there are no forced heirs or legitimes so the illegitimate children are not entitled
to the decedent's estate.

NO. It does not apply in this case since here, the decedent is a citizen and domiciled in Texas and renvoi doctrine
arises where the decedent is a national of one country and domiciled in another. It would only arise if Texas has a
conflict rule providing that the law of the country where the properties are situated will govern, where the said
properties involved are found in the Philippines whose law provides that the national law of the testator should govern.


Testate Estate of Bohanan vs Bohanan, et al
G.R. No. L-12105

FACTS:

C.O. Bohanan, the testator is a citizen of Nebraska and selected it as his domicile.On April, 23,1944, he executed his will
in Manila giving large legacies to his granson, brother and a sister and small amount to his children and nothing to his
wife (Magdalena C. Bohanan).On May 20, 1922, the decedent and Magdalena Bohanan were divorced and in 1925, she
married Carl Aaron, subsisting at the time of the decedent's death. Arguing that they have been deprived of their
legitimes, the decedent's wife and children, questioned the validity of the testamentary dispositions.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the application of the national law of the testator to his estate is valid

HELD:

YES. Since the decedent died in 1944, the old Civil Code applies to this case. Article 10 of the old Civil Code (Art. 16, new
Civil Code) states that the national law of the person whose succession is in question shall govern, in this case, the law of
Nevada, which allows the testator to dispose of his estates by will.

Aznar vs Garcia 7
G.R. No. L-16749
Nationality Principle Internal and Conflict Rule

Edward Christensen was born in New York but he migrated to California where he resided for a period of 9
years. In 1913, he came to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until his death. In his will, he instituted an
acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen (legitimate), as his only heir, but left a legacy sum of money in
favor of Helen Christensen Garcia (illegitimate). Counsel for Helen claims that under Article 16, paragraph 2 of the Civil
Code, California law should be applied; that under California law, the matter is referred back to the law of the domicile.
On the other hand, counsel for Maria, averred that the national law of the deceased must apply, illegitimate children not
being entitled to anything under California law.

ISSUE: Whether or not the national law of the deceased should be applied in determining the successional rights
of his heirs.

HELD: The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen said in effect that there are two
rules in California on the matter; the internal law which applies to Californians domiciled in California and the conflict
rule for Californians domiciled outside of California. Christensen being domiciled in the Philippines, the law of his
domicile must be followed. The case was remanded to the lower court for further proceedings the determination of
the successional rights under Philippine law only.

GREGORIO B. HONASAN II, petitioner, vs. THE PANEL OF INVESTIGATING PROSECUTORS OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
G.R. No. 159747

Facts:

An affidavit-complaint was filed before the DOJ by Mantillano charging Senator Honasan and others for the
offense of coup detat. Consequently Honasan questioned the OMB-DOJ Circular which according to Honasan the source
of the purported power of the DOJ to conduct preliminary investigation,since there was no publication of the said
circular.

Issue: Whether or not there is a need of publication.

Held:

Petitioner's contention is not plausible.

In the case of People vs. Que Po Lay the court ruled that only circulars and regulations which prescribe a penalty
for its violation should be published before becoming effective, this, on the general principle and theory that before the
public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provision, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the
people officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties: said precedent, to date, has not yet been
modified or reversed. OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 DOES NOT contain any penal provision or prescribe a
mandatory act or prohibit any, under pain or penalty.

In the case of Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 453 (1986), the Honorable Court ruled that:

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the
administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters
of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates
in the performance of their duties.OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 is merely an internal circular between the DOJ and
the Office of the Ombudsman, outlining authority and responsibilities among prosecutors of the DOJ and of the Office of
the Ombudsman in the conduct of preliminary investigation. OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 DOES NOT regulate the
conduct of persons or the public, in general.

Accordingly, there is no merit to petitioner's submission that OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 has to be
published.14


2. Human Relations
Article 19 to 36 (Civil Code)

PB Com vs. Trazo


GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and HERBERT C. HENDRY vs THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
and RESTITUTO M. TOBIAS
176 SCRA 778
August 25, 1989

Facts:

10 November 1972, herein private respondent Restituto Tobias, a purchasing agent and administrative
assistant to the engineering operations manager, discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent
transactions, which caused Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp loss of several thousands of pesos. He reported
it to his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to the Executive Vice President and General Manager
Herbert Hendry. A day after the report, Hendry told Tobias that he was number one suspect and ordered him
one week forced leave. When Tobias returned to work after said leave, Hendry called him a crook and a
swindler, ordered him to take a lie detector test, and to submit specimen of his handwriting, signature and
initials for police investigation. Moreover, petitioners hired a private investigator. Private investigation was still
incomplete; the lie detector tests yielded negative results; reports from Manila police investigators and from the
Metro Manila Police Chief Document Examiner are in favor of Tobias. Petitioners filed with the Fiscals Office of
Manila a total of six (6) criminal cases against private respondent Tobias, but were dismissed.

Tobias received a notice of termination of his employment from petitioners in January 1973, effective
December 1972. He sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO); but Hendry wrote a
letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty. Tobias, then, filed a
civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners. The
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch IX, through Judge Manuel T. Reyes rendered judgment in favor of private
respondent, ordering petitioners to pay him eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual damages, two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages, twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary
damages, thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's fees, and costs; hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent.

Held:
Yes. The Court, after examining the record and considering certain significant circumstances, finds that all
petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to private respondent and for which
the latter must now be indemnified: when Hendry told Tobias to just confess or else the company would file a
hundred more cases against him until he landed in jail; his (Hendry) scornful remarks about Filipinos ("You
Filipinos cannot be trusted.) as well as against Tobias (crook, and swindler); the writing of a letter to
RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty; and the filing of six criminal
cases by petitioners against private respondent. All these reveal that petitioners are motivated by malicious and
unlawful intent to harass, oppress, and cause damage to private respondent. The imputation of guilt without
basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human
conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 09055 is
AFFIRMED.



G.R. NO. L-39019 January 22, 1988
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY and PEDRO YAMBAO, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ISAAC CHAVEZ, SR., ISAAC O. CHAVEZ, JR., ROSENDO O. CHAVEZ, and
JUAN O. CHAVEZ, respondents-appellees.


FACTS: At or about the end of March 1965, Pedro Yambao, a bill collector of MERALCO, went to the
residence of the respondents and presented two overdue bills to Juana Chavez, who informed Yambao that the
said bills would be paid at the MERALCO main office. On April 2, 1965, Isaac Chavez went to the MERALCO main
office, but only paid for one of the two overdue bills. Past 2:30 pm in the afternoon of April 21, 1965, MERALCO
caused the discontinuation of the electric service in the respondents residence. The next day, Rosendo Chavez
went to the main office and paid for the other overdue bill as of April 2, and also paid for the subsequent bill
already due. The power line was reconnected at about 7:00 pm of the same day.

In an action for recovery of damages for embarrassment, humiliation, wounded feelings and hurt pride,
caused to the private respondents, by reason of the disconnection of their electrical service by the petitioners,
the then Court of First Instance of Manila ordered the petitioners jointly and severally to pay the private
respondents the sum of Php 10,000.00 as moral damages, Php 2,000.00 as exemplary damages, and Php
1,000.00 as attorneys fees.

On appeal, the petitioners contended that their failure to give a notice of disconnection might have
been a breach of duty or of contract, but by itself does not constitute bad faith or fraud, especially that the
respondents were delinquent. Hence, according to the petitioners, no moral damages may be recovered from
them under the clean hands doctrine.

ISSUE: WON moral damages are recoverable by reason of the failure of giving a notice of disconnection
by the petitioners

HELD: Yes. It was held that MERALCOs right to disconnect the electric service of a delinquent customer
is absolute, subject only to the requirement that MERALCO should give a written notice of disconnection 48
hours in advance, and that such disconnection shall never be made after 2:00 pm of any working day. Thus, as
held in the case of Manila Gas Corporation v. Court of Appeals, failure to give such prior notice amounts to a
tort, and the delinquency of a customer cannot be utilized to defeat or null the claim of damages. At most, such
circumstance can be considered as a mitigating factor in ascertaining the amount of damages.











RCPI vs Cout of Appeals
143 SCRA 657
Civil Law Torts and Damages Human Relations - Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code Negligence

Loreto Dionela received a telegram via the Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI). However, at the
end of the telegram were the following:
SA IYO WALANG PAKINABANG DUMATING KA DIYAN WALA KANG PADALA DITO KAHIT BULBUL MO

The said portion of the telegram was not intended for Loreto. Loreto sued RCPI for damages based on Article 19
and 20 of the Civil Code which provides:

ART. 19.- Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
ART. 20.-Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify
the latter for the same.

In its defense, RCPI averred that there was no intention to malign Loreto and that the attached message was an
insider joke between RCPI employees which was not meant to be attached. RCPI also disclaimed liability as it
insisted it should be held liable for the libelous acts of its employees.
Loreto however averred that the said message was read by his employees and it affected greatly his business
reputation. The trial court ruled in favor of Loreto. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the liability of RCPI is predicated under Article
19 and 20 of the Civil Code.

HELD: No. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the appellate court. The cause of action of private
respondent is based on Articles 19 and 20 of the new Civil Code as well as respondents breach of contract thru
negligence of its own employees. RCPI is not being sued for its subsidiary liability.

RCPI was negligent as it failed to take the necessary or precautionary steps to avoid the occurrence of the
humiliating incident now complained of. The company had not imposed any safeguard against such eventualities
and this void in its operating procedure does not speak well of its concern for their clienteles interests.
Negligence here is very patent. This negligence is imputable to appellant and not to its employees. RCPI should
be held liable for the acts of its employees. As a corporation, RCPI acts and conducts its business through its
employees. It cannot now disclaim liability for the acts of its employees. To hold that the RCPI is not liable
directly for the acts of its employees in the pursuit of its business is to deprive the general public availing of the
services of RCPI of an effective and adequate remedy.


Banal vs. Tadeo,Jr.G.R. No. 78911-25 December 11, 1987Petitioner: CHARMINA B. BANALRespondents: THE
HON. TOMAS V. TADEO, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC-Quezon City, Branch 105 and Rosario ClaudiaPonente:
GUTIERREZ, JR.,
J.:
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari to review and set aside the orders of the respondent Regional Trial Court,
Branch 105, Quezon City dated (1) 8 January 1987 which rejected the appearance of Atty. Nicolito L. Bustos as
private prosecutor in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-40909 to Q-40913 where respondent Rosario Claudio is the accused
for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22; and (2) 31 March 1987 which denied the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the order dated 8 January 1987; and for mandamus tallow Atty. Bustos to enter his
appearance as private prosecutor in the foretasted criminal cases. Fifteen (15) separate information for violation
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 40909-40913,were filed
against respondent Claudio before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and originally assigned to Branch
84.On January 8, 1987, the respondent court issued an order rejecting the appearance of Atty. Nicolito L. Bustos
as private prosecutor on the ground that the charge is for the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 which does
not provide for any civil liability or indemnity and hence, "it is not a crime against property but public order."
The petitioner, through counsel filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dated 8 January 1987 on March
10, 1987.In an order dated 31 March 1987, the respondent court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent Court acted with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of its jurisdiction
in rejecting the appearance of aprivate prosecutor.

Ruling:
Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides: Every person who, contraryto law, wilfully or negligently
causes damage to another, shall indemnify thelatter for the same. Not only the State but the petitioner too is
entitled to relief as a member of the public which the law seeks to protect. She was assured that the checks
were good when she parted with money, property or services. She suffered with the State when the checks
bounced.

TANJANCO vs. SANTOS
G.R. No. L-18630, December 17, 1966

FACTS
Apolonio Tanjanco, (defendant) and Araceli Santos have a carnal relationship in consideration of defendant's
promise of marriage (undying love, etc). Because of their sexual relationship, the plaintiff conceived a child and the
defendant refused to marry Santos. Santos claimed that defendant caused her moral shock, mental and emotional
anguish and social humiliation. (Art 21 of the new Civil Code) The Lower court dismissed the case due to failure to state
the cause of action. The Court of Appeals favored Santos.

ISSUE
Whether or not breach of a promise to marry can be consider

HELD
No. Where for one whole year, a woman of adult age maintained intimate sexual intercourse, such conduct is
incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly, there is voluntariness and mutual passion. Hence, no case is made
under Art. 21, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by CFI in dismissing the complaint.
It was also established that their sexual relationship continued even after Tanjacos refusal to marry Santos.


Bunag v. CA
(Actions for Breach of promise to marry)


Issue: W/N Article 21 of the New Civil Code is applicable such that damages may be awarded?

Held: Yes! Article 21 applies! SC said that Article 21 is designed to expand the concept of torts or quasi-delict
by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold moral wrongs which are impossible for human foresight to specifically
enumerate and punish in the statute books.

Where a mans promise to marry is the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his
representation to fulfil that promise thereafter become the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual
congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or
deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the
award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit
behind it and the wilful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential however, that such
injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals good customs, or public policy.

Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. Court of Appeal

19 SCRA 115 Civil Law Torts and Damages Breach of promise to Marry - Article 21 of the Civil Code

In August 1986, while working as a waitress in Dagupan City, Pangasinan, Marilou Gonzales, then 21 years old,
met Gashem Shookat Baksh, a 29 year old exchange student from Iran who was studying medicine in Dagupan. The two
got really close and intimate. On Marilous account, she said that Gashem later offered to marry her at the end of the
semester. Marilou then introduced Gashem to her parents where they expressed their intention to get married.
Marilous parents then started inviting sponsors and relatives to the wedding. They even started looking for animals to
slaughter for the occasion.

Meanwhile, Marilou started living with Gashem in his apartment where they had sexual intercourse. But in no
time, their relationship went sour as Gashem began maltreating Marilou. Gashem eventually revoked his promise of
marrying Marilou and he told her that he is already married to someone in Bacolod City. So Marilou went home and
later sued Gashem for damages.

The trial court ruled in favor of Marilou and awarded her P20k in moral damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the trial court.

On appeal, Gashem averred that he never proposed marriage to Marilou and that he cannot be adjudged to
have violated Filipino customs and traditions since he, being an Iranian, was not familiar with Filipino customs and
traditions.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.

HELD: Yes. Gashem is liable to pay for damages in favor of Marilou not really because of his breach of promise to
marry her but based on Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se. In this case, it is the deceit and fraud employed by
Gashem that constitutes a violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code. His promise of marrying Marilou was a deceitful
scheme to lure her into sexual congress. As found by the trial court, Marilou was not a woman of loose morals. She was
a virgin before she met Gashem. She would not have surrendered herself to Gashem had Gashem not promised to marry
her. Gashems blatant disregard of Filipino traditions on marriage and on the reputation of Filipinas is contrary to
morals, good customs, and public policy. As a foreigner who is enjoying the hospitality of our country and even taking
advantage of the opportunity to study here he is expected to respect our traditions. Any act contrary will render him
liable under Article 21 of the Civil Code.

The Supreme Court also elucidated that Article 21 was meant to expand the concepts of torts and quasi delict. It
is meant to cover situations such as this case where the breach complained of is not strictly covered by existing laws. It
was meant as a legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to
specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books such as the absence of a law penalizing a the breach of promise
to marry.

The Supreme Court however agreed with legal luminaries that if the promise to marry was made and there was
carnal knowledge because of it, then moral damages may be recovered (presence of moral or criminal seduction),
Except if there was mutual lust; or if expenses were made because of the promise (expenses for the wedding), then
actual damages may be recovered.