Meaning and Speech Act Theory

Lamont Johnson
University at Buffalo

"Words have meaning." This seems to e aout as simple and clear an assertion of a
factual state of affairs as any statement that one can ma!e. "n closer inspection ho#ever$
it merely raises the %uestion as to #hat "meaning" is.&'( )f in saying* "Words have
meaning." one intends to convey the idea that meaning is a property of #ords in the same
#ay that a dog has four legs and a tail$ then ) #ould suggest that the spea!er has a rather
inaccurate notion of #hat meaning is. )n order to clarify the nature of meaning$ this paper
#ill e+amine ho# speech act theory e+plains some of the many different #ays in #hich
meaning is communicated through speech acts. ,o#ever$ efore doing that$ it is
important to give some consideration to the ontological status of #ords and meaning so
as to avoid some of the common misconceptions #hich seem to e associated #ith this
type of analysis.
-irst$ it should e noted that #ords are not "o.ects" or "things" that have properties of
their o#n in the same #ay that actually e+isting things do. Words are relational entities.
Which is to say that #ords are composed of parts that are not integrated y any form or
structure intrinsic to the #ord itself. The symols &mar!s/sounds( #hich ta!en together
constitute a #ord$ ma!e the #ord real insofar as it e+ists outside the mind* ut$ as
virations in the air or as mar!s on paper$ #ords e+ist as relational entities and not as
actual things.&0( This is due to the fact that the medium #hich carries the #ord is not
proportionate to the idea or concept #hich constitutes the form of the #ord.&1( All that
the air or paper and in! can carry is the symolic representation of the actual form #hich
is understood #ithin the mind$ and not the form itself.
When a #ord is spo!en or #ritten it ecomes a relational entity #hich lac!s the po#er to
do or to cause anything. While it is true that the virations in the air or the mar!s on a
piece of paper can stimulate the senses$ a #ord as such$ can not cause !no#ledge. As
Augustine noted2
We learn nothing y means of these signs #e call #ords. "n the contrary$ as ) said$ #e
learn the force of the #ord$ that is the meaning #hich lies in the sound of the #ord$ #hen
#e come to !no# the o.ect signified y the #ord. Then only do #e perceive that the
#ord #as a sign conveying that meaning.&3(
The person #ho hears or sees the #ord must already !no# #hat it means if she is to e
ale to understand it. That is #hy$ if someone does not understand the meaning of a #ord$
you must e+plain it using other #ords #hich she does understand$ give e+amples$ or point
to some real thing so that she can come to !no# #hat it is that you are tal!ing aout. )f
human eings could directly cause !no#ledge in one another$ then #e #ould
communicate through a direct spiritual contact such that one person #ould e ale to
directly infuse a specific form into the mind of another. Since that is not ho# #e
communicate ho#ever$ it is clear that our #ords do not directly cause !no#ledge to
appear in the mind of another. )nstead$ our #ords are to!ens or signs #hich can only
function as a formal cause in that if the other person already !no#s #hat the #ord means$
she #ill e ale to recogni4e it and form the appropriate concept in her o#n mind.
5ommunication et#een human eings$ therefore$ involves an active receptivity on the
part of the hearer and not a mere passivity. The spo!en or #ritten #ord does not directly
actuali4e some potency in the mind of the receiver. 6ather$ it prompts him or her to loo!
at things in a ne# #ay so as to e ale to form ne# concepts and therey gro# in
understanding. Thus$ #ords are not in themselves "things" #hich cause !no#ledge$ ut
relational entities #hich carry the value of meaning. )t is meaning #hich must e present
for communication to occur. )t follo#s that$ although #ords are not actual things$ and as
such$ are not the efficient cause of the !no#ledge one gains through the use of language$
#ords do have value. Their value lies precisely in the meaning #hich they carry.
)t is important to note that the concept #hich gives a #ord its meaning is only .oined to
the #ord in the mind of the person #ho understands it. The spo!en or #ritten #ord is in
itself$ .ust a symol #hich must have a concept attached to it* first$ y the person #ho
spea!s or #rites the #ord$ and secondly$ y the person #ho hears or reads the #ord. So it
is that the meaning #hich a #ord has is totally su.ect dependent$ oth from the
standpoint of the person #ho spea!s a #ord$ and from that of the person #ho hears it.
The meaning of a #ord is something #hich is simply pro.ected onto the to!en #hich
carries it. This is done$ not only y the person #ho first spea!s the #ord$ ut also y the
person #ho hears it. Therefore$ if any meaningful communication is to occur et#een
persons$ there must e at least some intersu.ective agreement as to #hat the #ords
mean$ given the conte+t in #hich they are used. The fact that there are many different
languages and many different #ords #hich all can e used to refer to the same thing$
sho#s .ust ho# su.ective the #hole process of communication through the use of #ords
really is. )f it #ere not for definitions$ grammar$ and all the other rules concerning ho# to
use a particular language$ #e #ould hardly e ale to communicate #ith each other at all.
7iven the relational status of #ords$ and the su.ect dependency of the meanings #hich
they carry$ one should anticipate a degree of comple+ity to the #ord 8 meaning relation
that #ould render any simplistic or reductionist theory of meaning untenale. )t is for this
reason that speech act theory ecomes very helpful at this point ecause it reveals ho# a
difference in use also entails a difference in meaning. The distinction #hich J.L. Austin
ma!es et#een locutionary$ illocutionary$ and perlocutionary acts illustrates this point
very #ell. Austin #rites2
We first distinguished a group of things #e do in saying something$ #hich together #e
summed up y saying #e perform a locutionary act$ such #hich is roughly e%uivalent to
uttering a certain sentence #ith a certain sense and reference$ #hich again is roughly
e%uivalent to 9meaning9 in the traditional sense. Second$ #e said that #e also perform
illocutionary acts such as informing$ ordering$ #arning$ underta!ing$ :c.$ i.e. utterances
#hich have a certain &conventional( force. Thirdly$ #e may also perform perlocutionary
acts2 #hat #e ring aout or achieve y saying something$ such as convincing$
persuading$ deterring$ and even$ say$ surprising or misleading. ,ere #e have three$ if not
more$ different senses or dimensions of the 9use of a sentence9 or of 9the use of language9
&and$ of course$there are others also(.&;(
,ere Austin restricts 9meaning9 to the sense and reference of a locution. ,e then goes on
to locate the force of an illocutionary act in the conventional usage of an e+pression
#hich therey determines the !ind of act #hich the spea!er is performing. -or e+ample$
#hen a .ury delivers a verdict of "guilty" the utterance of the #ord has a certain force
determined y convention$ #hich the use of the #ord 9guilty9 in other situations does not
have even though the sense and reference of the #ord could e e+actly the same.
)n general$ it seems fair to say that the 9meaning9 of a #ord for Austin is a matter of
definition as specified y the o.ect$ action$ or state of affairs that one is using the #ord
to refer to. <efining meaning in terms of sense and reference alone$ ho#ever$ is
some#hat misleading as Searle points out.
)f one thin!s of sentential meaning as a matter of sense and reference$ and tacitly ta!es
sense and reference as properties of #ords and phrases$ then one is li!ely to neglect those
elements of meaning #hich are not matters of #ords and phrases$ and it is often those
elements #hich in virtue of their meaning are such crucial determinants of illocutionary
force.&=(
The illocutionary force is of course$ distinct from 9meaning9 in the sense in #hich Austin
uses the #ord. >ven if the force of an e+pression is determined primarily y using the
e+pression according to some estalished convention$ ho#ever$ it also seems to e the
case that the force is attached to and carried y an utterance in much the same #ay as the
sense and reference are$ e+cept that the force is attached through a social convention$
#hile sense is attached through a linguistic convention$ and reference is attached
intentionally y the spea!er.
-or e+ample$ if ) say to a friend* ") promise that ) #ill help you paint your house on
Saturday." ) use the sentence to refer to myself &)($ another person &you($ an activity
&paint($ an o.ect &your house($ a time &Saturday($ and a condition &help(. Thus$ )
intentionally fi+ the reference of these #ords$ #hich in turn means that specific
definitions of #ords are applicale in this situation and others are not. The #ord 9promise9
is added in order to clarify the illocutionary force of the sentence so that my friend !no#s
that ) am underta!ing an oligation to help him and am not merely e+pressing an
intention or ma!ing a prediction aout #hat ) #ill proaly do on Saturday. All of this
ta!en together and spo!en #ithin an appropriate conte+t is #hat ) mean y the sentence
and is the meaning #hich the sentence has #hen ) spea! it.
)f meaning$ therefore$ is ta!en to e #hatever intelligile content is pro.ected onto a sign$
symol$ or to!en y a rational eing #ithin the conte+t of performing a communicative
action$ the restriction of 9meaning9 to sense and reference #ould appear to e rather
aritrary. While it is true that illocutionary force is distinct from sense and reference$ it is
also true that the meaning of an utterance is not complete apart from an inclusion of the
illocutionary force as an aspect of the meaning of the utterance. Searle ta!es note of this
point #hen he critici4es Austin9s distinction et#een locutionary and illocutionary acts.
no sentence is completely force8neutral. >very sentence has some illocutionary force
potential$ if only of a very road !ind$ uilt into its meaning. -or e+ample$ even the most
primitive of the old8fashioned grammatical categories of indicative$ interrogative$ and
imperative sentences already contain determinants of illocutionary force. -or this reason
there is no specification of a locutionary act performed in the utterance of a complete
sentence #hich #ill not determine the specification of an illocutionary act.&?(
)f one adopts the roader notion of meaning as previously set forth$ it follo#s that #ords
or even sentences$ considered as astract entities$ do not have meaning. )t is only
communicative acts that have meaning$ ecause meaning only ecomes attached to #ords
or sentences through the action of a spea!er or hearer. An e+pression ta!es on a meaning
first$ in the speech act #hen a spea!er uses it to e+press a thought* and$ secondly$ in the
receptive act #hen a hearer interprets the utterance and assigns it a meaning out of his or
her o#n !no#ledge and e+perience. )n et#een the spea!er and the hearer an utterance
has a certain meaning attached to it that the spea!er intends the hearer to grasp so as to
complete the communicative act. )t is very misleading ho#ever$ to thin! that #ords or
sentences simply have meaning apart from the speech act or the receptive act #hich gives
them their meaning.
An o.ection seems to e raised y Searle at this point #hen he claims that the meaning
of a sentence is entirely determined from #ithin.
The principle that the meaning of a sentence is entirely determined y the meaning of its
meaningful parts ) ta!e as oviously true* #hat is not so oviously true$ ho#ever$ is that
these include more than #ords &or morphemes( and surface #ord order. The meaningful
components of a sentence include also its deep syntactic structure and the stress and
intonation contour of its utterance. Words and #ord order are not the only elements #hich
determine meaning.&@(
Based on this statement$ it #ould appear that Searle holds that #hile meaning involves
far more than .ust sense and reference$ sentences have meaning apart from their use in
particular speech acts. Thus$ #hile Searle has enlarged the scope of 9meaning9 eyond that
#hich Austin gave to it y locating meaning in sentences rather than #ords or phrases$ he
still detaches meaning from complete speech acts in holding that the meaning of a
sentence is entirely determined y the meaning of its parts. While ) #ould disagree #ith
such an interpretation of meaning$ Searle9s position has a sutlety to it #hich deserves
further consideration$ ho#ever$ for he also holds that2
The speech act or acts performed in the utterance of a sentence are in general a function
of the meaning of the sentence. The meaning of a sentence does not in all cases uni%uely
determine #hat speech act is performed in a given utterance of that sentence$ for a
spea!er may mean more than #hat he actually says$ ut it is al#ays in principle possile
for him to say e+actly #hat he means.&A(
Searle ma!es a distinction here et#een sentence meaning and spea!er meaning #hich he
#ill dra# on in order to e+plain indirect speech acts$ metaphor$ and other comple+
situations #here the literal meaning of a sentence is not identical #ith the spea!er9s
meaning. At the same time he does not #ish to completely separate sentence meaning
from spea!er meaning for as he goes on to say2
for these reasons a study of the meaning of sentences is not in principle distinct from a
study of speech acts. Broperly construed$ they are the same study. Since every meaningful
sentence in virtue of its meaning can e used to perform a particular speech act &or range
of speech acts($ and since every possile speech act can in principle e given an e+act
formulation in a sentence or sentences &assuming an appropriate conte+t of utterance($ the
study of the meanings of sentences and the study speech acts$ are not t#o independent
studies ut one study from t#o different points of vie#.&'C(

)f the study of speech acts and is as closely lin!ed to the study of sentence meaning as
Searle suggests$ ho# is it that he also claims that sentence meaning is distinct from
spea!er meaningD )n re.ecting Austin9s distinction et#een locutionary and illocutionary
acts$ Searle had argued that #hile sense and reference are conceptually distinct from
illocutionary force$ they are intrinsically united #ith it in the utterance of a complete
sentence that they are inseparale from each other. Similarly$ is it not also the case that
#hile sentence meaning and spea!er meaning are conceptually distinct they too are
inseparaly .oined together #ithin the conte+t of a particular speech actD
When spea!er meaning and the literal meaning of a sentence coincide the meaning of a
sentence is that #hich is in accord #ith all of the relevant linguistic and social
conventions #hich apply to the normal use of the sentence. )f a spea!er uses a sentence
metaphorically$ ho#ever$ he gives the sentence a metaphorical meaning such that it does
not have a literal meaning unless a hearer misinterprets the spea!er and ta!es the sentence
literally and gives it a literal interpretation. )n #hich case$ the hearer has misunderstood
the spea!er y paying more attention to the linguistic conventions associated #ith the
sentence than to the intentions of the spea!er.
The only other sense in #hich a sentence has a literal meaning #hich differs from the
spea!er9s meaning is if someone else as!s* "#hat #ould this sentence mean if it #ere not
eing used metaphoricallyD" The %uestion here is simply one of in%uiring into the
meaning the sentence #ould have if the spea!er meaning and the literal meaning #ere the
same. )n determining #hat the literal meaning #ould e$ this person gives an
interpretation to the sentence #hich differs from that #hich the original spea!er gave it.
Thus$ it is possile to spea! aout a difference et#een the original spea!er9s meaning
and the meaning of the sentence if the intention of the original spea!er is prescinded from
such that one gives a meaning to the sentence ased on the applicale linguistic
conventions alone.
The mista!e #hich needs to e avoided here ho#ever$ is that of thin!ing that the sentence
as used y the original spea!er had oth a literal meaning and a metaphorical meaning
such that one could spea! of the sentence meaning as eing different from the spea!er
meaning as Searle does. Unless a spea!er intends to give t#o meanings to a sentence$ it
has one and only one meaning$ and that is the meaning #hich the spea!er gives to it.
Someone else can give a different meaning to the same sentence ased on linguistic
conventions alone$ ut it then has a different meaning. The original speech act did not
have t#o meanings$ a spea!er meaning #hich can e attriuted to the spea!er and a
literal or sentence meaning #hich elongs to the sentence. The speech act had one and
only one meaning$ and that is the meaning #hich the spea!er gave to the sentence.
)n itself$ a sentence has no meaning #hatsoever. Someone has to give it a meaning$
ecause meaning is entirely su.ect dependent. Sounds and mar!s are not intelligent
eings that have some meaning of their o#n apart from that #hich is pro.ected onto them
y someone. Therefore$ meaning is not and cannot e a %uality of a sentence #hich
inheres in it in the same #ay that actual properties inhere in real things. Meaning is a
%uality of speech acts or of receptive acts ut not of sentences. >very time a person
spea!s or hears a sentence he or she gives it a meaning* ut$ to thin! that literal meaning
or sentence meaning someho# e+ists independently along side of the spea!er or hearer
meaning is to completely misunderstand the nature of meaning.
)n order to see the full importance of recogni4ing the ontological status of meaning prior
to analy4ing it$ one need only to loo! more closely at the #ay in #hich Searle
distinguishes spea!er meaning from sentence meaning.
sentences and #ords have only the meanings that they have. Strictly spea!ing$ #henever
#e tal! aout the metaphorical meaning of a #ord$ e+pression$ or sentence$ #e are ta!ing
aout #hat a spea!er might utter it to mean$ in a #ay that departs from #hat the #ord$
e+pression$ or sentence actually means.... To have a rief #ay of distinguishing #hat a
spea!er means y uttering #ords$ sentences$ and e+pressions$ on the one hand$ and #hat
the #ords$ sentences$ and e+pressions mean$ on the other$ ) shall call the former spea!er9s
utterance meaning$ and the latter$ #ord$ or sentence$ meaning.&''(

The position #hich Searle clearly ta!es here is that #ords and sentences have a meaning
of their o#n #hich differs from that of the spea!er meaning in cases of ironic$ indirect$ or
metaphorical usage. )f a sentence is to have a literal meaning$ ho#ever$ someone has to
give it a literal meaning. )f the spea!er uses the sentence metaphorically$ then it has the
metaphorical meaning #hich the spea!er intends it to have. )t does not also have a literal
meaning unless someone else interprets the sentence in a #ay that the spea!er did not
intend.
Beople mean things y #hat they say$ and they give meaning to the e+pressions #hich
they use$ ut #ords and sentences simply do not have meanings of their o#n apart from
eing used y someone.So it is that$ #ords have definitions and sentences have
conventional usages$ ut only linguistic acts have meaning.




Lamont Johnson
SUEF Buffalo


'. '. John Searle raises fundamentally the same %uestion as follo#s2 "What is the
difference et#een .ust uttering sounds or ma!ing mar!s and performing an illocutionary
actD "ne difference is that the sounds or mar!s one ma!es in the performance of an
illocutionary act are characteristically said to have meaning$ and a second related
difference is that one is characteristically said to mean something y the utterance of
those sounds or mar!s." &Speech Acts$ 'A=A$ p. 30.(
0. 0. Words$ li!e other artifacts such as paintings$ uildings$ and machines have functions
and features #hich ma!e them appear to e li!e natural sustances$ &eg. chemical
elements 8 compounds$ and all living things($ ut these features are attached to the entity
e+trinsically rather than eing an e+pression of the intrinsic form or structure of a specific
!ind of thing.
1. 1. ) #ill use the terms 9idea9$ 9concept9$ and 9form9 interchangaly throughout this paper$
to refer to #hatever mental content is .oined to individual #ords$ #ithout invo!ing any
particular theory as to ho# this actually occurs.
3. 3. Augustine$ "The Teacher"$ in2 Bhilosophy in the Middle Ages$ ,yman and Walsh ed.
'A=?$ p. 1C.
;. ;. Austin$ ,o# to do Things #ith Words$ 'A;;$ p. 'C@.
=. =. Searle$ "Austin on Locutionary and )llocutionary Acts". Bhilosophical 6evie#$ 'A=@$
p. 3'A.
?. ?. Searle$ "Austin on Locutionary and )llocutionary Acts". Bhilosophical 6evie#$ 'A=@$
p. 3'0.
@. @. iid. p. 3'=.
A. A. Searle$ Speech Acts$ 'A=A$ p.'@.
'C. 'C. iid.
''. ''. Searle$ >+pression and Meaning$ 'A?A$ p. ??.