What is the 'Absolute'?

by Chris Bailey
Published in the Oxford University Department for Continuing Education Philosophical Society
Annual Revie !"#!
$here is a problem that has to be overcome for the modern reader see%ing to understand the
philosophy of &egel' (t concerns hat &egel sa as the central tas% of philosophy' (n his first
substantial philosophical riting) The Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System of
Philosophy) he explicitly states that the tas% of philosophy is to %no the Absolute' *oth +ichte
and Schelling ere attempting to do ,ust that and in this or% &egel sided ith Schelling-s attempt
over that of +ichte' After or%ing closely ith Schelling for a period &egel bro%e from him over
this .uestion and believed that in his Logic he had finally accomplished hat he sa as this central
tas% of philosophy' *ut hat is the Absolute/ $he term completely dominated #0
th
and #1
th

Century 2erman philosophy) but has almost entirely lost its meaning today' (f e are to ma%e
sense of &egel e need to retrace the evolution of its meaning for him'
The Kantian Enigma
(n his Critique of Pure Reason 3ant had established a dualism that he believed could not be
overcome) yet) at the same time) had held out a tempting speculation that the dualism might be
resolved in a reality that he thought as forever beyond human %noledge4
All that seems necessary for an introduction or preliminary is that there are to stems of human
cognition) which may perhaps arise from a common but to us unnown root 5my emphasis6)
namely sensibility and understanding) through the first of hich ob,ects are given to us) but
through the second of hich they are thought' 5p' #7#8#7!6
3ant believed this reality could not be %non because it as clearly beyond experience' &e had
shon that hen Reason attempted to go beyond experience it inevitably fell into contradiction and
produced an irresolvable -transcendental dialectic-' &e illustrated this ith four antinomies'
&oever) philosophers folloing on from 3ant inevitably speculated about the nature of this
-absolute reality- that could resolve the duality' +ichte sought a solution in something he called the
-absolute (-' &is attempt produced a great deal of discussion ithin the small university of 9ena
after he as appointed professor of philosophy there in #:1;' Amongst those attending +ichte-s
lectures as a group of poets ho formed an informal school devoted to ,ustifying Romanticism in
philosophical terms' $he %ey members of this school ere Schleiermacher) &olderlin) +riedrich
Schegel) von &ardenberg 5ho rote under the pseudonym <ovalis6 and Schelling' *eteen
them) in ,ust a fe years at the end of the #0th century) they developed an overall philosophical
position concerning hat they no called the -Absolute-'

Although all of them too% philosophy seriously) only Schelling sa himself as a philosopher first
and a poet second' (t is Schelling therefore ho tried to rationalise and systematise the or% of the
others) hilst ma%ing important contributions himself'

The influence of Spinoza
$hese 2erman Romantics eventually re,ected +ichte-s -absolute (- as a dead end' $hey turned in
another direction to explain the Absolute' $heir main influence in this as Spino=a'

(n opposition to the dualism of Descartes) ho had designated mind and extension to be to
separate substances) Spino=a had insisted that the universe must ultimately consist of a single
Substance' $his single Substance appeared to us in different aspects) as extended matter and as
mental events'

$he 2erman Romantics sa this position of Spino=a as providing the basis for a solution to the
.uestion of the Absolute' $here as only one -absolute reality-) hich manifested itself to us in the
to different ays 3ant had designated) through the senses) and through understanding'
As Spino=a had ith Substance) the 2erman Romantics e.uated this Absolute ith the universe as
a hole' $hey differentiated their version of the universe from that of science) hich they sa as
flaed because it relied on conceptual thought' $hey gave three reasons hy conceptual thought)
represented by science in particular) could not %no the Absolute4
#
#6 Since there is nothing outside it) the Absolute must be the cause of itself) but conceptual
thought explains all events by external causes acting on them'
!6 $he Absolute is an indivisible unity of mind and the physical orld) but conceptual
thought inevitably divides this unity by separating out mind as sub,ect from the physical
orld as ob,ect'
;6 $he Absolute is a single infinite hole) not limited by anything outside itself' *ut
conceptual thought consists of determination) hich) as Spino=a had insisted) ta%es place
through negation) contrasting something ith other things and dividing it off from them'
$his third reason is essentially the same as 3ant-s insistence that any attempt to %no the Absolute
ould inevitably lead to a dialectical contradiction' $o ascribe any property) P) to the Absolute
ould be to exclude its opposite 8P) but the Absolute has to consist of both P and 8P or else there
ould be something outside the Absolute'
Essentially then) based on Spino=a) the 9ena school insisted that there must exist a single Absolute)
that is the unity of mind and extension) sub,ect and ob,ect) human thought and nature) prior to
conceptual thought) that e can never grasp through such thought because it alays divides this
unity and distorts hat e see' $his position eventually led them to re,ect philosophy itself as a
means of %noing the Absolute) because it as itself a form of conceptual %noledge)'

&o then can the mind gain %noledge of the Absolute at all/ $he 9ena school-s anser as that it
could be grasped aesthetically' >or%s of art could) they thought) disclose the Absolute to us in a
ay that neither science nor philosophy could' $he arts do not express %noledge in concepts'
$hey communicate directly to the senses' (f e regard a or% of art as an ob,ect of %noledge to
be determined by concepts e do not really grasp it at all' A or% of art can be interpreted in ne
ays' (t is in this sense indeterminate) because its meaning cannot be definitively and finally
established' Rather than this being a failing compared ith conceptual thought the 2erman
Romantics sa this as ma%ing a or% of art -infinite-) transcending the finite %noledge obtained
through science and other forms of conceptual thought to give direct %noledge of the infinite
Absolute' Art reminds us that the orld is alays more than e can say about it' >hereas science
aims at definitive %noledge of things) the arts see ho connecting things to other things may
constantly produce ne insights about the hole) the Absolute) that are denied to science' Science
continually divides hat is actually an indivisible hole into separate compartments and -things-'
$he 2erman Romantics believed this ould eventually ma%e the orld increasingly meaningless'
Since not everyone possesses the same artistic ability) the 9ena school-s position relied on -artistic
intuition- of the Absolute) hich some people) particularly those ith artistic genius) possessed
more than others' (t is difficult to explain this artistic intuition ithout falling into a mystical
explanation that it someho comes about through a state of consciousness giving direct %noledge
of the universe to some people that is beyond normal human perception' ?irtually all the 9ena
school eventually did succumb to various forms of such mysticism'
Schelling
$he exception as Schelling' &e sought to explain the source of artistic intuition ithout resorting
to mysticism and also tried to defend philosophy-s ability to %no the Absolute' &e endeavoured
to do both by extending the concept of intuition to include philosophy as ell) renaming it
-intellectual intuition-) and attempting to give an explanation of its source'

$o do this Schelling tried to develop a ne philosophy of nature' &e too% up a distinction that
Spino=a had made beteen natura naturans) nature in its initial -creative- stage of coming into
being) and natura naturata) the actual ob,ectively existing products of nature' $he latter is the
sub,ect of the natural sciences) but Schelling sought to develop an alternative conception) a natural
science based on natura naturans' >hereas existing natural science relied on analysis of the parts)
his natural science as to be concerned ith the organic interconnection and development of these
parts' $hrough this he tried to sho a connection beteen nature-s -unconscious creativity- and
mind-s -conscious creativity-'
&e believed that) through man) as the highest product of natura naturans) nature itself -thin%s-' (n
art the unconscious creativity of nature became conscious' $he medium the artist or%s on is a
product of the unconscious creativity of nature' $he artist ta%es it beyond hat it is) governed by
its existing natural form and turns this unconscious creativity of nature into something ne) uniting
!
unconscious and conscious creativity into something ob,ective that can then be consciously
apprehended by others'

Schelling-s position seemed to offer a ay forard for philosophy too) as it as proposing that a
similar -sub,ect8ob,ect identity- applied there too' A central problem of %noing the Absolute for
philosophy as that conceptual thought divided the thin%ing sub,ect) man%ind) from nature) its
ob,ect' *ut Schelling as no proposing a development of Spino=a that) as &egel described it
later) sa the universe @not as Substance) but Sub,ect as ellA' $hrough man%ind) the Absolute
comes to %no itselfB it is both sub,ect and ob,ect' $he division is overcome' $he overall process
of it coming to %no itself as seen at the same time as being the source of the Absolute-s on self
movement) re.uiring no external cause'
Schelling and egel
(n #0"# Schelling invited his old friend &egel to ,oin him at 9ena' &egel did so because he agreed
ith the direction Schelling-s or% had ta%en' (n #0"! they began ,ointly producing a ,ournal) the
Critical !ournal of Philosophy' At this time &egel as accepting Schelling-s position of
intellectual intuition and particularly his conception of -sub,ect8ob,ect identity-'
$here as a central problem to this position) hoever' $his problem concerned the relationship
beteen the finite and the infinite' Ending the sub,ect ob,ect division relied on the Absolute
coming to %no itself' *ut it could only do so through the thought of finite human beings' (f the
Absolute as infinite) ho could it be %non by the finite/ $his posed the further .uestion of hat
was the relationship beteen the finite and the infinite/ Schelling and &egel reasoned that the
Absolute must be both the infinite and the finite' &o could it be the single hole if the finite lay
outside it/
*ut this no revived once more the problem of the dialectic that 3ant had arned came about
hen reason ent beyond experience' $he finite and the infinite are opposites' +or the Absolute
to be both pure unity and at the same time a multiplicity of finite things as a complete
contradiction'
Schelling desperately tried to s.uare the circle' (n an unconvincing document) consisting of more
than fifty pages) he attempted to argue that the finite involved only a .uantitative difference from
the infinite) not a .ualitative one' $he finite) he argued) as) in effect) an illusion'
&egel no too% a different path' (n #0"CD7 he voiced his disagreements ith Schelling in a series
of public lectures' (n his Phenomenology of Spirit) published in #0":) he described the vie
Schelling no had of the Absolute as being @the night hen all cos are blac%A'

&egel had decided it as impossible to separate the idea of intellectual intuition from mysticism
and he no re,ected it' (nstead he adopted a far more radical) indeed revolutionary) solution) not
only to the problem of the finite) but to the hole .uestion of the dialectic that seemed to plague all
attempts to %no the Absolute' (nstead of re,ecting this dialectic) he embraced itE $o tac%le the
problems involved) he rote) it as necessary4
$o see that thought in its very nature is dialectical) and that) as understanding) it must 5my
emphasis6 fall into contradiction' 5F## p' #76
!ialectical logic
+or more than !)""" years) logic) the science of thought) had been dominated by Aristotle-s
principle of non8contradiction' *ut no &egel insisted that contradiction as a vital aspect of
thought itself and therefore needed to be part of logic if it deserved to be considered the science of
thought' &e set out to develop such a logic' On traditional logic) he rote4
$he traditional logic is a sub,ect on hich there are text8boo%s enough) but at the same time it is
one hich can by no means remain as it is4 it is a thing nobody can ma%e anything of4 -tis
dragged along li%e an old heirloom) only because a substitute G of hich the ant is universally
felt G is not yet in existence' 5p' xxxiii8xxxiv .uoted by >allace6
$raditional logic too% the form of deducing a property of an individual from a premise concerning
a universal' +or example4
All men are mortal'
Socrates is a man'
;
$herefore) Socrates is mortal'
*ut &egel no recognised that such deduction could only be a small aspect of thought as a hole'
>here did the universal come from in the first place/ >as this not also a vital aspect of thought
and therefore part of logic/
$he universal does not exist externally to the outard eye as a universal' $he %ind as %ind
cannot be perceived4 the las of the celestial motions are not ritten on the s%y' $he universal
is neither seen nor heard) its existence is only for the mind' '''$o discover the truth in things)
mere attention is not enoughB e must call in the action of our on faculties to transform hat
is immediately before us'5F!#' p' ;C6
3ant had shon that %noledge of universals as derived through thought sub,ecting experience
to a priori universal categories' >ere these categories not therefore a part of logic/ *ut there as
a problem if they ere to be included in logic' Once again it as the problem of dialectical
contradiction' $he categories contained opposites' (n applying one category to the universe)
thought is excluding its opposite' (f the categories ere to be considered part of the science of
thought it ould mean applying opposite categories at the same time' $he old logic could not
accommodate such a contradiction' &egel no set out to develop a logic that could'
Central to &egel-s vision as a reor%ing of the categories themselves' (f the categories ere to be
truly universal they must surely apply to themselves' $his meant developing a systematic
deduction of the categories starting from the most simple'
Could such a system of categories give us %noledge of the Absolute/ &egel reasoned that it
could) because it could overcome the problem of the finite that he and Schelling had tried to
confront earlier' $he Absolute must consist of both the infinite and the finite' $he finite as not
therefore an illusion) as Schelling had maintained) but as an essential aspect of the Absolute'
&uman thought) ta%ing place through finite individuals) could only approach the Absolute initially
through finite concepts) but these finite concepts ere the ay the Absolute showed itself to
individual human thought' $hey ere not ,ust an illusion) but the appearance of the Absolute'
&egel reasoned that starting from the reality of this appearance thought could proceed toards
%noledge of the Absolute itself'
&e described ho this too% place by ma%ing a clear distinction beteen to different aspects of
thought) Understanding and Reason' Understanding deals ith the finite' (t fixes the relations
beteen things' (n fact) it is responsible for us seeing these -things- in the first place) since they are
seen as discrete finite -things- through our finite concepts dividing the Absolute hole into
manageable parts'
(t as) &egel believed) this property of the Understanding that as responsible for the central
problem he and Schelling had faced' $he Understanding opposes the finite and infinite to each
other and in doing so creates a conception of the infinite that &egel calls -bad infinity-4
one can easily see that) hen they are so opposed) the infinite) which of course ought to
be the whole) 5my emphasis6 only appears as a single aspect and suffers restriction from
the finite' *ut a restricted infinity is itself only a finite' 5F!0' p' C16
(n contrast) Reason goes beyond Understanding toards grasping the Absolute itself' $he
universal categories of finite Understanding consist of opposites that excluded each other' Reason
dissolves the fixed categories of the Understanding by speculative thought that shos these
opposite categories of the Understanding) including the finite and infinite) do not exclude each
other at all' (t discovers them to be identical and in doing so moves from the Understanding
through the Speculative to derive ne concepts that synthesise the opposites and come closer to
grasping the Absolute'
All thought is in this ay dialectical' $he finite concepts of the Understanding alays inevitably
fall into contradiction to be rescued by speculation and reason overcoming the contradiction to
ascend further into %noledge of the Absolute and derive ne truer concepts of the universe'
$hese become ne finite concepts of the Understanding and the dialectic begins again' &egel
insists that this ta%es place through the mostly unconscious) spontaneous use of the universal
categories that his logic identified' &is logic) he insisted) is the true science of ho e thin%'
C
*ut he regarded it as much more than that4
Any man) it is supposed) can thin% ithout Hogic) as he can digest ithout studying physiology'
(f he have studied Hogic) he thin%s afterards as he did before) perhaps more methodically) but
ith little alteration' (f this ere all) and if Hogic did no more than ma%e men ac.uainted ith
the action of thought as the faculty of comparison and classification) it ould produce nothing
hich had been done .uite as ell before' And in point of fact Hogic hitherto had no other idea
of its duty than this' 5F#1 5!6 ' p' !:8!06
+or &egel thin%ing about thought itself) logic) as different from all other sciences' >hereas the
latter ere an open ended process of applying the categories to developing ne scientific theories)
logic as capable of completing itself by identifying all the categories absolutely and finally' &egel
sa this as e.uivalent to %noing the Absolute' &is Logic as his attempt to anser the problem
he and Schelling had been stuc% on' *y thought examining itself he believed finite human thought
could ascend a dialectical ladder of categories and transcend the gap beteen the finite and the
infinite) ithout any need for -intellectual intuition-'
At first) logic) thought examining itself) sees @a separation beteen the thought hich is our ob,ect)
and the sub,ect philosophising hich is) as it ere) external to the formerA 5F#:' p' !;6' Schelling
had surmised that such an act as in reality the universe) ith thought as its highest product)
coming to %no itself' *ut he could not bridge this gap beteen thought as the act of finite human
beings and thought as the product of an infinite Absolute) ithout introducing intellectual intuition'
&egel believed that by tracing the ob"ecti#e development of thought) which was actually
independent of indi#idual thiners) he could reach a stage here logic as shon to be the
Absolute examining itself) thus returning to the beginning) but dissolving the separation beteen
sub,ect and ob,ect and arriving at the ultimate truth of the universe4
$he very point of vie) hich originally is ta%en on its on evidence only) must in the course
of the science be converted to a result) G the ultimate result in hich philosophy returns into
itself and reaches the point ith hich it began' (n this manner philosophy exhibits the
appearance of a circle hich closes ith itself) and has no beginning in the same ay other
sciences have' $o spea% of a beginning of philosophy has a meaning only in relation to a person
ho proposes to commence the study) and not in relation to the science as science' $he same
thing may be thus expressed' $he notion of science G the notion therefore ith hich e start G
for the very reason that it is initial) implies a separation beteen the thought hich is our ob,ect)
and the sub,ect philosophising hich is) as it ere) external to the former) must be grasped and
comprehended by the science itself' $his is in short the one single aim) action) and goal of
philosophy G to arrive at the notion of its notion) and thus secure its return and its satisfaction'
5$bid%
(n achieving this end the categories of &egel-s Logic ascend through three stages) *eing) Essence
and the <otion'
$he sphere of *eing deals ith the orld of the Understanding' $he categories here are a series of
opposites that include being) nothing) .uality) .uantity' $hey are immediate in that each is a self
subsistent concept hich stands by itself) retaining a certain independence from its opposite though
also at the same time inseparable from it'
Essence is the sphere of negative ReasonB it is the sphere of mediation' (n *eing mediation is
implicit) but in Essence it becomes explicit' $he fixed orld is dissolved into ne categories that
reveal that the orld of *eing) Understanding) is only one of &ppearance' &ctuality is to be
grasped through a series of categories that exist in pairs that mediate each other 8 cause and effect)
action and reaction) substance and accident) identity and diversity' Each of these categories has no
meaning individually separate from its other'
$he <otion is the sphere of positive ReasonB it is the merging of mediation into a ne unity
resulting in a ne immediacy that reveals the ultimate truth behind *eing' $his truth turns out
ultimately to be that the universe is Reason' $he categories of Reason are the universe' $he
Absolute is finally revealed to be the Absolute (dea) the highest category in the sphere of the
<otion' $his Absolute (dea is self8determining) it is the cause of itself) and produces all the other
categories out of itself) including that of immediate *eing' &egel believes this explains the
existence of nature itself4
7
>e began ith *eing) abstract *eing4 here e no are e also have the (dea as *eing4 but
this (dea hich has *eing is <ature' 5F!CC' p' !1I6
$hus the universe begins not ith a cause) but ith Reason) that through its on self movement
brings about everything else'
$o say that this supposed explanation of the orld of nature has been controversial ould be
something of an understatement' Jost of subse.uent philosophy resulted from attempts to refute
&egel in one ay or another' (n this sense) at least) his influence on the history of philosophy has
been enormous'
Jodern philosophy seems to have abandoned the Absolute in the face of positivist conceptions of
the universe favoured by science' (t could be argued that much has been lost by this and that
science-s version of the universe is still flaed in the ay 2erman Romanticism insisted' (f
nothing else) a study of the rich vein of ideas on the nature of the universe contained in their
discussion of the Absolute at the turn of the #1
th
Century can be an important antidote to some of
the more vacuous assumptions and pronouncements of positivism and physicalism'
"ecommended reading
*eiser) +rederic% 'erman $dealism( The Struggle &gainst Sub"ecti#ism) *+,*-*,.* &arvard
University Press !""0 and /egel Routledge !""7
&oulgate) Stephen Presentation on /egel's Logic at OUDCE ee%end event on &egel !"#! 5mp;
audio6 and Logic and Phenomenology in & Companion to /egel *lac%ell !"":
(lyen%ov) Evald Dialectic Logic( 0ssays on $ts /istory and Theory As%ar *oo%s !""0
Pin%ard) $erry 'erman Philosophy *+1.-*,1.( The Legacy of $dealism Cambridge University
Press !""!
"eferences
&egel) 2'>'+' /egel's Logic( 2eing Part 3ne of the 0ncyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences
4*,5.% $ranslated by >illiam >allace Oxford University Press #1:7
3ant) (mmanuel Critique of Pure Reason $ranslated and edited by Paul 2uyer and Allen >ood
Cambridge University Press #110
I