Mejia, Melanie

Criminal Law 1


I. EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
A. PEOPLE V GENOSA 419 SCRA 537
FACTS: This is a case of a wife killing her husband. During their first year of marriage, Ben Genosa and Marivic
Genosa (appellant) lived happily but after some time, Ben changed and the couple would always quarrel and
sometimes their arguments became violent. The appellant testified that whenever her husband came home
drunk, he would always beat her. Records show that the appellant consulted medical doctors on six different
occasions, of which were caused by the husbands violence. On the night of the incident, the appellant and the
victim had a violent argument and the victim beat the appellant. However, the Marivic was able to run to another
room. She admitted killing her husband with a gun. According to the investigation, the alleged cause of death of
the victim was by beating with the use of a lead pipe. The appellant invoked self-defense and defense of her
unborn child (Note that at the time of the incident, the appellant was in an advanced stage of pregnancy8
months). However, the RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide with an
aggravating circumstance of treachery and imposed the penalty of death.

On automatic review of the before the SC, the appellant filed an urgent omnibus motion praying that the
Honorable Court allow:
1. The exhumation of Ben Genosa and the reexamination of the cause of his death
2. The examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of
mind at the time she killed her husband
3. The inclusion of the said experts reports in the records of the case for purposes of the automatic review
or, in the alternative, a partial re-opening of the case a quo to take the testimony of said psychologists
and psychiatrists.
The SC remanded the case to the RTC for reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the
battered syndrome woman plea. The testimonies of two expert witnesses on the battered woman syndrome, Dr.
Dayan and Dr. Pajarillo, were presented and admitted by the RTC and subsequently to the SC as part of the
records.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant can validly invoke the battered woman syndrome as constituting self

HELD: Yes. The court ruled against the appellant as she failed to prove that she is afflicted with the battered
woman syndrome.

A battered woman is characterized as a woman who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or
psychological behaviour by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern for
her rights. Such women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men. In order to be
classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. A woman who finds
herself in a violent situation more than once and remains in such situation is defined as a battered woman.

The battered woman syndrome (BWS) is characterized by a cycle of violence, which is comprised of three
phases: 1. Tension-building; 2. Acute battering incident and; 3. Tranquil period.
The SC is not discounting the possibility of self defense arising from the battered woman syndrome. However in
order for such argument to be considered valid, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have
been present with at least two battering episodes between the appellant and the victim. Also, the final acute
battering episode preceding the killing of the batter must have produced in the battered persons mind an actual
fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her
life. Lastly, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probablenot necessarily immediate and
actualgrave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the
accused. Taken together, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self defense. In the present case, the
appellant failed to establish that all of these elements were present in the incident. There is no doubt that there
have been acute battering in the past but the defendant failed to prove that in at least another battering episode
in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern. Neither did she provide sufficient evidence that the third
phase of the cycle was ever present.

At any rate, the existence of BWS does not in itself establish the legal right for the woman to kill her abusive
partner. Evidence still need to be considered in order to warrant self-defense. Article 11 of the Revised Penal
Code states: Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances occur:
1. Unlawful aggression; 2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it and; 3. Lack of
provocation on the part of the person defending himself. She was able to escape to their childrens bedroom and
withdraw from his violent behaviour. Marivic even attested that after Bens violent outburst he went to bed. This
means that the imminent danger which he posed had ended; he was no longer in a position that presented an
actual threat on her life or safety.

The SC affirmed the conviction of the appellant for parricide but considering the presence of two mitigating
circumstances and without any aggravating circumstance, the penalty was reduced to six years and 1 day of prision
mayor as minimum; to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Inasmuch as the appellant
has been detained for more than the minimum penalty imposed upon her, the director of the Bureau of
Corrections may immediately release her from custody upon due determination that she is eligible for parole,
unless she is being held for some other lawful cause.

B. PEOPLE V RETUBADO 417 SCRA 393
FACTS: This is an appeal of the decision of the RTC convicting, Jesus Retubado, herein the accused, of murder thus
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and damages amounting to Php 50,000 to the heirs of the victim Emmanuel
Caon.

Shortly before the incident that led to the death of Emmanuel Caon, someone played a joke on the appellants
brother, Edwin Retubado, who was mentally ill. The suspect behind the trick was Emmanuel Caon Jr but after the
matter was elevated to the barangay for resolution, it was found out that Caon Jr was not the culprit. The
barangay captain considered the case closed but the appellant, however, was bent on confronting Caon Jr.

On November 5, 1993, around 9 p.m., the saw the victim on his way home and tried to confront him. The victim,
however, ignored Retubado. Incensed, Retubado followed Caon to his home and insisted that he speak with Caon
Jr. The victim told Retubado that his son was already asleep. According to the victims wife, Retubado pulled out a
gun from under his shirt and shot Caon in the forehead. The victim fell on the floor as the appellant walked away.
The victim was brought to a nearby hospital but died shortly thereafter.
The appellant surrendered to the PNP but failed to surrender the handgun which was used in killing Caon. The
paraffin tests showed that Retubados left had had gunpowder residue.

Retubado admitted shooting the victim however, he claimed that it was done out of self defense. According to his
testimony, that when he insisted that Caon wake up his son, he went to his room and emerged there from holding
a handgun on his right hand. Fearing that he would be shot, Retubado struggled with the victim for the gun and by
accident, the gun went off and the bullet hit the victims forehead. Retubado rushed to his house to change his
clothes. He placed the gun on the table before entering the bedroom. When he went back, his younger sister,
Erica, told him that their bother Edwin had taken the gun. Retubado found Edwin outside their house near the
church, and the latter told the appellant that he threw the gun into the sea.

ISSUE: Whether or not Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code applies to the present case

HELD: Article 11 paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code states: Any person who, in order to avoid an evil or an
injury, does an act which causes damage to another, provided that the following are requisites are present: 1. That
the evil sought to be avoided actually exists; 2. That the injury feared be greater than that done to avoid it and; 3.
That there being no practical and less harmful means of preventing it.

After shooting the victim, the appellant fled from the scene of the crime. He surrendered shortly thereafter but
failed to surrender the gun used in the incident. The appellants claim that he placed the gun on the dining table
before entering his bedroom to change his clothes is incredible. There is no evidence that the appellant informed
the police authorities that he killed the victim in a state of necessity and that his brother, Edwin, threw the gun
into the sea. The appellant never presented the police officer to whom he confessed that he killed the victim in a
state of necessity.
The defense of a state of necessity is a justifying circumstance under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal
Code. It is an affirmative defense that must be proved by the accused with clear and convincing evidence. By
admitting causing the injuries and killing the victim, the accused must rely on the strength of his own evidence and
not on the weakness of the evidence of the prosecution because if such evidence is weak but the accused fails to
prove his defense, the evidence of the prosecution can no longer be disbelieved. Whether the accused acted under
a state of necessity is a question of fact, which is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. The legal
aphorism is that the findings of facts by the trial court, its calibration of the testimony of the witnesses of the
parties and of the probative weight thereof as well as its conclusions based on its own findings are accorded by the
appellate court high respect, if not conclusive effect, unless the trial court ignored, misconstrued or misapplied
cogent facts and circumstances of substance which, if considered, will change the outcome of the case. We have
meticulously reviewed the records and find no basis to deviate from the findings of the trial court that the
appellant was the provocateur, the unlawful aggressor and the author of a deliberate and malicious act of shooting
the victim at close range on the forehead.
Furthermore, the appellant had the motive to shoot and kill the victim, which is contrary to Article 11 of the
Revised Penal Code. The victim ignored the appellant as he tried to talk to him. Incensed, the appellant followed
the victim to his house and confronted him.

Since the appellant voluntarily turned himself into the police authorities prior to the issuance of any warrant for his
arrest, he is entitled to a mitigating circumstance. The appellant Jesus G. Retubado alias Jessie is found GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of homicide defined in and penalized by Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and is
hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence of ten (10) years of prision mayor, in its medium period, as
minimum, to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, in its medium period, as maximum, and to pay the heirs of
the victim, Emmanuel Caon, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity; P50,000.00 as moral damages; and P25,000.00 as
temperate damages.

C. PEOPLE V CATBAGAN 423 SCRA 536
FACTS: Carmelo Catbagan, the appellant herein, was convicted of homicide, murder and frustrated murder.

On March 15, 1998, the accused Catbagan went to the victim Danilo Lapidantes house to verify who had fired
gunshots between 9am and 11am and 4 pm in the afternoon of the same day. No one answered him.
Embarrassed, Catbagan left the place. Around 5:30 pm, Catbagan returned, this time with Zozimo (Jess) Pavabier.
The accused, again, inquired about the earlier shots to which Sgt Suico, one of the victims replied that it was just a
part of the celebration. Out of nowhere, a piece of stone was hurled to the general direction of Catbagan. He then
instructed Pavabier to look for the one who threw the stone.

At that moment, Suico extended his arm to Catbagan and introduced himself as PSG. Ignoring Suicos gestures, the
accused drew out his gun and fired successively at the victim. Jun Lacaden, who was then taking an nap prior to
the shooting incident, got of our the owner type jeep where he was sleeping. Unexpectedly, two shots were also
fired at him by Catbagan. One bullter hit Lacaden who then, fell down.

Almost simultaneously, Catbagan directed his attention to Lapidante who was then inside their compound.
Prompted by his wife Rosita to run and hide, Lapidante turned towards the main door of their house. But before
he could reach the safety of his house, Catbagan fired two shots at home, one of which hit him in the upper part of
his body. As a consequence of the injuries they sustained, Suico died on the spot, Lapidante later died in the
hospital whereas Lacaden was confined at the East Avenue Medical Center for treatment

The defendant, however, claimed that the victim Suico, drew out his gun first and instinctively, Catbagan drew his
gun and fired at him, hitting the latter with three shots. Lacaden, who was attacking the accused from the side,
was shot by Catbagan once. Danilo Lapidante hurriedly retreated to his house, allegedly to get a gun. Catbagan
fired a warning shot but Lapidante continued, causing him to fire at Lapidante who was hit once.

ISSUES: Whether the appellant was justified in shooting the victims as a direct result of his fulfillment of a lawful
duty

HELD: The appellant invoked his lawful performance of duty as one such circumstance, arguing that his presence
at the scene of the incident, prompted by the complaints from their neighbors and his own personal knowledge
relative to the wanton discharge of a firearm, the effectivity of the election gun ban, his contribution with the
barangay and the inquiry he made to the revelers, were all in consonance with the legitimate performance of a
sworn duty. Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a person who acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in
the lawful exercise of a right or office does not incur any criminal liability. Two requisites are necessary before
such defense can prosper; 1. The accused must have acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise
of a right or office and; 2. The injury caused or the offense committed should have been necessary however the
consequence of such lawful exercise. The requisites were absent in the present case. Catbagan was not
performing his duties at the time of the shooting, because the men he shot had not been indiscriminately firing
guns in his presence as he alleges. Furthermore, nothing was mentioned in his direct testimony that he was there
to effect an arrest. Granted that this presence at the scene of the incident was all in the legitimate performance
and fulfillment of a sworn duty, his act of shooting the victims cannot be justified.

D. TABUENA V SANDIGAN BAYAN 268 SCRA 332
FACTS: Then President Marcos instructed Tabuena over the phone to pay directly to the presidents office and in
cash what the MIAA owed PNCC to which Tabuena replied that he will comply. A week later, Tabuena received
from the private secretary of Marcos, Mrs. Fe Roa-Gimenez written memorandum affirming the same. In
obedience to President Marcoss verbal instruction and memorandum, the petitioner made three withdrawals
from the MIAA funds amounting to P 55 million. The checks were encashed and between January 10 and 31,
1986, the funds were received by Mrs. Gimenez who issued a receipt for the amount of P 55 million.

The disbursement of the money was described by Tabuena was not based on normal procedure. Not only were
there no vouchers prepared to support the disbursement, the P 55 million was paid in cash. Furthermore, no PNCC
receipt was presented. A PNCC representative confirmed that no payments were made to PNCC by MIAA for the
months of January to June 1986.

The petitioner claimed that he was merely complying with the Marcos Memorandum which ordered him to
immediately forward to the office of the President P 55 million as partial payment of MIAAs obligation to PNCC
and that he believed that MIAA indeed had liabilities to PNCC.

ISSUE: Whether the appellants can validly invoke obedience to a superior order as a defense

HELD: No. The SC ruled that that the petitioner acted in compliance to an order given by a superior. It is well
established that since Marcos was the president of the Philippines at the time, he had a say in matters involving
government agency affairs and transactions such as the present incident. And as a recipient of such directive from
the highest official in the land, Tabuena acted in good faith in obeying Marcoss orders. Therefore, Tabuena was
entitled to the justifying circumstance of any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for
some lawful purpose. As to the lawfulness of the order, it can be argued that the Marcos memorandum was
patently legal and that Tabuena acted under the honest belief that the P55 million was a due and demandavble
debt which was just a portion of a bigger liability to PNCC.

It can further be argued that even if we were to assume that the real and sole purpose behind the Marcos
memorandum was to siphon public funds for the personal benefit of those who were then in power, still no
criminal liability can be imputed to Tabuena. Since there is no sufficient evidence that he had anything to do with
the execution of the Marcos memorandum. Neither was there proof that he profited from the act. In short, no
conspiracy could be established between Tabuena and the real embezzlers.

The SC, then, ordered the reversal of the Sandiganbayan decision and Tabuena was acquitted of the crime
malversation of funds.

II. JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
A. PEOPLE V BELONIO 429 SCRA 579
FACTS: On January 6, 2000, Ramy Tamayo, herein the victim, decided to buy some cigarettes from a store not far
from Jennifer Carampatanas (his cousin) house. Randy was standing in front of the store to pay when the
accused, Randy Belonio, tried to force his way in front of the opening and as consequence, bumped on Ramy.
Jennifer saw that Randy cast Ramy a long and hard look. Thereafter, while Jennifer and Ramy sat on the bench,
the accused came over and sat on the other end. Belonio minutes and when he returned, Jenniferwho was
facing the direction of the approaching Belonionoticed that he was wearing long sleeves. Tamayo could not see
the accused as he was facing sideways to Jennifer. And without warning, Belonio stabbed Tamayo on the chest
using a dagger which was concealed in his hand. Jennifer, rushing to their house for help, saw the accused running
away from the scene of the crime. Thereafter, the accused was arrested from one of the houses near the
barangay hall where he took refuge.

During the trial, accused raised insanity as his defense and presented Dr. Antonio Gauzon, a psychiatrist who
certified the following: [He] is an individual who is suffering from schizophrenia, chronic undifferentiated and
probably triggered by substance abuse of shabu and marijuana. The defendant further argued that he was not in
his right and normal frame of mind when the killing took place. According to him, no normnal person would ever
bump another person, give him a hard look and thereafter, stab him to death. He also added that he and the
victim did not even know each other at that time.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused can validly invoke insanity as his defense in the death of Ramon Tamayo

HELD: The moral and legal presumption is that one acts with free will and intelligence and that a felonious or
criminal act has been done with deliberate intent. Whoever invokes insanity as a defense has, therefore, the
burden of proving its existence. In the present case, the defense failed to provide sufficient evidence that the
accused was insane at the time of the incident. The main circumstances leading to the killing of Tamayo do not
warrant that Belonio was insane. Dr. Servondo testified that based on the results of the psychiatric evaluation, the
patient [Belonio] was noted to be evasive, suspicious and manipulative but no psychotic features were observed
upon evaluation.

Under Philippine Law, mere abnormality of the mental faculties is not enough; there must be a complete
deprivation of intelligence in committing the act . Appellants past does not discredit the facts that (1) he did not
act with complete absence of the power to discern; (2) he was not deprived of reason; and (3) he was not totally
deprived of his will.

Furthermore, the element of treachery was present in the incident. For treachery to be appreciated, two elements
must concur: (1) the means of execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or
retaliate; and (2) the means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. The appellants acts of leaving,
then returning after a few minutes armed with a knife -- which he concealed while approaching the victim and
which he used in stabbing him -- while the latter was sitting, unaware and not forewarned of any danger, manifest
a deliberate employment of means to ensure the killing without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
victim might make.

B. PEOPLE V RENE ESTEPANO, ET AL. 307 SCRA 707
FACTS: Witness Florencio Tayco, who was with Enrique Balinas, the victim, narrated the events that followed the
killing of Balinas: On April 16, 1991 around 10 pm, Tayco was with Balinas and Lopito Gaudia at Barangay IV
Himamaylan Negros Occidental. The three met Dominador Estepano and started talking. When out of nowhere,
Rodrigo appeared and without provocation, stabbed the victim in the stomach with a guinunting (fighting bolo).
Ruben, who was armed with a cane cutter and Rodye, Dante, and Rene, each armed with a bolo, followed suit in
hacking Balinas. The other witness, Gaudia, stated that he saw Rodrigo withdrawing his bolo from Balinas neck
while another person [whom he did not name] who was armed with a cane cutter, was standing beside the fallen
Balinas.

According to Dominador, he was at home with his wife and son Roberto. They were about to eat dinner when he
heard the victim cry out for Rodrigo to come down and when he peeped through the window, he saw hacking the
victim.

Accused Ruben, Rene and Rodney invoked an alibi. Ruben claimed that at the time of the incident, he was at the
provincial hospital attending to his wife who earlier underwent a caesarian operation. Rene and Rodney claimed
that they were at home sleeping when the killing occurred. Rene, who was only 13 years old then, testified that he
came to know about the incident the same night when his mother awakened him to inform him about it. Rodney,
on the other hand, was awakened by shouts that his father killed Balinas.

ISSUE: Whether or not Rene Estepano was criminally liable for the death of Enrique Balinas

HELD: The appellants alibis are not sufficient to prove that they were not present at the scene of the crime when
the incident occurred. Ruben failed to introduce evidence that his wife was actually admitted at the hospital and
that she was discharged therefrom only on April 17, 1991. Rodney and Renes testimonies are not sufficient to
outweigh their positive identification by one of the witnesses. The three were unable to prove that it was
physically impossible for them to be at the locus criminis considering the proximity of the places where they
alleged to be and the place where the victim was murdered.

Regarding the accused Rene Estepano, the records show that he was only thirteen years old at the time of the
commission of the offense. Under Article 12 paragraph 3 of the Revised Penal Code, a person over nine years of
age and under fifteen is exempt from criminal liability unless it is shown that he acted with discernment. The
minor, in this case, is presumed to have acted without discernment and the prosecution has the burden of proving
it otherwise.

The records show that the prosecution failed to prove that the accused Rene Estepano acted with discernment.
Taycos testimony only established Renes presence and his participation in the crime, but it did not establish the
mental capacity to understand the consequence of his acts. Furthermore, the prosecution failed to investigate
whether Rene acted with discernment or not. As a matter of fact, he was merely asked about what he knew of
the incident that transpired on April 16, 1991. Even if he was a co-conspirator, he would still be exempt from
criminal liability as the prosecution failed to rebut the presumption of non-discernment on his part by virtue of his
age.

The accused Rene Estepano is acquitted in the absence of proof that he acted with discernment and is released
from prison. Accused-appellants RUBEN ESTEPANO and RODNEY ESTEPANO are found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of Murder and are accordingly sentenced each to reclusion perpetua

C. PEOPLE V AGLIDAY 367 SCRA 273
FACTS: RTC of San Carlos Pangasinan charged Ricardo T. Agliday guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount
of fifty thousand pesos (50,000.00).

Witness Conchita Agliday, the wife of the appellant Ricardo Agliday, testified that on the evening of February 25,
1999, while washing dishes in the kitchen, her son Richard Agliday was shot with a shotgun by her husband-
appellant Ricardo Agliday. As a result, the victim fell on his belly and the appellant ran away. Conchita further
testified that prior to the shooting incident, she and her husband were arguing over her work as a laundry woman.

Conchitas other son, Rey Agliday, corroborated her testimony. Rey testified that he was in their house resting on
a wooden bed when he saw his father shoot his brother with a shotgun, as he was only about 4 meters from them.
He further confirmed that before the shooting, his mother and his father-appellant had a quarrel but he did not
interfere. Richard, on the other hand, had intervened and for that reason, the appellant got his shotgun and shot
him. The appellant surrendered to the barangay captain who in turn, delivered him to the police.

According to the defendant, however, he was cleaning his shotgun that he uses for evening patrol with other
barangay tanods when he accidentally touched the trigger and hit Richard, who was going upstairs into the house
with Conchita. As such, he contended that he should be acquitted on the basis of exempting circumstance of
accident under Article 12 paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ricardo Agliday the appellant was criminally liable for parricide; Whether the killing of
Richard Agliday occurred as an accident

HELD: Under Article 12 paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability does not arise in a case in which a
crime was committed by any person who, while performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere
accident without fault or intention of causing it. The basis of the exemption from criminal liability under Article 12
is lack of criminal intent.

For the accused to invoke accident as his defense, the following elements must occur: 1. A person is performing a
lawful act; 2. With due care and; 3. He causes an injury to the another by mere accident and; 4. Without any fault
or intention of causing it. The first requisite is that the act has to be lawful however, in this case, the act of firing a
shotgun at another is not a lawful act.

The most essential consideration in an accident is the absence of criminal intent. In the instant case, the appellant
got his shotgun and returned to the kitchen to shoot his son, who had intervened in the quarrel between him and
his wife. It should also be noted that the shotgun could not be fired without first being cocked. Undoubtedly, the
appellant cocked the shotgun before discharging it, which shows a clear intent to fire it at someone.

The appellant cannot contend that he was only negligent since intent was not lacking in this case. Appellant's
external acts prove malice or criminal intent. A deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is inconsistent with reckless
imprudence.

D. US V CABALLEROS, ET AL. 4 PHIL 350
FACTS: Robero Baculi confessed to having assisted in the burial of the corpses, he did so because he was
compelled to do so by the murderers of the four teachers. This was corroborated by prosecution witness Teodoro
Sabate who testified that Baculi was not present when the Americans were killed and that he was not a member of
the group who killed the four. At time of the incident, Baculi was in a banana plantation when he heard some
gunshots. The accused tried to run but was seen by the leaders of the group who killed the American teachers.
Thereafter, they called him and striking him with the butts of their guns, they compelled him to bury the corpses.

ISSUE: Whether or not Baculi is criminally liable as accessories for concealing the body of the crime of murder
committed by the band

HELD: No. Baculi was not held criminally liable as accessory for concealing the corpses of the said teachers since
Baculi acted under the compulsion of an irresistible force. (Article 12 paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code).

E. PEOPLE V JESUS (QUILLOY) 88 PHIL 53
FACTS: Jesus alias Ernesto Quilloy was charged with treason and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
During the Japanese occupation, the appellant joined the Japanese Imperial Army and served as a guide of the
Japanese in arresting guerillas. He was often seen with the Makapili; he carried arms, wore Japanese uniform and
was in charge of the Makapili garrison in Los Banos, Laguna.

On January 14, 1945, the appellant along with five other Filipinos and several Japanese soldiers, all armed,
surrounded the house of Isabelo Alviar in barrio San Antonio, Los Banos , while the Alviars were having lunch.
Then one of the Filipinos, ordered all the people out of the house. Therein, the appellant identified Isabelo Alviar
as a guerilla. Immediately, the group took Alviar to town for investigation.

The victims wife, Simplicia Barcalla, followed closely but was warned by one of the Makapilis not to follow. When
the group arrived at the bridge leading to the town, Barcalla head multiple gunshots. She was later informed by
one Pablo Villanueva at the municipal headquarters that husband was dead and his corpse could be found near the
railroad track in Barrio San Antonio. The next morning, she went to the place and found the dead body of her
husband with two mortal bullet wounds.

The defendant claimed that he was himself a guerilla but in February 1945, he was taken prisoner by the Japanese
in Los Banos. He further claimed that he joined the Japanese forces on account of duress.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellant acted on the account of duress

HELD: Duress as a valid defense should be used based on a real, imminent, or reasonable fear for ones life or
limb. It should not be a inspired by a speculative, fanciful or remote fear. If the appellant was captured by the
Japanese for being a guerilla as he claimed, it is hardly believable that they would place so much confidence and
trust in him that they would arm him and dress him in the Japanese uniform. More unbelievable would be to
entrust him with the mission of helping the Japanese capture other guerillas without any fear that he might rejoin
his guerilla comrades.

Based on the records shown, the SC affirmed the decision of the Peoples Court.

F. US V VICENTILLO 19 PHIL 118
FACTS: The defendant Isidro Vicentillo, who was a municipal president at the time of the incident, was charged by
the lower court of illegal and arbitrary detention. Complainant claimed to have been unlawfully detained for a
period of three days.

ISSUE: Whether Article 12 paragraph 7 applies to the case at bar
HELD: No. The SC ruled that the alleged unlawful detention of the complainant was within the lawful authority of
the defendant, who was performing his functions as municipal president. Based on the evidence presented, the
alleged offense with which the complaining witness in this case was charged was committed by him in the
presence of the municipal president, who must be held to have had all the usual powers of a police officer for
making the arrest without warrant.

Under the Law, the person arrested must be delivered to the nearest judicial authority at most within 18 hours
otherwise, the arresting officer will be liable for arbitrary detention. Because there was no judicial authority at the
municipality during that time, they journeyed for three days by boat to the nearest justice of peace as there was
no other means of transportation. The distance which required a journey of 3 days was considered an insuperable
cause. Hence, he was exempt from criminal liability