Lazarte SUPREME COURT CASE

Consolidated case digests for Criminal Procedure
Maria Victoria Z. Matillano, Set 1 Final Half

People vs. Odilao

Facts: Herein respondent David S. Odilao, Jr.
together with Enrique Samonte and Mario Yares,
was charged with Estafa in an Information[2] filed
by the Asst. City Prosecutor Feliciano with the
RTC of Cebu City.
the said accused, conniving, confederating and
mutually helping with one another, having
received in trust from Trans Eagle Corporation a
luxury car known as Jeep Cherokee Sport 4wd
valued at P1,199,520.00 with the agreement that
they would sign the document of sale if they are
interested to buy the same and with the
obligation to return the said car to Trans Eagle
Corporation if they are not interested, the said
accused, once in possession of the said luxury car,
far from complying with their obligation, with
deliberate intent, with intent to gain, with
unfaithfulness and grave abuse of confidence, did
then and there misappropriate, misapply and
convert into their own personal use and benefit
the same or the amount of P1,199,520.00 which
is the equivalent value thereof, and inspite of
repeated demands made upon them to let them
comply with their obligation to return the luxury
car, they have failed and refused and instead
denied to have received the luxury car known as
Jeep Cherokee Sport 4WD and up to the
present time still fail and refuse to do so, to the
damage and prejudice of Trans Eagle Corporation
in the amount aforestated.

Issue: W/N the court of appeals committed
reversible error in granting the injunction sought
by the respondent which enjoined the trial court
from implementing the warrant of arrest and
from further conducting proceedings in the case
until the petition for review of the reinvestigation
report of the city prosecutor is resolved by the
department of justice?

Held:
the Court enunciated the following ruling in
Crespo vs. Mogul,[23] to wit:
The preliminary investigation conducted by the
fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a
prima facie case exists warranting the
prosecution of the accused is terminated upon
the filing of the information in the proper court.
In turn, as above stated, the filing of said
information sets in motion the criminal action
against the accused in Court. Should the fiscal
find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the
case, at such stage, the permission of the Court
must be secured. After such reinvestigation the
finding and recommendations of the fiscal should
be submitted to the Court for appropriate action.
While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi judicial
discretion to determine whether or not a criminal
case should be filed in court or not, once the case
had already been brought to Court whatever
disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in
the case thereafter should be addressed for the
consideration of the Court. The only qualification
is that the action of the Court must not impair the
substantial rights of the accused or the right of
the People to due process of law.
Whether the accused had been arraigned or not
and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by
the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice
whereby a motion to dismiss was submitted to
the Court, the Court in the exercise of its
discretion may grant the motion or deny it and
require that the trial on the merits proceed for
the proper determination of the case.
However, one may ask, if the trial court refuses
to grant the motion to dismiss filed by the fiscal
upon the directive of the Secretary of Justice will
there not be a vacuum in the prosecution? . . .
The answer is simple. The role of the fiscal or
prosecutor as We all know is to see that justice is
done and not necessarily to secure the conviction
of the person accused before the Courts. Thus, in
spite of his opinion to the contrary, it is the duty
of the fiscal to proceed with the presentation of
evidence of the prosecution to the Court to
enable the Court to arrive at its own independent
Yes. The rule in this jurisdiction is that once a
complaint or information is filed in Court any
disposition of the case as its dismissal or the
conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the
sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal
retains the direction and control of the
prosecution of criminal cases even while the case
is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion
on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole
judge on what to do with the case before it. The
determination of the case is within its exclusive
jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss
the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed
to the Court who has the option to grant or deny
the same. It does not matter if this is done
before or after the arraignment of the accused
or that the motion was filed after a
reinvestigation or upon instructions of the
Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of
the investigation.
Thus, in Perez vs. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc.,[24]
the Court held that the trial court judges
reliance on the prosecutors averment that the
Secretary of Justice had recommended the
dismissal of the case against the petitioner was,
to say the least, an abdication of the trial courts
duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie
case, in blatant violation of this Courts
pronouncement in Crespo vs. Mogul .
IT BEARS STRESSING THAT THE COURT IS
HOWEVER NOT BOUND TO ADOPT THE
RESOLUTION OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
SINCE THE COURT IS MANDATED TO
INDEPENDENTLY EVALUATE OR ASSESS THE
MERITS OF THE CASE, AND MAY EITHER AGREE
OR DISAGREE WITH THE RECOMMENDATION OF
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE. RELIANCE ALONE ON
THE RESOLUTION OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
WOULD BE AN ABDICATION OF THE TRIAL
COURTS DUTY AND JURISDICTION TO
DETERMINE PRIMA FACIE CASE.

Verily, the proceedings in the criminal case
pending in the trial court had been held in
abeyance long enough. Under Section 11, Rule
116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
the suspension of arraignment of an accused in
cases where a petition for review of the
resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either
the Department of Justice or the Office of the
President shall not exceed sixty days counted
from the filing of the petition with the reviewing
office. Although in this case, at the time that the
trial court deferred the arraignment in its Order
dated October 30, 2000, the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure had not yet taken effect and
there was as yet no prescribed period of time for
the suspension of arraignment, we believe that
the period of one and a half years from October
30, 2000 to June 13, 2002, when the trial court
ordered the implementation of the warrant of
arrest, was more than ample time to give private
complainant the opportunity to obtain a
resolution of her petition for review from the
DOJ. Indeed, with more than three years having
elapsed, it is now high time for the continuation
of the trial on the merits in the criminal case
below as the sixty-day period counted from the
filing of the petition for review with the DOJ,
provided for in Section 11, Rule 116 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure now
applicable to the case at bar, had long lapsed.

People vs. Oden

Facts: The Court is confronted with yet another
case where a home ceases being an abode of
safety and protection, this time to a motherless
daughter who has accused her own father, herein
appellant, of having repeatedly had carnal
knowledge of her "by means of force and
intimidation." Appellant Mario Oden was charged
with twelve (12) counts of "rape,".
"Due to fear, Anna Liza did not report to anyone
all the twelve (12) incidents of sexual
molestation.
"However, unknown to Anna Liza, her Ate Mercy
(wife of the complainants brother Arnold Oden)
witnessed the rape that took place on 08 January
2001. Ate Mercy saw through a small hole on the
wall inside the house - separating her bedroom
from that of Anna Lizas what accused had done
to her (Anna Liza). And it was not only Ate Mercy
who witnessed the rape. Arnold Oden (brother of
Anna Liza) also saw what the accused had done to
Anna Liza. Arnold was mad at accused; however
he was not able to do anything because he,
together with the rest of the siblings, were afraid
of their father (accused) - the reason being that
everytime accused would get angry, he would
beat all of them.
"Nonetheless, Ate Mercy reported to a neighbor,
Nanay Ludy, Anna Lizas harrowing experience on
08 January 2001. In turn, Nanay Ludy talked to
Anna Liza and directed her to report the incident
to the barangay. Anna Liza heeded Nanay Ludys
directive. She proceeded to the barangay -
together with her Ate Mercy and Ate Marilou
(wives of Anna Lizas older brothers) - and
reported her fathers outrageous wrongdoings.
On 28 January 2001, based on Anna Lizas sworn
statement, the barangay officials, together with
the police, arrested accused-appellant."2
After the prosecution had rested its case with the
testimony of its lone witness (the private
complainant), Atty. Harley Padolina (PAO)
manifested that the defense would not present
any evidence.

Issue: W/N the accused plea has been
improvidently made? YES

Held: In the review of his various cases by this
Court, appellant asserts that his plea of guilty has
been improvidently made on the mistaken belief
that he would be given a lighter penalty with his
plea of guilt.4 On this particular score, the
Solicitor General agrees.
THERE IS MERIT IN THE OBSERVATION.
Section 3, Rule 116, of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure is explicit on the procedure to be taken
when an accused pleads guilty to a capital
offense, viz:
"SEC. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception
of evidence. - When the accused pleads guilty to a
capital offense, the court shall conduct a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of his plea
and shall require the prosecution to prove his
guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The
accused may present evidence in his behalf."
The trial court is mandated (1) to conduct a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full
comprehension of the consequences of the plea
of guilt, (2) to require the prosecution to still
prove the guilt of the accused and the precise
degree of his culpability, and (3) to inquire
whether or not the accused wishes to present
evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if
he desires. The records must show the events
that have actually taken place during the inquiry,
the words spoken and the warnings given, with
special attention to the age of the accused, his
educational attainment and socio-economic
status, the manner of his arrest and detention,
the attendance of counsel in his behalf during the
custodial and preliminary investigations, and the
opportunity of his defense counsel to confer with
him. All these matters should be able to provide
trustworthy indices of his competence to give a
free and informed plea of guilt. The trial court
must describe the essential elements of the
crimes the accused is charged with and their
respective penalties and civil liabilities. It should
also direct a series of questions to defense
counsel to determine whether or not he has
conferred with the accused and has completely
explained to him the legal implications of a plea
of guilt.5
The process is mandatory and absent any
showing that it has been duly observed, a
searching inquiry cannot be said to have been
aptly undertaken.6 The trial court must be extra
solicitous to see to it that the accused fully
understands the meaning and importance of his
plea. In capital offenses7 particularly, life being at
stake, one cannot just lean on the presumption
that the accused has understood his plea.8
While the records of the case are indeed bereft of
any indication that the rule has sufficiently been
complied with, the evidence for the prosecution
outside of the plea of guilt, nevertheless, would
adequately establish the guilt of appellant beyond
reasonable doubt.9 THE MANNER BY WHICH THE
PLEA OF GUILT IS MADE, WHETHER
IMPROVIDENTLY OR NOT, LOSES MUCH OF GREAT
SIGNIFICANCE WHERE THE CONVICTION CAN BE
BASED ON INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE PROVING
THE COMMISSION BY THE PERSON ACCUSED OF
THE OFFENSE CHARGED.10
THE PROSECUTION PRESENTED AT THE WITNESS
STAND ANNA LIZA. SHE RECOUNTED
STRAIGHTFORWARDLY AND IN SUFFICIENT
DETAIL THE TWELVE HARROWING AND
HUMILIATING INCIDENTS OF RAPE SHE HAD
SUFFERED IN THE HANDS OF HER OWN FATHER.

Soriano vs. People, BSP and PDIC

Facts: A bank officer violates the DOSRI 2 law
when he acquires bank funds for his personal
benefit, even if such acquisition was facilitated by
a fraudulent loan application. Directors, officers,
stockholders, and their related interests cannot
be allowed to interpose the fraudulent nature of
the loan as a defense to escape culpability for
their circumvention of Section 83 of Republic Act
(RA) No. 337. HILARIO P. SORIANO and
ROSALINDA ILAGAN, as principals by direct
participation, with unfaithfulness or abuse of
confidence and taking advantage of their position
as President of the Rural Bank of San Miguel
(Bulacan), Inc. and Branch Manager of the Rural
Bank of San Miguel-San Miguel Branch [sic], a
duly organized banking institution under
Philippine Laws, conspiring confederating and
mutually helping one another, did then and there,
willfully and feloniously by making it appear that
one Enrico Carlos filled up the
application/information sheet and filed the
aforementioned loan documents when in truth
and in fact Enrico Carlos did not participate in the
execution of said loan documents and that by
virtue of said falsification and with deceit and
intent to cause damage, the accused succeeded in
securing a loan in the amount of eight million
pesos (PhP8,000,000.00) from the Rural Bank of
San Miguel-San Ildefonso branch in the name of
Enrico Carlos which amount of PhP8 million
representing the loan proceeds the accused
thereafter converted the same amount to their
own personal gain and benefit, to the damage
and prejudice of the Rural Bank of San Miguel-San
Ildefonso branch, its creditors, the Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas, and the Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation.
The other Information 17 dated November 10,
2000 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 238-M-
2001, was for violation of Section 83 of RA 337, as
amended by PD 1795. The said provision refers to
the prohibition against the so-called DOSRI loans.
NOTE: 2 INFORMATION WAS FILED ESTAFA and
VIOLATION OF DOSRI LAWS
RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The CA denied the petition on both issues
presented by petitioner. On the first issue, the CA
determined that the BSP letter, which petitioner
characterized to be a fatally infirm complaint, was
not actually a complaint, but a transmittal or
cover letter only. This transmittal letter merely
contained a summary of the affidavits which were
attached to it. It did not contain any averment of
personal knowledge of the events and
transactions that constitute the elements of the
offenses charged. Being a mere transmittal letter,
it need not comply with the requirements of
Section 3 (a) of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. 30
The CA further determined that the five affidavits
attached to the transmittal letter should be
considered as the complaint-affidavits that
charged petitioner with violation of Section 83 of
RA 337 and for Estafa thru Falsification of
Commercial Documents. These complaint-
affidavits complied with the mandatory
requirements set out in the Rules of Court they
were subscribed and sworn to before a notary
public and subsequently certified by State
Prosecutor Fonacier, who personally examined
the affiants and was convinced that the affiants
fully understood their sworn statements. 31
AEScHa

ANENT THE SECOND GROUND, THE CA FOUND
NO MERIT IN PETITIONER'S ARGUMENT THAT THE
VIOLATION OF THE DOSRI LAW AND THE
COMMISSION OF ESTAFA THRU FALSIFICATION OF
COMMERCIAL DOCUMENTS ARE INHERENTLY
INCONSISTENT WITH EACH OTHER. It explained
that the test in considering a motion to quash on
the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense, is whether the facts
alleged, when hypothetically admitted, constitute
the elements of the offense charged. The
appellate court held that this test was sufficiently
met because the allegations in the assailed
informations, when hypothetically admitted,
clearly constitute the elements of Estafa thru
Falsification of Commercial Documents and
Violation of DOSRI law. 32
On June 8, 2001, petitioner moved to quash 21
these informations on two grounds: that the
court had no jurisdiction over the offense
charged, and that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense.

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was
denied for lack of merit.

Issues:
1. Is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
the proper remedy against an Order
denying a Motion to Quash?
2. Is a Rule 65 petition for certiorari the
proper remedy against an Order denying
a Motion to Quash?

1
st
Issued Held:
The second issue was raised by petitioner in the
context of his Motion to Quash Information on
the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense. 43 It is settled that in
considering a motion to quash on such ground,
the test is "whether the facts alleged, if
hypothetically admitted, would establish the
essential elements of the offense charged as
defined by law. The trial court may not consider a
situation contrary to that set forth in the criminal
complaint or information. Facts that constitute
the defense of the petitioner[s] against the
charge under the information must be proved by
[him] during trial. Such facts or circumstances do
not constitute proper grounds for a motion to
quash the information on the ground that the
material averments do not constitute the
offense". 44 SaITHC
We have examined the two informations against
petitioner and we find that they contain
allegations which, if hypothetically admitted,
would establish the essential elements of the
crime of DOSRI violation and estafa thru
falsification of commercial documents.
In Criminal Case No. 238-M-2001 for violation of
DOSRI rules, the information alleged that
petitioner Soriano was the president of RBSM;
that he was able to indirectly obtain a loan from
RBSM by putting the loan in the name of
depositor Enrico Carlos; and that he did this
without complying with the requisite board
approval, reportorial, and ceiling requirements.
In Criminal Case No. 237-M-2001 for estafa thru
falsification of commercial documents, the
information alleged that petitioner, by taking
advantage of his position as president of RBSM,
falsified various loan documents to make it
appear that an Enrico Carlos secured a loan of P8
million from RBSM; that petitioner succeeded in
obtaining the loan proceeds; that he later
converted the loan proceeds to his own personal
gain and benefit; and that his action caused
damage and prejudice to RBSM, its creditors, the
BSP, and the PDIC. TEHIaD
Significantly, this is not the first occasion that we
adjudge the sufficiency of similarly worded
informations. In Soriano v. People, 45 involving
the same petitioner in this case (but different
transactions), we also reviewed the sufficiency of
informations for DOSRI violation and estafa thru
falsification of commercial documents, which
were almost identical, mutatis mutandis, with the
subject informations herein. We held in Soriano v.
People
that there is no basis for the quashal of the
informations as "they contain material allegations
charging Soriano with violation of DOSRI rules and
estafa thru falsification of commercial
documents".
Petitioner raises the theory that he could not
possibly be held liable for estafa in concurrence
with the charge for DOSRI violation. According to
him, the DOSRI charge presupposes that he
acquired a loan, which would make the loan
proceeds his own money and which he could
neither possibly misappropriate nor convert to
the prejudice of another, as required by the
statutory definition of estafa. 46 On the other
hand, if petitioner did not acquire any loan, there
can be no DOSRI violation to speak of. Thus,
petitioner posits that the two offenses cannot co-
exist. This theory does not persuade us.
Petitioner's theory is based on the false premises
that the loan was extended to him by the bank in
his own name, and that he became the owner of
the loan proceeds. Both premises are wrong.
ACTISE
The bank money (amounting to P8 million) which
came to the possession of petitioner was money
held in trust or administration by him for the
bank, in his fiduciary capacity as the President of
said bank. 47 It is not accurate to say that
petitioner became the owner of the P8 million
because it was the proceeds of a loan. That would
have been correct if the bank knowingly extended
the loan to petitioner himself. But that is not the
case here. According to the information for
estafa, the loan was supposed to be for another
person, a certain "Enrico Carlos"; petitioner,
through falsification, made it appear that said
"Enrico Carlos" applied for the loan when in fact
he ("Enrico Carlos") did not. Through such
fraudulent device, petitioner obtained the loan
proceeds and converted the same. Under these
circumstances, it cannot be said that petitioner
became the legal owner of the P8 million. Thus,
petitioner remained the bank's fiduciary with
respect to that money, which makes it capable of
misappropriation or conversion in his hands.
The next question is whether there can also be, at
the same time, a charge for DOSRI violation in
such a situation wherein the accused bank officer
did not secure a loan in his own name, but was
alleged to have used the name of another person
in order to indirectly secure a loan from the bank.
We answer this in the affirmative. In sum, the
informations filed against petitioner do not
negate each other.

2
nd
Issue Held:
In fine, the Court has consistently held that a
special civil action for certiorari is not the proper
remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash
an information. The proper procedure in such a
case is for the accused to enter a plea, go to trial
without prejudice on his part to present the
special defenses he had invoked in his motion to
quash and if after trial on the merits, an adverse
decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the
manner authorized by law. Thus, petitioners
should not have forthwith filed a special civil
action for certiorari with the CA and instead, they
should have gone to trial and reiterated the
special defenses contained in their motion to
quash. There are no special or exceptional
circumstances in the present case that would
justify immediate resort to a filing of a petition for
certiorari. Clearly, the CA did not commit any
reversible error, much less, grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the petition.
People vs. Elarcosa and Orias
Facts: Jorge, Segundina, Jose and Rosemarie, all
surnamed dela Cruz, heard some persons calling
out to them from outside their house, which is
located Negros Occidental. Since the voices of
these persons were not familiar to them, they did
not open their door immediately, and instead,
they waited for a few minutes in order to observe
and recognize these persons first. It was only
when one of them identified himself as Mitsuel L.
Elarcosa (Elarcosa), an acquaintance of the family,
that Segundina lighted the lamps, while Jose
opened the door. 1 Elarcosa and his companion,
accused-appellant Orias, then entered the house
and requested that supper be prepared for them
as they were roving. Both Elarcosa and accused-
appellant Orias were Citizen Armed Forces
Geographical Unit (CAFGU) members. 2
Segundina and Rosemarie immediately went to
the kitchen to prepare food, while Jose and Jorge
stayed in the living room with Elarcosa and
accused-appellant Orias. 3
Since the rice was not cooked yet, Rosemarie first
served a plate of suman to Elarcosa and accused-
appellant Orias, who were then engaged in a
conversation with her father, Jorge, and her
brother, Jose. She heard accused-appellant Orias
asked her brother why the latter did not attend
the dance at Sitio Nalibog. Her brother replied
that he was tired. Suddenly thereafter, Elarcosa
and accused-appellant Orias stood up and fired
their guns at Jose and Jorge.
Segundina, who was busy preparing supper in the
kitchen, ran towards the living room and
embraced her son, Jose, who was already lying on
the floor. Elarcosa and accused-appellant Orias
then immediately searched the wooden chest
containing clothes, money in the amount of forty
thousand pesos (PhP40,000) intended for the
forthcoming wedding of Jose in October, and a
registration certificate of large cattle. During this
time, Rosemarie escaped through the kitchen and
hid in the shrubs, which was about six (6)
extended arms length from their house. She
heard her mother crying loudly, and after a series
of gunshots, silence ensued. 5
Shortly thereafter, Rosemarie proceeded to the
house of her cousin, Gualberto Mechabe, who
advised her to stay in the house until the morning
since it was already dark and he had no other
companion who could help them. The following
morning, Rosemarie returned to their house
where she found the dead bodies of her parents
and her brother. 6 The money in the amount of
PhP40,000, as well as the certificate of
registration of large cattle, were also gone. 7
Eventually, Elarcosa and accused-appellant Orias,
as well as a certain Antonio David, Jr., were
charged with robbery with multiple homicide.
Issues:
1. W/N alibi of accused-appellant Orias
should be given wheight. NO
2. W/N there is duplicity of offense?
(ground for a MTQ) YES
Held:
1
st
Issue:
Although the alibi of accused-appellant Orias
appears to have been corroborated by a CAFGU
member by the name of Robert Arellano and by a
vendor present during the dance, said defense is
unworthy of belief not only because of its
inherent weakness and the fact that accused-
appellant Orias was positively identified by
Rosemarie, but also because it has been held that
alibi becomes more unworthy of merit where it is
established mainly by the accused himself, his
relatives, friends, and comrades-in-arms, 37 and
not by credible persons.
2
nd
Issue:
In the instant case, conspiracy is manifested by
the fact that the acts of accused-appellant Orias
and Elarcosa were coordinated. They were
synchronized in their approach to shoot Jose and
Jorge, and they were motivated by a single
criminal impulse, that is, to kill the victims. Verily,
conspiracy is implied when the accused persons
had a common purpose and were united in its
execution. Spontaneous agreement or active
cooperation by all perpetrators at the moment of
the commission of the crime is sufficient to create
joint criminal responsibility. 49
ACCUSED-APPELLANT ORIAS SHOULD BE
CONVICTED OF THREE (3) COUNTS OF MURDER
AND NOT OF THE COMPLEX CRIME OF MURDER
We, however, disagree with the findings of the CA
that accused-appellant Orias committed the
complex crime of multiple murder. Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code, which defines the
concept of complex crime, states:
ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. When a
single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies or when an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other, the penalty for
the most serious crime shall be imposed, the
same to be applied in its maximum period. (As
amended by Act No. 4000.)
In a complex crime, although two or more crimes
are actually committed, they constitute only one
crime in the eyes of the law, as well as in the
conscience of the offender. Hence, there is only
one penalty imposed for the commission of a
complex crime. Complex crime has two (2) kinds.
The first is known as compound crime, or when a
single act constitutes two or more grave or less
grave felonies. The second is known as complex
crime proper, or when an offense is a necessary
means for committing the other.
CONSIDERING OUR HOLDING ABOVE, WE RULE
THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT ORIAS IS GUILTY, NOT
OF A COMPLEX CRIME OF MULTIPLE MURDER,
BUT OF THREE (3) COUNTS OF MURDER FOR THE
DEATH OF THE THREE (3) VICTIMS.

Since there was only one information filed
against accused-appellant Orias and Elarcosa,
the Court observes that there is duplicity of the
offenses charged in the said information. This is
a ground for a motion to quash as three (3)
separate acts of murder were charged in the
information. Nonetheless, the failure of accused-
appellant Orias to interpose an objection on this
ground constitutes waiver. 55

Albert vs. Sandiganbayan and People
Facts: That in (sic) or about May 1990 and
sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City
of Davao, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, accused RAMON A.
ALBERT, a public officer, being then THE
PRESIDENT OF THE NATIONAL HOME MORTGAGE
AND FINANCE CORPORATION (NHMFC),
occupying the said position with a salary grade
above 27, while in the performance of his official
function, committing the offense in relation to his
office, taking advantage of his official position,
conspiring and confederating with accused FAVIO
D. SAYSON, then the Project Director of CODE
Foundation Inc. and accused ARTURO S.
ASUMBRADO, then the President of the Buhangin
Residents and Employees Association for
Development, Inc., acting with evident bad faith
and manifest partiality and or gross neglect of
duty, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally cause undue injury to the government
and public interest, enter and make it appear in
Tax Declarations that two parcels of real
property particularly described in the Certificate
of Titles are residential lands which Tax
Declarations accused submitted to the NHMFC
when in truth and in fact, as accused well knew,
the two pieces of real property covered by
Certificate of Titles are agricultural land, and by
reason of accused's misrepresentation, the
NHMFC released the amount of P4,535,400.00
which is higher than the loanable amount the
land could command being agricultural, thus
causing undue injury to the government. On 18
December 2000, pending the resolution of the
Motion to Dismiss, petitioner filed a Motion to
Lift Hold Departure Order and to be Allowed to
Travel. The prosecution did not object to the
latter motion on the condition that petitioner
would be "provisionally" arraigned. 6 On 12
March 2001, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to
Amend Motion to Lift Hold Departure Order and
to be Allowed to Travel. The following day, or on
13 March 2001, the Sandiganbayan arraigned
petitioner who entered a plea of "not guilty". In
the Resolution dated 16 April 2001, the
Sandiganbayan granted petitioner's Urgent
Motion to Amend Motion to Lift Hold Departure
Order and to be Allowed to Travel. On 26
November 2001, the Sandiganbayan denied
petitioner's Motion to Dismiss and ordered the
prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation of the
case with respect to petitioner. In a
Memorandum dated 6 January 2003, the SPO
who conducted the reinvestigation recommended
to the Ombudsman that the indictment against
petitioner be reversed for lack of probable cause.
However, the Ombudsman, in an Order dated 10
March 2003, disapproved the Memorandum and
directed the Office of the Special Prosecutor to
proceed with the prosecution of the criminal
case. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order of the
Ombudsman.
In a Resolution promulgated on 16 May 2003, the
Sandiganbayan scheduled the arraignment of
petitioner on 24 July 2003. However, in view of
the pending motion for reconsideration of the
order of the Ombudsman, the arraignment was
reset to 2 October 2003. HAICTD
In a Manifestation dated 24 September 2003, the
SPO informed the Sandiganbayan of the
Ombudsman's denial of petitioner's motion for
reconsideration. On even date, the prosecution
filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended
Information. During the 2 October 2003 hearing,
this ex-parte motion was withdrawn by the
prosecution with the intention of filing a Motion
for Leave to Admit Amended Information. The
scheduled arraignment of petitioner was reset to
1 December 2003. 7
On 7 October 2003, the prosecution filed a
Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Information.

THE RULING OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN
In its Resolution of 10 February 2004, 9 the
Sandiganbayan granted the prosecution's Motion
to Admit Amended Information. At the outset,
the Sandiganbayan explained that "gross neglect
of duty" which falls under Section 3 (f) of RA 3019
is different from "gross inexcusable negligence"
under Section 3 (e), and held thus:
In an information alleging gross neglect of duty, it
is not a requirement that such neglect or refusal
causes undue injury compared to an information
alleging gross inexcusable negligence where
undue effect constitutes substantial amendment
considering that the possible defense of the
accused may divert from the one originally
intended. ATDHSC
It may be considered however, that there are
three modes by which the offense for Violation of
Section 3(e) may be committed in any of the
following:
1. Through evident bad faith;
2. Through manifest partiality;
3. Through gross inexcusable negligence.
Proof of the existence of any of these modes in
connection with the prohibited acts under said
section of the law should suffice to warrant
conviction. 10
However, the Sandiganbayan also held that even
granting that the amendment of the information
be formal or substantial, the prosecution could
still effect the same in the event that the accused
had not yet undergone a permanent arraignment.
And since the arraignment of petitioner on 13
March 2001 was merely "provisional", then the
prosecution may still amend the information
either in form or in substance.

Issues:

1. WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN ADMITTING THE
AMENDED INFORMATION.

2. WHETHER THE SANDIGANBAYAN
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN FURTHER PROCEEDING
WITH THE CASE DESPITE THE VIOLATION
OF THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO A
SPEEDY TRIAL.
Held:
1
st
ISSUE: The original information filed against
petitioner alleged that he acted with "evident bad
faith and manifest partiality and or (sic) gross
neglect of duty". The amended information, on
the other hand, alleges that petitioner acted with
"evident bad faith and manifest partiality and/or
gross inexcusable negligence". Simply, the
amendment seeks to replace "gross neglect of
duty" with "gross inexcusable negligence". Given
that these two phrases fall under different
paragraphs of RA 3019 specifically, "gross
neglect of duty" is under Section 3 (f) while "gross
inexcusable negligence" is under Section 3 (e) of
the statute the question remains whether or
not the amendment is substantial and prejudicial
to the rights of petitioner. The test as to when the
rights of an accused are prejudiced by the
amendment of a complaint or information is
when a defense under the complaint or
information, as it originally stood, would no
longer be available after the amendment is made,
and when any evidence the accused might have,
would be inapplicable to the complaint or
information as amended. 26 On the other hand,
an amendment which merely states with
additional precision something which is already
contained in the original information and which,
therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction
for the crime charged is an amendment to form
that can be made at anytime. 27 In this case, the
amendment entails the deletion of the phrase
"gross neglect of duty" from the Information.
ALTHOUGH THIS MAY BE CONSIDERED A
SUBSTANTIAL AMENDMENT, THE SAME IS
ALLOWABLE EVEN AFTER ARRAIGNMENT AND
PLEA BEING BENEFICIAL TO THE ACCUSED. 28 As
a replacement, "gross inexcusable negligence"
would be included in the Information as a
modality in the commission of the offense. This
Court believes that the same constitutes an
amendment only in form. The Court held that a
conviction for a criminal negligent act can be had
under an information exclusively charging the
commission of a willful offense upon the theory
that the greater includes the lesser offense.

2
nd
Issue: Petitioner's contentions are futile. This
right, however, is deemed violated only when the
proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious,
and oppressive delays; or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and
secured; or when without cause or justifiable
motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse
without the party having his case tried. 32 A
simple mathematical computation of the period
involved is not sufficient. We concede that
judicial proceedings do not exist in a vacuum and
must contend with the realities of everyday life.
After reviewing the records of the case, we
believe that the right of petitioner to a speedy
trial was not infringed upon. The issue on the
inordinate delay in the resolution of the
complaint-affidavit filed against petitioner and his
co-accused and the filing of the original
Information against petitioner was raised in
petitioner's Motion to Dismiss, and was duly
addressed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution
denying the said motion. It appears that the said
delays were caused by the numerous motions for
extension of time to file various pleadings and to
reproduce documents filed by petitioner's co-
accused, and that no actual preliminary
investigation was conducted on petitioner.

Dino vs. OIlivarez
Petitioners instituted a complaint for vote buying
against respondent Pablo Olivarez. Based on the
finding of probable cause in the Joint Resolution
issued by Assistant City Prosecutor Antonietta
Pablo-Medina, with the approval of the city
prosecutor of Paraaque, two Informations were
filed before the RTC on 29 September 2004
charging respondent Pablo Olivarez with Violation
of Section 261, paragraphs a, b and k of Article
XXII of the Omnibus Election Code .
On 11 October 2004, respondent filed a Motion
to Quash the two criminal informations on the
ground that more than one offense was charged
therein, in violation of Section 3(f), Rule 117 of
the Rules of Court, in relation to Section 13, Rule
110 of the Rules of Court. This caused the
resetting of the scheduled arraignment on 18
October 2004 to 13 December 2004.
Before Judge Madrona could act on the motion to
quash, Assistant Prosecutor Pablo-Medina, with
the approval of the city prosecutor, filed on 28
October 2004 its "Opposition to the Motion to
Quash and Motion to Admit Amended
Informations." The Amended Informations sought
to be admitted charged respondent with violation
of only paragraph a, in relation to paragraph b, of
Section 261, Article XXII of the Omnibus Election
Code. CEaDAc
On 1 December 2004, Judge Madrona issued an
Order resetting the hearing scheduled on 13
December 2004 to 1 February 2005 on account of
the pending Motion to Quash of the respondent
and the Amended Informations of the public
prosecutor.
On 14 December 2004, respondent filed an
"Opposition to the Admission of the Amended
Informations," arguing that no resolution was
issued to explain the changes therein, particularly
the deletion of paragraph k, Section 261, Article
XXII of the Omnibus Election Code. Moreover, he
averred that the city prosecutor was no longer
empowered to amend the informations, since the
COMELEC had already directed it to transmit the
entire records of the case and suspend the
hearing of the cases before the RTC until the
resolution of the appeal before the COMELEC en
banc.
On 12 January 2005, Judge Madrona issued an
order denying respondent's Motion to Quash
dated 11 October 2004, and admitted the
Amended Informations dated 25 October 2004.
Respondent filed an Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration dated 20 January 2005 thereon.
On 1 February 2005, Judge Madrona reset the
arraignment to 9 March 2005, with a warning that
the arraignment would proceed without any
more delay, unless the Supreme Court would
issue an injunctive writ. aCIHAD
On 9 March 2005, respondent failed to appear
before the RTC. Thereupon, Judge Madrona, in
open court, denied the Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order denying the Motion
to Quash and admitting the Amended
Informations, and ordered the arrest of
respondent and the confiscation of the cash
bond.
On 11 March 2005, respondent filed an "Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Lift the
Order of Arrest of Accused Dr. Pablo Olivarez,"
which was denied in an Order dated 31 March
2005. The Order directed that a bench warrant be
issued for the arrest of respondent to ensure his
presence at his arraignment.
On 5 April 2005, the Law Department of the
COMELEC filed before the RTC a Manifestation
and Motion wherein it alleged that pursuant to
the COMELEC's powers to investigate and
prosecute election offense cases, it had the
power to revoke the delegation of its authority to
the city prosecutor.
Issue:
1. W/N court erred in ruling the admission
of the two amended informations and in
dismissing his motion to quash. (YES the
court erred)
2. W/N the city prosecutor defied the order
or directive of the COMELEC when it filed
the amended informations. (YES CP
acted in excess of his authority)

1. Held:
As it stands, since there are no amended
informations to speak of, the trial court has no
basis for denying respondent's motion to quash.
Consequently, there can be no arraignment on
the amended informations. In view of this, there
can be no basis for ordering the arrest of
respondent and the confiscation of his cash bond.
For having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, the trial court's orders dated 12
January 2005 denying the Motion to Quash and
admitting the amended information; 9 March
2005 denying the Motion for Reconsideration of
the Order denying the Motion to Quash,
admitting the amended informations, and
ordering the arrest of the respondent and the
confiscation of his cash bond; and 31 March 2005
denying respondent's Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration and/or to lift the Order of Arrest
are declared void and of no effect. Motion for
Reconsideration is Granted/
2. Held:
It cannot also be disputed that the COMELEC Law
Department has the authority to direct, nay,
order the public prosecutor to suspend further
implementation of the questioned resolution
until final resolution of said appeal, for it is
speaking on behalf of the COMELEC. The
COMELEC Law Department, without any doubt, is
authorized to do this as shown by the pleadings it
has filed before the trial court. If the COMELEC
Law Department is not authorized to issue any
directive/order or to file the pleadings on behalf
of the COMELEC, the COMELEC En Banc itself
would have said so. This, the COMELEC En Banc
did not do.
The records are likewise bereft of any evidence
showing that the City Prosecutor of Paraaque
doubted such authority. It knew that the
COMELEC Law Department could make such an
order, but the public prosecutor opted to
disregard the same and still filed the Amended
Informations contrary to the order to hold the
proceedings in abeyance until a final resolution of
said appeal was made by the COMELEC En Banc.
Lazarte vs. Sandiganbayan
Facts:

In June 1990, the National Housing Authority
(NHA) awarded the original contract for the
infrastructure works on the Pahanocoy Sites and
Services Project, Phase 1 in Bacolod City to A.C.
Cruz Construction. The project, with a contract
cost of P7,666,507.55, was funded by the World
Bank under the Project Loan Agreement forged
on 10 June 1983 between the Philippine
Government and the IBRD-World Bank.

A.C. Cruz Construction commenced the
infrastructure works on 1 August 1990. 5 In April
1991, the complainant Candido M. Fajutag, Jr.
(Fajutag, Jr.) was designated Project Engineer of
the project.

A Variation/Extra Work Order No. 1 was approved
for the excavation of unsuitable materials and
road filling works. As a consequence, Arceo Cruz
of A.C. Cruz Construction submitted the fourth
billing and Report of Physical Accomplishments
on 6 May 1991. Fajutag, Jr., however, discovered
certain deficiencies. As a result, he issued Work
Instruction No. 1 requiring some supporting
documents, such as: (1) copy of approved
concrete pouring; (2) survey results of original
ground and finished leaks; (3) volume calculation
of earth fill actually rendered on site; (4) test
results as to the quality of materials and
compaction; and (5) copy of work instructions
attesting to the demolished concrete structures.

The contractor failed to comply with the work
instruction. Upon Fajutag, Jr.'s further
verification, it was established that there was no
actual excavation and road filling works
undertaken by A.C. Cruz Construction.

On 2 October 2006, petitioner filed a motion to
quash the Information raising the following
grounds: (1) the facts charged in the information
do not constitute an offense; (2) the information
does not conform substantially to the prescribed
form; (3) the constitutional rights of the accused
to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusations against them have been violated by
the inadequacy of the information; and (4) the
prosecution failed to determine the individual
participation of all the accused in the information
in disobedience with the Resolution dated 27
March 2005. 18
On 2 March 2007, the Sandiganbayan issued the
first assailed resolution denying petitioner's
motion to quash. We quote the said resolution in
part:
Among the accused-movants, the public officer
whose participation in the alleged offense is
specifically mentioned in the May 30, 2006
Memorandum is accused Felicisimo Lazarte, Jr.,
the Chairman of the Inventory and Acceptance
Committee (IAC), which undertook the inventory
and final quantification of the accomplishment of
A.C. Cruz Construction. The allegations of Lazarte
that the IAC, due to certain constraints, allegedly
had to rely on the reports of the field engineers
and/or the Project Office as to which materials
were actually installed; and that he supposedly
affixed his signature to the IAC Physical Inventory
Report and Memoranda dated August 12, 1991
despite his not being able to attend the actual
inspection because he allegedly saw that all the
members of the Committee had already signed
are matters of defense which he can address in
the course of the trial. Hence, the quashal of the
information with respect to accused Lazarte is
denied for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court
hereby resolves as follows:
(1) Accused Robert Balao, Josephine Angsico and
Virgilio Dacalos' Motion to Admit Motion to
Quash dated October 4, 2006 is GRANTED; the
Motion to Quash dated October 4, 2006 attached
thereto, is GRANTED. Accordingly, the case is
hereby DISMISSED insofar as the said accused-
movants are concerned.
(2) The Motion to Quash dated October 2, 2006
of accused Engr. Felicisimo F. Lazarte, Jr. is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit. Let the arraignment of
the accused proceed as scheduled on March 13,
2007.
Issues:
1. W/N the Information filed before the
Sandiganbayan insufficiently averred the
essential elements of the crime charged
as it failed to specify the individual
participation of all the accused. NO
2. W/N the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction
over the case. YES

Held: The Court is not persuaded. The Court
affirms the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan.
At the outset, it should be stressed that the denial
of a motion to quash is not correctible by
certiorari. Well-established is the rule that when a
motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the
remedy is not a petition for certiorari but for
petitioners to go to trial without prejudice to
reiterating the special defenses invoked in their
motion to quash. Remedial measures as regards
interlocutory orders, such as a motion to quash,
are frowned upon and often dismissed. The
evident reason for this rule is to avoid multiplicity
of appeals in a single court. 31
This general rule, however, is subject to certain
exceptions. If the court, in denying the motion to
dismiss or motion to quash acts without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies. 32
And in the case at bar, the Court does not find the
Sandiganbayan to have committed grave abuse of
discretion.
The fundamental test in reflecting on the viability
of a motion to quash on the ground that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense is whether
or not the facts asseverated, if hypothetically
admitted, would establish the essential elements
of the crime defined in law. 33 Matters aliunde
will not be considered.
Finally, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan's
jurisdiction to hear the case. As correctly pointed
out by the Sandiganbayan, it is of no moment that
petitioner does not occupy a position with Salary
Grade 27 as he was a department manager of the
NHA, a government-owned or controlled
corporation, at the time of the commission of the
offense, which position falls within the ambit of
its jurisdiction.
The instant petition is DISMISSED. The
Resolutions dated 2 March 2007 and 18 October
2007 of the First Division of the Sandiganbayan
are AFFIRMED.
ALAWIYA y ABDUL vs. CA
Facts: On 18 September 2001, petitioners
executed sworn statements4 before the General
Assignment Section of the Western Police District
in United Nations Avenue, Manila, charging
accused P/C Insp. Michael Angelo Bernardo
Martin, P/Insp. Allanjing Estrada Medina, PO3
Arnold Ramos Asis, PO2 Pedro Santos Gutierrez,
PO2 Ignacio De Paz and PO2 Antonio Sebastian
Berida, Jr., who were all policemen assigned at
that time at the Northern Police District, with
kidnapping for ransom. The sworn-statements of
petitioners commonly alleged that at about 10:00
in the morning of 11 September 2001, while
petitioners were cruising on board a vehicle along
United Nations Avenue, a blue Toyota Sedan
bumped their vehicle from behind; that when
they went out of their vehicle to assess the
damage, several armed men alighted from the
Toyota Sedan, poked guns at, blindfolded, and
forced them to ride in the Toyota Sedan; that
they were brought to an office where
P10,000,000 and two vehicles were demanded
from them in exchange for their freedom; that,
after haggling, the amount was reduced to
P700,000 plus the two vehicles; that the money
and vehicles were delivered in the late evening of
11 September 2001; that they were released in
the early morning of 12 September 2001 in
Quiapo after they handed the Deed of Sale and
registration papers of the two vehicles.
On 24 January 2002, State Prosecutor Velasco
filed with the RTC of Manila an Information for
Kidnapping for Ransom against the accused with
no bail recommended.
On 28 January 2002, the trial court, upon motion
by the prosecution, issued a Hold Departure
Order against the accused.9 On even date, the
trial court issued a Warrant of Arrest against all
the accused.10

Meanwhile, on 8 February 2002, the accused filed
a petition for review of the Resolution of State
Prosecutor Velasco with the Office of the
Secretary of Justice.

On 18 February 2002, the accused moved for the
quashal of the Information on the ground that
"the officer who filed the Information has no
authority do so."11
Issue: Whether the accused policemen can seek
any relief (via a motion to quash the information)
from the trial court when they had not been
arrested yet.
Held: NO. At any rate, the accuseds motion to
quash, on the ground of lack of authority of the
filing officer, would have never prospered
because as discussed earlier, the Ombudsmans
power to investigate offenses involving public
officers or employees is not exclusive but is
concurrent with other similarly authorized
agencies of the government.
When the accused had not been arrested yet
People v. Mapalao,27 as correctly argued by the
OSG, does not squarely apply to the present
case. In that case, one of the accused, Rex
Magumnang, after arraignment and during the
trial, escaped from detention and had not been
apprehended since then. Accordingly, as to him
the trial in absentia proceeded and thereafter the
judgment of conviction was promulgated. The
Court held that since the accused remained at
large, he should not be afforded the right to
appeal from the judgment of conviction unless he
voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the court
or is otherwise arrested. While at large, the
accused cannot seek relief from the court as he is
deemed to have waived the same and he has no
standing in court.28 In Mapalao, the accused
escaped while the trial of the case was on-going,
whereas here, the accused have not been served
the warrant of arrest and have not been
arraigned. Therefore, Mapalao is definitely not on
all fours with the present case.lavvphil.net
Furthermore, there is nothing in the Rules
governing a motion to quash29 which requires
that the accused should be under the custody of
the law prior to the filing of a motion to quash on
the ground that the officer filing the information
had no authority to do so. Custody of the law is
not required for the adjudication of reliefs other
than an application for bail.30 However, while the
accused are not yet under the custody of the law,
any question on the jurisdiction over the person
of the accused is deemed waived by the accused
when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative
relief, except in cases when the accused invokes
the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning
such jurisdiction over his person.
There is no clear showing that the present case
falls under any of the recognized exceptions.
Moreover, as stated earlier, once the information
is filed with the trial court, any disposition of the
information rests on the sound discretion of the
court. The trial court is mandated to
independently evaluate or assess the existence of
probable cause and it may either agree or
disagree with the recommendation of the
Secretary of Justice. The trial court is not bound
to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of
Justice.34 Reliance alone on the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice amounts to an abdication of
the trial courts duty and jurisdiction to determine
the existence of probable cause.35
Considering that the Information has already
been filed with the trial court, then the trial court,
upon filing of the appropriate motion by the
prosecutor, should be given the opportunity to
perform its duty of evaluating, independently of
the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice
recommending the withdrawal of the Information
against the accused, the merits of the case and
assess whether probable cause exists to hold the
accused for trial for kidnapping for ransom.36
WHEREFORE, we REMAND this case to the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Manila, to
independently evaluate or assess the merits of
the case to determine whether probable cause
exists to hold the accused for trial.
Los Banos vs. Pedro
The petition seeks to revive the case against
respondent Joel R. Pedro (Pedro) for election gun
ban violation after the CA declared the case
permanently dismissed pursuant to Section 8,
Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.
Pedro was charged in court for carrying a loaded
firearm without the required written
authorization from the Commission on Elections
(Comelec) a day before the May 14, 2001 national
and local elections.
The accusation was based on Batas Pambansa
Bilang 881 or the Omnibus Election Code (Code)
after the Marinduque Philippine National Police
(PNP) caught Pedro illegally carrying his firearm at
a checkpoint at Boac, Marinduque.
Pedro filed a Motion for Preliminary Investigation,
which the RTC granted. 7 The preliminary
investigation, however, did not materialize.
Instead, Pedro filed with the RTC a Motion to
Quash, arguing that the Information "contains
averments which, if true, would constitute a legal
excuse or justification 8 and/or that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense." 9 Pedro
attached to his motion a Comelec Certification
dated September 24, 2001 that he was
"exempted" from the gun ban. The provincial
prosecutor opposed the motion.
The RTC quashed the Information and ordered
the police and the prosecutors to return the
seized articles to Pedro. 10 IHCSET
The petitioner, private prosecutor Ariel Los Baos
(Los Baos), representing the checkpoint team,
moved to reopen the case, as Pedro's Comelec
Certification was a "falsification", and the
prosecution was "deprived of due process" when
the judge quashed the information without a
hearing. Attached to Los Baos' motion were two
Comelec certifications stating that: (1) Pedro was
not exempted from the firearm ban; and (2) the
signatures in the Comelec Certification of
September 24, 2001 were forged.
The RTC reopened the case for further
proceedings, as Pedro did not object to Los
Baos' motion. 11 Pedro moved for the
reconsideration of the RTC's order primarily
based on Section 8 of Rule 117, 12 arguing that
the dismissal had become permanent. He likewise
cited the public prosecutor's lack of express
approval of the motion to reopen the case.
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION
The CA initially denied Pedro's petition. For
accuracy, we quote the material portions of its
ruling: The petition lacks merit.

To summarize this ruling, the appellate court,
while initially saying that there was an error of
law but no grave abuse of discretion that would
call for the issuance of a writ, reversed itself on
motion for reconsideration; it then ruled that the
RTC committed grave abuse of discretion because
it failed to apply Section 8, Rule 17 and the time-
bar under this provision.

Issue: The issue is ultimately reduced to whether
Section 8, Rule 117 is applicable to the case, as
the CA found. If it applies, then the CA ruling
effectively lays the matter to rest. If it does not,
then the revised RTC decision reopening the case
should prevail.
Held: We find the petition meritorious and hold
that the case should be remanded to the trial
court for arraignment and trial.
In People v. Lacson, 21 we ruled that there are
sine qua non requirements in the application of
the time-bar rule stated in the second paragraph
of Section 8 of Rule 117. We also ruled that the
time-bar under the foregoing provision is a
special procedural limitation qualifying the right
of the State to prosecute, making the time-bar
an essence of the given right or as an inherent
part thereof, so that the lapse of the time-bar
operates to extinguish the right of the State to
prosecute the accused.
c. Their Comparison

An examination of the whole Rule tells us that a
dismissal based on a motion to quash and a
provisional dismissal are far different from one
another as concepts, in their features, and legal
consequences. While the provision on
provisional dismissal is found within Rule 117
(entitled Motion to Quash), it does not follow
that a motion to quash results in a provisional
dismissal to which Section 8, Rule 117 applies. A
first notable feature of Section 8, Rule 117 is that
it does not exactly state what a provisional
dismissal is. The modifier "provisional" directly
suggests that the dismissals which Section 8
essentially refers to are those that are temporary
in character (i.e., to dismissals that are without
prejudice to the re-filing of the case), and not the
dismissals that are permanent (i.e., those that bar
the re-filing of the case). Based on the law, rules,
and jurisprudence, permanent dismissals are
those barred by the principle of double jeopardy,
22 by the previous extinction of criminal liability,
23 by the rule on speedy trial, 24 and the
dismissals after plea without the express consent
of the accused. 25 Section 8, by its own terms,
cannot cover these dismissals because they are
not provisional. A second feature is that Section 8
does not state the grounds that lead to a
provisional dismissal. This is in marked contrast
with a motion to quash whose grounds are
specified under Section 3. The delimitation of the
grounds available in a motion to quash suggests
that a motion to quash is a class in itself, with
specific and closely-defined characteristics under
the Rules of Court. A necessary consequence is
that where the grounds cited are those listed
under Section 3, then the appropriate remedy is
to file a motion to quash, not any other remedy.
Conversely, where a ground does not appear
under Section 3, then a motion to quash is not a
proper remedy. A motion for provisional dismissal
may then apply if the conditions required by
Section 8 obtain. AHCcET
A third feature, closely related to the second,
focuses on the consequences of a meritorious
motion to quash. This feature also answers the
question of whether the quashal of an
information can be treated as a provisional
dismissal. Sections 4, 5, 6, and 7 of Rule 117
unmistakably provide for the consequences of a
meritorious motion to quash. Section 4 speaks of
an amendment of the complaint or information, if
the motion to quash relates to a defect curable by
amendment. Section 5 dwells on the effect of
sustaining the motion to quash the complaint
or information may be re-filed, except for the
instances mentioned under Section 6. The latter
section, on the other hand, specifies the limit of
the re-filing that Section 5 allows it cannot be
done where the dismissal is based on extinction
of criminal liability or double jeopardy. Section 7
defines double jeopardy and complements the
ground provided under Section 3 (i) and the
exception stated in Section 6.
The failure of the Rules to state under Section 6
that a Section 8 provisional dismissal is a bar to
further prosecution shows that the framers did
not intend a dismissal based on a motion to
quash and a provisional dismissal to be confused
with one another; Section 8 operates in a world
of its own separate from motion to quash, and
merely provides a time-bar that uniquely applies
to dismissals other than those grounded on
Section 3Conversely, when a dismissal is pursuant
to a motion to quash under Section 3, Section 8
and its time-bar does not apply.
To recapitulate, quashal and provisional dismissal
are different concepts whose respective rules
refer to different situations that should not be
confused with one another. If the problem relates
to an intrinsic or extrinsic deficiency of the
complaint or information, as shown on its face,
the remedy is a motion to quash under the terms
of Section 3, Rule 117. All other reasons for
seeking the dismissal of the complaint or
information, before arraignment and under the
circumstances outlined in Section 8, fall under
provisional dismissal.
Thus, we conclude that Section 8, Rule 117 does
not apply to the reopening of the case that the
RTC ordered and which the CA reversed; the
reversal of the CA's order is legally proper.
The grounds Pedro cited in his motion to quash
are that the Information contains averments
which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or
justification [Section 3 (h), Rule 117], and that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense
[Section 3 (a), Rule 117]. We find from our
examination of the records that the Information
duly charged a specific offense and provides the
details on how the offense was committed. 28
Thus, the cited Section 3 (a) ground has no merit.
On the other hand, we do not see on the face or
from the averments of the Information any legal
excuse or justification. The cited basis, in fact, for
Pedro's motion to quash was a Comelec
Certification (dated September 24, 2001, issued
by Director Jose P. Balbuena, Sr. of the Law
Department, Committee on Firearms and Security
Personnel of the Comelec, granting him an
exemption from the ban and a permit to carry
firearms during the election period) 29 that Pedro
attached to his motion to quash. This COMELEC
Certification is a matter aliunde that is not an
appropriate motion to raise in, and cannot
support, a motion to quash grounded on legal
excuse or justification found on the face of the
Information. Significantly, no hearing was ever
called to allow the prosecution to contest the
genuineness of the COMELEC certification. 30
aATEDS

Thus, the RTC grossly erred in its initial ruling
that a quashal of the Information was in order.
Pedro, on the other hand, also misappreciated
the true nature, function, and utility of a motion
to quash. As a consequence, a valid Information
still stands, on the basis of which Pedro should
now be arraigned and stand trial.

Lazarte SUPREME COURT CASE

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Lazarte SUPREME COURT CASE

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Consolidated case digests for Criminal Procedure

Maria Victoria Z. Matillano, Set 1 Final Half

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