2AC Frontlines Starter Pack Aff

A-to T Exploration

Note

There are many Neg T violations on the word exploration this frontline answers the 1NC exploration
violation from the opening packet.


2AC v. Exploration

( ) We meet their Ocean Policy Committee ev is mostly spin. Many parts of
searching for the plane arent under the investigator's control including
weather, currents, unknown parts of the ocean.

( ) We meet the Ban card as well were not purely a targeted search. Were
exploring unknown aspects of the Indian Ocean.

( ) Counter-interpretation Exploration includes some intentional targets.

Mineart 2
Gary M. Mineart and Fred C. Klein, Mitretek Systems, A Data Management Strategy for the Ocean Exploration Program,
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.120.2580&rep=rep1&type=pdf

The Frontier Report defines ocean exploration as discovery through disciplined diverse observations
and recording of the findings [2]. The U.S. Navy, a partner in the Presidents Panel process, has refined its definition as the
systematic examination of the oceans for the purposes of discovery; cataloging and documenting what one finds; boldly going where no one
has gone before; and providing an initial knowledge base for hypothesis-based science and for exploitation [3]. This definition
recognizes that true ocean exploration is planned and executed to achieve discoveries as an
intentional process rather than relying on serendipitous discoveries that sporadically emerge from
typical oceanographic research programs. This definition also emphasizes the recording of results to
facilitate the sharing of each new baseline level of knowledge across a broad, multidisciplinary user
community.
( ) Neg leaves us with indefensible Affs. Raw exploration just for the sake of
knowledge is thin on advantages and massively links to politics and
spending. Allowing some targeted goal is important for allowing the Aff to win.

( ) Poor education almost no one in Congress would expect a bill without any
goal to pass. Teaches us poor policymaking skills.

( ) Overlimits all affs could be spun as having a hidden goal. Limits out
every Aff and wed never win.

( ) No neg ground loss we ran a whole advantage about topographic
knowledge and theres no disad theyve lost because we specified the 370
search area.
( ) Reasonability before competing interpretations any other stance causes a
race to the bottom that hurts topic-specific education.



A-to T Non-Military


Notes to students

First this is by far the deepest of the three sets of Aff T answers. This is because I think this violation
will get a lot of play this season.

Second the card under the header Must-read 1AR versus Non-Military T is one of the stronger Aff T
cards on the topic.

I did not include it in the frontline for reasons that I can explain upon request but I could easily see an
Aff choosing to do so.

I also think the some Negs are going to claim that the *2AC* Zedalis 79 ev spins Neg (I dont share
this assessment, but I think it might emerge). The 1AR must-read card from Zedalis 79 is useful
because in addition to helping the Aff for the reasons cited in the tag of the card it also should put
spin games about what the author really thinks to bed.

Third the first T answer on this frontline is tricky. I could see creating interesting discussions in lab. It
applies differently based upon how the plan is worded.


2AC

2AC Frontline
( ) We meet plan commits to a non-military search. If they win we cant be
dual-use assets that solely re-defines the plan and commits us to different
tech.
( ) Counter-interpretation and challenge make Negs explain factual
existence of non-military ops that are carried out with military assets.

Gvosdev 10
Nikolas K. Gvosdev is a professor of national security studies at the U.S. Naval War College. He is currently a senior editor at The
National Interest. internally quoting Derek Reveron, who is a professor of national security affairs at the U.S. Naval War
College The Defense Exports The National Interest October 10, 2010 http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-
defense-exports-4201

Derek Reverons concept of exporting security (discussed in detail in a book of the same name just released by Georgetown University Press)
could provide a way forward out of this impasse. Although the publics attention is drawn to the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, much
of what the U.S. military is doing today is strengthening the capacities of partnersstrengthening their abilities to exercise effective control
over their territories and coastlines and to be in a position to repel outside threats. The United States has security-assistance programs with 149
other nations. Some of it is active, kinetic support in combating insurgents, terrorist groups or drug cartels, as in Yemen and Colombia. Some of
it is developing partnership and training programs to enhance the ability of nations to deploy peacekeeping forces or coast guards. It can
encompass the gamut from humanitarian relief operations to creating defensive alliances. The net result of all of these efforts is to develop
enduring relations with other states that gives the United States access to a global network of bases and platforms, but also strengthens key
partners and reduces both the need for American presence and the negative attention it sometimes generatesand in so doing, can also
reduce the burden on the United States to have to act as a global sheriff. Reverons approach avoids the stocking up approach to military
procurement, because the emphasis would be on finding ways to deploy and use assets, rather than warehousing systems in case of
emergency. For instance, in the maritime realm, the carriers, amphibious vessels and destroyers that were
designed to contain the Soviet navy and protect sea lines of communication (and which might be used in a similar
role vis--vis China in the future) are now being used to conduct activities ashore to improve human
security. The 2010 response to the Haiti earthquake saw an aircraft carrier and sixteen other warships
deployed to provide humanitarian relief and rescue services; such nonmilitary missions , in turn, help to
reduce the factors which can produce security threats to the United States and reinforce American ties with other states.
Reveron quotes a navy official who notes that using war assets for non-military missions such as
training and humanitarian relief means We can show up, provide training, provide resources, and then leave very
little footprint behind. An exporting security approach guides future procurement decisions towards multiuse platforms that can
combine conventional and non-conventional missions.

( ) We dont de-limit we have literature proving were non-military and we
dont bleed to combat ops.
( ) Neg overlmits. Makes exploring the unknown impossible. Also limits-out
sonar or cameras because theyre dual-use.

Hollins 99
Ernest Hollings Democratic Senator from South Carolina STATEMENTS ON INTRODUCED BILLS AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS.
Part of this card is part of the Ocean Act legislation that Mr. Hollins CONGRESSIONAL RECORD: May 5, 1999 --
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CCUQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Foceanservice.n
oaa.gov%2Fwebsites%2Fretiredsites%2Foceanpanel.pdf&ei=n6ilU5LHMYiayASr_IK4DA&usg=AFQjCNHjeaR2TuboYv5E7lpoP5s9T
aa2mw
Nowhere is the need for U.S. leadership more evident than in the area of ocean exploration . Today , we still have explored only a
tiny fraction of the sea, but with the use of new technologies what we have found is truly incredible.
For example, hydrothermal vents, hot water geysers on the deep ocean floor, were discovered just 20 years ago by oceanographers trying to understand the
formation of the earth's crust. Now this discovery had led to the identification of nearly 300 new types of marine animals with untold pharmaceutical and
biomedical potential. In recent years, scientists from 19 nations have joined in an international partnership, headed by Admi ral Watkins, to explore the history and
structure of the Earth beneath the oceans basins. Their ship, the Resolution, is the world's largest scientific research vessel and can drill in water depths of up 8,200
meters. Over the past 12 years, it has recovered more than 115 miles of core samples through the world oceans. Recently ship scientists worked off the coast of
South Carolina collecting new evidence of a large meteor that struck the Earth 65 million years ago, and is thought to have triggered climate change that may be
linked to the disappearance of the dinosaurs. Many of our marine research efforts could have profound impacts on our economic wellbeing. For example, research
on coastal ocean currents and other processes that affect shoreline erosion is critical to effective management of the shoreline. Oceanographers are working with
federal, state, and local managers to use this new understanding in protecting beachfront property and the lives of those who reside and work in coastal
communities. Development of underwater cameras and sonar, begun in the 1940s for the U.S. Navy , has led to major
strides not only for military uses, but for marine archaeologists and scientists exploring unknown stretches of
sea floor. Consumers have benefited from the technology now used in video cameras . Sonar has
broad applications in both the military and commercial sector. Finally, marine biotechnology research is thought to be one of
the greatest remaining technological and industrial frontiers. Among the opportunities which it may offer are to: restore and protect marine ecosystems; monitor
human health and treat disease; increase food supplies through aquaculture; enhance seafood safety and quality; provide new types and sources of industrial
materials and processes; and understand biological and geochemical processes in the world ocean. In addition to the economic opportunities offered by our marine
research investment, traditional marine activities play an important role in our national economic outlook. Ninety-five percent of our international trade is shipped
on the ocean. In 1996, commercial fishermen in the United States landed almost 10 billion pounds of fish with a value of $3.5 billion. Their fishing-related activities
contributed over $42 billion to the U.S. economy. During the same period, marine anglers contributed another $20 billion. Travel and tourism also contribute over
$700 billion to our economy, much of which is generated in coastal areas. With a sound national ocean and coastal policy and effective marine resource
management, these numbers have nowhere to go but up. With respect to public safety, it is particularly important to develop ocean and coastal priorities that
reflect the changes we have seen in recent years. Before World War II, most of the U.S. shoreline was sparsely populated. There were long, wild stretches of coast,
dotted with an occasional port city, fishing village, or sleepy resort. Most barrier islands had few residents or were uninhabited. After the war, people began pouring
in, and coastal development began a period of explosive growth. In my state of South Carolina, our beaches attract millions of visitors every year, and more and
more people are choosing to move to the coast-making the coastal counties the fastest growing ones in the state. Seventeen of the twenty fastest growing states in
the nation are coastal stateswhich compounds the situation that the most densely populated regions already border the ocean. With population growth comes the
demand for highways, shopping centers, schools, and sewers that permanently alter the landscape. If people are to continue to live and work on the coast, we must
do a better job of planning how we impact the very regions in which we all want to live. There is no better example of how our ocean and coastal policies affect
public safety, than to look at the effects of hurricanes. Throughout the 1920s, hurricanes killed 2,122 Americans while causing about $1.8 billion in property
damages. By contrast, in the first five years of the 1990s, hurricanes killed 111 Americans, and resulted in damages of about $35 billion. While we have made
notable advances in early warning and evacuation systems to protect human lives, the risk of property loss continues to escalate and coastal inhabitants are more
vulnerable to major storms than they ever have been. In 1989, Hurricane Hugo came ashore in South Carolina, leaving more than $6 billion in damages. Of that total
from Hugo, the federal government paid out more than $2.8 billion in disaster assistance and more than $400 million from the National Flood Insurance Program.
The payments from private insurance companies were equally staggering. In 1992, Hurricane Andrew struck southern Florida and slammed into low l ying areas of
Louisiana, forever changing the lives of more than a quarter of a million people and causing an estimated $25 to $30 billion dollars in damage. Hurricanes
demonstrate that the human desire to live near the ocean and along the coast comes with both a responsibility and a cost. The oceans are part of our culture, part
of our heritage, part of our economy, and part of our future. Those who doubt the need for this legislation need only pick up a newspaper and they will be face to
face with pressing ocean and coastal issues. And while our coastal waters are governed by the United States or all of us, beyond our waters progress relies primarily
on international cooperation. There are no boundaries at sea, no national borders with fences and checkpoints. Deciding how to manage all these problems and use
the seas is one of the most complicated tasks we can tackle. Therefore, we need to be smart about ocean policy-we need the best minds to come together and take
a look at what the real challenges are. It is not enough to sit back and assume the role of caretakers. We must be proactive and develop a plan for the future. The
United Nations declared 1998 to the be the Year of the Ocean in part to encourage governments and the pubic to pay adequate attention to the need to protect the
marine environment and to ensure a healthy ocean. This is an unprecedented opportunity to follow up the Year of the Ocean activities by celebrating and enhancing
what has been accomplished in understanding and managing our oceans. The Stratton Commission stated in 1969: "How fully and wisely the United States uses the
sea in the decades ahead will affect profoundly its security, its economy, its ability to meet increasing demands for food and raw materials, its position and influence
in the world community, and the quality of the environment in which its people live." Those words are as true today as they were 30 years ago. Mr. President, it is
time to look towards the next 30 years. This bill offers us the vision and understanding needed to establish sound ocean and coastal policies for the 21st century,
and I thank the cosponsors of the legislation for joining with me in recognizing it significance. We look forward to working together in the bipartisan spirit of the
Stratton Commission to enact legislation that ensures the development of an integrated national ocean and coastal policy well into the next millennium. I ask
unanimous consent that the text of the bill be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the bill was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:
[pS4794] S959 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. This Act
may be cited as the "Oceans Act of 1999". SEC. 2. CONGRESSIONAL FINDINGS; PURPOSE AND OBJECTIVES. (a) FINDINGS.-The Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Covering more than two-thirds of the Earth's surface, the oceans and Great Lakes play a critical role in the global water cycle and in regulating climate, sustain a
large part of Earth's biodiversity, provide an important source of food and a wealth of other natural products, act as a frontier to scientific exploration, are critical to
national security, and provide a vital means of transportation. The coasts, transition between land and open ocean, are regions of remarkable high biological
productivity, contribute more than 30 percent of the Gross Domestic Product, and are of considerable importance for recreation, waste disposal, and mineral
exploration. (2) Ocean and coastal resources are susceptible to change as a direct and indirect result of human activities, and such changes can significantly impact
the ability of the oceans and Great Lakes to provide the benefits upon which the Nation depends. Changes in ocean and coastal processes could affect global
patterns, marine productivity and bio-diversity, environmental quality, national security, economic competitiveness, availability of energy, vulnerability to natural
hazards, and transportation safety and efficiency. (3) Ocean and coastal resources are not infinite, and human pressure on them is increasing. One half of the
Nation's population lives within 50 miles of the coast, ocean and coastal resources once considered inexhaustible are not threatened with depletion, and if
population trends continue as expected, pressure on and conflicting demands for ocean and coastal resources will increase further as will vulnerability to coastal
hazards. (4) Marine transportation is key to United States participation in the global economy and to the wide range of activities carried out in ocean and coastal
regions. Inland waterway and ports are the link between marine activities in ocean and coastal regions and the supporting transportation infrastructure ashore.
International trade is expected to triple by 2020. The increase has the potential to outgrow (A) the capabilities of the marine transportation system to ensure safety;
and (B) the existing capacity of ports and waterways. (5) Marine technologies hold tremendous promise for expanding the range and increasing the utility of
products from the oceans and Great Lakes, improving the stewardship of ocean and coastal resources, and contributing to business and manufacturing innovations
and the creation of new jobs. (6) Research has uncovered the link between oceanic and atmospheric processes and improved understanding of world climate
patterns and forecasts. Important new advances, including availability of military technology have made feasible the
exploration of large areas of the ocean which were inaccessible several years ago. In designating 1998 as "The Year
of the Ocean", the United Nations high-lighted the value of increasing our knowledge of the oceans.

( ) That contextualizes to our Aff. Civilian tech CANT reach 20,000 feet thats
our Austin and Malaysia Kini ev. Neg forces the Aff to explore known areas.


( ) Means no Aff would be topical exploration must search new places.

NOAA 2K
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, A New Era of Ocean Exploration, 8-22,
http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/websites/retiredsites/oceanpanel.pdf
What is Ocean Exploration? National Geographic Society: one explores to obtain information about areas that are
largely or completely unknown

( ) Poor grammar and contrived-limit. Non-military modifies THE
EXPLORATION ACTIVITY not tools used for it. Military equipment can be
used on non-military missions.

Zedalis 79
Rex J. Zedalis Research Associate, International and Comparative Law Department, George Washington University (1978-
1979). Member of the California Bar and the American Society of International Law "PEACEFUL PURPOSES" AND OTHER
RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE REVISED COMPOSITE NEGOTIATING TEXT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE EXISTING AND
THE PROPOSED MILITARY REGIME FOR THE HIGH SEAS Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 7 [1979],
Iss. 1, Art. 2 available via:
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=41&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CIMCEBYwKA&url=http%3A
%2F%2Fsurface.syr.edu%2Fcgi%2Fviewcontent.cgi%3Farticle%3D1098%26context%3Djilc&ei=jwKmU6j7Lo-
3yASFh4KwDg&usg=AFQjCNFbusVzhU2bXbZ1CMhi0Te-pKFeEg

Perhaps the most conspicuous addition made by Part VII of the RCNT to the legal regime established by the 1958 Convention is the reservation of the high seas to use for
"peaceful purposes." Article 88 of the RCNT69 states that the "[h]igh seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes." Though reservations of
transnational spatial areas for "peaceful purposes" is by no means a novel conception in international law,70 the ambiguity of the "peaceful purposes" provision has generated continuing debate as to the nature of the normative
prescription it declares. Some suggest that the term "peaceful purposes" permits all nonaggressive uses, even though they
may be of a military nature. Others insist that only non-military uses are consonant with the
provision.71 In the context of the instant draft convention, if only non-military uses are permitted,
then the high seas may not be employed for any activity of a
military nature, including the navigation of warships.12 On the other hand, if "peaceful purposes" simply prescribes a nonaggressive standard, then the
high seas may legally be used for a whole host of activities of a military nature as long as none of the activities are
aggressive. When the "peaceful purposes" provision of article 88 of the RCNT is construed in the context of the whole draft convention so as to effectuate the general
intention of the architects as evidenced by the preceding and subsequent provisions,73 the inescapable conclusion is that it establishes a nonaggressive normative
standard. One of the enumerated freedoms of the high seas guaranteed to all states is the freedom of navigation. This freedom is not restricted and in fact the RCNT contemplates navigation by military as well as
civilian vessels.74 Such use, however, would be clearly inconsistent with a non-military standard. 75 Military use of the high seas is a well
established customary utilization recognized by the general principles of international law and incorporated in article 87 of the RCNT by virtue of the words "inter alia" prefacing the litany of express freedoms. To suggest that the
"peaceful purposes" provision establishes a non-military standard is inconsistent with the language contemplating military navigation as well as that incorporating more extensive military uses. In light of the minimal interference
caused to inclusive uses of ocean space by highly valued exclusive military uses, such a result seems desirable. Continues to footnote. This is the first paragraph of an especially-long footnote: 75. The opposite, however,
has been argued in relation to the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. See Finch, Outer Space for ''Peaceful Purposes," 54 A.B.A.J. 365 (1968). Many commentators feel that the Outer Space Treaty language permitting the use of military
personnel and equipment on the moon and other celestial bodies requires that "peaceful purposes" be defined to prescribe a non-aggressive standard. In light of the fact that most if not all celestial exploration is undertaken by
military personnel utilizing military equipment, it can be cogently argued that the drafters included such language so as to avert suggestions that a non-military definition of the "peaceful purposes" clause precluded military
personnel from exploring outer space. Thus, it is very possible to have a non -military normative standard for outer space, yet in recognition of the realities, permit military personnel to explore space. After all,
military equipment can be used for activities of a non-military
nature.

(Notes to students: This is a little complicated. First, the RCNT as mentioned in this evidence means the Revised
Composite Negotiating Text produced at the eighth session of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea In
1958, the UN Law of the Sea added a peaceful purpose provision which means ships on the high seas were to be acting
peacefully. A debate broke out as to what peaceful purpose meant. Some argue that peaceful purpose means yes, can
be military, but non-aggressive. Thus, a defensive security mission or an act of military self-defense would be non-
aggressive. Others argued that non-military means no military application. The Aff is arguing with this ev that they
dont de-limit because they set a bright line that doesnt bleed to navigating defensive battleships on the high waters. That,
according to the Aff, is distinct from military equipment on a non-military ship. The author concludes BOTH that peaceful
purpose was intended to be non-aggressive AND that if the standard were non-military it would exclude military vessels.
Both are consistent with the Aff claim because the Aff should argue they are military equipment but not a military mission.
Someone may claim that this author concludes that the non-military standard differs for the oceans and this means the Aff
cant touch the military whatsoever. This is not what the author says. Rather, the author says that if for the ocean the
standard was BOTH yes some military and also the vague peaceful purpose standard that would NOT mean the same thing
in means in the Outer Space Convention. In the Outer Space Convention, that means military is discouraged but allowed out of
necessity. In the Law of Sea it means yes, some military but that peaceful purpose would limit to not just necessity but
also non-aggressive actions like a defensive mission or self-defense on the high seas. That is indeed a little complicated. Let
me know if you have questions.)

( ) Contrived limits outweighs all. If they can re-spin phrases in the topic for
the sake of limits, theyll always limit-out the Aff. Wed never win if grammar
is second to limits.
( ) No ground loss
--- we didnt spike-out non-military disads.
--- huge Aff thats stepped in current events literature. Theyve got plenty to
say.
--- we havent run hard power advantages which would be the upside to
abusing non-military.

( ) Reasonability before competing interpretations any other stance causes a
race to the bottom that hurts topic-specific education.

Backlines


*** Must-read 1AR versus Non-Military T

( ) Lack of bright line means err Aff. If not, then no workable cases. Also
proves military characteristics is a bad standard.

Zedalis 79
Rex J. Zedalis Research Associate, International and Comparative Law Department, George Washington University (1978-
1979). Member of the California Bar and the American Society of International Law "PEACEFUL PURPOSES" AND OTHER
RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE REVISED COMPOSITE NEGOTIATING TEXT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE EXISTING AND
THE PROPOSED MILITARY REGIME FOR THE HIGH SEAS Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 7 [1979],
Iss. 1, Art. 2 available via:
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=41&cad=rja&uact=8&ved=0CIMCEBYwKA&url=http%3A
%2F%2Fsurface.syr.edu%2Fcgi%2Fviewcontent.cgi%3Farticle%3D1098%26context%3Djilc&ei=jwKmU6j7Lo-
3yASFh4KwDg&usg=AFQjCNFbusVzhU2bXbZ1CMhi0Te-pKFeEg

The requirement in article 143(1) that marine scientific research be carried out "exclusively for peaceful purposes" does not appear to proscribe all scientific
research of a military nature. This conclusion is derived from the consistency of such a construction with the interpretation of "peaceful purposes" as used
elsewhere in the RCNT (articles 88 and 141), the absence of a provision explicitly prohibiting such traditional activity, and the fact that reading "peaceful purposes"
as prohibiting scientific research of a military nature would produce the anomalous result of having one provision (article 143(1)) proscribe relatively i nnocuous
research activity while provisions found elsewhere in Part XI (articles 136, 140(1), and 141) permit other extensive military uses consistent with principles of
international law. Nor does it appear that the requirement that such activity be carried out for the "benefit of mankind as a whole" significantly affects the
interpretation concerning the impact of article 143(1) on scientific research of a military nature. Though admittedly some may argue that no military activity can
benefit mankind as a whole, it seems that scientific research is distinct from what is typically viewed as military
activity. Specifically, while traditional military activity can benefit either the acting nation alone or the acting nation plus all others, except those against which it
is directed, recent history has demonstrated that almost all scientific activity, albeit military in nature, produces some useful
non-military applications. Moreover, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish most
military from most non-military scientific research. Certainly such an attempt could not turn upon
the character of those conducting the activity, particularly since military scientists are generally in
the forefront of scientific activities in transnational spatial areas. And, finally, as mentioned in relation to the requirement that marine
scientific research be carried out exclusively for "peaceful purposes," construing any provision in article 143(1) as proscribing military research produces
the anomalous result of outlawing innocuous activities while provisions elsewhere in Part XI permit other extensive military uses of the Area.

(Note: the word proscribing means to forbid, especially by law.)

Extension Aff is officially Non-Military

( ) Search-and-rescue are officially non-military ops.

Tilley 13
John A. Tilley, Associate Professor, Department of History, East Carolina University. Before joining the faculty at East Carolina
University, Tilley was an assistant curator at the Mariners' Museum in Newport News, Virginia. His publications include The
British Navy and the American Revolution (1987). His articles have appeared in The Nautical Research Journal and Model
Shipwright. Tilley teaches courses in military history. History of the U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary Published at RATLINES: UNITED
STATES COAST GUARD AUXILIARY UNOFFICIAL NEWSLETTER May 7, 2013 - http://www.ratlines.com/uscg_aux_history.htm

The third cornerstone is "Operations." The Auxiliary assists the Coast Guard in several of its non-military
functions , including search-and-rescue (SAR), safety, regatta, and harbor patrols, and checking aids to navigation (ATON).


( ) Search-and-rescue is non-military. Prefer ev that assumes maritime
activities and the region at hand.

WESTERN PACIFIC NAVAL SYMPOSIUM 12
(Internally quoting US Naval Admiral Gary Roughead The Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) is a forum for naval
professionals, which aims to increase naval cooperation in the Western Pacific by providing a venue for discussions on
professional issues, generating a flow of information and opinion, leading to common understanding and potential agreements.
There are currently 20 full members, including the United States, Australia, and Malaysia. 13th WESTERN PACIFIC NAVAL
SYMPOSIUM, KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA, 25 26 SEPTEMBER 2012
http://img.mod.gov.cn/reports/201310/bzdd/site21/20131128/4437e6581cab1400f28606.pdf.)

The Chair also reiterated the response made by Admiral Roughead (US Navy) at the 12th Symposium to the concept of
Harmonious Ocean pledged by Rear Admiral Xu Weibing (PLA Navy) that this forum should continue in openness and engage in
practical cooperation that will make the activities of the WPNS more expansive in its outlook and more inclusive in sharing its common
views of the strategic maritime security position, with a particular emphasis on its vision for the future. The Chair reflected that when Malaysia
hosted the 4th Symposium in 1994, some of the topics discussed include the non-military security issues such as approach in
managing maritime security, search and rescue and prevention of sea pollution. However, he said that the challenge
today was the management of naval issues as they are becoming more complex, complicated, multifaceted and intertwined. He added that
these have to be dealt with in a holistic manner and could be attended in a collaborative effort among the regional states as envisaged through
the theme of the Symposium, Enhancing Interoperability and Professional Cooperation."

( ) Search-and-rescue is non-military. Prefer ev that assumes maritime
activities and the region of the MH370 search.

Kaneda 4
Hideaki Kaneda, a former Vice Admiral of Japan's Defense Forces, is Director of the Okazaki Institute. CSIS Conference and
Publications. Maritime Security in East Asia Regional Assessment of Northeast Asia: Pursuing a Maritime Security Coalition in
the Asia-Pacific Region. A paper prepared for the Center for Strategic and International Studies American-Pacific Sealanes
Security Institute conference on Maritime Security in Asia. January 18-20, 2004, http://www.slocgroup.org/pubs/SLOC14.pdf.

At the beginning of the 21st Century, seven specific instability factors affect security in the Asia-Pacific
region. The first factor is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles from Northeast Asia to other regions. The
second factor is international terrorism, which has become especially apparent after the 9.11 terrorist attacks. Terrorism is gathering strength
through alliances in and out of the Asia-Pacific region, and increasingly targeting countries with weaker governments. The third factor is the
rapid build-up of Chinese military power, mainly naval and air power, which could potentially tip the balance of regional military power. The
fourth factor is the military confrontational structure that originated in the cold war and still remains on the Korean Peninsula and in the
Taiwan Strait. These bring instability, uncertainty and lack of clarity to the regional situation. The fifth factor is the historical issue of territorial,
religious and ethnic disputes and confrontations. In particular, disputes over the possession of islands are likely to significantly affect the
stability of the whole region while obstructing maritime security. The sixth factor is the confrontational structures surrounding oceanic
interests, which are closely related to the disputes over island possession. The seventh factor is the increase in internationalized and organized
criminal activities such as piracy, drug trafficking and slave trading, and illegal activities such as over-fishing, unsanctioned ocean resource
surveying and environmental destruction in Asia-Pacific waters. 2. Pursuing a Regional Maritime Security Coalition (1) Maritime Safety and
Security as a Common Key Phrase for Regional Security Surveying the above instability factors, maritime safety and security stands out as a
common key phrase highlighting the vital issues for regional security. Maritime safety and security can be divided into
three categories. The first is emergency maritime security, which indicates purely maritime military issues of war, including the defense
of territory and SLOC protection. The second is peacetime maritime safety, which indicates non-military
maritime issues such as international terrorism, piracy, drug trafficking, search and rescue, humanitarian and
navigational operations. The third is various maritime activities that can include fishing, preserving maritime resources and
environmental issues.



Extension Neg overlimits
( ) Their interpretation eliminates ALL search and rescue Aff those
inevitably use some military assets.

Thayer 14
Carl Thayer is Emeritus Professor at The University of New South Wales. He is a Southeast Asia regional specialist who taught at
the Australian Defence Force Academy, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Australian Command and Staff College, and
Centre for Defence and Strategic Studies, Australian Defence College. Flight MH370 Shows Limits of ASEANs Maritime
Cooperation The Diplomat March 18
th
http://thediplomat.com/2014/03/flight-mh370-shows-limits-of-aseans-maritime-
cooperation/

It should be noted that the focus of ASEAN SAR planning is mainly on ships in distress at sea. For example, the chairmans statement issued
after the twenty-third ASEAN Summit in Brunei in October last year declared that ASEAN leaders looked forward to developing the ideas of
establishing hotlines of communication to further enhance trust, confidence and to respond to emergency situations at sea and cooperate in
the area of search and rescue for vessels in distress at sea The ASEAN Maritime Forum, which was founded in 2010, has held four meetings.
None of these meetings has explicitly addressed SAR missions, capacity building or practical exercises. As the MH370 incident
revealed, military assets are invariably committed to SAR missions, especially in their initial phase.
ASEAN Defense Ministers, however, have not made SAR a priority. For example, the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM), established in
2006, began to conduct tabletop exercises in 2011, but they have not included SAR.

(Note: SAR stands for search and rescue)

( ) That overlimits think about what it means to not allow the Aff to search
on an ocean exploration topic. It makes the topic nonsense.


( ) No topical Aff under their interpretation Cant explore the unknown
without military or dual-use tech.

Nystuen 98
John D. Nystuen is Professor Emeritus, Geography and Urban Planning, University of Michigan. Book Review: The Universe
Below by William J. Broad Solstice Summer http://www-
personal.umich.edu/~copyrght/image/solstice/sum98/nysrev.html

In one of the continuing ironies of our age, the military pioneered the technology that opened the oceans to
exploration. They made the deep sea a battlefield in the Cold War. The military were not interested in exploration. Their interest was in being able to
operate in deep water to support submarine warfare and undersea espionage. The United States developed a technological advantage over the Soviet Union by
investing huge resources toward these purposes. Mr. Broad describes several defining events that shaped this effort. For example, in April, 1963, the USS Thresher,
the most advanced attack submarine of its day, inexplicably sank, its 129 men lost in water more than a mile and a half deep. The Navy had no way to
reach the ship to salvage sensitive equipment or to investigate the mystery of why she was lost. The tragedy
led to much greater expenditure on the development of deep submersible craft ostensibly to make
possible deep sea rescue operations but also to expand the possibilities for undersea espionage through use of search and salvage capacities
to be used to obtain intelligence from sunken Soviet ships, especially nuclear equipment and devices from submarines lost at sea. Mr. Broad is a Pulitzer prize
winning science writer for the New York Times. His investigative powers are evident in this book as he details the political and policy debate that took place in
Washington to direct resources into the Navys deep submersible operations. Most of the effort was to support espionage which was in line with the tendency of
the United States to depend upon technological means for conducting espionage instead of relying on spies and secret agents. After the end of the
Cold War much of this military technology was declassified and is now being used in civilian efforts at
exploration. Russian equipment is also available for hire and lease as the Soviet Union had also developed deep submersible capabilities during the Cold
War.


Extension No bright line

The Neg cant draw a bright line on military vs. non-military tech. Means they
limit out *everything*

Britt 93
(et al; Ambassador Maj Britt Theorin Chairperson for the UN Study on Charting the Potential Uses of
Resources Allocated to Military Activities for Civilian Endeavours to Protect the Environment. Britt also works for the Swedish
Disarmament Commission Potential Uses ofMilitary-Related Resources fur
Protection of the Environment Office for Disarmament Affairs: Report of the Secretary-General
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=21&ved=0CJkBEBYwFA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.un.or
g%2Fdisarmament%2FHomePage%2FODAPublications%2FDisarmamentStudySeries%2FPDF%2FSS-25.pdf&ei=jwKmU6j7Lo-
3yASFh4KwDg&usg=AFQjCNFgqbRqUI9ZDaOcUU30_5o1jDp9Hg)


Of all the military-related resources, technologies qualify most for environmental use and most technology is inherently dual-
purpose .. In many cases, the environmental applications may not differ fundamentally from the military, except where the latter is more
complex and costly. Many systems have been developed in parallel, or if developed for military purposes, have
resulted in spin-off to the non-military sector. In the market economies, manufacturers and R&D organizations may supply
both sectors and defence laboratories and agencies often have a major commitment to non-military work, and vice versa. The result of having
some of the costs of R&D, and production, for technology with civilian application underwritten by military budgets is sometimes seen as
beneficial by the industrial sector. Although the present study addresses military-related resources, it is not always feasible to
differentiate between the military and non-military, especially with respect to technology. Obviously the
reverse applies, and it can be argued that the civilian sector leads in many areas.

Navies can and do carry out non-military operations
Sakhuja 11
Dr Vijay Sakhuja is Director (Research), Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), New Delhi. He is also Visiting Senior Research
Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), Singapore since 2006. He is a former Indian Navy officer. Dr Sakhuja
received his Ph D from the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi. Asian Maritime Power in the 21st Century: Strategic
Transactions China, India and Southeast Asia. p. 199

Since the 1990s, India has been nurturing an ascendant operation maritime profile. It has established bilateral
engagements with the United States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, Israel, Japan and several countries in the
Southeast Asian region. Codenamed Malabar, the Indo-U.S. naval exercises were conceptualized in 1992 to mark
the beginning of a new relationship between India and the United States," and fourteen such naval exercises have taken place in the past. In
the beginning these exercises were rudimentary and these have progressively improved in content and complexity with participation by several
complex platforms such as aircraft carriers, nuclear submarines and long-range maritime patrol aircraft." The exercises paved the
way for greater understanding between the naval forces and helped to develop a broad framework for
operating together in support of non-military operations such as anti-piracy, safety of sea lanes, and
antidrug and gunrunning patrols. The 1998 Indian nuclear tests abruptly ended cooperation between the two navies, but bilateral
exercises were resumed and the cooperation got a boost with the Indian Navy dispatching a naval helicopter to USS Hewitt to carry out the
medical evacuation of a U.S. navy sailor.



Extension C-interp/we dont de-limit
( ) Armed Forces can do non-military ops like the plan. We dont de-limit to
combat or security missions.

Huntington 93
Samuel P. Huntington is Eaton Professor of the Science of Government and Director of the John M. Olin Institute for Strategic
Studies at the Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. Dr. Huntington is the author or editor of over a dozen books
and ninety scholarly articles. He has studied, taught, and written widely in three principal areas: military politics, strategy, and
civil-military relations; American and comparative politics: and. political development and the politics of less developed
countries. From the chapter Keynote: Non-Traditional Roles for the U.S. Military from the book: Non-Combat Roles for the
U.S. Military in the Post-Cold War Era, edited by James R. Graham p. 6-11

This past year after the hurricanes in Florida and Hawaii many people hailed the superb contribution the
military made to disaster relief as evidence of a "new role" for the U.S. armed forces. Nothing could be more off the target The U.S. military have regularly provided
such relief in the past. As the official U.S. military history puts it, during the 1920s and 1930s, "the most conspicuous employment of the Army within the United States... was in a variety of
tasks that only the Army had the resources and organization to tackle quickly. In floods and blizzards and hurricanes it was the Army that was first on the spot with cots, blankets, and food."2
That has been the case throughout our history. It is hard to conceive of any non-military role for the U.S. military that does not have some precedent in U.S. history. Non-military
functions of the armed forces are as American as apple pie. Throughout our history also, however, these non-
military uses of the armed forces have never served as the justification for the maintenance of armed
services. The overall size, composition, organization, recruitment, equipment, and training of the armed forces have been justified by the needs of
national security and the military missions, the combat missions , which the armed forces may have to perform. In this new fifth phase of American
international relations, the security and military functions of the armed forces remain as important as ever. They are the reasons why we will and should continue to have military forces in the
coming years. How can these military missions be defined? There are, I think, at least three such missions. First , for the first time in sixty years, no
major power, no peer rival, poses a security challenge to the United States. It is obviously in our interests to maintain this
situation , a goal which has been affirmed by both Presidents Reagan and Bush and in the initial version of the Defense Guidance issued in the winter of 1992. We now need the
military policy and forces not to contain and deter an existing threat as we did during the Cold War but rather to prevent the emergence of a new threat. To accomplish this goal, we must
maintain substantial invulnerable nuclear retaliatory forces plus military deployments in Europe and Asia for reassurance and to preclude rearmament by
Germany or Japan. We must also maintain U.S. technological superiority and U.S. maritime superiority, and provide the base for the rapid and effective creation of a new enhanced military
capability if a major power threat should begin to emerge. Second, regional powers do pose significant threats to American interests in Southwest Asia and East Asia, and we must
have the capability to deal with those threats as we did in the Gulf War. To deter or defeat regional aggression the United States will need light and heavy ground
forces, tactical aviation, naval and marine forces designed to fight from the sea against land targets, and the sea and air lift to deploy ground forces rapidly to the scene of combat Ideally the
U.S. should be able to fight the equivalent of another Gulf War. The Bush Administration's Base Force and Secretary of Defense Les Aspin's Option C both purportedly would provide this
capability. Whether five years from now American forces will in fact be able to fight another Gulf War against an Iraq-like enemy remains to be seen. Our decisive victory in the Gulf War,
however, makes it unlikely that we will be able to repeat that victory in the future. Any major regional aggressor in the future is likely to have and to use nuclear weapons. This point is
reflected in the response of the Indian defense minister when asked what lesson he drew from the Gulf War. He replied: "Don't fight the United States unless you have nuclear weapons."3 The
most likely aggressors of the futureNorth Korea, Iran, Iraq, and othersare intent on acquiring nuclear weapons. Until they do have these weapons, the probability of stability in their
regions is reasonably high. Once they do have these weapons, the likelihood they will use them will be high. In all likelihood the first sure knowledge the world will have that they possess a
usable nuclear weapon will be the explosion of that weapon on the territory of a neighbor. That act would be coupled with a massive conventional offensive designed to produce the quick
occupation of Seoul, the Saudi oil fields, or whatever other target the aggressor had in mind. This is the most serious type of regional threat the U.S. may have to confront, and it may well also
be one of the most probable. Coping with such aggression will place new demands, and what in the context of this conference we might call non-traditional, demands on U.S. military forces.
They will have to fight an enemy who has a small number of nuclear weapons and little or no inhibitions about using them. To deter this first use by a rogue state, the United States will have to
threaten massive, including possible nuclear, retaliation against such a state. The central function of the Strategic Command in the coming years will be maintenance of nuclear peace in the
Third World. Third, the U.S. military may also have to intervene quickly and effectively in countries important to the U.S. in order to support a
friendly government, restore a friendly government that has been overthrown, overthrow a hostile regime, protect American lives and property, rescue hostages, eliminate terrorists, destroy
drag mafias, and engage in other actions which normally fall under the heading of "low intensity conflict". Whether or not a state is aggressive or pacific,
reasonably decent or totally threatening, depends overwhelmingly on the nature of its government. President Clinton has very appropriately said that the promotion of democracy should be a
central, perhaps the central, theme of American foreign policy. In areas critical to its security, the U.S. has to be prepared to defend governments that are friendly and democratic and to
overthrow governments that are unfriendly and undemocratic. This requirement also emphasizes a new role for American military forces: the targeting of dictatorial governments and their
leaders. In the Gulf War the U.S. military degraded by more than fifty percent the capability of the Iraqi forces. The U.S. military also substantially brought Iraqi society to a standstill. The U.S.
military, however, proved incapable of eliminating the true villain of the piece: the Iraqi government. The elimination of Saddam Hussein was a U.S. objective, although not one endorsed by
the United Nations, and we failed to achieve that objective. During the past decade, indeed, we have tried to eliminate three hostile dictators: Khadaffi, Noriega, and Saddam Hussein. We only
succeeded with Noriega, and it took us some while and we suffered some embarrassment in doing that, although it involved a minuscule country with respect to which our intelligence had to
be better than almost any other place in the world. Targeting and incapacitating dictatorial governments will be an important mission for the U.S. military in the coming years, and it is one with
respect to which our capabilities are now sadly deficient These are some of the military missions of the United States armed forces in the
post-Cold War world. What then are appropriate non-military or civilian uses to which the armed forces may be put in this world? As I have indicated,
historically the non-combat activities have been multiple and diverse. There is no reason why they should not be so in the future. First, these uses of the armed forces could
well include those domestic functions in American society highlighted by Senator Nunn and included in the Defense Authorization Act. Second, these uses obviously should
include humanitarian relief at home and abroad where such activity is welcomed by the local government.
( ) Our interpretation wont de-limit. We allow military assets for
humanitarian task only if theyre necessary to complete a task.
Perry 8
(et al; Dr. Charles M. Perry Vice President & Director of Studies, Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis
The U.S. Foreign Disaster Response Process: How It Works and How It Could Work Better
Charles M. Perry May http://www.ifpa.org/pdf/DisasterRelief.pdf.)

Traditionally, if it is determined that military assets are indeed necessary to respond to a disaster, OFDA
will submit a formal request for military assistance to the State Departments Executive Secretariat, which will in turn forward
the request to the Executive Secretariat of DoD. Following an intensive intra-DoD review process, the secretary of defense or deputy secretary
may order the deployment of military assets to the disaster zone in support of OFDA efforts, signing what is called a third party waiver to
allow U.S. military goods and services to be used in a non-military operation to assist a third party. On the basis of such a waiver, over
fifteen thousand U.S. soldiers and sailors were deployed as part of the 2004 tsunami response to work alongside
OFDA in the affected regions. More specifically, the U.S. military provided twenty-six ships, eighty-two planes, and fifty-one
helicopters to help deliver more than 24.5 million tons of relief supplies and enable USAID and other disaster relief agencies to move
much-needed aid to inaccessible areas affected by the tsunami (OFDA 2005, 17). But DoD assistance may be as limited (if nonetheless crucial)
as the dispatch of a single C-130 to deliver supplies to a disaster zone, or the diversion of a nearby ship to assist in the evacuation of people at
risk or injured. In theory, the criterion for both levels of response is that no commercial alternative exists or is readily available. However,
despite the formal process for requesting military assistance, local U.S. ambassadors and country officers in the relevant regional bureau at the
State Department have often requested DoD assistance directly, leaving USAID and OFDA out of the loop. Moreover, some officials at State are
neither familiar with disaster management issues and procedures nor even aware of USAIDs and OFDAs role as the LFA for foreign HA/DR
activities. For instance, in response to flash floods in the Horn of Africa in 2006, State issued a request for DoD assistance. When personnel from
DoD spoke with the relevant regional bureau at State, they found that staff at the bureau were unaware of OFDAs role or that USAID was in
fact the LFA, and needed to provide the justification for DoD assistance. Still worse, DoD actually had to give bureau officials the contact
information for the proper USAID/OFDA representatives (interview 2007a). Examples such as this illustrate the conundrum facing DoD: How
does the military (meant primarily as a resource of last resort) respond to requests for assistance when State Department officials may not yet
have properly coordinated with USAID/OFDA to fully assess the availability of civilian options, including cheaper, commercial alternatives? In an
effort to avoid such situations in the future, USAID, DoD, and States Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (State/PM) are drafting new HA/DR
guidelines to clarify how State should respond to and handle overseas disasters, and to improve the State-DoD assistance request process.
OFDA, of course, is generally quite willing to request the mobilization of military assets for overseas relief
missions, and to give DoD relatively wide latitude to work directly with its counterpart in the affected nation. This is especially true when
that nation lies within a region of strategic interest, as was the case during the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, the 2005 Pakistan
earthquake, the 2006 Philippine mudslide, and the 2007 Bangladesh cyclone. That said, increased calls for DoD
involvement in HA/DR missions have pushed the military to operate less as an instrument of last resort in support
of civilian relief agencies and more as a regular contributor, intimately involved in a broad range of humanitarian
work. Increasingly, U.S. forces are on the ground, working alongside host nation officials and military personnel to eliminate sources of
instability and improve livelihoods through various development and capacity-building projects. In the Horn of Africa, for example, U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM) established the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) in 2002 to promote regional stability and protect
coalition interests through disaster relief, humanitarian support, medical and dental assistance, and construction and water development
projects. CJTF-HOA also provides military-to-military training in counterterrorism and in border and maritime security. In 2008, the U.S.
government will establish a new unified combatant command responsible for Africa known as Africa Command (or AFRICOM) to expand CJTF-
HOA civil affairs efforts and similar projects elsewhere on the continent. For their part, U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and PACOM
already run similar programs in their respective areas of responsibility (or AORs), such as Joint Task Force-Bravo (JTF-Bravo) in Central America
and Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines (JSOTF-P).
(Note: The acronym OFDA stands for the USs Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. HADR stands
for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief)



A-to Specific Neg cards





A-to Negs Brown card

( ) Reject the Brown ev:

--- No intent to universally define author defines for the purposes of her
personal thesis on Burmese Militia Groups.

--- Defines roles as in occupations within the military. Doesnt exclude
equipment.


A-to Wuerzner

( ) Wuerzner ev only proves theres no clear bright line for a military asset.
It doesnt prove you should err neg.

( ) The invert the error this ev just proves no affs topical because nothing is
non-military.

( ) Wuerzner makes no sense in context of the aff searching for the plan
doesnt fulfill the two standards in the card militarily effective AND definite

A-to Bunyan

( ) we meet it were civilian. Assets dont change missions.

( ) doesnt apply assumes the EUs rapid-reaction paramilitary police force


A-to Oxford 14

( ) we meet it were civilian. Assets dont change missions.

( ) Says not characteristic of the military. We meet were an atypical use of
military assets.



A-to Vocabulary 14

( ) massively de-limits uses the word associated. Rules out camera and
sonar.

( ) we meet it the EXPLORATION, not the tech, is not conceptually
ASSOCIATED with combat.


A-to Resnick

( ) Dismiss the Resnick ev:

--- its defining engagement and exploration or assets.
--- we meet it we think were facially the means. Our objective is non-
military.
--- the neg links harder to subjective and blurry. They have to contrive a
false distinction about assets.


A-to Websters 14

( ) We meet the 3
rd
definition on the same page were not the usual
characteristics of the military.

( ) we meet this just begs the question of our exploration v. asset distinction


A-to Benko

( ) Zedalis on-point answers Benko. It speaks to the non-aggressive vs.
non-military distinction and proves that plans exploration is non-miltiary
and not just non-aggressive.





A-to T Southern Ocean


2AC Frontline
( ) Counter-definition Southern Ocean is an ocean.

NOAA 14
(National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration There is only one global ocean Last Revised January 23, 2014
http://oceanservice.noaa.gov/facts/howmanyoceans.html)

While there is only one global ocean, the vast body of water that covers 71 percent of the Earth is geographically divided into distinct named
regions. The boundaries between these regions have evolved over time for a variety of historical, cultural,
geographical, and scientific reasons. Historically, there are four named oceans: the Atlantic, Pacific, Indian, and Arctic.
However, most countriesincluding the United Statesnow recognize the Southern (Antarctic) as the
fifth ocean. The Pacific, Atlantic, and Indian are known as the three major oceans. The Southern Ocean is the 'newest'
named ocean. It is recognized by the U.S. Board on Geographic Names as the body of water extending
from the coast of Antarctica to the line of latitude at 60 degrees South. The boundaries of this ocean were
proposed to the International Hydrographic Organization in 2000. However, not all countries agree on the proposed boundaries, so this has yet
to be ratified by members of the IHO. The U.S. is a member of the IHO, represented by the NOS Office of Coast Survey.


( ) No bright line or precision even National Geographic is torn on the
question.

Holland 11
ELIZABETHE HOLLAND Reporter for the St Louis Post Dispatch. She is internally quoting members of the American
Meteorological Society and Ann Kelly, who teaches graduate level courses on oceanography for high school teachers. Southern
Ocean debate buoys teachers' role in classroom St Louis Post Dispatch January 05, 2011
http://www.stltoday.com/news/science/southern-ocean-debate-buoys-teachers-role-in-classroom/article_3f5fd0e4-e164-
50b1-8af3-b847ed1f7407.html

"It's the newest ocean," said Ann Kelly, a teacher at Bishop DuBourg High School who, as a member of the American
Meteorological Society, oversees a graduate-level course on oceanography for teachers. Kelly said most of the teachers
who take the courses come into class having never heard of the Southern Ocean. "Most people are like, 'Oh, I didn't know they called it that,'"
she said. What the International Hydrographic Organization defines as the Southern Ocean completely surrounds Antarctica and extends
upward to 60 degrees south latitude in an area where the cold waters of the Antarctic Circumpolar Current an ocean current that flows from
west to east around Antarctica meet the warmer waters of the north. While debate continues over whether the Earth has four or five
oceans, promoters of the latter say the Southern Ocean is the fourth-largest of the five (smaller than the Pacific, Atlantic and Indian, but larger
than the Arctic). "Oceanographers and meteorologists do consider it important and do consider it an ocean," Kelly said. But
other experts don't even agree that it officially exists. It's a dispute that shows not only how teachers can be thrust into
academic disagreements, but how those scientific debates can take time to trickle down to classrooms. Not official Among the
detractors of a formal designation is the National Geographic Society, which doesn't officially recognize the
Southern Ocean. But the respected body hasn't exactly closed the books on the concept either. Cindy Aitken,
a spokeswoman for the organization, said the newest edition of the National Geographic Atlas of the World says: "The
Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific Oceans merge into icy water around Antarctica. Some define this as an ocean, calling it the Antarctic
Ocean, Austral Ocean or Southern Ocean. While most accept four oceans, including the Arctic, there is no international agreement on the name
or extent of a fifth ocean. "In general, National Geographic recognizes the Southern Ocean as a scientific term
and not a oceanographic feature.


( ) We meet plan still searches a body of water if youd rather call that body
of water the Southern Indian Ocean or the Southern Pacific Ocean, its still
an ocean. We arent searching the Hudson Bay or the Great Lakes.

( ) Antarctic Affs still exist under their interpretation theyd just be run an
Southern Indian Ocean or Southern Pacific.

( ) Negs Expertise arg is wrong our NOAA cards cites experts from around
the world that do recognize the Southern Ocean. National Geographic are
outliers and arent better qualified.

( ) they overlimit the arbitrarily say we cant explore a body of water that
every country on Earth recognizes as an ocean. Under their standard, any
internet weirdo that said the Pacific Ocean wasnt an Ocean would get equal
footing. Creates a poor model for real world education.
( ) No ground loss we didnt run an Antarctic advantage. And, all of the same
Neg links apply regardless of the name of the body of water.


( ) Reasonability before competing interpretations any other stance causes a
race to the bottom that hurts topic-specific education.


A-to China Cplan


2AC Frontline
( ) Perm do both
( ) At best, they can only solve Advantage One. They dont boost US soft power
or effect the US Pivot towards Asia.
( ) Only US tech can solve thats our 1AC ev from Lamothe, Austin, and
Malaysia Kini.

( ) International Fiat is bad we have to prep for over 190 countries; its not
reciprocal we get one actor, so should they; creates non-Real world model
as no one person controls the levers of power in two countries.

( ) Chinese search and mapping wont solve technical problems.

NDTV 14
This is originally an Agence France-Presse Report New Delhi Television Limited (NDTV) is an Indian commercial broadcasting
television network Chinese Ship in Latest Glitch in MH370 Search Mission May 31, 2014
http://www.ndtv.com/article/world/chinese-ship-in-latest-glitch-in-mh370-search-mission-533823

A Chinese ship mapping the ocean floor ahead of an intensive underwater search for missing Flight MH370 was
returning to port today due to a technical problem, officials said. The massive Indian Ocean search for the Malaysia Airlines
plane, which disappeared on March 8 carrying 239 people including five Indians, has so far failed to find any sign of the Boeing 777. The
Chinese survey ship, Zhu Kezhen, was conducting a bathymetric survey - or mapping of the ocean floor - to help
experts determine how to carry out the next stage of the search on the previously unmapped ocean seabed. "Zhu Kezhen
suffered a defect to its multibeam echosounder and is coming into port to conduct the necessary repairs," Australia's Joint
Agency Coordination Centre said in a statement.






Extensions China wont find it, US key

( ) China wont find it plan is key.

Ho 14
Benjamin Ho is an Associate Research Fellow in the Multilateralism and Regionalism Program in the S. Rajaratnam School of
International Studies, Nanyang Technological University. His research interests include the study of multilateral institutions in
the Asia-Pacific region, US-China political relations, and national security issues. Benjamin a Masters degree in International
Relations from NTU. MH370: Limits of Chinas Soft Power RSIS COMMENTARIES, S. Rajaratnam School of International
Studies This piece was also carried by the New Straits Times March 31
st

http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS0592014.pdf

Despite Chinas growing regional influence, it would seem that at the end of the day, Western involvement and
assistance is needed, especially when it comes to the use of technology in complex search missions.
According to the Straits Times China specialist Ching Cheong, what the MH370 incident revealed about Chinas power status in the region is not
encouraging as countries were reluctant to share information with it. Given Malaysias influential position in ASEAN, it is likely that the
Malaysian approach looking to the West, instead of China is representative of an overall ambivalence of the ASEAN community when it
comes to working with China, especially when it concerns sharing of technical information that could possibly impinge on national security and
intelligence-gathering capabilities. The fact that China does not enjoy the trust of its neighbours also raises the question to what extent its
global aspirations are viewed favourably by the rest of the region. In the case of MH370, China has contributed
considerable assets in searching for the aircraft. Yet none of these assets possess the technological
sophistication needed to undertake a mission as difficult as the current search for the missing airliner
- a sign that Chinas much- vaunted military modernisation programme still has some way to go before it matches
that of its Western counterparts. Unless Beijing is concealing its true capabilities something
unimaginable in such circumstances - regional countries would still turn to the West, if not always, for
leadership, at least for its technical competence and know-how, even on territory that China claims.


2AC Spending

Note

1AR extensions for most of these arguments are available in the spending core.


2AC Frontline

( ) Their Moore ev says the economy withstood over one-trillion in spending
during Obamas first term. Disad is empirically false.

( ) Plans under 1.5 million not even .01% of current debt
Time 13
Navy Goes to Great Depths to Determine Cause of Air Force Crash By Mark Thompson-Pulitzer Prize-winning
reporter for Time, 1/10/13, http://nation.time.com/2013/01/10/navy-goes-to-great-depths-to-determine-cause-
of-air-force-cause/

Getting to the downed craft was no small undertaking. According to the company: In early August 2012, at the direction of the Naval
Sea Systems Commands Director of Ocean Engineering, Supervisor of Salvage and Diving (SUPSALV), Phoenix mobilized the
Navys ORION deepwater side scan sonar system, the CURV 21 remotely operated vehicle (ROV), and the Navys motion compensated,
30,000 pound Fly-Away Deep Ocean Salvage System (FADOSS). All equipment was transported over land from Phoenixs facility in Largo,
Maryland to Dover Air Force Base in Delaware. From there, military transport aircraft moved the equipment to Hawaii, where the gear was
loaded aboard USNS Navajo (T-ATF 169). After a 10-day transit to the crash site, underwater search operations commenced using the Navys
20,000 fsw [feet of seawater] depth search system, ORION. After searching the initial planned search area spanning a 2 x 4 nautical mile (nm)
area, search operations shifted to another high-probability area and the suspected F-16 debris field was quickly identified. Next, Phoenix
personnel deployed the CURV 21 deepwater ROV system and conducted a detailed video survey of the area in which several high priority items,
including the Flight Data Recorder and engine, were identified. Over the next 10 days, the Phoenix team piloted the CURV 21
ROV through 12 dives and recovered all critical items desired by the embarked accident investigating
board. Phoenix spokesman Peter LeHardy says his company has a Navy contract for such work as deep as
20,000 feet. It does the work with Navy gear it maintains and operates. Recovering the F-16 was well within our capabilities, he
adds. Our deepest effort to date was a recovery of a subsea sensor back in 2010, at a depth of 18,558
feet. The Navy said the operation cost it $1.4 million.

( ) Not unique Econ low now. Prefer future predictive ev.

Kohl 5/27
{David, professor emeritus in the Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics (Virginia Tech),
two-time recipient of the American Agricultural Economics Associations Outstanding Teaching Award,
Economic Indicators and Confusing Signals, Corn and Soybean Digest: Road Warrior, 2014,
http://cornandsoybeandigest.com/blog/economic-indicators-and-confusing-signals#THUR}

The U.S. economy is showing mixed signals . The lead economic index (LEI) which foretells the future of the economy has been
increasing in recent months, most recently up 0.4%, which is bullish for the economy. Sixty percent of the factors that make up the LEI are
exhibiting positive signs. The purchasing manager index (PMI) also illustrates a positive growth oriented economy for the next few months. The
readings have consistently been above 50, a metric that suggests an expanding economy. Another positive sign is 78.6% factory capacity
utilization. For comparison, at the height of the great economic recession of 2009, this figure dropped to 68%, the lowest ever recorded.
Confusing Signals Despite the forward-looking good news, housing, which is a pivotal part of the economy,
is still struggling. With one in seven jobs in America tied to housing, this engine of the economy is improving
at a modest pace. Ideally, housing starts range between 1.1 million and 1.5 million annually. In recent months, this
metric has been in the 900,000 range, and it increased to 1.072 million in April. Reasons for the struggle include higher
mortgage rates, students with over $1 trillion of student loan debt collectively, increased regulation of mortgage lenders,
the desire to rent rather than own a home, and affordability of housing with flattening or reduced wage scales.
Another area of the economy that is struggling is unemployment. While the rate has declined to 6.3%,
the U-6 unemployment rate which includes the long-term unemployed, discouraged workers and people mismatched in the workforce is
at 12.3%. While many jobs are available, the particular skill sets needed may not be available, creating
a gap. This is particularly true in the agriculture industry with more use of technology and innovation, which requires a highly skilled
agricultural workforce. Oil prices remain stubbornly high impacting consumer purchases. Copper prices, a
bellwether of world economic growth and inflation, have declined by approximately 25% year-over-year. Yes, first quarter
gross domestic product (GDP) growth was a paltry 0.1%. Everyone he is blaming the winter weather, but there
may be other factors involved. Further tracking of economic indicators in the summer and fall may provide a clear path, but for
now the economy is muddling along!

( ) Deficit spending good also proves Neg link is epistemologically biased.
Krugman 13
Dwindling Deficit Disorder PAUL KRUGMAN- NY Times, PHD at MIT, Nobel Prize winner, best economist everrrrrr,
March 10, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/11/opinion/krugman-dwindling-deficit-disorder.html?_r=1&

For three years and more, policy debate in Washington has been dominated by warnings about the dangers of budget deficits. A
few lonely economists have tried from the beginning to point out that this fixation is all wrong, that deficit spending is actually appropriate in a
depressed economy. But even though the deficit scolds have been wrong about everything so far
where are the soaring interest rates we were promised? protests that we are having the wrong conversation have consistently fallen on
deaf ears. Whats really remarkable at this point, however, is the persistence of the deficit fixation in the face of
rapidly changing facts. People still talk as if the deficit were exploding, as if the United States budget were on an unsustainable
path; in fact, the deficit is falling more rapidly than it has for generations, it is already down to sustainable levels, and it is too small
given the state of the economy. Start with the raw numbers. Americas budget deficit soared after the
2008 financial crisis and the recession that went with it, as revenue plunged and spending on unemployment benefits and other safety-net programs rose. And this rise
in the deficit was a good thing ! Federal spending helped sustain the economy at a time when the
private sector was in panicked retreat ; arguably, the stabilizing role of a large government was the
main reason the Great Recession didnt turn into a full replay of the Great
Depression. But after peaking in 2009 at $1.4 trillion, the deficit began coming down. The Congressional Budget Office expects
the deficit for fiscal 2013 (which began in October and is almost half over) to be $845 billion. That may still sound like a big number, but given the state of the economy it really isnt. Bear
in mind that the budget doesnt have to be balanced to put us on a fiscally sustainable path; all we
need is a deficit small enough that debt grows more slowly than the economy. To take the classic
example, America never did pay off the debt from World War II in fact, our debt doubled in the 30
years that followed the war. But debt as a percentage of G.D.P. fell by three-quarters over the same
period. Right now, a sustainable deficit would be around $460 billion. The actual deficit is bigger than that. But according to new
estimates by the budget office, half of our current deficit reflects the effects of a still-depressed economy. The cyclically adjusted deficit what the
deficit would be if we were near full employment is only about $423 billion, which puts it in the
sustainable range ; next year the budget office expects that number to fall to just $172 billion. And thats why
budget office projections show the nations debt position more or less stable over the next decade. So we do not, repeat do not , face any kind of
deficit crisis either now or for years to come. There are, of course, longer-term fiscal issues: rising health costs and an aging population will put the
budget under growing pressure over the course of the 2020s. But I have yet to see any coherent explanation of why these longer-run concerns should determine budget policy right now. And
as I said, given the needs of the economy, the deficit is currently too small. Put it this way: Smart fiscal policy involves having the government
spend when the private sector wont, supporting the economy when it is weak and reducing debt
only when it is strong. Yet the cyclically adjusted deficit as a share of G.D.P. is currently about what it
was in 2006, at the height of the housing boom and it is headed down. Yes, well want to reduce
deficits once the economy recovers , and there are gratifying signs that a solid recovery is finally under
way. But unemployment, especially long-term unemployment, is still unacceptably high. The boom,
not the slump, is the time for austerity, John Maynard Keynes declared many years ago. He was right all you have
to do is look at Europe to see the disastrous effects of austerity on weak economies. And this is still nothing like a
boom. Now, Im aware that the facts about our dwindling deficit are unwelcome in many quarters. Fiscal fearmongering is a major industry
inside the Beltway, especially among those looking for excuses to do what they really want, namely
dismantle Medicare, Medicaid and Social Security. People whose careers are heavily invested in the
deficit-scold industry dont want to let evidence undermine their scare
tactics ; as the deficit dwindles, were sure to encounter a blizzard of bogus numbers purporting to
show that were still in some kind of fiscal crisis. But we arent . The deficit is indeed dwindling, and
the case for making the deficit a central policy concern, which was never very strong given low
borrowing costs and high unemployment , has now completely vanished.


( ) US Economy is resilient

Perez 13
{Tom, US Secretary of Labor, former law professor (Maryland), M.A. Public Policy (Harvard), Ph.D. in Law
(Harvard), The Resilience of the American Economy, US Department of Labor, 11/8,
http://social.dol.gov/blog/the-resilience-of-the-american-economy/#THUR}

The American economy is resilient . Octobers jobs report demonstrates continued steady growth ,
with the addition of 212,000 total private sector jobs in October. The unemployment rate, which fell in September to a nearly-five
year low of 7.2 percent, remains essentially unchanged at 7.3 percent, while American manufacturers added
19,000 jobs in the month of October. But while American businesses continue to add jobs 7.8 million over the last 44
months of private sector job growth they do so in spite of Congress , not because of it. Octobers job growth was
undoubtedly restrained by the brinksmanship and uncertainty created by the federal government
shutdown and the near-default on the nations debt. The American economy is resilient, but it is not
immune to manufactured crises. We see signs that suggest the shutdown had a discouraging effect on
Americas continued recovery. We remain concerned about the drop in the labor force participation rate, and American workers on
temporary layoffs rose by nearly 448,000, the largest monthly increase in the history of that series of data. The American people
deserve leadership that focuses on growing the economy not holding it hostage. Lets keep our eye on the ball by passing
immigration reform, which has bipartisan support and would inject a trillion dollars into the economy, and investing in infrastructure upgrades
that would create thousands of middle class jobs right now. Instead of erecting political roadblocks, lets work together to pave bipartisan roads
to full recovery. Todays employment numbers are a reminder that while the economy continues to grow
and create new jobs , it remains on uncertain footing. Too many Americans still find the rungs on the ladder of
opportunity beyond their reach. We need to move forward with common-sense proposals that will create jobs, strengthen the middle class,
reduce our deficit and expand opportunity for American families. The president and I stand ready to work with Congress to do just that.


( ) Economic decline wont cause war---best and most recent data confirms

Drezner 12 (Daniel W. Drezner, Professor, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts
University, October 2012, The Irony of Global Economic Governance: The System
Worked, http://www.globaleconomicgove rnance.org/wp-content/uploads/IR-Colloquium-MT12-
Week-5_The-Irony-of-Global-Economic-Governance.pdf

The final outcome addresses a dog that hasnt barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border
conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead
states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.37 Whether through greaterinternal
repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict , there were genuine concerns
that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea,
and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fuel impressions of surge in global public disorder. The aggregate data suggests
otherwise , however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has constructed a Global Peace Index annually since 2007. A key conclusion
they draw from the 2012 report is that The average level ofpeacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in
2007. 38 Interstateviolence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis as have
military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm thatthe Great Recession has not
triggered any increase in violent conflict; the secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been
reversed.39 Rogers Brubaker concludes, the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or
ethnic exclusion that might have been expected.40 None of these data suggest that the global economy is operating
swimmingly. Growth remains unbalanced and fragile, and has clearly slowed in 2012. Transnational capital flows remain depressed compared
to pre-crisis levels, primarily due to a drying up of cross-border interbank lending in Europe. Currency volatility remains an ongoing concern.
Compared to the aftermath of other postwar recessions, growth in output, investment, and employment in the developed world have all lagged
behind. But the Great Recession is not like other postwar recessions in either scope or kind; expecting a standard V-shaped recovery was
unreasonable. One financial analyst characterized the post-2008 global economy as in a state of contained depression.41 The key word is
contained, however. Given the severity, reach and depth of the2008 financial crisis, the proper comparison
is with Great Depression. And by that standard, the outcome variables look impressive. As Carmen Reinhart
and Kenneth Rogoff concluded in This Time is Different: that its macroeconomic outcome has been only the most severe global recession since
World War II and not even worse must be regarded as fortunate.42



1AR Extensions (Tylers Speech)

Overview

Then on the overview, they say that they win on magnitude because they get to
extinction, but food insecurity also leads to nuke war, which will cause
extinction. Countries become desperate for supplies and people don't think
straight. They are more willing to take drastic measures, which will lead to
disaster.

Hungry African 2017
Wow im hungry, im gonna start a nuclear war. This happens much more than people think. This is
definitely going to lead to extinction.


also ignoring food insecurity is immoral. Food insecurity leads to much worse
forms of structural violence like rape and stealing and more starving. You
have a moral obligation to try to help these people because they are actually
going to be hurting instead of some super unprobable nuclear war scenario.

We have the more probable impact because this stuff is real

We also have a faster timeframe because overfishing is happening now and
overfishing spirals

2ac 2 plan is under 1.5 million
Extend 2ac #2, Time 13 Plan only costs 1.4 million because they have used the drone for similar reasons
before and it only cost 1.4mill. This means it doesn't trigger the link, there is no link.
TS:
They say our card talks about a completely different dive and that ours would
require a top. scan but it still uses the same drone and the previous dive could
have used a top scan as well.

They say their Yan 14 Card should be preferred because it actually uses real estimates of
countries involved. The card talks about Malaysia, China, and Australia debating next steps to
find MH370, the problem with this card is that we are debating US subs, these subs are owned by
the US. The other countries the card focuses on dont have a lot of say in how the US spends it
money.

They say their card actually uses real estimates unlike the Aff but our estimates come
from the US navy, the actual pilates and owners of the sub, also one dive is all thats needed to get
a good estimate of future costs as top. scan costs just need to be added.

2ac 3 non unique econ low now
Extend 2AC #3, Khol 5/27 sais: Econ low now because the economy is struggling. This means if the
economy is low now, There will be no war.

They say-Economy is booming Kruger 6/6
1. Unemployment is at %12.3 because the economy is muddling along .
2. Oil, housing, and other prices are high because the economy is struggling and no one has any
money.
3. GDP is at 0.1% because there is no money to increase product.


2ac 4 deficit spending good
Extend 2ac #4, Krugman 13 says deficit spending good because it is necessary for a depressing economy
to have deficit spending. This means internal link turn.
They say that fiscal austerity is key to econ growth.
1. Krugman13 says that our economy is depressing and it is appropriate that deficit spending
should be implemented. Deficit spending good because no negative effects,
2. Its correlation vs causation they both may be happening at the same time, but the econ is not
getting better because of fiscal austerity.
3. Then they say that they control uniqueness because the econ is good and there is relatively little
spending, but one is not caused by the other. If anything, this economic recovery is a result of the
large amounts of spending that happened during obamas first term. Things don't affect each other
immediately, these things take time. And there hasn't been fiscal austerity until very recently, so it
cant have made this econ recovery session.
2ac 5 US econ resilient
Extend Perez 13, They say econ. fragile but Perez 13 says the They do so in spite of Congress, , not
because of it. Octobers job growth was undoubtedly restrained by the brinksmanship and uncertainty
created by the federal government shutdown and the near-default

2ac 6 econ decline doesnt cause war
Extend 2AC #6 Drezner 8/12 Says Econ. decline wont cause war because great depression didnt cause
war and we a society has changed to not allow large scale war.
They say Economy is regressing to 1914 levels therefore war will ensue but there is no surge in
nationalism which defined WW1.
They say perception James 13 causes instability but Drezner 12 says that there is no surge in bad
perception because the Interstate violence has declined.
They say economic collapse will cause global instability but the authors Harris and Burrows wrote this in
2009 while my card is 2012 while many things have changed in 3 years.



2AC vs. Politics Disad NSA Reform

Note

Since the Neg can run many modules I did not put impact answers in this frontline. Aff should place
those in the 2AC based on the choice of 1NC module.

Also, there are backlines to everything some are in the NSA Core file and others are in the politics
internal links core.




2AC
( ) Not unique Senate will modify bill now
Hattem, 5/24
Julian, Reporter @ The Hill covering tech policy, 5/24/14, http://thehill.com/policy/technology/207143-
nsa-reform-to-be-senate-fight-of-the-summer

NSA reform to be fight of the summer Civil libertarians who say the House didnt go far enough to reform the National
Security Agency are mounting a renewed effort in the Senate to shift momentum in their direction. After compromises in the
House bill, the NSAs critics are buckling down for a months-long fight in the Senate that they hope will lead to an end to government snooping
on Americans. This is going to be the fight of the summer, vowed Gabe Rottman, legislative counsel with the American Civil Liberties Union. If
advocates are able to change the House bills language to prohibit NSA agents from collecting large quantities of data, then thats a win, he
added. The bill still is not ideal even with those changes, but that would be an improvement, Rottman said. The USA Freedom Act was
introduced in both the House and Senate last autumn, after Edward Snowdens revelations about the NSAs operations captured headlines
around the globe. Privacy advocates like the ACLU rallied around the bill as the way to rein in the spy agency and more than 150 lawmakers
signed on as cosponsors in the House. In recent weeks, though, advocates worried that it was being progressively watered down. First, leaders
on the House Judiciary Committee made changes in order to gain support from a broader cross-section of the chamber. Then, after it sailed
through both the Judiciary and Intelligence Committees, additional changes were made behind closed doors that caused many
privacy groups and tech companies such as Microsoft and Apple to drop their support. When it passed the House
303-121 last week, fully half of the bills original cosponsors voted against it. We were of course very disappointed at the weakening of the
bill, said Robyn Greene, policy counsel at the New America Foundations Open Technology Institute. Right now we really are turning our
attention to the Senate to make sure that doesnt happen again. Instead of entirely blocking the governments ability to collect bulk amounts
of data, critics said that the new bill could theoretically allow federal agents to gather information about an entire area code or region of the
country. One factor working in the reformers favor is the strong support of Senate Judiciary Chairman
Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.). Unlike House Judiciary Chairman Bob Goodlatte (R-Va.), who only came to support the bill after negotiations to produce a
managers amendment, Leahy was the lead Senate sponsor of the USA Freedom Act. The fact that Leahy
controls the committee gavel means he should be able to guide the bill through when it comes up for
discussion next month, advocates said. The fact that he is the chairman and its his bill and this is an issue that
he has been passionate about for many years is comforting, Greene said. I think this is something he really wants to
see get done. He wants to see it get done right. And he wants to see that Americans are confident that their privacy is being adequately
protected, she added. Moments after the House passed its bill, Leahy issued a statement praising the action but said he
was disappointed that some meaningful reforms were not included. Other surveillance critics such
as Sens. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.), Rand Paul (R-Ky.), Mark Udall (D-Colo.) and Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.) expressed similar
dissatisfaction with the House effort. Their sentiments should be buoyed by the swift outrage from
civil liberties advocates on both sides of the aisle , reformers hoped.


( ) Regardless of details passage of some NSA reform bill is inevitable

Jakes, 14 (Lara, senior national security and diplomatic affairs writer for AP, former foreign correspondent and chief of bureau in
Baghdad, Bloomberg Business News, 1/18, http://www.businessweek.com/ap/2014-01-18/obama-fuels-reform-on-some-but-not-all-nsa-
spying)
Obama fuels reform on some but not all NSA spying President Barack Obama's orders to change some U.S. surveillance practices put the
burden on Congress to deal with a national security controversy that has alarmed Americans and outraged foreign allies. Yet he avoided major
action on the practice of sweeping up billions of phone, email and text messages from across the globe. In a speech at the Justice Department
on Friday, Obama said he was placing new limits on the way intelligence officials access phone records from
hundreds of millions of Americans and was moving toward eventually stripping the massive data collection from the government's hands.
His promises to end government storage of its collection of data on Americans' telephone calls and require judicial review to examine
the data were met with skepticism from privacy advocates and some lawmakers. But Obama has made it
nearly impossible for reluctant leaders in Congress to avoid making some changes in the U.S. phone
surveillance they have supported for years. Obama admitted that he has been torn between how to protect
privacy rights and how to protect the U.S. from terror attacks what officials have called the main purpose of the spy programs. "The
challenge is getting the details right, and that is not simple," he said. His speech had been anticipated since former National Security Agency
analyst Edward Snowden made off with an estimated 1.7 million documents related to surveillance and other NSA operations and gave them to
several journalists around the world. The revelations in the documents touched off a public debate about whether Americans wanted to give up
some privacy in exchange for intelligence-gathering on terror suspects. The president said his proposals "should give the American people
greater confidence that their rights are being protected, even as our intelligence and law enforcement agencies maintain the tools they need to
keep us safe." Obama acknowledged more needs to be done, but he largely left it to Congress to work out the details. The NSA says it does not
listen in on the phone calls or read the Internet messages without specific court orders on a case-by-case basis. But intelligence officials do
collect specific information about the calls and messages, such as how long they lasted, to try to track communications of suspected terrorists.
Plans to end the sweep of phone records have been building momentum in Congress among both
liberal Democrats and conservative Republicans.


( ) Not-unique Attention on Obama scandals crushes his political capital
now.

Stevens 14
Internally quoting Rhodes Cook, a political analyst, contributor to Politico, and publisher of the bimonthly political newsletter
The Rhodes Cook Letter. Matt Stevens is an Editorial writer for Republican-American. He holds a B.A. in political science and
an M.A. in print journalism and public affairs. Will Obama ever be popular again? Republican American June 9th, 2014
http://blogs.rep-am.com/worth_reading/2014/06/09/will-obama-ever-be-popular-again/

Mr. Cook pinned the presidents popularity woes on lingering economic problems, distaste for the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, and the scandals that have dogged the Obama administration. He declared it is not impossible,
but unlikely Mr. Obama will be able to stage a comeback. Read about it all here. I think Mr. Cooks intuition is right on the
money. If something happens to erode confidence in a president early in his second term, the lame-duck
nature of Round 2 makes it difficult to climb out of the hole. In Mr. Obamas case, not long after he was re-elected in 2012,
many Americans came to see his administration as an incompetent group of political tricksters, because of the
aforementioned debacles. Given that the resulting approval-ratings slump hasnt reversed itself, it seems this narrative is set in stone.
Since Mr. Obamas political capital diminishes by the day , it seems there is little he can do to change no pun intended
things. Indeed, his second-term situation is analogous to that of his predecessor, George W. Bush.


( ) Turn Plan Resurrects the 370 story. That successfully distracts media
focus on Obamas scandals.

TYT 14
TYT Network, The Young Turks Network, is a Multi-Channel Network of online video talk shows, consisting mostly of TYT
owned-and-operated shows and a select group of outside partners. The network generates over 68 million views per month.
MH370 Obama Connection Found (By Fox News) March 25
th
, 2014 http://liberalvideo.com/2014/03/25/mh370-obama-
connection-found-by-fox-news/


Now Bill OReilly is sounding desperate. How many times now since the start of the Malaysia Airlines story has
he devoted a segment to hammering the media mainly CNN for obsessing over the missing jetliner?
Were starting to lose count. In any case, OReillys answer to CNNs wall-to-wall reporting on the story is wall-to-wall whining about
its coverage of the story. Backed up by a nice helping of sanctimony, that is: In last nights sermon, OReilly slighted the networks
for steering clear of Benghazi, Libya, and the IRS in favor of the more neutral MH370.

( ) No link plan wouldnt cost political capital in the Senate. Senate is
majority Democrats but their link assumes fiscal conservatives who dont
want to spend big bucks on the plan.

( ) Political capital doesnt exist and isnt key to their DA. Winners Win is
more true.
Michael Hirsch, chief correspondent for National Journal. He also contributes to 2012 Decoded. Hirsh previously served as
the senior editor and national economics correspondent for Newsweek, based in its Washington bureau. He was also
Newsweeks Washington web editor and authored a weekly column for Newsweek.com, The World from Washington. Earlier
on, he was Newsweeks foreign editor, guiding its award-winning coverage of the September 11 attacks and the war on terror.
He has done on-the-ground reporting in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other places around the world, and served as the Tokyo-based
Asia Bureau Chief for Institutional Investor from 1992 to 1994. http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-
thing-as-political-capital-20130207

On Tuesday, in his State of the Union address, President Obama will do what every president does this time of year. For about 60 minutes, he will lay out a sprawling and ambitious wish list highlighted by gun control and immigration reform, climate change and debt reduction. In
response, the pundits will do what they always do this time of year: They will talk about how unrealistic most of the proposals are, discussions often informed by sagacious reckonings of how
muchpolitical capital Obama possesses to push his program through. Most of this talk will have no bearing
on what actually happens over the next four years. Consider this: Three months ago, just before the November election, if someone hadtalked seriously
about Obama having enough political capital to overseepassage of both immigration reformand gun-control legislation at the beginning of his second termeven after winning the
election by 4 percentage points and 5 million votes (the actual final tally)this person would have been called crazy and stripped of his pundits license. (It doesnt exist, but it ought to.) In his first
term, in a starkly polarized country, the president had been so frustrated by GOP resistance that he finally issued a limited executive order last August permitting immigrants who entered the country illegally as children to work without fear of deportation for at least two years.
Obama didnt dare to even bring up gun control, a Democratic third rail that has cost the party elections and that actually might have been even less popular on the right than the presidents health
care law. And yet, for reasons that have very little to do with Obamas personal prestige or popularityvariously put in terms of a mandate or political
capitalchances are fair that both will now happen. What changed? In the case of gun control, of course, it wasnt the
election. It was the horror of the 20 first-graders who were slaughtered in Newtown, Conn., in mid-December. The sickening reality of little girls and boys riddled with bullets from a high-capacity assault weapon seemed to precipitate a sudden tipping point in the
national conscience. One thing changed after another. Wayne LaPierre of the National Rifle Association marginalized himself with poorly chosen comments soon after the massacre. The pro-gun lobby, once a phalanx of opposition, began to fissure into reasonables and crazies. Former
Rep. Gabrielle Giffords, D-Ariz., who was shot in the head two years ago and is still struggling to speak and walk, started a PAC with her husband to appeal to the moderate middle of gun owners. Then she gave riveting and poignant testimony to the Senate, challenging lawmakers: Be
bold. As a result, momentum has appeared to build around some kind of a plan to curtail sales of the most dangerous weapons and ammunition and the way people are permitted to buy them. Its impossible to say now whether such a bill will pass and, if it does, whether it will make
anything more than cosmetic changes to gun laws. But one thing is clear: The political tectonics have shifted dramatically in very little time. Whole new possibilities exist now that didnt a few weeks ago. Meanwhile, the Republican members of the Senates so-called
Gang of Eight are pushing hard for a new spirit of compromise on immigration reform, a sharp change after an election year in which the GOP standard-bearer declared he would make life so miserable for the 11 million illegal immigrants in the U.S. that they would
self-deport. But this turnaround has very little to do with Obamas personal influencehis political mandate, as it were. It has almost
entirely to do with just two numbers: 71 and 27. Thats 71 percent for Obama, 27 percent for Mitt Romney, thebreakdown of the Hispanic vote in the 2012 presidential election. Obama drove home his advantage by giving a
speech on immigration reform on Jan. 29 at a Hispanic-dominated high school in Nevada, a swing state he won by a surprising 8 percentage points in November. But the movement on immigration has mainly come
out ofthe Republican Partys recent introspection, and the realization by its more thoughtful members, such as Sen. Marco Rubio of Florida and Gov. Bobby Jindal of Louisiana, that without such a shift the party
may be facing demographic death in a country where the 2010 census showed, for the first time, that white births have fallen into the minority. Its got nothing to do with Obamas political capital or, indeed, Obama at all. The point is not that political capital is a meaningless term.
Often it is a synonymfor mandate or momentum in the aftermath of a decisive electionand just about every politician ever elected has tried to claimmore of a mandate than he actually has. Certainly, Obama can say that because he was elected and Romney wasnt, he has a better
claimon the countrys mood and direction. Many pundits still defend political capital as a useful metaphor at least. Its an unquantifiable but meaningful concept, says Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute. You cant really look at a president and say hes got 37 ounces
of political capital. But the fact is, its a concept that matters, if you have popularity and some momentumon your side. The real problem is that the idea of political capitalor mandates, or momentumis so poorly
defined that presidents and pundits often get it wrong. Presidents usually over-estimate it, says George Edwards, a presidential scholar at Texas A&MUniversity. The best kind of
political capitalsome sense of an electoral mandate to do somethingis very rare. It almost never happens. In 1964, maybe. And to some degree in 1980. For that reason, political capital is a concept that misleads far more than it enlightens. It is distortionary. It
conveys the idea that we know more than we really do about the ever-elusiveconcept of political power, and it discounts the way
unforeseen events can suddenly change everything . Instead, it suggests, erroneously, that a political figure has a concrete amount of political capital to invest, just as someone might have real
investment capitalthat a particular leader can bank his gains, and the size of his account determines what he can do at any given moment in history. Naturally, any president has practical and electoral limits. Does he have a majority in both chambers of Congress and a cohesive coalition
behind him? Obama has neither at present. And unless a surge in the economyat the moment, still stuckor some other great victory gives himmore momentum, it is inevitable that the closer Obama gets to the 2014 election, the less he will be able to get done. Going into the
midterms, Republicans will increasingly avoid any concessions that make him(and the Democrats) stronger. But the abrupt emergence of the immigration and gun-control issues illustrates how suddenly shifts in mood can occur and how political interests can align in new ways just as
suddenly. Indeed, the pseudo-concept of political capital masks a larger truth about Washington that is kindergarten simple: You just dont know what you can do until you try. Or as Ornstein himself once wrote years ago, Winning wins. In theory, and in practice,
depending on Obamas handling of any particular issue, even in a polarized time, he couldstill deliver on a lot of his
second-term goals, depending on his skill and the breaks. Unforeseen catalysts can appear, like Newtown. Epiphanies can dawn, such as when many Republican Party leaders suddenly woke up in panic to the
huge disparity in the Hispanic vote. Some political scientists who study the elusive calculus of how to pass legislation and run successful presidencies say that political capital is, at best, an empty concept, and
that almost nothing in the academic literature successfully quantifies or even defines it. It can refer to a very abstract thing, like
a presidents popularity, but theres no mechanism there. That makes it kind of useless, says Richard Bensel, a government professor at Cornell University. Even Ornstein concedes that the calculus is far more complex than the term suggests. Winning on
one issue often changes the calculation for the next issue; there is never any known amount of
capital. The idea here is, if an issue comes up where the conventional wisdomis that president is not going to get what he wants, and he gets it, then each time that happens, it changes the calculus of the other actors Ornstein says. If
they think hes going to win, they may change positions to get on the winning side. Its a bandwagon
effect. ALL THE WAY WITH LBJ Sometimes, a clever practitioner of power can get more done just because hes aggressive and knows the hallways of Congress well. Texas A&Ms Edwards is right to say that the outcome of the 1964 election, Lyndon Johnsons landslide
victory over Barry Goldwater, was one of the few that conveyed a mandate. But one of the main reasons for that mandate (in addition to Goldwaters i neptitude as a candidate) was President Johnsons masterful use of power leading up to that election, and his ability to get far more
done than anyone thought possible, given his limited political capital. In the newest volume in his exhaustive study of LBJ, The Passage of Power, historian Robert Caro recalls Johnson getting cautionary advice after he assumed the presidency from the assassinated John F. Kennedy in late
1963. Dont focus on a long-stalled civil-rights bill, advisers told him, because it might jeopardize Southern lawmakers support for a tax cut and appropriations bill s the president needed. One of the wise, practical people around the table [said that] the presidency has only a certain
amount of coinage to expend, and you oughtnt to expend it on this, Caro writes. (Coinage, of course, was what political capital was called in those days.) Johnson replied, Well, what the hells the presidency for? Johnson didnt worry about coinage, and he got the Civil Rights Act
enacted, along with much else: Medicare, a tax cut, antipoverty programs. He appeared to understand not just the ways of Congress but also the way to maximize the momentumhe possessed in the lingering mood of national grief and determination by picking the right issues, as Caro
records. Momentum is not a mysterious mistress, LBJ said. It is a controllable fact of political life. Johnson had the skill and wherewithal to realize that, at that moment of history, he could have unlimited coinage if he handled the politics right. He did. (At least until Vietnam, that is.)
And then there are the presidents who get the politics, and the issues, wrong. It was the last president before Obama who was just starting a second term, George W. Bush, who really revived the claimof political capital, which he was very fond of wielding. Then Bush promptly
demonstrated that he didnt fully understand the concept either. At his first news conference after his 2004 victory, a confident-sounding Bush declared, I earned capital in the campaign, political capital, and now I intend to spend it. Thats my style. The 43rd president threw all of his
political capital at an overriding passion: the partial privatization of Social Security. He mounted a full-bore public-relations campaign that included town-hall meetings across the country. Bush failed utterly, of course. But the problem was not that he didnt have enough political capital.
Yes, he may have overestimated his standing. Bushs margin over John Kerry was thinhelped along by a bumbling Kerry campaign that was almost the mirror image of Romneys gaffe-filled failure this timebut that was not the real mistake. The problem was that whatever credibility or
stature Bush thought he had earned as a newly reelected president did nothing to make Social Security privatization a better idea in most peoples eyes. Voters didnt trust the plan, and four years later, at the end of Bushs term, the stock-market collapse bore out the publics skepticism.
Privatization just didnt have any momentum behind it, no matter who was pushing it or how much capital Bush spent to sell it. The mistake that Bush made with Social Security, says John Sides, an associate professor of political science at George Washington University and a well-
followed political blogger, was that just because he won an election, he thought he had a green light. But there was no sense of any kind of public urgency on Social Security reform. Its like he went into the garage where various Republican policy ideas were hanging up and picked one. I
dont think Obamas going to make that mistake. Bush decided he wanted to push a rock up a hill. He didnt understand how steep the hill was. I think Obama has more momentum on his side because of the Republican Partys concerns about the Latino vote and the shooting at
Newtown. Obama may also get his way on the debt ceiling, not because of his reelection, Sides says, but because Republicans are
beginning to doubt whether taking a hard line on fiscal policy is a good idea, as the party suffers in the polls. THE REAL LIMITS ON POWER
Presidents are limited in what they can do by time and attention span, of course, just as much as they are by electoral balances in the House and Senate. But this, too, has nothing to do with political capital. Another well -worn meme of recent years was that Obama used up too much
political capital passing the health care law in his first term. But the real problem was that the plan was unpopular, the economy was bad, and the president didnt realize that the national mood (yes, again, the national mood) was at a tipping point against big-government intervention,
with the tea-party revolt about to burst on the scene. For Americans in 2009 and 2010haunted by too many rounds of layoffs, appalled by the Wall Street bailout, aghast at the amount of federal spending that never seemed to find its way into their pocketsgovernment-imposed
health care coverage was simply an intervention too far. So was the idea of another economic stimulus. Cue the tea party and what ensued: two titani c fights over the debt ceiling. Obama, like Bush, had settled on pushing an issue that was out of sync with the countrys mood. Unlike
Bush, Obama did ultimately get his idea passed. But the bigger political problem with health care reformwas that it distracted the governments attention from other issues that people cared about more urgently, such as the need to jump-start the economy and financial reform. Various
congressional staffers told me at the time that their bosses didnt really have the time to understand how the Wall Street lobby was riddling the Dodd-Frank financial-reformlegislation with loopholes. Health care was sucki ng all the oxygen out of the room, the aides said. Weighing the
imponderables of momentum, the often-mystical calculations about when the historic moment is ripe for an issue, will never be a science. It is mainly intuition, and its best practitioners have a long history in American politics. This is a tale told well in Steven Spielbergs hit movie Lincoln.
Daniel Day-Lewiss AbrahamLincoln attempts a lot of behind-the-scenes vote-buying to win passage of the 13th Amendment, banning slavery, along with eloquent attempts to move peoples hearts and minds. He appears to be using the political capital of his reelection and the turning of
the tide in the Civil War. But its clear that a surge of conscience, a sense of the changing times, has as much to do with the final vote as all the backroomhorse-trading. The reason I think the idea of political capital is kind of distorting is that it implies you have chits you can gi ve out to
people. It really oversimplifies why you elect politicians, or why they can do what Lincoln did, says Tommy Bruce, a former political consultant in Washington. Consider, as another example, the storied political career of President Franklin Roosevelt. Because the mood was ripe for
dramatic change in the depths of the Great Depression, FDR was able to push an astonishing array of New Deal programs through a largely compliant Congress, assuming what some described as near-dictatorial powers. But in his second term, full of confidence because of a landslide
victory in 1936 that brought in unprecedented Democratic majorities in the House and Senate, Roosevelt overreached with his infamous Court-packing proposal. All of a sudden, the political capital that experts thought was limitless disappeared. FDRs plan to expand the Supreme Court
by putting in his judicial allies abruptly created an unanticipated wall of opposition from newly reunited Republicans and conservative Southern Democrats. FDR thus inadvertently handed back to Congress, especially to the Senate, the power and influence he had seized in his first term.
Sure, Roosevelt had loads of popularity and momentum in 1937. He seemed to have a bank vault full of political capital. But, once again, a president simply chose to take on the wrong issue at the wrong time; this time, instead of most of the political interests in the country aligning his
way, they opposed him. Roosevelt didnt fully recover until World War II, despite two more election victories. In terms of Obamas second-termagenda, what all these shifting tides of momentum and political calculation mean is this: Anything goes. Obama has no more elections to win,
and he needs to worry only about the support he will have in the House and Senate after 2014. But if he picks issues that the countrys mood will supportsuch as, perhaps, immigration reformand gun controlthere is no
reason tothink he cant win far more victories thanany of the careful calculators of political capital now believe
is possible, including battles over tax reform and deficit reduction. Amid todays atmosphere of Republican self-doubt, a new, more mature Obama seems to be emerging, one who has his agenda clearly in mind and will ride the mood of the country more adroitly. If
he can get some early winsas he already has, apparently, on the fiscal cliff and the upper-income tax increasethat will create momentum, and one win
may well lead to others. Winning wins. Obama himself learned some hard lessons over the past four years about the falsity of the political -capital concept. Despite his decisive victory over John McCain in 2008, he
fumbled the selling of his $787 billion stimulus plan by portraying himself naively as a post-partisan president who somehow had been given the electoral mandate to be all things to all people. So Obama tried to sell his stimulus as a long-termrestructuring plan that would lay the
groundwork for long-termeconomic growth. The president thus fed GOP suspicions that he was just another big-government liberal. Had he understood better that the country was digging in against yet more government intervention and had sold the stimulus as what it mainly wasa
giant shot of adrenalin to an economy with a stopped heart, a pure emergency measurehe might well have escaped the worst of the backlash. But by laying on ambitious programs, and following up quickly with his health care plan, he only sealed his reputation on the right as a closet
socialist. After that, Obamas public posturing provoked automatic opposition fromthe GOP, no matter what he said. If the president put his personal imprimatur on any planfrom deficit reduction, to health care, to immigration reformRepublicans were virtually guaranteed to come
out against it. But this year, when he sought to exploit the chastened GOPs newfound willingness to compromise on immigration, his approach was different. He seemed to understand that the Republicans needed to reclaimimmigration reformas their own issue, and he was willing to
let themhave some credit. When he mounted his bully pulpit in Nevada, he delivered another new message as well: You Republicans dont have to listen to what I say anymore. And dont worry about whos got the political capital. Just take a hard look at where Im saying this: in a state
you were supposed to have won but lost because of the rising Hispanic vote. Obama was cleverly pointing the GOP toward conclusions that he knows it is already reaching on its own: If you, the Republicans, want to have any kind of a future in a vastly changed electoral map, you have no
choice but to move. Its your choice.


( ) Not intrinsic a logical policy maker could do both the plan and reform the
NSA in the manner the neg describes.


( ) PC not real- its a myth- vote based on ideology

Moraes 13
Frank Moraes is a freelance writer with broad interests. He is educated as a scientist with a PhD in
Atmospheric Physics. He has worked in climate science, remote sensing, and throughout the computer
industry. And he has taught physics. 1-8-2013 http://the-reaction.blogspot.com/2013/01/political-
capital-is-myth.html

Yesterday, Jonathan Chait metaphorically scratched his head: "Nominating Hagel Most Un-Obama Thing Ever." He can't understand this nomination given that (1)
Hagel will be a hard sell and (2) Obama doesn't much listen to his advisers anyway. It is interesting speculation, but I wouldn't have even thought about it had he not
written, "Why waste political capital picking a fight that isn't essential to any policy goals?" This brought to mind something
that has been on my mind for a while, as in posts like "Bipartisan Consensus Can Bite Me." I'm afraid that just like Santa Claus and most conceptions
of God, " Political Capital" is a myth. I think it is just an idea that Villagers find comforting. It is a neat
narrative in which one can straightjacket a political fight. Otherwise, it is just bullshit . Let's go back to late 2004, after Bush Jr was re-
elected. He said, "I earned capital in the political campaign and I intend to spend it." What was this thing that Bush intended
to spend? It is usually said that political capital is some kind of mandate from the masses. But that is clearly not what Bush meant. He got a mandate to fuck the
poor and kill the gays. But he used his political capital to privatize Social Security. One could say that this proves the point, but does anyone really think if Bush had
decided to use his political capital destroying food stamps and Medicaid that he would have succeeded any better? The truth was that Bush's political capital didn't
exist. Let's look at more recent events: the Fiscal Cliff. Obama didn't win that fight because the people who voted for him
demanded it. He won it because everyone knew that in the new year he would still be president. Tax rates were going up.
Boehner took the Fiscal Cliff deal because it was the best deal that he felt he could get. He didn't fold
because of some magic p olitical c apital that Obama could wave over him. There is no doubt that public opinion does affect how
politicians act. Even politicians in small safe districts have to worry that larger political trends may end up making them look stupid, out of touch, or just cruel. But
beyond that, they really don't care. If they did, then everyone in the House would now be a Democrat: after all, Obama won a mandate and the
associated p olitical c apital. But they don't, because presidential elections have consequences -- for who's in the White House. They don't
have much consequence for the representative from the Third District of California.



*** Note: insert impact answers as needed


Extensions Distractions Link Turn


370 traps the new cycle distracts from Obamas setbacks.

Finkelstein 14
Mark Finkelstein is a NewsBusters Senior Contributor. Morning Joe Goes All-In MH370: Better Than Broadcasting Obama's
Bungles NewsBusters March 20, 2014 http://newsbusters.org/blogs/mark-finkelstein/2014/03/20/morning-joe-goes-all-
mh370-better-discussing-obamas-bungles#ixzz34mLSYMim

You're MSNBC. That hurts I know, but work with me. So, what would you like to feature: President Obama getting
Putinized? Syria flouting the WMD agreement? Iran's inexorable march toward nukes? The ongoing Obamacare debacle?
Not so much. Say: why not make like CNN and go all in on MH-370? Which is precisely what Morning Joe did today. The first
103 minutes were devoted exclusively to the story of the missing plane, as an endless series of experts and
panelists speculated to no particular avail. Rare that we agree with Madeline Albright. But long into the second hour, duringfinallya Ukraine
segment, Albright said "I know we're all focused on the airplane," but suggesting that Ukraine is by far the more critical issue. Mika Brzezinski
reacted defensively. View the video after the jump. As soon as the Ukraine segment was over, it was back to MH370. As a small-plane pilot, I'm
normally fascinated by aviation stories in the news. But at this point, the endless jabber and surmise have turned me off to MH-370. Have NB
readers reached the saturation point too, at least until there's some hard news? MADELINE ALBRIGHT: We worked in the '90s to try to get
Russia to be a part of the system. We did everything we possibly could. And I think that they now are in a process of isolating themselves. It is
dangerous. This is a game changer. And I think -- I know we're all focused on the airplane . But the bottom line is, this
has really, truly long-term implications and we all need to focus on how to deal with Ukraine, how to deal with US-
European relations, try to get our economic treaties -- trade treaties done. And then focus on our relations with Russia. Turning point,
I'm very glad thATe "Time" has it on the cover, and I'm very glad to have been a part of this discussion.


Public still has huge appetite for the 370 story it will trap headlines.

IBT 14
Athena Yenko reporter working for International Business Times internally quoting CNN Worldwide President Jeff Zucker
MH370: CNNs Obsession with MH370 Coverage Explained May 12,
2014http://au.ibtimes.com/articles/552160/20140512/mh370-cnn-coverage-larry-king-obama.htm#.U56MgijcBXI


Apparently, it seemed that King was wrong as CNN Worldwide President Jeff Zucker said that it was the audience
who led CNN to how it is handling its reporting of MH370. Speaking with Mashable, Zucker explained that data
retrieved from three different analytics systems that CNN used, plus record of overnight TV ratings, led
the network to dwell on MH370 the way it did - intense. The data that the system tracked showed that the missing
plane's story sprang branches. The network then decided give a longer air time for MH370 coverage. "Clearly,
the audience has spoken and said that what CNN did was correct," Zucker said. "I think that if people want to be critical of CNN for
over-covering a story, that's totally fine with us." According to chart presented by Mashable, CNN's ratings were lower in 2013
until the network reported on MH 370. The significant boost in its 2014 ratings in March was attributed the
news surrounding the missing Malaysian plane. "We're looking at consumption patterns and trends
across the web, mobile, social and video, and then on third-party sites, looking at that and making decisions about
how we program for all platforms. You're seeing that start to come online and start to bear fruit with something like the Malaysian airline
story," KC Estenson, general manager of CNN Digital, explained.



Media will get sucked-back into news about 370.

Willies 14
Egberto Willies is an author, blogger, political activist and Executive Committee member of Move to Amend Bill Maher
equates America's Malaysia flight MH370 obsession to our political dysfunction Daily Kos May 03, 2014
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2014/05/03/1296709/-Bill-Maher-equates-America-s-Malaysia-flight-MH370-obsession-to-our-
political-dysfunction

Comedy and satire have the uncanny ability to tell stories in a nonthreatening manner. Done correctly they can be heard palatably. Bill Maher
takes Americas obsession with Malaysia Flight MH370 as a proxy for many of Americas dysfunctions. Many will only see the humor in the
piece. Subsequently the observed absurdities in the piece of what we do politically and otherwise are bound to self-reveal. That is why both Jon
Stewart and Bill Maher are so effective. Maher illustrates how Americas obsession with Malaysia is ill-placed given the
reality of flight travel. He notes that Americans are uninterested in knowing much about genetically modified foods, the
content of impactful legislation, the extent of polluters misbehavior, and many other issues. These issues have much more impact
on their daily lives. Yet these issues get very little scrutiny from the media. Granted, there are reasons for a
continuous effort to find MH370. We should want to know if there is some flaw in the plane that could affect the entire fleet.
However, given that these planes have been flying for years, empirically one can assume they are safe in the aggregate. Ultimately
Maher gets to the core of the American psychology . We have the need for complete closure. Is that a
mental disorder, intrinsically human, or the need to be all-knowing? It is likely all of the above. The side effects are palpable as Maher clearly
states.



Extensions Scandals = draining Obamas PC now
( ) Media distraction needed Obamas agenda currently dogged by negative
stories.

Oliphant 14
James Oliphant White House Correspondent for National Journal. Before joining National Journal, he was a correspondent
covering the 2012 presidential campaign for the Los Angeles Times and the Chicago Tribune, and also worked as a congressional
and legal affairs reporter for those newspapers. He is a former editor-in-chief of Legal Times in Washington. How Does a
Paralyzed President Move the Needle? National Journal June 12 http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/how-does-a-
paralyzed-president-move-the-needle-20140612

This was supposed to be a summer in which President Obama's political operation could work on fine-tuning its midterm message and making
the Democrats' case to voters. But as congressional races have started to heat up, the White House has consistently found
itself distracted and paralyzed by A Series of Unfortunate Events. Take this week. The administration rolled out
a student-loan initiative intended to provide relief to overburdened graduates while, ideally, also motivating some of them to come to
the polls in the fall to support Democrats. But White House aides instead found themselves still fending off questions
about the Bowe Bergdahl prisoner swap, a hoped-for feel-good moment that went bad in a hurry. Later in the week, a speech on
college affordability was overshadowed by bad news from Iraq, as events there swiftly seized the spotlight. Moreover, the two most-talked
about people of the week were Eric Cantor and Hillary Clinton, not the president of the United States. The rocky week came right
on the heels of a Veterans Administration scandal caught the White House flat-footed and amid a crisis in Ukraine that shows no
sign of abating despite the administration's best diplomatic efforts. To make matters worse, the steady economic progress that many had
anticipated this year has come only in dribs and drabs. And the president's approval rating remains mired in the low 40s, unlikely to rebound
soon. All of it has made crafting any sort of coherent stay-the-course message a challenge, to put it
mildly. Questions remain, too, about whether this White House is more committed to the president's liberal legacy than to backstopping
endangered Democrats. The Environmental Protection Agency's new power-plant regulations, for example, couldn't have landed at a worse
time for Sen. Mary Landrieu in Louisiana or Senate aspirant Alison Lundergan Grimes in Kentuckytwo embattled Democratic candidates in
fossil-fuel states. Nor has the administration shown any inclination to approve the Keystone XL pipeline any time soon, a move that would help
them and other candidates in similar straits.


2AC v. K Military Cloak

2AC frontline
( ) Logic disproves their whole K if the US is so power-hungry, make them
explain why the US pulled-out of the search. The plan is the same commitment,
but just with better tech. All of their impacts should have happened in March
& April when the US was searching.

( ) Perm do plan and reject imperial rationale. Humanitarian help can be
advanced without propping up violent imperialism.

GROVOGUI 13
Professor Siba N. GROVOGUI, Department of Political Science, The Johns Hopkins University The Missing Human
Intervention, Human Security, and Empire Jun 6, 2013 -
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=6&ved=0CEYQFjAF&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwiser.wits.ac.za
%2Fsites%2Fdefault%2Ffiles%2Fcivicrm%2Fcustom%2FGrovogui_The_Missing_Human_9f9a18a669741ee718ed991ab3a2e739.
pdf&ei=_s-fU7DVEYGbyASHt4KAAg&usg=AFQjCNFSsgdgQLJrMtuYR9yc_fvMnatB6A

I hasten to clarify that what is at stake here is not humanitarianism as a universal property but the propriety of the associated practices. To me, it is
indeed possible to envisage humanitarianism devoid of imperial rationality, one that matches in its rationality a
certain universal instrumentality: the need to assist others in need. From this perspective, humanitarianism is intended
to provide solidarity, security, and the instruments of life when the latter seem in doubt. However, humanitarianism
today is the fulfillment of an imperial design in which rebellious and faltering postcolonial entities are reconstituted as a reincarnation of the mythical Babylon and
thus in need of law and a re-insertion into a new metaphorical Jerusalem. It is in this context that one may legitimately ask in the context of real interventions
questions about the meaning and subject of solidarity; the extent and purpose of security; all the domains of the allowable human activity. This is to say that
concern about the instrumentalism or institutional relevancy of humanitarianism must be distinguished from ones attendant to
the instrumentalization of this very instrumentality in the context of actual interventions.

( ) Policy Framework first best teaches pragmatic change. And avoids
regress endless items become the nexus question discourages clash with
the other 99% of the Aff.

( ) Perm do plan and all non-competitive parts of the Alt.

( ) K is too sweeping. Humanitarian efforts like the plan can empower and the
Alt is nihilism.

Moore 2K
David Moore teaches Economic History and Development Studies at the University of Natal in Durban. Economic History and
Development Studies University of Natal at Durban Working Paper No. 24: Humanitarian agendas, state reconstruction and
democratisation processes in war-torn societies. The card is edited for abelist langauge
www.refworld.org/pdfid/4ff5843f2.pdf

But in the past few years, the discourse has become stronger: the humanitarian international cannot do the
right thing. The criticism comes close to asserting that reliance on private NGOs, the aid agencies of bloated western
states, and venal African lites to assist recovery from natural or political disasters is destructive from the moment of
conception. It claims that any activities from the well-meaning outside world leads to corruption at best, and
prolongation of war or disaster at worst. The HIs assist warlords through political, economic, and de facto diplomatic recognition by negotiating with them for
passage through insurgent controlled areas, or for access to airfields for the landing of food-bearing planes. The food in the planes is usually the wrong type, it ends
up making profit for the merchants who steal it or bribe aid officials to buy it, its cheap availability discourages small commodity producers from planting their seeds
for the next harvest and it benefits highly subsidised western agribusiness. The communities surrounding refugee camps are changed irreparably.82 Some
members of the HI (if one includes the evangelists in Mozambique who befriended Renamo in Mozambique) even sell arms to the insurgents they think are on the
right side of heavenly justice.83 All of these narratives fit seamlessly into a discourse of discontent: a discourse that says attempts to do good inevitably go wrong.
This world-view fits in with leftist cynicism asserting that nothing but a working class revolution (or perhaps the
perfect vanguard of a peasant-worker alliance) can set things right and all else serves capital or chaos. It tallies with realist non-
interventionism on the conservative side and with the state-centric right in the discipline and practice of international relations (this ideology lets venal lites do
what they want). It fits with laissez-faire economists, Ayn Randesque libertarians , and even small-liberal advocates of good-governance who
counsel the long road to institutional renewal and governmental capacity before trying anything else like popular renewal from below or dependency inducing and
corruption causing welfare from above. It is close to what Albert Hirschman has called the rhetoric of reaction : the three horsemen of perversity,
futility and jeopardy mean that paralysis (constant inaction) is the best answer.84 It is such a counsel of despair that one can almost
foresee the response to Peter Singers suggestion that Americans earning more than a basic-needs income of $US30,000 should give the rest away:85 it would
cause more harm than good leading to corruption, dependency, aid to warlords, inappropriate food etc. Similar arguments would be made about a Tobin tax.
The perverse logic of his argument leads de Waal to swing from modesty to grandiosity in his advocacy of changes to the humanitarian aid
regime. His humble measures are negative: he advises the HI not to obscure power relations, not to seek the media limelight, and not to claim long-term solutions
in situations of relief (de Waal condemns statements about justice and long-term development being served up by humanitarian actors86). These measures
seem to be Band-Aids stuck on to his relentless register of despair. Yet in spite of writing a whole book on humanitarianism as a mode of power
the reader is warned (rightly) that the HI has much less influence than arms manufacturers, civil servants in donor treasuries and a host of others87 but not
specifically the IFIs! On the more visionary scale, he ranges from suggesting choosing the committed political group of ones choice88 to advocating the
appointment of an ombudsperson89 or international auditor or commissioner.90 Between the utopian and the banal, he adds a third way of better public service
techniques akin to the discourse of good governance, and more reliance on African NGOs. Finally, de Waal appears to advance the cause of something that might
be called the political international which would tell the truth: both about the reality of politics and the limited HI role.91 Such advice ignores the
reality that while the humanitarian mode of power operates very state-like institutions are in being formed. They can become
instruments of democratisation. It is to one case study of such a process of governmentalisation that this paper now turns.

( ) Zero link to their military humanism arg. Their GROVOGUI ev is about
abusing humanitarianism to kill-to-save like Iraq or Afghanistan. The Aff
isnt close to that and the presumption is that the passengers arent alive,
rendering kill-to-save illogical.

( ) We impact turn their K. The Negs Seed, Kirk & Fukushima cards simply
posit the soft power and the pivot are bad our advantages prove they are all.

( ) Particularity first Best studies prove Chinas a risk in this specific context.

Ratner 14
(et al; Dr. Ely Ratner Senior Fellow and Deputy Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program, Center for a New American Security
Roiling the Waters Foreign Policy Jan-Feb http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/01/21/roiling_the_waters)
U.S. officials have been careful to avoid provoking a China that appears increasingly willing to flex its newfound military muscle. Perhaps that's
why Biden invoked his father's advice in warning on the eve of his Beijing visit that "the only conflict that is worse than one that is intended is
one that is unintended." But an overemphasis on stability can be dangerous. While preventing inadvertent
war in Asia is obviously a worthy goal, it is just as important to discourage China from believing that it
can employ economic, military, and diplomatic coercion to settle international disagreements without triggering
a serious response. Making the risk of escalation too low will at some point start running counter to
U.S. interests. Why? Because China is taking advantage of Washington's risk aversion by rocking the boat,
seeing what it can extract in the process, and letting the United States worry about righting it. Beijing's playbook of tailored coercion relies in
part on China's confidence that it can weather ephemeral international outrage while Washington takes responsibility for ensuring the situation
doesn't get out of control. This means that reducing the likelihood of escalation through high-level strategic
dialogues and military-to-military hotlines, however important, is in and of itself insufficient to curb Chinese
assertiveness. History has demonstrated the perils of focusing too much on stability at the expense
of deterrence. The Cuban missile crisis, the modern world's closest brush with the apocalypse, was precipitated by Soviet Premier Nikita
Khrushchev's perception that the United States, especially President John F. Kennedy, was overly concerned about stability and cooling tensions
between the superpowers. Khrushchev's sense that America could be pushed was formed by Kennedy's cautious reactions to assertive Soviet
moves toward Berlin, as well as Khrushchev's measure of Kennedy at the 1961 Vienna superpower summit as "weak" and accommodating.
Over the following year and a half, Khrushchev and the Soviet Union sought to exploit what they perceived to be shaky American resolve,
pressing in Berlin, where East Germany built a wall closing off the free part of the city, and secretly deploying nuclear-armed missiles to Cuba.
Only through a demonstrated willingness on the part of Kennedy to go to the nuclear brink -- with U.S. nuclear forces on high alert and U.S.
naval forces prepared to forcibly halt Soviet ships attempting to run the blockade (accompanied by a U.S. concession on missile deployments in
Turkey) -- was the United States able to get Moscow to back down. Needless to say, restraint and a willingness to negotiate were elemental to a
peaceful resolution of the crisis, but only in the context of a major mobilization of U.S. forces against Cuba, the elevation of the U.S. alert level
to Defcon 2 (one step short of nuclear war), and chilling threats designed to convince the Soviets that conciliation was the only viable move. OF
COURSE, CHINA IS NOT THE SOVIET UNION. And 2014 is not 1962. The point is simply that a country with the power of the USSR or China,
unsatisfied with features of the existing order, motivated to do something to change it, and skeptical of the resolve of the United States, could
well pursue a policy of coercion and brinkmanship, even under the shadow of nuclear weapons. As historian Francis Gavin has argued, the
whole history of the Cold War shows that countries like China -- and, at times, the United States -- can
bluff, coerce, and threaten their way to geopolitical gain. The worst way to deal with such a power is to
leave it with the impression that these approaches work. Just as the United States would have been far better off if
Kennedy, at the Vienna summit, had squelched Khrushchev's doubts about his resolve to defend Berlin, it will be far better if the leadership in
Beijing has the clear sense that the United States will meet each challenge to its and its allies' interests resolutely. Taking a cue from history,
the United States needs to inject a healthy degree of risk into Beijing's calculus, even as it searches for
ways to cooperate with China. This does not mean abandoning engagement or trying to contain China,
let alone fomenting conflict. But it does mean communicating that Beijing has less ability to control
escalation than it seems to think. China must understand that attempts to roil the waters could result in precisely the kinds of
costs and conflicts it seeks to avoid. To make this work, the United States should pursue policies that actually elevate the risks -- political,
economic, or otherwise -- to Beijing of acting assertively. On the high seas, the focal point for the region's territorial disputes, China has bullied
its neighbors by relying on non-military vessels. China is using its rapidly expanding coast guard to assert its expansive sovereignty claims by
harassing non-Chinese fishermen, oil companies, and military vessels that pass through contested waters in the East and South China seas. This
has the benefit of exploiting China's dominant numerical advantage while keeping the U.S. Navy on the sidelines. Washington should
blur the false distinction between non-military and military ships by stating that it will respond to
physical coercion and the use of force as deemed appropriate -- regardless of whether the perpetrator is a white- or gray-
hulled ship. Exercises that practice U.S. naval operations against aggressive non-military vessels would be a good place to start. So would calling
upon China to end its illegal occupation of the disputed Scarborough Shoal off the Philippine coast, while contesting Chinese administration
there by sending the U.S. Navy through the area to assert its right to freedom of navigation. The Chinese PLA Navy, for its part, hasn't been shy
to test the waters. In early December, the U.S. Pacific Fleet revealed that the guided-missile cruiser USS Cowpens, while shadowing China's new
aircraft carrier on a routine mission in international seas, was forced to take evasive action when a PLA Navy warship attached to the carrier
group approached on a collision course, literally forcing the cruiser into a game of chicken. "The Chinese knew what they were doing," a military
official told CNN. Beyond the sea, the United States must demonstrate a willingness to push back militarily when China attempts to coerce
America's allies and partners. To do this, the U.S. military needs capabilities and plans that not only prepare it for major war, but that also offer
plausible, concrete options for responding to Chinese attempts to exploit America's perceived aversion to instability. Leaders throughout Asia
will be watching. Too much caution, especially if China is clearly the initiator, may be read as U.S. weakness, thereby
perpetuating rather than diminishing China's incentives toward adventurism.





Optional Args to consider adding to 2AC

( ) Who is Tony Seed ?... He has no real quals and lacks the background to
explain the rationale behind the search.


***this one makes sense if they say China Threat, Representation K ***


( ) Reps K bad assumes Representational Determinism. Prefer the
particularized and surrounding context of HOW our reps were deployed.

Shim 14
(David Shim is Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations and International Organization of the University
of Groningen As part of the critique of visual determinism, this card internally quotes David D. Perlmutter, Ph.D.. He is Dean of
the College of Media & Communication at Texas Tech University. Before coming to Texas Tech, he was the director of the
School of Journalism and Mass Communication at the University of Iowa. As a documentary photographer, he is the author or
editor of seven books on political communication and persuasion. Also, he has written several dozen research articles for
academic journals as well as more than 200 essays for U.S. and international newspapers and magazines such as Campaigns &
Elections, Christian Science Monitor, Editor & Publisher, Los Angeles Times, MSNBC.com., Philadelphia Inquirer, and USA Today.
Routledge Book Publication Visual Politics and North Korea: Seeing is believing p.24-25)

Imagery can enact powerful effects, since political actors are almost always pressed to take action when confronted with images of atrocity and human suffering resultant from wars, famines
and natural disasters. Usually, humanitarian emergencies are conveyed through media representations, which indicate the
important role of images in producing emergency situations as (global) events (Benthall 1993; Campbell 2003b; Lisle 2009; Moeller 1999; Postman 1987). Debbie Lisle
(2009: 148) maintains that, 'we see that the objects, issues and events we usually study [. . .] do not even exist without the media [.. .+ to express them. As a consequence, visual images have
political and ethical consequences as a result of their role in shaping private and public ways of seeing (Bleiker. Kay 2007). This is because how people come to know, think about and respond
to developments in the world is deeply entangled with how these developments are made visible to them. Visual representations participate in the processes of how people situate themselves
in space and time, because seeing involves accumulating and ordering information in order to be able to construct knowledge of people, places and events. For example, the remembrance of
such events as the Vietnam War, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 or the torture in Abu Ghraib prison cannot be separated from the ways in which these events have been
represented in films, TV and photography (Bleiker 2009; Campbell/Shapiro 2007; Moller2007). The visibility of these events can help to set the conditions for specific forms of political action.
The current war in Afghanistan serves as an example of this. Another is the nexus of hunger images and relief operations. Vision and visuality thus become
part and parcel of political dynamics, also revealing the ethical dimension of imagery, as it affects the ways in which people interact with each other. However,
particular representations do not automatically lead to particular responses as, for instance,
proponents of the so-called 'CNN effect would argue (for an overview of the debates among academic, media and policy-making circles on the 'CNN
effect', see Gilboa 2005; see also. Dauber 2001; Eisensee/ Stromberg 2007; Livingston/Eachus 1995; O'Loughlin 2010; Perlmutter 1998, 2005; Robinson 1999, 20011. There is no
causal relationship between a specific image and a political intervention, in which a dependent
variable (the image) would explain the outcome of an independent one (the act). David Perlmutter (1998: I),
for instance, explicitly challenges, as he calls it, the 'visual determinism' of images, which dominates political and
public opinion. Referring to findings based on public surveys, he argues that the formation of opinions by individuals depends not on images but
on their idiosyncratic predispositions and values (see also, Domke et al. 2002; Perlmutter 2005).



( ) Imperial K backfires on OWN goals.

Hoare 6
Marko Attila Hoare is a Research Fellow at the Faculty of History, University of Cambridge. This is a review of the book Occidentalism: The West
in the Eyes of its Enemies by Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit, Atlantic Dissent Summer 2006
http://dissentmagazine.org/democratiya/article_pdfs/d5Hoare.pdf
The perfect is the enemy of the good this is a proverb that applies to the seductive but bankrupt ideology of anti-
imperialism, which presents itself as opposition to the most powerful form of oppression but which in
practice is something much less positive, indeed negative and reactionary. In simplest terms, imperialism
can be defined as a states pursuit of empire or the expansion of its power, through acquiring territory from, or power over, other states or
peoples. No reasonable person would not oppose this, but anti-imperialism today means something other than opposition to imperialism.
Imperialism, in the eyes of the average antiimperialist, is coterminous with the West, i.e. with the US and its West European and Israeli
allies. As such, it is used to refer to the bloc of states that dominates the world today, and there is undoubtedly something emotionally
appealing to the individual radical in apparently fighting that which is all-powerful. As an eighteen-year old Trotskyist and anti-imperialist at
the time of the 1991 Gulf War, I can testify to the empowering sense of self-righteousness I felt as I demonstrated against the US and its allies,
in the course of which my views became increasingly extreme: I fervently believed that the US-led intervention was by far a greater evil than
Saddams occupation of Kuwait; that it would be a blessing for humanity if the US and its allies were defeated; that such a defeat would trigger
revolutionary outbreaks across the Middle East and even in the West. Such were the views of a teenage zealot with no knowledge of the
Middle Eastern peoples or appreciation of their interests. I debated at the time with Kanan Makiya, the great Iraqi dissident, who shocked me
by saying that it was in Iraqs interests to be liberated by the US. Makiya derived his views from his great knowledge of Middle Eastern politics
and his love for the Iraqi people; I derived mine from abstract principles. It was only when my own mothers country, Yugoslavia, was torn apart
by local fascists that I gradually came to realise that Makiya had been right, and to comprehend the political and moral bankruptcy of anti-
imperialism. It is very easy to be ideologically purist when it is someone elses country that is at stake; much more difficult when it is ones own,
and ones own people are being slaughtered. For the rest of this article, for the sake of style, we shall drop the quote marks around the term
anti-imperialism. Yet, as Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit show in their fascinating, insightful and elegantly written introduction to the
philosophy of antiWesternism, the term tends not to mean opposition to imperialism, but something at once darker and fundamental to
modern political thought. What follows should not be taken as an attack on the small minority of decent, sincere anti-imperialists who
genuinely oppose oppression and injustice on an internationalist basis today anti-imperialists of this kind are very much the exception rather
than the rule. Before examining the theoretical meaning of anti-imperialism, it is worth listing at least twelve practical reasons why the
phenomenon, in its left-wing manifestation to which I once subscribed, is a negative one: 1) Anti-imperialism is impotent. The left-wing
radicals who describe themselves as anti-imperialists, and who engage in the unending, indiscriminate demonisation and denunciation of the
US and its allies, have no idea about how to defeat imperialism, nor any means to bring it about. The high-point of the
Western lefts anti-imperialism was probably the US defeat in the Vietnam war brought about in part by the anti-war demonstrations in the
West, it is true, but also by a set of fortuitous circumstances: the largeness of Vietnam as a country (with one quarter the population of the US);
the skill and dedication of the North Vietnamese / Vietcong resistance; and the support given by the Soviets and Chinese to the latter. Take
away such circumstances and anti-imperialism is a broken reed. Thirty years after its defeat in Vietnam, the US and liberal Western capitalism
are stronger than ever. Even the million-strong monster demonstration in London against the Iraq war failed to prevent British participation.
Anti-imperialism gives moral satisfaction to the anti-imperialist, but does not actually weaken or halt imperialism in any
way. 2) Anti-imperialism has no positive content. The socialists who opposed World War I, and the left-wing radicals who demonstrated
against the Vietnam War, did so in the belief that they were fighting for a better society one that the Bolshevik Revolution and the Communist
victory in Vietnam seemed to them to be heralding. Now that Communism has been discredited and there is no alternative to the Western
liberal-capitalist model on the horizon, the current generation of anti-imperialists continue to demonstrate against Western intervention and
the liberal-capitalist system, but without offering anything in return: the idealists have been transformed into
nihilists; their victory promises not a better, more just and egalitarian world, but the triumph of genocide in the Balkans and
fundamentalism in the Middle East, in return for a minor setback to our own democratically elected leaders. 3) Anti-imperialism is redundant. It
is perfectly possible to oppose acts of Western military intervention that one considers wrong, without subscribing to an antiimperialist
ideology. Rightly or wrongly, large segments of the Western elites opposed intervention in World Wars I and II and in the Vietnam War.
Opposition to the US intervention in Iraq united the British Conservative politicians Malcolm Rifkind, Douglas Hogg and Douglas Hurd; the
presidents of Russia and France; the currently ruling Spanish Socialists; and the Pope yet none of these is lumbered with an anti-imperialist
ideology. Nor does support for one act of Western intervention imply support for them all: Clare Short supported intervention in Kosovo but
opposed it in Iraq; Boris Johnson opposed it in Kosovo and supported it in Iraq; each justified their stance with reasoned arguments. Anti-
imperialism merely confuses the debate over the rightness or wrongness of a given act of intervention, by loading it with ideological baggage.
4) Anti-imperialism is based on a faulty theoretical model that owes more to Christian modes of thinking than to Marxism or socialism. The
popularity of the term originally derived from Lenins concept of imperialism as the highest stage of capitalism, whereby the cartelisation of
capitalism at the national level stifled domestic competition and resulted in heightened conflict between the advanced capitalist countries, in
which the export of capital to third-world countries was eventually backed up by military invasion and colonisation. Right or wrong, this was at
least a sober theoretical model, but it is one that has been jettisoned by contemporary anti-imperialists in favour of a model derived from the
Christian concept of Satan, or the all-powerful force for evil. In place of Lenins concept of rival imperialist powers engaged in an unending
struggle with one another for control of the worlds riches, they understand imperialism to mean a homogenous bloc possessed of a single evil
will. Often this is equated with Washington, with the assumption that Britain, Israel and other close US allies are mere minions of the US. This
fails to take into account the fact that even in the US alone, the political and economic elite is divided between different, often mutually hostile,
institutions and interest blocs, no one of which alone represents the US or imperialism. Over intervention in the former Yugoslavia, the US
establishment was bitterly divided. Yet the antiimperialists imagine all these competing, contradictory interests to be a seamless, dark unity.
Consequently: 5) Anti-imperialism writes off the struggle within the ruling elite. Anti-imperialists necessarily
see all mainstream politicians as representative of a single bourgeois or imperialist interest, and are therefore unwilling to accept that some
factions within the ruling elite may be pursuing more progressive policies than others. Again, this tendency has its roots in
a Protestant obsession with inner purity of belief, over and above the concrete results of actions, so that the hypocrisy of
bourgeois politicians is more important to the anti-imperialists than whether or not their policies bring objective benefits. The
fact that liberal, conservative or social democratic politicians in the US, Britain or elsewhere may be genuinely sympathetic
to oppressed nationalities such as the Iraqi Kurds or the Kosovo Albanians, and may be pushing for policies that would
benefit them, in opposition to other Western politicians who would prefer to ally themselves with the Saddams and the
Miloevids, is of no interest to the anti-imperialists, who will not throw their weight behind the progressives
in these debates. Yet it is precisely in this arena that the most important political
questions of the day are being decided.


( ) No, not ethics impacts consequences should be first.

Issac, 2
(Jeffery, Professor of Political Science at Indiana University, Dissent, Vol. 49 No. 2, Spring)
Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To accomplish anything in the political world one must attend to
the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that
power is beyond morality. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold
Niebuhr, Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility.
The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that
the purity of ones intentions does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or
refusing to make common cause with morally comprised parties may seem like the right thing, but if such tactics entail impotence,
then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters;
(2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness, it
is often a form of complicity in injustice. This is why, from the standpoint of politics-as opposed to religion-pacifism is always a
potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and
(3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the
effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with good may
engender impotence, it is often the pursuit of good that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in
the twentieth century: it is not enough that ones goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important,
always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and
historically contextualized ways. Moral absolutism inhibits THIS judgment. It alienates those who are not true believers. It
promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.





Extensions Neg = too sweeping

( ) Too sweeping to say all military humanitarianism drive a violent agenda.

Bagayoko 8
Niagale Bagayoko is a political scientist who has done research on security sector reform in francophone African countries and
led field research in Central African Republic, Cameroon, Mali and Senegal. She has also studied interagency and multilateral
processes in post-conflict environments as well as sub-regional security mechanisms in West Africa (ECOWAS). She has carried
out extensive research on the impact of Western security policies (France, United States, European Union) on African conflict-
management mechanisms. State, non-state and multilateral logics of action in post-conflict environments Working Paper
series - Global Consortium on Security Transformation #6 December
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&ved=0CCYQFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.operatio
nspaix.net%2FDATA%2FDOCUMENT%2F4976~v~State_Non-State_and_Multilateral_Logics_of_Action_in_Post-
Conflict_Environments.pdf&ei=_QejU_WTC-Xt8AGI5oHwDg&usg=AFQjCNHDH8y20WnsuNKVziu5uSE_tygszA

Critical voices in the NGO and academic worlds increasingly argue that there is a danger that northern
security priorities might securitize the humanitarian and development agendas, particularly in post-conflict
environments. While these dangers are real, nevertheless one should not stereotype all international actors as
northern or as promoting northern security (e.g. anti-terrorist) agendas . Rather than caricaturizing all the international
actors that intervene in post-conflict situations with the global label of Northener, it is instead more fruitful to view such
actors as diverse players with conflicting interests that operate according to different policy logics.
Indeed, post-conflict environments involve an ever increasing range of international actors. The first category of actors includes agents
deployed by northern states, while the second category constitutes the agents deployed by multilateral organizations. A third set of
international stakeholders include non-states actors, such as NGOs, private companies and media organizations. These various actors are
driven by very differing normative agendas. While they engage in the same fields of study and reform, their logics of action
refer to standards, norms or procedures that are often hardly compatible one with each other.


( ) No hidden agenda No ev proves liberal humanitarian efforts are designed
for imperial conquest.

Chandler 10
(David Chandler is Professor of International Relations at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Westminster
Review of International Studies Vol. 36 (2011), Special Issue: Evaluating Global Orders, pp.137-155. Available at:
http://www.davidchandler.org/pdf/journal_articles/RIS%20-%20Uncritical%20Critique%20of%20Lib%20Peace.pdf)
In the critiques of the liberal peace, this growing consensus on the problematic nature of liberalism appears to cross the political
and policy spectrum. The fundamental and shared claim of the critics is that the lack of success of external
interventions, designed not only to halt conflict but to help reconstruct the peace, is down to the liberalism of the interveners. If
only they were not, in various ways, so liberal, then it is alleged external intervention or assistance may potentially be
much less problematic. It can appear that the main academic and political matter of dispute is whether the liberal peace discourse is
amenable to policy change. Here the divide seems to roughly approximate to the division highlighted above, in terms of the heuristic categories
of power- and ideas-based liberal peace critics. The more radical, power-based, critics, with a more economically deterministic approach to
the structural dynamics or the needs of neo-liberalism are less likely to be optimistic of reform. On the ideas-based side, those critics of
liberal peace frameworks who tend to be more engaged in policy related work are more optimistic with regard to a shift away from the policy
emphasis of liberal peace. In a recent article, Endre Begby and Peter Burgess argue that the majority of the critics of the liberal peace seem to
share two key assumptions about external intervention: firstly, that external Western intervention (of some kind) is necessary, and secondly,
that the goal of this intervention should be the liberal one of human freedom and flourishing.33 They state that, in which case, the problem is
not so much with the aspirations or goals of liberal peace but with the practices of intervention itself. They have a valid point regarding the
limited nature of much of this critical discourse, but do not reflect adequately on the diminished content of the liberalism of the policy
interventions themselves nor the liberal aspirations of those who advocate for the reform of practices of external intervention. It seems that
the common ground in the broad and disparate critiques of the liberal peace, is not the critique of the external practices of intervention as
much as the classical assumptions of liberalism itself. The critique of liberalism as a set of assumptions and practices seems to be driving the
approach to the study of post-Cold War interventions in ways which have tended to produce a fairly one-sided framework of analysis in which
the concept of liberalism is ill-equipped to bear the analytical weight placed upon it and appears increasingly emptied of theoretical or
empirical content. Liberalism appears to be used promiscuously to explain a broad range of often contradictory policy perspectives and
practices across very differing circumstances and with very differing outcomes. In this sense, it appears that liberalism operates as a field of
adversity34 through which a coherent narrative of post-Cold War intervention has been articulated both by critical and policy orientated
theorists. The promiscuous use of liberalism to explain very different policy approaches is, of course, facilitated by the ambiguous nature of the
concept itself. It is this ambiguity which enables liberalism to be critiqued from opposing directions, sometimes by the same author at the same
time. Good examples of this are Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk who criticise liberal peacebuilding for being both too laissez-faire and too
interventionist in its approach to the regulation and management of conflict. In the peacebuilding literature today, the experience of the early
and mid-1990s and the quick exit policies of the first generation peacebuilding operations in Nambia, Nicaragua, Angola, Cambodia, El
Salvador, Mozambique, Liberia, Rwanda, Bosnia, Croatia and Guatemala has been repackaged as evidence that Western interveners had too
much faith in the liberal subject.35 Similarly, the ad hoc responses to the problems of the early 1990s in the development of second
generation peacebuilding with protectorate powers in Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor, has been criticised as liberal hubris, on the assumption
that international overlords could bring democracy, development and security to others. It seems that, rather than adding clarity, the critique
of the liberalism of intervention tells us very little. The mechanism through which these liberal framings have been facilitated and critiqued is
that of the discursive centring of the non-liberal Other; on whose behalf the policy critics assert the need for different policy practices. In this
way, the policy critics of past policy approaches evade a direct critique of liberal assumptions about equality, autonomy, and transformative
capacity, instead, arguing that the non-liberal Other (in various ways) invalidates, challenges or resists (passively as well as actively) policy
practices which may otherwise have been less problematic. Rather than a critique of liberalism for its inability to overcome social, economic
and cultural inequalities, both the policy, ideas-based, critique of the liberal peace and the more radical, power-based, critiques argue that
social, economic and cultural inequalities and differences have to be central to policy practices and invalidate universalising liberal attempts to
reconstruct and rebuild post-conflict societies. In this context in which the dichotomy between a liberal policymaking sphere and a non-liberal
sphere of policy intervention comes to the fore there is an inevitable tendency towards a consensual framing of the problematic of
statebuilding or peacebuilding intervention as a problem of the relationship between the liberal West and the non-liberal Other. The rock
on which the liberal peace expectations are held to crash is that of the non-liberal Other. The non-liberal
Other increasingly becomes portrayed as the barrier to Western liberal aspirations of social peace and progress;
either as it lacks the institutional, social, economic and cultural capacities that are alleged to be necessary to overcome the problems
of liberal peace or as a subaltern or resisting subject, for whom liberal peacebuilding frameworks threaten their
economic or social existence or fundamental values or identities. The critique becomes apology in that this discursive
focus upon the non-Western or non-liberal Other is often held to explain the lack of policy success and, through this, suggest
that democracy or development are somehow not appropriate aspirations or that expectations need to be substantially
lowered or changed to account for difference. It would appear that the assumptions held to be driving liberal peace
approaches are very much in the eye of their critical beholders. The most obvious empirical
difficulty is that international policy regarding intervention and statebuilding seems to have little
transformative aspiration: far from assumptions of liberal universalism, it would appear that,
with the failure of post-colonial development, especially from the 1970s onwards, international policymakers have developed historically
low expectations about what can be achieved through external intervention and assistance. The lack of transformative
belief is highlighted by one of the key concerns of the policy critics of the liberal peace the focus on capacity-building state institutions and
intervening to construct civil societies. The focus on institutional solutions (at both the formal and informal levels) to the problems of conflict
and transition is indicative of the narrowing down of aspirations from transforming society to merely regulating or managing it often
understood critically as the securitising of policymaking. This is a long way from the promise of liberal transformation and the
discourse of liberating societies economically and politically. In fact, it is the consensus of opinion on the dangers of
democracy, which has informed the focus on human rights and good governance. For the policy and radical critics of liberal peace, liberal rights
frameworks are often considered problematic in terms of the dangers of exclusion and extremism. Todays illiberal peace approaches do not
argue for the export of democracy the freeing up of the political sphere on the basis of support for popular autonomy. The language of
illiberal institutionalist approaches is that of democratisation: the problematisation of the liberal subject, held to be incapable of moral, rational
choices at the ballot box, unless tutored by international experts concerned to promote civil society and pluralist values. In these frameworks,
the holding of elections serves as an examination of the population and the behaviour of electoral candidates, rather than as a process for the
judgement or construction of policy (which it is assumed needs external or international frameworks for its production).The focus on
institutionalism does not stem from a critique of liberal peace programmes; institutionalist approaches developed from the 1970s onwards and
were rapidly mainstreamed with the end of the Cold War.36 From 1989 onwards, Western governments and donors have stressed that policy
interventions cannot just rely on promoting the freedoms of the market and democracy, but need to put institutional reform and good
governance at the core.37 Even in relation to Central and Eastern Europe it was regularly stressed that the people and elected representatives
were not ready for freedom and that it would take a number of generations before it could be said that democracy was consolidated.38 The
transitology literature was based on the critique of liberal assumptions this was why a transitional period was necessary. Transition implied
that markets and democracy could not work without external institutional intervention to prevent instability. While markets needed to be
carefully managed through government policymaking it was held that civil society was necessary to ensure that the population learnt civic
values to make democracy viable.39 It was through the engagement with transition and the problematic negotiation of EU enlargement that
the discursive framework of liberal institutionalism where human rights, the rule of law, civil society, and anti-corruption are privileged over
democracy was programmatically cohered. It was also through the discussion of transition that the concept of sovereign autonomy was
increasingly problematised, initially in relation to the protections for minority rights and then increasingly expanded to cover other areas of
domestic policymaking. 40 It would appear that the key concepts and values of the liberal peace held to have been promoted with vigour with
the victory of liberalism at the end of the Cold War were never as dominant a framing as their radical and policy critics have claimed.41
Rather than attempting to transform non-Western societies into the liberal self-image of the West, it
would appear that external interveners have had much more status quo aspirations, concerned with
regulatory stability and regional and domestic security, rather than transformation. Rather than imposing or
exporting alleged liberal Western models, international policy making has revolved around the
promotion of regulatory and administrative measures which suggest the problems are not the lack of markets or
democracy but rather the culture of society or the mechanisms of governance. Rather than promoting democracy and liberal freedoms, the
discussion has been how to keep the lid on or to manage the complexity of non-Western societies, usually perceived in terms of fixed ethnic
and regional divisions. The solution to the complexity of the non-liberal state and society has been the internationalisation of the mechanisms
of governance, removing substantive autonomy rather than promoting it. While it is true that the reconstruction or rebuilding of states is at the
centre of external projects of intervention, it would be wrong to see the project of statebuilding as one which aimed
at the construction of a liberal international order.42 This is not just because external statebuilding would be understood as
a contradiction in liberal terms but, more importantly, because the states being constructed in these projects of post-conflict and failed state
intervention are not liberal states in the sense of having self-determination and political autonomy. The state at the centre of
statebuilding is not the Westphalian state of classical International Relations (IR) theorising. Under the
internationalised regulatory mechanisms of intervention and statebuilding the state is increasingly reduced to an administrative level, in which
sovereignty no longer marks a clear boundary line between the inside and the outside.43 Whether we consider European Union (EU)
statebuilding, explicitly based on a sharing of sovereignty, or consider other statebuilding interventions, such as those by the international
financial institutions in sub-Saharan Africa, it is clear that the state is central as a mechanism for external coordination and regulation rather
than as a self-standing actor in so-called Westphalian terms.44




Extensions Aggression toward china good
( ) The Alt cant solve underplaying Chinese aggression makes solutions
impossible.

Friedman 14
Edward Friedman is Professor Emeritus in the Department of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. He has
worked in rural China, co-authoring Chinese Village, Socialist State (Yale University Press, 1993) and Revolution, Resistance, and
Reform in Village China (Yale University Press, 2007) and serving as the major editor condensing and re-organizing Yang
Jishengs great study of the Leap era famine Tombstone: The Great Chinese Famine, 1958-1962 (Farrar, Straus and Giroux,
2012) for an English-reading public. Time to Escalate ? Should the U.S. Make China Uncomfortable? China File Jan 21
st

please note that the top portion of this card is from the editors as they pose a question to Friedman.
https://www.chinafile.com/time-escalate-should-us-make-china-uncomfortable

How should the United States respond to Chinas new level of assertiveness in the Asia Pacific? In the past
few months as Beijing has stepped up territorial claims around Chinas maritime bordersand in the skies above themthe Obama
administration has moved to soothe tensions, cool tempers and slow momentum toward potential conflict. In the January/February issue of
Foreign Policy, Elbridge Colby and Ely Ratner of the Center for a New American Security argue that when the U.S. plays
peacemaker it encourages China to raise the stakes, pursuing ever greater levels of adventurism with the
confidence that Washington will step in and make sure things dont get truly out of hand. China is taking advantage of Washingtons risk
aversion by rocking the boat, they write, seeing what it can extract in the process and letting the United States worry about righting it.
Instead, they conclude, the U.S. ought to pursue a military and diplomatic strategy that includes lowering its tolerance of
provocations at sea, deepening military ties with Japan, and building stronger alliances with other countries in the region to inject a
healthy degree of risk into Beijings calculus, even as it searches for ways to cooperate with China. We
asked ChinaFile Contributors to respond. The Editors Responses (by Edward Friedman): Colby and Ratner perform an
invaluable service by detailing how C.C.P. government foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific region is dangerously
expansionist and a threat to Chinas neighbors. Ruling groups in Beijing imagine Chinas security as requiring a great expansion of
Chinese power. Our two authors are absolutely correct that analysts who will not confront this reality are
hiding the seriousness of the challenge.


A-to Pan K and China Threat K

( ) The Pan K doesnt liberate and reifies conventional IR theyve bought-
into the system by identifying us as the bad ones

Callahan 5
William A. Callahan is professor of international politics and China studies at the University of Manchester and codirector of the British Inter-
university China Center, Review of International Studies (2005), 31, 701714
doi:10.1017/S0260210505006716

Indeed, analysts increasingly criticise the political consequences of an Euro-American mode of representing China as a
threat;10 since Chinese security discourse is rarely analysed it is now necessary to explore the political consequences of Chinas modes of
self-representation and how China threat theory is produced in the PRC. Indeed, this example will add to the critical examination of two of
the main research themes of security studies: strategic culture and threat perception. To put it another way, the emergence of China is not
simply an issue of international diplomacy and national security. It has important intertextual overlaps with other discourses that frame
questions about China and the world, such as the dynamic between domestic and international politics, economics and politics, dangers and
opportunities as they produce Western and Chinese identity. A recent article in the popular Chinese news magazine, Liaowang, explains
how Chinas peaceful rise is intimately linked with China threat in an overlap of domestic and international politics:11 The world knows
about the achievements of Chinas reform and opening. But since the beginning of the 1990s, China threat theory has been churned out
from some corners of the world . . . to smear Chinas image and to contain Chinas rise. With the appearance of peaceful rise theory
international opinion suddenly realises the weaknesses of China threat theory. . . . Peaceful rise is the formula that sums up the essence of
domestic policy and foreign relations in reform China. Indeed, the articles in this Forum likewise speak of dangers when they discuss Chinas
opportunities. This suggests that as in the popular Chinese phrase weijicrisis, danger (wei) and opportunity (ji) are not separate, but are
intimately linked. To understand the opportunities of China, it is necessary to see how the mirror-image of peaceful rise the China threat
shapes the image of rising China not just abroad, but within China itself. Many writers take the meaning of China threat as
self-evident, and then proceed to either agree or disagree with it. This introduction will examine the production of China
threat theory in order to provide a critical background for the discussion of Chinas place in the world examined in the remaining articles.
First, it will examine Western warnings of a China threat, and Chinese responses to them. Some commentators frame this as a geopolitical
debate in Sino-US public diplomacy, and warn that it risks spinning out of control in a security dilemma. While I do not disagree with this
concern, the essay will show that because the Chinese reaction is much stronger than the American action, something else is going on. The
main purpose for these Chinese language texts is not to correct foreign misunderstandings; the key audience for China threat theory is
domestic, for identity construction in the PRC. I will argue that Chinese texts gather together a diverse and contradictory set of criticisms of
the PRC and use China threat theory discourse to collectively label them as foreign. By then refuting the China threat theory criticisms as
fallacies spread by ill-intentioned foreigners, the texts assert peaceful rise as the proper way to understand Chinas emergence on the
world stage. Thus in a curious way, the negative images of the PRC that are continually circulated in Chinese texts serve to construct Chinese
identity through a logic of estrangement that separates the domestic self from the foreign other. Although Chinese discussions of
China threat theory are successful in generating national feeling within China, the discourse actually tends to reproduce
China as a threatening power abroad because refutations of China threat theory end up generating a
new set of foreign threats. Hence rather than engaging in critical security studies to question the
international order, these refutations of China threat theory actually buttress the existing
geopolitical framework of international relations. In the conclusion, I argue that we need to question how Realism has
colonised the rise of China debate by deliberately using theory to open up critical space for the issues discussed in this Forums consideration
of Chinas rise.
8 Johnston, Is China a Status Quo Power?, p. 6.
9 David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, revised
edn. (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), p. 5.
10 See Johnston, Is China a Status Quo Power?; Emma Broomfield, Perceptions of Danger: The
China Threat Theory, Journal of Contemporary China, 12:35 (2003), pp. 26584; Chengxin Pan,
The China Threat in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as
Power Politics, Alternatives, 29:3 (2004), pp. 30531.
11 Ling Dequan, Heping jueqi gangju muzhang *Explaining Peaceful rise+, Liaowang,
5 (2 February 2004), p. 6.

( ) Our argument is not that China is a threat its that we should avoid either
simplistic, reifying extreme. The 1AC instead points to context.

Callahan 5
William A. Callahan is professor of international politics and China studies at the University of Manchester and codirector of the British Inter-
university China Center, Review of International Studies (2005), 31, 701714
doi:10.1017/S0260210505006716

The argument of this essay is not that China is a threat. Rather, it has examined the productive linkages that knit together the
image of China as a peacefully rising power and the discourse of China as a threat to the economic and military stability of East Asia. It
would be easy to join the chorus of those who denounce China threat theory as the misguided product of
the Blue Team, as do many in China and the West. But that would be a mistake, because depending on
circumstances anything from rising powers to civilian aircraft can be interpreted as a threat. The purpose is
not to argue that interpretations are false in relation to some reality (such as that China is fundamentally peaceful
rather than war-like), but that it is necessary to unpack the political and historical context of each perception of
threat. Indeed, China threat has never described a unified American understanding of the PRC: it has always been one position among
many in debates among academics, public intellectuals and policymakers. Rather than inflate extremist positions (in both the
West and China) into irrefutable truth, it is more interesting to examine the debates that produced the
threat/opportunity dynamic. This essay has examined how China threat theory is enthusiastically reproduced and circulated beyond the
Beltway in Chinese texts to show how Chinese elites engage in their own threat interpretations and national identity productions. Thus it
underlines how China threat and China opportunity are not diametrically opposed as sites of total truth or
falsity; threat and opportunity are intimately related as complementary opposites that entail each other.

( ) The K of China threats reifies by identifying the flaws in US posture and
painting China as victimized, the IR system replicates itself


Callahan 5
William A. Callahan is professor of international politics and China studies at the University of Manchester and codirector of the British Inter-
university China Center, Review of International Studies (2005), 31, 701714
doi:10.1017/S0260210505006716


Hence by turning China threat into a theory, the discourse moves from merely responding to criticism in
a negative way, actively producing positive meaning. Rather than simply putting an end to China
threat theory as the first article on the topic advised in 1992,37 the discourse continually reproduces and circulates this set of
images of a peacefully rising China that is the victim of criticism that only comes from abroad. Although Taiwan is a site of much
discussion of a China threat, Taiwanese people are rarely criticised in the mainlands China threat theory texts. This underlines how the
category China threat theory is used to sort out the domestic from the foreign: Taiwanese are seen by Beijing as Chinese compatriots. Because
Beijing frames China threat theory as a foreign fallacy and Cross-Straits relations as an issue of domestic politics, the large and vociferous
cache of China threat texts from Taiwan are erased by China threat theory discourse. Although Chinese premier Zhu Rongji sought to change
the subject from China threat to China opportunity, many China threat theory articles engage in a proliferation of foreign threats. As a former
Deputy Chief of Staff of the PLA reasons: If we follow the logic of China threat theory, who benefits from it, and who thus can be a threat to
other countries security?38 The common response to China threat theory thus is that America is the real threat.39 Yet it is not just the sole
superpower that is seen as a threat. China threat theory articles also generate a Japan threat theory and an India threat theory. Many
articles tell us that real reason for Japanese scholars, politicians and officials warning of a potential China threat is to justify rearming Japan and
reviving the imperial Japanese militarism of the early 20th century.40 This concern provided the back-story that motivated the mass anti-
Japanese demonstrations that rocked China in April 2005. As Shih concludes about Sino-Japanese diplomacy more generally, the perception of
a threatening Japan serves to differentiate China from Japan and consolidate an otherwise shaky national identity in China.41 Likewise, when
Indias leaders stated that their reason for becoming a nuclear power in 1998 was not the threat from Pakistan so much as the threat from
China, a Chinese response was to create an India threat theory. An anonymous author concludes that if India continues to be unfriendly, the
PRC will have to contain India. This policy would encircle India with a network of hostile alliances and foment Islamic fundamentalism in
Kashmir and beyond.42 The message is clear; if a country rejects Chinas peaceful overtures, then China will fight diplomatically, militarily, and
rhetorically, including spreading an India threat theory in South Asia and beyond. Although China threat theory is ascribed to the Cold War
thinking of foreigners who suffer from an enemy deprivation syndrome, the use of containment as a response to threats in Chinese texts
suggests that Chinese strategists are also seeking to fill the symbolic gap left by the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was the key threat to
the PRC after 1960. Refutations of China threat theory do not seek to deconstruct the discourse of threat
as part of critical security studies. Rather they are expressions of a geopolitical identity politics
because they refute Chinese threats as a way of facilitating the production of an America threat, a
Japan threat, an India threat, and so on. Uniting to fight these foreign threats affirms Chinas national identity. Unfortunately, by
refuting China threat in this bellicose way that is by generating a new series of threats the China
threat theory texts end up confirming the threat that they seek to deny: Japan, India and Southeast Asia are
increasingly threatened by Chinas protests of peace.43

( ) The K of China Threats creates new boundaries that reify systems of
domination

Callahan 5
William A. Callahan is professor of international politics and China studies at the University of Manchester and codirector of the British Inter-
university China Center, Review of International Studies (2005), 31, 701714
doi:10.1017/S0260210505006716

Lastly, some China threat theory articles go beyond criticising the ignorance and bad intentions of the
offending texts to conclude that those who promote China threat must be crazy: There is a consensus within mainland academic
circles that there is hardly any reasonable logic to explain the views and practices of the United States
toward China in the past few years. It can only be summed up in a word: Madness .47 Indians likewise are said to suffer from a China
threat theory syndrome.48 This brings us back to Foucaults logic of rationality being constructed through the
exclusion of a range of activities that are labelled as madness. The rationality of the rise of China depends upon
distinguishing it from the madness of those who question it. Like Joseph Nyes concern that warnings of a
China threat could become a self-fulfilling prophesy, China threat theory texts vigorously reproduce
the dangers of the very threat they seek to deny. Rather than adding to the debate, they end up
policing what Chinese and foreigners can rationally say.

( ) The K of China Threat reifies identity. This also proves their attempt to
paint this as a larger indict on US policy is part of a process of ID construction.

Callahan 5
William A. Callahan is professor of international politics and China studies at the University of Manchester and codirector of the British Inter-
university China Center, Review of International Studies (2005), 31, 701714
doi:10.1017/S0260210505006716

Using a database that gives access to articles in a broad range of Chinese academic and professional journals, this introduction has examined
Chinas slippery relation to the world through the logic of how China threat emerged as a theory in the PRC. Rather than referring to a clear set
of data or policies, the essay has shown how China threat theory serves to discursively unify a diverse and
contradictory set of texts that are judged to be anti-China, regardless of whether they posit a rising China,
an insignificant China, or a collapsing China. Refuting these texts is not just an attack on the pessimists in the US,
Japan, India, and Southeast Asia, but is an active performance of identity in China as specifically national (rather than local,
class, ethnic, or gendered). Rather than suggest that commentators change from China threat to China opportunity, I have argued that
neither China threat nor China opportunity is autonomous or coherent. Like in the oft-quoted Chinese phrase for crisis, weiji, threat and
opportunity construct each other in the events (that is, crises) of domestic and international politics. Most of the Chinese articles that assert a
China threat theory are actually direct responses to events: the sale of fighter jets to Taiwan (1992), the publication of alarmist books and
articles in the US (1997, 2000), Japans National Defence White Papers (2000, 2001, 2004), critical official US reports (2002, 2004), and so on.
By transforming China threat from a response to these specific events into a general theory, I argued
that Chinese texts are engaged in a discussion of how to understand China through a negative logic of
estrangement. There are many ways to construct national identity. Praising the economic development of
reform China and peaceful civilisation of Chinese tradition is one way. Refuting foreign criticisms through China threat
theory is another. The large quantity and sharp quality of China threat theory discourse suggests that denouncing critics as
foreign in this way is an important means of asserting the image of China as a peaceful rising power. Rather than the
main target of the Chinese articles being world opinion for international politics, the main audience for the China threat theory articles is
domestic, for identity politics in China. This negative discourse mirrors the glories of China, and serves to differentiate and estrange China as a
unique entity in an increasingly globalised world.

Extensions Representational Determinism
( ) Reps dont shape policy determinism wrong

Richardson 8
Alexia -- Traces of terror : photography and memory of political violence in Argentina and Peru as part of the critique of
visual determinism, this card internally quotes David D. Perlmutter, Ph.D.. He is Dean of the College of Media & Communication
at Texas Tech University. Before coming to Texas Tech, he was the director of the School of Journalism and Mass
Communication at the University of Iowa. As a documentary photographer, he is the author or editor of seven books on
political communication and persuasion. Also, he has written several dozen research articles for academic journals as well as
more than 200 essays for U.S. and international newspapers and magazines such as Campaigns & Elections, Christian Science
Monitor, Editor & Publisher, Los Angeles Times, MSNBC.com., Philadelphia Inquirer, and USA Today. This was the her
Dissertation to gain her PhD in the School of Modern Languages and Cultures University of Durham. While pursuing her PhD at
Durham University, Alexia Richardson gained much traction on the international conference scene presenting a paper titled
'Ni un paso atrs: Resistance and Emotion in Images of Las Madres de Plaza de Mayo' at the Public Displays of Affection
conference at the University of Rochester, New York. Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online:
http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/1898/
Despite the ubiquitous nature of photographic images, their pervasive influence may be hard to pin down. In a sceptical analysis, David Perlmutter (1998) questions the logic of
'visual determinism', which argues for the role of images in policy decisions - the so-called 'CNN effect'
which draws elected officials to the television set as they evaluate their ever-changing position in the public eye. According to Perlmutter, icons are selected and confirmed by a small section of society he calls 'discourse elites' -
politicians, academics, and workers in the media. Because such privileged professionals work daily with images, control them, study them in broadsheet newspapers and believe in their effects, they tend to assume that the general
public does likewise, often overestimating the familiarity of even the most famous images to the untrained or uninterested viewer. Choosing specific examples including Adams' image of General Loan in Tet and other'icons of
outrage', he argues that the measurable effect of visual images is small and they do not usually overturn
policy , although, by contrast, some examples of decisions influenced by images are given in Taylor (1998: 136). So, while many blamed photographs like those made by Adams
for influencing public opinion in the United States against the war in Vietnam, Perlmutter argues for
the reverse: that because public opinion was already turning against the war, it seized on the image of
Loan as a confirmation of its new values. Perlmutter's warning against an exaggerated or naive trust in the power of the image is
important, and he is correct in stating that an objective measurement of the influence of images on
policy decisions is hard to find. Nevertheless, his analysis does not preclude a more general awareness of certain regularly circulated photographs in society, and influence may also have
more general effects than government policy decisions. Accordingly, Hariman and Lucaites (2001: 19) believe that, 'visual practices have long been important yet undervalued constituents of democratic culture precisely because
they are media for emotional representation that lead to performative identification rather than rational deliberation'. I would concur that the value accorded to written documents and the official archive of materials is often
denied the photographic image which, nevertheless, is so regularly witnessed that its pull on the emotions should not be dismissed. 5



( ) Determinism unproven. Reps arent presumptively malignant and dont
shape reality.

Frosh 11
Professor Paul Frosh, Distinguished Scholar at the Rothberg International School Department of Communication and
Journalism, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Framing Pictures, Picturing Frames: Visual Metaphors in Political
Communications Research Journal of Communication Inquiry published online 20 June 2011 DOI: 10.1177/0196859911410242

Probably the best known example of how accounts of power relations in visual media have come to structure conceptual thought is the case of iconoclasm: the long
history of suspicion in Western thought that images are uniquely, and in general malignly, powerful.5 Platos parable of
the cave, with which this article began, is a case in point: cave dwellers mistake the images for reality. Scholars such as David Freedberg (1991) and W. J. T. Mitchell (1986, 1994)
have excavated influential traditions of thought predisposed against the power of images, while contemporary
discussions include Finnegan and Kangs (2004) analysis of iconoclasm in political theory, especially the conceptualization of the public sphere.6 Of course, iconoclasm extends beyond
scholarly discourse: as Domke et al. (2002) point out, belief in the malign independent power of visual images, which they call
visual determinism, is regularly voiced by political office holders and commentators , despite the relative paucity of
evidence for such power. 7


Representational Determinism and War Reps
( ) Our determinism thesis applies to war reps. Their thesis is Nixonism.

Albanese 8
The author currently a practicing attorney in New York State and now holds BA from the University of Rhode Island, and a JD
from University of Maine School of Law. The author wrote this paper as an Honors undergrad and it was selected for the Digital
Commons Project of the Film and Media Studies Commons, Journalism Studies Commons, Peace and Conflict Studies Commons,
and the Photography Commons Jeffrey, "Opening the Aperture: Examining Images of War in the Press" (2008). Senior Honors
Projects. Paper 110. http://digitalcommons.uri.edu/srhonorsprog/110

Did visual images of war really contribute so much to Americas failure in Vietnam? Does television really have a pacifist*ic+ bias (Hallin, 1994: 45)? Does television
coverage of war inherently demoraliz*e+ the home front as Richard Nixon and countless other policymakers assert (Nixon, 1978 as quoted in
Hallin, 1986: 3)? The assumptions that form the foundation of what Perlmutter terms visual determinism are not without their
criticisms. I will link, from Perlmutters list, the fourth and fifth assumptions (that the meaning of an image and the emotional responses it elicits are unambiguous) with Hoskins first
(the singularity of the audience). Visual determinism seems less convincing when these assumptions are considered in the
context of framing. According to Robert Entman, to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text in such a way
as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation (Entman, 1993 as quoted in Perlmutter 1998: 7). Despite their high-
definition, the meaning of the information contained in pictures is not fixed or unambiguous. As Perlmutter notes, visual images are chronologically and spatially limited
anecdotes about specific incidents (Perlmutter 1998: 17) and facts or quotes chosen for commentary are frames meant to affect *their+ meaning
(Perlmutter 1998: 39). Pictures need to be contextualized by the press or other political elites in order to have meaning. Similarly,
identical pictures can serve contradictory purposes (Perlmutter 1998: 23). Consider AP photographer Eddie Adams iconic photograph (see fig. 1) of General Nguyen Ngoc Loan, leader of
South Vietnams police and intelligence units, summarily executing an NLF prisoner on the streets of Saigon during the Tet Offensive. To some, the villain in the photograph is the NLF soldier
an agent of the enemy who killed Americans. To others, the villain is General Loan, a man the U.S. supported and, it seemed, may have committed a war crime. In a 1988 issue of the comic
book The Nam, the photograph is re-created and it is the photojournalist himself who is the villain for putting the scene on the *f+ront page of every newspaper in the states. As Franklin
notes, *t+he logic of this comic-book militarism is inescapable: photographers must be allowed to image for the public only what the military deems suitable (Franklin 1994: 40). This relates
to Hoskins critique of the concept of a mass audience (Hoskins 2005: 15). Just as different frames can construct different meanings for identical pictures, the different experiences of
audiences may result in identically framed pictures having different meanings. As Hallin notes, *o+ne of the traditional findings of research on the effects of mass communication, for instance,
is that because of selective perception, the media will often tend merely to reinforce peoples existing attitudes (Hallin 1986: 107). A photographic image does not have a meaning, but rather
meanings. There is not a mass audience, but rather audiences. The existence of a diversity of meanings and
audiences results in a diversity of emotional impacts and responses an image has the potential to provoke. Media
coverage of war does not occur in a vacuum. It must be situated historically when analyzing its impact on public opinion and
governmental policy . However, as Hallin has noted, this has not deterred many people from believing that there was a causal relationship between Vietnams status as the
first televised war and Vietnam being (in 1986, at least) the countrys most divisive and least successful war (1986: 105). As noted above, the conventional wisdom among policymakers and
members of the military has been that it was television coverage of the Vietnam War that was the principal cause of what they see as a national failure of will, a failure which led to military
defeat (Hallin 1986: 105).

( ) War Reps create ethical responses in the wake of violence.

Albanese 8
The author currently a practicing attorney in New York State and now holds BA from the University of Rhode Island, and a JD
from University of Maine School of Law. The author wrote this paper as an Honors undergrad and it was selected for the Digital
Commons Project of the Film and Media Studies Commons, Journalism Studies Commons, Peace and Conflict Studies Commons,
and the Photography Commons Jeffrey, "Opening the Aperture: Examining Images of War in the Press" (2008). Senior Honors
Projects. Paper 110. http://digitalcommons.uri.edu/srhonorsprog/110

Images of dead or wounded soldiers or civilians provide important evidentiary information about the human costs of war.
They also may provide information that is required for ethical behavior. British archaeologist Timothy Taylor has established the
concept of visceral insulation, an inevitable consequence of social stratification and specialization: This phrase describes the way in which the necessary specialization of the modern world
screens or insulates people from visceral thingsVisceral insulation is a recoil from corporeality, as if we feel that, by coming too close to what is bodily, our inevitable mortality will somehow
make itself too painfully known (2002: 277). Control over the imagery of war through press restrictions and the dissemination of bomb-scope
footage by the Department of Defense are devices that viscerally insulate the American public, create the appearance of a war from which the human body is
absent, and make it easier for citizens to accept war. In March of 2008, the Pew Research Center released the results of polling that found that only 28%
of Americans were aware of how many Americans had been killed in Iraq (Pew Research Center 2008). Perhaps a lack of
publicly available images depicting dead or wounded soldiers has contributed to this lack of knowledge about the human costs of war. Perhaps, as
Taylor suggests, knowledge of death as an inevitability is the best spur to ethical behavior, because *d+eath signals
the end point beyond which our reputations become irrevocable (2002: 287).