You are on page 1of 5

Remedial Curricula: A Critique

Author(s): Michael W. Apple


Reviewed work(s):
Source: Curriculum Theory Network, No. 10 (Autumn, 1972), pp. 74-77
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education/University of Toronto
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1179219 .
Accessed: 12/03/2013 16:09
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
.
Wiley and Ontario Institute for Studies in Education/University of Toronto are collaborating with JSTOR to
digitize, preserve and extend access to Curriculum Theory Network.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded on Tue, 12 Mar 2013 16:09:17 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
REMEDIAL
CURRICULA--A CRITIQUE
Michael W.
Apple
University
of Wisconsin
At the
outset,
let me state that Robbie Case has done a commendable
job
of
cutting through
much of the
tangled
mass of
verbiage
that has
enveloped
discussions of the various and
disparate positions
on "remediation." To
quote
a
phrase
that has seen a bit of action in the last few
months,
in
another
context,
much of the work done in remedial education has been "old
wine in new bottles."
His
analysis
is valuable in that it
points
to certain
possible
defects
in
previous perspectives
on the
problem.
Yet his
proposal
leaves me some-
how
dissatisfied.
The
emphasis
on
"learning
how to learn" has a
vaguely
familiar
ring,
as well as a checkered
history,
and I am rather
wary
of
taking
it at face value without closer
scrutiny--a scrutiny
that cannot be
made without a better
glimpse
of the
meaning
that Case
assigns
to the
phrase
than is evident in his
paper.
Those small
problems aside,
there is an
issue that needs to be dealt with that is not
explicitly
considered
by
him
but is of no small
importance.
What Case does not consider is the
ideological configuration
behind the
remediation
perspective.
Much of the
argument accepts (and
perhaps
legitimates)
education structures as
they
exist
today.
That
is,
the
concept
itself
implies
an
inherently
conservative value
position
which is
quite
functional to the
ongoing
maintenance of
already
reified
patterns
of
interaction in schools. It
begs
the
question
of the
possible
need for a
more basic
restructuring
of the media of
schooling.
To
say this, however,
is not
necessarily
to
say
that he is
wrong.
After
all,
the circle of
despair
has to be broken
somewhere;
and there is
74
Curriculum Theory Network 10
This content downloaded on Tue, 12 Mar 2013 16:09:17 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
no doubt in
my
mind that his
very
realistic
perspective
on the
types
of
changes
that can be
brought
about
now, given
our limited resources and
political realities,
can be
partially
effective
(even
if
only
due to the
so-called Hawthorne
effect). Moreover, very
few curriculists will
quarrel
with the
necessity
for
teaching disadvantaged
students
strategies
that will
enable them to be more effective in
"competing"
on
equal
terms with "middle-
class"
youth.
Yet,
to
say this,
I
feel,
is not to
say enough.
It
presupposes
that
much of the disenchantment and
poor
achievement of black
students,
for
example,
is a result of
"cognitive"
deficits and that the disenchantment
will be
significantly
lessened if these
cognitive processes
are
taught.
This
may
be true of
"working-class"
students in Canadian
cities,
but I
would hesitate to
generalize
from this. The disaffection for school on the
part
of
many
of the so-called
disadvantaged goes
much
deeper,
I would
suggest,
than Case realizes.
Using
his
logic,
it is
just
as
plausible
to
link the
"poor
achievement" and
rejection
of
major segments
of school
experience
to a
rejection
of
symbolically charged
institutional control
itself and to a
profound change
in
minority
students' attitudes toward the
legitimacy
of a number of the
obligatory meaning
structures which dominate
middle-class life
(that
this is
increasingly widespread
is
pointed to,
for
example,
in Thomas Luckmann's
important
little
book,
The Invisible
Religion:
The Transformation of
Symbols
in Industrial
Society).
While Case's
proposal
does not
ignore
the
political
realities of
making
concrete
changes
in how
schools
operate (and
to be
sure,
this is
quite
a
strong point
in his
favor),
it
may ignore
the
political
realities in the
change
in consciousness on the
part
of certain
minority groups (e.g., blacks),
a consciousness that is
possibly significantly
alien to the
working-class youth
of Toronto. This
relationship undoubtedly requires
a closer
examination.
In a
necessarily brief
critique
such as
this,
it is
obviously possible
to touch on but a few of the
many questions
which Case's
paper raises.
Therefore, let me note certain issues that he and all of us
might delve into
more
deeply
in the
educationally meritorious
activity
of
enabling students
to
cope somehow with their environment.
i.
When and where is it
possible to reduce
higher-order operations into
CTN 10 75
This content downloaded on Tue, 12 Mar 2013 16:09:17 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
specifiable
subroutines? What
provisions
are made for the
integration
of these atomized elements? Are the
potent philosophical
and
very
practical arguments
that can be raised
against behaviorally specified
objectives
also
applicable
here?
(On
these
points,
cf. the work of
Michael
Polanyi.)
2. Does the
program naively (in
a
nonpejorative
sense of the
term)
continue the artificial
separation
between
"cognitive"
and "affective"
functioning?
Since the
program
does aim at
establishing
some sort of
theoretical
perspective
that will
generate
educational research at
many levels,
as well as at
effecting specific
and much needed
program-
matic
changes,
this
may
be a critical
point.
Added
weight
is
given
to
this
question
when
coupled
with the fact that such so-called
"cognitive
structures" as scientific
paradigms
also act as norms and value
perspectives
(cf.
Apple, 1971).
3. Does the
proposal
continue the outmoded liberal notion
equating
education with
opportunity?
Is the social and economic structure of
this
society open enough
to
cope
with
high
academic achievement on the
part
of its disenfranchised? In a
very
real
sense,
the all too
prevalent
lack of
opportunity
after education will not be affected in
any significant way by
this
proposal,
thus
possibly breeding
even
further disenchantment. While this
type
of
suggestion may
be
important
in
leading
to a
revolutionary
consciousness
(as
in the
rapid growth
of
educational level with little concomitant alteration of the structures
of
opportunity
in South Africa and in sections of South
America),
I am
not
quite
certain that this is what Case had in mind.
What has been said should not be taken as a
negative response
to Case's
well-written
analysis.
I have tried to
point
to a few
questions
and
puzzlements
that it raises in
my
mind and that I feel are
significant.
Given the mediocre state of much curriculum
writing, any paper
that can
raise
important
issues and also
attempt
to solve them is to be
applauded.
Robbie Case's
paper
meets both of these criteria.
76 CTN 10
This content downloaded on Tue, 12 Mar 2013 16:09:17 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
REFERENCES
Apple,
Michael W. "The Hidden Curriculum and the Nature of
Conflict."
Interchange, 2,
No. 4
(1971),
27-40.
Luckmann,
Thomas. The
Invisible Religion:
The Transformation of
Symbols
in Industrial
Society.
New York:
Macmillan,
1967.
Polanyi,
Michael.
The Tacit
Dimension.
New York:
Doubleday,
1966.
Polanyi, Michael.
Personal
Knowledge.
New York:
Harper
&
Row, 1964.
CTN 10
77
This content downloaded on Tue, 12 Mar 2013 16:09:17 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

You might also like