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Smart power in reunified Germany
William R. Patterson
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International Studies Program, Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA, USA
Online Publication Date: 01 December 2008
To cite this Article Patterson, William R.(2008)'Smart power in reunified Germany',Journal of Power,1:3,339 354
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Journal of Power
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ISSN 1754-0291 print/ISSN 1754-0305 online
2008 Taylor & Francis
DOI: 10.1080/17540290802479236
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Smart power in reunified Germany
William R. Patterson*
International Studies Program, Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA, USA
Taylor and Francis Ltd RPOW_A_348091.sgm 10.1080/17540290802479236 Journal of Power 1754-0291 (print)/1754-0305 (online) Original Article 2008 Taylor & Francis 13000000December 2008 WilliamPatterson wpatt001@odu.edu
Since its reunification, Germany has struggled with the dilemma of power. Many of
Germanys European allies feared the possibility of a resurgently powerful German
nation that would revert to power politics and endanger the established European order.
Such worries were prevalent even among many Germans who, still struggling with their
past, werent sure that they could trust themselves with the use of power. Yet Germany,
just as any other country, had foreign policy objectives and global responsibilities that
sometimes required the use of power to achieve. This article examines how Germany
responded to this dilemma and how the use of both hard and soft power have evolved in
German foreign policy since reunification. It demonstrates that at first Germany relied
almost exclusively on the use of soft power. As Germany established trust among its
allies, the international community, and its own citizens, it gradually began to increase
its use of hard power and to take on greater international responsibilities. Today
Germany uses a mixture of soft and hard power what Richard Armitage and Joseph
Nye have dubbed smart power to meet its foreign policy goals and to fulfill its
international responsibilities.
Keywords: Germany; German reunification; soft power; hard power; smart power
Introduction
The issue of power has been a tricky one for Germans in the years following reunification.
During the Cold War, Germany had largely renounced the use of hard power since the rejec-
tion of militaristic values was a necessary condition for Germany to come to grips with its
recent Nazi past. Germany was a paradigmatic example of a country rejecting hard power
(at least in its most aggressive forms) on the basis of a historically shaped moral outlook.
This outlook did, of course, affect German military capability. The development of the kind
of hard power which the United States embraces was impeded in Germany by its own
cautious view of power based upon its history and the values it espoused as a member of
the European Union. Another impediment was the refusal of the rest of Europe to accept
such power in Germany due to old suspicions that have not been completely laid to rest even
today.
Germanys reunification struck fear in the hearts of many Europeans that the Germans
would quickly regain their preWorld War II lust for power and expansion and would once
again pose a threat to peace on the continent. This did not come to pass, however, and many
scholars and pundits were surprised at Germanys continued introversion and lack of will-
ingness to accept a position of global leadership. This became such a problem, in fact, that
many began accusing the Germans of failing to live up to their international responsibilities.
Germany took especially harsh criticism from the US, for example, for its failure to contribute
*Email: wpatt001@odu.edu
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340 W.R. Patterson
troops during the Gulf War. Germans soon came to realize that their newfound position in
the global community would no longer allow them to retire from the international stage as
they had during the Cold War.
Germany found itself in an odd position. Historical memories still made the develop-
ment of hard military power difficult for the Germans as too much of a build-up would rile
suspicions among its neighbors. On the other hand, however, the strength of Germanys
economy and position in the world brought with it many responsibilities that could in some
cases only be fulfilled with the utilization of hard power. In order to dampen fears of expan-
sionism while simultaneously living up to the expectations of its allies, Germany was forced
to be very smart about its use of power.
Out of this necessity, the Germans have developed a complex amalgamation of
hard and soft power, what Armitage and Nye (2007) have recently called smart power.
During the Cold War, soft power had come to dominate German foreign policy since the
development of hard power was unacceptable to its European neighbors. The accumula-
tion of soft power before and since reunification, however, has allowed for a greater
build-up and use of hard power when necessary as long as that use remains consistent
with the values that sustain Germanys soft power. In Germany, hard and soft power are
interdependent. Germanys soft power has come to rely on at least some amount of hard
power. Without the military muscle to back up its high ideals, Germanys commitments
to its foreign policy goals would not be taken seriously and its soft power would dwin-
dle. Without a large degree of soft power, on the other hand, Germanys hard power
would be too threatening to the rest of Europe and could not be successfully accumulated
and applied without strong resistance. Hard and soft power in Germany are inextricably
intertwined.
This article explores the interplay of hard and soft power in German foreign policy since
reunification. It argues that Germany has actively pursued a foreign policy that has
supported its own international goals in the most efficient way open to it, through the smart
application of both soft and hard power. Germany has taken an active role in exerting its
soft power, and increasingly its hard power, to meet its foreign policy objectives. The
important issue for the purposes of this article, and one that has often been overlooked, is
how the Germans have mixed these two elements of power so expertly. Germany provides
a real-world example of Armitage and Nyes concept of smart power.
The paper is divided into four sections. In the first section, the concept of power is exam-
ined and its main aspects hard, soft and smart are explored. How Germany has relied
upon its soft power to achieve its foreign-policy objectives since reunification is the focus
of the second section. In the third section, Germanys incremental development and use of
hard power is examined. Finally, in the fourth section, the interaction between soft and hard
power in German foreign policy is discussed. This section will outline how Germanys use
of hard and soft power have impacted the development of each other and come to form an
effective example of smart power.
What is power?
To some scholars, hard power is the only type of power that really matters. Robert Kagans
discussion of power in his famous book Of Paradise and Power (2004b), for example,
focuses overwhelmingly on hard power. In Kagans view, power is gauged by military
capacity and the ability to achieve desired results, with force being one of the primary ways
of doing so. To analysts in Kagans camp, a states power can be measured by the military
force that it can bring to bear. How many tanks, fighter planes and soldiers a country has,
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Journal of Power 341
along with its economic capacity to build more, provides a good measurement of that
countrys power. Real power has only two elements military and economic capability.
This limited concept of power, however, is, in the view of many other scholars, too narrow.
Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, for example, argue in their book Power and Interdependence:
Power has always been an elusive concept for statesmen and analysts of international politics;
now it is even more slippery. The traditional view was that military power dominated other
forms, and that states with the most military power controlled world affairs. But the resources
that produce power capabilities have become more complex. (2001, p. 10)
From the point of view of these scholars, hard military capability is only one element on
a broader spectrum of power. Because Germany, for example, chooses to downplay its hard
military power does not mean that it has rejected all forms of power. The Germans have
come to recognize that the unreflective use of hard military power is no longer optimal for
them. In its place, they have begun to accumulate a different type of power soft power.
Since its reunification, Germany has been developing such power as a replacement to the
traditional military power that it once craved.
Joseph Nye broadened the definition of power by developing the concept of soft power.
He defines power as the ability to obtain the outcomes that one wants (2003, p. 65) and
points out that military coercion is not the only way to do this. He divides power into two
general forms rather than just one: soft power and hard power. Military power and
economic power, he explains, are both examples of hard command power that can be used
to induce others to change their position. Hard power can rest on inducements (carrots) or
threats (sticks) (Nye 2002, p. 8).
The other type of power, soft power, is subtler and does not rest on outright coercion.
This type of power is created through moral and ideological persuasiveness and leadership
in multilateral international organizations. A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in
world politics because other countries want to follow it, admiring its values, emulating its
example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness (Nye 2002, p. 8).
Hard power rests on the capacity to force others to ones position while soft power lies
in the ability to attract and persuade rather than coerce (Nye 2003, p. 66). As a country
develops a reputation for upholding certain values, such as respect for human rights, a desire
for peaceful relations, and a level of deference to international institutions, that countrys
ability to persuade other like-minded states is enhanced. Consistently endorsing and
supporting such values increases a states legitimacy and makes its leadership more desir-
able. Soft power allows a state to influence the preferences of others and to place its own
goals at the forefront of the agenda. As Nye puts it:
Soft power rests on the ability to set the political agenda in a way that shapes the preferences
of others. The ability to establish preferences tends to be associated with intangible power
resources such as an attractive culture, ideology, and institutions. (2002, p. 9)
Influence is an important measure of a states power. Baumann et al. argue that a states
influence is a measure of how strongly it can itself impact its environment, in particular the
behavior of other states and the collective decision-making in, and action of, international
organizations (2001, p. 40). These authors argue that the ability to influence other actors
within the international system is crucial to that states ability to meet its security and other
foreign policy goals.
A state is interested in influencing the behavior of other states or collective actions of
international organizations to suit its purposes. Otherwise, other states, which are potentially
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342 W.R. Patterson
threatening, could shape these actions and decisions to suit their purposes, which would run
contrary to the states security interests. Hence every state is interested in transforming its
capabilities into influence. (Ibid., p. 41)
Developing soft power is one effective way of doing this.
Some scholars remain skeptical of soft power. Niall Ferguson has written:
The trouble with soft power is that its, well, soft. All over the Islamic world kids enjoy (or
would like to enjoy) bottles of Coke, Big Macs, CDs by Britney Spears and DVDs starring
Tom Cruise. Do any of these things make them love the United States more? Strangely not.
(2003, p. 21)
Since the Islamic world has been exposed to Britney Spears but still hasnt warmed up to
the US, scholars such as Ferguson claim that soft power hasnt proven itself to be very
effective or particularly useful. But when Ferguson and others attack soft power in this
manner they are attacking only a caricature. Soft power is more than Britney Spears. It
arises, Nye tells us, from the attractiveness of a countrys culture, political ideals, and
policies (2003, p. 66). Culture is only one element of soft power, and pop-culture only a
sub-element of that.
It has been US policy, rather than its culture, that has damaged its relationship with the
Islamic world, though this is not to say that the relationship would be totally friendly had
the US made different policy choices. US policies concerning such issues as Guantanamo
Bay and the scandal at Abu Ghraib have affected Americas image and political legitimacy
throughout the Islamic world and have damaged Americas relations with those countries.
This has undermined the USs soft power and has made it more difficult for the US to obtain
the outcomes it wants when dealing with these countries.
Issues such as these have also weakened Americas ability to work cooperatively with
its European allies. Even one of the gurus of hard power, Kagan, has lamented that the US
has stumbled into a crisis of legitimacy. He argued in a 2004 issue of Foreign Affairs:
The struggle to define and obtain international legitimacy in this new era may prove to be
among the most critical contests of our time. In some ways, it is as significant in determing the
future of the U.S. role in the international system as any purely material measure of power and
influence. (2004a, p. 67)
Where the US ultimately stands in this struggle will be largely dependent on its ability to
project soft power.
Even Ferguson, in the same article in which he downplays the importance of soft power,
writes:
Two things can greatly magnify or diminish the ability of any entity to project power: first, its
own legitimacy in the eyes of its individual members and second, its credibility in the eyes of
other powers. These are the unquantifiable but perhaps most important elements of power.
(2003, p. 22)
But this is exactly what is argued by the proponents of soft power! It seems that the prob-
lems scholars such as Kagan and Ferguson have with soft power are more about semantics
and definitions than over real issues.
Armitage and Nye (2007) have expanded the concept of power even further in their
recent study on smart power commissioned by the Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS). Spurred on by what they view as a counterproductive over-reliance on hard
power in recent American foreign policy, Armitage and Nye explore the possibility of
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Journal of Power 343
combining hard and soft power in a more effective, and smart, manner. They explain:
Smart power is neither hard nor soft it is the skillful combination of both (Ibid., p. 7).
They further elaborate that smart power is an approach that underscores the necessity of a
strong military, but also invests heavily in alliances, partnerships, and institutions at all
levels to expand American influence and establish the legitimacy of American action
(Ibid.).
Their study is meant to convince American policymakers that an over-reliance on hard
power is a counterproductive and inefficient means to achieving its ends, while also conced-
ing that soft power alone will not be enough. What the US needs to do, they argue, is to
combine its use of hard and soft power in an intelligent and strategic way so that these two
elements of power can complement and reinforce each other. They warn that an over-
reliance on only one element of power can have counter-productive results. In regards to the
issue of terrorism, for example, they point out:
Excessive use of force can actually abet terrorist recruitment among local populations. We
must strike a balance between the use of force against irreconcilable extremists committed to
violent struggle and other means of countering terrorism if we want to maintain our legitimacy.
(Armitage and Nye 2007, pp. 1011)
In order to meet its foreign policy goals, the report contends that the US should respond
to provocations with force when necessary but refrain from overreacting. The US must also
eliminate symbols that erode Americas image abroad (such as Guantanamo Bay), increase
Americas diplomatic capability, and provide a more positive vision of the US to the rest of
the world by working for the global good and by making policy decisions that display a
recognition of the needs and aspirations of others. In sum the United States must find ways
of transforming its power into a moral consensus that ensures the willing acceptance if not
active promotion of our values over time (Armitage and Nye 2007, p. 12).
Though the CSIS study was commissioned specifically to analyze elements of American
power, this article applies the concept to Germany. Germany has increasingly relied upon
its hard power since reunification but only in accordance with its firmly held values. The
Germans have combined the use of hard and soft power effectively and have thereby
enhanced the effectiveness of their overall power. The foreign policy of the reunified
Germany serves as a perfect case study for the development and use of smart power.
The Germans are a bunch of softies
To many, German reunification was an ominous occurrence. Numerous politicians (with
Margaret Thatcher and Franois Mitterrand being prime examples) and scholars (especially
neo-realist theorists) believed that a reunified Germany would be a resurgently powerful
and dominating Germany. Even among those who outwardly cheered German reunification,
there was often an undertone of apprehension. Division had been the primary guarantee that
Germany would remain weak and could never again threaten to subjugate the rest of
Europe. Was this guarantee shattered with the new-found power that a unified Germany
possessed? Would the Germans revert to a Bismarckian foreign policy of realpolitik?
Would they attempt to struggle free from the international institutions that had previously
constrained them and reverse the course of the European Union? Would they march towards
rearmament on a massive scale and seek nuclear weapons?
Many people asked these questions with trepidation. The answer given by Thomas
Bergner was not an uncommon one. He wrote:
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344 W.R. Patterson
Germany will clearly no longer tolerate different treatment than is received by other European
countries. The Germans have made clear that a policy of singularity according to which
Germany is expected to operate under special conditions not shared by other nations, will no
longer be acceptable. (1991, p. 92)
It was widely assumed that a reunited Germany would be a resurgently powerful Germany
and a Germany that would be reluctant to play by the old rules of the game that had curtailed
its use of power during the Cold War. Europe braced itself for an unrestrained German
superpower in its midst. The reality, however, turned out to be quite different.
Much to the relief of the rest of Europe, and indeed the world, Germany did not attempt
to dominate. In fact, it did none of the things that neo-realist foreign policy theorists would
have predicted. It did not rebuild its army or seek nuclear weapons; on the contrary, it was
a strong advocate for peaceful relations among nations and a primary force behind nuclear
non-proliferation initiatives. It did not attempt to free itself from the bonds of international
organizations; instead it became one of the strongest proponents for wider and deeper
European integration. It did not adopt a policy of realpolitik but argued for a world
constrained by international values and norms.
Germanys foreign-policy behavior remained remarkably restrained, and its outlook on
power did not change, at least not right away. Even after reunification, Peter Katzenstein
noted: The German approach to power, and the practices that sustain and reformulate it,
emphasizes its soft elements (1997, p. 3). Rather than revert to the use of hard military
power, Germany maintained its reliance on soft power. The possible reasons for this are
many. The Germans have remained haunted by their past. Their defeat in two world wars,
and the crimes that they committed during them, has created a reflexive disdain for the use
of military force in the German psyche. The Germans, at least in West Germany, have also
been part of a deepening European Community for the past forty-five years which has
ingrained in them a certain set of norms and values that cannot easily be disregarded.
Finally, the Germans recognized the distrust harbored towards them by many other
European nations. A resurgence of military power would only have heightened that distrust
and caused a Europe-wide backlash.
A resort to hard military power would simply not have been effective; in fact, it would
have been counterproductive. As Simon Bulmer put it:
Germanys agent power may be facilitated by various resources, such as authority, money,
legitimacy, information, or organizational capability. Military capacity a traditional power
resource in realist analysis is of limited value for the articulation of German European policy
interests, because it is not the currency the EU deals in. (1997, p. 75)
Since reunification, Germany has developed a set of foreign policy goals that simply
would not be best met through the use of hard power. These include: the expansion of the
EU to Eastern Europe, the advancement of human rights worldwide, the furtherance of
international law and the power of global international institutions and organizations, and
the prevention of nuclear proliferation. Of these goals, the expansion and deepening of the
EU is perhaps the most important.
Germany has a strong interest in the further development of the EU and of its own posi-
tion within that organization. The integration of Eastern Europe has been of special impor-
tance to Germany. Germany conducts a vast amount of trade with these countries and is in
close geographical proximity to many of them. Germany, more than any other Western
European state, has benefited in both economic and security terms by bringing Eastern
Europe into the peaceful capitalist structure of the EU. This outcome could not have been
accomplished through military means, so Germany used its soft power to meet its interests.
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Germany created the soft power that it needed to influence the EU by being a primary
supporter of it. Ulf Frenkler has written:
Germanys efforts and continued willingness to maintain and at times expedite the integration
process through its own initiatives are to be seen as clearly positive. Germany was aware of its
central significance for the success or failure of the European unification process and commit-
ted itself willingly to this responsibility. (2001, p. 29)
This commitment to the EU continued throughout Germanys own unification process and
did not waver despite its growing power.
At precisely the time when many scholars and politicians throughout Europe were fear-
ful that Germany would begin to unravel itself from international institutions, its effort to
strengthen them only grew. Following its own reunification, Germany immediately began
to champion further European integration, despite the skepticism by many other EU
member-states about the ability of Eastern Europe to acclimate to the rules and culture of
the EU. Jeffrey Anderson notes that Germany pushed strongly
for enlargement to the east; a general consensus among political elites held that the prospect of
EU membership for Central and Eastern European countries would undergird their path to
democracy and markets, thereby contributing to political stability and economic prosperity in
the region. The German government spearheaded the creation of EC assistance programs like
PHARE (Pologne-Hongrie assistance a la restructuation des economies) and TACIS (Technical
Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States). It also provided much of the impetus
for the string of European Agreements negotiated with Poland, Hungary, and the Czech and
Slovak Republics, Bulgaria, Romania, and the Baltic republics, and Slovenia, which were
viewed as precursors to formal membership in the EU. (1999, p. 53)
This aggressive and consistent push for European integration not only reassured the rest
of Europe of its own good intentions but also gave Germany a seat of influence within the
European integration process. Because of its strong endorsement of integration, it could
push for the implementation of its own preferences and gain a modicum of control over the
process itself. Bulmer argues: In certain central areas of policy, it has been possible for the
FRG to play an active role in shaping institutional development in such a way as to mobilize
a bias in the character of EU governance (1997, pp. 7374).
Germany was the strongest backer for the expansion of the EU to those Eastern Euro-
pean countries who qualified. While others worried more about the economic and govern-
mental pressures that would come with further expansion, Germany continually pushed for
it. This strong support fostered gratitude among the Eastern Europeans and helped advance
the German goal of creating a peaceful trade and security relationship with the East.
Through its use of soft power, Germany has successfully pushed for greater and greater
European integration, especially with the Eastern European countries, and has created for
itself a position of leadership within Europe. It has been able to shape the preferences of
other European nations, and of the EU itself, to more closely accord with its own prefer-
ences. It has utilized its values and moral influence to mold European integration to meet
its own goals.
This trend continues today. During her EU Presidency, for example, Germanys Chan-
cellor, Angela Merkel, made reconsideration of the European Constitution, which was
rejected by referendums in France and Holland, a top priority. Just prior to her accession,
the news organization Deutsche Welle reported:
Merkelsaid when Germany takes over the EUs rotating presidency in 2007 it would work
to promote the European Constitution despite its rejection by French and Dutch voters last year.
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346 W.R. Patterson
We absolutely need the constitution to ensure the European Union is effective and capable
of action, Merkel said, but she also warned of moving too hastily. We must reflect how we
can bring the constitution project to a successful conclusion. (2006)
Germanys contribution to the EU is not the only example of its commitment to multi-
lateral institutions. Germany is highly committed to multilateralism and has demonstrated
this through a variety of organizations. John Duffield notes:
More than their counterparts in most countries, German leaders have been inclined to comply
with institutional rules and to work through institutional channels. They have also been more
favorably disposed toward maintaining and strengthening existing international institutions and
toward creating new ones. (1998, pp. 56).
The Germans have utilized international institutions and organizations to forward their
agenda on human rights and nuclear non-proliferation and, most notably in recent years, to
express their discontent with American actions in Iraq.
Despite the fears held by many that a reunified Germany might seek to become a nuclear
power, the Germans have fought vigorously against nuclear proliferation. Oliver Meier
argues:
Germany has become one of the strongest supporters of the NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty)
and Germanys decision to be a non-nuclear weapon state can be considered permanent. The
period after Germanys unification in 1990 has proven that the German commitment to remain
a non-nuclear weapon state is as strong as ever. (2001, p. 69)
Germanys forceful rejection of nuclear weapons has eased tensions with its European
partners and provided it with the moral influence to be a key player in multilateral non-
proliferation negotiations. Germanys leadership on non-proliferation issues was evident at
the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference during which
Germany was one of the driving forces behind the European Unions very successful efforts to
convince those non-nuclear weapons states that were opposed to an indefinite extension of the
NPT or undecided on the issue of indefinite extension to change their minds. (Ibid., p. 71)
Germany demonstrated through its own behavior that security without nuclear weapons was
possible and was therefore able to lead a multilateral effort to convince others that they
could similarly afford to forgo nuclear weaponry.
Another issue on which Germany has successfully utilized multilateral organizations in
order to advance its own interests is that of human rights. Human rights issues are very
salient in Germany. In an attempt to atone for their past, and to prevent future atrocities, the
Germans have taken a leading role on these issues both domestically and internationally.
Germany has continually proven its commitment to human rights through its domestic
policies and behavior. Florian Pfeil argues: Compared to other constitutions, the German
Basic Law accords an eminent status to guarantees of a wide range of human rights, and
The internal human rights situation in Germany by any global standard is very good (2001,
p. 91).
This domestic commitment to human rights has allowed Germany to become a leader
on human rights issues in the international arena as well. Pfeil notes: Germany has signed
up to all important human rights covenants and plays an active role in the UN human rights
regime (2001, p. 91). As part of its goal to increase human rights accountability, Germany
was one of the primary backers of the Treaty of Rome establishing the International
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Criminal Court (ICC). Having been the defendants in the Nuremberg Trials only 50 years
before, the strong support that the Germans gave to the ICC was dramatic and had a
significant impact on its acceptance by the international community. The adoption of the
ICC statute can be seen as a great success for German human rights policy in the area of
institution-building (Ibid., p. 93).
The German commitment to international organizations and international laws was
displayed most stridently during the run-up to the most recent Iraq war. To Germany (and
to most of Europe), more was at stake than Saddam Hussein. To them, the entire international
order of multilateralism and the efficacy of international law was at stake. August Pradetto
points out: Schroder justified his rejection of the Iraq War in February 2003 asking, whether
there is (or rather should be) a single power determining the course of the world (2006,
p. 25). The US was seen to be overbearing and disdainful of European opinions. International
law seemed to have no place in the Bush Administrations reasoning and their willingness
to act unilaterally, as stated repeatedly by the president, was disconcerting to most Europeans.
In response to this perceived unilateralism, Germany, along with several other countries,
utilized its soft power to erode the legitimacy of the American actions. Nye argues:
Unable to balance American military power, France, Germany, Russia, and China created a
coalition to balance American soft power by depriving the United States of the legitimacy that
might have been bestowed by a second UN resolution. Although such balancing did not avert
the war in Iraq, it did significantly raise the price. (2003, p. 66)
This is a prime example in which several states pooled their soft power to at least partially
counteract the hard power of a militarily dominant state. Even Kagan has written: Ideals
and interests often coincide, and Europes assaults on the legitimacy of the U.S. dominance
may also become an effective way of constraining and controlling the superpower (2004a,
p. 65).
Germanys record on multilateralism has not been perfect, however. In fact, Germany
has acted unilaterally in some instances that remain controversial. Its recognition of Slove-
nia and Croatia in 1991, in contravention of an EU consensus not to do so, is a prominent
example. Germanys unilateral recognition of these countries was particularly worrying to
many of its European partners because it came so soon after its own reunification. To many
this seemed an ominously defiant first step in the foreign policy of a newly united
Germany (Crawford 1996, p. 482). The decision angered EU member-states and was
viewed as a deliberate action to undermine a multilateral agreement.
Germanys decision in this case, however, can still be viewed as upholding values upon
which its soft power has been built. One of the prime normative values held by the Germans,
and by the international community, is that of the right of self-determination. Having only
recently reunited after decades of the domination of East Germany by Soviet aggression, the
Germans were particularly sympathetic to the plight of the Croatians and Slovenians. In a
clash between two conflicting norms, that of multilateralism and self-determination, the
Germans chose to support self-determination (Crawford 1996, p. 485). The fact that
Germany was not attempting to undermine the European Union, as some at the time feared,
has been borne out by subsequent history.
Soft power matters, and since reunification Germany has, with only a few exceptions,
relied heavily upon it to meet its foreign policy goals. Germany has used its soft power to
enhance its own international reputation and to allay the fears of other states that it might
once again seek to dominate Europe. It has pursued its national interests in widening the EU
to Eastern Europe, deepening EU integration between all of its member-states, preventing
nuclear proliferation, enforcing international human rights standards, and standing up to
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348 W.R. Patterson
what it perceived to be American unilateralism, all without resorting to military power.
Germanys successful use of soft power in achieving its foreign policy goals demonstrates
that conceptions of power that focus exclusively on the application of hard military power
are too narrow. In order to get a true picture of any given states power capabilities, a
broader picture is necessary.
This section has focused on the development and use of soft power in Germany. The
impression that Germany completely lacks hard power, however, would be a mistaken one.
Germany cannot, of course, match the US in regards to its military might, but it does none-
theless possess some military capability. In recent years, Germany has been less and less
reticent to apply this hard power. The next section will explore Germanys development and
use of hard military power.
Toughening up
Initially, fears of German post-unification military power were great. Franois Mitterrand,
for example, openly worried: A reunified Germany would represent a double danger for
Europe, by its power and because it would create pressure for alliance between Britain,
France, and the Soviet Union. That would mean certain war in the twenty-first century
(cited Crawshaw 2004, p. 80). Such anxiety was felt not only by foreigners, but by many
Germans themselves. Could the Germans trust themselves after the horrors they had
committed during World War II? At first they were not at all confident that they could. To
ensure that they could never be responsible for a second Holocaust, the Germans largely
repudiated the use of force, especially in a realpolitik setting. Katzenstein argues that there
are virtually no traces of Germanys return to realist normalcy, to balance of power poli-
tics in an anarchical international system. Germans shun the practice of power politics and
balancing (1997, p. 9).
Germanys renunciation of military force became immediately apparent in its shrinking
military budget. Between 1960 and 1990, the West German defense budget had risen
steadily at just under 3% per year and increased by 4.7% in the year 1990 (Tartter 1996,
p. 489). This trend came to an abrupt halt following reunification, and defense spending was
placed on a downward trajectory. From a high of slightly over $42 billion (in US dollars) in
1990, defense spending was down to $28 billion in 2000. Since 2000, and with Germanys
increased military commitments around the world, defense spending has increased again but
in 2007 still fell below the 1990 figure at just under $42 billion (NATO 2007).
Relying solely upon these numbers, however, to judge Germanys use of hard power
would be misleading. Germany has increasingly been doing more with less and while on
paper Germanys hard power may seem to be reduced in comparison to the Cold War days,
its actual use of hard power has been steadily growing. Rainer Baumann has noted: Step-
by-step, post-unification Germany has given up its reservations about participating in out-
of-area operations (2001, p. 174). Whereas prior to reunification Germanys military
played a completely defensive deterrent role, Germany has since become much more
comfortable using its military capability in a greater variety of missions and in an interna-
tional context. By 2003, Germany had
nearly ten thousand troops deployed in numerous international missions, working in concert
with other countries under UN and NATO mandates to secure peace, fight terrorism and
support democracy. Through its commitment to international cooperation, Germany has
become the second largest contributor of troops to multilateral missions after the United States.
German armed forces are deployed in Afghanistan, in Kuwait, in the Horn of Africa, in
Kosovo, Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Georgia. (Germany Info Webpage 2008)
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That Germany would participate to such a large degree in international military opera-
tions was not inevitable. Indeed, during the Gulf War, its first major challenge to contribute
troops to an international cause, the Germans balked. This war was led by one of Germanys
primary allies (the US), had extensive international backing, and was being undertaken for
the ostensive reason of thwarting an aggressive state and upholding international law. To
most of the international community, this was a legitimate war. Yet the Germans refused to
contribute military forces nonetheless.
There were several reasons for the German reticence to contribute armed forces. First
was the fact that their Constitution was widely interpreted as prohibiting it. In the view of
many Germans, the Basic Law simply did not allow for the deployment of military forces
overseas. Second, Germany was in the midst of reunification. Despite reunification being a
major historical achievement, it was also a tumultuous time for the Germans. A rift of 55 years
had created many differences between the East and West Germans that did not disappear
with the dismantlement of a stone wall. Questions of German identity and the German future
were abundant, and the answers were not at all clear. Too much distrust still existed between
the Easterners and Westerners for them to provide a coherent military contribution to the
war. Before getting involved in foreign adventures they first needed to discover who they
were. A third reason was, of course, fear of power. Reunification greatly enhanced Germanys
power position in the world and there was much apprehension about that, both within Germany
itself and throughout Europe as a whole. To take a strong military stance in an international
conflict so soon after reunification would have confirmed many peoples worst fears. The
Germans had not yet built up the international trust to enable them to field military units abroad.
Germany needed time before it was ready to send its military on out-of-area missions,
but not too much time. The united Germany first tested the waters of international military
deployment in 1992. In that year, Germany began its participation in the UNTAC mission
in Cambodia to which it contributed approximately 140 Bundeswehr soldiers. Most of these
soldiers were medical personnel rather than combat troops, yet even this commitment was
controversial within Germany. Other missions would, however, follow in quick succession.
According to Steve Crawshaw, Cambodia marked only the beginning of a cascading series
of changes involving Germans in war zones (2004, p. 119).
Only two months after the commitment of troops to Cambodia, Germany elected to send
AWACS aircraft to aid in the enforcement of the no-fly zone and embargo being imposed
upon Yugoslavia. These were reconnaissance rather than fighter aircraft, so it was justified
as a non-combat mission. Additionally, this mission was taking place inside Europe, which
could plausibly be regarded as being within the self-defense jurisdiction of NATO.
The third appearance of German military personnel abroad began the next year, 1993,
with the Bundeswehr deployment to Somalia in support of UNOSOM II. This deployment
was much more robust, with over 1,500 soldiers participating. These soldiers were involved
in technical assistance such as engineering and logistics and again, no troops were involved
in actual combat. The operation was rationalized by the German leadership as being purely
humanitarian and therefore not a violation of the Basic Law, which precluded the deploy-
ment of military troops beyond German borders.
These missions were bitterly opposed by several factions in the German government,
most specifically by the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) and the Partei des
Demokratischen Sozialismus (PDS). These parties challenged the deployment of troops
through the German court system. This would prove to have momentous repercussions for
German foreign policy. The court ultimately found the deployments to be constitutional,
thereby granting full legal legitimacy to the use of Bundeswehr personnel in foreign opera-
tions for the first time. Kerry Longhurst remarks:
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350 W.R. Patterson
In mapping the trajectory of change in Germanys post-Cold War security policy, the Consti-
tutional Courts decision of 12 July 1994 is of central significance. This decision essentially
ratified the CDU-CSU strategy of incrementally extending the Bundeswehrs remit, without
recourse to constitutional amendments. (2004, p. 64)
This decision gave the German government the green light to become even more involved
in future international military operations.
Germanys next international engagement would once again be in Yugoslavia. In 1994,
NATO requested that the Germans provide aircraft to aid in the extraction of UN peacekeep-
ers involved in the UNPROFOR mission. A combat role was again avoided, and the mission
was justified to the German people on the grounds that it was a mission of protection for
international peacekeeping forces. This deployment foreshadowed Germanys subsequent
non-combat involvement in the IFOR mission in Bosnia in 1995.
Within five years of reunification, German military forces had been sent to participate
in international missions in Cambodia, Somalia, and various areas in the former Yugoslavia.
Furthermore, these deployments had not only been given an official stamp of approval by
the German high court but had also met with broad international appreciation. Germany was
incrementally, but quickly, overcoming its reluctance to utilize its military in out-of-area
operations. This reluctance would be even further shattered in 1998 when Germany agreed
to participate in the NATO mission in Kosovo.
Kosovo was a watershed moment for German military involvement because it was the
first mission since its establishment that the Bundeswehr would be involved in actual
combat missions. Longhurst argues: Germanys involvement in Kosovo certainly was
qualitatively different to any other previous deployment, principally because this time the
Bundeswehr was engaged in an offensive military operation against a sovereign state with-
out a clear mandate from the UN (2004, p. 70). Germany had moved from participating in
UN-sanctioned, non-combative, peacekeeping missions to involvement in a full combat
scenario supported only by NATO. This was a huge step in German foreign policy.
An even greater step would come following 11 September 2001 when Germany made a
full commitment to combat operations in Afghanistan. The NATO article of common defense
was invoked immediately after the attacks and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder prom-
ised unconditional solidarity with the US war on terrorism. Nearly 4,000 Bundeswehr troops
were deployed to Afghanistan, and Germany even accepted the position as the lead nation
in charge of NATO combat operations in that country. These actions of support are, according
to Longhurst, firm expressions of Germanys commitment to having a role in international
security and accepting the utility of armed force (2004, p. 77). German foreign policy, and
its willingness to use military force abroad, has come a long way since the Gulf War.
German smart power
As demonstrated in the previous two sections, Germany has resorted to both soft and hard
power in pursuit of its national interests. It has used soft power to strengthen its position in
international organizations, prevent nuclear proliferation, enforce human rights standards and
stand-up to unilateral American power. It has utilized hard military power to solidify its posi-
tion in the world, to stabilize situations of conflict and to combat terrorism. What is most
significant about German power, however, is how the elements of soft and hard power have
formed a mutually supportive nexus that has allowed for the increase of both: its smart power.
The possession of a large degree of soft power was a necessary precondition for the
development of any significant amount of hard power in Germany. The rest of Europe was
far too suspicious of German power to have allowed it to pursue hard military power with
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Journal of Power 351
any degree of exuberance. Writing at the time, Bergner noted: Even the hint of an indepen-
dent military course will be sufficient to set capitals from London to Moscow off in search
of new alliances in the old game of national power politics (1991, p. 89). Any sign of
resurgent German power would have set into motion a game of balancing and power politics
that Germany wanted nothing to do with.
Duffield echoed these sentiments when he wrote:
Germany has continued to be watched more closely and with greater mistrust than would
another country in the same geopolitical circumstances, while German initiatives have still
been more likely to be met with suspicion, criticism, and even resistance. Consequently,
Germany has continued to have strong incentives to act cautiously in order to reassure its
neighbors that they have nothing to fear. (1998, p. 48)
That is precisely what developing its soft power allowed Germany to do.
By proving to its European partners that it had no intentions of revamping its old war
machine or rekindling its old aspirations of European conquest, Germany was incrementally
able to increase and actively use its hard power. European fears were allayed by Germanys
continued deference to international institutions, its strong support for human rights issues
and its leading role in creating nuclear non-proliferation regimes. Duffield argues: By
acting through established institutional channels, states may be able to reassure others about
their intentions, thereby reducing international tension and mistrust (1998, p. 19). Rather
than immediately striking out on the path to hard military power, Germany first built up its
international reputation as a peaceful nation and one that was devoted to multilateralism and
international law. This provided them with greater latitude in the future when it came to
issues of military deployments abroad. Thomas Banchoff has noted: Concerns in 199091
about the possibility of a more nationally oriented German foreign policy faded in the years
that followed (1999, p. 163).
In fact, the Germans were at first so reluctant to utilize military force that their refusal
to do so began to erode their soft power. While the Germans constantly spoke about the
importance of international law and the enforcement of human rights norms, their refusal to
back these values up with force when necessary made them look disingenuous at best and
downright hypocritical at worst. In order to maintain their soft power, the Germans needed
to occasionally back it up with hard power.
The first hint that Germany may not be able to rely on its soft power alone came early
on with the Gulf War. Germanys refusal to participate in the war militarily caused some
consternation with its allies, especially the US, which felt that it was playing checkbook
diplomacy. Nina Philippi writes:
Although Germany finally paid about 16 billion Deutsch Marks to help finance Operation
Desert Storm, this only partially compensated for the German absence and their allies disap-
pointment at Germanys lack of solidarity. The pressure on Germany to play a greater role in
world politics grew in the aftermath of the Gulf crisis. (2001, p. 52)
Germany, then, seemed trapped. On the one hand, they had to be cautious about using
their hard power too openly so as not to arouse suspicions of a reversion to realpolitik, while
on the other they were being accused of not sufficiently supporting their allies and their own
values when they rebuffed requests for military contributions. This problem only deepened
with later crises. Crawshaw points out, for example, that:
During the early years of the Balkan wars in the 1990s, German politicians openly advocated
tougher action against Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic and his Bosnian Serb allies, especially
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352 W.R. Patterson
after the discovery of concentration camps in Bosnia. In the words of the defence minister,
Volker Ruhe: concentration camps in Germany were stopped by soldiers, not by demonstra-
tions in another country. On the other hand, the government insisted that Germany itself could
not possibly send troops because of the Second World War. The British government
gleefully accused Bonn of rank hypocrisy. (2004, pp. 119120)
German atrocities in World War II started to look less like a rational reason for restraint
on the foreign deployment of troops and more like an excuse. The Germans resolved this
dilemma by agreeing to send the Bundeswehr abroad, but only when asked to do so by the
UN or some other multilateral organization and only when it was absolutely necessary to
protect the moral values and interests that they espoused. As Longhurst puts it:
The new German perspective towards the use of force was characterized by a greater disposi-
tion to consider using the Bundeswehr in a wider range of missions. Consensus and agreement
to actually deploy armed forces, though, would be governed by strict criteria, which would
include the presence of a UN mandate, a multilateral framework, a clear mission statement, as
well as an unambiguous humanitarian dimension. (2004, p. 69)
The humanitarian aspect was always clearly spelled out in the missions that the
Bundeswehr was dispatched to. Cambodia, Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo all had clear
humanitarian elements that could be pointed to as justification for armed intervention. For
Germany, hard power has not been used in pursuit of power politics as neo-realists would
expect, but rather it has been employed in the support of values and ideas that have been
agreed upon by the majority of the international community. This policy has met with a
good deal of success. Crawshaw writes, for example:
When German troops arrived in Prizren in western Kosovo they were stunned by their
reception. Thousands hugged and kissed the conscripts, and put flowers in their flak jackets.
Crowds chanted: Deutsch-land! A young Kosovo Albanian described her reaction on seeing
the German tanks. I fainted right on the street. This was a miracle. Germans had spent
years telling each other that the world would be horrified if they were to set foot in a war
zone ever again. Now, it was clear that this assumption was based on a misconception.
(2004, p. 125)
The old saying goes that nothing succeeds like success, and this has definitely been the
case with German foreign policy. Germany has been able to wrap its hard power in an exte-
rior of soft power and has found the combination quite useful. The fears of its Europeans
friends have been allayed, and the tumultuous internal dissent has been largely quieted.
Only 17% of the German population had supported intervention in the Gulf War, a few
years later 54% supported involvement in Bosnia, and a full 69% supported involvement in
the war on terrorism immediately following 9/11 (Pradetto 2006, p. 24). Germany seems to
have found the solution to its power dilemma. As Crawshaw puts it, Germans are an inter-
national fighting force for the first time in six decades. At last, that fact frightens neither the
Germans nor the rest of the world (2004, p. 131).
Conclusion
Since its reunification, Germany has been able to expertly combine its hard with its soft
power. German foreign policy has been marked by a respect for international law and multi-
lateral institutions. Human rights issues have also played an important role in German as
opposed to recent American foreign policy. But this is not to say, as analysts such as Kagan
might, that Germans have an allergy to the use of power in all its forms.
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Since reunification, Germany has focused on the development of its soft power in order
to solidify its influence over other international actors, especially within Europe. This strat-
egy has allowed Germany to allay the fears of its neighbors and allies, and to reassure them
that Germany does not present a risk to their security. It has increased Germanys influence
over the behavior of other states and over the actions of the international organizations to
which it belongs. Furthermore, it has helped create an international environment in which
the development and use of German hard power has become more acceptable.
The goals that Germany has recently been pursuing through its foreign policy have been
more achievable through the use of soft power, reinforced with limited and restrained hard
power, than would be possible through a more muscular and militaristic approach. Robert
Jervis reminds us: It is important to remember that power is not a goal in itself but is a
means to reach other objectives (1989, p. 247). To resort to hard power when such action
is not likely to achieve the desired objectives is counter-productive. The Germans have
taken a wiser, smarter, approach and have built up their soft power to an extent that makes
their hard power more palatable to the rest of the international community. Contrary to
being allergic to power, Germany has used its soft power, and its increasing hard power, in
an assertive way to meet its foreign policy goals. Since its reunification, Germany has accu-
mulated and used a considerable amount of smart power.
Germany has developed a foreign-policy consensus that allows it to maintain its reputa-
tion as a peaceful nation devoted to multilateral institutions while simultaneously making a
substantial military contribution to global crises when the right conditions are met. The
Germans have managed to fuse together the elements of hard and soft into a complex
amalgamation of power that exemplifies what Armitage and Nye call smart power. In
German foreign policy, hard power is made permissible by soft power, and soft power is
made credible by hard power.
Though the use of American power is not likely to mirror that of the Germans any time
soon (nor should it considering their different histories and current positions in the world
system), the case of Germany does provide a useful example of how smart power can be
developed and used. Hard and soft power are not mutually exclusive ends on the spectrum
of power; on the contrary, Germany has demonstrated that these two elements of power can
be used most successfully when adeptly combined in such a way as to increase both. The
US, and other states as well, could learn valuable lessons about the application of smart
power from the case of Germany.
Notes on contributor
William R. Patterson is a PhD candidate in the International Studies program at Old Dominion
University in Norfolk, Virginia. Primary research interests include issues relating to international
policing, political philosophy and European studies, and he has previously published in the journals
Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement, Journal of Social Philosophy, International Journal of
Applied Philosophy and International Topics.
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