notes

None of these cards are highlighted- you should do that yourself so you can familiarize yourself with
them. The 2nc overview is also more of a guide- you have to fill large parts of that out yourself based on
what you want from the cards.

framework
1nc

Resolved is legislative
Parcher 1 - Jeff Parcher, former debate coach at Georgetown, Feb 2001
http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200102/0790.html

Pardon me if I turn to a source besides Bill. American Heritage Dictionary: Resolve: 1. To make a firm decision about. 2. To
decide or express by formal vote. 3. To separate something into constiutent parts See Syns at *analyze* (emphasis in orginal) 4. Find a solution
to. See Syns at *Solve* (emphasis in original) 5. To dispel: resolve a doubt. - n 1. Firmness of purpose; resolution. 2. A determination or
decision. (2) The very nature of the word "resolution" makes it a question. American Heritage: A course of action determined or
decided on. A formal statement of a decision, as by a legislature. (3) The resolution is obviously a
question. Any other conclusion is utterly inconceivable. Why? Context. The debate community
empowers a topic committee to write a topic for ALTERNATE side debating. The committee is not a
random group of people coming together to "reserve" themselves about some issue. There is context -
they are empowered by a community to do something. In their deliberations, the topic community
attempts to craft a resolution which can be ANSWERED in either direction. They focus on issues like
ground and fairness because they know the resolution will serve as the basis for debate which will be
resolved by determining the policy desirablility of that resolution. That's not only what they do, but it's
what we REQUIRE them to do. We don't just send the topic committee somewhere to adopt their own
group resolution. It's not the end point of a resolution adopted by a body - it's the preliminary wording
of a resolution sent to others to be answered or decided upon. (4) Further context: the word resolved is
used to emphasize the fact that it's policy debate. Resolved comes from the adoption of resolutions by
legislative bodies. A resolution is either adopted or it is not. It's a question before a legislative body.
Should this statement be adopted or not. (5) The very terms 'affirmative' and 'negative' support my
view. One affirms a resolution. Affirmative and negative are the equivalents of 'yes' or 'no' - which, of
course, are answers to a question.

USFG should means the debate is only about government policy
Ericson 3 (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts California Polytechnic U., et al., The
Debaters Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements,
although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented
propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---The United States in The United States should adopt a policy of free
trade. Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb shouldthe first part of a
verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put
a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase
free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs,
discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred.
The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the
affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform
the future action that you propose.

Voting issue
Preparation and clashchanging the topic post facto manipulates balance of prep,
which structurally favors the aff because they are able to choose the initial framework
for debate and permute non-competitive counter-methodologiesstrategic fairness
on a limited topic is key to engaging a well-prepared opponentthey force us to give
up every other pursuit for win debates
Harris 13 (Scott, April 5 This ballot by Scott Harris
http://www.cedadebate.org/forum/index.php?topic=4762.0, nkj)

I understand that there has been some criticism of Northwesterns strategy in this debate round. This criticism is premised on the idea
that they ran framework instead of engaging Emporias argument about home and the Wiz. I think this criticism is unfair.
Northwesterns framework argument did engage Emporias argument. Emporia said that you should
vote for the team that performatively and methodologically made debate a home. Northwesterns
argument directly clashed with that contention. My problem in this debate was with aspects of the execution of the
argument rather than with the strategy itself. It has always made me angry in debates when people have treated topicality as if it were a less
important argument than other arguments in debate. Topicality is a real argument. It is a researched strategy. It is an
argument that challenges many affirmatives. The fact that other arguments could be run in a debate or
are run in a debate does not make topicality somehow a less important argument. In reality, for many of you
that go on to law school you will spend much of your life running topicality arguments because you will find that words in the law matter. The
rest of us will experience the ways that word choices matter in contracts, in leases, in writing laws and in many
aspects of our lives. Kansas ran an affirmative a few years ago about how the location of a comma in a
law led a couple of districts to misinterpret the law into allowing individuals to be incarcerated in jail for
two days without having any formal charges filed against them. For those individuals the location of the
comma in the law had major consequences. Debates about words are not insignificant. Debates about
what kinds of arguments we should or should not be making in debates are not insignificant either. The
limits debate is an argument that has real pragmatic consequences. I found myself earlier this year judging Harvards
eco-pedagogy aff and thought to myselfI could stay up tonight and put a strategy together on eco-pedagogy, but then I thought to myself
why should I have to? Yes, I could put together a strategy against any random argument somebody makes employing an energy metaphor but
the reality is there are only so many nights to stay up all night researching. I would like to actually spend time playing catch with my children
occasionally or maybe even read a book or go to a movie or spend some time with my wife. A world where there are an infinite
number of affirmatives is a world where the demand to have a specific strategy and not run framework
is a world that says this community doesnt care whether its participants have a life or do well in school
or spend time with their families. I know there is a new call abounding for interpreting this NDT as a mandate for broader more
diverse topics. The reality is that will create more work to prepare for the teams that choose to debate the topic but will have little to no effect
on the teams that refuse to debate the topic. Broader topics that do not require positive government action or are
bidirectional will not make teams that wont debate the topic choose to debate the topic. I think that is a con
job. I am not opposed to broader topics necessarily. I tend to like the way high school topics are written more than the way college topics are
written. I just think people who take the meaning of the outcome of this NDT as proof that we need to make it so people get to talk about
anything they want to talk about without having to debate against topicality or framework arguments
are interested in constructing a world that might make debate an unending nightmare and not a very
good home in which to live. Limits, to me, are a real impact because I feel their impact in my everyday
existence.

Debates a gamefairness and rules come first
Villa 96Dana Villa Political Theory @ UC Santa Barbara Arendt and Heidegger: the Fate of the
Political p. 37
If political action is to be valued for its own sake, then the content of political action must be politics in
the sense that political action is talk about politics. The circularity of this formulation, given by George Kateb, is
unavoidable. It helps if we use an analogy that Kateb proposes, the analogy between such a purely political politics and a game. A game,
writes Kateb, is not about anything outside itself, it is its own sufficient worldthe content of any game is
itself. What matters in a game is the play itself, and the quality of this play is utterly dependent upon
the willingness and ability of the players to enter the world of the game. The Arendtian conception of politics is
one in which the spirit animating the play (the sharing of words and deeds)comes before all elsebefore personal
concerns, groups, interests, and even moral claims. If allowed to dominate the game, these elements detracts from
the play and from the performance of action. A good game happens only when the players submit
themselves to its spirit and do not allow subjective or external motives to dictate the play. A good
game, like genuine politics, is played for its own sake.

A limited topic is key to decision-making and advocacy skills
Steinberg and Freeley 8 *Austin J. Freeley is a Boston based attorney who focuses on criminal,
personal injury and civil rights law, AND David L. Steinberg , Lecturer of Communication Studies @ U
Miami, Argumentation and Debate: Critical Thinking for Reasoned Decision Making pp45-
Debate is a means of settling differences, so there must be a difference of opinion or a conflict of interest before there can be a debate. If
everyone is in agreement on a tact or value or policy, there is no need for debate: the matter can be settled by unanimous consent. Thus, for
example, it would be pointless to attempt to debate "Resolved: That two plus two equals four," because there is simply no controversy about
this statement. (Controversy is an essential prerequisite of debate. Where there is no clash of ideas, proposals, interests, or expressed positions
on issues, there is no debate. In addition, debate cannot produce effective decisions without clear identification of a question or questions to
be answered. For example, general argument may occur about the broad topic of illegal immigration. How many illegal immigrants are in the
United States? What is the impact of illegal immigration and immigrants on our economy? What is their impact on our communities? Do they
commit crimes? Do they take jobs from American workers? Do they pay taxes? Do they require social services? Is it a problem that some do not
speak English? Is it the responsibility of employers to discourage illegal immigration by not hiring undocumented workers? Should they have
the opportunity- to gain citizenship? Docs illegal immigration pose a security threat to our country? Do illegal immigrants do work that
American workers are unwilling to do? Are their rights as workers and as human beings at risk due to their status? Are they abused by
employers, law enforcement, housing, and businesses? I low are their families impacted by their status? What is the moral and philosophical
obligation of a nation state to maintain its borders? Should we build a wall on the Mexican border, establish a national identification can!, or
enforce existing laws against employers? Should we invite immigrants to become U.S. citizens? Surely you can think of many more concerns to
be addressed by a conversation about the topic area of illegal immigration. Participation in this "debate" is likely to be emotional and
intense. However, it is not likely to be productive or useful without focus on a particular question and
identification of a line demarcating sides in the controversy. To be discussed and resolved effectively,
controversies must be stated clearly. Vague understanding results in unfocused deliberation and poor
decisions, frustration, and emotional distress, as evidenced by the failure of the United States Congress to make progress on
the immigration debate during the summer of 2007.
Someone disturbed by the problem of the growing underclass of poorly educated, socially
disenfranchised youths might observe, "Public schools are doing a terrible job! They are overcrowded, and many teachers are poorly
qualified in their subject areas. Even the best teachers can do little more than struggle to maintain order in their classrooms." That same
concerned citizen, facing a complex range of issues, might arrive at an unhelpful decision, such as "We ought to do something about
this" or. worse. "It's too complicated a problem to deal with." Groups of concerned citizens worried about the state of
public education could join together to express their frustrations, anger, disillusionment, and emotions
regarding the schools, but without a focus for their discussions, they could easily agree about the sorry
state of education without finding points of clarity or potential solutions. A gripe session would follow. But if a
precise question is posedsuch as "What can be done to improve public education?"then a more profitable area of
discussion is opened up simply by placing a focus on the search for a concrete solution step. One or more
judgments can be phrased in the form of debate propositions, motions for parliamentary debate, or bills for legislative assemblies. The
statements "Resolved: That the federal government should implement a program of charter schools in at-risk communities" and "Resolved:
That the state of Florida should adopt a school voucher program" more clearly identify specific ways of dealing with educational problems in a
manageable form, suitable for debate. They provide specific policies to be investigated and aid discussants in identifying points of difference.
To have a productive debate, which facilitates effective decision making by directing and placing limits
on the decision to be made, the basis for argument should be clearly defined. If we merely talk about
"homelessness" or "abortion" or "crime'* or "global warming" we are likely to have an interesting discussion but not to establish profitable
basis for argument. For example, the statement "Resolved: That the pen is mightier than the sword" is debatable, yet fails to provide much
basis for clear argumentation. If we take this statement to mean that the written word is more effective than physical force for some purposes,
we can identify a problem area: the comparative effectiveness of writing or physical force for a specific purpose.
Although we now have a general subject, we have not yet stated a problem. It is still too broad, too loosely worded to promote well-organized
argument. What sort of writing are we concerned withpoems, novels, government documents, website development, advertising, or what?
What does "effectiveness" mean in this context? What kind of physical force is being comparedfists, dueling swords, bazookas, nuclear
weapons, or what? A more specific question might be. "Would a mutual defense treaty or a visit by our fleet be more effective in assuring
Liurania of our support in a certain crisis?" The basis for argument could be phrased in a debate proposition such as "Resolved: That the United
States should enter into a mutual defense treatv with Laurania." Negative advocates might oppose this proposition by arguing that fleet
maneuvers would be a better solution. This is not to say that debates should completely avoid creative
interpretation of the controversy by advocates, or that good debates cannot occur over competing
interpretations of the controversy; in fact, these sorts of debates may be very engaging. The point is that
debate is best facilitated by the guidance provided by focus on a particular point of difference, which will be
outlined in the following discussion.

Government policy discussions are key
Esberg and Sagan 12 *Jane Esberg is special assistant to the director at New York University's Center
on. International Cooperation. She was the winner of 2009 Firestone Medal, AND Scott Sagan is a
professor of political science and director of Stanford's Center for International Security and
Cooperation NEGOTIATING NONPROLIFERATION: Scholarship, Pedagogy, and Nuclear Weapons Policy,
2/17 The Nonproliferation Review, 19:1, 95-108
These government or quasi-government think tank simulations often provide very similar lessons for high-level
players as are learned by students in educational simulations. Government participants learn about the
importance of understanding foreign perspectives, the need to practice internal coordination, and the
necessity to compromise and coordinate with other governments in negotiations and crises. During the Cold
War, political scientist Robert Mandel noted how crisis exercises and war games forced government officials to overcome bureaucratic
myopia, moving beyond their normal organizational roles and thinking more creatively about how others might react in a crisis or conflict.6
The skills of imagination and the subsequent ability to predict foreign interests and reactions remain
critical for real-world foreign policy makers. For example, simulations of the Iranian nuclear crisis*held in 2009 and 2010 at the
Brookings Institutions Saban Center and at Harvard Universitys Belfer Center, and involving former US senior officials and regional
experts*highlighted the dangers of misunderstanding foreign governments preferences and misinterpreting their subsequent behavior. In both
simulations, the primary criticism of the US negotiating team lay in a failure to predict accurately how other
states, both allies and adversaries, would behave in response to US policy initiatives.7
By university age, students often have a pre-defined view of international affairs, and the literature on
simulations in education has long emphasized how such exercises force students to challenge their
assumptions about how other governments behave and how their own government works.8 Since
simulations became more common as a teaching tool in the late 1950s, educational literature has expounded
on their benefits, from encouraging engagement by breaking from the typical lecture format, to
improving communication skills, to promoting teamwork.9 More broadly, simulations can deepen
understanding by asking students to link fact and theory, providing a context for facts while bringing
theory into the realm of practice.10 These exercises are particularly valuable in teaching international affairs for many of the same
reasons they are useful for policy makers: they force participants to grapple with the issues arising from a world in
flux.11 Simulations have been used successfully to teach students about such disparate topics as European politics, the Kashmir crisis, and
US response to the mass killings in Darfur.12 Role-playing exercises certainly encourage students to learn political
and technical facts* but they learn them in a more active style. Rather than sitting in a classroom and
merely receiving knowledge, students actively research their governments positions and actively
argue, brief, and negotiate with others.13 Facts can change quickly; simulations teach students how to
contextualize and act on information.14

Substantive constraints on the debate are key to pluralism and agonistic democracy
Dryzek 6Professor of Social and Political Theory, The Australian National University (John,
Reconciling Pluralism and Consensus as Political Ideals, American Journal of Political Science,Vol. 50, No.
3, July 2006, Pp. 634649)
Mouffe is a radical pluralist: By pluralism I mean the end of a substantive idea of the good life (1996, 246). But neither Mouffe nor Young
want to abolish communication in the name of pluralism and difference; much of their work advocates sustained attention to
communication. Mouffe also cautions against uncritical celebration of difference, for some differences
imply subordination and should therefore be challenged by a radical democratic politics (1996, 247). Mouffe
raises the question of the terms in which engagement across difference might proceed. Participants should ideally accept that
the positions of others are legitimate, though not as a result of being persuaded in argument. Instead, it
is a matter of being open to conversion due to adoption of a particular kind of democratic attitude that
converts antagonism into agonism, fighting into critical engagement, enemies into adversaries who are
treated with respect. Respect here is not just (liberal) toleration, but positive validation of the position
of others. For Young, a communicative democracy would be composed of people showing equal respect,
under procedural rules of fair discussion and decisionmaking (1996, 126). Schlosberg speaks of agonistic
respect as a critical pluralist ethos (1999, 70).
Mouffe and Young both want pluralism to be regulated by a particular kind of attitude, be it respectful, agonistic, or even in Youngs (2000, 16
51) case reasonable. Thus neither proposes unregulated pluralism as an alternative to (deliberative) consensus.
This regulation cannot be just procedural, for that would imply anything goes in terms of the
substance of positions. Recall that Mouffe rejects differences that imply subordination. Agonistic ideals
demand judgments about what is worthy of respect and what is not. Connolly (1991, 211) worries about dogmatic
assertions and denials of identity that fuel existential resentments that would have to be changed to make agonism possible. Young seeks
transformation of private, self-regarding desires into public appeals to justice (2000, 51). Thus for Mouffe, Connolly, and Young alike,
regulative principles for democratic communication are not just attitudinal or procedural; they also refer
to the substance of the kinds of claims that are worthy of respect. These authors would not want to
legislate substance and are suspicious of the content of any alleged consensus. But in retreating from
anything goes relativism, they need principles to regulate the substance of what rightfully belongs in
democratic debate.

Effective deliberation is key to decisionmakingthats key to an informed citizenry
that can reclaim the political and solve existential problems
Lundberg 10 (Christian O. Lundberg 10 Professor of Communications @ University of North Carolina,
Chapel Hill, Tradition of Debate in North Carolina in Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st
Century By Allan D. Louden, p311)
The second major problem with the critique that identifies a naivety in articulating debate and democracy is that it presumes that the primary
pedagogical outcome of debate is speech capacities. But the democratic capacities built by debate are not limited to speechas indicated
earlier, debate builds capacity for critical thinking, analysis of public claims, informed decision making, and
better public judgment. If the picture of modem political life that underwrites this critique of debate is a
pessimistic view of increasingly labyrinthine and bureaucratic administrative politics, rapid scientific and
technological change outpacing the capacities of the citizenry to comprehend them, and ever-expanding
insular special-interest- and money-driven politics, it is a puzzling solution, at best, to argue that these
conditions warrant giving up on debate. If democracy is open to rearticulation, it is open to
rearticulation precisely because as the challenges of modern political life proliferate, the citizenry's
capacities can change, which is one of the primary reasons that theorists of democracy such as Ocwey in The Public awl Its Problems
place such a high premium on education (Dewey 1988,63, 154). Debate provides an indispensible form of education in the
modem articulation of democracy because it builds precisely the skills that allow the citizenry to
research and be informed about policy decisions that impact them, to son rhroueh and evaluate the
evidence for and relative merits of arguments for and against a policy in an increasingly information-rich
environment, and to prioritize their time and political energies toward policies that matter the most to
them.
The merits of debate as a tool for building democratic capacity-building take on a special significance in
the context of information literacy. John Larkin (2005, HO) argues that one of the primary failings of
modern colleges and universities is that they have not changed curriculum to match with the challenges
of a new information environment. This is a problem for the course of academic study in our current
context, but perhaps more important, argues Larkin, for the future of a citizenry that will need to make
evaluative choices against an increasingly complex and multimediatcd information environment (ibid-).
Larkin's study tested the benefits of debate participation on information-literacy skills and concluded
that in-class debate participants reported significantly higher self-efficacy ratings of their ability to
navigate academic search databases and to effectively search and use other Web resources:
To analyze the self-report ratings of the instructional and control group students, we first conducted a
multivariate analysis of variance on all of the ratings, looking jointly at the effect of instmction/no
instruction and debate topic . . . that it did not matter which topic students had been assigned . . .
students in the Instnictional debate) group were significantly more confident in their ability to access
information and less likely to feel that they needed help to do so----These findings clearly indicate
greater self-efficacy for online searching among students who participated in (debate).... These results
constitute strong support for the effectiveness of the project on students' self-efficacy for online
searching in the academic databases. There was an unintended effect, however: After doing ... the
project, instructional group students also felt more confident than the other students in their ability to
get good information from Yahoo and Google. It may be that the library research experience increased
self-efficacy for any searching, not just in academic databases. (Larkin 2005, 144)
Larkin's study substantiates Thomas Worthcn and Gaylcn Pack's (1992, 3) claim that debate in the
college classroom plays a critical role in fostering the kind of problem-solving skills demanded by the
increasingly rich media and information environment of modernity. Though their essay was written in
1992 on the cusp of the eventual explosion of the Internet as a medium, Worthcn and Pack's framing of
the issue was prescient: the primary question facing today's student has changed from how to best
research a topic to the crucial question of learning how to best evaluate which arguments to cite and
rely upon from an easily accessible and veritable cornucopia of materials.
There are, without a doubt, a number of important criticisms of employing debate as a model for
democratic deliberation. But cumulatively, the evidence presented here warrants strong support for
expanding debate practice in the classroom as a technology for enhancing democratic deliberative
capacities. The unique combination of critical thinking skills, research and information processing skills,
oral communication skills, and capacities for listening and thoughtful, open engagement with hotly
contested issues argues for debate as a crucial component of a rich and vital democratic life. In-class
debate practice both aids students in achieving the best goals of college and university education, and
serves as an unmatched practice for creating thoughtful, engaged, open-minded and self-critical
students who are open to the possibilities of meaningful political engagement and new articulations of
democratic life.
Expanding this practice is crucial, if only because the more we produce citizens that can actively and
effectively engage the political process, the more likely we are to produce revisions of democratic life
that are necessary if democracy is not only to survive, but to thrive. Democracy faces a myriad of
challenges, including: domestic and international issues of class, gender, and racial justice; wholesale
environmental destruction and the potential for rapid climate change; emerging threats to international
stability in the form of terrorism, intervention and new possibilities for great power conflict; and
increasing challenges of rapid globalization including an increasingly volatile global economic structure.
More than any specific policy or proposal, an informed and active citizenry that deliberates with greater
skill and sensitivity provides one of the best hopes for responsive and effective democratic governance,
and by extension, one of the last best hopes for dealing with the existential challenges to democracy in
an increasingly complex world.

Theres topical versions that can use most of the 1ac...changes by debate

Policymaking is essential to create permanent, codified change at every level of
society
Themba-Nixon 2K (Makani, Executive Director of The Praxis Project, a nonprofit organization helping
communities use media and policy advocacy to advance health equity and justice. Changing the Rules:
What Public Policy Means for Organizing Colorlines 3.2)

"This is all about policy," a woman complained to me in a recent conversation. "I'm an organizer." The flourish and passion with which she
made the distinction said everything. Policy is for wonks, sell-out politicians, and ivory-tower eggheads. Organizing
is what real, grassroots people do. Common as it may be, this distinction doesn't bear out in the real
world. Policy is more than law. It is any written agreement (formal or informal) that specifies how an
institution, governing body, or community will address shared problems or attain shared goals. It spells
out the terms and the consequences of these agreements and is the codification of the body's values-as
represented by those present in the policymaking process. Given who's usually present, most policies
reflect the political agenda of powerful elites. Yet, policy can be a force for change-especially when we
bring our base and community organizing into the process. In essence, policies are the codification of power
relationships and resource allocation. Policies are the rules of the world we live in. Changing the world
means changing the rules. So, if organizing is about changing the rules and building power, how can
organizing be separated from policies? Can we really speak truth to power, fight the right, stop
corporate abuses, or win racial justice without contesting the rules and the rulers, the policies and the
policymakers? The answer is no-and double no for people of color. Today, racism subtly dominates nearly
every aspect of policymaking. From ballot propositions to city funding priorities, policy is increasingly about the
control, de-funding, and disfranchisement of communities of color. What Do We Stand For? Take the public
conversation about welfare reform, for example. Most of us know it isn't really about putting people to work. The right's message was framed
around racial stereotypes of lazy, cheating "welfare queens" whose poverty was "cultural." But the new welfare policy was about moving
billions of dollars in individual cash payments and direct services from welfare recipients to other, more powerful, social actors. Many of us
were too busy to tune into the welfare policy drama in Washington, only to find it washed up right on our doorsteps. Our members are
suffering from workfare policies, new regulations, and cutoffs. Families who were barely getting by under the old rules are being pushed over
the edge by the new policies. Policy doesn't get more relevant than this. And so we got involved in policy-as
defense. Yet we have to do more than block their punches. We have to start the fight with initiatives of
our own. Those who do are finding offense a bit more fun than defense alone. Living wage ordinances, youth
development initiatives, even gun control and alcohol and tobacco policies are finding their way onto the public agenda, thanks to focused
community organizing that leverages power for community-driven initiatives. - Over 600 local policies have been passed to regulate the
tobacco industry. Local coalitions have taken the lead by writing ordinances that address local problems and organizing broad support for them.
- Nearly 100 gun control and violence prevention policies have been enacted since 1991. - Milwaukee, Boston, and Oakland are among the
cities that have passed living wage ordinances: local laws that guarantee higher than minimum wages for workers, usually set as the minimum
needed to keep a family of four above poverty. These are just a few of the examples that demonstrate how organizing for local policy advocacy
has made inroads in areas where positive national policy had been stalled by conservatives. Increasingly, the local policy arena is where the
action is and where activists are finding success. Of course, corporate interests-which are usually the target of these
policies-are gearing up in defense. Tactics include front groups, economic pressure, and the tried and
true: cold, hard cash. Despite these barriers, grassroots organizing can be very effective at the smaller scale of local politics. At the local
level, we have greater access to elected officials and officials have a greater reliance on their constituents for reelection. For example, getting
400 people to show up at city hall in just about any city in the U.S. is quite impressive. On the other hand, 400 people at the state house or the
Congress would have a less significant impact. Add to that the fact that all 400 people at city hall are usually constituents, and the impact is
even greater. Recent trends in government underscore the importance of local policy. Congress has enacted a series of measures devolving
significant power to state and local government. Welfare, health care, and the regulation of food and drinking water safety are among the areas
where states and localities now have greater rule. Devolution has some negative consequences to be sure. History has taught us that, for social
services and civil rights in particular, the lack of clear federal standards and mechanisms for accountability lead to uneven enforcement and
even discriminatory implementation of policies. Still, there are real opportunities for advancing progressive initiatives in this more localized
environment. Greater local control can mean greater community power to shape and implement important social policies that were heretofore
out of reach. To do so will require careful attention to the mechanics of local policymaking and a clear blueprint of what we stand for. Getting It
in Writing Much of the work of framing what we stand for takes place in the shaping of demands. By getting into the policy arena
in a proactive manner, we can take our demands to the next level. Our demands can become law, with
real consequences if the agreement is broken. After all the organizing, press work, and effort, a group should leave a
decisionmaker with more than a handshake and his or her word. Of course, this work requires a certain amount of
interaction with "the suits," as well as struggles with the bureaucracy, the technical language, and the
all-too-common resistance by decisionmakers. Still, if it's worth demanding, it's worth having in writing-
whether as law, regulation, or internal policy. From ballot initiatives on rent control to laws requiring
worker protections, organizers are leveraging their power into written policies that are making a real
difference in their communities. Of course, policy work is just one tool in our organizing arsenal, but it is a tool we simply
can't afford to ignore. Making policy work an integral part of organizing will require a certain amount of
retrofitting. We will need to develop the capacity to translate our information, data, and experience into
stories that are designed to affect the public conversation. Perhaps most important, we will need to
move beyond fighting problems and on to framing solutions that bring us closer to our vision of how
things should be. And then we must be committed to making it so.






2nc feminism
Framework is totally feminist- we dont preclude you from remaining rooted in your
identity but common ground is crucial to a communicative ethic that allows us to
forge a politics of solidarity in difference
Lister 97 (Ruth. Hypatia. Vol 12, No. 4. Citizenship in Feminism: Identity, Action, and Locale. Dialectics
of Citizenship. JSTOR)

The third plank is a commitment to dialogue. This commitment has been expressed under a number of rubrics;
most notably, "dialogic," "deliberative," or "communicative" democracy. Underlying them is Habermas's
notion of a "communicative ethic," which emphasizes the crucial role of free and open public
communication and deliberation between citizens as the basis of democratic political legitimation. This
has been used critically by a number of feminist political theorists who envisage such public dialogue as
the framework for the articulation of difference in which diverse voices, particularly those normally
excluded from public discourse, have an equal right to be heard. Unlike Habermas himself, for those feminists
the point of such dialogue is not to arrive at agreement on "the" general interest, but instead to
promote the development of views and the exercise of judgement, having taken account of different
viewpoints. This commitment to dialogue is premised on the belief that it enables new positions to
emerge as other viewpoints are acknowledged. The importance of dialogue in which "each group
becomes better able to consider other groups'" standpoints without relinquishing the uniqueness of its own standpoint
or suppressing other groups' partial perspectives is underlined also by Patricia Hill Collins as typical of Afrocentric feminist
thought (1991, 236). Nira Yuval-Davis (1997), drawing on the work of a group of Italian feminists, calls this a process of "rooting" and
"shifting," in which participants remain rooted in their own identities and values but at the same time are
willing to shift views in dialogue with those of other identities and values. This, Yuval-Davis suggests,
represents a "transversal" dialogue or politics, which depends on participants avoiding uncritical
solidarity and the homogenization of "the other." How to turn such theoretical ideas into practical realities is, of course,
another question. As Yuval-Davis warns, in some situations, conflicting interests are not reconcilable in this way and, by and large, political
systems do not provide the time and space for such dialogue. Moreover, there is a tendency to underestimate the difficulties some groups, in
particular the poor and economically marginalized, would have in entering the dialogue in the first place. Nevertheless, we can point to
examples to show that such a transversal politics is possible. To take just two from conflict areas: during the
period of transition to the new South Africa, a Women's National Coalition was formed, which
represented an "extraordinary convergence of women across geographical, racial, class, religious and
political lines" and "a forum through which women who harbored deep animosities could also identify
common concerns" (Kemp et. al., 1995, 150-51). Through a process of dialogue and negotiation and despite
fissures and disagreements, the coalition drafted a Women's Charter for Effective Equality, which gave women in their
diversity a voice in the writing of the new constitution. The opportunity to have a voice at such a historic
time, combined with a focus on a clear, specific goal, is believed to have provided the impetus to work
through the differences that existed. A second example can be found in Northern Ireland. In a photo essay, titled "Different
Together," Cynthia Cockbum describes how a form of transversal politics is being pursued by Belfast women's
centers: Individual women hold on to their political identities-some long for a united Ireland, others feel deeply
threatened by the idea. But they have identified a commonality in being women, being community based and
being angry at injustice and inequality, that allows them to affirm and even welcome this and other
kinds of difference. (1996a, 46) Two Belfast women who gave evidence to the Northern Ireland Opsahl Commission explained that, in
their experience, cooperation was easier "when the deliberations and activities are directed towards the
issues which matter" in women's lives, by which they meant the struggle to improve the quality of life in
the disadvantaged communities in which they lived.5 Cockbum (1996b), drawing also on women's projects in Bosnia and
Israel, found a number of factors which facilitated working across communal divisions, including a clear
practical focus and a sensitivity in defining agendas. Each case revealed a commitment to working with
the "other" and an affirmation of "difference." This was combined with an acknowledgment of
differences within each group and of the fluidity of ethnic identities, as well as a willingness to look
outward; for instance, in Belfast, to women in local Indian and Chinese communities. None of this was easy; but these
examples suggest that with commitment, it is possible to forge a politics of solidarity in difference.

2nc pluralism
Framework is a prerequisite to creating new possibilities of inclusiveness
McCann 13 (Hannah. Australian National University Gender Institute Inaugural PhD Scholar. April 2.
http://binarythis.com/2013/04/02/cultural-citizenship-identity-politics-and-spaces-of-belonging/)

A few weeks ago I came across this article on cultural citizenship as discussed by a recent panel at Harvard University. What fascinated me
was the focus on conceptualising citizenship as not simply related to national identity or civic activity, but
to the artistic creation of spaces of belonging with others. More specifically, this article considers how shared
creative activities can engender inclusion that isnt simply about enveloping the other in a predefined
space, but is in fact about creating a new space with the other. As panellist Colin Jacobson is quoted as saying, In
order to play with someone else, you have to have a shared common ground on which to stand. Notably
it seems that cultural citizenship is also explicitly connected with ideas about minority expression, and as this
article also discusses, the importance of being able to perform significant traditional forms of music in new
contexts. However, the broader theme of creativity as key to emergent spaces of belonging that does not
take identity, simple pluralism, or assimilation as centralising concepts par excellence for notions of
belonging, I think has relevance to potentially imagining new possibilities of gender and sexuality
beyond binaries like man/woman and gay/straight outside of the problematics of identity politics.

at: distancing
DEBATE roleplay specifically activates agency
Hanghoj 8
(http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information_til/Studerende_ved_SDU/Din_uddannelse/phd_hum/afhandlin
ger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf Thorkild Hanghj, Copenhagen, 2008 Since this PhD project began in 2004, the
present author has been affiliated with DREAM (Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media
Materials), which is located at the Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern
Denmark. Research visits have taken place at the Centre for Learning, Knowledge, and Interactive Technologies (L-
KIT), the Institute of Education at the University of Bristol and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab
Denmark at the School of Education, University of Aarhus, where I currently work as an assistant professor)
Thus, debate games require teachers to balance the centripetal/centrifugal forces of gaming and teaching, to be able to
reconfigure their discursive authority, and to orchestrate the multiple voices of a dialogical game space in relation to particular goals. These
Bakhtinian perspectives provide a valuable analytical framework for describing the discursive interplay between different practices and
knowledge aspects when enacting (debate) game scenarios. In addition to this, Bakhtins dialogical philosophy also offers an
explanation of why debate games (and other game types) may be valuable within an educational context. One of the central
features of multi-player games is that players are expected to experience a simultaneously real and imagined scenario both in
relation to an insiders (participant) perspective and to an outsiders (co-participant) perspective. According to Bakhtin, the
outsiders perspective reflects a fundamental aspect of human understanding: In order to understand, it is immensely
important for the person who understands to be located outside the object of his or her creative understanding in time, in space, in culture.
For one cannot even really see one's own exterior and comprehend it as a whole, and no mirrors or photographs can help; our real exterior can
be seen and understood only by other people, because they are located outside us in space, and because they are others (Bakhtin, 1986: 7). As
the quote suggests, every person is influenced by others in an inescapably intertwined way, and consequently no voice can be said to be
isolated. Thus, it is in the interaction with other voices that individuals are able to reach understanding and find their
own voice. Bakhtin also refers to the ontological process of finding a voice as ideological becoming, which represents the
process of selectively assimilating the words of others (Bakhtin, 1981: 341). Thus, by teaching and playing debate scenarios, it is
possible to support students in their process of becoming not only themselves, but also in becoming articulate and
responsive citizens in a democratic society.


at: critical pedagogy

They will always win that the principles of their advocacy are good in the abstract
we can only debate the merits of their 1AC if they defend specific consequences of
political implementation
Michael Ignatieff, Carr professor of human rights at Harvard, 2004 Lesser Evils p. 20-1
As for moral perfectionism, this would be the doctrine that a liberal state should never have truck with dubious moral means and should spare
its officials the hazard of having to decide between lesser and greater evils. A moral perfectionist position also holds that
states can spare their officials this hazard simply by adhering to the universal moral standards set out in
human rights conventions and the laws of war. There are two problems with a perfectionist stance, leaving
aside the question of whether it is realistic. The first is that articulating nonrevocable, nonderogable moral standards
is relatively easy. The problem is deciding how to apply them in specific cases. What is the line between
interrogation and torture, between targeted killing and unlawful assassination, between preemption and aggression? Even when legal and
moral distinctions between these are clear in the abstract, abstractions are less than helpful when political leaders
have to choose between them in practice. Furthermore, the problem with perfectionist standards is
that they contradict each other. The same person who shudders, rightly, at the prospect of torturing a suspect might be prepared to
kill the same suspect in a preemptive attack on a terrorist base. Equally, the perfectionist commitment to the right to life might preclude such
attacks altogether and restrict our response to judicial pursuit of offenders through process of law. Judicial responses to the problem of terror
have their place, but they are no substitute for military operations when terrorists possess bases, training camps, and heavy weapons. To stick
to a perfectionist commitment to the right to life when under terrorist attack might achieve moral consistency at the price of leaving us
defenseless in the face of evildoers. Security, moreover, is a human right, and thus respect for one right might lead us to betray another.

at: rules/predictability bad

No link to rules or predictability badour argument isn't rules-based in the sense they
identify, its a set of contestable guidelines for evaluating competitions. Rejecting the
topic because rules are oppressive doesnt solve and only a standard like the
resolution is limited enough to enable preparation and testing but has enough internal
complexity to solve their impact
Armstrong 2K Paul B. Armstrong, Professor of English and Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences
at the State University of New York at Stony Brook, Winter 2000, The Politics of Play: The Social
Implications of Iser's Aesthetic Theory, New Literary History, Vol. 31, No. 1, p. 211-223
Such a play-space also opposes the notion that the only alternative to the coerciveness of consensus must
be to advocate the sublime powers of rule-breaking.8 Iser shares Lyotards concern that to privilege harmony and agreement in a
world of heterogeneous language games is to limit their play and to inhibit semantic innovation and the creation of new games. Lyotards
endorsement of the sublimethe pursuit of the unpresentable by rebelling against restrictions, defying norms, and
smashing the limits of existing paradigmsis undermined by contradictions, however, which Isers explication of play recognizes
and addresses. The paradox of the unpresentable, as Lyotard acknowledges, is that it can only be manifested through a game
of representation. The sublime is, consequently, in Isers sense, an instance of doubling. If violating norms creates new
games, this crossing of boundaries depends on and carries in its wake the conventions and structures it
oversteps. The sublime may be uncompromising, asocial, and unwilling to be bound by limits, but its pursuit of what is not
contained in any order or system makes it dependent on the forms it opposes. The radical presumption of the
sublime is not only terroristic in refusing to recognize the claims of other games whose rules it declines to
limit itself by. It is also naive and self-destructive in its impossible imagining that it can do without the
others it opposes. As a structure of doubling, the sublime pursuit of the unpresentable requires a play-space that includes other, less
radical games with which it can interact. Such conditions of exchange would be provided by the nonconsensual
reciprocity of Iserian play. Isers notion of play offers a way of conceptualizing power which acknowledges the necessity
and force of disciplinary constraints without seeing them as unequivocally coercive and determining. The contradictory
combination of restriction and openness in how play deploys power is evident in Isers analysis of regulatory and
aleatory rules. Even the regulatory rules, which set down the conditions participants submit to in order to play a
game, permit a certain range of combinations while also establishing a code of possible play. . . . Since these rules limit
the text game without producing it, they are regulatory but not prescriptive. They do no more than set the aleatory in motion,
and the aleatory rule differs from the regulatory in that it has no code of its own (FI 273). Submitting to the discipline of regulatory
restrictions is both constraining and enabling because it makes possible certain kinds of interaction that
the rules cannot completely predict or prescribe in advance. Hence the existence of aleatory rules that are not
codified as part of the game itself but are the variable customs, procedures, and practices for playing it. Expert facility with
aleatory rules marks the difference, for example, between someone who just knows the rules of a game and
another who really knows how to play it. Aleatory rules are more flexible and openended and more susceptible to
variation than regulatory rules, but they too are characterized by a contradictory combination of constraint and
possibility, limitation and unpredictability,






Identity politics bad

1. They force the commodification of autobiography in exchange for the ballot- this
subverts their performance by requiring outsiders become exemplary participants in
the very culture they criticize
Coughlin 95 (Anne M. Coughlin, Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School August, 1995,
Regulating the Self: Autobiographical Performances in Outsider Scholarship, Virginia Law Review, 81
Va. L. Rev. 1229, Lexis)

Although Williams is quick to detect insensitivity and bigotry in remarks made by strangers, colleagues, and friends, her taste for irony fails her
when it comes to reflection on her relationship with her readers and the material benefits that her autobiographical performances have earned
for her.196 Perhaps Williams should be more inclined to thank, rather than reprimand, her editors for behaving as readers of autobiography
invariably do. When we examine this literary faux pas-the incongruity between Williams's condemnation of her editors and the professional
benefits their publication secured her-we detect yet another contradiction between the outsiders' use of autobiography and their desire to
transform culture radically. Lejeune's characterization of autobiography as a "contract" reminds us that autobiography
is a lucrative commodity. In our culture, members of the reading public avidly consume personal stories,197 which surely explains why
first- rate law journals and academic presses have been eager to market outsider narratives. No matter how
unruly the self that it records, an autobiographical performance transforms that self into a form of
"property in a moneyed economy"198 and into a valuable intellectual asset in an academy that requires its members
to publish.199 Accordingly, we must be skeptical of the assertion that the outsiders' splendid publication
record is itself sufficient evidence of the success of their endeavor.20 Certainly, publication of a best seller may
transform its author's life, with the resulting commercial success and academic renown.201 As one critic of autobiography puts it, "failures do
not get pub- lished."202 While writing a successful autobiography may be momentous for the individual author,
this success has a limited impact on culture. Indeed, the transformation of outsider authors into
"success stories" subverts outsiders' radical intentions by constituting them as exemplary participants
within contemporary culture, willing to market even themselves to literary and academic consumers.203
What good does this transformation do for outsiders who are less fortunate and less articulate than middle-
class law professors?204 Although they style themselves cultural critics, the storytellers generally do not reflect
on the meaning of their own commercial success, nor ponder its entanglement with the cultural values
they claim to resist. Rather, for the most part, they seem content simply to take advantage of the peculiarly
American license, identified by Professor Sacvan Bercovitch, "to have your dissent and make it too."205


2. Their narrative is centered on the Western idealized notion of the self- this
recreates the cultural hegemony they criticize by prioritizing the subjectivity of the
performer over collective solutions for racism
Coughlin 95 (Anne M. Coughlin, Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School August, 1995,
Regulating the Self: Autobiographical Performances in Outsider Scholarship, Virginia Law Review, 81
Va. L. Rev. 1229, Lexis)

IV. The Autobiographical Self The outsider narratives do not reflect on another feature of auto-
biographical discourse that is perhaps the most significant obstacle to their goal to bring to law an
understanding of the human self that will supersede the liberal individual. Contrary to the outsiders'
claim that their personalized discourse infuses law with their distinctive experiences and political
perspectives, numerous historians and critics of autobiography have insisted that those who participate
in autobiographical discourse speak not in a different voice, but in a common voice that reflects their
membership in a culture devoted to liberal values.206 As Sacvan Bercovitch puts it, American cultural
ideals, including specifically the mythic connection between the "heroic individual . . . [and] the values of
free enterprise," are "epitomized in autobiography."207 In his seminal essay on the subject, Professor
Georges Gusdorf makes an observation that seems like a prescient warning to outsiders who would
appropriate autobiography as their voice. He remarks that the practice of writing about one's own self
reflects a belief in the autonomous individual, which is "peculiar to Western man, a concern that has
been of good use in his systematic conquest of the universe and that he has communicated to men of
other cultures; but those men will thereby have been annexed by a sort of intellectual colonizing to a
mentality that was not their own."208 Similarly, Albert Stone, a critic of American autobiography, argues
that auto-biographical performances celebrate the Western ideal of individualism, "which places the self
at the center of its world."209 Stone begins to elucidate the prescriptive character of autobiographical
discourse as he notes with wonder "the tenacious social ideal whose persistence is all the more
significant when found repeated in personal histories of Afro-Americans, immigrants, penitentiary
prisoners, and others whose claims to full individuality have often been denied by our society."'2
Precisely because it appeals to readers' fascination with the self-sufficiency, resiliency and uniqueness of
the totemic individual privileged by liberal political theory, there is a risk that autobiographical discourse
is a fallible, even co-opted, instrument for the social reforms envisioned by the outsiders. By affirming
the myths of individual success in our culture, autobiography reproduces the political, economic, social
and psychological structures that attend such success.21' In this light, the outsider autobiographies
unwittingly deflect attention from collective social responsibility and thwart the development of
collective solutions for the eradication of racist and sexist harms. Although we may suspect in some
cases that the author's own sense of self was shaped by a community whose values oppose those of
liberal individualism, her decision to register her experience in autobiographical discourse will have a
significant effect on the self she reproduces.212 Her story will solicit the public's attention to the life of
one individual, and it will privilege her individual desires and rights above the needs and obligations of a
collectivity. Moreover, literary theorists have remarked the tendency of autobiographical discourse to
override radical authorial intention. Even where the autobiographer self-consciously determines to
resist liberal ideology and represents her life story as the occasion to announce an alternative political
theory, "[t]he relentless individualism of the genre subordinates" her political critique.213 Inevitably, at
least within American culture, the personal narrative engrosses the readers' imagination. Fascinated by
the travails and triumphs of the developing autobiographical self, readers tend to construe the text's
political and social observations only as another aspect of the author's personality. Paradoxically,
although autobiography is the product of a culture that cultivates human individuality, the genre seems
to make available only a limited number of autobiographical protagonists.214 Many theorists have
noticed that when an author assumes the task of defining her own, unique subjectivity, she invariably
reproduces herself as a character with whom culture already is well-acquainted.215 While a variety of
forces coerce the autobiographer to conform to culturally sanctioned human models,216 the pressures
exerted by the literary market surely play a significant role. The autobiographer who desires a material
benefit from her performance must adopt a persona that is intelligible, if not enticing, to her
audience.217 As I will illustrate in the sections that follow, the outsider narratives capitalize on, rather
than subvert, autobiographical protagonists that serve the values of liberalism.

3. Appeals to personal experience replace analysis of group oppression with personal
testimony. As a result, politics becomes a policing operationthose not in an identity
group are denied intellectual access and those within the group who dont conform to
the affs terms are excluded. Over time, this strategy LIMITS politics to ONLY the
personal. This devastates structural change, and turns the caseit demands that
political performance assimilate to very limited norms of experience
Scott 92 (Joan Harold F. Linder Professor at the School of Social Science in the Institute for Advanced
Study in Princeton Multiculturalism and the Politics of Identity October Summer p. 16-19)

The logic of individualism has structured the approach to multiculturalism in many ways. The call for
tolerance of difference is framed in terms of respect for individual characteristics and attitudes; group
differences are conceived categorically and not relationally, as distinct entities rather than
interconnected structures or systems created through repeated processes of the enunciation of
difference. Administrators have hired psychological consulting firms to hold diversity workshops which
teach that conflict resolution is a negotation between dissatisfied individuals. Disciplinary codes that
punish "hate-speech" justify prohibitions in terms of the protection of individuals from abuse by other
individuals, not in terms of the protection of members of historically mistreated groups from
discrimination, nor in terms of the ways language is used to construct and reproduce asymmetries of
power. The language of protection, moreover, is conceptualized in terms of victimization; the way to
make a claim or to justify one's protest against perceived mistreatment these days is to take on the
mantle of the victim. (The so-called Men's Movement is the latest comer to this scene.) Everyone--
whether an insulted minority or the perpetrator of the insult who feels he is being unjustly accused-
now claims to be an equal victim before the law. Here we have not only an extreme form of
individualizing, but a conception of individuals without agency. There is nothing wrong, on the face of it,
with teaching individuals about how to behave decently in relation to others and about how to
empathize with each other's pain. The problem is that difficult analyses of how history and social
standing, privilege, and subordination are involved in personal behavior entirely drop out. Chandra
Mohanty puts it this way: There has been an erosion of the politics of collectivity through the
reformulation of race and difference in individualistic terms. The 1960s and '70s slogan "the personal is
political" has been recrafted in the 1980s as "the political is personal." In other words, all politics is
collapsed into the personal, and questions of individual behaviors, attitudes, and life-styles stand in for
political analysis of the social. Individual political struggles are seen as the only relevant and legitimate
form of political struggle.5 Paradoxically, individuals then generalize their perceptions and claim to
speak for a whole group, but the groups are also conceived as unitary and autonomous. This
individualizing, personalizing conception has also been behind some of the recent identity politics of
minorities; indeed it gave rise to the intolerant, doctrinaire behavior that was dubbed, initially by its
internal critics, "political correctness." It is particularly in the notion of "experience" that one sees this
operating. In much current usage of "experience," references to structure and history are implied but
not made explicit; instead, personal testimony of oppression replaces analysis, and this testimony comes
to stand for the experience of the whole group. The fact of belonging to an identity group is taken as
authority enough for one's speech; the direct experience of a group or culture-that is, membership in it-
becomes the only test of true knowledge. The exclusionary implications of this are twofold: all those not
of the group are denied even intellectual access to it, and those within the group whose experiences or
interpretations do not conform to the established terms of identity must either suppress their views or
drop out. An appeal to "experience" of this kind forecloses discussion and criticism and turns politics
into a policing operation: the borders of identity are patrolled for signs of nonconformity; the test of
membership in a group becomes less one's willingness to endorse certain principles and engage in
specific political actions, less one's positioning in specific relationships of power, than one's ability to use
the prescribed languages that are taken as signs that one is inherently "of" the group. That all of this
isn't recognized as a highly political process that produces identities is troubling indeed, especially
because it so closely mimics the politics of the powerful, naturalizing and deeming as discernably
objective facts the prerequisites for inclusion in any group. Indeed, I would argue more generally that
separatism, with its strong insistence on an exclusive relationship between group identity and access to
specialized knowledge (the argument that only women can teach women's literature or only African-
Americans can teach African-American history, for example), is a simultaneous refusal and imitation of
the powerful in the present ideological context. At least in universities, the relationship between
identity-group membership and access to specialized knowledge has been framed as an objection to the
control by the disciplines of the terms that establish what counts as (important, mainstream, useful,
collective) knowledge and what does not. This has had an enormously important critical impact,
exposing the exclusions that have structured claims to universal or comprehensive knowledge. When
one asks not only where the women or African-Americans are in the history curriculum (for example),
but why they have been left out and what are the effects of their exclusion, one exposes the process by
which difference is enunciated. But one of the complicated and contradictory effects of the
implementation of programs in women's studies, African-American studies, Chicano studies, and now
gay and lesbian studies is to totalize the identity that is the object of study, reiterating its binary
opposition as minority (or subaltern) in relation to whatever is taken as majority or dominant.



4. Incorporating personal narratives into debate forces us to do violence against
ourselves- vote neg to accommodate the interruption of knowability and reject the
unconscious as recuperable
Butler 1 (Judith is Maxine Elliot Professor in the Departments of Rhetoric and Comparative Literature
at the University of California, Berkeley, 1 Giving an Account of Oneself, Diacritics 31.4 22-40, Project
Muse)

But here, and for the time being, my concern is with a suspect coherence that sometimes attaches to narrative
and, specifically, with the way in which narrative coherence may foreclose upon an ethical resource,
namely, an acceptance of the limits of knowability in oneself and others. It may even be that to hold a person
accountable for his or her life in narrative form is to require a falsification of that life in the name of a
certain conception of ethics. Indeed, if we require that someone be able to tell in story form the reasons
why his or her life has taken the path it has, that is, to be a coherent autobiographer, it may be that we
prefer the seamlessness of the story to something we might tentatively call the truth of the person, a
truth which, to a certain degree, and for reasons we have already suggested, is indicated more radically as an
interruption. It may be that stories have to be interrupted, and that for interruption to take place, a story has to be underway. This brings
me closer to the account of the transference I would like to offer, a transference that might be understood as a repeated ethical practice.
Indeed, if, in the name of ethics, we require that another do a certain violence to herself, and do it in front
of us, offering a narrative account or, indeed, a confession, then, conversely, it may be that by
permitting, sustaining, accommodating the interruption, a certain practice of nonviolence precisely
follows. If violence is the act by which a subject seeks to reinstall its mastery and unity, then nonviolence may well follow from living the
persistent challenge to mastery that our obligations to others require. Although some would say that to be a split subject, or a subject whose
access to itself is opaque and not self-grounding, is precisely not to have the grounds for agency and the conditions for accountability, it may be
that this way in which we are, from the start, interrupted by alterity and not fully recoverable to
ourselves, indicates the way in which we are, from the start, ethically implicated in the lives of others.
The point here is not to celebrate a certain notion of incoherence, but only to consider that our incoherence is ineradicable but nontotalizing,
and that it establishes the way in which we are implicated, beholden, derived, constituted by what is beyond us and before us. If we say
that the self must be narrated, that only the narrated self can be intelligible, survivable, then we say that
we cannot survive with an unconscious. We say, in effect, that the unconscious threatens us with an
insupportable unintelligibility, and for that reason we must oppose it. The "I" who makes such an utterance will
surely, in one form or another, be besieged precisely by what it disavows. This stand, and it is a stand, it must
be a stand, an upright, wakeful, knowing stand, believes that it survives without the unconscious or, if it accepts an
unconscious, accepts it as something which is thoroughly recuperable by the knowing "I," as a
possession perhaps, believing that the unconscious can be fully and exhaustively translated into what is
conscious. It is easy to see this as a defended stance, for it remains to be known in what this particular defense consists. It is, after all, the
stand that many make against psychoanalysis itself. In the language which articulates the opposition to a non-narrativizable
beginning resides the fear that the absence of narrative will spell a certain threat, a threat to life, and will pose
the risk, if not the certainty, of a certain kind of death, the death of a subject who cannot, who can never, fully
recuperate the conditions of its own emergence. But this death, if it is a death, is only the death of a certain
kind of subject, one that was never possible to begin with, the death of a fantasy, and so a loss of what
one never had. One goes to analysis, I presume, to have someone receive one's words, and this produces a quandary, since the one who
might receive the words is unknown in large part, and so the one who receives becomes, in a certain way, an allegory for reception itself, for
the phantasmatic relation to receiving that is articulated to, or at least in the face of, an Other. But if this is an allegory, it is not reducible to a
structure of reception that would apply equally well to everyone, although it would give us the general structures within which a particular life
might be understood. We, as subjects who narrate ourselves in the first person, encounter in common
something of a predicament. Since I cannot tell the story in a straight line, and I lose my thread, and I start again, and I forget
something crucial, and it is to hard to think about how to weave it in, and I start thinking, thinking, there must be some conceptual thread that
will provide a narrative here, some lost link, some possibility for chronology, and the "I" becomes increasingly conceptual,
increasingly awake, focused, determined, it is at this point that the thread must fall apart. The "I" who
narrates finds that it cannot direct its narration, finds that it cannot give an account of its inability to
narrate, why its narration breaks down, and so it comes to experience itself, or, rather, reexperience
itself, as radically, if not irretrievably, unknowing about who it is. And then the "I" is no longer imparting
a narrative to a receiving analyst or Other. The "I" is breaking down in certain very specific ways in front
of the Other or, to anticipate Levinas, in the face of the Other (originally I wrote, "the in face of the Other," indicating that my syntax was
already breaking down) or, indeed, by virtue of the Other's face. The "I" finds that, in the face of an Other, it is breaking
down. It does not know itself, and perhaps it never will. But is that the task, to know itself, to achieve an
adequate narrative account of a life? And should it be? Is the task to cover over the breakage, the rupture,
which is constitutive of the "I" through a narrative means that quite forcefully binds the elements
together in a narration that is enacted as if it were perfectly possible, as if the break could be mended
and defensive mastery restored?



5. Their 1ac author concludes neg- the US is obviously not perfect but were definitely
not colonialist
Ferraro 02 (The Ruth C. Lawson Professor of International Politics Mount Holyoke College AB,
Dartmouth College; MIA, Columbia University; PhD, Massachusetts Institute of Technology) The Myth
of Engagement: America as an Isolationist World Power April 2002
https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/afp/myth.htm)

The United States could have chosen to exercise world power along formal imperial lines-it could have
acquired colonies, and there were many opportunities for it to do so. 3 The United States did annex the
Philippines, and has a very ambiguous relationship to Puerto Rico, Guam, the Virgin Islands, and other
American territories. For most of its history, however, the land and peoples that it acquired, with the
exception of the indigenous nations of North America, were ultimately assimilated as fully equal
participants in the American government. The deliberate choice to forgo the colonial option is a
distinctive attribute of American foreign policy, and some American leaders, such as Woodrow Wilson
and Franklin Roosevelt, injected the idea of self-determination into the discourse of world politics in
powerful and revolutionary ways. But the choice also made it very difficult for the United States to
maintain a visible and effective presence abroad. Ultimately, the United States is obliged to maintain
military bases abroad in order to exercise its power on a global scale, and there are significant problems
with that approach. 4