Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 183591 October 14, 2008

THE PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO, duly represented by GOVERNOR JESUS SACDALAN and/or VICE-GOVERNOR
EMMANUEL PIOL, for and in his own behalf, petitioners,
vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), represented
by SEC. RODOLFO GARCIA, ATTY. LEAH ARMAMENTO, ATTY. SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN and/or
GEN. HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., the latter in his capacity as the present and duly-appointed Presidential Adviser on the
Peace Process (OPAPP) or the so-called Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, respondents.

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G.R. No. 183752 October 14, 2008

CITY GOVERNMENT OF ZAMBOANGA, as represented by HON. CELSO L. LOBREGAT, City Mayor of Zamboanga, and in his
personal capacity as resident of the City of Zamboanga, Rep. MA. ISABELLE G. CLIMACO, District 1, and Rep. ERICO BASILIO A.
FABIAN, District 2, City of Zamboanga, petitioners,
vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE NEGOTIATING PANEL (GRP), as represented by
RODOLFO C. GARCIA, LEAH ARMAMENTO, SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN and HERMOGENES
ESPERON, in his capacity as the Presidential Adviser on Peace Process, respondents.

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G.R. No. 183893 October 14, 2008

THE CITY OF ILIGAN, duly represented by CITY MAYOR LAWRENCE LLUCH CRUZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE PANEL ON ANCESTRAL DOMAIN (GRP), represented
by SEC. RODOLFO GARCIA, ATTY. LEAH ARMAMENTO, ATTY. SEDFREY CANDELARIA, MARK RYAN SULLIVAN; GEN.
HERMOGENES ESPERON, JR., in his capacity as the present and duly appointed Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process;
and/or SEC. EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary. respondents.

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G.R. No. 183951 October 14, 2008

THE PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, as represented by HON. ROLANDO E. YEBES, in his capacity
as Provincial Governor, HON. FRANCIS H. OLVIS, in his capacity as Vice-Governor and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, HON. CECILIA JALOSJOS CARREON, Congresswoman, 1st Congressional District, HON. CESAR G. JALOSJOS,
Congressman, 3rd Congressional District, and Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Zamboanga del Norte,
namely, HON. SETH FREDERICK P. JALOSJOS, HON. FERNANDO R. CABIGON, JR., HON. ULDARICO M. MEJORADA II,
HON. EDIONAR M. ZAMORAS, HON. EDGAR J. BAGUIO, HON. CEDRIC L. ADRIATICO, HON. FELIXBERTO C. BOLANDO,
HON. JOSEPH BRENDO C. AJERO, HON. NORBIDEIRI B. EDDING, HON. ANECITO S. DARUNDAY, HON. ANGELICA J.
CARREON and HON. LUZVIMINDA E. TORRINO, petitioners,
vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE NEGOTIATING PANEL [GRP], as represented by HON.
RODOLFO C. GARCIA and HON. HERMOGENES ESPERON, in his capacity as the Presidential Adviser of Peace Process,
respondents.

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G.R. No. 183962 October 14, 2008

ERNESTO M. MACEDA, JEJOMAR C. BINAY, and AQUILINO L. PIMENTEL III, petitioners,
vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES PEACE NEGOTIATING PANEL, represented by its Chairman
RODOLFO C. GARCIA, and the MORO ISLAMIC LIBERATION FRONT PEACE NEGOTIATING PANEL, represented by its
Chairman MOHAGHER IQBAL, respondents.

x--------------------------------------------x

FRANKLIN M. DRILON and ADEL ABBAS TAMANO, petitioners-in-intervention.

x--------------------------------------------x

SEN. MANUEL A. ROXAS, petitioners-in-intervention.

x--------------------------------------------x

MUNICIPALITY OF LINAMON duly represented by its Municipal Mayor NOEL N. DEANO, petitioners-in-intervention,

x--------------------------------------------x

THE CITY OF ISABELA, BASILAN PROVINCE, represented by MAYOR CHERRYLYN P. SANTOS-AKBAR, petitioners-in-
intervention.

x--------------------------------------------x

THE PROVINCE OF SULTAN KUDARAT, rep. by HON. SUHARTO T. MANGUDADATU, in his capacity as Provincial Governor and
a resident of the Province of Sultan Kudarat, petitioner-in-intervention.

x-------------------------------------------x

RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of Indigenous Peoples in Mindanao Not Belonging to the MILF,
petitioner-in-intervention.

x--------------------------------------------x

CARLO B. GOMEZ, GERARDO S. DILIG, NESARIO G. AWAT, JOSELITO C. ALISUAG and RICHALEX G. JAGMIS, as citizens
and residents of Palawan, petitioners-in-intervention.

x--------------------------------------------x

MARINO RIDAO and KISIN BUXANI, petitioners-in-intervention.

x--------------------------------------------x

MUSLIM LEGAL ASSISTANCE FOUNDATION, INC (MUSLAF), respondent-in-intervention.

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MUSLIM MULTI-SECTORAL MOVEMENT FOR PEACE & DEVELOPMENT (MMMPD), respondent-in-intervention.

x--------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Subject of these consolidated cases is the extent of the powers of the President in pursuing the peace process. While the facts
surrounding this controversy center on the armed conflict in Mindanao between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation
Front (MILF), the legal issue involved has a bearing on all areas in the country where there has been a long-standing armed conflict.
Yet again, the Court is tasked to perform a delicate balancing act. It must uncompromisingly delineate the bounds within which the
President may lawfully exercise her discretion, but it must do so in strict adherence to the Constitution, lest its ruling unduly restricts
the freedom of action vested by that same Constitution in the Chief Executive precisely to enable her to pursue the peace process
effectively.

I. FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS OF THE PETITIONS

On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the MILF, through the Chairpersons of their
respective peace negotiating panels, were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD)
Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

The MILF is a rebel group which was established in March 1984 when, under the leadership of the late Salamat Hashim, it
splintered from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) then headed by Nur Misuari, on the ground, among others, of what
Salamat perceived to be the manipulation of the MNLF away from an Islamic basis towards Marxist-Maoist orientations.1

The signing of the MOA-AD between the GRP and the MILF was not to materialize, however, for upon motion of petitioners,
specifically those who filed their cases before the scheduled signing of the MOA-AD, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining
Order enjoining the GRP from signing the same.

The MOA-AD was preceded by a long process of negotiation and the concluding of several prior agreements between the two
parties beginning in 1996, when the GRP-MILF peace negotiations began. On July 18, 1997, the GRP and MILF Peace Panels
signed the Agreement on General Cessation of Hostilities. The following year, they signed the General Framework of Agreement of
Intent on August 27, 1998.

The Solicitor General, who represents respondents, summarizes the MOA-AD by stating that the same contained, among others,
the commitment of the parties to pursue peace negotiations, protect and respect human rights, negotiate with sincerity in the
resolution and pacific settlement of the conflict, and refrain from the use of threat or force to attain undue advantage while the peace
negotiations on the substantive agenda are on-going.2

Early on, however, it was evident that there was not going to be any smooth sailing in the GRP-MILF peace process. Towards the
end of 1999 up to early 2000, the MILF attacked a number of municipalities in Central Mindanao and, in March 2000, it took control
of the town hall of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.3 In response, then President Joseph Estrada declared and carried out an "all-out-
war" against the MILF.

When President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office, the military offensive against the MILF was suspended and the
government sought a resumption of the peace talks. The MILF, according to a leading MILF member, initially responded with deep
reservation, but when President Arroyo asked the Government of Malaysia through Prime Minister Mahathir Mohammad to help
convince the MILF to return to the negotiating table, the MILF convened its Central Committee to seriously discuss the matter and,
eventually, decided to meet with the GRP.4

The parties met in Kuala Lumpur on March 24, 2001, with the talks being facilitated by the Malaysian government, the parties
signing on the same date the Agreement on the General Framework for the Resumption of Peace Talks Between the GRP and the
MILF. The MILF thereafter suspended all its military actions.5

Formal peace talks between the parties were held in Tripoli, Libya from June 20-22, 2001, the outcome of which was the GRP-MILF
Tripoli Agreement on Peace (Tripoli Agreement 2001) containing the basic principles and agenda on the following aspects of the
negotiation: Security Aspect, Rehabilitation Aspect, and Ancestral Domain Aspect. With regard to the Ancestral Domain Aspect, the
parties in Tripoli Agreement 2001 simply agreed "that the same be discussed further by the Parties in their next meeting."

A second round of peace talks was held in Cyberjaya, Malaysia on August 5-7, 2001 which ended with the signing of the
Implementing Guidelines on the Security Aspect of the Tripoli Agreement 2001 leading to a ceasefire status between the parties.
This was followed by the Implementing Guidelines on the Humanitarian Rehabilitation and Development Aspects of the Tripoli
Agreement 2001, which was signed on May 7, 2002 at Putrajaya, Malaysia. Nonetheless, there were many incidence of violence
between government forces and the MILF from 2002 to 2003.

Meanwhile, then MILF Chairman Salamat Hashim passed away on July 13, 2003 and he was replaced by Al Haj Murad, who was
then the chief peace negotiator of the MILF. Murad's position as chief peace negotiator was taken over by Mohagher Iqbal.6

In 2005, several exploratory talks were held between the parties in Kuala Lumpur, eventually leading to the crafting of the draft
MOA-AD in its final form, which, as mentioned, was set to be signed last August 5, 2008.

II. STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS

Before the Court is what is perhaps the most contentious "consensus" ever embodied in an instrument - the MOA-AD which is
assailed principally by the present petitions bearing docket numbers 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951 and 183962.

Commonly impleaded as respondents are the GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain7 and the Presidential Adviser on the Peace
Process (PAPP) Hermogenes Esperon, Jr.

On July 23, 2008, the Province of North Cotabato8 and Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piol filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No.
183591, for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order.9 Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and
furnish them the complete and official copies of the MOA-AD including its attachments, and to prohibit the slated signing of the
MOA-AD, pending the disclosure of the contents of the MOA-AD and the holding of a public consultation thereon. Supplementarily,
petitioners pray that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional.10

This initial petition was followed by another one, docketed as G.R. No. 183752, also for Mandamus and Prohibition11 filed by the
City of Zamboanga,12 Mayor Celso Lobregat, Rep. Ma. Isabelle Climaco and Rep. Erico Basilio Fabian who likewise pray for similar
injunctive reliefs. Petitioners herein moreover pray that the City of Zamboanga be excluded from the Bangsamoro Homeland and/or
Bangsamoro Juridical Entity and, in the alternative, that the MOA-AD be declared null and void.

By Resolution of August 4, 2008, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order commanding and directing public respondents
and their agents to cease and desist from formally signing the MOA-AD.13 The Court also required the Solicitor General to submit to
the Court and petitioners the official copy of the final draft of the MOA-AD,14 to which she complied.15

Meanwhile, the City of Iligan16 filed a petition for Injunction and/or Declaratory Relief, docketed as G.R. No. 183893, praying that
respondents be enjoined from signing the MOA-AD or, if the same had already been signed, from implementing the same, and that
the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. Petitioners herein additionally implead Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as
respondent.

The Province of Zamboanga del Norte,17 Governor Rolando Yebes, Vice-Governor Francis Olvis, Rep. Cecilia Jalosjos-Carreon,
Rep. Cesar Jalosjos, and the members18 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga del Norte filed on August 15, 2008 a
petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition,19 docketed as G.R. No. 183951. They pray, inter alia, that the MOA-AD be
declared null and void and without operative effect, and that respondents be enjoined from executing the MOA-AD.

On August 19, 2008, Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay, and Aquilino Pimentel III filed a petition for Prohibition,20 docketed as G.R.
No. 183962, praying for a judgment prohibiting and permanently enjoining respondents from formally signing and executing the
MOA-AD and or any other agreement derived therefrom or similar thereto, and nullifying the MOA-AD for being unconstitutional and
illegal. Petitioners herein additionally implead as respondent the MILF Peace Negotiating Panel represented by its Chairman
Mohagher Iqbal.

Various parties moved to intervene and were granted leave of court to file their petitions-/comments-in-intervention. Petitioners-in-
Intervention include Senator Manuel A. Roxas, former Senate President Franklin Drilon and Atty. Adel Tamano, the City of
Isabela21 and Mayor Cherrylyn Santos-Akbar, the Province of Sultan Kudarat22 and Gov. Suharto Mangudadatu, the Municipality
of Linamon in Lanao del Norte,23 Ruy Elias Lopez of Davao City and of the Bagobo tribe, Sangguniang Panlungsod member
Marino Ridao and businessman Kisin Buxani, both of Cotabato City; and lawyers Carlo Gomez, Gerardo Dilig, Nesario Awat,
Joselito Alisuag, Richalex Jagmis, all of Palawan City. The Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation, Inc. (Muslaf) and the Muslim Multi-
Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development (MMMPD) filed their respective Comments-in-Intervention.

By subsequent Resolutions, the Court ordered the consolidation of the petitions. Respondents filed Comments on the petitions,
while some of petitioners submitted their respective Replies.

Respondents, by Manifestation and Motion of August 19, 2008, stated that the Executive Department shall thoroughly review the
MOA-AD and pursue further negotiations to address the issues hurled against it, and thus moved to dismiss the cases. In the
succeeding exchange of pleadings, respondents' motion was met with vigorous opposition from petitioners.

The cases were heard on oral argument on August 15, 22 and 29, 2008 that tackled the following principal issues:

1. Whether the petitions have become moot and academic

(i) insofar as the mandamus aspect is concerned, in view of the disclosure of official copies of the final draft of the Memorandum of
Agreement (MOA); and

(ii) insofar as the prohibition aspect involving the Local Government Units is concerned, if it is considered that consultation has
become fait accompli with the finalization of the draft;

2. Whether the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for adjudication;

3. Whether respondent Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it negotiated and initiated the MOA vis--vis ISSUES Nos. 4 and 5;

4. Whether there is a violation of the people's right to information on matters of public concern (1987 Constitution, Article III, Sec. 7)
under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (1987 Constitution, Article II, Sec. 28) including
public consultation under Republic Act No. 7160 (LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991)[;]

If it is in the affirmative, whether prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is an appropriate remedy;

5. Whether by signing the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines would be BINDING itself

a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision
not recognized by law;

b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No.
8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997), particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)[;]

If in the affirmative, whether the Executive Branch has the authority to so bind the Government of the Republic of the Philippines;

6. Whether the inclusion/exclusion of the Province of North Cotabato, Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality
of Linamon, Lanao del Norte in/from the areas covered by the projected Bangsamoro Homeland is a justiciable question; and

7. Whether desistance from signing the MOA derogates any prior valid commitments of the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines.24

The Court, thereafter, ordered the parties to submit their respective Memoranda. Most of the parties submitted their memoranda on
time.

III. OVERVIEW OF THE MOA-AD

As a necessary backdrop to the consideration of the objections raised in the subject five petitions and six petitions-in-intervention
against the MOA-AD, as well as the two comments-in-intervention in favor of the MOA-AD, the Court takes an overview of the MOA.

The MOA-AD identifies the Parties to it as the GRP and the MILF.

Under the heading "Terms of Reference" (TOR), the MOA-AD includes not only four earlier agreements between the GRP and
MILF, but also two agreements between the GRP and the MNLF: the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, and the Final Peace Agreement on
the Implementation of the 1976 Tripoli Agreement, signed on September 2, 1996 during the administration of President Fidel
Ramos.

The MOA-AD also identifies as TOR two local statutes - the organic act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)25
and the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA),26 and several international law instruments - the ILO Convention No. 169
Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries in relation to the UN Declaration on the Rights of the
Indigenous Peoples, and the UN Charter, among others.

The MOA-AD includes as a final TOR the generic category of "compact rights entrenchment emanating from the regime of dar-ul-
mua'hada (or territory under compact) and dar-ul-sulh (or territory under peace agreement) that partakes the nature of a treaty
device."

During the height of the Muslim Empire, early Muslim jurists tended to see the world through a simple dichotomy: there was the dar-
ul-Islam (the Abode of Islam) and dar-ul-harb (the Abode of War). The first referred to those lands where Islamic laws held sway,
while the second denoted those lands where Muslims were persecuted or where Muslim laws were outlawed or ineffective.27 This
way of viewing the world, however, became more complex through the centuries as the Islamic world became part of the
international community of nations.

As Muslim States entered into treaties with their neighbors, even with distant States and inter-governmental organizations, the
classical division of the world into dar-ul-Islam and dar-ul-harb eventually lost its meaning. New terms were drawn up to describe
novel ways of perceiving non-Muslim territories. For instance, areas like dar-ul-mua'hada (land of compact) and dar-ul-sulh (land of
treaty) referred to countries which, though under a secular regime, maintained peaceful and cooperative relations with Muslim
States, having been bound to each other by treaty or agreement. Dar-ul-aman (land of order), on the other hand, referred to
countries which, though not bound by treaty with Muslim States, maintained freedom of religion for Muslims.28

It thus appears that the "compact rights entrenchment" emanating from the regime of dar-ul-mua'hada and dar-ul-sulh simply refers
to all other agreements between the MILF and the Philippine government - the Philippines being the land of compact and peace
agreement - that partake of the nature of a treaty device, "treaty" being broadly defined as "any solemn agreement in writing that
sets out understandings, obligations, and benefits for both parties which provides for a framework that elaborates the principles
declared in the [MOA-AD]."29

The MOA-AD states that the Parties "HAVE AGREED AND ACKNOWLEDGED AS FOLLOWS," and starts with its main body.

The main body of the MOA-AD is divided into four strands, namely, Concepts and Principles, Territory, Resources, and
Governance.

A. CONCEPTS AND PRINCIPLES

This strand begins with the statement that it is "the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify
themselves and be accepted as Bangsamoros.'" It defines "Bangsamoro people" as the natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao
and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their descendants
whether mixed or of full blood, including their spouses.30

Thus, the concept of "Bangsamoro," as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD, includes not only "Moros" as traditionally understood
even by Muslims,31 but all indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds that the freedom of choice
of indigenous peoples shall be respected. What this freedom of choice consists in has not been specifically defined.

The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the "Bangsamoro homeland," the ownership of which is vested exclusively in the Bangsamoro
people by virtue of their prior rights of occupation.32 Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form
part of the public domain.33

The Bangsamoro people are acknowledged as having the right to self-governance, which right is said to be rooted on ancestral
territoriality exercised originally under the suzerain authority of their sultanates and the Pat a Pangampong ku Ranaw. The
sultanates were described as states or "karajaan/kadatuan" resembling a body politic endowed with all the elements of a nation-
state in the modern sense.34

The MOA-AD thus grounds the right to self-governance of the Bangsamoro people on the past suzerain authority of the sultanates.
As gathered, the territory defined as the Bangsamoro homeland was ruled by several sultanates and, specifically in the case of the
Maranao, by the Pat a Pangampong ku Ranaw, a confederation of independent principalities (pangampong) each ruled by datus
and sultans, none of whom was supreme over the others.35

The MOA-AD goes on to describe the Bangsamoro people as "the First Nation' with defined territory and with a system of
government having entered into treaties of amity and commerce with foreign nations."

The term "First Nation" is of Canadian origin referring to the indigenous peoples of that territory, particularly those known as Indians.
In Canada, each of these indigenous peoples is equally entitled to be called "First Nation," hence, all of them are usually described
collectively by the plural "First Nations."36 To that extent, the MOA-AD, by identifying the Bangsamoro people as "the First Nation" -
suggesting its exclusive entitlement to that designation - departs from the Canadian usage of the term.

The MOA-AD then mentions for the first time the "Bangsamoro Juridical Entity" (BJE) to which it grants the authority and jurisdiction
over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro.37

B. TERRITORY

The territory of the Bangsamoro homeland is described as the land mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial
domains, including the aerial domain and the atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic
region.38

More specifically, the core of the BJE is defined as the present geographic area of the ARMM - thus constituting the following areas:
Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and Marawi City. Significantly, this core also includes certain municipalities
of Lanao del Norte that voted for inclusion in the ARMM in the 2001 plebiscite.39

Outside of this core, the BJE is to cover other provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, which are grouped into two
categories, Category A and Category B. Each of these areas is to be subjected to a plebiscite to be held on different dates, years
apart from each other. Thus, Category A areas are to be subjected to a plebiscite not later than twelve (12) months following the
signing of the MOA-AD.40 Category B areas, also called "Special Intervention Areas," on the other hand, are to be subjected to a
plebiscite twenty-five (25) years from the signing of a separate agreement - the Comprehensive Compact.41

The Parties to the MOA-AD stipulate that the BJE shall have jurisdiction over all natural resources within its "internal waters,"
defined as extending fifteen (15) kilometers from the coastline of the BJE area;42 that the BJE shall also have "territorial waters,"
which shall stretch beyond the BJE internal waters up to the baselines of the Republic of the Philippines (RP) south east and south
west of mainland Mindanao; and that within these territorial waters, the BJE and the "Central Government" (used interchangeably
with RP) shall exercise joint jurisdiction, authority and management over all natural resources.43 Notably, the jurisdiction over the
internal waters is not similarly described as "joint."

The MOA-AD further provides for the sharing of minerals on the territorial waters between the Central Government and the BJE, in
favor of the latter, through production sharing and economic cooperation agreement.44 The activities which the Parties are allowed
to conduct on the territorial waters are enumerated, among which are the exploration and utilization of natural resources, regulation
of shipping and fishing activities, and the enforcement of police and safety measures.45 There is no similar provision on the sharing
of minerals and allowed activities with respect to the internal waters of the BJE.

C. RESOURCES

The MOA-AD states that the BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries and shall
have the option to establish trade missions in those countries. Such relationships and understandings, however, are not to include
aggression against the GRP. The BJE may also enter into environmental cooperation agreements.46

The external defense of the BJE is to remain the duty and obligation of the Central Government. The Central Government is also
bound to "take necessary steps to ensure the BJE's participation in international meetings and events" like those of the ASEAN and
the specialized agencies of the UN. The BJE is to be entitled to participate in Philippine official missions and delegations for the
negotiation of border agreements or protocols for environmental protection and equitable sharing of incomes and revenues involving
the bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain.47

With regard to the right of exploring for, producing, and obtaining all potential sources of energy, petroleum, fossil fuel, mineral oil
and natural gas, the jurisdiction and control thereon is to be vested in the BJE "as the party having control within its territorial
jurisdiction." This right carries the proviso that, "in times of national emergency, when public interest so requires," the Central
Government may, for a fixed period and under reasonable terms as may be agreed upon by both Parties, assume or direct the
operation of such resources.48

The sharing between the Central Government and the BJE of total production pertaining to natural resources is to be 75:25 in favor
of the BJE.49

The MOA-AD provides that legitimate grievances of the Bangsamoro people arising from any unjust dispossession of their territorial
and proprietary rights, customary land tenures, or their marginalization shall be acknowledged. Whenever restoration is no longer
possible, reparation is to be in such form as mutually determined by the Parties.50

The BJE may modify or cancel the forest concessions, timber licenses, contracts or agreements, mining concessions, Mineral
Production and Sharing Agreements (MPSA), Industrial Forest Management Agreements (IFMA), and other land tenure instruments
granted by the Philippine Government, including those issued by the present ARMM.51

D. GOVERNANCE

The MOA-AD binds the Parties to invite a multinational third-party to observe and monitor the implementation of the Comprehensive
Compact. This compact is to embody the "details for the effective enforcement" and "the mechanisms and modalities for the actual
implementation" of the MOA-AD. The MOA-AD explicitly provides that the participation of the third party shall not in any way affect
the status of the relationship between the Central Government and the BJE.52

The "associative" relationship
between the Central Government
and the BJE

The MOA-AD describes the relationship of the Central Government and the BJE as "associative," characterized by shared authority
and responsibility. And it states that the structure of governance is to be based on executive, legislative, judicial, and administrative
institutions with defined powers and functions in the Comprehensive Compact.

The MOA-AD provides that its provisions requiring "amendments to the existing legal framework" shall take effect upon signing of
the Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the aforesaid amendments, with due regard to the non-derogation of prior
agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact. As will be discussed later, much of
the present controversy hangs on the legality of this provision.

The BJE is granted the power to build, develop and maintain its own institutions inclusive of civil service, electoral, financial and
banking, education, legislation, legal, economic, police and internal security force, judicial system and correctional institutions, the
details of which shall be discussed in the negotiation of the comprehensive compact.

As stated early on, the MOA-AD was set to be signed on August 5, 2008 by Rodolfo Garcia and Mohagher Iqbal, Chairpersons of
the Peace Negotiating Panels of the GRP and the MILF, respectively. Notably, the penultimate paragraph of the MOA-AD identifies
the signatories as "the representatives of the Parties," meaning the GRP and MILF themselves, and not merely of the negotiating
panels.53 In addition, the signature page of the MOA-AD states that it is "WITNESSED BY" Datuk Othman Bin Abd Razak, Special
Adviser to the Prime Minister of Malaysia, "ENDORSED BY" Ambassador Sayed Elmasry, Adviser to Organization of the Islamic
Conference (OIC) Secretary General and Special Envoy for Peace Process in Southern Philippines, and SIGNED "IN THE
PRESENCE OF" Dr. Albert G. Romulo, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of RP and Dato' Seri Utama Dr. Rais Bin Yatim, Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Malaysia, all of whom were scheduled to sign the Agreement last August 5, 2008.

Annexed to the MOA-AD are two documents containing the respective lists cum maps of the provinces, municipalities, and
barangays under Categories A and B earlier mentioned in the discussion on the strand on TERRITORY.

IV. PROCEDURAL ISSUES

A. RIPENESS

The power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies.54 Courts decline to issue advisory opinions or to resolve
hypothetical or feigned problems, or mere academic questions.55 The limitation of the power of judicial review to actual cases and
controversies defines the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of power, to assure that the courts will not intrude into
areas committed to the other branches of government.56

An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial
resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute. There must be a contrariety of legal rights that can
be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence.57 The Court can decide the constitutionality of an act or
treaty only when a proper case between opposing parties is submitted for judicial determination.58

Related to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when
the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.59 For a case to be considered ripe for
adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come
into the picture,60 and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the
challenged action.61 He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of
the act complained of.62

The Solicitor General argues that there is no justiciable controversy that is ripe for judicial review in the present petitions, reasoning
that

The unsigned MOA-AD is simply a list of consensus points subject to further negotiations and legislative enactments as well as
constitutional processes aimed at attaining a final peaceful agreement. Simply put, the MOA-AD remains to be a proposal that does
not automatically create legally demandable rights and obligations until the list of operative acts required have been duly complied
with. x x x

x x x x

In the cases at bar, it is respectfully submitted that this Honorable Court has no authority to pass upon issues based on hypothetical
or feigned constitutional problems or interests with no concrete bases. Considering the preliminary character of the MOA-AD, there
are no concrete acts that could possibly violate petitioners' and intervenors' rights since the acts complained of are mere
contemplated steps toward the formulation of a final peace agreement. Plainly, petitioners and intervenors' perceived injury, if at all,
is merely imaginary and illusory apart from being unfounded and based on mere conjectures. (Underscoring supplied)

The Solicitor General cites63 the following provisions of the MOA-AD:

TERRITORY

x x x x

2. Toward this end, the Parties enter into the following stipulations:

x x x x

d. Without derogating from the requirements of prior agreements, the Government stipulates to conduct and deliver, using all
possible legal measures, within twelve (12) months following the signing of the MOA-AD, a plebiscite covering the areas as
enumerated in the list and depicted in the map as Category A attached herein (the "Annex"). The Annex constitutes an integral part
of this framework agreement. Toward this end, the Parties shall endeavor to complete the negotiations and resolve all outstanding
issues on the Comprehensive Compact within fifteen (15) months from the signing of the MOA-AD.

x x x x

GOVERNANCE

x x x x

7. The Parties agree that mechanisms and modalities for the actual implementation of this MOA-AD shall be spelt out in the
Comprehensive Compact to mutually take such steps to enable it to occur effectively.

Any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon the signing of a
Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework with due regard to non-derogation of
prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact.64 (Underscoring supplied)

The Solicitor General's arguments fail to persuade.

Concrete acts under the MOA-AD are not necessary to render the present controversy ripe. In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre,65 this Court
held:

x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into
a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough
to awaken judicial duty.

x x x x

By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x settling the dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of the courts.66

In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe,67 the United States Supreme Court held that the challenge to the constitutionality
of the school's policy allowing student-led prayers and speeches before games was ripe for adjudication, even if no public prayer
had yet been led under the policy, because the policy was being challenged as unconstitutional on its face.68

That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness. For example, in New York v. United States,69 decided
in 1992, the United States Supreme Court held that the action by the State of New York challenging the provisions of the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Act was ripe for adjudication even if the questioned provision was not to take effect until January 1, 1996,
because the parties agreed that New York had to take immediate action to avoid the provision's consequences.70

The present petitions pray for Certiorari,71 Prohibition, and Mandamus. Certiorari and Prohibition are remedies granted by law when
any tribunal, board or officer has acted, in the case of certiorari, or is proceeding, in the case of prohibition, without or in excess of
its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.72 Mandamus is a remedy granted by law
when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled.73 Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues
and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials.74

The authority of the GRP Negotiating Panel is defined by Executive Order No. 3 (E.O. No. 3), issued on February 28, 2001.75 The
said executive order requires that "[t]he government's policy framework for peace, including the systematic approach and the
administrative structure for carrying out the comprehensive peace process x x x be governed by this Executive Order."76

The present petitions allege that respondents GRP Panel and PAPP Esperon drafted the terms of the MOA-AD without consulting
the local government units or communities affected, nor informing them of the proceedings. As will be discussed in greater detail
later, such omission, by itself, constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate under E.O. No. 3.

Furthermore, the petitions allege that the provisions of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution. The MOA-AD provides that "any
provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon the signing of a
Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework," implying an amendment of the
Constitution to accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution.
Such act constitutes another violation of its authority. Again, these points will be discussed in more detail later.

As the petitions allege acts or omissions on the part of respondent that exceed their authority, by violating their duties under E.O.
No. 3 and the provisions of the Constitution and statutes, the petitions make a prima facie case for Certiorari, Prohibition, and
Mandamus, and an actual case or controversy ripe for adjudication exists. When an act of a branch of government is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.77

B. LOCUS STANDI

For a party to have locus standi, one must allege "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions."78

Because constitutional cases are often public actions in which the relief sought is likely to affect other persons, a preliminary
question frequently arises as to this interest in the constitutional question raised.79

When suing as a citizen, the person complaining must allege that he has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to
which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act
complained of.80 When the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in the
execution of the laws.81

For a taxpayer, one is allowed to sue where there is an assertion that public funds are illegally disbursed or deflected to an illegal
purpose, or that there is a wastage of public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.82 The Court retains
discretion whether or not to allow a taxpayer's suit.83

In the case of a legislator or member of Congress, an act of the Executive that injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative
but nonetheless substantial injury that can be questioned by legislators. A member of the House of Representatives has standing to
maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office.84

An organization may be granted standing to assert the rights of its members,85 but the mere invocation by the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines or any member of the legal profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law does not suffice to clothe it with standing.86

As regards a local government unit (LGU), it can seek relief in order to protect or vindicate an interest of its own, and of the other
LGUs.87

Intervenors, meanwhile, may be given legal standing upon showing of facts that satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing
intervention,88 such as a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties.

In any case, the Court has discretion to relax the procedural technicality on locus standi, given the liberal attitude it has exercised,
highlighted in the case of David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,89 where technicalities of procedure were brushed aside, the constitutional
issues raised being of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance deserving the attention of the Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents.90 The Court's forbearing stance on locus standi on issues involving constitutional
issues has for its purpose the protection of fundamental rights.

In not a few cases, the Court, in keeping with its duty under the Constitution to determine whether the other branches of government
have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and have not abused the discretion given them, has brushed
aside technical rules of procedure.91

In the petitions at bar, petitioners Province of North Cotabato (G.R. No. 183591) Province of Zamboanga del Norte (G.R. No.
183951), City of Iligan (G.R. No. 183893) and City of Zamboanga (G.R. No. 183752) and petitioners-in-intervention Province of
Sultan Kudarat, City of Isabela and Municipality of Linamon have locus standi in view of the direct and substantial injury that they, as
LGUs, would suffer as their territories, whether in whole or in part, are to be included in the intended domain of the BJE. These
petitioners allege that they did not vote for their inclusion in the ARMM which would be expanded to form the BJE territory.
Petitioners' legal standing is thus beyond doubt.

In G.R. No. 183962, petitioners Ernesto Maceda, Jejomar Binay and Aquilino Pimentel III would have no standing as citizens and
taxpayers for their failure to specify that they would be denied some right or privilege or there would be wastage of public funds. The
fact that they are a former Senator, an incumbent mayor of Makati City, and a resident of Cagayan de Oro, respectively, is of no
consequence. Considering their invocation of the transcendental importance of the issues at hand, however, the Court grants them
standing.

Intervenors Franklin Drilon and Adel Tamano, in alleging their standing as taxpayers, assert that government funds would be
expended for the conduct of an illegal and unconstitutional plebiscite to delineate the BJE territory. On that score alone, they can be
given legal standing. Their allegation that the issues involved in these petitions are of "undeniable transcendental importance"
clothes them with added basis for their personality to intervene in these petitions.

With regard to Senator Manuel Roxas, his standing is premised on his being a member of the Senate and a citizen to enforce
compliance by respondents of the public's constitutional right to be informed of the MOA-AD, as well as on a genuine legal interest
in the matter in litigation, or in the success or failure of either of the parties. He thus possesses the requisite standing as an
intervenor.

With respect to Intervenors Ruy Elias Lopez, as a former congressman of the 3rd district of Davao City, a taxpayer and a member of
the Bagobo tribe; Carlo B. Gomez, et al., as members of the IBP Palawan chapter, citizens and taxpayers; Marino Ridao, as
taxpayer, resident and member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cotabato City; and Kisin Buxani, as taxpayer, they failed to
allege any proper legal interest in the present petitions. Just the same, the Court exercises its discretion to relax the procedural
technicality on locus standi given the paramount public interest in the issues at hand.

Intervening respondents Muslim Multi-Sectoral Movement for Peace and Development, an advocacy group for justice and the
attainment of peace and prosperity in Muslim Mindanao; and Muslim Legal Assistance Foundation Inc., a non-government
organization of Muslim lawyers, allege that they stand to be benefited or prejudiced, as the case may be, in the resolution of the
petitions concerning the MOA-AD, and prays for the denial of the petitions on the grounds therein stated. Such legal interest suffices
to clothe them with standing.

B. MOOTNESS

Respondents insist that the present petitions have been rendered moot with the satisfaction of all the reliefs prayed for by petitioners
and the subsequent pronouncement of the Executive Secretary that "[n]o matter what the Supreme Court ultimately decides[,] the
government will not sign the MOA."92

In lending credence to this policy decision, the Solicitor General points out that the President had already disbanded the GRP Peace
Panel.93

In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,94 this Court held that the "moot and academic" principle not being a magical formula that
automatically dissuades courts in resolving a case, it will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic, if it finds that (a) there is a
grave violation of the Constitution;95 (b) the situation is of exceptional character and paramount public interest is involved;96 (c) the
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public;97 and (d) the
case is capable of repetition yet evading review.98

Another exclusionary circumstance that may be considered is where there is a voluntary cessation of the activity complained of by
the defendant or doer. Thus, once a suit is filed and the doer voluntarily ceases the challenged conduct, it does not automatically
deprive the tribunal of power to hear and determine the case and does not render the case moot especially when the plaintiff seeks
damages or prays for injunctive relief against the possible recurrence of the violation.99

The present petitions fall squarely into these exceptions to thus thrust them into the domain of judicial review. The grounds cited
above in David are just as applicable in the present cases as they were, not only in David, but also in Province of Batangas v.
Romulo100 and Manalo v. Calderon101 where the Court similarly decided them on the merits, supervening events that would
ordinarily have rendered the same moot notwithstanding.

Petitions not mooted

Contrary then to the asseverations of respondents, the non-signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace
Panel did not moot the present petitions. It bears emphasis that the signing of the MOA-AD did not push through due to the Court's
issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order.

Contrary too to respondents' position, the MOA-AD cannot be considered a mere "list of consensus points," especially given its
nomenclature, the need to have it signed or initialed by all the parties concerned on August 5, 2008, and the far-reaching
Constitutional implications of these "consensus points," foremost of which is the creation of the BJE.

In fact, as what will, in the main, be discussed, there is a commitment on the part of respondents to amend and effect necessary
changes to the existing legal framework for certain provisions of the MOA-AD to take effect. Consequently, the present petitions are
not confined to the terms and provisions of the MOA-AD, but to other on-going and future negotiations and agreements necessary
for its realization. The petitions have not, therefore, been rendered moot and academic simply by the public disclosure of the MOA-
AD,102 the manifestation that it will not be signed as well as the disbanding of the GRP Panel not withstanding.

Petitions are imbued with paramount public interest

There is no gainsaying that the petitions are imbued with paramount public interest, involving a significant part of the country's
territory and the wide-ranging political modifications of affected LGUs. The assertion that the MOA-AD is subject to further legal
enactments including possible Constitutional amendments more than ever provides impetus for the Court to formulate controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public and, in this case, the government and its negotiating entity.

Respondents cite Suplico v. NEDA, et al.103 where the Court did not "pontificat[e] on issues which no longer legitimately constitute
an actual case or controversy [as this] will do more harm than good to the nation as a whole."

The present petitions must be differentiated from Suplico. Primarily, in Suplico, what was assailed and eventually cancelled was a
stand-alone government procurement contract for a national broadband network involving a one-time contractual relation between
two parties-the government and a private foreign corporation. As the issues therein involved specific government procurement
policies and standard principles on contracts, the majority opinion in Suplico found nothing exceptional therein, the factual
circumstances being peculiar only to the transactions and parties involved in the controversy.

The MOA-AD is part of a series of agreements

In the present controversy, the MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out the Tripoli Agreement
2001. The MOA-AD which dwells on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of said Tripoli Agreement is the third such component to be
undertaken following the implementation of the Security Aspect in August 2001 and the Humanitarian, Rehabilitation and
Development Aspect in May 2002.

Accordingly, even if the Executive Secretary, in his Memorandum of August 28, 2008 to the Solicitor General, has stated that "no
matter what the Supreme Court ultimately decides[,] the government will not sign the MOA[-AD]," mootness will not set in in light of
the terms of the Tripoli Agreement 2001.

Need to formulate principles-guidelines

Surely, the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another one will be drawn up to carry out the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the
Tripoli Agreement 2001, in another or in any form, which could contain similar or significantly drastic provisions. While the Court
notes the word of the Executive Secretary that the government "is committed to securing an agreement that is both constitutional
and equitable because that is the only way that long-lasting peace can be assured," it is minded to render a decision on the merits in
the present petitions to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, the public and, most especially, the government
in negotiating with the MILF regarding Ancestral Domain.

Respondents invite the Court's attention to the separate opinion of then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban in Sanlakas v. Reyes104
in which he stated that the doctrine of "capable of repetition yet evading review" can override mootness, "provided the party raising it
in a proper case has been and/or continue to be prejudiced or damaged as a direct result of their issuance." They contend that the
Court must have jurisdiction over the subject matter for the doctrine to be invoked.

The present petitions all contain prayers for Prohibition over which this Court exercises original jurisdiction. While G.R. No. 183893
(City of Iligan v. GRP) is a petition for Injunction and Declaratory Relief, the Court will treat it as one for Prohibition as it has far
reaching implications and raises questions that need to be resolved.105 At all events, the Court has jurisdiction over most if not the
rest of the petitions.

Indeed, the present petitions afford a proper venue for the Court to again apply the doctrine immediately referred to as what it had
done in a number of landmark cases.106 There is a reasonable expectation that petitioners, particularly the Provinces of North
Cotabato, Zamboanga del Norte and Sultan Kudarat, the Cities of Zamboanga, Iligan and Isabela, and the Municipality of Linamon,
will again be subjected to the same problem in the future as respondents' actions are capable of repetition, in another or any form.

It is with respect to the prayers for Mandamus that the petitions have become moot, respondents having, by Compliance of August
7, 2008, provided this Court and petitioners with official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD and its annexes. Too, intervenors
have been furnished, or have procured for themselves, copies of the MOA-AD.

V. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

As culled from the Petitions and Petitions-in-Intervention, there are basically two SUBSTANTIVE issues to be resolved, one relating
to the manner in which the MOA-AD was negotiated and finalized, the other relating to its provisions, viz:

1. Did respondents violate constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the right to information when they
negotiated and later initialed the MOA-AD?

2. Do the contents of the MOA-AD violate the Constitution and the laws?

ON THE FIRST SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE

Petitioners invoke their constitutional right to information on matters of public concern, as provided in Section 7, Article III on the Bill
of Rights:

Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis
for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.107

As early as 1948, in Subido v. Ozaeta,108 the Court has recognized the statutory right to examine and inspect public records, a
right which was eventually accorded constitutional status.

The right of access to public documents, as enshrined in both the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 Constitution, has been recognized
as a self-executory constitutional right.109

In the 1976 case of Baldoza v. Hon. Judge Dimaano,110 the Court ruled that access to public records is predicated on the right of
the people to acquire information on matters of public concern since, undoubtedly, in a democracy, the pubic has a legitimate
interest in matters of social and political significance.

x x x The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of information in a
democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public of the nation's problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision-
making if they are denied access to information of general interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope
with the exigencies of the times. As has been aptly observed: "Maintaining the flow of such information depends on protection for
both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if either process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases." x x x111

In the same way that free discussion enables members of society to cope with the exigencies of their time, access to information of
general interest aids the people in democratic decision-making by giving them a better perspective of the vital issues confronting the
nation112 so that they may be able to criticize and participate in the affairs of the government in a responsible, reasonable and
effective manner. It is by ensuring an unfettered and uninhibited exchange of ideas among a well-informed public that a government
remains responsive to the changes desired by the people.113

The MOA-AD is a matter of public concern

That the subject of the information sought in the present cases is a matter of public concern114 faces no serious challenge. In fact,
respondents admit that the MOA-AD is indeed of public concern.115 In previous cases, the Court found that the regularity of real
estate transactions entered in the Register of Deeds,116 the need for adequate notice to the public of the various laws,117 the civil
service eligibility of a public employee,118 the proper management of GSIS funds allegedly used to grant loans to public
officials,119 the recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth,120 and the identity of party-list nominees,121 among others,
are matters of public concern. Undoubtedly, the MOA-AD subject of the present cases is of public concern, involving as it does the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, which directly affects the lives of the public at large.

Matters of public concern covered by the right to information include steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the
contract. In not distinguishing as to the executory nature or commercial character of agreements, the Court has categorically ruled:

x x x [T]he right to information "contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction." Certainly, a
consummated contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the people can never exercise the
right if no contract is consummated, and if one is consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its defects.

Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract, which may be grossly disadvantageous to the
government or even illegal, becomes fait accompli. This negates the State policy of full transparency on matters of public concern, a
situation which the framers of the Constitution could not have intended. Such a requirement will prevent the citizenry from
participating in the public discussion of any proposed contract, effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. We
can allow neither an emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a retreat by the State of its avowed "policy of full disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest."122 (Emphasis and italics in the original)

Intended as a "splendid symmetry"123 to the right to information under the Bill of Rights is the policy of public disclosure under
Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all
its transactions involving public interest.124

The policy of full public disclosure enunciated in above-quoted Section 28 complements the right of access to information on matters
of public concern found in the Bill of Rights. The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while
Section 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands.125

The policy of public disclosure establishes a concrete ethical principle for the conduct of public affairs in a genuinely open
democracy, with the people's right to know as the centerpiece. It is a mandate of the State to be accountable by following such
policy.126 These provisions are vital to the exercise of the freedom of expression and essential to hold public officials at all times
accountable to the people.127

Whether Section 28 is self-executory, the records of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission so disclose:

MR. SUAREZ. And since this is not self-executory, this policy will not be enunciated or will not be in force and effect until after
Congress shall have provided it.

MR. OPLE. I expect it to influence the climate of public ethics immediately but, of course, the implementing law will have to be
enacted by Congress, Mr. Presiding Officer.128

The following discourse, after Commissioner Hilario Davide, Jr., sought clarification on the issue, is enlightening.

MR. DAVIDE. I would like to get some clarifications on this. Mr. Presiding Officer, did I get the Gentleman correctly as having said
that this is not a self-executing provision? It would require a legislation by Congress to implement?

MR. OPLE. Yes. Originally, it was going to be self-executing, but I accepted an amendment from Commissioner Regalado, so that
the safeguards on national interest are modified by the clause "as may be provided by law"

MR. DAVIDE. But as worded, does it not mean that this will immediately take effect and Congress may provide for reasonable
safeguards on the sole ground national interest?

MR. OPLE. Yes. I think so, Mr. Presiding Officer, I said earlier that it should immediately influence the climate of the conduct of
public affairs but, of course, Congress here may no longer pass a law revoking it, or if this is approved, revoking this principle, which
is inconsistent with this policy.129 (Emphasis supplied)

Indubitably, the effectivity of the policy of public disclosure need not await the passing of a statute. As Congress cannot revoke this
principle, it is merely directed to provide for "reasonable safeguards." The complete and effective exercise of the right to information
necessitates that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature. Since both provisions go
hand-in-hand, it is absurd to say that the broader130 right to information on matters of public concern is already enforceable while
the correlative duty of the State to disclose its transactions involving public interest is not enforceable until there is an enabling law.
Respondents cannot thus point to the absence of an implementing legislation as an excuse in not effecting such policy.

An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the
government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end
that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will.131 Envisioned to be corollary to the twin rights to
information and disclosure is the design for feedback mechanisms.

MS. ROSARIO BRAID. Yes. And lastly, Mr. Presiding Officer, will the people be able to participate? Will the government provide
feedback mechanisms so that the people can participate and can react where the existing media facilities are not able to provide full
feedback mechanisms to the government? I suppose this will be part of the government implementing operational mechanisms.

MR. OPLE. Yes. I think through their elected representatives and that is how these courses take place. There is a message and a
feedback, both ways.

x x x x

MS. ROSARIO BRAID. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I just make one last sentence?

I think when we talk about the feedback network, we are not talking about public officials but also network of private business o[r]
community-based organizations that will be reacting. As a matter of fact, we will put more credence or credibility on the private
network of volunteers and voluntary community-based organizations. So I do not think we are afraid that there will be another OMA
in the making.132 (Emphasis supplied)

The imperative of a public consultation, as a species of the right to information, is evident in the "marching orders" to respondents.
The mechanics for the duty to disclose information and to conduct public consultation regarding the peace agenda and process is
manifestly provided by E.O. No. 3.133 The preambulatory clause of E.O. No. 3 declares that there is a need to further enhance the
contribution of civil society to the comprehensive peace process by institutionalizing the people's participation.

One of the three underlying principles of the comprehensive peace process is that it "should be community-based, reflecting the
sentiments, values and principles important to all Filipinos" and "shall be defined not by the government alone, nor by the different
contending groups only, but by all Filipinos as one community."134 Included as a component of the comprehensive peace process
is consensus-building and empowerment for peace, which includes "continuing consultations on both national and local levels to
build consensus for a peace agenda and process, and the mobilization and facilitation of people's participation in the peace
process."135

Clearly, E.O. No. 3 contemplates not just the conduct of a plebiscite to effectuate "continuing" consultations, contrary to
respondents' position that plebiscite is "more than sufficient consultation."136

Further, E.O. No. 3 enumerates the functions and responsibilities of the PAPP, one of which is to "[c]onduct regular dialogues with
the National Peace Forum (NPF) and other peace partners to seek relevant information, comments, recommendations as well as to
render appropriate and timely reports on the progress of the comprehensive peace process."137 E.O. No. 3 mandates the
establishment of the NPF to be "the principal forum for the PAPP to consult with and seek advi[c]e from the peace advocates, peace
partners and concerned sectors of society on both national and local levels, on the implementation of the comprehensive peace
process, as well as for government[-]civil society dialogue and consensus-building on peace agenda and initiatives."138

In fine, E.O. No. 3 establishes petitioners' right to be consulted on the peace agenda, as a corollary to the constitutional right to
information and disclosure.

PAPP Esperon committed grave abuse of discretion

The PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation. The furtive process by which
the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious,
oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof.

The Court may not, of course, require the PAPP to conduct the consultation in a particular way or manner. It may, however, require
him to comply with the law and discharge the functions within the authority granted by the President.139

Petitioners are not claiming a seat at the negotiating table, contrary to respondents' retort in justifying the denial of petitioners' right
to be consulted. Respondents' stance manifests the manner by which they treat the salient provisions of E.O. No. 3 on people's
participation. Such disregard of the express mandate of the President is not much different from superficial conduct toward token
provisos that border on classic lip service.140 It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined.

As for respondents' invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege, it is not tenable under the premises. The argument defies sound
reason when contrasted with E.O. No. 3's explicit provisions on continuing consultation and dialogue on both national and local
levels. The executive order even recognizes the exercise of the public's right even before the GRP makes its official
recommendations or before the government proffers its definite propositions.141 It bear emphasis that E.O. No. 3 seeks to elicit
relevant advice, information, comments and recommendations from the people through dialogue.

AT ALL EVENTS, respondents effectively waived the defense of executive privilege in view of their unqualified disclosure of the
official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD. By unconditionally complying with the Court's August 4, 2008 Resolution, without a
prayer for the document's disclosure in camera, or without a manifestation that it was complying therewith ex abundante ad
cautelam.

Petitioners' assertion that the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991 declares it a State policy to "require all national agencies and
offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local government units, non-governmental and people's organizations, and
other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions"142 is well-
taken. The LGC chapter on intergovernmental relations puts flesh into this avowed policy:

Prior Consultations Required. - No project or program shall be implemented by government authorities unless the consultations
mentioned in Sections 2 (c) and 26 hereof are complied with, and prior approval of the sanggunian concerned is obtained: Provided,
That occupants in areas where such projects are to be implemented shall not be evicted unless appropriate relocation sites have
been provided, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.143 (Italics and underscoring supplied)

In Lina, Jr. v. Hon. Pao,144 the Court held that the above-stated policy and above-quoted provision of the LGU apply only to
national programs or projects which are to be implemented in a particular local community. Among the programs and projects
covered are those that are critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular
group of people residing in the locality where these will be implemented.145 The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that
unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people,146 which could pervasively and
drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.

With respect to the indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs), whose interests are represented herein by
petitioner Lopez and are adversely affected by the MOA-AD, the ICCs/IPs have, under the IPRA, the right to participate fully at all
levels of decision-making in matters which may affect their rights, lives and destinies.147 The MOA-AD, an instrument recognizing
ancestral domain, failed to justify its non-compliance with the clear-cut mechanisms ordained in said Act,148 which entails, among
other things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the ICCs/IPs.

Notably, the IPRA does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an
ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise. The recognition of the ancestral domain is the raison d'etre of the MOA-
AD, without which all other stipulations or "consensus points" necessarily must fail. In proceeding to make a sweeping declaration
on ancestral domain, without complying with the IPRA, which is cited as one of the TOR of the MOA-AD, respondents clearly
transcended the boundaries of their authority. As it seems, even the heart of the MOA-AD is still subject to necessary changes to
the legal framework. While paragraph 7 on Governance suspends the effectivity of all provisions requiring changes to the legal
framework, such clause is itself invalid, as will be discussed in the following section.

Indeed, ours is an open society, with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and available always to public
cognizance. This has to be so if the country is to remain democratic, with sovereignty residing in the people and all government
authority emanating from them.149

ON THE SECOND SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE

With regard to the provisions of the MOA-AD, there can be no question that they cannot all be accommodated under the present
Constitution and laws. Respondents have admitted as much in the oral arguments before this Court, and the MOA-AD itself
recognizes the need to amend the existing legal framework to render effective at least some of its provisions. Respondents,
nonetheless, counter that the MOA-AD is free of any legal infirmity because any provisions therein which are inconsistent with the
present legal framework will not be effective until the necessary changes to that framework are made. The validity of this argument
will be considered later. For now, the Court shall pass upon how

The MOA-AD is inconsistent with the Constitution and laws as presently worded.

In general, the objections against the MOA-AD center on the extent of the powers conceded therein to the BJE. Petitioners assert
that the powers granted to the BJE exceed those granted to any local government under present laws, and even go beyond those of
the present ARMM. Before assessing some of the specific powers that would have been vested in the BJE, however, it would be
useful to turn first to a general idea that serves as a unifying link to the different provisions of the MOA-AD, namely, the international
law concept of association. Significantly, the MOA-AD explicitly alludes to this concept, indicating that the Parties actually framed its
provisions with it in mind.

Association is referred to in paragraph 3 on TERRITORY, paragraph 11 on RESOURCES, and paragraph 4 on GOVERNANCE. It is
in the last mentioned provision, however, that the MOA-AD most clearly uses it to describe the envisioned relationship between the
BJE and the Central Government.

4. The relationship between the Central Government and the Bangsamoro juridical entity shall be associative characterized by
shared authority and responsibility with a structure of governance based on executive, legislative, judicial and administrative
institutions with defined powers and functions in the comprehensive compact. A period of transition shall be established in a
comprehensive peace compact specifying the relationship between the Central Government and the BJE. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

The nature of the "associative" relationship may have been intended to be defined more precisely in the still to be forged
Comprehensive Compact. Nonetheless, given that there is a concept of "association" in international law, and the MOA-AD - by its
inclusion of international law instruments in its TOR- placed itself in an international legal context, that concept of association may
be brought to bear in understanding the use of the term "associative" in the MOA-AD.

Keitner and Reisman state that

[a]n association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic model, one state, the
associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the principal, while maintaining its international status as a state. Free
associations represent a middle ground between integration and independence. x x x150 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

For purposes of illustration, the Republic of the Marshall Islands and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), formerly part of the
U.S.-administered Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands,151 are associated states of the U.S. pursuant to a Compact of Free
Association. The currency in these countries is the U.S. dollar, indicating their very close ties with the U.S., yet they issue their own
travel documents, which is a mark of their statehood. Their international legal status as states was confirmed by the UN Security
Council and by their admission to UN membership.

According to their compacts of free association, the Marshall Islands and the FSM generally have the capacity to conduct foreign
affairs in their own name and right, such capacity extending to matters such as the law of the sea, marine resources, trade, banking,
postal, civil aviation, and cultural relations. The U.S. government, when conducting its foreign affairs, is obligated to consult with the
governments of the Marshall Islands or the FSM on matters which it (U.S. government) regards as relating to or affecting either
government.

In the event of attacks or threats against the Marshall Islands or the FSM, the U.S. government has the authority and obligation to
defend them as if they were part of U.S. territory. The U.S. government, moreover, has the option of establishing and using military
areas and facilities within these associated states and has the right to bar the military personnel of any third country from having
access to these territories for military purposes.

It bears noting that in U.S. constitutional and international practice, free association is understood as an international association
between sovereigns. The Compact of Free Association is a treaty which is subordinate to the associated nation's national
constitution, and each party may terminate the association consistent with the right of independence. It has been said that, with the
admission of the U.S.-associated states to the UN in 1990, the UN recognized that the American model of free association is
actually based on an underlying status of independence.152

In international practice, the "associated state" arrangement has usually been used as a transitional device of former colonies on
their way to full independence. Examples of states that have passed through the status of associated states as a transitional phase
are Antigua, St. Kitts-Nevis-Anguilla, Dominica, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and Grenada. All have since become independent states.153

Back to the MOA-AD, it contains many provisions which are consistent with the international legal concept of association,
specifically the following: the BJE's capacity to enter into economic and trade relations with foreign countries, the commitment of the
Central Government to ensure the BJE's participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies, and
the continuing responsibility of the Central Government over external defense. Moreover, the BJE's right to participate in Philippine
official missions bearing on negotiation of border agreements, environmental protection, and sharing of revenues pertaining to the
bodies of water adjacent to or between the islands forming part of the ancestral domain, resembles the right of the governments of
FSM and the Marshall Islands to be consulted by the U.S. government on any foreign affairs matter affecting them.

These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated
state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.

The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution

No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an "associative" relationship with the
national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or
regional government. It also implies the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not
contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to
prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.

Even the mere concept animating many of the MOA-AD's provisions, therefore, already requires for its validity the amendment of
constitutional provisions, specifically the following provisions of Article X:

SECTION 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.

SECTION 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities,
municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures, and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.

The BJE is a far more powerful
entity than the autonomous region
recognized in the Constitution

It is not merely an expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government being fundamentally
different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo
Convention,154 namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other
states.

Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating it -
which has betrayed itself by its use of the concept of association - runs counter to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of
the Republic.

The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government and the BJE being itself contrary to the present
Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and powers of the BJE are in
conflict with the Constitution and the laws.

Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that "[t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a
majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and
geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region." (Emphasis supplied)

As reflected above, the BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term
"autonomous region" in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD would still be in conflict with it. Under paragraph 2(c)
on TERRITORY in relation to 2(d) and 2(e), the present geographic area of the ARMM and, in addition, the municipalities of Lanao
del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite - Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and
Tangkal - are automatically part of the BJE without need of another plebiscite, in contrast to the areas under Categories A and B
mentioned earlier in the overview. That the present components of the ARMM and the above-mentioned municipalities voted for
inclusion therein in 2001, however, does not render another plebiscite unnecessary under the Constitution, precisely because what
these areas voted for then was their inclusion in the ARMM, not the BJE.

The MOA-AD, moreover, would not
comply with Article X, Section 20 of
the Constitution

since that provision defines the powers of autonomous regions as follows:

SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of
autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:

(1) Administrative organization;

(2) Creation of sources of revenues;

(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;

(4) Personal, family, and property relations;

(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;

(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;

(7) Educational policies;

(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and

(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region.
(Underscoring supplied)

Again on the premise that the BJE may be regarded as an autonomous region, the MOA-AD would require an amendment that
would expand the above-quoted provision. The mere passage of new legislation pursuant to sub-paragraph No. 9 of said
constitutional provision would not suffice, since any new law that might vest in the BJE the powers found in the MOA-AD must, itself,
comply with other provisions of the Constitution. It would not do, for instance, to merely pass legislation vesting the BJE with treaty-
making power in order to accommodate paragraph 4 of the strand on RESOURCES which states: "The BJE is free to enter into any
economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries: provided, however, that such relationships and understandings do
not include aggression against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines x x x." Under our constitutional system, it is only
the President who has that power. Pimentel v. Executive Secretary155 instructs:

In our system of government, the President, being the head of state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations
and is the country's sole representative with foreign nations. As the chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the
country's mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is vested with the authority to deal with foreign states
and governments, extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter into treaties, and otherwise transact the
business of foreign relations. In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if the scheme envisioned in the MOA-AD is to be effected. That
constitutional provision states: "The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the
framework of national unity and development." (Underscoring supplied) An associative arrangement does not uphold national unity.
While there may be a semblance of unity because of the associative ties between the BJE and the national government, the act of
placing a portion of Philippine territory in a status which, in international practice, has generally been a preparation for
independence, is certainly not conducive to national unity.

Besides being irreconcilable with the Constitution, the MOA-AD is also inconsistent with prevailing statutory law, among which are
R.A. No. 9054156 or the Organic Act of the ARMM, and the IPRA.157

Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act of the ARMM is a bar to the adoption of the definition of "Bangsamoro people" used in the
MOA-AD. Paragraph 1 on Concepts and Principles states:

1. It is the birthright of all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as "Bangsamoros".
The Bangsamoro people refers to those who are natives or original inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including
Palawan and the Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization of its descendants whether mixed or of full blood. Spouses
and their descendants are classified as Bangsamoro. The freedom of choice of the Indigenous people shall be respected.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

This use of the term Bangsamoro sharply contrasts with that found in the Article X, Section 3 of the Organic Act, which, rather than
lumping together the identities of the Bangsamoro and other indigenous peoples living in Mindanao, clearly distinguishes between
Bangsamoro people and Tribal peoples, as follows:

"As used in this Organic Act, the phrase "indigenous cultural community" refers to Filipino citizens residing in the autonomous region
who are:

(a) Tribal peoples. These are citizens whose social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish them from other sectors of the
national community; and

(b) Bangsa Moro people. These are citizens who are believers in Islam and who have retained some or all of their own social,
economic, cultural, and political institutions."

Respecting the IPRA, it lays down the prevailing procedure for the delineation and recognition of ancestral domains. The MOA-AD's
manner of delineating the ancestral domain of the Bangsamoro people is a clear departure from that procedure. By paragraph 1 of
Territory, the Parties simply agree that, subject to the delimitations in the agreed Schedules, "[t]he Bangsamoro homeland and
historic territory refer to the land mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, and the aerial domain, the
atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region."

Chapter VIII of the IPRA, on the other hand, lays down a detailed procedure, as illustrated in the following provisions thereof:

SECTION 52. Delineation Process. - The identification and delineation of ancestral domains shall be done in accordance with the
following procedures:

x x x x

b) Petition for Delineation. - The process of delineating a specific perimeter may be initiated by the NCIP with the consent of the
ICC/IP concerned, or through a Petition for Delineation filed with the NCIP, by a majority of the members of the ICCs/IPs;

c) Delineation Proper. - The official delineation of ancestral domain boundaries including census of all community members therein,
shall be immediately undertaken by the Ancestral Domains Office upon filing of the application by the ICCs/IPs concerned.
Delineation will be done in coordination with the community concerned and shall at all times include genuine involvement and
participation by the members of the communities concerned;

d) Proof Required. - Proof of Ancestral Domain Claims shall include the testimony of elders or community under oath, and other
documents directly or indirectly attesting to the possession or occupation of the area since time immemorial by such ICCs/IPs in the
concept of owners which shall be any one (1) of the following authentic documents:

1) Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs customs and traditions;

2) Written accounts of the ICCs/IPs political structure and institution;

3) Pictures showing long term occupation such as those of old improvements, burial grounds, sacred places and old villages;

4) Historical accounts, including pacts and agreements concerning boundaries entered into by the ICCs/IPs concerned with other
ICCs/IPs;

5) Survey plans and sketch maps;

6) Anthropological data;

7) Genealogical surveys;

8) Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional communal forests and hunting grounds;

9) Pictures and descriptive histories of traditional landmarks such as mountains, rivers, creeks, ridges, hills, terraces and the like;
and

10) Write-ups of names and places derived from the native dialect of the community.

e) Preparation of Maps. - On the basis of such investigation and the findings of fact based thereon, the Ancestral Domains Office of
the NCIP shall prepare a perimeter map, complete with technical descriptions, and a description of the natural features and
landmarks embraced therein;

f) Report of Investigation and Other Documents. - A complete copy of the preliminary census and a report of investigation, shall be
prepared by the Ancestral Domains Office of the NCIP;

g) Notice and Publication. - A copy of each document, including a translation in the native language of the ICCs/IPs concerned shall
be posted in a prominent place therein for at least fifteen (15) days. A copy of the document shall also be posted at the local,
provincial and regional offices of the NCIP, and shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation once a week for two (2)
consecutive weeks to allow other claimants to file opposition thereto within fifteen (15) days from date of such publication: Provided,
That in areas where no such newspaper exists, broadcasting in a radio station will be a valid substitute: Provided, further, That mere
posting shall be deemed sufficient if both newspaper and radio station are not available;

h) Endorsement to NCIP. - Within fifteen (15) days from publication, and of the inspection process, the Ancestral Domains Office
shall prepare a report to the NCIP endorsing a favorable action upon a claim that is deemed to have sufficient proof. However, if the
proof is deemed insufficient, the Ancestral Domains Office shall require the submission of additional evidence: Provided, That the
Ancestral Domains Office shall reject any claim that is deemed patently false or fraudulent after inspection and verification:
Provided, further, That in case of rejection, the Ancestral Domains Office shall give the applicant due notice, copy furnished all
concerned, containing the grounds for denial. The denial shall be appealable to the NCIP: Provided, furthermore, That in cases
where there are conflicting claims among ICCs/IPs on the boundaries of ancestral domain claims, the Ancestral Domains Office
shall cause the contending parties to meet and assist them in coming up with a preliminary resolution of the conflict, without
prejudice to its full adjudication according to the section below.

x x x x

To remove all doubts about the irreconcilability of the MOA-AD with the present legal system, a discussion of not only the
Constitution and domestic statutes, but also of international law is in order, for

Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution states that the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land."

Applying this provision of the Constitution, the Court, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,158 held that the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights is part of the law of the land on account of which it ordered the release on bail of a detained alien of Russian descent
whose deportation order had not been executed even after two years. Similarly, the Court in Agustin v. Edu159 applied the
aforesaid constitutional provision to the 1968 Vienna Convention on Road Signs and Signals.

International law has long recognized the right to self-determination of "peoples," understood not merely as the entire population of a
State but also a portion thereof. In considering the question of whether the people of Quebec had a right to unilaterally secede from
Canada, the Canadian Supreme Court in REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF QUEBEC160 had occasion to acknowledge that "the
right of a people to self-determination is now so widely recognized in international conventions that the principle has acquired a
status beyond convention' and is considered a general principle of international law."

Among the conventions referred to are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights161 and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights162 which state, in Article 1 of both covenants, that all peoples, by virtue of the right of self-
determination, "freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development."

The people's right to self-determination should not, however, be understood as extending to a unilateral right of secession. A
distinction should be made between the right of internal and external self-determination. REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF
QUEBEC is again instructive:

"(ii) Scope of the Right to Self-determination

126. The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self-determination of a people is normally fulfilled through
internal self-determination - a people's pursuit of its political, economic, social and cultural development within the framework of an
existing state. A right to external self-determination (which in this case potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to
unilateral secession) arises in only the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances. x x x

External self-determination can be defined as in the following statement from the Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra, as

The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an independent State or the
emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people constitute modes of implementing the right of self-
determination by that people. (Emphasis added)

127. The international law principle of self-determination has evolved within a framework of respect for the territorial integrity of
existing states. The various international documents that support the existence of a people's right to self-determination also contain
parallel statements supportive of the conclusion that the exercise of such a right must be sufficiently limited to prevent threats to an
existing state's territorial integrity or the stability of relations between sovereign states.

x x x x (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

The Canadian Court went on to discuss the exceptional cases in which the right to external self-determination can arise, namely,
where a people is under colonial rule, is subject to foreign domination or exploitation outside a colonial context, and - less definitely
but asserted by a number of commentators - is blocked from the meaningful exercise of its right to internal self-determination. The
Court ultimately held that the population of Quebec had no right to secession, as the same is not under colonial rule or foreign
domination, nor is it being deprived of the freedom to make political choices and pursue economic, social and cultural development,
citing that Quebec is equitably represented in legislative, executive and judicial institutions within Canada, even occupying
prominent positions therein.

The exceptional nature of the right of secession is further exemplified in the REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF
JURISTS ON THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE AALAND ISLANDS QUESTION.163 There, Sweden presented to the Council of the
League of Nations the question of whether the inhabitants of the Aaland Islands should be authorized to determine by plebiscite if
the archipelago should remain under Finnish sovereignty or be incorporated in the kingdom of Sweden. The Council, before
resolving the question, appointed an International Committee composed of three jurists to submit an opinion on the preliminary issue
of whether the dispute should, based on international law, be entirely left to the domestic jurisdiction of Finland. The Committee
stated the rule as follows:

x x x [I]n the absence of express provisions in international treaties, the right of disposing of national territory is essentially an
attribute of the sovereignty of every State. Positive International Law does not recognize the right of national groups, as such, to
separate themselves from the State of which they form part by the simple expression of a wish, any more than it recognizes the right
of other States to claim such a separation. Generally speaking, the grant or refusal of the right to a portion of its population of
determining its own political fate by plebiscite or by some other method, is, exclusively, an attribute of the sovereignty of every State
which is definitively constituted. A dispute between two States concerning such a question, under normal conditions therefore, bears
upon a question which International Law leaves entirely to the domestic jurisdiction of one of the States concerned. Any other
solution would amount to an infringement of sovereign rights of a State and would involve the risk of creating difficulties and a lack
of stability which would not only be contrary to the very idea embodied in term "State," but would also endanger the interests of the
international community. If this right is not possessed by a large or small section of a nation, neither can it be held by the State to
which the national group wishes to be attached, nor by any other State. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Committee held that the dispute concerning the Aaland Islands did not refer to a question which is left by international law to the
domestic jurisdiction of Finland, thereby applying the exception rather than the rule elucidated above. Its ground for departing from
the general rule, however, was a very narrow one, namely, the Aaland Islands agitation originated at a time when Finland was
undergoing drastic political transformation. The internal situation of Finland was, according to the Committee, so abnormal that, for a
considerable time, the conditions required for the formation of a sovereign State did not exist. In the midst of revolution, anarchy,
and civil war, the legitimacy of the Finnish national government was disputed by a large section of the people, and it had, in fact,
been chased from the capital and forcibly prevented from carrying out its duties. The armed camps and the police were divided into
two opposing forces. In light of these circumstances, Finland was not, during the relevant time period, a "definitively constituted"
sovereign state. The Committee, therefore, found that Finland did not possess the right to withhold from a portion of its population
the option to separate itself - a right which sovereign nations generally have with respect to their own populations.

Turning now to the more specific category of indigenous peoples, this term has been used, in scholarship as well as international,
regional, and state practices, to refer to groups with distinct cultures, histories, and connections to land (spiritual and otherwise) that
have been forcibly incorporated into a larger governing society. These groups are regarded as "indigenous" since they are the living
descendants of pre-invasion inhabitants of lands now dominated by others. Otherwise stated, indigenous peoples, nations, or
communities are culturally distinctive groups that find themselves engulfed by settler societies born of the forces of empire and
conquest.164 Examples of groups who have been regarded as indigenous peoples are the Maori of New Zealand and the aboriginal
peoples of Canada.

As with the broader category of "peoples," indigenous peoples situated within states do not have a general right to independence or
secession from those states under international law,165 but they do have rights amounting to what was discussed above as the
right to internal self-determination.

In a historic development last September 13, 2007, the UN General Assembly adopted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples (UN DRIP) through General Assembly Resolution 61/295. The vote was 143 to 4, the Philippines being
included among those in favor, and the four voting against being Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the U.S. The Declaration
clearly recognized the right of indigenous peoples to self-determination, encompassing the right to autonomy or self-government, to
wit:

Article 3

Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely
pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

Article 4

Indigenous peoples, in exercising their right to self-determination, have the right to autonomy or self-government in matters relating
to their internal and local affairs, as well as ways and means for financing their autonomous functions.

Article 5

Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and strengthen their distinct political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions,
while retaining their right to participate fully, if they so choose, in the political, economic, social and cultural life of the State.

Self-government, as used in international legal discourse pertaining to indigenous peoples, has been understood as equivalent to
"internal self-determination."166 The extent of self-determination provided for in the UN DRIP is more particularly defined in its
subsequent articles, some of which are quoted hereunder:

Article 8

1. Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right not to be subjected to forced assimilation or destruction of their culture.

2. States shall provide effective mechanisms for prevention of, and redress for:

(a) Any action which has the aim or effect of depriving them of their integrity as distinct peoples, or of their cultural values or ethnic
identities;

(b) Any action which has the aim or effect of dispossessing them of their lands, territories or resources;

(c) Any form of forced population transfer which has the aim or effect of violating or undermining any of their rights;

(d) Any form of forced assimilation or integration;

(e) Any form of propaganda designed to promote or incite racial or ethnic discrimination directed against them.

Article 21

1. Indigenous peoples have the right, without discrimination, to the improvement of their economic and social conditions, including,
inter alia, in the areas of education, employment, vocational training and retraining, housing, sanitation, health and social security.

2. States shall take effective measures and, where appropriate, special measures to ensure continuing improvement of their
economic and social conditions. Particular attention shall be paid to the rights and special needs of indigenous elders, women,
youth, children and persons with disabilities.

Article 26

1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or
otherwise used or acquired.

2. Indigenous peoples have the right to own, use, develop and control the lands, territories and resources that they possess by
reason of traditional ownership or other traditional occupation or use, as well as those which they have otherwise acquired.

3. States shall give legal recognition and protection to these lands, territories and resources. Such recognition shall be conducted
with due respect to the customs, traditions and land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples concerned.

Article 30

1. Military activities shall not take place in the lands or territories of indigenous peoples, unless justified by a relevant public interest
or otherwise freely agreed with or requested by the indigenous peoples concerned.

2. States shall undertake effective consultations with the indigenous peoples concerned, through appropriate procedures and in
particular through their representative institutions, prior to using their lands or territories for military activities.

Article 32

1. Indigenous peoples have the right to determine and develop priorities and strategies for the development or use of their lands or
territories and other resources.

2. States shall consult and cooperate in good faith with the indigenous peoples concerned through their own representative
institutions in order to obtain their free and informed consent prior to the approval of any project affecting their lands or territories
and other resources, particularly in connection with the development, utilization or exploitation of mineral, water or other resources.

3. States shall provide effective mechanisms for just and fair redress for any such activities, and appropriate measures shall be
taken to mitigate adverse environmental, economic, social, cultural or spiritual impact.

Article 37

1. Indigenous peoples have the right to the recognition, observance and enforcement of treaties, agreements and other constructive
arrangements concluded with States or their successors and to have States honour and respect such treaties, agreements and
other constructive arrangements.

2. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as diminishing or eliminating the rights of indigenous peoples contained in treaties,
agreements and other constructive arrangements.

Article 38

States in consultation and cooperation with indigenous peoples, shall take the appropriate measures, including legislative measures,
to achieve the ends of this Declaration.

Assuming that the UN DRIP, like the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, must now be regarded as embodying customary
international law - a question which the Court need not definitively resolve here - the obligations enumerated therein do not strictly
require the Republic to grant the Bangsamoro people, through the instrumentality of the BJE, the particular rights and powers
provided for in the MOA-AD. Even the more specific provisions of the UN DRIP are general in scope, allowing for flexibility in its
application by the different States.

There is, for instance, no requirement in the UN DRIP that States now guarantee indigenous peoples their own police and internal
security force. Indeed, Article 8 presupposes that it is the State which will provide protection for indigenous peoples against acts like
the forced dispossession of their lands - a function that is normally performed by police officers. If the protection of a right so
essential to indigenous people's identity is acknowledged to be the responsibility of the State, then surely the protection of rights
less significant to them as such peoples would also be the duty of States. Nor is there in the UN DRIP an acknowledgement of the
right of indigenous peoples to the aerial domain and atmospheric space. What it upholds, in Article 26 thereof, is the right of
indigenous peoples to the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or otherwise used or
acquired.

Moreover, the UN DRIP, while upholding the right of indigenous peoples to autonomy, does not obligate States to grant indigenous
peoples the near-independent status of an associated state. All the rights recognized in that document are qualified in Article 46 as
follows:

1. Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, group or person any right to engage in any
activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the United Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging any action
which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States.

Even if the UN DRIP were considered as part of the law of the land pursuant to Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, it would not
suffice to uphold the validity of the MOA-AD so as to render its compliance with other laws unnecessary.

It is, therefore, clear that the MOA-AD contains numerous provisions that cannot be reconciled with the Constitution and the laws as
presently worded. Respondents proffer, however, that the signing of the MOA-AD alone would not have entailed any violation of law
or grave abuse of discretion on their part, precisely because it stipulates that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the laws shall
not take effect until these laws are amended. They cite paragraph 7 of the MOA-AD strand on GOVERNANCE quoted earlier, but
which is reproduced below for convenience:

7. The Parties agree that the mechanisms and modalities for the actual implementation of this MOA-AD shall be spelt out in the
Comprehensive Compact to mutually take such steps to enable it to occur effectively.

Any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon signing of a
Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal framework with due regard to non derogation of
prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be contained in the Comprehensive Compact.

Indeed, the foregoing stipulation keeps many controversial provisions of the MOA-AD from coming into force until the necessary
changes to the legal framework are effected. While the word "Constitution" is not mentioned in the provision now under
consideration or anywhere else in the MOA-AD, the term "legal framework" is certainly broad enough to include the Constitution.

Notwithstanding the suspensive clause, however, respondents, by their mere act of incorporating in the MOA-AD the provisions
thereof regarding the associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government, have already violated the
Memorandum of Instructions From The President dated March 1, 2001, which states that the "negotiations shall be conducted in
accordance with x x x the principles of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines." (Emphasis
supplied) Establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is, for the reasons already
discussed, a preparation for independence, or worse, an implicit acknowledgment of an independent status already prevailing.

Even apart from the above-mentioned Memorandum, however, the MOA-AD is defective because the suspensive clause is invalid,
as discussed below.

The authority of the GRP Peace Negotiating Panel to negotiate with the MILF is founded on E.O. No. 3, Section 5(c), which states
that there shall be established Government Peace Negotiating Panels for negotiations with different rebel groups to be "appointed
by the President as her official emissaries to conduct negotiations, dialogues, and face-to-face discussions with rebel groups."
These negotiating panels are to report to the President, through the PAPP on the conduct and progress of the negotiations.

It bears noting that the GRP Peace Panel, in exploring lasting solutions to the Moro Problem through its negotiations with the MILF,
was not restricted by E.O. No. 3 only to those options available under the laws as they presently stand. One of the components of a
comprehensive peace process, which E.O. No. 3 collectively refers to as the "Paths to Peace," is the pursuit of social, economic,
and political reforms which may require new legislation or even constitutional amendments. Sec. 4(a) of E.O. No. 3, which reiterates
Section 3(a), of E.O. No. 125,167 states:

SECTION 4. The Six Paths to Peace. - The components of the comprehensive peace process comprise the processes known as
the "Paths to Peace". These component processes are interrelated and not mutually exclusive, and must therefore be pursued
simultaneously in a coordinated and integrated fashion. They shall include, but may not be limited to, the following:

a. PURSUIT OF SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL REFORMS. This component involves the vigorous implementation of
various policies, reforms, programs and projects aimed at addressing the root causes of internal armed conflicts and social unrest.
This may require administrative action, new legislation or even constitutional amendments.

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

The MOA-AD, therefore, may reasonably be perceived as an attempt of respondents to address, pursuant to this provision of E.O.
No. 3, the root causes of the armed conflict in Mindanao. The E.O. authorized them to "think outside the box," so to speak. Hence,
they negotiated and were set on signing the MOA-AD that included various social, economic, and political reforms which cannot,
however, all be accommodated within the present legal framework, and which thus would require new legislation and constitutional
amendments.

The inquiry on the legality of the "suspensive clause," however, cannot stop here, because it must be asked whether the President
herself may exercise the power delegated to the GRP Peace Panel under E.O. No. 3, Sec. 4(a).

The President cannot delegate a power that she herself does not possess. May the President, in the course of peace negotiations,
agree to pursue reforms that would require new legislation and constitutional amendments, or should the reforms be restricted only
to those solutions which the present laws allow? The answer to this question requires a discussion of the extent of the President's
power to conduct peace negotiations.

That the authority of the President to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution
does not mean that she has no such authority. In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,168 in issue was the authority of the President to
declare a state of rebellion - an authority which is not expressly provided for in the Constitution. The Court held thus:

"In her ponencia in Marcos v. Manglapus, Justice Cortes put her thesis into jurisprudence. There, the Court, by a slim 8-7 margin,
upheld the President's power to forbid the return of her exiled predecessor. The rationale for the majority's ruling rested on the
President's

. . . unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of executive power and which are necessary for her to comply with
her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the article on the
Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution. This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members
of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr.
Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific powers of the President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief
clause, but not a diminution of the general grant of executive power.

Thus, the President's authority to declare a state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and, at the
same time, draws strength from her Commander-in-Chief powers. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Similarly, the President's power to conduct peace negotiations is implicitly included in her powers as Chief Executive and
Commander-in-Chief. As Chief Executive, the President has the general responsibility to promote public peace, and as
Commander-in-Chief, she has the more specific duty to prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless violence.169

As the experience of nations which have similarly gone through internal armed conflict will show, however, peace is rarely attained
by simply pursuing a military solution. Oftentimes, changes as far-reaching as a fundamental reconfiguration of the nation's
constitutional structure is required. The observations of Dr. Kirsti Samuels are enlightening, to wit:

x x x [T]he fact remains that a successful political and governance transition must form the core of any post-conflict peace-building
mission. As we have observed in Liberia and Haiti over the last ten years, conflict cessation without modification of the political
environment, even where state-building is undertaken through technical electoral assistance and institution- or capacity-building, is
unlikely to succeed. On average, more than 50 percent of states emerging from conflict return to conflict. Moreover, a substantial
proportion of transitions have resulted in weak or limited democracies.

The design of a constitution and its constitution-making process can play an important role in the political and governance transition.
Constitution-making after conflict is an opportunity to create a common vision of the future of a state and a road map on how to get
there. The constitution can be partly a peace agreement and partly a framework setting up the rules by which the new democracy
will operate.170

In the same vein, Professor Christine Bell, in her article on the nature and legal status of peace agreements, observed that the
typical way that peace agreements establish or confirm mechanisms for demilitarization and demobilization is by linking them to new
constitutional structures addressing governance, elections, and legal and human rights institutions.171

In the Philippine experience, the link between peace agreements and constitution-making has been recognized by no less than the
framers of the Constitution. Behind the provisions of the Constitution on autonomous regions172 is the framers' intention to
implement a particular peace agreement, namely, the Tripoli Agreement of 1976 between the GRP and the MNLF, signed by then
Undersecretary of National Defense Carmelo Z. Barbero and then MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari.

MR. ROMULO. There are other speakers; so, although I have some more questions, I will reserve my right to ask them if they are
not covered by the other speakers. I have only two questions.

I heard one of the Commissioners say that local autonomy already exists in the Muslim region; it is working very well; it has, in fact,
diminished a great deal of the problems. So, my question is: since that already exists, why do we have to go into something new?

MR. OPLE. May I answer that on behalf of Chairman Nolledo. Commissioner Yusup Abubakar is right that certain definite steps
have been taken to implement the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement with respect to an autonomous region in Mindanao. This is a
good first step, but there is no question that this is merely a partial response to the Tripoli Agreement itself and to the fuller standard
of regional autonomy contemplated in that agreement, and now by state policy.173(Emphasis supplied)

The constitutional provisions on autonomy and the statutes enacted pursuant to them have, to the credit of their drafters, been partly
successful. Nonetheless, the Filipino people are still faced with the reality of an on-going conflict between the Government and the
MILF. If the President is to be expected to find means for bringing this conflict to an end and to achieve lasting peace in Mindanao,
then she must be given the leeway to explore, in the course of peace negotiations, solutions that may require changes to the
Constitution for their implementation. Being uniquely vested with the power to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups, the
President is in a singular position to know the precise nature of their grievances which, if resolved, may bring an end to hostilities.

The President may not, of course, unilaterally implement the solutions that she considers viable, but she may not be prevented from
submitting them as recommendations to Congress, which could then, if it is minded, act upon them pursuant to the legal procedures
for constitutional amendment and revision. In particular, Congress would have the option, pursuant to Article XVII, Sections 1 and 3
of the Constitution, to propose the recommended amendments or revision to the people, call a constitutional convention, or submit
to the electorate the question of calling such a convention.

While the President does not possess constituent powers - as those powers may be exercised only by Congress, a Constitutional
Convention, or the people through initiative and referendum - she may submit proposals for constitutional change to Congress in a
manner that does not involve the arrogation of constituent powers.

In Sanidad v. COMELEC,174 in issue was the legality of then President Marcos' act of directly submitting proposals for
constitutional amendments to a referendum, bypassing the interim National Assembly which was the body vested by the 1973
Constitution with the power to propose such amendments. President Marcos, it will be recalled, never convened the interim National
Assembly. The majority upheld the President's act, holding that "the urges of absolute necessity" compelled the President as the
agent of the people to act as he did, there being no interim National Assembly to propose constitutional amendments. Against this
ruling, Justices Teehankee and Muoz Palma vigorously dissented. The Court's concern at present, however, is not with regard to
the point on which it was then divided in that controversial case, but on that which was not disputed by either side.

Justice Teehankee's dissent,175 in particular, bears noting. While he disagreed that the President may directly submit proposed
constitutional amendments to a referendum, implicit in his opinion is a recognition that he would have upheld the President's action
along with the majority had the President convened the interim National Assembly and coursed his proposals through it. Thus
Justice Teehankee opined:

"Since the Constitution provides for the organization of the essential departments of government, defines and delimits the powers of
each and prescribes the manner of the exercise of such powers, and the constituent power has not been granted to but has been
withheld from the President or Prime Minister, it follows that the President's questioned decrees proposing and submitting
constitutional amendments directly to the people (without the intervention of the interim National Assembly in whom the power is
expressly vested) are devoid of constitutional and legal basis."176 (Emphasis supplied)

From the foregoing discussion, the principle may be inferred that the President - in the course of conducting peace negotiations -
may validly consider implementing even those policies that require changes to the Constitution, but she may not unilaterally
implement them without the intervention of Congress, or act in any way as if the assent of that body were assumed as a certainty.

Since, under the present Constitution, the people also have the power to directly propose amendments through initiative and
referendum, the President may also submit her recommendations to the people, not as a formal proposal to be voted on in a
plebiscite similar to what President Marcos did in Sanidad, but for their independent consideration of whether these
recommendations merit being formally proposed through initiative.

These recommendations, however, may amount to nothing more than the President's suggestions to the people, for any further
involvement in the process of initiative by the Chief Executive may vitiate its character as a genuine "people's initiative." The only
initiative recognized by the Constitution is that which truly proceeds from the people. As the Court stated in Lambino v.
COMELEC:177

"The Lambino Group claims that their initiative is the people's voice.' However, the Lambino Group unabashedly states in ULAP
Resolution No. 2006-02, in the verification of their petition with the COMELEC, that ULAP maintains its unqualified support to the
agenda of Her Excellency President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo for constitutional reforms.' The Lambino Group thus admits that their
people's' initiative is an unqualified support to the agenda' of the incumbent President to change the Constitution. This forewarns
the Court to be wary of incantations of people's voice' or sovereign will' in the present initiative."

It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office,178 only to preserve and defend the Constitution.
Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed
amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for
constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.

The foregoing discussion focused on the President's authority to propose constitutional amendments, since her authority to propose
new legislation is not in controversy. It has been an accepted practice for Presidents in this jurisdiction to propose new legislation.
One of the more prominent instances the practice is usually done is in the yearly State of the Nation Address of the President to
Congress. Moreover, the annual general appropriations bill has always been based on the budget prepared by the President, which
- for all intents and purposes - is a proposal for new legislation coming from the President.179

The "suspensive clause" in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed standards

Given the limited nature of the President's authority to propose constitutional amendments, she cannot guarantee to any third party
that the required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit
these proposals as recommendations either to Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers are vested.

Paragraph 7 on Governance of the MOA-AD states, however, that all provisions thereof which cannot be reconciled with the present
Constitution and laws "shall come into force upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes
to the legal framework." This stipulation does not bear the marks of a suspensive condition - defined in civil law as a future and
uncertain event - but of a term. It is not a question of whether the necessary changes to the legal framework will be effected, but
when. That there is no uncertainty being contemplated is plain from what follows, for the paragraph goes on to state that the
contemplated changes shall be "with due regard to non derogation of prior agreements and within the stipulated timeframe to be
contained in the Comprehensive Compact."

Pursuant to this stipulation, therefore, it is mandatory for the GRP to effect the changes to the legal framework contemplated in the
MOA-AD - which changes would include constitutional amendments, as discussed earlier. It bears noting that,

By the time these changes are put in place, the MOA-AD itself would be counted among the "prior agreements" from which there
could be no derogation.

What remains for discussion in the Comprehensive Compact would merely be the implementing details for these "consensus points"
and, notably, the deadline for effecting the contemplated changes to the legal framework.

Plainly, stipulation-paragraph 7 on GOVERNANCE is inconsistent with the limits of the President's authority to propose
constitutional amendments, it being a virtual guarantee that the Constitution and the laws of the Republic of the Philippines will
certainly be adjusted to conform to all the "consensus points" found in the MOA-AD. Hence, it must be struck down as
unconstitutional.

A comparison between the "suspensive clause" of the MOA-AD with a similar provision appearing in the 1996 final peace
agreement between the MNLF and the GRP is most instructive.

As a backdrop, the parties to the 1996 Agreement stipulated that it would be implemented in two phases. Phase I covered a three-
year transitional period involving the putting up of new administrative structures through Executive Order, such as the Special Zone
of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) and the Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), while Phase II
covered the establishment of the new regional autonomous government through amendment or repeal of R.A. No. 6734, which was
then the Organic Act of the ARMM.

The stipulations on Phase II consisted of specific agreements on the structure of the expanded autonomous region envisioned by
the parties. To that extent, they are similar to the provisions of the MOA-AD. There is, however, a crucial difference between the two
agreements. While the MOA-AD virtually guarantees that the "necessary changes to the legal framework" will be put in place, the
GRP-MNLF final peace agreement states thus: "Accordingly, these provisions [on Phase II] shall be recommended by the GRP to
Congress for incorporation in the amendatory or repealing law."

Concerns have been raised that the MOA-AD would have given rise to a binding international law obligation on the part of the
Philippines to change its Constitution in conformity thereto, on the ground that it may be considered either as a binding agreement
under international law, or a unilateral declaration of the Philippine government to the international community that it would grant to
the Bangsamoro people all the concessions therein stated. Neither ground finds sufficient support in international law, however.

The MOA-AD, as earlier mentioned in the overview thereof, would have included foreign dignitaries as signatories. In addition,
representatives of other nations were invited to witness its signing in Kuala Lumpur. These circumstances readily lead one to
surmise that the MOA-AD would have had the status of a binding international agreement had it been signed. An examination of the
prevailing principles in international law, however, leads to the contrary conclusion.

The Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Lom Accord Amnesty180 (the Lom Accord case) of the Special Court of Sierra Leone
is enlightening. The Lom Accord was a peace agreement signed on July 7, 1999 between the Government of Sierra Leone and the
Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a rebel group with which the Sierra Leone Government had been in armed conflict for around
eight years at the time of signing. There were non-contracting signatories to the agreement, among which were the Government of
the Togolese Republic, the Economic Community of West African States, and the UN.

On January 16, 2002, after a successful negotiation between the UN Secretary-General and the Sierra Leone Government, another
agreement was entered into by the UN and that Government whereby the Special Court of Sierra Leone was established. The sole
purpose of the Special Court, an international court, was to try persons who bore the greatest responsibility for serious violations of
international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since November 30, 1996.

Among the stipulations of the Lom Accord was a provision for the full pardon of the members of the RUF with respect to anything
done by them in pursuit of their objectives as members of that organization since the conflict began.

In the Lom Accord case, the Defence argued that the Accord created an internationally binding obligation not to prosecute the
beneficiaries of the amnesty provided therein, citing, among other things, the participation of foreign dignitaries and international
organizations in the finalization of that agreement. The Special Court, however, rejected this argument, ruling that the Lome Accord
is not a treaty and that it can only create binding obligations and rights between the parties in municipal law, not in international law.
Hence, the Special Court held, it is ineffective in depriving an international court like it of jurisdiction.

"37. In regard to the nature of a negotiated settlement of an internal armed conflict it is easy to assume and to argue with some
degree of plausibility, as Defence counsel for the defendants seem to have done, that the mere fact that in addition to the parties to
the conflict, the document formalizing the settlement is signed by foreign heads of state or their representatives and representatives
of international organizations, means the agreement of the parties is internationalized so as to create obligations in international law.

x x x x

40. Almost every conflict resolution will involve the parties to the conflict and the mediator or facilitator of the settlement, or persons
or bodies under whose auspices the settlement took place but who are not at all parties to the conflict, are not contracting parties
and who do not claim any obligation from the contracting parties or incur any obligation from the settlement.

41. In this case, the parties to the conflict are the lawful authority of the State and the RUF which has no status of statehood and is
to all intents and purposes a faction within the state. The non-contracting signatories of the Lom Agreement were moral guarantors
of the principle that, in the terms of Article XXXIV of the Agreement, "this peace agreement is implemented with integrity and in good
faith by both parties". The moral guarantors assumed no legal obligation. It is recalled that the UN by its representative appended,
presumably for avoidance of doubt, an understanding of the extent of the agreement to be implemented as not including certain
international crimes.

42. An international agreement in the nature of a treaty must create rights and obligations regulated by international law so that a
breach of its terms will be a breach determined under international law which will also provide principle means of enforcement. The
Lom Agreement created neither rights nor obligations capable of being regulated by international law. An agreement such as the
Lom Agreement which brings to an end an internal armed conflict no doubt creates a factual situation of restoration of peace that
the international community acting through the Security Council may take note of. That, however, will not convert it to an
international agreement which creates an obligation enforceable in international, as distinguished from municipal, law. A breach of
the terms of such a peace agreement resulting in resumption of internal armed conflict or creating a threat to peace in the
determination of the Security Council may indicate a reversal of the factual situation of peace to be visited with possible legal
consequences arising from the new situation of conflict created. Such consequences such as action by the Security Council
pursuant to Chapter VII arise from the situation and not from the agreement, nor from the obligation imposed by it. Such action
cannot be regarded as a remedy for the breach. A peace agreement which settles an internal armed conflict cannot be ascribed the
same status as one which settles an international armed conflict which, essentially, must be between two or more warring States.
The Lom Agreement cannot be characterised as an international instrument. x x x" (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

Similarly, that the MOA-AD would have been signed by representatives of States and international organizations not parties to the
Agreement would not have sufficed to vest in it a binding character under international law.

In another vein, concern has been raised that the MOA-AD would amount to a unilateral declaration of the Philippine State, binding
under international law, that it would comply with all the stipulations stated therein, with the result that it would have to amend its
Constitution accordingly regardless of the true will of the people. Cited as authority for this view is Australia v. France,181 also
known as the Nuclear Tests Case, decided by the International Court of Justice (ICJ).

In the Nuclear Tests Case, Australia challenged before the ICJ the legality of France's nuclear tests in the South Pacific. France
refused to appear in the case, but public statements from its President, and similar statements from other French officials including
its Minister of Defence, that its 1974 series of atmospheric tests would be its last, persuaded the ICJ to dismiss the case.182 Those
statements, the ICJ held, amounted to a legal undertaking addressed to the international community, which required no acceptance
from other States for it to become effective.

Essential to the ICJ ruling is its finding that the French government intended to be bound to the international community in issuing its
public statements, viz:

43. It is well recognized that declarations made by way of unilateral acts, concerning legal or factual situations, may have the effect
of creating legal obligations. Declarations of this kind may be, and often are, very specific. When it is the intention of the State
making the declaration that it should become bound according to its terms, that intention confers on the declaration the character of
a legal undertaking, the State being thenceforth legally required to follow a course of conduct consistent with the declaration. An
undertaking of this kind, if given publicly, and with an intent to be bound, even though not made within the context of international
negotiations, is binding. In these circumstances, nothing in the nature of a quid pro quo nor any subsequent acceptance of the
declaration, nor even any reply or reaction from other States, is required for the declaration to take effect, since such a requirement
would be inconsistent with the strictly unilateral nature of the juridical act by which the pronouncement by the State was made.

44. Of course, not all unilateral acts imply obligation; but a State may choose to take up a certain position in relation to a particular
matter with the intention of being bound-the intention is to be ascertained by interpretation of the act. When States make statements
by which their freedom of action is to be limited, a restrictive interpretation is called for.

x x x x

51. In announcing that the 1974 series of atmospheric tests would be the last, the French Government conveyed to the world at
large, including the Applicant, its intention effectively to terminate these tests. It was bound to assume that other States might take
note of these statements and rely on their being effective. The validity of these statements and their legal consequences must be
considered within the general framework of the security of international intercourse, and the confidence and trust which are so
essential in the relations among States. It is from the actual substance of these statements, and from the circumstances attending
their making, that the legal implications of the unilateral act must be deduced. The objects of these statements are clear and they
were addressed to the international community as a whole, and the Court holds that they constitute an undertaking possessing legal
effect. The Court considers *270 that the President of the Republic, in deciding upon the effective cessation of atmospheric tests,
gave an undertaking to the international community to which his words were addressed. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As gathered from the above-quoted ruling of the ICJ, public statements of a state representative may be construed as a unilateral
declaration only when the following conditions are present: the statements were clearly addressed to the international community,
the state intended to be bound to that community by its statements, and that not to give legal effect to those statements would be
detrimental to the security of international intercourse. Plainly, unilateral declarations arise only in peculiar circumstances.

The limited applicability of the Nuclear Tests Case ruling was recognized in a later case decided by the ICJ entitled Burkina Faso v.
Mali,183 also known as the Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute. The public declaration subject of that case was a statement
made by the President of Mali, in an interview by a foreign press agency, that Mali would abide by the decision to be issued by a
commission of the Organization of African Unity on a frontier dispute then pending between Mali and Burkina Faso.

Unlike in the Nuclear Tests Case, the ICJ held that the statement of Mali's President was not a unilateral act with legal implications.
It clarified that its ruling in the Nuclear Tests case rested on the peculiar circumstances surrounding the French declaration subject
thereof, to wit:

40. In order to assess the intentions of the author of a unilateral act, account must be taken of all the factual circumstances in which
the act occurred. For example, in the Nuclear Tests cases, the Court took the view that since the applicant States were not the only
ones concerned at the possible continuance of atmospheric testing by the French Government, that Government's unilateral
declarations had conveyed to the world at large, including the Applicant, its intention effectively to terminate these tests (I.C.J.
Reports 1974, p. 269, para. 51; p. 474, para. 53). In the particular circumstances of those cases, the French Government could not
express an intention to be bound otherwise than by unilateral declarations. It is difficult to see how it could have accepted the terms
of a negotiated solution with each of the applicants without thereby jeopardizing its contention that its conduct was lawful. The
circumstances of the present case are radically different. Here, there was nothing to hinder the Parties from manifesting an intention
to accept the binding character of the conclusions of the Organization of African Unity Mediation Commission by the normal method:
a formal agreement on the basis of reciprocity. Since no agreement of this kind was concluded between the Parties, the Chamber
finds that there are no grounds to interpret the declaration made by Mali's head of State on 11 April 1975 as a unilateral act with
legal implications in regard to the present case. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Assessing the MOA-AD in light of the above criteria, it would not have amounted to a unilateral declaration on the part of the
Philippine State to the international community. The Philippine panel did not draft the same with the clear intention of being bound
thereby to the international community as a whole or to any State, but only to the MILF. While there were States and international
organizations involved, one way or another, in the negotiation and projected signing of the MOA-AD, they participated merely as
witnesses or, in the case of Malaysia, as facilitator. As held in the Lom Accord case, the mere fact that in addition to the parties to
the conflict, the peace settlement is signed by representatives of states and international organizations does not mean that the
agreement is internationalized so as to create obligations in international law.

Since the commitments in the MOA-AD were not addressed to States, not to give legal effect to such commitments would not be
detrimental to the security of international intercourse - to the trust and confidence essential in the relations among States.

In one important respect, the circumstances surrounding the MOA-AD are closer to that of Burkina Faso wherein, as already
discussed, the Mali President's statement was not held to be a binding unilateral declaration by the ICJ. As in that case, there was
also nothing to hinder the Philippine panel, had it really been its intention to be bound to other States, to manifest that intention by
formal agreement. Here, that formal agreement would have come about by the inclusion in the MOA-AD of a clear commitment to
be legally bound to the international community, not just the MILF, and by an equally clear indication that the signatures of the
participating states-representatives would constitute an acceptance of that commitment. Entering into such a formal agreement
would not have resulted in a loss of face for the Philippine government before the international community, which was one of the
difficulties that prevented the French Government from entering into a formal agreement with other countries. That the Philippine
panel did not enter into such a formal agreement suggests that it had no intention to be bound to the international community. On
that ground, the MOA-AD may not be considered a unilateral declaration under international law.

The MOA-AD not being a document that can bind the Philippines under international law notwithstanding, respondents' almost
consummated act of guaranteeing amendments to the legal framework is, by itself, sufficient to constitute grave abuse of discretion.
The grave abuse lies not in the fact that they considered, as a solution to the Moro Problem, the creation of a state within a state,
but in their brazen willingness to guarantee that Congress and the sovereign Filipino people would give their imprimatur to their
solution. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a
Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure
the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with that process.

The sovereign people may, if it so desired, go to the extent of giving up a portion of its own territory to the Moros for the sake of
peace, for it can change the Constitution in any it wants, so long as the change is not inconsistent with what, in international law, is
known as Jus Cogens.184 Respondents, however, may not preempt it in that decision.

SUMMARY

The petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of respondents to consult the local government units or communities affected
constitutes a departure by respondents from their mandate under E.O. No. 3. Moreover, respondents exceeded their authority by
the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of government
is a proper matter for judicial review.

As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public interest or of transcendental importance, the Court
grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping with the liberal
stance adopted in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo.

Contrary to the assertion of respondents that the non-signing of the MOA-AD and the eventual dissolution of the GRP Peace Panel
mooted the present petitions, the Court finds that the present petitions provide an exception to the "moot and academic" principle in
view of (a) the grave violation of the Constitution involved; (b) the exceptional character of the situation and paramount public
interest; (c) the need to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and (d) the fact that the case is
capable of repetition yet evading review.

The MOA-AD is a significant part of a series of agreements necessary to carry out the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace
signed by the government and the MILF back in June 2001. Hence, the present MOA-AD can be renegotiated or another one drawn
up that could contain similar or significantly dissimilar provisions compared to the original.

The Court, however, finds that the prayers for mandamus have been rendered moot in view of the respondents' action in providing
the Court and the petitioners with the official copy of the final draft of the MOA-AD and its annexes.

The people's right to information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Article III of the Constitution is in splendid symmetry
with the state policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest under Sec. 28, Article II of the Constitution.
The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while Section 28 recognizes the duty of
officialdom to give information even if nobody demands. The complete and effective exercise of the right to information necessitates
that its complementary provision on public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable safeguards
or limitations as may be provided by law.

The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving public interest in the highest order. In declaring that
the right to information contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract, jurisprudence finds no
distinction as to the executory nature or commercial character of the agreement.

An essential element of these twin freedoms is to keep a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government
and the people. Corollary to these twin rights is the design for feedback mechanisms. The right to public consultation was
envisioned to be a species of these public rights.

At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutional imperatives and justify the exercise of the people's right to be consulted on
relevant matters relating to the peace agenda.

One, E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels and for a principal
forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular dialogues to
seek relevant information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.

Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all national offices to conduct consultations before any
project or program critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group
of people residing in such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally
vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or
displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment.

Three, Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and
delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the
Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department or any
government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.

The invocation of the doctrine of executive privilege as a defense to the general right to information or the specific right to
consultation is untenable. The various explicit legal provisions fly in the face of executive secrecy. In any event, respondents
effectively waived such defense after it unconditionally disclosed the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD, for judicial
compliance and public scrutiny.

In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent
consultation process, as mandated by E.O. No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The furtive process by which
the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious,
oppressive, arbitrary and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the
duty enjoined.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept
underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the
concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence.

While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be
effective until that framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing
an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions
From The President dated March 1, 2001, addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually
guarantees that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace
Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a
usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the
process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue
influence or interference with that process.

While the MOA-AD would not amount to an international agreement or unilateral declaration binding on the Philippines under
international law, respondents' act of guaranteeing amendments is, by itself, already a constitutional violation that renders the MOA-
AD fatally defective.

WHEREFORE, respondents' motion to dismiss is DENIED. The main and intervening petitions are GIVEN DUE COURSE and
hereby GRANTED.

The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 is declared
contrary to law and the Constitution.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-9959 December 13, 1916

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, represented by the Treasurer of the Philippine Islands, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EL MONTE DE PIEDAD Y CAJA DE AHORRAS DE MANILA, defendant-appellant.

William A. Kincaid and Thomas L. Hartigan for appellant.
Attorney-General Avancea for appellee.



TRENT, J.:

About $400,000, were subscribed and paid into the treasury of the Philippine Islands by the inhabitants of the Spanish Dominions of
the relief of those damaged by the earthquake which took place in the Philippine Islands on June 3, 1863. Subsequent thereto and
on October 6 of that year, a central relief board was appointed, by authority of the King of Spain, to distribute the moneys thus
voluntarily contributed. After a thorough investigation and consideration, the relief board allotted $365,703.50 to the various sufferers
named in its resolution, dated September 22, 1866, and, by order of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, a list of these
allotments, together with the names of those entitled thereto, was published in the Official Gazette of Manila dated April 7, 1870.
There was later distributed, inaccordance with the above-mentioned allotments, the sum of $30,299.65, leaving a balance of
S365,403.85 for distribution. Upon the petition of the governing body of the Monte de Piedad, dated February 1, 1833, the Philippine
Government, by order dated the 1st of that month, directed its treasurer to turn over to the Monte de Piedad the sum of $80,000 of
the relief fund in installments of $20,000 each. These amounts were received on the following dates: February 15, March 12, April
14, and June 2, 1883, and are still in the possession of the Monte de Piedad. On account of various petitions of the persons, and
heirs of others to whom the above-mentioned allotments were made by the central relief board for the payment of those amounts,
the Philippine Islands to bring suit against the Monte de Piedad a recover, "through the Attorney-General and in representation of
the Government of the Philippine Islands," the $80.000, together with interest, for the benefit of those persons or their heirs
appearing in the list of names published in the Official Gazette instituted on May 3, 1912, by the Government of the Philippine
Islands, represented by the Insular Treasurer, and after due trial, judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of
$80,000 gold or its equivalent in Philippine currency, together with legal interest from February 28, 1912, and the costs of the cause.
The defendant appealed and makes the following assignment of errors:

1. The court erred in not finding that the eighty thousand dollars ($80,000), give to the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros,
were so given as a donation subject to one condition, to wit: the return of such sum of money to the Spanish Government of these
Islands, within eight days following the day when claimed, in case the Supreme Government of Spain should not approve the action
taken by the former government.

2. The court erred in not having decreed that this donation had been cleared; said eighty thousand dollars ($80,000) being at
present the exclusive property of the appellant the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros.

3. That the court erred in stating that the Government of the Philippine Islands has subrogated the Spanish Government in
its rights, as regards an important sum of money resulting from a national subscription opened by reason of the earthquake of June
3, 1863, in these Island.

4. That the court erred in not declaring that Act Numbered 2109, passed by the Philippine Legislature on January 30, 1912,
is unconstitutional.

5. That the court erred in holding in its decision that there is no title for the prescription of this suit brought by the Insular
Government against the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros for the reimbursement of the eighty thousand dollars ($80,000) given
to it by the late Spanish Government of these Islands.

6. That the court erred in sentencing the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros to reimburse the Philippine Government in the
sum of eighty thousand dollars ($80,000) gold coin, or the equivalent thereof in the present legal tender currency in circulation, with
legal interest thereon from February 28th, 1912, and the costs of this suit.

In the royal order of June 29, 1879, the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands was directed to inform the home Government in
what manner the indemnity might be paid to which, by virtue of the resolutions of the relief board, the persons who suffered damage
by the earthquake might be entitled, in order to perform the sacred obligation which the Government of Spain had assumed toward
the donors.

The next pertinent document in order is the defendant's petition, dated February 1, 1883, addressed to the Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands, which reads:

Board of Directors of the Monte de Piedad of Manila Presidencia.

Excellency: The Board of Directors of the Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros of Manila informs your Excellency, First: That the
funds which it has up to the present been able to dispose of have been exhausted in loans on jewelry, and there only remains the
sum of one thousand and odd pesos, which will be expended between to-day and day after tomorrow. Second: That, to maintain the
credit of the establishment, which would be greatly injured were its operations suspended, it is necessary to procure money. Third:
That your Excellency has proposed to His Majesty's Government to apply to the funds of the Monte de Piedad a part of the funds
held in the treasury derived form the national subscription for the relief of the distress caused by the earthquake of 1863. Fourth:
That in the public treasury there is held at the disposal of the central earthquake relief board over $1090,000 which was deposited in
the said treasury by order of your general Government, it having been transferred thereto from the Spanish-Filipino Bank where it
had been held. fifth: That in the straightened circumstances of the moment, your Excellency can, to avert impending disaster to the
Monte de Piedad, order that, out of that sum of one hundred thousand pesos held in the Treasury at the disposal of the central relief
board, there be transferred to the Monte de Piedad the sum of $80,000, there to be held under the same conditions as at present in
the Treasury, to wit, at the disposal of the Relief Board. Sixth: That should this transfer not be approved for any reason, either
because of the failure of His Majesty's Government to approve the proposal made by your Excellency relative to the application to
the needs of the Monte de Piedad of a pat of the subscription intended to believe the distress caused by the earthquake of 1863, or
for any other reason, the board of directors of the Monte de Piedad obligates itself to return any sums which it may have received on
account of the eighty thousand pesos, or the whole thereof, should it have received the same, by securing a loan from whichever
bank or banks may lend it the money at the cheapest rate upon the security of pawned jewelry. This is an urgent measure to
save the Monte de Piedad in the present crisis and the board of directors trusts to secure your Excellency's entire cooperation and
that of the other officials who have take part in the transaction.

The Governor-General's resolution on the foregoing petition is as follows:

GENERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES.
MANILA, February 1, 1883.

In view of the foregoing petition addressed to me by the board of directors of the Monte de Piedad of this city, in which it is stated
that the funds which the said institution counted upon are nearly all invested in loans on jewelry and that the small account
remaining will scarcely suffice to cover the transactions of the next two days, for which reason it entreats the general Government
that, in pursuance of its telegraphic advice to H. M. Government, the latter direct that there be turned over to said Monte de Piedad
$80,000 out of the funds in the public treasury obtained from the national subscription for the relief of the distress caused by the
earthquake of 1863, said board obligating itself to return this sum should H. M. Government, for any reason, not approve the said
proposal, and for this purpose it will procure funds by means of loans raised on pawned jewelry; it stated further that if the aid so
solicited is not furnished, it will be compelled to suspend operations, which would seriously injure the credit of so beneficient an
institution; and in view of the report upon the matter made by the Intendencia General de Hacienda; and considering the fact that the
public treasury has on hand a much greater sum from the source mentioned than that solicited; and considering that this general
Government has submitted for the determination of H. M. Government that the balance which, after strictly applying the proceeds
obtained from the subscription referred to, may remain as a surplus should be delivered to the Monte de Piedad, either as a
donation, or as a loan upon the security of the credit of the institution, believing that in so doing the wishes of the donors would be
faithfully interpreted inasmuch as those wishes were no other than to relieve distress, an act of charity which is exercised in the
highest degree by the Monte de Piedad, for it liberates needy person from the pernicious effects of usury; and

Considering that the lofty purposes that brought about the creation of the pious institution referred to would be frustrated, and that
the great and laudable work of its establishment, and that the great and laudable and valuable if the aid it urgently seeks is not
granted, since the suspension of its operations would seriously and regrettably damage the ever-growing credit of the Monte de
Piedad; and

Considering that if such a thing would at any time cause deep distress in the public mind, it might be said that at the present juncture
it would assume the nature of a disturbance of public order because of the extreme poverty of the poorer classes resulting from the
late calamities, and because it is the only institution which can mitigate the effects of such poverty; and

Considering that no reasonable objection can be made to granting the request herein contained, for the funds in question are
sufficiently secured in the unlikely event that H> M. Government does not approve the recommendation mentioned, this general
Government, in the exercise of the extraordinary powers conferred upon it and in conformity with the report of the Intendencia de
Hacienda, resolves as follows:

First. Authority is hereby given to deliver to the Monte de Piedad, out of the sum held in the public treasury of these Islands obtained
from the national subscription opened by reason of the earthquakes of 1863, amounts up to the sum $80,000, as its needs may
require, in installments of $20,000.

Second. The board of directors of the Monte de Piedad is solemnly bound to return, within eight days after demand, the sums it may
have so received, if H. M. Government does not approve this resolution.

Third. The Intendencia General de Hacienda shall forthwith, and in preference to all other work, proceed to prepare the necessary
papers so that with the least possible delay the payment referred to may be made and the danger that menaces the Monte de
Piedad of having to suspend its operations may be averted.

H. M. Government shall be advised hereof.lawphi1.net
(Signed) P. DE RIVERA.

By the royal order of December 3, 1892, the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands was ordered to "inform this ministerio what
is the total sum available at the present time, taking into consideration the sums delivered to the Monte de Piedad pursuant to the
decree issued by your general Government on February 1, 1883," and after the rights of the claimants, whose names were
published in the Official Gazette of Manila on April 7, 1870, and their heirs had been established, as therein provided, as such
persons "have an unquestionable right to be paid the donations assigned to them therein, your general Government shall convoke
them all within a reasonable period and shall pay their shares to such as shall identify themselves, without regard to their financial
status," and finally "that when all the proceedings and operations herein mentioned have been concluded and the Government can
consider itself free from all kinds of claims on the part of those interested in the distribution of the funds deposited in the vaults of the
Treasury, such action may be taken as the circumstances shall require, after first consulting the relief board and your general
Government and taking account of what sums have been delivered to the Monte de Piedad and those that were expended in 1888
to relieve public calamities," and "in order that all the points in connection with the proceedings had as a result of the earthquake be
clearly understood, it is indispensable that the offices hereinbefore mentioned comply with the provisions contained in paragraphs 2
and 3 of the royal order of June 25, 1879." On receipt of this Finance order by the Governor-General, the Department of Finance
was called upon for a report in reference to the $80,000 turned over to the defendant, and that Department's report to the Governor-
General dated June 28, 1893, reads:

Intendencia General de Hacienda de Filipinas (General Treasury of the Philippines) Excellency. By Royal Order No. 1044 of
December 3, last, it is provided that the persons who sustained losses by the earthquakes that occurred in your capital in the year
1863 shall be paid the amounts allotted to them out of the sums sent from Spain for this purpose, with observance of the rules
specified in the said royal order, one of them being that before making the payment to the interested parties the assets shall be
reduced to money. These assets, during the long period of time that has elapsed since they were turned over to the Treasury of the
Philippine Islands, were used to cover the general needs of the appropriation, a part besides being invested in the relief of charitable
institutions and another part to meet pressing needs occasioned by public calamities. On January 30, last, your Excellency was
please to order the fulfillment of that sovereign mandate and referred the same to this Intendencia for its information and the
purposes desired (that is, for compliance with its directions and, as aforesaid, one of these being the liquidation, recovery, and
deposit with the Treasury of the sums paid out of that fund and which were expended in a different way from that intended by the
donors) and this Intendencia believed the moment had arrived to claim from the board of directors of the Monte de Piedad y Caja de
Ahorros the sum of 80,000 pesos which, by decree of your general Government of the date of February 1, 1883, was loaned to it out
of the said funds, the (Monte de Piedad) obligating itself to return the same within the period of eight days if H. M. Government did
not approve the delivery. On this Intendencia's demanding from the Monte de Piedad the eighty thousand pesos, thus complying
with the provisions of the Royal Order, it was to be supposed that no objection to its return would be made by the Monte de Piedad
for, when it received the loan, it formally engaged itself to return it; and, besides, it was indisputable that the moment to do so had
arrived, inasmuch as H. M. Government, in ordering that the assets of the earthquake relief fund should he collected, makes
express mention of the 80,000 pesos loaned to the Monte de Piedad, without doubt considering as sufficient the period of ten years
during which it has been using this large sum which lawfully belongs to their persons. This Intendencia also supposed that the
Monte de Piedad no longer needed the amount of that loan, inasmuch as, far from investing it in beneficient transactions, it had
turned the whole amount into the voluntary deposit funds bearing 5 per cent interests, the result of this operation being that the
debtor loaned to the creditor on interest what the former had gratuitously received. But the Monte de Piedad, instead of fulfilling the
promise it made on receiving the sum, after repeated demands refused to return the money on the ground that only your Excellency,
and not the Intendencia (Treasury), is entitled to order the reimbursement, taking no account of the fact that this Intendencia was
acting in the discharge of a sovereign command, the fulfillment of which your Excellency was pleased to order; and on the further
ground that the sum of 80,000 pesos which it received from the fund intended for the earthquake victims was not received as a loan,
but as a donation, this in the opinion of this Intendencia, erroneously interpreting both the last royal order which directed the
apportionment of the amount of the subscription raised in the year 1863 and the superior decree which granted the loan, inasmuch
as in this letter no donation is made to the Monte de Piedad of the 80,000 pesos, but simply a loan; besides, no donation whatever
could be made of funds derived from a private subscription raised for a specific purpose, which funds are already distributed and the
names of the beneficiaries have been published in the Gaceta, there being lacking only the mere material act of the delivery, which
has been unduly delayed. In view of the unexpected reply made by the Monte de Piedad, and believing it useless to insist further in
the matter of the claim for the aforementioned loan, or to argue in support thereof, this Intendencia believes the intervention of your
Excellency necessary in this matter, if the royal Order No. 1044 of December 3, last, is to be complied with, and for this purpose I
beg your Excellency kindly to order the Monte de Piedad to reimburse within the period of eight days the 80,000 which it owes, and
that you give this Intendencia power to carry out the provisions of the said royal order. I must call to the attention of your Excellency
that the said pious establishment, during the last few days and after demand was made upon it, has endorsed to the Spanish-
Filipino Bank nearly the whole of the sum which it had on deposit in the general deposit funds.

The record in the case under consideration fails to disclose any further definite action taken by either the Philippine Government or
the Spanish Government in regard to the $80,000 turned over to the Monte de Piedad.

In the defendant's general ledger the following entries appear: "Public Treasury: February 15, 1883, $20,000; March 12, 1883,
$20,000; April 14, 1883, $20,000; June 2, 1883, $20,000, total $80,000." The book entry for this total is as follows: "To the public
Treasury derived from the subscription for the earthquake of 1863, $80,000 received from general Treasury as a returnable loan,
and without interest." The account was carried in this manner until January 1, 1899, when it was closed by transferring the amount
to an account called "Sagrada Mitra," which latter account was a loan of $15,000 made to the defendant by the Archbishop of
Manila, without interest, thereby placing the "Sagrada Mitra" account at $95,000 instead of $15,000. The above-mentioned journal
entry for January 1, 1899, reads: "Sagrada Mitra and subscription, balance of these two account which on this date are united in
accordance with an order of the Exmo. Sr. Presidente of the Council transmitted verbally to the Presidente Gerente of these
institutions, $95,000."

On March 16, 1902, the Philippine government called upon the defendant for information concerning the status of the $80,000 and
received the following reply:

MANILA, March 31, 1902.

To the Attorney-General of the Department of Justice of the Philippine Islands.

SIR: In reply to your courteous letter of the 16th inst., in which you request information from this office as to when and for what
purpose the Spanish Government delivered to the Monte de Piedad eighty thousand pesos obtained from the subscription opened
in connection with the earthquake of 1863, as well as any other information that might be useful for the report which your office is
called upon to furnish, I must state to your department that the books kept in these Pious Institutions, and which have been
consulted for the purpose, show that on the 15th of February, 1883, they received as a reimbursable loan and without interest,
twenty thousand pesos, which they deposited with their own funds. On the same account and on each of the dates of March 12,
April 14 and June 2 of the said year, 1883, they also received and turned into their funds a like sum of twenty thousand pesos,
making a total of eighty thousand pesos. (Signed) Emilio Moreta.

I hereby certify that the foregoing is a literal copy of that found in the letter book No. 2 of those Pious Institutions.

Manila, November 19, 1913
(Sgd.) EMILIO LAZCANOTEGUI,
Secretary

(Sgd.) O. K. EMILIO MORETA,
Managing Director.

The foregoing documentary evidence shows the nature of the transactions which took place between the Government of Spain and
the Philippine Government on the one side and the Monte de Piedad on the other, concerning the $80,000. The Monte de Piedad,
after setting forth in its petition to the Governor-General its financial condition and its absolute necessity for more working capital,
asked that out of the sum of $100,000 held in the Treasury of the Philippine Islands, at the disposal of the central relief board, there
be transferred to it the sum of $80,000 to be held under the same conditions, to wit, "at the disposal of the relief board." The Monte
de Piedad agreed that if the transfer of these funds should not be approved by the Government of Spain, the same would be
returned forthwith. It did not ask that the $80,000 be given to it as a donation. The Governor-General, after reciting the substance of
the petition, stated that "this general Government has submitted for the determination of H. M. Government that the balance which,
after strictly applying the proceeds obtained from the subscription referred to, may remain as a surplus, should be delivered to the
Monte de Piedad, either as a donation, or as a loan upon the security of the credit of the institution," and "considering that no
reasonable objection can be made to granting the request herein contained," directed the transfer of the $80,000 to be made with
the understanding that "the Board of Directors of the Monte de Piedad is solemnly bound to return, within eight days after demand,
the sums it may have so received, if H. M. Government does not approve this resolution." It will be noted that the first and only time
the word "donation" was used in connection with the $80,000 appears in this resolution of the Governor-General. It may be inferred
from the royal orders that the Madrid Government did tacitly approve of the transfer of the $80,000 to the Monte de Piedad as a loan
without interest, but that Government certainly did not approve such transfer as a donation for the reason that the Governor-General
was directed by the royal order of December 3, 1892, to inform the Madrid Government of the total available sum of the earthquake
fund, "taking into consideration the sums delivered to the Monte de Piedad pursuant to the decree issued by your general
Government on February 1, 1883." This language, nothing else appearing, might admit of the interpretation that the Madrid
Government did not intend that the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands should include the $80,000 in the total available sum,
but when considered in connection with the report of the Department of Finance there can be no doubt that it was so intended. That
report refers expressly to the royal order of December 3d, and sets forth in detail the action taken in order to secure the return of the
$80,000. The Department of Finance, acting under the orders of the Governor-General, understood that the $80,000 was
transferred to the Monte de Piedad well knew that it received this sum as a loan interest." The amount was thus carried in its books
until January, 1899, when it was transferred to the account of the "Sagrada Mitra" and was thereafter known as the "Sagrada Mitra
and subscription account." Furthermore, the Monte de Piedad recognized and considered as late as March 31, 1902, that it received
the $80,000 "as a returnable loan, and without interest." Therefore, there cannot be the slightest doubt the fact that the Monte de
Piedad received the $80,000 as a mere loan or deposit and not as a donation. Consequently, the first alleged error is entirely
without foundation.

Counsel for the defendant, in support of their third assignment of error, say in their principal brief that:

The Spanish nation was professedly Roman Catholic and its King enjoyed the distinction of being deputy ex officio of the Holy See
and Apostolic Vicar-General of the Indies, and as such it was his duty to protect all pious works and charitable institutions in his
kingdoms, especially those of the Indies; among the latter was the Monte de Piedad of the Philippines, of which said King and his
deputy the Governor-General of the Philippines, as royal vice-patron, were, in a special and peculiar manner, the protectors; the
latter, as a result of the cession of the Philippine Islands, Implicitly renounced this high office and tacitly returned it to the Holy See,
now represented by the Archbishop of Manila; the national subscription in question was a kind of foundation or pious work, for a
charitable purpose in these Islands; and the entire subscription not being needed for its original purpose, the royal vice-patron, with
the consent of the King, gave the surplus thereof to an analogous purpose; the fulfillment of all these things involved, in the majority,
if not in all cases, faithful compliance with the duty imposed upon him by the Holy See, when it conferred upon him the royal
patronage of the Indies, a thing that touched him very closely in his conscience and religion; the cessionary Government though
Christian, was not Roman Catholic and prided itself on its policy of non-interference in religious matters, and inveterately maintained
a complete separation between the ecclesiastical and civil powers.

In view of these circumstances it must be quite clear that, even without the express provisions of the Treaty of Paris, which
apparently expressly exclude such an idea, it did not befit the honor of either of the contracting parties to subrogate to the American
Government in lieu of the Spanish Government anything respecting the disposition of the funds delivered by the latter to the Monte
de Piedad. The same reasons that induced the Spanish Government to take over such things would result in great inconvenience to
the American Government in attempting to do so. The question was such a delicate one, for the reason that it affected the
conscience, deeply religious, of the King of Spain, that it cannot be believed that it was ever his intention to confide the exercise
thereof to a Government like the American. (U. S. vs. Arredondo, 6 Pet. [U. S.], 711.)

It is thus seen that the American Government did not subrogate the Spanish Government or rather, the King of Spain, in this regard;
and as the condition annexed to the donation was lawful and possible of fulfillment at the time the contract was made, but became
impossible of fulfillment by the cession made by the Spanish Government in these Islands, compliance therewith is excused and the
contract has been cleared thereof.

The contention of counsel, as thus stated, in untenable for two reason, (1) because such contention is based upon the erroneous
theory that the sum in question was a donation to the Monte de Piedad and not a loan, and (2) because the charity founded by the
donations for the earthquake sufferers is not and never was intended to be an ecclesiastical pious work. The first proposition has
already been decided adversely to the defendant's contention. As to the second, the record shows clearly that the fund was given by
the donors for a specific and definite purpose the relief of the earthquake sufferers and for no other purpose. The money was
turned over to the Spanish Government to be devoted to that purpose. The Spanish Government remitted the money to the
Philippine Government to be distributed among the suffers. All officials, including the King of Spain and the Governor-General of the
Philippine Islands, who took part in the disposal of the fund, acted in their purely civil, official capacity, and the fact that they might
have belonged to a certain church had nothing to do with their acts in this matter. The church, as such, had nothing to do with the
fund in any way whatever until the $80,000 reached the coffers of the Monte de Piedad (an institution under the control of the
church) as a loan or deposit. If the charity in question had been founded as an ecclesiastical pious work, the King of Spain and the
Governor-General, in their capacities as vicar-general of the Indies and as royal vice-patron, respectively, would have disposed of
the fund as such and not in their civil capacities, and such functions could not have been transferred to the present Philippine
Government, because the right to so act would have arisen out of the special agreement between the Government of Spain and the
Holy See, based on the union of the church and state which was completely separated with the change of sovereignty.

And in their supplemental brief counsel say:

By the conceded facts the money in question is part of a charitable subscription. The donors were persons in Spain, the trustee was
the Spanish Government, the donees, the cestuis que trustent, were certain persons in the Philippine Islands. The whole matter is
one of trusteeship. This is undisputed and indisputable. It follows that the Spanish Government at no time was the owner of the
fund. Not being the owner of the fund it could not transfer the ownership. Whether or not it could transfer its trusteeship it certainly
never has expressly done so and the general terms of property transfer in the Treaty of Paris are wholly insufficient for such a
purpose even could Spain have transferred its trusteeship without the consent of the donors and even could the United States, as a
Government, have accepted such a trust under any power granted to it by the thirteen original States in the Constitution, which is
more than doubtful. It follows further that this Government is not a proper party to the action. The only persons who could claim to
be damaged by this payment to the Monte, if it was unlawful, are the donors or the cestuis que trustent, and this Government is
neither.

If "the whole matter is one of trusteeship," and it being true that the Spanish Government could not, as counsel say, transfer the
ownership of the fund to the Monte de Piedad, the question arises, who may sue to recover this loan? It needs no argument to show
that the Spanish or Philippine Government, as trustee, could maintain an action for this purpose had there been no change of
sovereignty and if the right of action has not prescribed. But those governments were something more than mere common law
trustees of the fund. In order to determine their exact status with reference to this fund, it is necessary to examine the law in force at
the time there transactions took place, which are the law of June 20, 1894, the royal decree of April 27. 1875, and the instructions
promulgated on the latter date. These legal provisions were applicable to the Philippine Islands (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil.
Rep., 34)

The funds collected as a result of the national subscription opened in Spain by royal order of the Spanish Government and which
were remitted to the Philippine Government to be distributed among the earthquake sufferers by the Central Relief Board
constituted, under article 1 of the law of June 20, 1894, and article 2 of the instructions of April 27, 1875, a special charity of a
temporary nature as distinguished from a permanent public charitable institution. As the Spanish Government initiated the creation
of the fund and as the donors turned their contributions over to that Government, it became the duty of the latter, under article 7 of
the instructions, to exercise supervision and control over the moneys thus collected to the end that the will of the donors should be
carried out. The relief board had no power whatever to dispose of the funds confided to its charge for other purposes than to
distribute them among the sufferers, because paragraph 3 of article 11 of the instructions conferred the power upon the secretary of
the interior of Spain, and no other, to dispose of the surplus funds, should there be any, by assigning them to some other charitable
purpose or institution. The secretary could not dispose of any of the funds in this manner so long as they were necessary for the
specific purpose for which they were contributed. The secretary had the power, under the law above mentioned to appoint and
totally or partially change the personnel of the relief board and to authorize the board to defend the rights of the charity in the courts.
The authority of the board consisted only in carrying out the will of the donors as directed by the Government whose duty it was to
watch over the acts of the board and to see that the funds were applied to the purposes for which they were contributed .The
secretary of the interior, as the representative of His Majesty's Government, exercised these powers and duties through the
Governor-General of the Philippine Islands. The Governments of Spain and of the Philippine Islands in complying with their duties
conferred upon them by law, acted in their governmental capacities in attempting to carry out the intention of the contributors. It will
this be seen that those governments were something more, as we have said, than mere trustees of the fund.

It is further contended that the obligation on the part of the Monte de Piedad to return the $80,000 to the Government, even
considering it a loan, was wiped out on the change of sovereignty, or inn other words, the present Philippine Government cannot
maintain this action for that reason. This contention, if true, "must result from settled principles of rigid law," as it cannot rest upon
any title to the fund in the Monte de Piedad acquired prior to such change. While the obligation to return the $80,000 to the Spanish
Government was still pending, war between the United States and Spain ensued. Under the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898,
the Archipelago, known as the Philippine Islands, was ceded to the United States, the latter agreeing to pay Spain the sum of
$20,000,000. Under the first paragraph of the eighth article, Spain relinquished to the United States "all buildings, wharves,
barracks, forts, structures, public highways, and other immovable property which, in conformity with law, belonged to the public
domain, and as such belonged to the crown of Spain." As the $80,000 were not included therein, it is said that the right to recover
this amount did not, therefore, pass to the present sovereign. This, in our opinion, does not follow as a necessary consequence, as
the right to recover does not rest upon the proposition that the $80,000 must be "other immovable property" mentioned in article 8 of
the treaty, but upon contractual obligations incurred before the Philippine Islands were ceded to the United States. We will not
inquire what effect his cession had upon the law of June 20, 1849, the royal decree of April 27, 1875, and the instructions
promulgated on the latter date. In Vilas vs. Manila (220 U. S., 345), the court said:

That there is a total abrogation of the former political relations of the inhabitants of the ceded region is obvious. That all laws
theretofore in force which are in conflict with the political character, constitution, or institutions of the substituted sovereign, lose their
force, is also plain. (Alvarez y Sanchez vs. United States, 216 U. S., 167.) But it is equally settled in the same public law that the
great body of municipal law which regulates private and domestic rights continues in force until abrogated or changed by the new
ruler.

If the above-mentioned legal provisions are in conflict with the political character, constitution or institutions of the new sovereign,
they became inoperative or lost their force upon the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States, but if they are among
"that great body of municipal law which regulates private and domestic rights," they continued in force and are still in force unless
they have been repealed by the present Government. That they fall within the latter class is clear from their very nature and
character. They are laws which are not political in any sense of the word. They conferred upon the Spanish Government the right
and duty to supervise, regulate, and to some extent control charities and charitable institutions. The present sovereign, in exempting
"provident institutions, savings banks, etc.," all of which are in the nature of charitable institutions, from taxation, placed such
institutions, in so far as the investment in securities are concerned, under the general supervision of the Insular Treasurer
(paragraph 4 of section 111 of Act No. 1189; see also Act No. 701).

Furthermore, upon the cession of the Philippine Islands the prerogatives of he crown of Spain devolved upon he United States. In
Magill vs. Brown (16 Fed. Cas., 408), quoted with approval in Mormon Charch vs. United States (136 U. S.,1, 57), the court said:

The Revolution devolved on the State all the transcendent power of Parliament, and the prerogative of the crown, and gave their
Acts the same force and effect.

In Fontain vs. Ravenel (17 Hw., 369, 384), Mr. Justice McLean, delivering the opinion of the court in a charity case, said:

When this country achieved its independence, the prerogatives of the crown devolved upon the people of the States. And this power
still remains with them except so fact as they have delegated a portion of it to the Federal Government. The sovereign will is made
known to us by legislative enactment. The State as a sovereign, is the parens patriae.

Chancelor Kent says:

In this country, the legislature or government of the State, as parens patriae, has the right to enforce all charities of public nature, by
virtue of its general superintending authority over the public interests, where no other person is entrusted with it. (4 Kent Com., 508,
note.)

The Supreme Court of the United States in Mormon Church vs. United States, supra, after approving also the last quotations, said:

This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, whether that power is lodged in a royal person or
in the legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary powers which are sometimes exerted by irresponsible monarchs to the great
detriment of the people and the destruction of their liberties. On the contrary, it is a most beneficient functions, and often necessary
to be exercised in the interest of humanity, and for the prevention of injury to those who cannot protect themselves.

The court in the same case, after quoting from Sohier vs. Mass. General Hospital (3 Cush., 483, 497), wherein the latter court held
that it is deemed indispensible that there should be a power in the legislature to authorize the same of the estates of in facts, idiots,
insane persons, and persons not known, or not in being, who cannot act for themselves, said:

These remarks in reference to in facts, insane persons and person not known, or not in being, apply to the beneficiaries of charities,
who are often in capable of vindicating their rights, and justly look for protection to the sovereign authority, acting as parens patriae.
They show that this beneficient functions has not ceased t exist under the change of government from a monarchy to a republic; but
that it now resides in the legislative department, ready to be called into exercise whenever required for the purposes of justice and
right, and is a clearly capable of being exercised in cases of charities as in any other cases whatever.

In People vs. Cogswell (113 Cal. 129, 130), it was urged that the plaintiff was not the real party in interest; that the Attorney-General
had no power to institute the action; and that there must be an allegation and proof of a distinct right of the people as a whole, as
distinguished from the rights of individuals, before an action could be brought by the Attorney-General in the name of the people.
The court, in overruling these contentions, held that it was not only the right but the duty of the Attorney-General to prosecute the
action, which related to charities, and approved the following quotation from Attorney-General vs. Compton (1 Younge & C. C., 417):

Where property affected by a trust for public purposes is in the hands of those who hold it devoted to that trust, it is the privilege of
the public that the crown should be entitled to intervene by its officers for the purpose of asserting, on behalf on the public generally,
the public interest and the public right, which, probably, no individual could be found effectually to assert, even if the interest were
such as to allow it. (2 Knet's Commentaries, 10th ed., 359; Lewin on Trusts, sec. 732.)

It is further urged, as above indicated, that "the only persons who could claim to be damaged by this payment to the Monte, if it was
unlawful, are the donors or the cestuis que trustent, and this Government is neither. Consequently, the plaintiff is not the proper
party to bring the action." The earthquake fund was the result or the accumulation of a great number of small contributions. The
names of the contributors do not appear in the record. Their whereabouts are unknown. They parted with the title to their respective
contributions. The beneficiaries, consisting of the original sufferers and their heirs, could have been ascertained. They are quite
numerous also. And no doubt a large number of the original sufferers have died, leaving various heirs. It would be impracticable for
them to institute an action or actions either individually or collectively to recover the $80,000. The only course that can be
satisfactorily pursued is for the Government to again assume control of the fund and devote it to the object for which it was originally
destined.

The impracticability of pursuing a different course, however, is not the true ground upon which the right of the Government to
maintain the action rests. The true ground is that the money being given to a charity became, in a measure, public property, only
applicable, it is true, to the specific purposes to which it was intended to be devoted, but within those limits consecrated to the public
use, and became part of the public resources for promoting the happiness and welfare of the Philippine Government. (Mormon
Church vs. U. S., supra.) To deny the Government's right to maintain this action would be contrary to sound public policy, as tending
to discourage the prompt exercise of similar acts of humanity and Christian benevolence in like instances in the future.

As to the question raised in the fourth assignment of error relating to the constitutionality of Act No. 2109, little need be said for the
reason that we have just held that the present Philippine Government is the proper party to the action. The Act is only a
manifestation on the part of the Philippine Government to exercise the power or right which it undoubtedly had. The Act is not, as
contended by counsel, in conflict with the fifth section of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, because it does not take property
without due process of law. In fact, the defendant is not the owner of the $80,000, but holds it as a loan subject to the disposal of the
central relief board. Therefor, there can be nothing in the Act which transcends the power of the Philippine Legislature.

In Vilas vs. Manila, supra, the plaintiff was a creditor of the city of Manila as it existed before the cession of the Philippine Islands to
the United States by the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898. The action was brought upon the theory that the city, under its
present charter from the Government of the Philippine Islands, was the same juristic person, and liable upon the obligations of the
old city. This court held that the present municipality is a totally different corporate entity and in no way liable for the debts of the
Spanish municipality. The Supreme Court of the United States, in reversing this judgment and in holding the city liable for the old
debt, said:

The juristic identity of the corporation has been in no wise affected, and, in law, the present city is, in every legal sense, the
successor of the old. As such it is entitled to the property and property rights of the predecessor corporation, and is, in law, subject
to all of its liabilities.

In support of the fifth assignment of error counsel for the defendant argue that as the Monte de Piedad declined to return the
$80,000 when ordered to do so by the Department of Finance in June, 1893, the plaintiff's right of action had prescribed at the time
this suit was instituted on May 3, 1912, citing and relying upon article 1961, 1964 and 1969 of the Civil Code. While on the other
hand, the Attorney-General contends that the right of action had not prescribed (a) because the defense of prescription cannot be
set up against the Philippine Government, (b) because the right of action to recover a deposit or trust funds does not prescribe, and
(c) even if the defense of prescription could be interposed against the Government and if the action had, in fact, prescribed, the
same was revived by Act No. 2109.

The material facts relating to this question are these: The Monte de Piedad received the $80,000 in 1883 "to be held under the
same conditions as at present in the treasury, to wit, at the disposal of the relief board." In compliance with the provisions of the
royal order of December 3, 1892, the Department of Finance called upon the Monte de Piedad in June, 1893, to return the $80,000.
The Monte declined to comply with this order upon the ground that only the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and not the
Department of Finance had the right to order the reimbursement. The amount was carried on the books of the Monte as a returnable
loan until January 1, 1899, when it was transferred to the account of the "Sagrada Mitra." On March 31, 1902, the Monte, through its
legal representative, stated in writing that the amount in question was received as a reimbursable loan, without interest. Act No.
2109 became effective January 30, 1912, and the action was instituted on May 3rd of that year.

Counsel for the defendant treat the question of prescription as if the action was one between individuals or corporations wherein the
plaintiff is seeking to recover an ordinary loan. Upon this theory June, 1893, cannot be taken as the date when the statute of
limitations began to run, for the reason that the defendant acknowledged in writing on March 31, 1902, that the $80,000 were
received as a loan, thereby in effect admitting that it still owed the amount. (Section 50, Code of Civil Procedure.) But if counsels'
theory is the correct one the action may have prescribed on May 3, 1912, because more than ten full years had elapsed after March
31, 1902. (Sections 38 and 43, Code of Civil Procedure.)

Is the Philippine Government bound by the statute of limitations? The Supreme Court of the United States in U. S. vs. Nashville,
Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway Co. (118 U. S., 120, 125), said:

It is settled beyond doubt or controversy upon the foundation of the great principle of public policy, applicable to all governments
alike, which forbids that the public interests should be prejudiced by the negligence of the officers or agents to whose care they are
confided that the United States, asserting rights vested in it as a sovereign government, is not bound by any statute of limitations,
unless Congress has clearly manifested its intention that it should be so bound. (Lindsey vs. Miller, 6 Pet. 666; U. S. vs. Knight, 14
Pet., 301; Gibson vs. Chouteau, 13 Wall., 92; U. S. vs. Thompson, 98 U. S., 486; Fink vs. O'Neil, 106 U. S., 272, 281.)

In Gibson vs. Choteau, supra, the court said:

It is a matter of common knowledge that statutes of limitation do not run against the State. That no laches can be imputed to the
King, and that no time can bar his rights, was the maxim of the common laws, and was founded on the principle of public policy, that
as he was occupied with the cares of government he ought not to suffer from the negligence of his officer and servants. The
principle is applicable to all governments, which must necessarily act through numerous agents, and is essential to a preservation of
the interests and property of the public. It is upon this principle that in this country the statutes of a State prescribing periods within
which rights must be prosecuted are not held to embrace the State itself, unless it is expressly designated or the mischiefs to be
remedied are of such a nature that it must necessarily be included. As legislation of a State can only apply to persons and thing over
which the State has jurisdiction, the United States are also necessarily excluded from the operation of such statutes.

In 25 Cyc., 1006, the rule, supported by numerous authorities, is stated as follows:

In the absence of express statutory provision to the contrary, statute of limitations do not as a general rule run against the sovereign
or government, whether state or federal. But the rule is otherwise where the mischiefs to be remedied are of such a nature that the
state must necessarily be included, where the state goes into business in concert or in competition with her citizens, or where a
party seeks to enforces his private rights by suit in the name of the state or government, so that the latter is only a nominal party.

In the instant case the Philippine Government is not a mere nominal party because it, in bringing and prosecuting this action, is
exercising its sovereign functions or powers and is seeking to carry out a trust developed upon it when the Philippine Islands were
ceded to the United States. The United States having in 1852, purchased as trustee for the Chickasaw Indians under treaty with that
tribe, certain bonds of the State of Tennessee, the right of action of the Government on the coupons of such bonds could not be
barred by the statute of limitations of Tennessee, either while it held them in trust for the Indians, or since it became the owner of
such coupons. (U. S. vs. Nashville, etc., R. Co., supra.) So where lands are held in trust by the state and the beneficiaries have no
right to sue, a statute does not run against the State's right of action for trespass on the trust lands. (Greene Tp. vs. Campbell, 16
Ohio St., 11; see also Atty.-Gen. vs. Midland R. Co., 3 Ont., 511 [following Reg. vs. Williams, 39 U. C. Q. B., 397].)

These principles being based "upon the foundation of the great principle of public policy" are, in the very nature of things, applicable
to the Philippine Government.

Counsel in their argument in support of the sixth and last assignments of error do not question the amount of the judgment nor do
they question the correctness of the judgment in so far as it allows interest, and directs its payment in gold coin or in the equivalent
in Philippine currency.

For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 128195 October 3, 2001

ELIZABETH LEE and PACITA YU LEE, HON. JUDGE JOSE D. ALOVERA,* Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 17,
Roxas City, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ROXAS CITY, petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS AND THE ADMINISTRATOR, LAND
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY and THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS,* respondents.

PARDO, J.:

The case under consideration is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the court of appeals nullifying that of the
Regional Trial Court, Roxas City, in Reconstitution case No. R-1928,2 pertaining to lot 398, Capiz Cadastre, covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 3389.

Sometime in March 1936, Carmen, Francisco, Jr., Ramon, Lourdes, Mercedes, Concepcion, Mariano, Jose, Loreto, Manuel, Rizal,
and Jimmy, alll surnamed Dinglasan sold to Lee Liong, A Chinese citizen, a parcel of land with an approximate area of 1,631 square
meters, designed as lot 398 and covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 3389, situated at the corner of Roxas Avenue and Pavia
Street, Roxas City.3

However, in 1948, the former owners filed with the Court of First Instance, Capiz an action against the heirs of Lee Liong for
annulment of sale and recovery of land.4 The plaintiffs assailed the validity of the sale because of the constitutional prohibition
against aliens acquiring ownership of private agriculture land, including residential, commercial or industrial land. Rebuffed in the
trial court and the Court of Appeals, plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court. On June 27, 1956, the Supreme Court ruled thus:

"granting the sale to be null and void and can not give title to the vendee, it does not necessarily follow therefrom that title remained
in the vendor, who had also violated the constitutional prohibition, or that he (vendor) has the right to recover the title of which he
has divested himself by his in ignoring the prohibition. In such contingency another principle of law sets in to bar the equally guilty
vendor from recovering the title which he had voluntarily conveyed for a consideration, that of pari delicto."5

On July 1, 1968, the same former owners Rafael A. Dinglasan, together with Francisco, Carmen, Ramon, Lourdes, Mercedes,
Concepcion, Mariano, Jose, Loreto, Rizal, Jimmy, and Jesse Dinglasan filed with the Court of First Instance, Capiz an action for
recovery of the same parcel of land.6 Citing the case of the Philippines Banking Corporation v. Lui She,7 they submitted that the
sale to Lee Liong was null and void for being violative of the Constitution. On September 23, 1968, the heirs of Lee Liong filed with
the trial court a motion to dismiss the case on the ground of res judicata.8 On October 10, 1968, and November 9, 1968, the trial
court denied the motion.9 The heirs of Lee Liong elevated the case to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari. On April 22,
1977, the Supreme Court annulled the orders of the trial court and directed it to dismiss the case, holding that the suit was barred by
res judicata.10

On September 7, 1993, Elizabeth Manuel-Lee and Pacita Yu Lee filed with the regional Trial Court, Roxas City a petition for
reconstitution of title of Lot No. 398 of the Capiz Cadastre, formerly covered by Original Certificate of title No. 3389 of the register of
Deeds of Roxas City.11 Petitioners alleged that they were the windows of the deceased Lee Bing Hoo and Lee Bun Ting , who were
the heirs of Lee Liong, The owner of the lot. Lee Liong died intestate in February 1944. On June 30, 1947, Lee Liong's widow, Ang
Chia, and his two sons, Lee Bun Ting and Lee Bing Ho, executed an extra judicial settlement of the state of Lee Liong, adjudicating
to themselves the subject parcel of land.12 Petitioner Elizabeth Lee acquired her share in lot No. 398 through an extra-judicial
settlement and donation executed in her favor by her deceased husband Lee Bong Hoo. Petitioner Pacita Yu Lee acquired her
share in the same lot by succession from her deceased husband Lee Bun Ting, as evidenced by a deed of extra-judicial
settlement.13

Previously, on December 9, 1948, the Register of Deeds, Capiz Salvador Villaluz, issued a certification that a transfer certificate of
title over the property was issued in the name of Lee Liong.14 However, the records of the Register of Deeds, Roxas City were
burned during the war. Thus, as heretofore stated, on September 7, 1968, petitioners filed a petition for reconstitution of
title.1wphi1.nt

On June 10, 1994, the Regional Trial Court, Roxas City, Branch 17, ordered the reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of
title in the name of Lee Liong on the basis of an approved plan and technical description.15 The dispositive portion of the trial
Court's decision reads thus:

"WHEREFORE, in reiteration the Register of Deeds for the City of Roxas is ordered to reconstitute the lost or destroyed certificate of
title in the name Lee Liong, deceased, of Roxas City, with all the conditions stated in paragraph 2 of this decision. This decision
shall become final after the lapse of thirty (30) days from receipt by the Register of Deeds and by the Commissioner of LRA of a
notice of such judgement without any appeal having been filed by any of such officials.

"SO ORDERED.

"Given at Roxas City, Philippines,

"June 10, 1994.

"JOSE O. ALOVERA
"Judge"16

On August 18, 1994, the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Roxas City, Branch 17 issued an Entry of Judgement.17

On January 25, 1995, the Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of judgement in Reconstitution
Case No. 1928, alleging that the Regional Trial Court, Roxas City had no jurisdiction over the case.18 The Solicitor General
contended that the petitioners were not the proper parties in the reconstitution of title, since their predecessor-in-interest Lee Liong
did not acquire title to the lot because he was a Chinese citizen and was constitutionally not qualified to own the subject land.

On April 30, 1996, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision declaring the judgement of reconstitution void.19

On May 24, 1996, Elizabeth Manuel-Lee and Pacita Yu Lee filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the
decision. 20 On February 18, 19976, the Court of appeals denied the motion.21

Hence this petition.22

Petitioners submitted that the Solicitor General was estopped from seeking annulment of the judgement of reconstitution after failing
to object during the reconstitution proceedings before the trial court, despite due notice. Petitioners alleged that the Solicitor General
merely acted on the request of private and politically powerful individuals who wished to capitalize on the prime location of the
subject land.

Petitioners emphasized that the ownership of the land had been settled in two previous cases of the Supreme Court, where the
Court ruled in favor of their predecessor-in-interest, Lee Liong. Petitioners also pointed out that they acquired ownership of the land
through actual possession of the lot and their consistent payment of taxes over the land for more than sixty years.

On the other hand, the Solicitor General submitted that the decision in the reconstitution case was void; otherwise, it would amount
to circumventing the constitutional proscription against aliens acquiring ownership of private or public agricultural lands.

We grant the petition.

The reconstitution of a certificate of title denotes restoration in the original form and condition of a lost or destroyed instrument
attesting the title of a person to a piece of land23. The purpose of the reconstruction of title is to have, after observing the
procedures prescribed by law, the title reproduced in exactly the same way it has been when the loss or destruction occurred.24

In this case, petitioners sought a reconstitution of title in the name of Lee Liong, alleging that the transfer of certificate of title issued
to him was lost or destroyed during World War II. All the documents recorded and issued by the Register of Deed, Capiz, which
include the transfer certificate of title issued in the name of Lee Liong, were all destroyed during the war. The fact that the original of
the transfer certificate of title was not in the files of the Office of the Register of Deeds did not imply that a transfer certificate of title
had not been issued.25 In the trial court proceeding, petitioners presented evidence proving the sale of the land from the Dinglasans
to Lee Liong and the latter's subsequent possessions of the of the property in the concept of owner. Thus, the trial court after
examining all the evidence before it, ordered the reconstruction of title in the name of Lee Liong.

However, there is a question as to whether Lee Liong as the qualification to own land in the Philippines.

The sale of the land in question was consummated sometime in March 1936, during the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. Under
the 1935 Constitution,26 aliens could not acquire private agricultural lands, save in cases of hereditary succession.27 Thus, Lee
Liong, a chinese citizen, was disqualified to acquire the land in question.28

The fact that the Court did not annul the sale of the land to an alien did not validate the transaction, for it was still contrary to the
constitutional proscription against aliens acquiring lands of the public or private domain. However, the proper party to assail the
illegality of the transaction was not the parties to the transaction.29 "In sales of real estate to aliens incapable of holding title thereto
by virtue of the provisions of the Constitution both the vendor and the vendee are deemed to have committed the constitutional
violation and being thus in pari delicto the courts will not afford protection to either party."30 The proper party to assail the sale is the
Solicitor General. This was what was done in this case when the Solicitor General initiated an action for annulment of judgment of
reconstitution of title. While it took the Republic more than sixty years to assert itself, it is not barred from initiating such action.
Prescription never against the State.31

Although ownership of the land cannot revert to the original sellers, because of the doctrine of pari delicto, the Solicitor General may
initiate an action for reversion or escheat of the land to the State, subject to other defenses, as hereafter set forth.32

In this case, subsequent circumstances militate against escheat proceedings because the land is now in the hands of Filipinos. The
original vendee, Lee Liong, has since died and the land has been inherited by his heirs and subsequently their heirs, petitioners
herein. Petitioners are Filipino citizens, a fact the Solicitor General does not dispute.

The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands of the public or private domain was intended to protect lands from falling
in the hands of non-Filipinos. In this case, however, there would be no more public policy violated since the land is in the hands of
Filipinos qualified to acquire and own such land. "If land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or
transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.33
Thus, the subsequent transfer of the property to qualified Filipinos may no longer be impugned on the basis of the invalidity of the
initial transfer.34 The objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.

Incidentally, it must be mentioned that reconstitution of the original certificate of title must be based on an owner's duplicate,
secondary evidence thereof, or other valid sources of the title be reconstituted.35 In this case, reconstitution was based on the plan
and technical description approved by the Land Registration Authority.36 This renders the order of reconstitution void for lack of
factual support.37 A judgment with absolute nothing to support it is void.38

As earlier mentioned, a reconstitution of the title is the reissuance of a new certificate of title lost or destroyed in its original form and
condition.39 It does not pass upon the ownership of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title.40 Any change in the ownership
of the property must be the subject of a separate suit.41 Thus, although petitioners are in possession of the land, a separate
proceedings is necessary to thresh out the issue of ownership of the land.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 36274. In lieu
thereof, the Court sets aside the order of reconstitution of title in Reconstitution Case No. R-1928, Regional Trial Court, Roxas City,
and dismisses the petition, without prejudice.1wphi1.nt

No Cost.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 161434 March 3, 2004

MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners,
vs.
The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER,
respondents.

x-----------------------------x

G.R. No. 161634 March 3, 2004

ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner,
vs.
RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR., respondent.

x-----------------------------x

G. R. No. 161824 March 3, 2004

VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN AS FERNANDO POE JR.,
respondents.

D E C I S I O N

VITUG, J.:

Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state believes are deserving of the privilege. It is a "precious heritage,
as well as an inestimable acquisition,"1 that cannot be taken lightly by anyone - either by those who enjoy it or by those who dispute
it.

Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise a single question of profound importance to the nation. The issue of
citizenship is brought up to challenge the qualifications of a presidential candidate to hold the highest office of the land. Our people
are waiting for the judgment of the Court with bated breath. Is Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one of the main
contenders for the presidency, a natural-born Filipino or is he not?

The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish and American colonial roots and reminds us of the rich heritage of
civil law and common law traditions, the fusion resulting in a hybrid of laws and jurisprudence that could be no less than distinctly
Filipino.

Antecedent Case Settings

On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate
of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP)
Party, in the forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of
birth to be Manila.

Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections
and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition docketed
SPA No. 04-003 before the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his
certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be
a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an
American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner
asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an
illegitimate child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of respondent on two assertions - first,
Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no
such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent.

In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January 2004, petitioner, in support of his claim, presented several
documentary exhibits - 1) a copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified photocopy of an affidavit executed in Spanish by
Paulita Poe y Gomez attesting to her having filed a case for bigamy and concubinage against the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe,
after discovering his bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an English translation of the affidavit aforesaid, 4) a certified
photocopy of the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe, 5) a certification issued by the Director of the Records Management and
Archives Office, attesting to the fact that there was no record in the National Archives that a Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or
entered the Philippines before 1907, and 6) a certification from the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National
Archives to the effect that no available information could be found in the files of the National Archives regarding the birth of Allan F.
Poe.

On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of evidence, the more significant ones being - a) a certification
issued by Estrella M. Domingo of the Archives Division of the National Archives that there appeared to be no available information
regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry of births for San Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by the Officer-In-
Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives that no available information about the marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita
Gomez could be found, c) a certificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe, d) Original Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of
Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou, e) copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844, No. 20643, No. 23477
and No. 23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of the certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the purported marriage
contract between Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification issued by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City,
Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in the said office during the period of from 1900 until May 1946 were totally destroyed
during World War II.

On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit. Three days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier
filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 06 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004,
petitioner assailed the decision of the COMELEC before this Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised
Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition, docketed G. R. No. 161824, likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of
preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions.

The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824, would include G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson,
and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs. The Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.), and Victorino X.
Fornier," and the other, docketed G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando
Poe, Jr.," both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.

Jurisdiction of the Court

In G. R. No. 161824

In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to have the COMELEC deny due course to or cancel FPJs certificate of
candidacy for alleged misrepresentation of a material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born citizen) before the COMELEC, petitioner
Fornier invoked Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code

"Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. --- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or
to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained
therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false"

in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code -

"Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the
Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections" -

and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would authorize "any interested party" to file a verified petition to
deny or cancel the certificate of candidacy of any nuisance candidate.

Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the Supreme Court per Rule 642 in an action for certiorari
under Rule 653 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution also reads

"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the
date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of
the last pleading, brief, or memorandum, required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise
provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on
certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."

Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law which power "includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."

It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No. 161824 was aptly elevated to, and could well be taken cognizance of
by, this Court. A contrary view could be a gross denial to our people of their fundamental right to be fully informed, and to make a
proper choice, on who could or should be elected to occupy the highest government post in the land.

In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634

Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No. 161634, invoke the provisions of Article VII, Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and
in urging the Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions they directly instituted before it. The Constitutional provision cited
reads:

"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose."

The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution to designate any
tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and vice-presidential contests, has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs.
Roxas,4 as "not (being) justiciable" controversies or disputes involving contests on the elections, returns and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President. The constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No. 1793, "An Act
Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the
President-Elect and the Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same." Republic Act
1793 designated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to be the members of the tribunal. Although the
subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of government under the 1973 Constitution might have implicitly affected Republic
Act No. 1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now be deemed revived under the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the
1987 Constitution.

Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-election scenario. Election contests consist of either an
election protest or a quo warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the
winning candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would support this premise -

"Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President of the Philippines.

"Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of an election protest or a petition for quo warranto against the
President or Vice-President. An election protest shall not include a petition for quo warranto. A petition for quo warranto shall not
include an election protest.

"Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who received the
second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-President, as the case may be, by
filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the
winner."

The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
"President" or "Vice-President", of the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto
proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a
public office.5 In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered
candidate who would have received either the second or third highest number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again
presupposes a post-election scenario.

It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would
not include cases directly brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before
the elections are held.

Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs. Commission on Elections et al.," and G. R. No.
161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be dismissed for want of
jurisdiction.

The Citizenship Issue

Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a brief historical background on the concept of citizenship.

Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the
"citizen" to refer to a man who shared in the administration of justice and in the holding of an office.6 Aristotle saw its significance if
only to determine the constituency of the "State," which he described as being composed of such persons who would be adequate
in number to achieve a self-sufficient existence.7 The concept grew to include one who would both govern and be governed, for
which qualifications like autonomy, judgment and loyalty could be expected. Citizenship was seen to deal with rights and
entitlements, on the one hand, and with concomitant obligations, on the other.8 In its ideal setting, a citizen was active in public life
and fundamentally willing to submit his private interests to the general interest of society.

The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In the 18th century, the concept was limited, by and large, to
civil citizenship, which established the rights necessary for individual freedom, such as rights to property, personal liberty and
justice.9 Its meaning expanded during the 19th century to include political citizenship, which encompassed the right to participate in
the exercise of political power.10 The 20th century saw the next stage of the development of social citizenship, which laid emphasis
on the right of the citizen to economic well-being and social security.11 The idea of citizenship has gained expression in the modern
welfare state as it so developed in Western Europe. An ongoing and final stage of development, in keeping with the rapidly shrinking
global village, might well be the internationalization of citizenship.12

The Local Setting - from Spanish Times to the Present

There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish regime but "subjects of Spain" or "Spanish subjects."13 In
church records, the natives were called 'indios', denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of the archipelago. Spanish laws on
citizenship became highly codified during the 19th century but their sheer number made it difficult to point to one comprehensive
law. Not all of these citizenship laws of Spain however, were made to apply to the Philippine Islands except for those explicitly
extended by Royal Decrees.14

Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima Recopilacion, promulgated in Spain on 16 July 1805 but as to
whether the law was extended to the Philippines remained to be the subject of differing views among experts;15 however, three
royal decrees were undisputably made applicable to Spaniards in the Philippines - the Order de la Regencia of 14 August 1841,16
the Royal Decree of 23 August 1868 specifically defining the political status of children born in the Philippine Islands,17 and finally,
the Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was expressly made applicable to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13
July 1870.18

The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine Islands because of the express mandate of its Article 89,
according to which the provisions of the Ultramar among which this country was included, would be governed by special laws.19

It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on 18 December 1889, which came out with the first
categorical enumeration of who were Spanish citizens. -

"(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,

"(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of Spain,

"(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,

"(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants of any town of the Monarchy."20

The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history. Already in the state of decline as a superpower, Spain was forced to
so cede her sole colony in the East to an upcoming world power, the United States. An accepted principle of international law
dictated that a change in sovereignty, while resulting in an abrogation of all political laws then in force, would have no effect on civil
laws, which would remain virtually intact.

The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between Spain and the United States.21 Under Article IX of the treaty,
the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United States would be determined by its
Congress -

"Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her
sovereignty may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property, including the
right to sell or dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on their industry, commerce,
and professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are applicable to foreigners. In case they remain in the territory
they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from the date of the
exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration they
shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they reside.

Thus

"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined
by the Congress."22

Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United States Congress on the subject, the native inhabitants of the
Philippines ceased to be Spanish subjects. Although they did not become American citizens, they, however, also ceased to be
"aliens" under American laws and were thus issued passports describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the
protection of the United States.

The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to as
the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the United States on the Philippines -

".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein, who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April,
1891, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve their
allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain,
signed at Paris, December tenth eighteen hundred and ninety eight."23

Under the organic act, a "citizen of the Philippines" was one who was an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the
11th day of April 1899. The term "inhabitant" was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of
Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899.24

Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines from 11 April 1899 to 01 July 1902, during which period no
citizenship law was extant in the Philippines. Weight was given to the view, articulated in jurisprudential writing at the time, that the
common law principle of jus soli, otherwise also known as the principle of territoriality, operative in the United States and England,
governed those born in the Philippine Archipelago within that period.25 More about this later.

In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the following amendment to the Philippine Bill of 1902 -

"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those
natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other insular possession of the
United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who would become citizens of the United States, under the
laws of the United States, if residing therein."26

With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of "Philippine citizens" had for the first time crystallized. The word
"Filipino" was used by William H. Taft, the first Civil Governor General in the Philippines when he initially made mention of it in his
slogan, "The Philippines for the Filipinos." In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones Law restated virtually the
provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as so amended by the Act of Congress in 1912 -

"That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-
nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequently thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the
provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and
ninety-eight and except such others as have since become citizens of some other country; Provided, That the Philippine Legislature,
herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the Philippine
Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and such other
persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could become citizens of the United States
under the laws of the United States, if residing therein."

Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if
he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that date, not a citizen of
some other country.

While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli was a mode of acquiring citizenship, the 1935
Constitution brought to an end to any such link with common law, by adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship
as being the basis of Filipino citizenship -

"Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the Philippines -

"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution

"(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public
office in the Philippine Islands.

"(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

"(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.

"(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."

Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with existing civil law provisions at the time, which provided that
women would automatically lose their Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their foreign husbands, resulted in discriminatory
situations that effectively incapacitated the women from transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children and required
illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking to correct this
anomaly, as well as fully cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino women as equals to men, the framers of the 1973
Constitution crafted the provisions of the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect such concerns -

"Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens of the Philippines:

"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.

"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.

"(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.

"(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."

For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided that

"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her Philippine citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is
deemed, under the law to have renounced her citizenship."

The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to
correct the irregular situation generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.

Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:

"The following are citizens of the Philippines:

"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.

"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.

"(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and

"(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."

The Case Of FPJ

Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:

"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write,
at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding
such election."

The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship."27

The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its
history, four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis28 had been in vogue. Only two,
i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs.
Collector of Customs29 (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong
vs. Secretary of Labor30 (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth.

Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the earliest established direct ascendant of FPJ was his
paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married to Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had
not been presented in evidence, his death certificate, however, identified him to be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan,
and 84 years old at the time of his death on 11 September 1954. The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed
that he was born on 17 May 1915 to an Espaol father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza Espaol mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced by
petitioner was an "uncertified" copy of a supposed certificate of the alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez on 05 July
1936. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16 September 1940. In
the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be
twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an American citizen. The birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20
August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen, twenty-one years old
and married.

Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth certificate of respondent and the
marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents
would be that -

1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;

2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;

3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940;

4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and

5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old.

Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish the fact that FPJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen? The marriage
certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of
public record in the custody of a public officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during
the proceedings before the COMELEC.

The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for petitioner and Exhibit "3" for respondent. The marriage certificate of Allan F.
Poe to Bessie Kelley was submitted as Exhibit "21" for respondent. The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou was submitted by
respondent as his Exhibit "5." While the last two documents were submitted in evidence for respondent, the admissibility thereof,
particularly in reference to the facts which they purported to show, i.e., the marriage certificate in relation to the date of marriage of
Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and the death certificate relative to the death of Lorenzo Pou on 11 September 1954 in San Carlos,
Pangasinan, were all admitted by petitioner, who had utilized those material statements in his argument. All three documents were
certified true copies of the originals.

Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that -

"Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:

"x x x x x x x x x

"(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or is recorded in a public office."

Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth
certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of their contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides:

"Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated."

The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries made therein could be grounded on 1) the sense of
official duty in the preparation of the statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of that duty, 3) the routine
and disinterested origin of most such statements, and 4) the publicity of record which makes more likely the prior exposure of such
errors as might have occurred.31

The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11 September 1954, at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos,
Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed that Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the year 1870 when the Philippines was still a colony
of Spain. Petitioner would argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines during the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902
considering that there was no existing record about such fact in the Records Management and Archives Office. Petitioner, however,
likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place during the same period. In his death certificate, the residence of
Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to
conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a person at the time of his death was also his residence before
death. It would be extremely doubtful if the Records Management and Archives Office would have had complete records of all
residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.

Proof of Paternity and Filiation

Under Civil Law.

Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation (relationship or civil status of the child to the father [or mother]) or
paternity (relationship or civil status of the father to the child) of an illegitimate child, FPJ evidently being an illegitimate son
according to petitioner, the mandatory rules under civil law must be used.

Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08 December 1889 up until the day prior to 30 August
1950 when the Civil Code of the Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was required to establish filiation or paternity.
Acknowledgment was either judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or compulsory acknowledgment was possible only if done
during the lifetime of the putative parent; voluntary acknowledgment could only be had in a record of birth, a will, or a public
document.32 Complementary to the new code was Act No. 3753 or the Civil Registry Law expressing in Section 5 thereof, that -

"In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or only by the
mother if the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the document the name of the father
who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein any information by which such father could be identified."

In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the certificate was
required to be signed or sworn to by the father. The failure of such requirement rendered the same useless as being an authoritative
document of recognition.33 In Mendoza vs. Mella,34 the Court ruled -

"Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the question here really is whether or not his birth certificate
(Exhibit 1), which is merely a certified copy of the registry record, may be relied upon as sufficient proof of his having been
voluntarily recognized. No such reliance, in our judgment, may be placed upon it. While it contains the names of both parents, there
is no showing that they signed the original, let alone swore to its contents as required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all that might
have happened, it was not even they or either of them who furnished the data to be entered in the civil register. Petitioners say that
in any event the birth certificate is in the nature of a public document wherein voluntary recognition of a natural child may also be
made, according to the same Article 131. True enough, but in such a case, there must be a clear statement in the document that the
parent recognizes the child as his or her own."

In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties, nowhere in the document was the signature of Allan F. Poe
found. There being no will apparently executed, or at least shown to have been executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only other
proof of voluntary recognition remained to be "some other public document." In Pareja vs. Pareja,35 this Court defined what could
constitute such a document as proof of voluntary acknowledgment:

"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public documents, those executed by private individuals which must be
authenticated by notaries, and those issued by competent public officials by reason of their office. The public document pointed out
in Article 131 as one of the means by which recognition may be made belongs to the first class."

Let us leave it at that for the moment.

The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children into voluntary, legal or compulsory.
Voluntary recognition was required to be expressedly made in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any
authentic writing. Legal acknowledgment took place in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child who was
recognized or judicially declared as natural. Compulsory acknowledgment could be demanded generally in cases when the child
had in his favor any evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which would last during the lifetime of the child,
and might pass exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an action to claim acknowledgment, however, could only be brought during the
lifetime of the presumed parent.

Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument, "authentic writing," so as to be an authentic writing for purposes
of voluntary recognition, simply as being a genuine or indubitable writing of the father. The term would include a public instrument
(one duly acknowledged before a notary public or other competent official) or a private writing admitted by the father to be his.

The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article 173, and Article 175 provide:

"Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

"(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

"(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.

"In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

"(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

"(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

"Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs
should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to
institute the action.

"The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.

"x x x x x x x x x.

"Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same, evidence as legitimate
children.

"The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the second
paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent."

The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of the code reads:

"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance
with the Civil Code or other laws."

Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals,36 the Court has ruled:

"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child should be decided under Article 278 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. Article 2260 of that Code provides that 'the voluntary recognition of a natural child shall take place according to this
Code, even if the child was born before the effectivity of this body of laws' or before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article 278 may be
given retroactive effect."

It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children is an attempt to
break away from the traditional idea of keeping well apart legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within the family in favor of the
greater interest and welfare of the child. The provisions are intended to merely govern the private and personal affairs of the family.
There is little, if any, to indicate that the legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual would also affect his political rights or, in
general, his relationship to the State. While, indeed, provisions on "citizenship" could be found in the Civil Code, such provisions
must be taken in the context of private relations, the domain of civil law; particularly -

"Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the organization of the family and the regulation of property. It has
thus [been] defined as the mass of precepts which determine and regulate the relations of assistance, authority and obedience
among members of a family, and those which exist among members of a society for the protection of private interests."37

In Yaez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,38 the Court has held:

"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x x the laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons, govern Spaniards although they reside in a foreign country; that, in consequence, 'all questions of a
civil nature, such as those dealing with the validity or nullity of the matrimonial bond, the domicile of the husband and wife, their
support, as between them, the separation of their properties, the rules governing property, marital authority, division of conjugal
property, the classification of their property, legal causes for divorce, the extent of the latter, the authority to decree it, and, in
general, the civil effects of marriage and divorce upon the persons and properties of the spouses, are questions that are governed
exclusively by the national law of the husband and wife."

The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is best exemplified in Article 15 of the Civil Code, stating that -

"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the
Philippines, even though living abroad" -

that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the Constitutional provisions on citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is
significant in civil relationships found in different parts of the Civil Code,39 such as on successional rights and family relations.40 In
adoption, for instance, an adopted child would be considered the child of his adoptive parents and accorded the same rights as their
legitimate child but such legal fiction extended only to define his rights under civil law41 and not his political status.

Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This discriminatory attitude may be traced to the Spanish family and
property laws, which, while defining proprietary and successional rights of members of the family, provided distinctions in the rights
of legitimate and illegitimate children. In the monarchial set-up of old Spain, the distribution and inheritance of titles and wealth were
strictly according to bloodlines and the concern to keep these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood was paramount.

These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in the Spanish Civil Code, and the invidious discrimination
survived when the Spanish Civil Code became the primary source of our own Civil Code. Such distinction, however, remains and
should remain only in the sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or impinge on the domain of political law.

The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship status should thus be deemed independent from and not
inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code provisions on proof of filiation or
paternity, although good law, do not have preclusive effects on matters alien to personal and family relations. The ordinary rules on
evidence could well and should govern. For instance, the matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded from being applicable
by the Civil Code or Family Code provisions.

Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -

"Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of
another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the
relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word `pedigree includes
relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of
the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree."

For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already dead or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a
person must be at issue, (c) the declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be
made before the controversy has occurred, and (e) the relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in
question must be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.

Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit 20 before the
COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e, living
together with Bessie Kelley and his children (including respondent FPJ) in one house, and as one family -

"I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing in Stockton, California, U.S.A., after being sworn in
accordance with law do hereby declare that:

"1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.

"2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.

"3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe, more popularly known in the Philippines as `Fernando
Poe, Jr., or `FPJ.

"4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke's Hospital, Magdalena Street, Manila.

"x x x x x x x x x

"7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged while they were students at the University of the Philippines
in 1936. I was also introduced to Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister that same year.

"8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938.

"9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children, Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan and Fernando II, and myself lived
together with our mother at our family's house on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until the liberation of Manila in 1945,
except for some months between 1943-1944.

"10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4) more children after Ronald Allan Poe.

"x x x x x x x x x

"18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew, Ronald Allan Poe is a natural born Filipino, and that he is
the legitimate child of Fernando Poe, Sr.

"Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004.

Ruby Kelley Mangahas Declarant DNA Testing

In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which
examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be
resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals,42 this Court has acknowledged the
strong weight of DNA testing -

"Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately,
we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines
Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short
tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from
the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and the child are analyzed to establish
parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as
the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts
should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny
progress."

Petitioners Argument For Jurisprudential Conclusiveness

Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his citizenship to respondent
FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child. According to petitioner, prior to his marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5,
1936, contracted marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez, making his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous and
respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The veracity of the supposed certificate of marriage between Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez
could be most doubtful at best. But the documentary evidence introduced by no less than respondent himself, consisting of a birth
certificate of respondent and a marriage certificate of his parents showed that FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to a Filipino father
and an American mother who were married to each other a year later, or on 16 September 1940. Birth to unmarried parents would
make FPJ an illegitimate child. Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so followed the citizenship of his mother,
Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, basing his stand on the ruling of this Court in Morano vs. Vivo,43 citing Chiongbian vs. de Leo44
and Serra vs. Republic.45

On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is most convincing; he states -

"We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in each of them. If the pronouncement of the Court on jus sanguinis
was on the lis mota, the pronouncement would be a decision constituting doctrine under the rule of stare decisis. But if the
pronouncement was irrelevant to the lis mota, the pronouncement would not be a decision but a mere obiter dictum which did not
establish doctrine. I therefore invite the Court to look closely into these cases.

"First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an illegitimate child of a Filipino father. It was about a stepson of a Filipino, a
stepson who was the child of a Chinese mother and a Chinese father. The issue was whether the stepson followed the
naturalization of the stepfather. Nothing about jus sanguinis there. The stepson did not have the blood of the naturalized stepfather.

"Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. It was about a legitimate son of a
father who had become Filipino by election to public office before the 1935 Constitution pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the
1935 Constitution. No one was illegitimate here.

"Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of a Filipino father. Serra was an illegitimate child of a
Chinese father and a Filipino mother. The issue was whether one who was already a Filipino because of his mother who still needed
to be naturalized. There is nothing there about invidious jus sanguinis.

"Finally, Paa vs. Chan.46 This is a more complicated case. The case was about the citizenship of Quintin Chan who was the son of
Leoncio Chan. Quintin Chan claimed that his father, Leoncio, was the illegitimate son of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother.
Quintin therefore argued that he got his citizenship from Leoncio, his father. But the Supreme Court said that there was no valid
proof that Leoncio was in fact the son of a Filipina mother. The Court therefore concluded that Leoncio was not Filipino. If Leoncio
was not Filipino, neither was his son Quintin. Quintin therefore was not only not a natural-born Filipino but was not even a Filipino.

"The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with an obiter dictum. The Court said obiter that even if Leoncio,
Quintin's father, were Filipino, Quintin would not be Filipino because Quintin was illegitimate. This statement about Quintin, based
on a contrary to fact assumption, was absolutely unnecessary for the case. x x x It was obiter dictum, pure and simple, simply
repeating the obiter dictum in Morano vs. Vivo.

"x x x x x x x x x

"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no textual foundation in the Constitution, it would also violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution not once but twice. First, it would make an illegitimate distinction between a legitimate child and
an illegitimate child, and second, it would make an illegitimate distinction between the illegitimate child of a Filipino father and the
illegitimate child of a Filipino mother.

"The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was established long ago by People vs. Cayat.47 I would grant that the
distinction between legitimate children and illegitimate children rests on real differences. x x x But real differences alone do not
justify invidious distinction. Real differences may justify distinction for one purpose but not for another purpose.

"x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public service? What possible state interest can there be for
disqualifying an illegitimate child from becoming a public officer. It was not the fault of the child that his parents had illicit liaison.
Why deprive the child of the fullness of political rights for no fault of his own? To disqualify an illegitimate child from holding an
important public office is to punish him for the indiscretion of his parents. There is neither justice nor rationality in that. And if there is
neither justice nor rationality in the distinction, then the distinction transgresses the equal protection clause and must be
reprobated."

The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former member of this Court), Professor Ruben Balane and Dean Martin
Magallona, at bottom, have expressed similar views. The thesis of petitioner, unfortunately hinging solely on pure obiter dicta,
should indeed fail.

Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its mother, it did so for the benefit the child. It
was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the assumption that the mother had custody,
would exercise parental authority and had the duty to support her illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice or
discriminate against him.

The fact of the matter perhaps the most significant consideration is that the 1935 Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on
the day, month and year of birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor
distinctions, the Constitution states that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines." There utterly is no cogent justification to prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly are none provided.

In Sum

(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, possesses jurisdiction over the petition in G. R. No. 161824, filed under
Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No. 161824 assails the resolution of the COMELEC for
alleged grave abuse of discretion in dismissing, for lack of merit, the petition in SPA No. 04-003 which has prayed for the
disqualification of respondent FPJ from running for the position of President in the 10th May 2004 national elections on the
contention that FPJ has committed material representation in his certificate of candidacy by representing himself to be a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines.

(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the petitions in G. R. No. 161434 and No. 161634 both having
been directly elevated to this Court in the latters capacity as the only tribunal to resolve a presidential and vice-presidential election
contest under the Constitution. Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the Court can directly be invoked only after, not before, the
elections are held.

(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to
take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father
of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy
of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship
of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born
sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence
upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that
Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship
(of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during
which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of
whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.

(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made
a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus
Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to
the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as
so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC,48 must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful.

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS

1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections,
Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino X. Fornier, Respondents," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo
Antonio Velez, Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondent," for want of jurisdiction.

2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe,
also known as Fernando Poe, Jr.," for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Commission on Elections
in dismissing the petition in SPA No. 04-003.

No Costs.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 137000 August 9, 2000

CIRILO R. VALLES, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROSALIND YBASCO LOPEZ, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PURISIMA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing
Resolutions dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999, respectively, of the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 98-336, dismissing
the petition for disqualification filed by the herein petitioner, Cirilo R. Valles, against private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, in
the May 1998 elections for governor of Davao Oriental.

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo
Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian. In 1949, at the age of fifteen,
she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines.

On June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo Lopez, a Filipino citizen, at the Malate Catholic Church in Manila. Since then, she
has continuously participated in the electoral process not only as a voter but as a candidate, as well. She served as Provincial Board
Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental. In 1992, she ran for and was elected governor of Davao Oriental. Her
election was contested by her opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr., in a petition for quo warranto, docketed as EPC No. 92-54, alleging as
ground therefor her alleged Australian citizenship. However, finding no sufficient proof that respondent had renounced her Philippine
citizenship, the Commission on Elections en banc dismissed the petition, ratiocinating thus:

"A cursory reading of the records of this case vis-a-vis the impugned resolution shows that respondent was able to produce
documentary proofs of the Filipino citizenship of her late father... and consequently, prove her own citizenship and filiation by virtue
of the Principle of Jus Sanguinis, the perorations of the petitioner to the contrary notwithstanding.

On the other hand, except for the three (3) alleged important documents . . . no other evidence substantial in nature surfaced to
confirm the allegations of petitioner that respondent is an Australian citizen and not a Filipino. Express renunciation of citizenship as
a mode of losing citizenship under Commonwealth Act No. 63 is an equivocal and deliberate act with full awareness of its
significance and consequence. The evidence adduced by petitioner are inadequate, nay meager, to prove that respondent
contemplated renunciation of her Filipino citizenship".1

In the 1995 local elections, respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez ran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental. Her opponent,
Francisco Rabat, filed a petition for disqualification, docketed as SPA No. 95-066 before the COMELEC, First Division, contesting
her Filipino citizenship but the said petition was likewise dismissed by the COMELEC, reiterating substantially its decision in EPC
92-54.

The citizenship of private respondent was once again raised as an issue when she ran for re-election as governor of Davao Oriental
in the May 11, 1998 elections. Her candidacy was questioned by the herein petitioner, Cirilo Valles, in SPA No. 98-336.

On July 17, 1998, the COMELECs First Division came out with a Resolution dismissing the petition, and disposing as follows:

"Assuming arguendo that res judicata does not apply and We are to dispose the instant case on the merits trying it de novo, the
above table definitely shows that petitioner herein has presented no new evidence to disturb the Resolution of this Commission in
SPA No. 95-066. The present petition merely restates the same matters and incidents already passed upon by this Commission not
just in 1995 Resolution but likewise in the Resolution of EPC No. 92-54. Not having put forth any new evidence and matter
substantial in nature, persuasive in character or sufficiently provocative to compel reversal of such Resolutions, the dismissal of the
present petition follows as a matter of course.

x x x x x x x x x

"WHEREFORE, premises considered and there being no new matters and issues tendered, We find no convincing reason or
impressive explanation to disturb and reverse the Resolutions promulgated by this Commission in EPC 92-54 and SPA. 95-066.
This Commission RESOLVES as it hereby RESOLVES to DISMISS the present petition.

SO ORDERED."2

Petitioner interposed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid Resolution but to no avail. The same was denied by the
COMELEC in its en banc Resolution of January 15, 1999.

Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this Court via the present petition; questioning the citizenship of private respondent Rosalind
Ybasco Lopez.

The Commission on Elections ruled that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is a Filipino citizen and therefore, qualified to
run for a public office because (1) her father, Telesforo Ybasco, is a Filipino citizen, and by virtue of the principle of jus sanguinis
she was a Filipino citizen under the 1987 Philippine Constitution; (2) she was married to a Filipino, thereby making her also a
Filipino citizen ipso jure under Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473; (3) and that, she renounced her Australian citizenship on
January 15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and her Australian passport was accordingly
cancelled as certified to by the Australian Embassy in Manila; and (4) furthermore, there are the COMELEC Resolutions in EPC No.
92-54 and SPA Case No. 95-066, declaring her a Filipino citizen duly qualified to run for the elective position of Davao Oriental
governor.

Petitioner, on the other hand, maintains that the private respondent is an Australian citizen, placing reliance on the admitted facts
that:

a) In 1988, private respondent registered herself with the Bureau of Immigration as an Australian national and was issued Alien
Certificate of Registration No. 404695 dated September 19, 1988;

b) On even date, she applied for the issuance of an Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), and

c) She was issued Australian Passport No. H700888 on March 3, 1988.

Petitioner theorizes that under the aforestated facts and circumstances, the private respondent had renounced her Filipino
citizenship. He contends that in her application for alien certificate of registration and immigrant certificate of residence, private
respondent expressly declared under oath that she was a citizen or subject of Australia; and said declaration forfeited her Philippine
citizenship, and operated to disqualify her to run for elective office.

As regards the COMELECs finding that private respondent had renounced her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before
the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and had her Australian passport cancelled on February 11, 1992, as
certified to by the Australian Embassy here in Manila, petitioner argues that the said acts did not automatically restore the status of
private respondent as a Filipino citizen. According to petitioner, for the private respondent to reacquire Philippine citizenship she
must comply with the mandatory requirements for repatriation under Republic Act 8171; and the election of private respondent to
public office did not mean the restoration of her Filipino citizenship since the private respondent was not legally repatriated. Coupled
with her alleged renunciation of Australian citizenship, private respondent has effectively become a stateless person and as such, is
disqualified to run for a public office in the Philippines; petitioner concluded.

Petitioner theorizes further that the Commission on Elections erred in applying the principle of res judicata to the case under
consideration; citing the ruling in Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration,3 that:

"xxx Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the
corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata,
hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. xxx"

The petition is unmeritorious.

The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of
the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship
on the basis of place of birth.

Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the
spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an Australian.
Historically, this was a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at that time, what served as the Constitution of the
Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the United States governed the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1,
1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.

Among others, these laws defined who were deemed to be citizens of the Philippine islands. The Philippine Bill of 1902 defined
Philippine citizens as:

SEC. 4 xxx all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of
April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in the Philippine Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall
be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such
as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace
between the United States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight. (underscoring ours)

The Jones Law, on the other hand, provides:

SEC. 2 That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and
ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of
the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the
provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and
ninety-eight, and except such others as have since become citizens of some other country: Provided, That the Philippine
Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives
of the Philippine Islands who cannot come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United
States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States, or who could become
citizens of the United States under the laws of the United States if residing therein. (underscoring ours)

Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided therein including
their children are deemed to be Philippine citizens. Private respondents father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879 in
Daet, Camarines Norte, a fact duly evidenced by a certified true copy of an entry in the Registry of Births. Thus, under the Philippine
Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the
laws in force at the time of her birth, Telesforos daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of
the Philippines.

The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of
Philippine citizenship, to wit:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption of this Constitution.

(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of foreign parents who, before the adoption of this Constitution had been elected to public
office in the Philippine Islands.

(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.

(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.

(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was subsequently retained under the
19734 and 19875 Constitutions. Thus, the herein private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino citizen, having been born
to a Filipino father. The fact of her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing her Philippine citizenship. If Australia
follows the principle of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of
dual citizenship.

Petitioner also contends that even on the assumption that the private respondent is a Filipino citizen, she has nonetheless
renounced her Philippine citizenship. To buttress this contention, petitioner cited private respondents application for an Alien
Certificate of Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR), on September 19, 1988, and the issuance to her of
an Australian passport on March 3, 1988.

Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship:

(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;

(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;

(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the constitution or laws of a foreign country upon attaining twenty-one years of
age or more;

(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air service of a foreign country;

(5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization;

(6) By having been declared by competent authority, a deserter of the Philippine armed forces in time of war, unless subsequently, a
plenary pardon or amnesty has been granted: and

(7) In case of a woman, upon her marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue of the laws in force in her husbands country, she acquires his
nationality.

In order that citizenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be express. Petitioners contention that the application
of private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her Australian passport, is bereft of merit. This issue was put to rest
in the case of Aznar vs. COMELEC6 and in the more recent case of Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC.7

In the case of Aznar, the Court ruled that the mere fact that respondent Osmena was a holder of a certificate stating that he is an
American did not mean that he is no longer a Filipino, and that an application for an alien certificate of registration was not
tantamount to renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

And, in Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC, it was held that the fact that respondent Manzano was registered as an American
citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and was holding an American passport on April 22, 1997, only a year before he
filed a certificate of candidacy for vice-mayor of Makati, were just assertions of his American nationality before the termination of his
American citizenship.

Thus, the mere fact that private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an Australian passport and had an alien
certificate of registration are not acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against her claim of
Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same must be express.8 As held by this court
in the aforecited case of Aznar, an application for an alien certificate of registration does not amount to an express renunciation or
repudiation of ones citizenship. The application of the herein private respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her
holding of an Australian passport, as in the case of Mercado vs. Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of her Australian citizenship
before she effectively renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual citizenship - she was an Australian and a
Filipino, as well.

Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact that a child of Filipino parent/s was born in another country has not been included
as a ground for losing ones Philippine citizenship. Since private respondent did not lose or renounce her Philippine citizenship,
petitioners claim that respondent must go through the process of repatriation does not hold water.

Petitioner also maintains that even on the assumption that the private respondent had dual citizenship, still, she is disqualified to run
for governor of Davao Oriental; citing Section 40 of Republic Act 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991,
which states:

"SEC. 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:

x x x x x x x x x

(d) Those with dual citizenship;

x x x x x x x x x

Again, petitioners contention is untenable.

In the aforecited case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the Court clarified "dual citizenship" as used in the Local Government Code and
reconciled the same with Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution on dual allegiance.9 Recognizing situations in which a Filipino
citizen may, without performing any act, and as an involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of different countries, be also a
citizen of another state, the Court explained that dual citizenship as a disqualification must refer to citizens with dual allegiance. The
Court succinctly pronounced:

"xxx the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, xxx 40 (d) and in R.A. No. 7854, xxx 20 must be understood as referring to dual
allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification."

Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual citizenship did not automatically disqualify her from running for a public office.
Furthermore, it was ruled that for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of
their certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship.10 The filing of a certificate of candidacy
sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification as a dual citizen.11 This is so because in the
certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen and that he/she will support and defend the Constitution of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is under oath, operates as an effective
renunciation of foreign citizenship. Therefore, when the herein private respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in 1992, such fact
alone terminated her Australian citizenship.

Then, too, it is significant to note that on January 15 1992, private respondent executed a Declaration of Renunciation of Australian
Citizenship, duly registered in the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia on May 12, 1992. And, as a result, on
February 11, 1992, the Australian passport of private respondent was cancelled, as certified to by Second Secretary Richard F.
Munro of the Embassy of Australia in Manila. As aptly appreciated by the COMELEC, the aforesaid acts were enough to settle the
issue of the alleged dual citizenship of Rosalind Ybasco Lopez. Since her renunciation was effective, petitioners claim that private
respondent must go through the whole process of repatriation holds no water.

Petitioner maintains further that when citizenship is raised as an issue in judicial or administrative proceedings, the resolution or
decision thereon is generally not considered res judicata in any subsequent proceeding challenging the same; citing the case of Moy
Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration.12 He insists that the same issue of citizenship may be threshed out anew.

Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is concerned, i.e. the principle of res judicata generally does not apply in cases
hinging on the issue of citizenship. However, in the case of Burca vs. Republic,13 an exception to this general rule was recognized.
The Court ruled in that case that in order that the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the following must
be present:

1) a persons citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy where said person is a party;

2) the Solicitor General or his authorized representative took active part in the resolution thereof, and

3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by this Court.

Although the general rule was set forth in the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao, the case did not foreclose the weight of prior rulings on
citizenship. It elucidated that reliance may somehow be placed on these antecedent official findings, though not really binding, to
make the effort easier or simpler.14 Indeed, there appears sufficient basis to rely on the prior rulings of the Commission on Elections
in SPA. No. 95-066 and EPC 92-54 which resolved the issue of citizenship in favor of the herein private respondent. The evidence
adduced by petitioner is substantially the same evidence presented in these two prior cases. Petitioner failed to show any new
evidence or supervening event to warrant a reversal of such prior resolutions. However, the procedural issue notwithstanding,
considered on the merits, the petition cannot prosper.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the COMELEC Resolutions, dated July 17, 1998 and January 15, 1999,
respectively, in SPA No. 98-336 AFFIRMED.

Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is hereby adjudged qualified to run for governor of Davao Oriental. No pronouncement
as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC



BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999

RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR,

vs.

VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.

R E S O L U T I O N



KAPUNAN, J.:

Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father validly elect Philippine citizenship
fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of majority? This is the question sought to be resolved in the present case
involving the application for admission to the Philippine Bar of Vicente D. Ching.

The facts of this case are as follows:

Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a Filipino, was born in
Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the Philippines.

On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis University in Baguio City, filed an
application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution of this Court, dated 1 September 1998, he was allowed to take the
Bar Examinations, subject to the condition that he must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship.

In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18 November 1998, the following documents:

1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of Accountancy of the Professional Regulations Commission
showing that Ching is a certified public accountant;

2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, Election Officer of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) in Tubao La Union showing that Ching is a registered voter of the said place; and

3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, showing that Ching was elected as a member of
the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union during the 12 May 1992 synchronized elections.

On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released and Ching was one of the successful Bar examinees. The
oath-taking of the successful Bar examinees was scheduled on 5 May 1999. However, because of the questionable status of
Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take his oath. Pursuant to the resolution of this Court, dated 20 April 1999, he was
required to submit further proof of his citizenship. In the same resolution, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was required to
file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the bar and on the documents evidencing his Philippine citizenship.

The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being the "legitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother
born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected
Philippine citizenship" 1 in strict compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act Providing for the
Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen." The
OSG adds that "(w)hat he acquired at best was only an inchoate Philippine citizenship which he could perfect by election upon
reaching the age of majority." 2 In this regard, the OSG clarifies that "two (2) conditions must concur in order that the election of
Philippine citizenship may be effective, namely: (a) the mother of the person making the election must be a citizen of the Philippines;
and (b) said election must be made upon reaching the age of majority." 3 The OSG then explains the meaning of the phrase "upon
reaching the age of majority:"

The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been construed to mean a reasonable time after reaching the age of majority
which had been interpreted by the Secretary of Justice to be three (3) years (VELAYO, supra at p. 51 citing Op., Sec. of Justice No.
70, s. 1940, Feb. 27, 1940). Said period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when a (sic) person concerned has
always considered himself a Filipino (ibid., citing Op. Nos. 355 and 422, s. 1955; 3, 12, 46, 86 and 97, s. 1953). But in Cuenco, it
was held that an election done after over seven (7) years was not made within a reasonable time.

In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship and, if ever he does, it would already be
beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present jurisprudence. However, due to the peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's
case, the OSG recommends the relaxation of the standing rule on the construction of the phrase "reasonable period" and the
allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his oath as a member of the
Philippine Bar.

On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his Affidavit of Election of Philippine Citizenship and his Oath of
Allegiance, both dated 15 July 1999. In his Manifestation, Ching states:

1. I have always considered myself as a Filipino;

2. I was registered as a Filipino and consistently declared myself as one in my school records and other official documents;

3. I am practicing a profession (Certified Public Accountant) reserved for Filipino citizens;

4. I participated in electoral process[es] since the time I was eligible to vote;

5. I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan from 1992 to 1995;

6. I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 625;

7. My election was expressed in a statement signed and sworn to by me before a notary public;

8. I accompanied my election of Philippine citizenship with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of
the Philippines;

9. I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and my oath of allegiance to (sic) the Civil Registrar of Tubao La Union, and

10. I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps. 10.00) as filing fees.

Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999, the question raised is whether he has elected Philippine
citizenship within a "reasonable time." In the affirmative, whether his citizenship by election retroacted to the time he took the bar
examination.

When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935
Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father,
unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. 4 This right to elect Philippine citizenship was
recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided that "(t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five" are citizens of the Philippines. 5 Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution
was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states that "(t)hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine citizens. 6 It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and
1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship should not be understood as having a curative effect on any
irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. 7 If the citizenship of a person was subject to
challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial challenge had not been
commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution. 8

C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the procedure that should
be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino
mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention "in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party
concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall
accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."

However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the election of Philippine citizenship
should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be made "upon reaching the age of majority." The age of
majority then commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. 9 In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the
validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of this Court prior
to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based
on the pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States Government to the effect that the election should be made
within a "reasonable time" after attaining the age of majority. 10 The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the
election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of
majority. 11 However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, 12 that the three (3) year period is not an inflexible rule. We said:

It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable period after reaching the age of majority, and that the Secretary
of Justice has ruled that three (3) years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship under the constitutional provision
adverted to above, which period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when the person concerned has always
considered himself a Filipino. 13

However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect Philippine citizenship is not indefinite:

Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He became of age on February 16, 1944. His election of
citizenship was made on May 15, 1951, when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over seven (7) years after he had
reached the age of majority. It is clear that said election has not been made "upon reaching the age of majority." 14

In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-five (35) years old when he complied with the
requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14) years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the
interpretation of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority," Ching's election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick,
the allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in this connection, that the special circumstances
invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a
registered voter and a former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the
requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.

Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute what Ching erroneously labels as informal election of citizenship.
Ching cannot find a refuge in the case of In re: Florencio Mallare, 15 the pertinent portion of which reads:

And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were (sic) legally married to an alien, Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage
when he came of age, constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. It has been established that Esteban Mallare
was a registered voter as of April 14, 1928, and that as early as 1925 (when he was about 22 years old), Esteban was already
participating in the elections and campaigning for certain candidate[s]. These acts are sufficient to show his preference for Philippine
citizenship. 16

Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and circumstances obtaining therein are very different from those in the present
case, thus, negating its applicability. First, Esteban Mallare was born before the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution and the
enactment of C.A. No. 625. Hence, the requirements and procedures prescribed under the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for
electing Philippine citizenship would not be applicable to him. Second, the ruling in Mallare was an obiter since, as correctly pointed
out by the OSG, it was not necessary for Esteban Mallare to elect Philippine citizenship because he was already a Filipino, he being
a natural child of a Filipino mother. In this regard, the Court stated:

Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino, and no other act would be necessary to
confer on him all the rights and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs.
Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543, Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952, Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693,
Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither could any act be taken on the erroneous belief that he is a
non-filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully entitled. 17

The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated in Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 18 where
we held:

We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal process.

In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the
participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the
Court, we held:

Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age constitutes a positive act of Philippine citizenship. (p. 52: emphasis
supplied)

The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines.

For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be excepted to have elected Philippine citizenship as they were
already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.

xxx xxx xxx

The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to elect citizenship. For those already
Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession
open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for public office,
and other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations for these persons.

An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien. Or his status is doubtful because he is a
national of two countries. There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).

We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private respondent would not only have been superfluous but
it would also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship? 19

The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching. However, even if we consider the special circumstances in the life
of Ching like his having lived in the Philippines all his life and his consistent belief that he is a Filipino, controlling statutes and
jurisprudence constrain us to disagree with the recommendation of the OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to validly elect
Philippine citizenship. The span of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally
expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon
reaching the age of majority." Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship. The
prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the
elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry.
Ching's unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.

Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient.
20 One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the
right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and,
as a result. this golden privilege slipped away from his grasp.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's application for admission to the Philippine Bar.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 142840 May 7, 2001

ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner,
vs.
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents.

CONCURRING OPINION

DISSENTING OPINION

KAPUNAN, J.:

The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement that "no person shall
be a Member of the House of Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen."1

Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino
parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution.2

On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the consent of the
Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for
under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or
accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country." Said provision of law reads:

SECTION 1. How citizenship may be lost. A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following ways and/or events:

x x x

(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed of a foreign country: Provided, That the rendering of service to,
or the acceptance of such commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country, and the taking of an oath of allegiance incident
thereto, with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall not divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the
following circumstances is present:

(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance with said foreign country; or

(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines:
Provided, That the Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of rendering said service, or acceptance of said commission, and taking
the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so only in connection with his service to said foreign country; And
provided, finally, That any Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is commissioned in, the armed forces of a foreign country
under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall not be Republic of the Philippines during the period of his
service to, or commission in, the armed forces of said country. Upon his discharge from the service of the said foreign country, he
shall be automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and politically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil political rights as
a Filipino citizen x x x.

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June
5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine Corps.

On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630.3 He
ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a
convincing margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.1wphi1.nt

Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a
natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.4

On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision5 dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the duly elected
Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the decision in its resolution dated April 27, 2000.6

Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the HRET's decision on the following grounds:

1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it ruled that private
respondent is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased being such in view of the loss and
renunciation of such citizenship on his part.

2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it considered
private respondent as a citizen of the Philippines despite the fact he did not validly acquire his Philippine citizenship.

3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship was invalid, the HRET committed serious errors and grave
abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction, when it dismissed the petition despite the fact that such reacquisition could
not legally and constitutionally restore his natural-born status.7

The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be
considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.

Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino since he lost h is Philippine citizenship
when he swore allegiance to the United States in 1995, and had to reacquire the same by repatriation. He insists that Article citizens
are those who are from birth with out having to perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.

Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status as natural-born citizen when he was repatriated since the
phrase "from birth" in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the innate, inherent and inborn characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.

The petition is without merit.

The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follow:

(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;

(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mother, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, and

(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.8

There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to
the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a
particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.9

As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citezenship."10

On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally under
Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law
(Act No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530.11 To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the
qualifications12 and none of the disqualification13 provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The decision granting Philippine
citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening
period, the applicant has (1) not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been
convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the
nation or contrary to any Government announced policies.14

Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth
Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by
naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.15

Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of initially acquiring Philippine
citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for
reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63.16 Under this law, a former Filipino citizen who wishes
to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications17 and none of the disqualification mentioned in Section 4 of
C.A. 473.18

Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the
armed forces;19 services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;20 (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United
States at any other time,21 (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien;22 and (5) political economic necessity.23

As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or
last resided.

In Angat v. Republic,24 we held:

xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630], the person desiring to reacquire Philippine citizenship
would not even be required to file a petition in court, and all that he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and to register that fact with the civil registry in the place of his residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines.
[Italics in the original.25

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.26 This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his
citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born
citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the United States.
However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630, which provides:

Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces
of the United States, or after separation from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may
reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same with Local
Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation
of any other citizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil Registry of
Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original
status as a natural-born citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father.27 It bears stressing that the act of
repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine citizenship.

Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to perform an act to regain his
citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in its decision, the term "natural-born citizen" was first defined in Article
III, Section 4 of the 1973 Constitution as follows:

Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect his Philippine citizenship.

Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person must be a Filipino citizen birth and (2) he does not
have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his Philippine citizenship.

Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens which were not considered natural-born: (1)
those who were naturalized and (2) those born before January 17, 1973,38 of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of
majority, elected Philippine citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not considered natural-born obviously because they were
not Filipino at birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers before the effectively
of the 1973 Constitution were likewise not considered natural-born because they also had to perform an act to perfect their
Philippines citizenship.

The present Constitution, however, now consider those born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and
who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the majority age as natural-born. After defining who re natural-born citizens,
Section 2 of Article IV adds a sentence: "Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof
shall be deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is
apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1)
those who are natural-born and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e.,
did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy
is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently
reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the
reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent
Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceeding in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-
born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives.

A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the members of the House.29 The Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to check "whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter.30 In the absence
thereof, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power and annul the decision of the HRET nor to substitute the
Court's judgement for that of the latter for the simple reason that it is not the office of a petition for certiorari to inquire into the
correctness of the assailed decision.31 There is no such showing of grave abuse of discretion in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC



G.R. No. 135083 May 26, 1999

ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner,
vs.
EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.



MENDOZA, J.:

Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in
the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V. Daza III. The results of the election were as follows:

Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853

Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894

Gabriel V. Daza III 54,275 1

The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto
Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.

In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998, 2 the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under 40(d) of the
Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. The COMELEC's
Second Division said:

What is presented before the Commission is a petition for disqualification of Eduardo Barrios Manzano as candidate for the office of
Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998 elections. The petition is based on the ground that the respondent is an American
citizen based on the record of the Bureau of Immigration and misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen.

In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of
Immigration under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in 1955
of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States, San Francisco, California, September 14, 1955, and is
considered in American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his
Filipino citizenship.

Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent Manzano is born a Filipino and a US citizen. In other words, he
holds dual citizenship.

The question presented is whether under our laws, he is disqualified from the position for which he filed his certificate of candidacy.
Is he eligible for the office he seeks to be elected?

Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective
local position.

WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano DISQUALIFIED as candidate for Vice-
Mayor of Makati City.

On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. 3 The motion remained pending even until after the election
held on May 11, 1998.

Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated May 10, 1998, of the COMELEC, the board of canvassers tabulated
the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but suspended the proclamation of the winner.

On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. 4 Petitioner's motion was opposed by private
respondent.

The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc rendered its resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one
commissioner abstaining, the COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of its Second Division and declared private respondent
qualified to run for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. 5 The pertinent portions of the resolution of the
COMELEC en banc read:

As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by
operation of the United States Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli.

He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos
at the time of his birth. At the age of six (6), his parents brought him to the Philippines using an American passport as travel
document. His parents also registered him as an alien with the Philippine Bureau of Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate
of registration. This, however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine citizenship and
did not take an oath of allegiance to the United States.

It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a voter, and voted in the
elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law, he no
longer had U.S. citizenship.

At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, was not yet final.
Respondent Manzano obtained the highest number of votes among the candidates for vice-mayor of Makati City, garnering one
hundred three thousand eight hundred fifty three (103,853) votes over his closest rival, Ernesto S. Mercado, who obtained one
hundred thousand eight hundred ninety four (100,894) votes, or a margin of two thousand nine hundred fifty nine (2,959) votes.
Gabriel Daza III obtained third place with fifty four thousand two hundred seventy five (54,275) votes. In applying election laws, it
would be far better to err in favor of the popular choice than be embroiled in complex legal issues involving private international law
which may well be settled before the highest court (Cf. Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA 727).

WHEREFORE, the Commission en banc hereby REVERSES the resolution of the Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998,
ordering the cancellation of the respondent's certificate of candidacy.

We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to be QUALIFIED as a candidate for the position of vice-mayor of Makati
City in the May 11, 1998, elections.

ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the Makati City Board of Canvassers, upon proper notice to the parties, to reconvene and
proclaim the respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano as the winning candidate for vice-mayor of Makati City.

Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers, on the evening of August 31, 1998, proclaimed
private respondent as vice mayor of the City of Makati.

This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the aforesaid resolution of the COMELEC en banc and to declare private
respondent disqualified to hold the office of vice mayor of Makati City. Petitioner contends that

[T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:

A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen when he:

1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the age of majority when he was already 37 years old; and,

2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) registered himself as a voter and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995
and 1998.

B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati;

C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division adopted on 7 May 1998 was not yet final
so that, effectively, petitioner may not be declared the winner even assuming that Manzano is disqualified to run for and hold the
elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.

We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by private respondent Manzano whether petitioner Mercado his
personality to bring this suit considering that he was not an original party in the case for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril nor
was petitioner's motion for leave to intervene granted.

I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT

Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure of the COMELEC in support of his claim that
petitioner has no right to intervene and, therefore, cannot bring this suit to set aside the ruling denying his motion for intervention:

Sec. 1. When proper and when may be permitted to intervene. Any person allowed to initiate an action or proceeding may,
before or during the trial of an action or proceeding, be permitted by the Commission, in its discretion to intervene in such action or
proceeding, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or
when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by such action or proceeding.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 3. Discretion of Commission. In allowing or disallowing a motion for intervention, the Commission or the Division, in the
exercise of its discretion, shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of
the original parties and whether or not the intervenor's rights may be fully protected in a separate action or proceeding.

Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in litigation nor an interest to protect because he is
"a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City [who] cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City if the
private respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and executory judgment."

The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene in the proceedings before the COMELEC,
there had already been a proclamation of the results of the election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the basis of
which petitioner came out only second to private respondent. The fact, however, is that there had been no proclamation at that time.
Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting private respondent from the race at the time he sought to intervene. The
rule in Labo v. COMELEC, 6 reiterated in several cases, 7 only applies to cases in which the election of the respondent is contested,
and the question is whether one who placed second to the disqualified candidate may be declared the winner. In the present case,
at the time petitioner filed a "Motion for Leave to File Intervention" on May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner,
and petitioner's purpose was precisely to have private respondent disqualified "from running for [an] elective local position" under
40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted the disqualification proceedings), a registered voter of Makati
City, was competent to bring the action, so was petitioner since the latter was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.

Nor is petitioner's interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a motion for intervention only on May 20, 1998, after
private respondent had been shown to have garnered the highest number of votes among the candidates for vice mayor. That
petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is clear from 6
of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reform Law of 1987, which provides:

Any candidate who his been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not
be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for
and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of
action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.

Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final
judgment rendered.

The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioner's motion for intervention was tantamount to a denial of the motion,
justifying petitioner in filing the instant petition for certiorari. As the COMELEC en banc instead decided the merits of the case, the
present petition properly deals not only with the denial of petitioner's motion for intervention but also with the substantive issues
respecting private respondent's alleged disqualification on the ground of dual citizenship.

This brings us to the next question, namely, whether private respondent Manzano possesses dual citizenship and, if so, whether he
is disqualified from being a candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.

II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION

The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under 40 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No.
7160), which declares as "disqualified from running for any elective local position: . . . (d) Those with dual citizenship." This provision
is incorporated in the Charter of the City of Makati. 8

Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as the Solicitor General, who sides with him in this case, contends that
through 40(d) of the Local Government Code, Congress has "command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons possessing
dual allegiance to hold local elective office."

To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of
the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. 9 For instance, such a
situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a
state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently
considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following
classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:

(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli;

(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their father's' country such children are
citizens of that country;

(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latter's country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or
omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.

There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any act, be also a citizen of another
state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship.

Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to
two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individual's volition.

With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the Constitution provides: "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national
interest and shall be dealt with by law." This provision was included in the 1987 Constitution at the instance of Commissioner Blas F.
Ople who explained its necessity as follows: 10

. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual citizenship. I have circulated a memorandum to the Bernas
Committee according to which a dual allegiance and I reiterate a dual allegiance is larger and more threatening than that of
mere double citizenship which is seldom intentional and, perhaps, never insidious. That is often a function of the accident of mixed
marriages or of birth on foreign soil. And so, I do not question double citizenship at all.

What we would like the Committee to consider is to take constitutional cognizance of the problem of dual allegiance. For example,
we all know what happens in the triennial elections of the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce which consists of
about 600 chapters all over the country. There is a Peking ticket, as well as a Taipei ticket. Not widely known is the fact chat the
Filipino-Chinese community is represented in the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China in Taiwan. And until recently, sponsor
might recall, in Mainland China in the People's Republic of China, they have the Associated Legislative Council for overseas
Chinese wherein all of Southeast Asia including some European and Latin countries were represented, which was dissolved after
several years because of diplomatic friction. At that time, the Filipino-Chinese were also represented in that Overseas Council.

When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this unsettled kind of allegiance of Filipinos, of citizens who are already
Filipinos but who, by their acts, may be said to be bound by a second allegiance, either to Peking or Taiwan. I also took close note
of the concern expressed by some Commissioners yesterday, including Commissioner Villacorta, who were concerned about the
lack of guarantees of thorough assimilation, and especially Commissioner Concepcion who has always been worried about minority
claims on our natural resources.

Dull allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to Taiwan, Singapore, China or Malaysia, and this is already happening.
Some of the great commercial places in downtown Taipei are Filipino-owned, owned by Filipino-Chinese it is of common
knowledge in Manila. It can mean a tragic capital outflow when we have to endure a capital famine which also means economic
stagnation, worsening unemployment and social unrest.

And so, this is exactly what we ask that the Committee kindly consider incorporating a new section, probably Section 5, in the
article on Citizenship which will read as follows: DUAL ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO CITIZENSHIP AND SHALL BE DEALT WITH
ACCORDING TO LAW.

In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem of these citizens with dual allegiance, thus: 11

. . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their concern about dual citizenship in the sense that it implies a double
allegiance under a double sovereignty which some of us who spoke then in a freewheeling debate thought would be repugnant to
the sovereignty which pervades the Constitution and to citizenship itself which implies a uniqueness and which elsewhere in the
Constitution is defined in terms of rights and obligations exclusive to that citizenship including, of course, the obligation to rise to the
defense of the State when it is threatened, and back of this, Commissioner Bernas, is, of course, the concern for national security. In
the course of those debates, I think some noted the fact that as a result of the wave of naturalizations since the decision to establish
diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China was made in 1975, a good number of these naturalized Filipinos still
routinely go to Taipei every October 10; and it is asserted that some of them do renew their oath of allegiance to a foreign
government maybe just to enter into the spirit of the occasion when the anniversary of the Sun Yat-Sen Republic is commemorated.
And so, I have detected a genuine and deep concern about double citizenship, with its attendant risk of double allegiance which is
repugnant to our sovereignty and national security. I appreciate what the Committee said that this could be left to the determination
of a future legislature. But considering the scale of the problem, the real impact on the security of this country, arising from, let us
say, potentially great numbers of double citizens professing double allegiance, will the Committee entertain a proposed amendment
at the proper time that will prohibit, in effect, or regulate double citizenship?

Clearly, in including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se
but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the
phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, 20 must be understood as referring to "dual allegiance."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must,
therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should
suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with
dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G.
Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission, pointed out: "[D]ual citizenship is just a reality
imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother.
But whether she is considered a citizen of another country is something completely beyond our control." 12

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the other country of which they are also
citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws,
such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment as the following discussion on 40(d)
between Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows: 13

SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41, page 17: "Any person with dual citizenship" is
disqualified to run for any elective local position. Under the present Constitution, Mr. President, someone whose mother is a citizen
of the Philippines but his father is a foreigner is a natural-born citizen of the Republic. There is no requirement that such a natural
born citizen, upon reaching the age of majority, must elect or give up Philippine citizenship.

On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging to the country of his or her father and one belonging
to the Republic of the Philippines, may such a situation disqualify the person to run for a local government position?

SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the moment when he would want to run for public office, he
has to repudiate one of his citizenships.

SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the country of origin or the country of the father claims that
person, nevertheless, as a citizen? No one can renounce. There are such countries in the world.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office would, in effect, be an election for him of his desire to
be considered as a Filipino citizen.

SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not require an election. Under the Constitution, a person
whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines is, at birth, a citizen without any overt act to claim the citizenship.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the Gentleman's example, if he does not renounce his
other citizenship, then he is opening himself to question. So, if he is really interested to run, the first thing he should do is to say in
the Certificate of Candidacy that: "I am a Filipino citizen, and I have only one citizenship."

SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr. President. He will always have one citizenship, and
that is the citizenship invested upon him or her in the Constitution of the Republic.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that will prove that he also acknowledges other
citizenships, then he will probably fall under this disqualification.

This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must renounce "all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince,
potentate, state, or sovereignty" 14 of which at the time he is a subject or citizen before he can be issued a certificate of
naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines. In Parado v. Republic, 15 it was held:

[W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he renounce, his loyalty to any other country or
government and solemnly declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is
satisfied and compiled with. The determination whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our
Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted
by the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its operation and application. If the
requirement of the Chinese Law of Nationality were to be read into our Naturalization Law, we would be applying not what our
legislative department has deemed it wise to require, but what a foreign government has thought or intended to exact. That, of
course, is absurd. It must be resisted by all means and at all cost. It would be a brazen encroachment upon the sovereign will and
power of the people of this Republic.

III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP

The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on September 4, 1955, of Filipino parents. Since
the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, while the United States follows the doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree
that, at birth at least, he was a national both of the Philippines and of the United States. However, the COMELEC en banc held that,
by participating in Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998, private respondent "effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship under
American law," so that now he is solely a Philippine national.

Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in Philippine elections is not sufficient evidence of renunciation
and that, in any event, as the alleged renunciation was made when private respondent was already 37 years old, it was ineffective
as it should have been made when he reached the age of majority.

In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renounced his American citizenship, the COMELEC must have in
mind 349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of the United States, which provided that "A person who is a national of the United
States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: . . . (e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or
participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory." To be sure this provision was declared
unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in Afroyim v. Rusk 16 as beyond the power given to the U.S. Congress to regulate
foreign relations. However, by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine
citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. Private respondent's certificate of candidacy, filed on March 27, 1998,
contained the following statements made under oath:

6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF "NATURAL-BORN" OR "NATURALIZED") NATURAL-BORN

xxx xxx xxx

10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747-A, BARANGAY SAN LORENZO, CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF
MAKATI, PROVINCE OF NCR.

11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.

12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED. I WILL SUPPORT AND DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION
OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WILL MAINTAIN TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE THERETO; THAT I WILL OBEY THE LAWS,
LEGAL ORDERS AND DECREES PROMULGATED BY THE DULY CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES; AND THAT I IMPOSE THIS OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION
OR PURPOSE OF EVASION. I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FACTS STATED HEREIN ARE TRUE AND CORRECT OF MY
OWN PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE.

The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he
might have as a dual citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo v. COMELEC it was held: 17

It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively
give him dual citizenship, which under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would disqualify him "from running for any elective
local position?" We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at
the time he took said oath of allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that
he "had long renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenship long before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was
stateless in the interim when he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino
citizenship."

On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:

By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when he took his oath of allegiance to the
Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of
allegiance to the Philippine Government.

These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the elections of 1995 have not been effectively
rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing
of capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse.

There is, therefore, no merit in petitioner's contention that the oath of allegiance contained in private respondent's certificate of
candidacy is insufficient to constitute renunciation that, to be effective, such renunciation should have been made upon private
respondent reaching the age of majority since no law requires the election of Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.

Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted that he is registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation and that he holds an American passport which he used in his last travel to the United States on April
22, 1997. There is no merit in this. Until the filing of his certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998, he had dual citizenship. The acts
attributed to him can be considered simply as the assertion of his American nationality before the termination of his American
citizenship. What this Court said in Aznar v. COMELEC 18 applies mutatis mundatis to private respondent in the case at bar:

. . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate staring
he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. . . . [T]he Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is
not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of
Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation
needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be "express," it stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine citizenship
when there is no renunciation, either "express" or "implied."

To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or
immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance
thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned,
effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondent's oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with the fact that he has spent his
youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country,
leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are
enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v.
Defensor-Santiago, 19 we sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a
naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad
that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship,
renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.1wphi1.nt

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC



G.R. Nos. 92191-92 July 30, 1991

ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner,
vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.

G.R. Nos. 92202-03 July 30, 1991

SIXTO T. BALANQUIT, JR., petitioner,
vs.
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR., respondents.

Hechanova & Associates for petitioner Co.

Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro and Arcilla Law Offices for respondent Ong, Jr.



GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p

The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and reversal of a decision of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET).

The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for
voting purposes. The sole issue before us is whether or not, in making that determination, the HRET acted with grave abuse of
discretion.

On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held.

Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district of Northern Samar are the
petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.

Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar.

The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent premised on the following grounds:

1) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and

2) Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar.

The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private respondent.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November 12, 1989. This was, however, denied by the HRET in its
resolution dated February 22, 1989.

Hence, these petitions for certiorari.

We treat the comments as answers and decide the issues raised in the petitions.

ON THE ISSUE OF JURISDICTION

The first question which arises refers to our jurisdiction.

The Constitution explicitly provides that the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Senate Electoral Tribunal
(SET) shall be the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective members. (See
Article VI, Section 17, Constitution)

The authority conferred upon the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and complete. The use of the word sole emphasizes the exclusivity
of the jurisdiction of these Tribunals.

The Supreme Court in the case of Lazatin v. HRET (168 SCRA 391 [1988]) stated that under the 1987 Constitution, the jurisdiction
of the Electoral Tribunal is original and exclusive, viz:

The use of the word "sole" emphasizes the exclusive character of the jurisdiction conferred (Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra
at p. 162). The exercise of power by the Electoral Commission under the 1935 Constitution has been described as "intended to be
as complete and unimpaired as if it had originally remained in the legislature." (id., at p. 175) Earlier this grant of power to the
legislature was characterized by Justice Malcolm as "full, clear and complete; (Veloso v. Board of Canvassers of Leyte and Samar,
39 Phil. 886 [1919]) Under the amended 1935 Constitution, the power was unqualifiedly reposed upon the Electoral Tribunal and it
remained as full, clear and complete as that previously granted the Legislature and the Electoral Commission, (Lachica v. Yap, 25
SCRA 140 [1968]) The same may be said with regard to the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal under the 1987 Constitution. (p.
401)

The Court continued further, ". . . so long as the Constitution grants the HRET the power to be the sole judge of all contests relating
to election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives, any final action taken by the HRET on a matter
within its jurisdiction shall, as a rule, not be reviewed by this Court . . . the power granted to the Electoral Tribunal is full, clear and
complete and excludes the exercise of any authority on the part of this Court that would in any wise restrict it or curtail it or even
affect the same." (pp. 403-404)

When may the Court inquire into acts of the Electoral Tribunals under our constitutional grants of power?

In the later case of Robles v. HRET (181 SCRA 780 [1990]) the Supreme Court stated that the judgments of the Tribunal are
beyond judicial interference save only "in the exercise of this Court's so-called extraordinary jurisdiction, . . . upon a determination
that the Tribunal's decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion or
paraphrasing Morrero, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use by the Tribunal of its power as constitutes a
denial of due process of law, or upon a demonstration of a very clear unmitigated ERROR, manifestly constituting such GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION that there has to be a remedy for such abuse." (at pp. 785-786)

In the leading case of Morrero v. Bocar (66 Phil. 429 [1938]) the Court ruled that the power of the Electoral Commission "is beyond
judicial interference except, in any event, upon a clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of power as will constitute a
denial of due process." The Court does not venture into the perilous area of trying to correct perceived errors of independent
branches of the Government, It comes in only when it has to vindicate a denial of due process or correct an abuse of discretion so
grave or glaring that no less than the Constitution calls for remedial action.

The Supreme Court under the 1987 Constitution, has been given an expanded jurisdiction, so to speak, to review the decisions of
the other branches and agencies of the government to determine whether or not they have acted within the bounds of the
Constitution. (See Article VIII, Section 1, Constitution)

Yet, in the exercise thereof, the Court is to merely check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the
Constitutional limits of its jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing that the HRET has
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective
power; it will not decide a matter which by its nature is for the HRET alone to decide. (See Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668
[1989]) It has no power to look into what it thinks is apparent error.

As constitutional creations invested with necessary power, the Electoral Tribunals, although not powers in the tripartite scheme of
the government, are, in the exercise of their functions independent organs independent of Congress and the Supreme Court. The
power granted to HRET by the Constitution is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had remained originally in the
legislature. (Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 [1936])

In passing upon petitions, the Court with its traditional and careful regard for the balance of powers, must permit this exclusive
privilege of the Tribunals to remain where the Sovereign authority has place it. (See Veloso v. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and
Samar, 39 Phil. 886 [1919])

It has been argued that under Article VI, Section 17 of the present Constitution, the situation may exist as it exists today where there
is an unhealthy one-sided political composition of the two Electoral Tribunals. There is nothing in the Constitution, however, that
makes the HRET because of its composition any less independent from the Court or its constitutional functions any less exclusive.
The degree of judicial intervention should not be made to depend on how many legislative members of the HRET belong to this
party or that party. The test remains the same-manifest grave abuse of discretion.

In the case at bar, the Court finds no improvident use of power, no denial of due process on the part of the HRET which will
necessitate the exercise of the power of judicial review by the Supreme Court.

ON THE ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP

The records show that in the year 1895, the private respondent's grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines from China. Ong Te
established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he bought from the fruits of hard work.

As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of residence from the then Spanish colonial administration.

The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year
1915.

Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar. In Laoang, he was able to establish an enduring relationship with his
neighbors, resulting in his easy assimilation into the community.

As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural values and practices.
He was baptized into Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in
love and, thereafter, got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice.

The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the private respondent who was born in 1948.

The private respondent's father never emigrated from this country. He decided to put up a hardware store and shared and survived
the vicissitudes of life in Samar.

The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a branch was set-up in Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, the
father of the private respondent, unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal affirmation of where he cast his life and family, filed
with the Court of First Instance of Samar an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954.

On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong Chuan a Filipino citizen.

On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Samar issued an order declaring the decision of April 28, 1955 as final and
executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of Allegiance.

Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance; correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization was issued to
him.

At the time Jose Ong Chuan took his oath, the private respondent then a minor of nine years was finishing his elementary education
in the province of Samar. There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos insofar as the customs and
practices of the local populace were concerned.

Fortunes changed. The house of the family of the private respondent in Laoang, Samar was burned to the ground.

Undaunted by the catastrophe, the private respondent's family constructed another one in place of their ruined house. Again, there
is no showing other than that Laoang was their abode and home.

After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in search for better education, went to Manila in order to acquire
his secondary and college education.

In the meantime, another misfortune was suffered by the family in 1975 when a fire gutted their second house in Laoang, Samar.
The respondent's family constructed still another house, this time a 16-door apartment building, two doors of which were reserved
for the family.

The private respondent graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the CPA Board Examinations.

Since employment opportunities were better in Manila, the respondent looked for work here. He found a job in the Central Bank of
the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he worked in the hardware business of his family in Manila. In 1971, his elder
brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention. His status as a natural born citizen was challenged.
Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to derived citizenship on the
basis of the mother's citizenship formally and solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural born Filipino. The
Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the meaning of natural born citizenship since it was precisely amending the article on
this subject.

The private respondent frequently went home to Laoang, Samar, where he grew up and spent his childhood days.

In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim.

For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and correspondingly, voted there
during those elections.

The private respondent after being engaged for several years in the management of their family business decided to be of greater
service to his province and ran for public office. Hence, when the opportunity came in 1987, he ran in the elections for
representative in the second district of Northern Samar.

Mr. Ong was overwhelmingly voted by the people of Northern Samar as their representative in Congress. Even if the total votes of
the two petitioners are combined, Ong would still lead the two by more than 7,000 votes.

The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:

SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:

1. Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the Constitution;

2. Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;

3. Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority; and

4. Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.

SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed
natural-born citizens.

The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after February 2,
1987 but also to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship before that date.

The provision in Paragraph 3 was intended to correct an unfair position which discriminates against Filipino women. There is no
ambiguity in the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, viz:

Mr. Azcuna: With respect to the provision of section 4, would this refer only to those who elect Philippine citizenship after the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution or would it also cover those who elected it under the 1973 Constitution?

Fr. Bernas: It would apply to anybody who elected Philippine citizenship by virtue of the provision of the 1935 Constitution
whether the election was done before or after January 17, 1973. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 228;
Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Trenas: The Committee on Citizenship, Bill of Rights, Political Rights and Obligations and Human Rights has more or
less decided to extend the interpretation of who is a natural-born citizen as provided in section 4 of the 1973 Constitution by adding
that persons who have elected Philippine Citizenship under the 1935 Constitution shall be natural-born? Am I right Mr. Presiding
Officer?

Fr. Bernas: yes.

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Nolledo: And I remember very well that in the Reverend Father Bernas' well written book, he said that the decision was
designed merely to accommodate former delegate Ernesto Ang and that the definition on natural-born has no retroactive effect. Now
it seems that the Reverend Father Bernas is going against this intention by supporting the amendment?

Fr. Bernas: As the Commissioner can see, there has been an evolution in my thinking. (Records of the Constitutional
Commission, Vol. 1, p. 189)

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Rodrigo: But this provision becomes very important because his election of Philippine citizenship makes him not only a
Filipino citizen but a natural-born Filipino citizen entitling him to run for Congress. . .

Fr. Bernas: Correct. We are quite aware of that and for that reason we will leave it to the body to approve that provision of
section 4.

Mr. Rodrigo: I think there is a good basis for the provision because it strikes me as unfair that the Filipino citizen who was
born a day before January 17, 1973 cannot be a Filipino citizen or a natural-born citizen. (Records of the Constitutional Commission,
Vol. 1, p. 231)

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Rodrigo: The purpose of that provision is to remedy an inequitable situation. Between 1935 and 1973 when we were
under the 1935 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers but alien mothers were natural-born Filipinos. However, those born of
Filipino mothers but alien fathers would have to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and if they do elect,
they become Filipino citizens but not natural-born Filipino citizens. (Records of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 356)

The foregoing significantly reveals the intent of the framers. To make the provision prospective from February 3, 1987 is to give a
narrow interpretation resulting in an inequitable situation. It must also be retroactive.

It should be noted that in construing the law, the Courts are not always to be hedged in by the literal meaning of its language. The
spirit and intendment thereof, must prevail over the letter, especially where adherence to the latter would result in absurdity and
injustice. (Casela v. Court of Appeals, 35 SCRA 279 [1970])

A Constitutional provision should be construed so as to give it effective operation and suppress the mischief at which it is aimed,
hence, it is the spirit of the provision which should prevail over the letter thereof. (Jarrolt v. Mabberly, 103 U.S. 580)

In the words of the Court in the case of J.M. Tuason v. LTA (31 SCRA 413 [1970]:

To that primordial intent, all else is subordinated. Our Constitution, any constitution is not to be construed narrowly or pedantically
for the prescriptions therein contained, to paraphrase Justice Holmes, are not mathematical formulas having their essence in their
form but are organic living institutions, the significance of which is vital not formal. . . . (p. 427)

The provision in question was enacted to correct the anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien mother
was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have
to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born.

Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with an alien father were placed on
equal footing. They were both considered as natural-born citizens.

Hence, the bestowment of the status of "natural-born" cannot be made to depend on the fleeting accident of time or result in two
kinds of citizens made up of essentially the same similarly situated members.

It is for this reason that the amendments were enacted, that is, in order to remedy this accidental anomaly, and, therefore, treat
equally all those born before the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship either before or after the effectivity of that
Constitution.

The Constitutional provision in question is, therefore curative in nature. The enactment was meant to correct the inequitable and
absurd situation which then prevailed, and thus, render those acts valid which would have been nil at the time had it not been for the
curative provisions. (See Development Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 96 SCRA 342 [1980])

There is no dispute that the respondent's mother was a natural born Filipina at the time of her marriage. Crucial to this case is the
issue of whether or not the respondent elected or chose to be a Filipino citizen.

Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the Constitution accords natural born status to children born of Filipino
mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.

To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and
unnecessary. The reason is obvious. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a natural born citizen but his father had
been naturalized when the respondent was only nine (9) years old. He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973
and 1987 the Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of
his already having been a citizen since 1957. In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an unusual and
unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen since he was nine years old.

We have jurisprudence that defines "election" as both a formal and an informal process.

In the case of In Re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the
participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the
Court, we held:

Esteban's exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship (p. 52;
emphasis supplied)

The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines.

For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be expected to have elected citizenship as they were already
citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.

The respondent was born in an outlying rural town of Samar where there are no alien enclaves and no racial distinctions. The
respondent has lived the life of a Filipino since birth. His father applied for naturalization when the child was still a small boy. He is a
Roman Catholic. He has worked for a sensitive government agency. His profession requires citizenship for taking the examinations
and getting a license. He has participated in political exercises as a Filipino and has always considered himself a Filipino citizen.
There is nothing in the records to show that he does not embrace Philippine customs and values, nothing to indicate any tinge of
alien-ness no acts to show that this country is not his natural homeland. The mass of voters of Northern Samar are frilly aware of
Mr. Ong's parentage. They should know him better than any member of this Court will ever know him. They voted by overwhelming
numbers to have him represent them in Congress. Because of his acts since childhood, they have considered him as a Filipino.

The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to elect citizenship. For those already
Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession
open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for public office,
and other categorical acts of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations of choice for these persons.

An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien. Or his status is doubtful because he is a
national of two countries. There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).

We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private respondent would not only have been superfluous but
it would also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine citizenship?

The respondent HRET has an interesting view as to how Mr. Ong elected citizenship. It observed that "when protestee was only
nine years of age, his father, Jose Ong Chuan became a naturalized Filipino. Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act squarely
applies its benefit to him for he was then a minor residing in this country. Concededly, it was the law itself that had already elected
Philippine citizenship for protestee by declaring him as such." (Emphasis supplied)

The petitioners argue that the respondent's father was not, validly, a naturalized citizen because of his premature taking of the oath
of citizenship.

The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping Mr. Ong's father of his citizenship after his death and at this very late
date just so we can go after the son.

The petitioners question the citizenship of the father through a collateral approach. This can not be done. In our jurisdiction, an
attack on a person's citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity. (See Queto v. Catolico, 31 SCRA 52 [1970])

To ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan as null and void would run against the principle of
due process. Jose Ong Chuan has already been laid to rest. How can he be given a fair opportunity to defend himself. A dead man
cannot speak. To quote the words of the HRET "Ong Chuan's lips have long been muted to perpetuity by his demise and obviously
he could not use beyond where his mortal remains now lie to defend himself were this matter to be made a central issue in this
case."

The issue before us is not the nullification of the grant of citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan. Our function is to determine whether or not
the HRET committed abuse of authority in the exercise of its powers. Moreover, the respondent traces his natural born citizenship
through his mother, not through the citizenship of his father. The citizenship of the father is relevant only to determine whether or not
the respondent "chose" to be a Filipino when he came of age. At that time and up to the present, both mother and father were
Filipinos. Respondent Ong could not have elected any other citizenship unless he first formally renounced Philippine citizenship in
favor of a foreign nationality. Unlike other persons faced with a problem of election, there was no foreign nationality of his father
which he could possibly have chosen.

There is another reason why we cannot declare the HRET as having committed manifest grave abuse of discretion. The same issue
of natural-born citizenship has already been decided by the Constitutional Convention of 1971 and by the Batasang Pambansa
convened by authority of the Constitution drafted by that Convention. Emil Ong, full blood brother of the respondent, was declared
and accepted as a natural born citizen by both bodies.

Assuming that our opinion is different from that of the Constitutional Convention, the Batasang Pambansa, and the respondent
HRET, such a difference could only be characterized as error. There would be no basis to call the HRET decision so arbitrary and
whimsical as to amount to grave abuse of discretion.

What was the basis for the Constitutional Convention's declaring Emil Ong a natural born citizen?

Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, inhabitants of the Philippines who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April 1899 and then
residing in said islands and their children born subsequent thereto were conferred the status of a Filipino citizen.

Was the grandfather of the private respondent a Spanish subject?

Article 17 of the Civil Code of Spain enumerates those who were considered Spanish Subjects, viz:

ARTICLE 17. The following are Spaniards:

1. Persons born in Spanish territory.

2. Children born of a Spanish father or mother, even though they were born out of Spain.

3. Foreigners who may have obtained naturalization papers.

4. Those without such papers, who may have acquired domicile in any town in the Monarchy. (Emphasis supplied)

The domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence. This domicile, once established is considered to continue and
will not be deemed lost until a new one is established. (Article 50, NCC; Article 40, Civil Code of Spain; Zuellig v. Republic, 83 Phil.
768 [1949])

As earlier stated, Ong Te became a permanent resident of Laoang, Samar around 1895. Correspondingly, a certificate of residence
was then issued to him by virtue of his being a resident of Laoang, Samar. (Report of the Committee on Election Protests and
Credentials of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, September 7, 1972, p. 3)

The domicile that Ong Te established in 1895 continued until April 11, 1899; it even went beyond the turn of the 19th century. It is
also in this place were Ong Te set-up his business and acquired his real property.

As concluded by the Constitutional Convention, Ong Te falls within the meaning of sub-paragraph 4 of Article 17 of the Civil Code of
Spain.

Although Ong Te made brief visits to China, he, nevertheless, always returned to the Philippines. The fact that he died in China,
during one of his visits in said country, was of no moment. This will not change the fact that he already had his domicile fixed in the
Philippines and pursuant to the Civil Code of Spain, he had become a Spanish subject.

If Ong Te became a Spanish subject by virtue of having established his domicile in a town under the Monarchy of Spain,
necessarily, Ong Te was also an inhabitant of the Philippines for an inhabitant has been defined as one who has actual fixed
residence in a place; one who has a domicile in a place. (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Vol. II) A priori, there can be no other logical
conclusion but to educe that Ong Te qualified as a Filipino citizen under the provisions of section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902.

The HRET itself found this fact of absolute verity in concluding that the private respondent was a natural-born Filipino.

The petitioners' sole ground in disputing this fact is that document presented to prove it were not in compliance with the best the
evidence rule. The petitioners allege that the private respondent failed to present the original of the documentary evidence,
testimonial evidence and of the transcript of the proceedings of the body which the aforesaid resolution of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention was predicated.

On the contrary, the documents presented by the private respondent fall under the exceptions to the best evidence rule.

It was established in the proceedings before the HRET that the originals of the Committee Report No. 12, the minutes of the plenary
session of 1971 Constitutional Convention held on November 28, 1972 cannot be found.

This was affirmed by Atty. Ricafrente, Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional Convention; by Atty. Nolledo, Delegate to the
1971 Constitutional Convention; and by Atty. Antonio Santos, Chief Librarian of the U.P Law Center, in their respective testimonies
given before the HRET to the effect that there is no governmental agency which is the official custodian of the records of the 1971
Constitutional Convention. (TSN, December 12, 1988, pp. 30-31; TSN, January 17, 1989, pp. 34-35; TSN, February 1, 1989, p. 44;
TSN, February 6, 1989, pp. 28-29)

The execution of the originals was established by Atty. Ricafrente, who as the Assistant Secretary of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention was the proper party to testify to such execution. (TSN, December 12, 1989, pp. 11-24)

The inability to produce the originals before the HRET was also testified to as aforestated by Atty. Ricafrente, Atty. Nolledo, and
Atty. Santos. In proving the inability to produce, the law does not require the degree of proof to be of sufficient certainty; it is enough
that it be shown that after a bona fide diligent search, the same cannot be found. (see Government of P.I. v. Martinez, 44 Phil. 817
[1918])

Since the execution of the document and the inability to produce were adequately established, the contents of the questioned
documents can be proven by a copy thereof or by the recollection of witnesses.

Moreover, to erase all doubts as to the authenticity of the documentary evidence cited in the Committee Report, the former member
of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, Atty. Nolledo, when he was presented as a witness in the hearing of the protest against the
private respondent, categorically stated that he saw the disputed documents presented during the hearing of the election protest
against the brother of the private respondent. (TSN, February 1, 1989, pp. 8-9)

In his concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Sarmiento, a vice-president of the Constitutional Convention, states that he was presiding
officer of the plenary session which deliberated on the report on the election protest against Delegate Emil Ong. He cites a long list
of names of delegates present. Among them are Mr. Chief Justice Fernan, and Mr. Justice Davide, Jr. The petitioners could have
presented any one of the long list of delegates to refute Mr. Ong's having been declared a natural-born citizen. They did not do so.
Nor did they demur to the contents of the documents presented by the private respondent. They merely relied on the procedural
objections respecting the admissibility of the evidence presented.

The Constitutional Convention was the sole judge of the qualifications of Emil Ong to be a member of that body. The HRET by
explicit mandate of the Constitution, is the sole judge of the qualifications of Jose Ong, Jr. to be a member of Congress. Both bodies
deliberated at length on the controversies over which they were sole judges. Decisions were arrived at only after a full presentation
of all relevant factors which the parties wished to present. Even assuming that we disagree with their conclusions, we cannot
declare their acts as committed with grave abuse of discretion. We have to keep clear the line between error and grave abuse.

ON THE ISSUE OF RESIDENCE

The petitioners question the residence qualification of respondent Ong.

The petitioners lose sight of the meaning of "residence" under the Constitution. The term "residence" has been understood as
synonymous with domicile not only under the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution.

The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the meaning of residence vis-a-vis the qualifications of a candidate
for Congress continues to remain the same as that of domicile, to wit:

Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to
require residence in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the elections. So my question is: What is the
Committee's concept of residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of domicile or
constructive residence?

Mr. Davide: Madame President, in so far as the regular members of the National Assembly are concerned, the proposed
section merely provides, among others, and a resident thereof, that is, in the district, for a period of not less than one year preceding
the day of the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it was domicile. (Records of the
1987 Constitutional Convention, Vol. 11, July 22, 1986. p. 87)

xxx xxx xxx

Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that
"resident" has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.

Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.

Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider at the proper time to go back to actual residence rather than mere
intention to reside?

Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that a provision in the Constitution in the Article
on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that it should
be by domicile and not physical and actual residence. (Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, Vol. 11, July 22, 1986, p.
110)

The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word "residence" which regarded it as having the same
meaning as domicile.

The term "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return.
(Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966 [1967]) The absence of a person from said permanent residence, no matter how long,
notwithstanding, it continues to be the domicile of that person. In other words, domicile is characterized by animus revertendi (Ujano
v. Republic, 17 SCRA 147 [1966])

The domicile of origin of the private respondent, which was the domicile of his parents, is fixed at Laoang, Samar. Contrary to the
petitioners' imputation, Jose Ong, Jr. never abandoned said domicile; it remained fixed therein even up to the present.

The private respondent, in the proceedings before the HRET sufficiently established that after the fire that gutted their house in
1961, another one was constructed.

Likewise, after the second fire which again destroyed their house in 1975, a sixteen-door apartment was built by their family, two
doors of which were reserved as their family residence. (TSN, Jose Ong, Jr., November 18,1988, p. 8)

The petitioners' allegation that since the private respondent owns no property in Laoang, Samar, he cannot, therefore, be a resident
of said place is misplaced.

The properties owned by the Ong Family are in the name of the private respondent's parents. Upon the demise of his parents,
necessarily, the private respondent, pursuant to the laws of succession, became the co-owner thereof (as a co- heir),
notwithstanding the fact that these were still in the names of his parents.

Even assuming that the private respondent does not own any property in Samar, the Supreme Court in the case of De los Reyes v.
Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held that it is not required that a person should have a house in order to establish his residence and
domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative. (Emphasis supplied)

To require the private respondent to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be tantamount to a property
qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements.
Nowhere is it required by the Constitution that the candidate should also own property in order to be qualified to run. (see Maquera
v. Borra, 122 Phil. 412 [1965])

It has also been settled that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than
in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of residence. (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 [1954])

As previously stated, the private respondent stayed in Manila for the purpose of finishing his studies and later to practice his
profession, There was no intention to abandon the residence in Laoang, Samar. On the contrary, the periodical journeys made to his
home province reveal that he always had the animus revertendi.

The Philippines is made up not only of a single race; it has, rather, undergone an interracial evolution. Throughout our history, there
has been a continuing influx of Malays, Chinese, Americans, Japanese, Spaniards and other nationalities. This racial diversity gives
strength to our country.

Many great Filipinos have not been whole-blooded nationals, if there is such a person, for there is none. To mention a few, the great
Jose Rizal was part Chinese, the late Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee was part Chinese, and of course our own President,
Corazon Aquino is also part Chinese. Verily, some Filipinos of whom we are proud were ethnically more Chinese than the private
respondent.

Our citizens no doubt constitute the country's greatest wealth. Citizenship is a special privilege which one must forever cherish.

However, in order to truly revere this treasure of citizenship, we do not, on the basis of too harsh an interpretation, have to
unreasonably deny it to those who qualify to share in its richness.

Under the overly strict jurisprudence surrounding our antiquated naturalization laws only the very affluent backed by influential
patrons, who were willing to suffer the indignities of a lengthy, sometimes humiliating, and often corrupt process of clearances by
minor bureaucrats and whose lawyers knew how to overcome so many technical traps of the judicial process were able to acquire
citizenship. It is time for the naturalization law to be revised to enable a more positive, affirmative, and meaningful examination of an
applicant's suitability to be a Filipino. A more humane, more indubitable and less technical approach to citizenship problems is
essential.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. The questioned decision of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal is
AFFIRMED. Respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is declared a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and a resident of Laoang, Northern
Samar.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC



G.R. No. L-21289 October 4, 1971

MOY YA LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM and LAU YUEN YEUNG, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, respondent-appellee.

Aruego, Mamaril & Associates for petitioners-appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Frine' C. Zaballero and Solicitor Sumilang V. Bernardo for
respondent-appellee.



BARREDO, J.:

Appeal from the following decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No. 49705 entitled Moy Ya Lim Yao, etc.,
et al. vs. The Commissioner of Immigration which, brief as it is, sufficiently depicts the factual setting of and the fundamental issues
involved in this case thus:

In the instant case, petitioners seek the issuance of a writ of injunction against the Commissioner of Immigration, "restraining the
latter and/or his authorized representative from ordering plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung to leave the Philippines and causing her arrest
and deportation and the confiscation of her bond, upon her failure to do so."

The prayer for preliminary injunction embodied in the complaint, having been denied, the case was heard on the merits and the
parties submitted their respective evidence.

The facts of the case, as substantially and correctly stated by the Solicitor General are these:

On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant. In the interrogation
made in connection with her application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese
residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great (grand) uncle Lau
Ching Ping for a period of one month (Exhibits "l," "1-a," and "2"). She was permitted to come into the Philippines on March 13,
1961, and was permitted to stay for a period of one month which would expire on April 13, 1961. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y,
Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from
the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the
Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative might properly allow. After repeated extensions, petitioner Lau Yuen
Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to February 13, 1962 (Exhibit "4"). On January 25, 1962, she contracted marriage
with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of respondent to
confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought this
action for injunction with preliminary injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted
that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung could not write either English or Tagalog. Except for a few words, she could not speak either English
or Tagalog. She could not name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her
brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law.

Under the facts unfolded above, the Court is of the considered opinion, and so holds, that the instant petition for injunction cannot be
sustained for the same reason as set forth in the Order of this Court, dated March 19, 1962, the pertinent portions of which read:

First, Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law provides:

Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.

The above-quoted provision is clear and its import unequivocal and hence it should be held to mean what it plainly and explicitly
expresses in unmistakable terms. The clause "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" incontestably implies that an alien woman
may be deemed a citizen of the Philippines by virtue of her marriage to a Filipino citizen only if she possesses all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications specified in the law, because these are the explicit requisites provided by law for an alien to be
naturalized. (Lee Suan Ay, Alberto Tan and Lee Chiao vs. Emilio Galang, etc., G. R. No. L-11855). However, from the allegation of
paragraph 3 of the complaint, to wit:

3. That plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung, Chinese by birth, who might herself be lawfully naturalized as a Filipino citizen (not being
disqualified to become such by naturalization), is a Filipino citizen by virtue of her marriage on January 25, 1962 to plaintiff MOY YA
LIM YAO alias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM, under the Naturalization Laws of the Philippines.

it can be deduced beyond debate that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung while claiming not to be disqualified, does not and cannot allege
that she possesses all the qualifications to be naturalized, naturally because, having been admitted as a temporary visitor only on
March 13, 1961, it is obvious at once that she lacks at least, the requisite length of residence in the Philippines (Revised
Naturalization Law, Sec. 2, Case No. 2, Sec. 3, Case No. 3).

Were if the intention of the law that the alien woman, to be deemed a citizen of the Philippines by virtue of marriage to a Filipino
citizen, need only be not disqualified under the Naturalization Law, it would have been worded "and who herself is not disqualified to
become a citizen of the Philippines."

Second, Lau Yuen Yeung, a temporary Chinese woman visitor, whose authorized stay in the Philippines, after repeated extensions
thereof, was to expire last February 28, 1962, having married her co-plaintiff only on January 25, 1962, or just a little over one month
before the expiry date of her stay, it is evident that said marriage was effected merely for convenience to defeat or avoid her then
impending compulsory departure, not to say deportation. This cannot be permitted.

Third, as the Solicitor General has well stated:

5. That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been admitted as a temporary alien visitor on the strength of a deliberate and
voluntary representation that she will enter and stay only for a period of one month and thereby secured a visa, cannot go back on
her representation to stay permanently without first departing from the Philippines as she had promised. (Chung Tiao Bing, et al. vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, G. R. No. L-9966, September 29, 1956; Ong Se Lun vs. Board of Commissioners, G. R. No. L-6017,
September 16, 1954; Sec. 9, last par., Phil. Immigration Law).

The aforequoted argument of the Solicitor General is well buttressed not only by the decided cases of the Supreme Court on the
point mentioned above, but also on the very provisions of Section 9, sub-paragraph (g) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940
which reads:

An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot remain in the Philippines permanently. To obtain permanent admission, a non-
immigrant alien must depart voluntarily to some foreign country and procure from the appropriate Philippine Consul the proper visa
and thereafter undergo examination by the Officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for determination of his
admissibility in accordance with the requirements of this Act. (This paragraph is added by Republic Act 503). (Sec. 9, subparagraph
(g) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940).

And fourth, respondent Commissioner of Immigration is charged with the administration of all laws relating to immigration (Sec. 3,
Com. Act No. 613) and in the performance of his duties in relation to alien immigrants, the law gives the Commissioner of
Immigration a wide discretion, a quasi-judicial function in determining cases presented to him (Pedro Uy So vs. Commissioner of
Immigration CA-G. R. No. 23336-R, Dec. 15, 1960), so that his decision thereon may not be disturbed unless he acted with abuse of
discretion or in excess of his jurisdiction.

It may also be not amiss to state that wife Lau Yuen Yeung, while she barely and insufficiently talk in broken Tagalog and English,
she admitted that she cannot write either language.

The only matter of fact not clearly passed upon by His Honor which could have some bearing in the resolution of this appeal is the
allegation in the brief of petitioners-appellants, not denied in the governments brief, that "in the hearing ..., it was shown thru the
testimony of the plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung that she does not possess any of the disqualifications for naturalization." Of course, as an
additional somehow relevant factual matter, it is also emphasized by said appellants that during the hearing in the lower court, held
almost ten months after the alleged marriage of petitioners, "Lau Yuen Yeung was already carrying in her womb for seven months a
child by her husband."

Appellants have assigned six errors allegedly committed by the court a quo, thus:

I

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CLAUSE "WHO MIGHT HERSELF BE LAWFULLY NATURALIZED" (OF
SECTION 15, REVISED NATURALIZATION LAW) INCONTESTABLY IMPLIES THAT AN ALIEN WOMAN MAY BE DEEMED A
CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES BY VIRTUE OF HER MARRIAGE TO A FILIPINO CITIZEN, ONLY IF SHE POSSESSES ALL THE
QUALIFICATIONS AND NONE OF THE DISQUALIFICATIONS SPECIFIED IN THE LAW.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A WOMAN FOREIGNER WHO DOES NOT POSSESS ANY OF THE
DISQUALIFICATIONS FOR CITIZENSHIP AND WHO MARRIED A FILIPINO CITIZEN IS STILL CONSIDERED AN ALIEN EVEN
AFTER SUCH MARRIAGE AS TO FALL WITHIN THE REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 9, SUB-PARAGRAPH (9) OF THE
PHILIPPINE IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1940.

III

THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT LAU YUEN YEUNG'S MARRIAGE TO A FILIPINO CITIZEN WAS ONLY FOR
CONVENIENCE, MERELY BECAUSE THE SAME WAS CELEBRATED JUST OVER A MONTH BEFORE THE EXPIRY DATE OF
HER AUTHORIZED STAY.

IV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION ACTED WITH ABUSE OF
DISCRETION OR IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION WHEN SAID OFFICER THREATENED TO SEND OUT OF THE COUNTRY
PLAINTIFF LAU YUEN YEUNG WITH WARNING THAT HER FAILURE TO DO SO WOULD MEAN CONFISCATION OF HER
BOND, ARREST AND IMMEDIATE DEPORTATION, IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT LAU YUEN YEUNG IS NOW A FILIPINO
CITIZEN.

V

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS' COMPLAINT AND IN REFUSING TO
PERMANENTLY ENJOIN THE COMMISSIONER FROM ORDERING PLAINTIFF LAU YUEN YEUNG TO LEAVE THE
PHILIPPINES AS A TEMPORARY VISITOR WHICH SHE IS NOT.

VI

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS' MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION EMBODIED IN THEIR COMPLAINT, IN AN ORDER DATED MARCH 19, 1962. (PAGES 36-41, RECORD ON
APPEAL) .

We need not discuss these assigned errors separately. In effect, the above decision upheld the two main grounds of objection of the
Solicitor General to the petition in the court below, viz:

That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been admitted as a temporary alien visitor on the strength of a deliberate and voluntary
representation that she will enter and stay only for a period of one month and thereby secured a visa, cannot go back on her
representation to stay permanently without first departing from the Philippines as she had promised. (Chung Tiao Bing, et al. vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-9966, September 29, 1956; Ong Se Lun vs. Board of Commissioners, G.R. No. L-6017,
Sept. 16, 1954, Sec. 9, last par. Phil. Immigration Law);

That the mere marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically confer on the latter Philippine citizenship. The alien
wife must possess all the qualifications required by law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization and none of the
disqualifications. (Lee Suan Ay, Alberto Tan and Lee Chiao vs. Galang, etc., G. R. No. L-11855, Dec. 25, 1959)

It is obvious from the nature of these objection that their proper resolution would necessarily cover all the points raised in appellants'
assignments of error, hence, We will base our discussions, more or less, on said objections.

I

The first objection of the Solicitor General which covers the matters dealt with in appellants' second and fourth assignments of error
does not require any lengthy discussion. As a matter of fact, it seem evident that the Solicitor General's pose that an alien who has
been admitted into the Philippines as a non-immigrant cannot remain here permanently unless he voluntarily leaves the country first
and goes to a foreign country to secure thereat from the appropriate Philippine consul the proper visa and thereafter undergo
examination by officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for determination of his admissibility in accordance
with the requirements of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended by Republic Act 503, is premised on the assumption
that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung is not a Filipino citizen. We note the same line of reasoning in the appealed decision of the court a
quo. Accordingly, it is but safe to assume that were the Solicitor General and His Honor of the view that said petitioner had become
ipso facto a Filipina by virtue of her marriage to her Filipino husband, they would have held her as entitled to assume the status of a
permanent resident without having to depart as required of aliens by Section 9 (g) of the law.

In any event, to set this point at rest, We hereby hold that portion of Section 9 (g) of the Immigration Act providing:

An alien who is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot remain in the Philippines permanently. To obtain permanent admission, a non-
immigrant alien must depart voluntarily to some foreign country and procure from the appropriate Philippine consul the proper visa
and thereafter undergo examination by the officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for determination of his
admissibility in accordance with the requirements of this Act.

does not apply to aliens who after coming into the Philippines as temporary visitors, legitimately become Filipino citizens or acquire
Filipino citizenship. Such change of nationality naturally bestows upon their the right to stay in the Philippines permanently or not, as
they may choose, and if they elect to reside here, the immigration authorities may neither deport them nor confiscate their bonds.
True it is that this Court has vehemently expressed disapproval of convenient ruses employed by alien to convert their status from
temporary visitors to permanent residents in circumvention of the procedure prescribed by the legal provision already mentioned,
such as in Chiong Tiao Bing vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 99 Phil. 1020, wherein, thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, the Court,
reiterating the ruling in Ong Se Lun vs. Board of Immigration Commissioners, 95 PMI. 785, said:

... It is clear that if an alien gains admission to the Islands on the strength of a deliberate and voluntary representation that he will
enter only for a limited time, and thereby secures the benefit of a temporary visa, the law will not allow him subsequently to go back
on his representation and stay permanently, without first departing from the Philippines as he had promised. No officer can relieve
him of the departure requirements of section 9 of the Immigration Act, under the guise of "change" or "correction", for the law makes
no distinctions, and no officer is above the law. Any other ruling would, as stated in our previous decision, encourage aliens to enter
the Islands on false pretences; every alien so permitted to enter for a limited time, might then claim a right to permanent admission,
however flimsy such claim should be, and thereby compel our government to spend time, money and effort to examining and
verifying whether or not every such alien really has a right to take up permanent residence here. In the meanwhile, the alien would
be able to prolong his stay and evade his return to the port whence he came, contrary to what he promised to do when he entered.
The damages inherent in such ruling are self-evident.

On the other hand, however, We cannot see any reason why an alien who has been here as a temporary visitor but who has in the
meanwhile become a Filipino should be required to still leave the Philippines for a foreign country, only to apply thereat for a re-entry
here and undergo the process of showing that he is entitled to come back, when after all, such right has become incontestible as a
necessary concomitant of his assumption of our nationality by whatever legal means this has been conferred upon him. Consider for
example, precisely the case of the minor children of an alien who is naturalized. It is indubitable that they become ipso facto citizens
of the Philippines. Could it be the law that before they can be allowed permanent residence, they still have to be taken abroad so
that they may be processed to determine whether or not they have a right to have permanent residence here? The difficulties and
hardships which such a requirement entails and its seeming unreasonableness argue against such a rather absurd construction.
Indeed, as early as 1957, in Ly Giok Ha vs. Galang, 101 Phil. 459, Mr. Justice Concepcion, our present Chief Justice, already ruled
thus:

... (P)etitioners allege that, upon her marriage to a Filipino, Ly Giok Ha became also a citizen of the Philippines. Indeed, if this
conclusion were correct, it would follow that, in consequence of her marriage, she had been naturalized as such citizen, and, hence
the decision appealed from would have to be affirmed, for section 40(c) of Commonwealth Act 613 provides that "in the event of the
naturalization as a Philippine citizen ... of the alien on whose behalf the bond deposit is given, the bond shall be cancelled or the
sum deposited shall be returned to the depositor or his legal representative." (At. pp. 462-463)

In other words, the applicable statute itself more than implies that the naturalization of an alien visitor as a Philippine citizen logically
produces the effect of conferring upon him ipso facto all the rights of citizenship including that of being entitled to permanently stay
in the Philippines outside the orbit of authority of the Commissioner of Immigration vis-a-vis aliens, if only because by its very nature
and express provisions, the Immigration Law is a law only for aliens and is inapplicable to citizens of the Philippines. In the sense
thus discussed therefore, appellants' second and fourth assignments of error are well taken.

II

Precisely, the second objection, of the Solicitor General sustained by the trial judge is that appellant Lau Yuen Yeung's marriage to
appellant Moya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo whose Filipino citizenship is not denied did not have the effect of making her a
Filipino, since it has not been shown that she "might herself be lawfully naturalized," it appearing clearly in the record that she does
not possess all the qualifications required of applicants for naturalization by the Revised Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act
473, even if she has proven that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications thereunder. In other words, the Solicitor
General implicitly concedes that had it been established in the proceedings below that appellant Lau Yuen Yeung possesses all the
qualifications required by the law of applicants for naturalization, she would have been recognized by the respondent as a Filipino
citizen in the instant case, without requiring her to submit to the usual proceedings for naturalization.

To be sure, this position of the Solicitor General is in accord with what used to be the view of this Court since Lee Suan Ay, et al. v.
Emilio Galang, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-11855, promulgated December 23, 1959, 106 Phil., 706,713, 1 for it was only in Zita Ngo
Burca vs. Republic, G.R. NO. L-24252 which was promulgated on January 30, 1967 (19 SCRA 186), that over the pen of Mr. Justice
Conrado Sanchez, this Court held that for an alien woman who marries a Filipino to be deemed a Filipina, she has to apply for
naturalization in accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Revised Naturalization Law and prove in said naturalization
proceeding not only that she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided in the law but also that she has
complied with all the formalities required thereby like any other applicant for naturalization, 2 albeit said decision is not yet part of
our jurisprudence inasmuch as the motion for its reconsideration is still pending resolution. Appellants are in effect urging Us,
however, in their first and second assignments of error, not only to reconsider Burca but to even reexamine Lee Suan Ay which, as
a matter of fact, is the prevailing rule, having been reiterated in all subsequent decisions up to Go Im Ty. 3

Actually, the first case in which Section 15 of the Naturalization Law, Commonwealth Act 473, underwent judicial construction was in
the first Ly Giok Ha case, 4 one almost identical to the one at bar. Ly Giok Ha, a woman of Chinese nationality, was a temporary
visitor here whose authority to stay was to expire on March 14, 1956. She filed a bond to guaranty her timely departure. On March 8,
1956, eight days before the expiration of her authority to stay, she married a Filipino by the name of Restituto Lacasta. On March 9,
1956, her husband notified the Commissioner of Immigration of said marriage and, contending that his wife had become a Filipina
by reason of said marriage, demanded for the cancellation of her bond, but instead of acceding to such request, the Commissioner
required her to leave, and upon her failure to do so, on March 16, 1956, the Commissioner confiscated her bond; a suit was filed for
the recovery of the bond; the lower court sustained her contention that she had no obligation to leave, because she had become
Filipina by marriage, hence her bond should be returned. The Commissioner appealed to this Court. In the said appeal, Mr. Justice
Roberto Concepcion, our present Chief Justice, spoke for the Court, thus:

The next and most important question for determination is whether her marriage to a Filipino justified or, at least, excused the
aforesaid failure of Ly Giok Ha to depart from the Philippines on or before March 14, 1956. In maintaining the affirmative view,
petitioners alleged that, upon her marriage to a Filipino, Ly Giok Ha became, also, a citizen of the Philippines. Indeed, if this
conclusion were correct, it would follow that, in consequence of her marriage, she had been naturalized as such citizen, and, hence,
the decision appealed from would have to be affirmed, for section 40(c) of Commonwealth Act No. 613 provides that "in the event of
the naturalization as a Philippine citizen ... of the alien on whose behalf the bond deposit is given, the bond shall be cancelled or the
sum deposited shall be returned to the depositor or his legal representative." Thus the issue boils down to whether an alien female
who marries a male citizen of the Philippines follows ipso facto his political status.

The pertinent part of section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, upon which petitioners rely, reads:

Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized
shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.

Pursuant thereto, marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife, unless she "herself may be
lawfully naturalized." As correctly held in an opinion of the Secretary of Justice (Op. No. 52, series of 1950),* this limitation of section
15 excludes, from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of the Philippines
under section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473, namely:

(a) Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach
doctrines opposing all organized governments;

(b) Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault, or assassination for the success
and predominance of their ideas;

(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;

(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;

(e) Persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases;

(f) Persons who, during the period of their residence in the Philippines, have not mingled socially with the Filipinos, or who
have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals of the Filipinos;

(g) Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the ... Philippines are at war, during the period of such war;

(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United States, whose laws does not grant Filipinos the right to
become naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.

In the case at bar, there is neither proof nor allegation in the pleadings that Ly Giok Ha does not fall under any of the classes
disqualified by law. Moreover, as the parties who claim that, despite her failure to depart from the Philippines within the period
specified in the bond in question, there has been no breach thereof, petitioners have the burden of proving her alleged change of
political status, from alien to citizen. Strictly speaking, petitioners have not made out, therefore a case against the respondents-
appellants.

Considering, however, that neither in the administrative proceedings, nor in the lower court, had the parties seemingly felt that there
was an issue on whether Ly Giok Ha may "be lawfully naturalized," and this being a case of first impression in our courts, we are of
the opinion that, in the interest of equity and justice, the parties herein should be given an opportunity to introduce evidence, if they
have any, on said issue. (At pp. 462-464.) .

As may be seen, although not specifically in so many words, no doubt was left in the above decision as regards the following
propositions: .

1. That under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, the Revised Naturalization Law, the marriage of an alien woman to a
Filipino makes her a Filipina, if she "herself might be lawfully naturalized";

2. That this Court declared as correct the opinion of the Secretary of Justice that the limitation of Section 15 of the
Naturalization Law excludes from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, only those disqualified from being naturalized under
Section 4 of the law qouted in the decision;

3. That evidence to the effect that she is not disqualified may be presented in the action to recover her bond confiscated by
the Commissioner of Immigration;

4. That upon proof of such fact, she may be recognized as Filipina; and

5. That in referring to the disqualification enumerated in the law, the Court somehow left the impression that no inquiry need
be made as to qualifications, 5 specially considering that the decision cited and footnotes several opinions of the Secretary of
Justice, the immediate superior of the Commissioner of Immigration, the most important of which are the following:

Paragraph (a), section 13 of Act No. 2927, as amended, (now section 15, Commonwealth Act No. 473), provided that "any woman
who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines." A similar provision in the naturalization law of the United States has been construed as not
requiring the woman to have the qualifications of residence, good character, etc., as in the case of naturalization by judicial
proceedings, but merely that she is of the race of persons who may be naturalized. (Kelly v. Owen [Dist. Col. 1868] 7 Wall 496, 5F,
11, 12; ex parte Tryason [D. C. Wash. 1914] 215 F. 449, 27 Op. Atty. Gen. 507). (Op. No. 168, s. 1940 of Justice Sec. Jose Abad
Santos.)

In a previous opinion rendered for your Office, I stated that the clause "who might herself be lawfully naturalized", should be
construed as not requiring the woman to have the qualifications of residence, good character, etc., as in cases of naturalization by
judicial proceedings, but merely that she is of the race of persons who may be naturalized. (Op. No. 79, s. 1940)

Inasmuch as the race qualification has been removed by the Revised Naturalization Law, it results that any woman who married a
citizen of the Philippines prior to or after June 17, 1939, and the marriage not having been dissolved, and on the assumption that
she possesses none of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, follows the citizenship of her
husband. (Op. No. 176, s. 1940 of Justice Sec. Jose Abad Santos.)

From the foregoing narration of facts, it would seem that the only material point of inquiry is as to the citizenship of Arce Machura. If
he shall be found to be a citizen of the Philippines, his wife, Mrs. Lily James Machura, shall likewise be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines pursuant to the provision of Section 15, Commonwealth Act No. 473, which reads in part as follows:

Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized
shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.

The phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized", as contained in the above provision, means that the woman who is married
to a Filipino citizen must not belong to any of the disqualified classes enumerated in Section 4 of the Naturalization Law (Ops., Sec.
of Jus., No. 28, s. 1950; No. 43, s. 1948, No. 95, s. 1941; Nos. 79 and 168, s. 1940). Under the facts stated in the within papers,
Mrs. Machura does not appear to be among the disqualified classes mentioned in the law.

It having been shown that Arce Machura or Arsenio Guevara was born as an illegitimate of a Filipino mother, he should be
considered as a citizen of the Philippines in consonance with the well-settled rule that an illegitimate child follows the citizenship of
his only legally recognized parent, the mother (Op., Sec. of Jus., Nos. 58, 98 & 281, s. 1948; No. 96, s. 1949). Her husband being a
Filipino, Mrs. Machura must necessarily be deemed as a citizen of the Philippines by marriage (Sec. 15, Com. Act No. 473.) (Op.
No. 52, s. 1950 of Justice Sec. Ricardo Nepomuceno.)

The logic and authority of these opinions, compelling as they are, must have so appealed to this Court that five days later, on May
22, 1957, in Ricardo Cua v. The Board of Commissioners, 101 Phil. 521, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, reiterated the same ruling on the
basis of the following facts:

Tjioe Wu Suan, an Indonesian, arrived in Manila on November 1, 1952, but it turned out that her passport was forged. On December
10, 1953, a warrant was issued for her arrest for purpose of deportation. Later, on December 20, 1953, she married Ricardo Cua, a
Filipino, and because of said marriage, the Board of Special Inquiry considered her a Filipina. Upon a review of the case, however,
the Board of Immigration Commissioners insisted on continuing with the deportation proceedings and so, the husband filed
prohibition and mandamus proceedings. The lower court denied the petition. Although this Court affirmed said decision, it held, on
the other hand, that:

Granting the validity of marriage, this Court has ruled in the recent case of Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, supra, p. 459, that the bare fact of
a valid marriage to a citizen does not suffice to confer his citizenship upon the wife. Section 15 of the Naturalization Law requires
that the alien woman who marries a Filipino must show, in addition, that she "might herself be lawfully naturalized" as a Filipino
citizen. As construed in the decision cited, this last condition requires proof that the woman who married a Filipino is herself not
disqualified under section 4 of the Naturalization Law.

No such evidence appearing on record, the claim of assumption of Filipino citizenship by Tjioe Wu Suan, upon her marriage to
petitioner, is untenable. The lower court, therefore, committed no error in refusing to interfere with the deportation proceedings,
where she can anyway establish the requisites indispensable for her acquisition of Filipino citizenship, as well as the alleged validity
of her Indonesian passport. (Ricardo Cua v. The Board of Immigration Commissioners, G. R. No. L-9997, May 22, 1957, 101 Phil.
521, 523.) [Emphasis supplied] .

For emphasis, it is reiterated that in the above two cases, this Court expressly gave the parties concerned opportunity to prove the
fact that they were not suffering from any of the disqualifications of the law without the need of undergoing any judicial naturalization
proceeding. It may be stated, therefore, that according to the above decisions, the law in this country, on the matter of the effect of
marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino is that she thereby becomes a Filipina, if it can be proven that at the time of such marriage,
she does not possess any of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of the Naturalization Law, without the need of submitting
to any naturalization proceedings under said law.

It is to be admitted that both of the above decisions made no reference to qualifications, that is, as to whether or not they need also
to be proved, but, in any event, it is a fact that the Secretary of Justice understood them to mean that such qualifications need not
be possessed nor proven. Then Secretary of Justice Jesus Barrera, who later became a distinguished member of this Court, 6 so
ruled in opinions rendered by him subsequent to Ly Giok Ha, the most illustrative of which held: .

At the outset it is important to note that an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen needs only to show that she "might herself be
lawfully naturalized" in order to acquire Philippine citizenship. Compliance with other conditions of the statute, such as those relating
to the qualifications of an applicant for naturalization through judicial proceedings, is not necessary. (See: Leonard v. Grant, 5 Fed.
11; 27 Ops. Atty. Gen [U.S.] 507; Ops. Sec. of Justice, No. 776, s. 1940, and No. 111, s. 1953.

This view finds support in the case of Ly Giok Ha et al. v. Galang et al., G.R. No. L-10760, promulgated May 17, 1957, where the
Supreme Court, construing the abovequoted section of the Naturalization Law, held that "marriage to a male Filipino does not vest
Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife," unless she "herself may be lawfully naturalized," and that "this limitation of Section 15
excludes, from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of the Philippines
under Section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473." In other words, disqualification for any of the causes enumerated in Section 4
of the Act is the decisive factor that defeats the right of the foreign wife of a Philippine citizen to acquire Philippine citizenship.

xxx xxx xxx

Does petitioner, Lim King Bian, belong to any of these groups The Commissioner of Immigration does not say so but merely
predicates his negative action on the ground that a warrant of deportation for "overstaying" is pending against the petitioner.

We do not believe the position is well taken. Since the grounds for disqualification for naturalization are expressly enumerated in the
law, a warrant of deportation not based on a finding of unfitness to become naturalized for any of those specified causes may not be
invoked to negate acquisition of Philippine citizenship by a foreign wife of a Philippine citizen under Section 15 of the Naturalization
Law. (Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius) (Op. No. 12, s. 1958 of Justice Undersec. Jesus G. Barrera.)

Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen in order to acquire Philippine citizenship,
the procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation of her
alien certificate of registration alleging, among other things, that she is married to a Filipino citizen and that she is not disqualified
from acquiring her husband's citizenship pursuant to section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing of said
petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that
the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups disqualified by the cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen
(please see attached CEB Form 1), the Bureau of Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or
decision granting or denying the petition. (Op. No. 38, s. 19058 of Justice Sec. Jesus G. Barrera.)

This view finds support in the case of Ly Giok Ha et al., v. Galang et al. (G.R. No. L-10760, promulgated May 17, 1957), where the
Supreme Court, construing the above-quoted section in the Revised Naturalization Law, held that "marriage to a male Filipino does
not vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign wife, unless she herself may be lawfully naturalized," and that "this limitation of Section
15 excludes, from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of the Philippines
under Section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473." In other words, disqualification for any of the causes enumerated in section 4
of the Act is the decisive factor that defeats the right of an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen to acquire Philippine citizenship.
(Op. 57, s. 1958 of Justice Sec. Jesus G. Barrera.)

The contention is untenable. The doctrine enunciated in the Ly Giok Ha case is not a new one. In that case, the Supreme Court held
that under paragraph I of Section 15 Of Commonwealth Act No. 473, 'marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship
to his foreign wife unless she "herself may be lawfully naturalized"', and, quoting several earlier opinions of the Secretary of Justice,
namely: No. 52, s. 1950; No. 168, s. 1940; No. 95, s. 1941; No. 63, s. 1948; No. 28. s. 1950, "this limitation of section 15 excludes
from the benefits of naturalization by marriage, those disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under section
4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473." (Op. 134, s. 1962 of Justice Undersec. Magno S. Gatmaitan.)

It was not until more than two years later that, in one respect, the above construction of the law was importantly modified by this
Court in Lee Suan Ay, supra, in which the facts were as follows:

Upon expiration of the appellant Lee Suan Ay's authorized period of temporary stay in the Philippines (25 March 1955), on 26 March
1955 the Commissioner of Immigration asked the bondsman to present her to the Bureau of Immigration within 24 hours from
receipt of notice, otherwise the bond will be confiscated(Annex 1). For failure of the bondsman to comply with the foregoing order,
on 1 April 1955. the Commissioner of Immigration ordered the cash bond confiscated (Annex E). Therefore, there was an order
issued by the Commissioner of Immigration confiscating or forfeiting the cash bond. Unlike in forfeiture of bail bonds in criminal
proceedings, where the Court must enter an order forfeiting the bail bond and the bondsman must be given an opportunity to
present his principal or give a satisfactory reason for his inability to do so, before final judgment may be entered against the
bondsman,(section 15, Rule 110; U.S. v. Bonoan, 22 Phil. 1.) in forfeiture of bonds posted for the temporary stay of an alien in the
Philippines, no court proceeding is necessary. Once a breach of the terms and conditions of the undertaking in the bond is
committed, the Commissioner of Immigration may, under the terms and conditions thereof, declare it forfeited in favor of the
Government. (In the meanwhile, on April 1, 1955, Lee Suan Ay and Alberto Tan, a Filipino, were joined in marriage by the Justice of
the Peace of Las Pias, Rizal.)

Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla speaking for a unanimous court which included Justices Concepcion and Reyes who had penned Ly Giok
Ha, and Ricardo Cua, ruled thus:

The fact that Lee Suan Ay (a Chinese) was married to a Filipino citizen does not relieve the bondsman from his liability on the bond.
The marriage took place on 1 April 1955, and the violation of the terms and conditions of the undertaking in the bond failure to
depart from the Philippines upon expiration of her authorized period of temporary stay in the Philippines (25 March 1955) and failure
to report to the Commissioner of Immigration within 24 hours from receipt of notice were committed before the marriage.
Moreover, the marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically confer Philippine citizenship upon the latter. She must
possess the qualifications required by law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization.* There is no showing that the appellant Lee
Suan Ay possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided for by law to become a Filipino citizen by
naturalization.

Pertinently to be noted at once in this ruling, which, to be sure, is the one relied upon in the appealed decision now before Us, is the
fact that the footnote of the statement therein that the alien wife "must possess the qualifications required by law to become a
Filipino citizen by naturalization" makes reference to Section 15, Commonwealth Act 473 and precisely, also to Ly Giok Ha v.
Galang, supra. As will be recalled, on the other hand, in the opinions of the Secretary of Justice explicitly adopted by the Court in Ly
Giok Ha, among them, Opinion No. 176, Series of 1940, above-quoted, it was clearly held that "(I)n a previous opinion rendered for
your Office, I stated that the clause "who might herself be lawfully naturalized", should be construed as not requiring the woman to
have the qualifications of residence, good character, etc., as in cases of naturalization by judicial proceedings but merely that she is
of the race by persons who may be naturalized. (Op. No. 79, s. 1940)

Since Justice Padilla gave no reason at all for the obviously significant modification of the construction of the law, it could be said
that there was need for clarification of the seemingly new posture of the Court. The occasion for such clarification should have been
in Kua Suy, etc., et al. vs. The Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-13790, October 31, 1963, penned by Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, who had rendered the opinion in Ricardo Cua, supra, which followed that in Ly Giok Ha, supra, but apparently seeing no
immediate relevancy in the case on hand then of the particular point in issue now, since it was not squarely raised therein similarly
as in Lee Suan Ay, hence, anything said on the said matter would at best be no more than obiter dictum, Justice Reyes limited
himself to holding that "Under Section 15 of the Naturalization Act, the wife is deemed a citizen of the Philippines only if she "might
herself be lawfully naturalized," so that the fact of marriage to a citizen, by itself alone, does not suffice to confer citizenship, as this
Court has previously ruled in Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, 54 O.G. 356, and in Cua v. Board of Immigration Commissioners, 53 O.G. 8567;
and there is here no evidence of record as to the qualifications or absence of disqualifications of appellee Kua Suy", without
explaining the apparent departure already pointed out from Ly Giok Ha and Ricardo Cua. Even Justice Makalintal, who wrote a
separate concurring and dissenting opinion merely lumped together Ly Giok Ha, Ricardo Cua and Lee Suan Ay and opined that
both qualifications and non-disqualifications have to be shown without elucidating on what seemed to be departure from the said
first two decisions.

It was only on November 30, 1963 that to Mr. Justice Roberto Regala fell the task of rationalizing the Court's position. In Lo San
Tuang v. Galang, G.R. No. L-18775, November 30, 1963, 9 SCRA 638, the facts were simply these: Lo San Tuang, a Chinese
woman, arrived in the Philippines on July 1, 1960 as a temporary visitor with authority to stay up to June 30, 1961. She married a
Filipino on January 7, 1961, almost six months before the expiry date of her permit, and when she was requested to leave after her
authority to stay had expired, she refused to do so, claiming she had become a Filipina by marriage, and to bolster her position, she
submitted an affidavit stating explicitly that she does not possess any of the disqualifications enumerated in the Naturalization Law,
Commonwealth Act 473. When the case reached the court, the trial judge held for the government that in addition to not having any
of the disqualifications referred to, there was need that Lo San Tuang should have also possessed all the qualifications of residence,
moral character, knowledge of a native principal dialect, etc., provided by the law. Recognizing that the issue squarely to be passed
upon was whether or not the possession of all the qualifications were indeed needed to be shown apart from non-disqualification,
Justice Regala held affirmatively for the Court, reasoning out thus: .

It is to be noted that the petitioner has anchored her claim for citizenship on the basis of the decision laid down in the case of
Leonard v. Grant, 5 Swy. 603, 5 F 11, where the Circuit Court of Oregon held that it was only necessary that the woman "should be
a person of the class or race permitted to be naturalized by existing laws, and that in respect of the qualifications arising out of her
conduct or opinions, being the wife of a citizen, she is to be regarded as qualified for citizenship, and therefore considered a citizen."
(In explanation of its conclusion, the Court said: "If, whenever during the life of the woman or afterwards, the question of her
citizenship arises in a legal proceeding, the party asserting her citizenship by reason of her marriage with a citizen must not only
prove such marriage, but also that the woman then possessed all the further qualifications necessary to her becoming naturalized
under existing laws, the statute will be practically nugatory, if not a delusion and a share. The proof of the facts may have existed at
the time of the marriage, but years after, when a controversy arises upon the subject, it may be lost or difficult to find.")

In other words, all that she was required to prove was that she was a free white woman or a woman of African descent or nativity, in
order to be deemed an American citizen, because, with respect to the rest of the qualifications on residence, moral character, etc.,
she was presumed to be qualified.

Like the law in the United States, our former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927, as amended by Act No. 3448) specified the classes
of persons who alone might become citizens of the Philippines, even as it provided who were disqualified. Thus, the pertinent
provisions of that law provided:

Section 1. Who may become Philippine citizens Philippine citizenship may be acquired by (a) natives of the Philippines who are
not citizens thereof under the Jones Law; (b) natives of the Insular possessions of the United States; (c) citizens of the United
States, or foreigners who under the laws of the United States may become citizens of said country if residing therein.

Section 2. Who are disqualified. The following cannot be naturalized as Philippine citizens: (a) Persons opposed to organized
government or affiliated with any association or group of persons who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all organized
government; (b) persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for the
success and predominance of their ideas; (c) polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; (d) persons convicted of crimes
involving moral turpitude; (e) persons suffering from mental alienation or incurable contagious diseases; (f) citizens or subjects of
nations with whom the United States and the Philippines are at war, during the period of such war.

Section 3. Qualifications. The persons comprised in subsection (a) of section one of this Act, in order to be able to acquire
Philippine citizenship, must be not less than twenty-one years of age on the day of the hearing of their petition.

The persons comprised in subsections (b) and (c) of said section one shall, in addition to being not less than twenty-one years of
age on the day of the hearing of the petition, have all and each of the following qualifications:

First. Residence in the Philippine Islands for a continuous period of not less than five years, except as provided in the next following
section;

Second. To have conducted themselves in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of their residence in the
Philippine Islands, in their relation with the constituted government as well as with the community in which they are living;

Third. To hold in the Philippine Islands real estate worth not less than one thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or have some
known trade or profession; and

Fourth. To speak and write English, Spanish, or some native tongue.

In case the petitioner is a foreign subject, he shall, besides, declare in writing and under oath his intention of renouncing absolutely
and perpetually all faith and allegiance to the foreign authority, state or sovereignty of which he was a native, citizen or subject.

Applying the interpretation given by Leonard v. Grant supra, to our law as it then stood, alien women married to citizens of the
Philippines must, in order to be deemed citizens of the Philippines, be either (1) natives of the Philippines who were not citizens
thereof under the Jones Law, or (2) natives of other Insular possessions of the United States, or (3) citizens of the United States or
foreigners who under the laws of the United States might become citizens of that country if residing therein. With respect to the
qualifications set forth in Section 3 of the former law, they were deemed to have the same for all intents and purposes.

But, with the approval of the Revised Naturalization Law (Commonwealth Act No. 473) on June 17, 1939, Congress has since
discarded class or racial consideration from the qualifications of applicants for naturalization (according to its proponent, the purpose
in eliminating this consideration was, first, to remove the features of the existing naturalization act which discriminated in favor of the
Caucasians and against Asiatics who are our neighbors, and are related to us by racial affinity and, second, to foster amity with all
nations [Sinco, Phil. Political Law 502 11 ed.]), even as it retained in Section 15 the phrase in question. The result is that the
phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" must be understood in the context in which it is now found, in a setting so
different from that in which it was found by the Court in Leonard v. Grant.

The only logical deduction from the elimination of class or racial consideration is that, as the Solicitor General points out, the phrase
"who might herself be lawfully naturalized" must now be understood as referring to those who under Section 2 of the law are
qualified to become citizens of the Philippines.

There is simply no support for the view that the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" must now be understood as
requiring merely that the alien woman must not belong to the class of disqualified persons under Section 4 of the Revised
Naturalization Law. Such a proposition misreads the ruling laid down in Leonard v. Grant. A person who is not disqualified is not
necessarily qualified to become a citizen of the Philippines, because the law treats "qualifications" and "disqualifications" in separate
sections. And then it must not be lost sight of that even under the interpretation given to the former law, it was to be understood that
the alien woman was not disqualified under Section 2 of that law. Leonard v. Grant did not rule that it was enough if the alien woman
does not belong to the class of disqualified persons in order that she may be deemed to follow the citizenship of her husband: What
that case held was that the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized, merely means that she belongs to the class or race of
persons qualified to become citizens by naturalization the assumption being always that she is not otherwise disqualified.

We therefore hold that under the first paragraph of Section 15 of the Naturalization Law, an alien woman, who is married to a citizen
of the Philippines, acquires the citizenship of her husband only if she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
provided by law. Since there is no proof in this case that petitioner has all the qualifications and is not in any way disqualified, her
marriage to a Filipino citizen does not automatically make her a Filipino citizen. Her affidavit to the effect that she is not in any way
disqualified to become a citizen of this country was correctly disregarded by the trial court, the same being self-serving.

Naturally, almost a month later in Sun Peck Yong v. Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-20784, December 27, 1963, 9 SCRA
875, wherein the Secretary of Foreign Affairs reversed a previous resolution of the preceding administration to allow Sun Peck Yong
and her minor son to await the taking of the oath of Filipino citizenship of her husband two years after the decision granting him
nationalization and required her to leave and this order was contested in court, Justice Barrera held:

In the case of Lo San Tuang v. Commissioner of Immigration (G.R. No. L-18775, promulgated November 30, 1963; Kua Suy vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, L-13790, promulgated October 31, 1963), we held that the fact that the husband became a
naturalized citizen does not automatically make the wife a citizen of the Philippines. It must also be shown that she herself
possesses all the qualifications, and none of the disqualifications, to become a citizen. In this case, there is no allegation, much less
showing, that petitioner-wife is qualified to become a Filipino citizen herself. Furthermore, the fact that a decision was favorably
made on the naturalization petition of her husband is no assurance that he (the husband) would become a citizen, as to make a
basis for the extension of her temporary stay.

On the same day, in Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-21136, December 27, 1963, 9 SCRA 876, Justice Barrera reiterated the same
ruling and citing particularly Lo San Tuang and Kua Suy, held that the marriage of Tong Siok Sy to a Filipino on November 12, 1960
at Taichung, Taiwan and her taking oath of Filipino citizenship before the Philippine Vice-Consul at Taipeh, Taiwan on January 6,
1961 did not make her a Filipino citizen, since she came here only in 1961 and obviously, she had not had the necessary ten-year
residence in the Philippines required by the law.

Such then was the status of the jurisprudential law on the matter under discussion when Justice Makalintal sought a reexamination
thereof in Choy King Tee v. Galang, G.R. No. L-18351, March 26, 1965, 13 SCRA 402. Choy King Tee's husband was granted
Philippine citizenship on January 13, 1959 and took the oath on January 31 of the same year. Choy King Tee first came to the
Philippines in 1955 and kept commuting between Manila and Hongkong since then, her last visa before the case being due to expire
on February 14, 1961. On January 27, 1961, her husband asked the Commissioner of Immigration to cancel her alien certificate of
registration, as well as their child's, for the reason that they were Filipinos, and when the request was denied as to the wife, a
mandamus was sought, which the trial court granted. Discussing anew the issue of the need for qualifications, Justice Makalintal not
only reiterated the arguments of Justice Regala in Lo San Tuang but added further that the ruling is believed to be in line with the
national policy of selective admission to Philippine citizenship. 7

No wonder, upon this authority, in Austria v. Conchu, G.R. No. L-20716, June 22, 1965, 14 SCRA 336, Justice J.P. Bengzon readily
reversed the decision of the lower court granting the writs of mandamus and prohibition against the Commissioner of Immigration,
considering that Austria's wife, while admitting she did not possess all the qualifications for naturalization, had submitted only an
affidavit that she had none of the disqualifications therefor. So also did Justice Dizon similarly hold eight days later in Brito v.
Commissioner, G.R. No. L-16829, June 30, 1965, 14 SCRA 539.

Then came the second Ly Giok Ha case 8 wherein Justice J. B. L. Reyes took occasion to expand on the reasoning of Choy King
Tee by illustrating with examples "the danger of relying exclusively on the absence of disqualifications, without taking into account
the other affirmative requirements of the law." 9

Lastly, in Go Im Ty v. Republic, G.R. No. L-17919, decided on July 30, 1966, 10 Justice Zaldivar held for the Court that an alien
woman who is widowed during the dependency of the naturalization proceedings of her husband, in order that she may be allowed
to take the oath as Filipino, must, aside from proving compliance with the requirements of Republic Act 530, show that she
possesses all the qualifications and does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under the Naturalization Law, citing in the
process the decision to such effect discussed above, 11 even as he impliedly reversed pro tanto the ruling in Tan Lin v. Republic,
G.R. No. L-13786, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 383.

Accordingly, in Burca, Justice Sanchez premised his opinion on the assumption that the point now under discussion is settled law.

In the case now at bar, the Court is again called upon to rule on the same issue. Under Section 15 of the Naturalization Law,
Commonwealth Act 473, providing that:

SEC. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. Any woman, who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.

Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof.

A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of the naturalization of the parent, shall automatically become a
Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born child, who is not in the Philippines at the time the parent is naturalized, shall be deemed a
Philippine citizen only during his minority, unless he begins to reside permanently in the Philippines when still a minor, in which
case, he will continue to be a Philippine citizen even after becoming of age.

A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parent, shall be considered a Philippine citizen unless within one
year after reaching the age of majority he fails to register himself as a Philippine citizen at the American Consulate of the country
where he resides, and to take the necessary oath of allegiance.

is it necessary, in order that an alien woman who marries a Filipino or who is married to a man who subsequently becomes a
Filipino, may become a Filipino citizen herself, that, aside from not suffering from any of the disqualifications enumerated in the law,
she must also possess all the qualifications required by said law? if nothing but the unbroken line from Lee Suan Ay to Go Im Ty, as
recounted above, were to be considered, it is obvious that an affirmative answer to the question would be inevitable, specially, if it is
noted that the present case was actually submitted for decision on January 21, 1964 yet, shortly after Lo San Tuang, Tong Siok Sy
and Sun Peck Yong, all supra, and even before Choy King Tee, supra, were decided. There are other circumstances, however,
which make it desirable, if not necessary, that the Court take up the matter anew. There has been a substantial change in the
membership of the Court since Go Im Ty, and of those who were in the Court already when Burca was decided, two members,
Justice Makalintal and Castro concurred only in the result, precisely, according to them, because (they wanted to leave the point
now under discussion open in so far as they are concerned. 12 Truth to tell, the views and arguments discussed at length with
copious relevant authorities, in the motion for reconsideration as well as in the memorandum of the amici curae 13 in the Burca case
cannot just be taken lightly and summarily ignored, since they project in the most forceful manner, not only the legal and logical
angles of the issue, but also the imperative practical aspects thereof in the light of the actual situation of the thousands of alien
wives of Filipinos who have so long, even decades, considered themselves as Filipinas and have always lived and acted as such,
officially or otherwise, relying on the long standing continuous recognition of their status as such by the administrative authorities in
charge of the matter, as well as by the courts. Under these circumstances, and if only to afford the Court an opportunity to consider
the views of the five justices who took no part in Go Im Ty (including the writer of this opinion), the Court decided to further
reexamine the matter. After all, the ruling first laid in Lee Suan Ay, and later in Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee stand the second
(1966) Ly Giok Ha, did not categorically repudiate the opinions of the Secretary of Justice relied upon by the first (1959) Ly Giok Ha.
Besides, some points brought to light during the deliberations in this case would seem to indicate that the premises of the later
cases can still bear further consideration.

Whether We like it or not, it is undeniably factual that the legal provision We are construing, Section 15, aforequoted, of the
Naturalization Law has been taken directly, copied and adopted from its American counterpart. To be more accurate, said provision
is nothing less than a reenactment of the American provision. A brief review of its history proves this beyond per adventure of doubt.

The first Naturalization Law of the Philippines approved by the Philippine Legislature under American sovereignty was that of March
26, 1920, Act No. 2927. Before then, as a consequence of the Treaty of Paris, our citizenship laws were found only in the Organic
Laws, the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Act of the United States Congress of March 23, 1912 and later the Jones Law of 1916. In fact,
Act No. 2927 was enacted pursuant to express authority granted by the Jones Law. For obvious reasons, the Philippines gained
autonomy on the subjects of citizenship and immigration only after the effectivity of the Philippine Independence Act. This made it
practically impossible for our laws on said subject to have any perspective or orientation of our own; everything was American.

The Philippine Bill of 1902 provided pertinently: .

SECTION 4. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside herein who were Spanish subjects on the
eleventh day of April, eighteen-hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent
thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States,
except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty
of peace between the United States and Spain signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight.

This Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 was amended by Act of Congress of March 23, 1912, by adding a provision as follows:

Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those
natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of other insular possessions of the
United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who would become citizens of the United States, under the
laws of the United States, if residing therein.

The Jones Law reenacted these provisions substantially: .

SECTION 2. That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of April, eighteen
hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided in said islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and held to
be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris December tenth,
eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and except such others as have since become citizens of some other country: Provided, That the
Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by
those natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the
United States, and such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the United States under the laws of the
United States if residing therein.

For aught that appears, there was nothing in any of the said organic laws regarding the effect of marriage to a Filipino upon the
nationality of an alien woman, albeit under the Spanish Civil Code provisions on citizenship, Articles 17 to 27, which were, however,
abrogated upon the change of sovereignty, it was unquestionable that the citizenship of the wife always followed that of the
husband. Not even Act 2927 contained any provision regarding the effect of naturalization of an alien, upon the citizenship of his
alien wife, nor of the marriage of such alien woman with a native born Filipino or one who had become a Filipino before the
marriage, although Section 13 thereof provided thus: .

SEC. 13. Right of widow and children of petitioners who have died. In case a petitioner should die before the final decision has
been rendered, his widow and minor children may continue the proceedings. The decision rendered in the case shall, so far as the
widow and minor children are concerned, produce the same legal effect as if it had been rendered during the life of the petitioner.

It was not until November 30, 1928, upon the approval of Act 3448, amending Act 2977, that the following provisions were added to
the above Section 13:

SECTION 1. The following new sections are hereby inserted between sections thirteen and fourteen of Act Numbered
Twenty-nine hundred and Twenty-seven:

SEC. 13(a). Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippine Islands and who might herself
be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippine Islands.

SEC. 13(b). Children of persons who have been duly naturalized under this law, being under the age of twenty-one years at
the time of the naturalization of their parents, shall, if dwelling in the Philippine Islands, be considered citizens thereof.

SEC. 13(c). Children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippine Islands after the
naturalization of their parents shall be considered citizens thereof.

When Commonwealth Act 473, the current naturalization law, was enacted on June 17, 1939, the above Section 13 became its
Section 15 which has already been quoted earlier in this decision. As can be seen, Section 13 (a) abovequoted was re-enacted
practically word for word in the first paragraph of this Section 15 except for the change of Philippine Islands to Philippines. And it
could not have been on any other basis than this legislative history of our naturalization law that each and everyone of the decisions
of this Court from the first Ly Giok Ha to Go Im Ty, discussed above, were rendered.

As stated earlier, in the opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in the first Ly Giok Ha, it was quite clear that for an alien woman who
marries a Filipino to become herself a Filipino citizen, there is no need for any naturalization proceeding because she becomes a
Filipina ipso facto from the time of such marriage, provided she does not suffer any of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4
of Commonwealth Act 473, with no mention being made of whether or not the qualifications enumerated in Section 2 thereof need
be shown. It was only in Lee Suan Ay in 1959 that the possession of qualifications were specifically required, but it was not until
1963, in Lo San Tuang, that Justice Regala reasoned out why the possession of the qualifications provided by the law should also
be shown to be possessed by the alien wife of a Filipino, for her to become a Filipina by marriage.

As may be recalled, the basic argument advanced by Justice Regala was briefly as follows: That "like the law in the United States,
our Naturalization Law specified the classes of persons who alone might become citizens, even as it provided who were
disqualified," and inasmuch as Commonwealth Act 473, our Naturalization Law since 1939 did not reenact the section providing who
might become citizens, allegedly in order to remove racial discrimination in favor of Caucasians and against Asiatics, "the only
logical deduction ... is that the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" must now be understood as referring to those who
under Section 2 of the law are qualified to become citizens of the Philippines" and "there is simply no support for the view that the
phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" must now be understood as requiring merely that the alien woman must not
belong to the class of disqualified persons under Section 4 of the Revised Naturalization Law." 14

A similar line of reasoning was followed in Choy King Tee, which for ready reference may be qouted:

The question has been settled by the uniform ruling of this Court in a number of cases. The alien wife of a Filipino citizen must first
prove that she has all the qualifications required by Section 2 and none of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of the
Naturalization Law before she may be deemed a Philippine citizen (Lao Chay v. Galang, L-190977, Oct. 30, 1964, citing Lo San
Tuang v. Galang, L-18775, Nov. 30, 1963; Sun Peck Yong v. Commissioner of Immigration, L-20784, December 27, 1963; Tong
Siok Sy v. Vivo, L-21136, December 27, 1963). The writer of this opinion has submitted the question anew to the court for a possible
reexamination of the said ruling in the light of the interpretation of a similar law in the United States after which Section 15 of our
Naturalization Law was patterned. That law was section 2 of the Act of February 10, 1855 (Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of
the U.S.). The local law, Act No. 3448, was passed on November 30, 1928 as an amendment to the former Philippine Naturalization
Law, Act No. 2927, which was approved on March 26, 1920. Under this Naturalization Law, acquisition of Philippine citizenship was
limited to three classes of persons, (a) Natives of the Philippines who were not citizens thereof; (b) natives of the other insular
possessions of the United States; and (c) citizens of the United States, or foreigners who, under the laws of the United States, may
become citizens of the latter country if residing therein. The reference in subdivision (c) to foreigners who may become American
Citizens is restrictive in character, for only persons of certain specified races were qualified thereunder. In other words, in so far as
racial restrictions were concerned there was at the time a similarity between the naturalization laws of the two countries and hence
there was reason to accord here persuasive force to the interpretation given in the United States to the statutory provision
concerning the citizenship of alien women marrying American citizens.

This Court, however, believes that such reason has ceased to exist since the enactment of the Revised Naturalization Law,
(Commonwealth Act No. 473) on June 17, 1939. The racial restrictions have been eliminated in this Act, but the provision found in
Act No. 3448 has been maintained. It is logical to presume that when Congress chose to retain the said provision that to be
deemed a Philippine citizen upon marriage the alien wife must be one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized," the reference is
no longer to the class or race to which the woman belongs, for class or race has become immaterial, but to the qualifications and
disqualifications for naturalization as enumerated in Sections 2 and 4 of the statute. Otherwise the requirement that the woman
"might herself be lawfully naturalized" would be meaningless surplusage, contrary to settled norms of statutory construction.

The rule laid down by this Court in this and in other cases heretofore decided is believed to be in line with the national policy of
selective admission to Philippine citizenship, which after all is a privilege granted only to those who are found worthy thereof, and
not indiscriminately to anybody at all on the basis alone of marriage to a man who is a citizen of the Philippines, irrespective of moral
character, ideological beliefs, and identification with Filipino ideals, customs and traditions.

Appellee here having failed to prove that she has all the qualifications for naturalization, even, indeed, that she has none of the
disqualifications, she is not entitled to recognition as a Philippine citizen.

In the second Ly Giok Ha, the Court further fortified the arguments in favor of the same conclusion thus:

On cross-examination, she (Ly Giok Ha) failed to establish that: (1) she has been residing in the Philippines for a continuous period
of at least (10) years (p. 27, t.s.n., id.); (2) she has a lucrative trade, profession, or lawful occupation (p. 13, t.s.n., id.); and (3) she
can speak and write English, or any of the principal Philippine languages (pp. 12, 13, t.s.n., id.).

While the appellant Immigration Commissioner contends that the words emphasized indicate that the present Naturalization Law
requires that an alien woman who marries a Filipino husband must possess the qualifications prescribed by section 2 in addition to
not being disqualified under any of the eight ("a" to "h") subheadings of section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, in order to claim
our citizenship by marriage, both the appellee and the court below (in its second decision) sustain the view that all that the law
demands is that the woman be not disqualified under section 4.

At the time the present case was remanded to the court of origin (1960) the question at issue could be regarded as not conclusively
settled, there being only the concise pronouncement in Lee Suan Ay, et al. v. Galang, G. R. No. L-11855, Dec. 23, 1959, to the
effect that:

The marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically confer Philippine citizenship upon the latter. She must possess
the qualifications required by law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization.

Since that time, however, a long line of decisions of this Court has firmly established the rule that the requirement of section 15 of
Commonwealth Act 473 (the Naturalization Act), that an alien woman married to a citizen should be one who "might herself be
lawfully naturalized," means not only woman free from the disqualifications enumerated in section 4 of the Act but also one who
possesses the qualifications prescribed by section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473 (San Tuan v. Galang, L-18775, Nov. 30, 1963; Sun
Peck Yong v. Com. of Immigration, L-20784, Dee. 27, 1963; Tong Siok Sy v. Vivo, L-21136, Dec. 27, 1963; Austria v. Conchu, L-
20716, June 22, 1965; Choy King Tee v. Galang, L-18351, March 26, 1965; Brito v. Com. of Immigration, L-16829, June 30, 1965).

Reflection will reveal why this must be so. The qualifications prescribed under section 2 of the Naturalization Act, and the
disqualifications enumerated in its section 4 are not mutually exclusive; and if all that were to be required is that the wife of a Filipino
be not disqualified under section 4, the result might well be that citizenship would be conferred upon persons in violation of the
policy of the statute. For example, section 4 disqualifies only

(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; and

(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude,

so that a blackmailer, or a maintainer of gambling or bawdy houses, not previously convicted by a competent court would not be
thereby disqualified; still, it is certain that the law did not intend such person to be admitted as a citizen in view of the requirement of
section 2 that an applicant for citizenship "must be of good moral character."

Similarly, the citizen's wife might be a convinced believer in racial supremacy, in government by certain selected classes, in the right
to vote exclusively by certain "herrenvolk", and thus disbelieve in the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution; yet she would
not be disqualified under section 4, as long as she is not "opposed to organized government," nor affiliated to groups "upholding or
teaching doctrines opposing all organized governments", nor "defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal
assault or assassination for the success or predominance of their ideas." Et sic de caeteris.

The foregoing instances should suffice to illustrate the danger of relying exclusively on the absence of disqualifications, without
taking into account the other affirmative requirements of the law, which, in the case at bar, the appellee Ly Giok Ha admittedly does
not possess.

As to the argument that the phrase "might herself be lawfully naturalized" was derived from the U.S. Revised Statutes (section 1994)
and should be given the same territorial and racial significance given to it by American courts, this Court has rejected the same in
Lon San Tuang v. Galang, L-18775, November 30, 1963; and in Choy King Tee v. Galang, L-18351, March 26, 1965.

It is difficult to minimize the persuasive force of the foregoing rationalizations, but a closer study thereof cannot bat reveal certain
relevant considerations which adversely affect the premises on which they are predicated, thus rendering the conclusions arrived
thereby not entirely unassailable.

1. The main proposition, for instance, that in eliminating Section 1 of Act 2927 providing who are eligible for Philippine
citizenship, the purpose of Commonwealth Act 473, the Revised Naturalization Law, was to remove the racial requirements for
naturalization, thereby opening the door of Filipino nationality to Asiatics instead of allowing the admission thereto of Caucasians
only, suffers from lack of exact accuracy. It is important to note, to start with, that Commonwealth Act 473 did away with the whole
Section 1 of Act 2927 which reads, thus:

SECTION 1. Who may become Philippine citizens. Philippine citizenship may be acquired by: (a) natives of the
Philippines who are not citizens thereof under the Jones Law; (b) natives of the other Insular possessions of the United States; (c)
citizens of the United States, or foreigners who under the laws of the United States may become citizens of said country if residing
therein.

and not only subdivision (c) thereof. Nowhere in this whole provision was there any mention of race or color of the persons who
were then eligible for Philippine citizenship. What is more evident from said provision is that it reflected the inevitable subordination
of our legislation during the pre-Commonwealth American regime to the understandable stations flowing from our staffs as a territory
of the United States by virtue of the Treaty of Paris. In fact, Section 1 of Act 2927 was precisely approved pursuant to express
authority without which it could not have been done, granted by an amendment to Section 4 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 introduced
by the Act of the United States Congress of March 23, 1912 and which was reenacted as part of the Jones Law of 1916, the
pertinent provisions of which have already been footed earlier. In truth, therefore, it was because of the establishment of the
Philippine Commonwealth and in the exercise of our legislative autonomy on citizenship matters under the Philippine Independence
Act that Section 1 of Act 2927 was eliminated, 15 and not purposely to eliminate any racial discrimination contained in our
Naturalization Law. The Philippine Legislature naturally wished to free our Naturalization Law from the impositions of American
legislation. In other words, the fact that such discrimination was removed was one of the effects rather than the intended purpose of
the amendment.

2. Again, the statement in Choy King Tee to the effect that "the reference in subdivision (c) (of Section 1 of Act 2927) to
foreigners who may become American citizens is restrictive in character, for only persons of certain specified races were qualified
thereunder" fails to consider the exact import of the said subdivision. Explicitly, the thrust of the said subdivision was to confine the
grant under it of Philippine citizenship only to the three classes of persons therein mentioned, the third of which were citizens of the
United States and, corollarily, persons who could be American citizens under her laws. The words used in the provision do not
convey any idea of favoring aliens of any particular race or color and of excluding others, but more accurately, they refer to all the
disqualifications of foreigners for American citizenship under the laws of the United States. The fact is that even as of 1906, or long
before 1920, when our Act 2927 became a law, the naturalization, laws of the United States already provided for the following
disqualifications in the Act of the Congress of June 29, 1906:

SEC. 7. That no person who disbelieves in or who is opposed to organized government, or who is a member of or affiliated with
any organization entertaining and teaching such disbelief in or opposition to organized government, or who advocates or teaches
the duty, necessity, or propriety of the unlawful assaulting or killing of any officer or officers, either of specific individuals or of
officers generally, of the Government of the United States, or of any other organized government, because of his or their official
character, or who is a polygamist, shall be naturalized or be made a citizen of the United States.

and all these disqualified persons were, therefore, ineligible for Philippine citizenship under Section 1 of Act 2927 even if they
happened to be Caucasians. More importantly, as a matter of fact, said American law, which was the first "Act to Establish a Bureau
of Immigration and Naturalization and to provide for a Uniform Rule for Naturalization of Aliens throughout the United States"
contained no racial disqualification requirement, except as to Chinese, the Act of May 6, 1882 not being among the expressly
repealed by this law, hence it is clear that when Act 2927 was enacted, subdivision (e) of its Section 1 could not have had any
connotation of racial exclusion necessarily, even if it were traced back to its origin in the Act of the United States Congress of 1912
already mentioned above. 16 Thus, it would seem that the rationalization in the qouted decisions predicated on the theory that the
elimination of Section 1 of Act 2927 by Commonwealth Act 473 was purposely for no other end than the abolition of racial
discrimination in our naturalization law has no clear factual basis. 17

3. In view of these considerations, there appears to be no cogent reason why the construction adopted in the opinions of the
Secretary of Justice referred to in the first Ly Giok Ha decision of the Chief Justice should not prevail. It is beyond dispute that the
first paragraph of Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473 is a reenactment of Section 13(a) of Act 2927, as amended by Act 3448,
and that the latter is nothing but an exact copy, deliberately made, of Section 1994 of the Raised Statutes of the United States as it
stood before its repeal in 1922. 18 Before such repeal, the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" found in said Section
15 had a definite unmistakable construction uniformly foIlowed in all courts of the United States that had occasion to apply the same
and which, therefore, must be considered, as if it were written in the statute itself. It is almost trite to say that when our legislators
enacted said section, they knew of its unvarying construction in the United States and that, therefore, in adopting verbatim the
American statute, they have in effect incorporated into the provision, as thus enacted, the construction given to it by the American
courts as well as the Attorney General of the United States and all administrative authorities, charged with the implementation of the
naturalization and immigration laws of that country. (Lo Cham v. Ocampo, 77 Phil., 635 [1946]; Laxamana v. Baltazar, 92 Phil., 32
[1952]; Hartley v. Commissioner, 295 U.S. 216, 79 L. ed. 1399, 55 S Ct. 756 [19353; Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79, 83 L ed. 52,
59 S Ct. 45 [1938]; Helvering v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110, 83 L ed. 536, 59 S Ct. 423 [1939]. [p. 32, Memo of
Amicus Curiae]).

A fairly comprehensive summary of the said construction by the American courts and administrative authorities is contained in
United States of America ex rel. Dora Sejnensky v. Robert E. Tod, Commissioner of Immigration, Appt., 295 Fed. 523, decided
November 14, 1922, 26 A. L. R. 1316 as follows:

Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes (Comp. Stat. 3948, 2 Fed. Sta. Anno. 2d ed. p. 117) provides as follows: "Any woman who is
now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the United States, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a
citizen."

Section 1944 of the Revised Stat. is said to originate in the Act of Congress of February 10, 1855 (10 Stat. at L. 604, chap. 71),
which in its second section provided "that any woman, who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws, married, or who
shall be married to a citizen of the United States, shall be deemed and taken to be a citizen."

And the American Statute of 1855 is substantially a copy of the earlier British Statute 7 & 8 Vict. chap. 66, s 16, 1844, which
provided that "any woman married, or who shall be married, to a natural-born subject or person naturalized, shall be deemed and
taken to be herself naturalized, and have all the rights and privileges of a natural born subject."

The Act of Congress of September 22, 1922 (42 Stat. at L. 1021, chap. 411, Comp. Stat. 4358b, Fed. Stat. Anno. Supp. 1922, p.
255), being "An Act Relative to the Naturalization and Citizenship of Married Women," in 2, provides "that any woman who marries a
citizen of the United States after the passage of this Act, ... shall not become a citizen of the United States by reason of such
marriage ..."

Section 6 of the act also provides "that 1994 of the Revised Statutes ... are repealed."

Section 6 also provides that `such repeal shall not terminate citizenship acquired or retained under either of such sections, ..."
meaning 2 and 6. So that this Act of September 22, 1922, has no application to the facts of the present case, as the marriage of the
relator took place prior to its passage. This case, therefore, depends upon the meaning to be attached to 1994 of the Revised
Statutes.

In 1868 the Supreme Court, in Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496, 498, 19 L. ed. 283, 284, construed this provision as found in the Act of
1855 as follows: "The term, "who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws," only limits the application of the law to free
white women. The previous Naturalization Act, existing at the time, only required that the person applying for its benefits should be
"a free white person," and not an alien enemy."

This construction limited the effect of the statute to those aliens who belonged to the class or race which might be lawfully
naturalized, and did not refer to any of the other provisions of the naturalization laws as to residence or moral character, or to any of
the provisions of the immigration laws relating to the exclusion or deportation of aliens.

In 1880, in Leonard v. Grant (C. C.) 5 Fed. 11, District Judge Deady also construed the Act of 1855, declaring that "any woman who
is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the United States, and might herself be lawfully naturalized, shall be deemed a
citizen." He held that "upon the authorities, and the reason, if not the necessity, of the case," the statute must be construed as in
effect declaring that an alien woman, who is of the class or race that may be lawfully naturalized under the existing laws, and who
marries a citizen of the United States, is such a citizen also, and it was not necessary that it should appear affirmatively that she
possessed the other qualifications at the time of her marriage to entitle her to naturalization.

In 1882, the Act of 1855 came before Mr. Justice Harlan, sitting in the circuit court, in United States v. Kellar, 13 Fed. 82. An alien
woman, a subject of Prussia came to the United States and married here a naturalized citizen. Mr. Justice Harlan, with the
concurrence of Judge Treat, held that upon her marriage she became ipso facto a citizen of the United States as fully as if she had
complied with all of the provisions of the statutes upon the subject of naturalization. He added: "There can be no doubt of this, in
view of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United, States in Kelly v. Owen, 7 Wall. 496, 19 L. ed. 283." The alien "belonged to
the class of persons" who might be lawfully naturalized.

In 1904, in Hopkins v. Fachant, 65 C. C. A. 1, 130 Fed. 839, an alien woman came to the United States from France and entered
the country contrary to the immigration laws. The immigration authorities took her into custody at the port of New York, with the view
of deporting her. She applied for her release under a writ of habeas corpus, and pending the disposition of the matter she married a
naturalized American citizen. The circuit court of appeals for the ninth Circuit held, affirming the court below, that she was entitled to
be discharged from custody. The court declared: "The rule is well settled that her marriage to a naturalized citizen of the United
States entitled her to be discharged. The status of the wife follows that of her husband, ... and by virtue of her marriage her
husband's domicil became her domicil." .

In 1908, the circuit court for the district of Rhode Island in Re Rustigian, 165. Fed. 980, had before it the application of a husband for
his final decree of naturalization. It appeared that at that time his wife was held by the immigration authorities at New York on the
ground that she was afflicted with a dangerous and contagious disease. Counsel on both sides agreed that the effect of the
husband's naturalization would be to confer citizenship upon the wife. In view of that contingency District Judge Brown declined to
pass upon the husband's application for naturalization, and thought it best to wait until it was determined whether the wife's disease
was curable. He placed his failure to act on the express ground that the effect of naturalizing the husband might naturalize her. At
the same time he express his opinion that the husband's naturalization would not effect her naturalization, as she was not one who
could become lawfully naturalized. "Her own capacity (to become naturalized)," the court stated "is a prerequisite to her attaining
citizenship. If herself lacking in that capacity, the married status cannot confer it upon her." Nothing, however, was actually decided
in that case, and the views expressed therein are really nothing more than mere dicta. But, if they can be regarded as something
more than that, we find ourselves, with all due respect for the learned judge, unable to accept them.

In 1909, in United States ex rel. Nicola v. Williams, 173 Fed. 626, District Judge Learned Hand held that an alien woman, a subject
of the Turkish Empire, who married an American citizen while visiting Turkey, and then came to the United States, could not be
excluded, although she had, at the time of her entry, a disease which under the immigration laws would have been sufficient ground
for her exclusion, if she bad not had the status of a citizen. The case was brought into this court on appeal, and in 1911 was
affirmed, in 106 C. C. A. 464, 184 Fed. 322. In that case, however at the time the relators married, they might have been lawfully
naturalized, and we said: "Even if we assume the contention of the district attorney to be correct that marriage will not make a citizen
of a woman who would be excluded under our immigration laws, it does not affect these relators."

We held that, being citizens, they could not be excluded as aliens; and it was also said to be inconsistent with the policy of our law
that the husband should be a citizen and the wife an alien. The distinction between that case and the one now before the court is
that, in the former case, the marriage took place before any order of exclusion had been made, while in this the marriage was
celebrated after such an order was made. But such an order is a mere administrative provision, and has not the force of a judgment
of a court, and works no estoppel. The administrative order is based on the circumstances that existed at the time the order of
exclusion was made. If the circumstances change prior to the order being carried into effect, it cannot be executed. For example, if
an order of exclusion should be based on the ground that the alien was at the time afflicted with a contagious disease, and it should
be made satisfactorily to appear, prior to actual deportation, that the alien had entirely recovered from the disease, we think it plain
that the order could not be carried into effect. So, in this case, if, after the making of the order of exclusion and while she is
permitted temporarily to remain, she in good faith marries an American citizen, we cannot doubt the validity of her marriage, and that
she thereby acquired, under international law and under 1994 of the Revised Statutes, American citizenship, and ceased to be an
alien. There upon, the immigration authorities lost their jurisdiction over her, as that jurisdiction applies only to aliens, and not to
citizens.

In 1910, District Judge Dodge, in Ex parte Kaprielian, 188 Fed. 694, sustained the right of the officials to deport a woman under the
following circumstances: She entered this country in July, 1910, being an alien and having been born in Turkey. She was taken into
custody by the immigration authorities in the following September, and in October a warrant for her deportation was issued. Pending
hearings as to the validity of that order, she was paroled in the custody of her counsel. The ground alleged for her deportation was
that she was afflicted with a dangerous and contagious disease at the time of her entry. One of the reasons assigned to defeat
deportation was that the woman had married a citizen of the United States pending the proceedings for her deportation. Judge
Dodge declared himself unable to believe that a marriage under such circumstances "is capable of having the effect claimed, in view
of the facts shown." He held that it was no part of the intended policy of 1994 to annul or override the immigration laws, so as to
authorize the admission into the country of the wife of a naturalized alien not otherwise entitled to enter, and that an alien woman,
who is of a class of persons excluded by law from admission to the United States does not come within the provisions of that
section. The court relied wholly upon the dicta contained in the Rustigian Case. No other authorities were cited.

In 1914, District Judge Neterer, in Ex parte Grayson, 215 Fed. 449, construed 1994 and held that where, pending proceedings to
deport an alien native of France as an alien prostitute, she was married to a citizen of the United States, she thereby became a
citizen, and was not subject to deportation until her citizenship was revoked by due process of law. It was his opinion that if, as was
contended, her marriage was conceived in fraud, and was entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws and
preventing her deportation, such fact should be established in a court of competent jurisdiction in an action commenced for the
purpose. The case was appealed and the appeal was dismissed. 134 C. C. A. 666, 219 Fed. 1022.

It is interesting also to observe the construction placed upon the language of the statute by the Department of Justice. In 1874,
Attorney General Williams, 14 Ops. Atty. Gen. 402, passing upon the Act of February 10, 1855, held that residence within the United
States for the period required by the naturalization laws was riot necessary in order to constitute an alien woman a citizen, she
having married a citizen of the United States abroad, although she never resided in the United States, she and her husband having
continued to reside abroad after the marriage.

In 1909, a similar construction was given to the Immigration Act of May 5, 1907, in an opinion rendered by Attorney General
Wickersham. It appeared an unmarried woman, twenty-eight years of age and a native of Belgium, arrived in New York and went at
once to a town in Nebraska, where she continued to reside. About fifteen months after her arrival she was taken before a United
States commissioner by way of instituting proceedings under the Immigration Act (34 Stat. at L. 898, chap. 1134, Comp. Stat. 4242,
3 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 637) for her deportation, on the ground that she had entered this country for the purpose of prostitution,
and had been found an inmate of a house of prostitution and practicing the same within three years after landing. It appeared,
however, that after she was taken before the United States commissioner, but prior to her arrest under a warrant by the Department
of Justice, she was lawfully married to a native-born citizen of the United States. The woman professed at the time of her marriage
an intention to abandon her previous mode of life and to remove with her husband to his home in Pennsylvania. He knew what her
mode of life had been, but professed to believe in her good intentions. The question was raised as to the right to deport her, the
claim being advance that by her marriage she bad become an American citizen and therefore could not be deported. The Attorney
General ruled against the right to deport her as she had become an American citizen. He held that the words, "who might herself be
lawfully naturalized," refer to a class or race who might be lawfully naturalized, and that compliance with the other conditions of the
naturalization laws was not required. 27 Ops. Atty. Gen. 507.

Before concluding this opinion, we may add that it has not escaped our observation that Congress, in enacting the Immigration Act
of 1917, so as to provide, in 19, "that the marriage to an American citizen of a female of the sexually immoral classes ... shall not
invest such female with United States citizenship if the marriage of such alien female shall be solemnized after her arrest or after the
commission of acts which make her liable to deportation under this act."

Two conclusions seem irresistibly to follow from the above change in the law:

(1) Congress deemed legislation essential to prevent women of the immoral class avoiding deportation through the device of
marrying an American citizen.

(2) If Congress intended that the marriage of an American citizen with an alien woman of any other of the excluded classes,
either before or after her detention, should not confer upon her American citizenship, thereby entitling her to enter the country, its
intention would have been expressed, and 19 would not have been confined solely to women of the immoral class.

Indeed, We have examined all the leading American decisions on the subject and We have found no warrant for the proposition that
the phrase "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" in Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes was meant solely as a racial bar,
even if loose statements in some decisions and other treaties and other writings on the subject would seem to give such impression.
The case of Kelley v. Owen, supra, which appears to be the most cited among the first of the decisions 19 simply held:

As we construe this Act, it confers the privileges of citizenship upon women married to citizens of the United States, if they are of the
class of persons for whose naturalization the previous Acts of Congress provide. The terms "married" or "who shall be married," do
not refer in our judgment, to the time when the ceremony of marriage is celebrated, but to a state of marriage. They mean that,
whenever a woman, who under previous Acts might be naturalized, is in a state of marriage to a citizen, whether his citizenship
existed at the passage of the Act or subsequently, or before or after the marriage, she becomes, by that fact, a citizen also. His
citizenship, whenever it exists, confers, under the Act, citizenship upon her. The construction which would restrict the Act to women
whose husbands, at the time of marriage, are citizens, would exclude far the greater number, for whose benefit, as we think, the Act
was intended. Its object, in our opinion, was to allow her citizenship to follow that of her husband, without the necessity of any
application for naturalization on her part; and, if this was the object, there is no reason for the restriction suggested.

The terms, "who might lawfully be naturalized under the existing laws," only limit the application of the law to free white women. The
previous Naturalization Act, existing at the time only required that the person applying for its benefits should be "a free white
person," and not an alien enemy. Act of April 14th, 1802, 2 Stat. at L. 153.

A similar construction was given to the Act by the Court of Appeals of New York, in Burton v. Burton, 40 N. Y. 373; and is the one
which gives the widest extension to its provisions.

Note that write the court did say that "the terms, "who might lawfully be naturalized under existing laws" only limit the application to
free white women" 20 it hastened to add that "the previous Naturalization Act, existing at the time, ... required that the person
applying for its benefits should be (not only) a "free white person" (but also) ... not an alien enemy." This is simply because under
the Naturalization Law of the United States at the time the case was decided, the disqualification of enemy aliens had already been
removed by the Act of July 30, 1813, as may be seen in the corresponding footnote hereof anon. In other words, if in the case of
Kelly v. Owen only the race requirement was mentioned, the reason was that there was no other non-racial requirement or no more
alien enemy disqualification at the time; and this is demonstrated by the fact that the court took care to make it clear that under the
previous naturalization law, there was also such requirement in addition to race. This is impotent, since as stated in re Rustigian,
165 Fed. Rep. 980, "The expression used by Mr. Justice Field, (in Kelly v. Owen) the terms "who might lawfully be naturalized under
existing laws" only limit the application of the law to free white women, must be interpreted in the application to the special facts and
to the incapacities under the then existing laws," (at p. 982) meaning that whether or not an alien wife marrying a citizen would be a
citizen was dependent, not only on her race and nothing more necessarily, but on whether or not there were other disqualifications
under the law in force at the time of her marriage or the naturalization of her husband.

4. As already stated, in Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee and the second Ly Giok Ha, the Court drew the evidence that
because Section 1 of Act 2927 was eliminated by Commonwealth Act 473, it follows that in place of the said eliminated section
particularly its subdivision (c), being the criterion of whether or not an alien wife "may be lawfully naturalized," what should be
required is not only that she must not be disqualified under Section 4 but that she must also possess the qualifications enumerated
in Section 2, such as those of age, residence, good moral character, adherence to the underlying principles of the Philippine
Constitution, irreproachable conduct, lucrative employment or ownership of real estate, capacity to speak and write English or
Spanish and one of the principal local languages, education of children in certain schools, etc., thereby implying that, in effect, sails
Section 2 has been purposely intended to take the place of Section 1 of Act 2927. Upon further consideration of the proper
premises, We have come, to the conclusion that such inference is not sufficiently justified.

To begin with, nothing extant in the legislative history, which We have already explained above of the mentioned provisions has
been shown or can be shown to indicate that such was the clear intent of the legislature. Rather, what is definite is that Section 15
is, an exact copy of Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which, at the time of the approval of Commonwealth
Act 473 had already a settled construction by American courts and administrative authorities.

Secondly, as may be gleaned from the summary of pertinent American decisions quoted above, there can be no doubt that in the
construction of the identically worded provision in the Revised Statutes of the United States, (Section 1994, which was taken, from
the Act of February 10, 1855) all authorities in the United States are unanimously agreed that the qualifications of residence, good
moral character, adherence to the Constitution, etc. are not supposed to be considered, and that the only eligibility to be taken into
account is that of the race or class to which the subject belongs, the conceptual scope of which, We have just discussed. 21 In the
very case of Leonard v. Grant, supra, discussed by Justice Regala in Lo San Tuang, the explanation for such posture of the
American authorities was made thus:

The phrase, "shall be deemed a citizen" in section 1994 Rev. St., or as it was in the Act of 1855, supra, "shall be deemed and taken
to be a citizen" while it may imply that the person to whom it relates has not actually become a citizen by ordinary means or in the
usual way, as by the judgment of a competent court, upon a proper application and proof, yet it does not follow that such person is
on that account practically any the less a citizen. The word "deemed" is the equivalent of "considered" or "judged"; and, therefore,
whatever an act of Congress requires to be "deemed" or "taken" as true of any person or thing, must, in law, be considered as
having been duly adjudged or established concerning "such person or thing, and have force and effect accordingly. When,
therefore, Congress declares that an alien woman shall, under certain circumstances, be "deemed' an American citizen, the effect
when the contingency occurs, is equivalent to her being naturalized directly by an act of Congress, or in the usual mode thereby
prescribed.

Unless We disregard now the long settled familiar rule of statutory construction that in a situation like this wherein our legislature has
copied an American statute word for word, it is understood that the construction already given to such statute before its being copied
constitute part of our own law, there seems to be no reason how We can give a different connotation or meaning to the provision in
question. At least, We have already seen that the views sustaining the contrary conclusion appear to be based on in accurate
factual premises related to the real legislative background of the framing of our naturalization law in its present form.

Thirdly, the idea of equating the qualifications enumerated in Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473 with the eligibility requirements of
Section 1 of Act 2927 cannot bear close scrutiny from any point of view. There is no question that Section 2 of Commonwealth Act
473 is more or less substantially the same as Section 3 of Act 2927. In other words, Section 1 of Act 2927 co-existed already with
practically the same provision as Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473. If it were true that the phrase "who may be lawfully
naturalized" in Section 13 (a) of Act 2927, as amended by Act 3448, referred to the so-called racial requirement in Section 1 of the
same Act, without regard to the provisions of Section 3 thereof, how could the elimination of Section 1 have the effect of shifting the
reference to Section 3, when precisely, according to the American jurisprudence, which was prevailing at the time Commonwealth
Act 473 was approved, such qualifications as were embodied in said Section 3, which had their counterpart in the corresponding
American statutes, are not supposed to be taken into account and that what should be considered only are the requirements similar
to those provided for in said Section 1 together with the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4?

Fourthly, it is difficult to conceive that the phrase "who might be lawfully naturalized" in Section 15 could have been intended to
convey a meaning different than that given to it by the American courts and administrative authorities. As already stated, Act 3448
which contained said phrase and from which it was taken by Commonwealth Act 473, was enacted in 1928. By that, time, Section
1994 of the Revised Statutes of the United States was no longer in force because it had been repealed expressly the Act of
September 22, 1922 which did away with the automatic naturalization of alien wives of American citizens and required, instead, that
they submit to regular naturalization proceedings, albeit under more liberal terms than those of other applicants. In other words,
when our legislature adopted the phrase in question, which, as already demonstrated, had a definite construction in American law,
the Americans had already abandoned said phraseology in favor of a categorical compulsion for alien wives to be natural judicially.
Simple logic would seem to dictate that, since our lawmakers, at the time of the approval of Act 3448, had two choices, one to adopt
the phraseology of Section 1994 with its settled construction and the other to follow the new posture of the Americans of requiring
judicial naturalization and it appears that they have opted for the first, We have no alternative but to conclude that our law still
follows the old or previous American Law On the subject. Indeed, when Commonwealth Act 473 was approved in 1939, the
Philippine Legislature, already autonomous then from the American Congress, had a clearer chance to disregard the old American
law and make one of our own, or, at least, follow the trend of the Act of the U.S. Congress of 1922, but still, our legislators chose to
maintain the language of the old law. What then is significantly important is not that the legislature maintained said phraseology after
Section 1 of Act 2927 was eliminated, but that it continued insisting on using it even after the Americans had amended their law in
order to provide for what is now contended to be the construction that should be given to the phrase in question. Stated differently,
had our legislature adopted a phrase from an American statute before the American courts had given it a construction which was
acquiesced to by those given upon to apply the same, it would be possible for Us to adopt a construction here different from that of
the Americans, but as things stand, the fact is that our legislature borrowed the phrase when there was already a settled
construction thereof, and what is more, it appears that our legislators even ignored the modification of the American law and
persisted in maintaining the old phraseology. Under these circumstances, it would be in defiance of reason and the principles of
Statutory construction to say that Section 15 has a nationalistic and selective orientation and that it should be construed
independently of the previous American posture because of the difference of circumstances here and in the United States. It is
always safe to say that in the construction of a statute, We cannot fall on possible judicial fiat or perspective when the demonstrated
legislative point of view seems to indicate otherwise.

5. Viewing the matter from another angle, there is need to emphasize that in reality and in effect, the so called racial
requirements, whether under the American laws or the Philippine laws, have hardly been considered as qualifications in the same
sense as those enumerated in Section 3 of Act 2927 and later in Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473. More accurately, they have
always been considered as disqualifications, in the sense that those who did not possess them were the ones who could not "be
lawfully naturalized," just as if they were suffering from any of the disqualifications under Section 2 of Act 2927 and later those under
Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473, which, incidentally, are practically identical to those in the former law, except those in
paragraphs (f) and (h) of the latter. 22 Indeed, such is the clear impression anyone will surely get after going over all the American
decisions and opinions quoted and/or cited in the latest USCA (1970), Title 8, section 1430, pp. 598-602, and the first decisions of
this Court on the matter, Ly Giok Ha (1959) and Ricardo Cua, citing with approval the opinions of the secretary of Justice. 23 Such
being the case, that is, that the so-called racial requirements were always treated as disqualifications in the same light as the other
disqualifications under the law, why should their elimination not be viewed or understood as a subtraction from or a lessening of the
disqualifications? Why should such elimination have instead the meaning that what were previously considered as irrelevant
qualifications have become disqualifications, as seems to be the import of the holding in Choy King Tee to the effect that the
retention in Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473 of the same language of what used to be Section 13 (a) of Act 2927 (as amended
by Act 3448), notwithstanding the elimination of Section 1 of the latter, necessarily indicates that the legislature had in mind making
the phrase in question "who may be lawfully naturalized" refer no longer to any racial disqualification but to the qualification under
Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 473? Otherwise stated, under Act 2927, there were two groups of persons that could not be
naturalized, namely, those falling under Section 1 and those falling under Section 2, and surely, the elimination of one group, i.e.
those belonging to Section 1, could not have had, by any process of reasoning, the effect of increasing, rather than decreasing, the
disqualifications that used to be before such elimination. We cannot see by what alchemy of logic such elimination could have
convicted qualifications into disqualifications specially in the light of the fact that, after all, these are disqualifications clearly set out
as such in the law distinctly and separately from qualifications and, as already demonstrated, in American jurisprudence,
qualifications had never been considered to be of any relevance in determining "who might be lawfully naturalized," as such phrase
is used in the statute governing the status of alien wives of American citizens, and our law on the matter was merely copied
verbatim from the American statutes.

6. In addition to these arguments based on the applicable legal provisions and judicial opinions, whether here or in the
United States, there are practical considerations that militate towards the same conclusions. As aptly stated in the motion for
reconsideration of counsel for petitioner-appellee dated February 23, 1967, filed in the case of Zita Ngo Burca v. Republic, supra:

Unreasonableness of requiring alien wife to prove "qualifications"

There is one practical consideration that strongly militates against a construction that Section 15 of the law requires that an alien
wife of a Filipino must affirmatively prove that she possesses the qualifications prescribed under Section 2, before she may be
deemed a citizen. Such condition, if imposed upon an alien wife, becomes unreasonably onerous and compliance therewith
manifestly difficult. The unreasonableness of such requirement is shown by the following:

1. One of the qualifications required of an Applicant for naturalization under Section 2 of the law is that the applicant "must
have resided in the Philippines for a continuous period of not less than ten years." If this requirement is applied to an alien wife
married to a Filipino citizen, this means that for a period of ten years at least, she cannot hope to acquire the citizenship of her
husband. If the wife happens to be a citizen of a country whose law declares that upon her marriage to a foreigner she automatically
loses her citizenship and acquires the citizenship of her husband, this could mean that for a period of ten years at least, she would
be stateless. And even after having acquired continuous residence in the Philippines for ten years, there is no guarantee that her
petition for naturalization will be granted, in which case she would remain stateless for an indefinite period of time.

2. Section 2 of the law likewise requires of the applicant for naturalization that he "must own real estate in the Philippines
worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine currency, or must have some known lucrative trade, profession, or lawful
occupation." Considering the constitutional prohibition against acquisition by an alien of real estate except in cases of hereditary
succession (Art. XIII, Sec. 5, Constitution), an alien wife desiring to acquire the citizenship of her husband must have to prove that
she has a lucrative income derived from a lawful trade, profession or occupation. The income requirement has been interpreted to
mean that the petitioner herself must be the one to possess the said income. (Uy v. Republic, L-19578, Oct. 27, 1964; Tanpa Ong
vs. Republic, L-20605, June 30, 1965; Li Tong Pek v. Republic, L-20912, November 29, 1965). In other words, the wife must prove
that she has a lucrative income derived from sources other than her husband's trade, profession or calling. It is of common
knowledge, and judicial notice may be taken of the fact that most wives in the Philippines do not have gainful occupations of their
own. Indeed, Philippine law, recognizing the dependence of the wife upon the husband, imposes upon the latter the duty of
supporting the former. (Art. 291, Civil Code). It should be borne in mind that universally, it is an accepted concept that when a
woman marries, her primary duty is to be a wife, mother and housekeeper. If an alien wife is not to be remiss in this duty, how can
she hope to acquire a lucrative income of her own to qualify her for citizenship?

3. Under Section 2 of the law, the applicant for naturalization "must have enrolled his minor children of school age, in any of
the public schools or private schools recognized by the Office of the Private Education of the Philippines, where Philippine history,
government and civics are taught or prescribed as part of the school curriculum during the entire period of residence in the
Philippines required of him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as Philippine citizen." If an alien woman has minor
children by a previous marriage to another alien before she marries a Filipino, and such minor children had not been enrolled in
Philippine schools during her period of residence in the country, she cannot qualify for naturalization under the interpretation of this
Court. The reason behind the requirement that children should be enrolled in recognized educational institutions is that they follow
the citizenship of their father. (Chan Ho Lay v. Republic, L-5666, March 30, 1954; Tan Hi v. Republic, 88 Phil. 117 [1951]; Hao Lian
Chu v. Republic, 87 Phil. 668 [1950]; Yap Chin v. Republic, L-4177, May 29, 1953; Lim Lian Hong v. Republic, L-3575, Dec. 26,
1950). Considering that said minor children by her first husband generally follow the citizenship of their alien father, the basis for
such requirement as applied to her does not exist. Cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex.

4. Under Section 3 of the law, the 10-year continuous residence prescribed by Section 2 "shall be understood as reduced to
five years for any petitioner (who is) married to a Filipino woman." It is absurd that an alien male married to a Filipino wife should be
required to reside only for five years in the Philippines to qualify for citizenship, whereas an alien woman married to a Filipino
husband must reside for ten years.

Thus under the interpretation given by this Court, it is more difficult for an alien wife related by marriage to a Filipino citizen to
become such citizen, than for a foreigner who is not so related. And yet, it seems more than clear that the general purpose of the
first paragraph of Section 15 was obviously to accord to an alien woman, by reason of her marriage to a Filipino, a privilege not
similarly granted to other aliens. It will be recalled that prior to the enactment of Act No. 3448 in 1928, amending Act No. 2927 (the
old Naturalization Law), there was no law granting any special privilege to alien wives of Filipinos. They were treated as any other
foreigner. It was precisely to remedy this situation that the Philippine legislature enacted Act No. 3448. On this point, the observation
made by the Secretary of Justice in 1941 is enlightening:

It is true that under, Article 22 of the (Spanish) Civil Code, the wife follows the nationality of the husband; but the Department of
State of the United States on October 31, 1921, ruled that the alien wife of a Filipino citizen is not a Filipino citizen, pointing out that
our Supreme Court in the leading case of Roa v. Collector of Customs (23 Phil. 315) held that Articles 17 to 27 of the Civil Code
being political have been abrogated upon the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States. Accordingly, the stated taken by
the Attorney-General prior to the envictment of Act No. 3448, was that marriage of alien women to Philippine citizens did not make
the former citizens of this counting. (Op. Atty. Gen., March 16, 1928) .

To remedy this anomalous condition, Act No. 3448 was enacted in 1928 adding section 13(a) to Act No. 2927 which provides that
"any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippine Islands, and who might herself be lawfully
naturalized, shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippine Islands. (Op. No. 22, s. 1941; emphasis ours).

If Section 15 of the, Revised Naturalization Law were to be interpreted, as this Court did, in such a way as to require that the alien
wife must prove the qualifications prescribed in Section 2, the privilege granted to alien wives would become illusory. It is submitted
that such a construction, being contrary to the manifested object of the statute must be rejected.

A statute is to be construed with reference to its manifest object, and if the language is susceptible of two constructions, one which
will carry out and the other defeat such manifest object, it should receive the former construction. (In re National Guard, 71 Vt. 493,
45 A. 1051; Singer v. United States, 323 U.S. 338, 89 L. ed. 285. See also, U.S. v. Navarro, 19 Phil. 134 [1911]; U. S. v. Toribio, 15
Phil. 85 [1910).

... A construction which will cause objectionable results should be avoided and the court will, if possible, place on the statute a
construction which will not result in injustice, and in accordance with the decisions construing statutes, a construction which will
result in oppression, hardship, or inconveniences will also be avoided, as will a construction which will prejudice public interest, or
construction resulting in unreasonableness, as well as a construction which will result in absurd consequences.

So a construction should, if possible, be avoided if the result would be an apparent inconsistency in legislative intent, as has been
determined by the judicial decisions, or which would result in futility, redundancy, or a conclusion not contemplated by the
legislature; and the court should adopt that construction which will be the least likely to produce mischief. Unless plainly shown to
have been the intention of the legislature, an interpretation which would render the requirements of the statute uncertain and vague
is to be avoided, and the court will not ascribe to the legislature an intent to confer an illusory right. ... (82 C.J.S., Statutes, sec. 326,
pp. 623-632).

7. In Choy King Tee and the second Ly Giok Ha, emphasis was laid on the need for aligning the construction of Section 15
with "the national policy of selective admission to Philippine citizenship." But the question may be asked, is it reasonable to suppose
that in the pursuit of such policy, the legislature contemplated to make it more difficult if not practically impossible in some instances,
for an alien woman marrying a Filipino to become a Filipina than any ordinary applicant for naturalization, as has just been
demonstrated above? It seems but natural and logical to assume that Section 15 was intended to extend special treatment to alien
women who by marrying a Filipino irrevocably deliver themselves, their possessions, their fate and fortunes and all that marriage
implies to a citizen of this country, "for better or for worse." Perhaps there can and will be cases wherein the personal conveniences
and benefits arising from Philippine citizenship may motivate such marriage, but must the minority, as such cases are bound to be,
serve as the criterion for the construction of law? Moreover, it is not farfetched to believe that in joining a Filipino family the alien
woman is somehow disposed to assimilate the customs, beliefs and ideals of Filipinos among whom, after all, she has to live and
associate, but surely, no one should expect her to do so even before marriage. Besides, it may be considered that in reality the
extension of citizenship to her is made by the law not so much for her sake as for the husband. Indeed, We find the following
observations anent the national policy rationalization in Choy King Tee and Ly Giok Ha (the second) to be quite persuasive:

We respectfully suggest that this articulation of the national policy begs the question. The avowed policy of "selectives admission"
more particularly refers to a case where citizenship is sought to be acquired in a judicial proceeding for naturalization. In such a
case, the courts should no doubt apply the national policy of selecting only those who are worthy to become citizens. There is here a
choice between accepting or rejecting the application for citizenship. But this policy finds no application in cases where citizenship is
conferred by operation of law. In such cases, the courts have no choice to accept or reject. If the individual claiming citizenship by
operation of law proves in legal proceedings that he satisfies the statutory requirements, the courts cannot do otherwise than to
declare that he is a citizen of the Philippines. Thus, an individual who is able to prove that his father is a Philippine citizen, is a
citizen of the Philippines, "irrespective of his moral character, ideological beliefs, and identification with Filipino ideals, customs, and
traditions." A minor child of a person naturalized under the law, who is able to prove the fact of his birth in the Philippines, is likewise
a citizen, regardless of whether he has lucrative income, or he adheres to the principles of the Constitution. So it is with an alien wife
of a Philippine citizen. She is required to prove only that she may herself be lawfully naturalized, i.e., that she is not one of the
disqualified persons enumerated in Section 4 of the law, in order to establish her citizenship status as a fact.

A paramount policy consideration of graver import should not be overlooked in this regard, for it explains and justifies the obviously
deliberate choice of words. It is universally accepted that a State, in extending the privilege of citizenship to an alien wife of one of
its citizens could have had no other objective than to maintain a unity of allegiance among the members of the family. (Nelson v.
Nelson, 113 Neb. 453, 203 N. W. 640 [1925]; see also "Convention on the Nationality of Married Women: Historical Background and
Commentary." UNITED NATIONS, Department of Economic and Social Affairs E/CN, 6/399, pp. 8 et seq.). Such objective can only
be satisfactorily achieved by allowing the wife to acquire citizenship derivatively through the husband. This is particularly true in the
Philippines where tradition and law has placed the husband as head of the family, whose personal status and decisions govern the
life of the family group. Corollary to this, our laws look with favor on the unity and solidarity of the family (Art. 220, Civil Code), in
whose preservation of State as a vital and enduring interest. (See Art. 216, Civil Code). Thus, it has been said that by tradition in our
country, there is a theoretic identity of person and interest between husband and wife, and from the nature of the relation, the home
of one is that of the other. (See De la Via v. Villareal, 41 Phil. 13). It should likewise be said that because of the theoretic identity of
husband and wife, and the primacy of the husband, the nationality of husband should be the nationality of the wife, and the laws
upon one should be the law upon the other. For as the court, in Hopkins v. Fachant (9th Cir., 1904) 65 C.C.A., 1, 130 Fed. 839,
held: "The status of the wife follows that of the husband, ... and by virtue of her marriage her husband's domicile became her
domicile." And the presumption under Philippine law being that the property relations of husband and wife are under the regime of
conjugal partnership (Art. 119, Civil Code), the income of one is also that of the other.

It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished traditions of family unity and identity that a husband should be a citizen and the wife
an alien, and that the national treatment of one should be different from that of the other. Thus, it cannot be that the husband's
interests in property and business activities reserved by law to citizens should not form part of the conjugal partnership and be
denied to the wife, nor that she herself cannot, through her own efforts but for the benefit of the partnership, acquire such interests.
Only in rare instances should the identity of husband and wife be refused recognition, and we submit that in respect of our
citizenship laws, it should only be in the instances where the wife suffers from the disqualifications stated in Section 4 of the Revised
Naturalization Law. (Motion for Reconsideration, Burca vs. Republic, supra.)

With all these considerations in mind, We are persuaded that it is in the best interest of all concerned that Section 15 of the
Naturalization Law be given effect in the same way as it was understood and construed when the phrase "who may be lawfully
naturalized," found in the American statute from which it was borrowed and copied verbatim, was applied by the American courts
and administrative authorities. There is merit, of course in the view that Philippine statutes should be construed in the light of
Philippine circumstances, and with particular reference to our naturalization laws. We should realize the disparity in the
circumstances between the United States, as the so-called "melting pot" of peoples from all over the world, and the Philippines as a
developing country whose Constitution is nationalistic almost in the come. Certainly, the writer of this opinion cannot be the last in
rather passionately insisting that our jurisprudence should speak our own concepts and resort to American authorities, to be sure,
entitled to admiration, and respect, should not be regarded as source of pride and indisputable authority. Still, We cannot close our
eyes to the undeniable fact that the provision of law now under scrutiny has no local origin and orientation; it is purely American,
factually taken bodily from American law when the Philippines was under the dominating influence of statutes of the United States
Congress. It is indeed a sad commentary on the work of our own legislature of the late 1920's and 1930's that given the opportunity
to break away from the old American pattern, it took no step in that direction. Indeed, even after America made it patently clear in
the Act of Congress of September 22, 1922 that alien women marrying Americans cannot be citizens of the United States without
undergoing naturalization proceedings, our legislators still chose to adopt the previous American law of August 10, 1855 as
embodied later in Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes of 1874, Which, it is worth reiterating, was consistently and uniformly
understood as conferring American citizenship to alien women marrying Americans ipso facto, without having to submit to any
naturalization proceeding and without having to prove that they possess the special qualifications of residence, moral character,
adherence to American ideals and American constitution, provided they show they did not suffer from any of the disqualificati ons
enumerated in the American Naturalization Law. Accordingly, We now hold, all previous decisions of this Court indicating otherwise
notwithstanding, that under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized,
becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law.
Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband
the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said
Section 4.

As under any other law rich in benefits for those coming under it, doubtless there will be instances where unscrupulous persons will
attempt to take advantage of this provision of law by entering into fake and fictitious marriages or mala fide matrimonies. We cannot
as a matter of law hold that just because of these possibilities, the construction of the provision should be otherwise than as dictated
inexorably by more ponderous relevant considerations, legal, juridical and practical. There can always be means of discovering such
undesirable practice and every case can be dealt with accordingly as it arises.

III.

The third aspect of this case requires necessarily a re-examination of the ruling of this Court in Burca, supra, regarding the need of
judicial naturalization proceedings before the alien wife of a Filipino may herself be considered or deemed a Filipino. If this case
which, as already noted, was submitted for decision in 1964 yet, had only been decided earlier, before Go Im Ty, the foregoing
discussions would have been sufficient to dispose of it. The Court could have held that despite her apparent lack of qualifications,
her marriage to her co-petitioner made her a Filipina, without her undergoing any naturalization proceedings, provided she could
sustain, her claim that she is not disqualified under Section 4 of the law. But as things stand now, with the Burca ruling, the question
We have still to decide is, may she be deemed a Filipina without submitting to a naturalization proceeding?

Naturally, if Burca is to be followed, it is clear that the answer to this question must necessarily be in the affirmative. As already
stated, however, the decision in Burca has not yet become final because there is still pending with Us a motion for its
reconsideration which vigorously submits grounds worthy of serious consideration by this Court. On this account, and for the
reasons expounded earlier in this opinion, this case is as good an occasion as any other to re-examine the issue.

In the said decision, Justice Sanchez held for the Court:

We accordingly rule that: (1) An alien woman married to a Filipino who desires to be a citizen of this country must apply therefore by
filing a petition for citizenship reciting that she possesses all the qualifications set forth in Section 2 and none of the disqualifications
under Section 4, both of the Revised Naturalization Law; (2) Said petition must be filed in the Court of First Instance where petitioner
has resided at least one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition; and (3) Any action by any other office, agency, board
or official, administrative or otherwise other than the judgment of a competent court of justice certifying or declaring that an
alien wife of the Filipino citizen is also a Filipino citizen, is hereby declared null and void.

3. We treat the present petition as one for naturalization. Or, in the words of law, a "petition for citizenship". This is as it
should be. Because a reading of the petition will reveal at once that efforts were made to set forth therein, and to prove afterwards,
compliance with Sections 2 and 4 of the Revised Naturalization law. The trial court itself apparently considered the petition as one
for naturalization, and, in fact, declared petitioner "a citizen of the Philippines."

In other words, under this holding, in order for an alien woman marrying a Filipino to be vested with Filipino citizenship, it is not
enough that she possesses the qualifications prescribed by Section 2 of the law and none of the disqualifications enumerated in its
Section 4. Over and above all these, she has to pass thru the whole process of judicial naturalization apparently from declaration of
intention to oathtaking, before she can become a Filipina. In plain words, her marriage to a Filipino is absolutely of no consequence
to her nationality vis-a-vis that of her Filipino husband; she remains to be the national of the country to which she owed allegiance
before her marriage, and if she desires to be of one nationality with her husband, she has to wait for the same time that any other
applicant for naturalization needs to complete, the required period of ten year residence, gain the knowledge of English or Spanish
and one of the principle local languages, make her children study in Filipino schools, acquire real property or engage in some lawful
occupation of her own independently of her husband, file her declaration of intention and after one year her application for
naturalization, with the affidavits of two credible witnesses of her good moral character and other qualifications, etc., etc., until a
decision is ordered in her favor, after which, she has to undergo the two years of probation, and only then, but not before she takes
her oath as citizen, will she begin to be considered and deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines. Briefly, she can become a Filipino
citizen only by judicial declaration.

Such being the import of the Court's ruling, and it being quite obvious, on the other hand, upon a cursory reading of the provision, in
question, that the law intends by it to spell out what is the "effect of naturalization on (the) wife and children" of an alien, as plainly
indicated by its title, and inasmuch as the language of the provision itself clearly conveys the thought that some effect beneficial to
the wife is intended by it, rather than that she is not in any manner to be benefited thereby, it behooves Us to take a second hard
look at the ruling, if only to see whether or not the Court might have overlooked any relevant consideration warranting a conclusion
different from that complained therein. It is undeniable that the issue before Us is of grave importance, considering its consequences
upon tens of thousands of persons affected by the ruling therein made by the Court, and surely, it is for Us to avoid, whenever
possible, that Our decision in any case should produce any adverse effect upon them not contemplated either by the law or by the
national policy it seeks to endorse.

AMICI CURIAE in the Burca case, respectable and impressive by their number and standing in the Bar and well known for their
reputation for intellectual integrity, legal acumen and incisive and comprehensive resourcefulness in research, truly evident in the
quality of the memorandum they have submitted in said case, invite Our attention to the impact of the decision therein thus:

The doctrine announced by this Honorable Court for the first time in the present case -- that an alien woman who marries a
Philippine citizen not only does not ipso facto herself become a citizen but can acquire such citizenship only through ordinary
naturalization proceedings under the Revised Naturalization Law, and that all administrative actions "certifying or declaring such
woman to be a Philippine citizen are null and void" has consequences that reach far beyond the confines of the present case.
Considerably more people are affected, and affected deeply, than simply Mrs. Zita N. Burca. The newspapers report that as many
as 15 thousand women married to Philippine citizens are affected by this decision of the Court. These are women of many and
diverse nationalities, including Chinese, Spanish, British, American, Columbian, Finnish, Japanese, Chilean, and so on. These
members of the community, some of whom have been married to citizens for two or three decades, have all exercised rights and
privileges reserved by law to Philippine citizens. They will have acquired, separately or in conjugal partnership with their citizen
husbands, real property, and they will have sold and transferred such property. Many of these women may be in professions
membership in which is limited to citizens. Others are doubtless stockholders or officers or employees in companies engaged in
business activities for which a certain percentage of Filipino equity content is prescribed by law. All these married women are now
faced with possible divestment of personal status and of rights acquired and privileges exercised in reliance, in complete good faith,
upon a reading of the law that has been accepted as correct for more than two decades by the very agencies of government
charged with the administration of that law. We must respectfully suggest that judicial doctrines which would visit such
comprehensive and far-reaching injury upon the wives and mothers of Philippine citizens deserve intensive scrutiny and
reexamination.

To be sure, this appeal can be no less than what this Court attended to in Gan Tsitung vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-20819, Feb. 21,
1967, 19 SCRA 401 when Chief Justice Concepcion observed:

The Court realizes, however, that the rulings in the Barretto and Delgado cases although referring to situations the equities of
which are not identical to those obtaining in the case at bar may have contributed materially to the irregularities committed therein
and in other analogous cases, and induced the parties concerned to believe, although erroneously, that the procedure followed was
valid under the law.

Accordingly, and in view of the implications of the issue under consideration, the Solicitor General was required, not only, to
comment thereon, but, also, to state "how many cases there are, like the one at bar, in which certificates of naturalization have been
issued after notice of the filing of the petition for naturalization had been published in the Official Gazette only once, within the
periods (a) from January 28, 1950" (when the decision in Delgado v. Republic was promulgated) "to May 29, 1957" (when the Ong
Son Cui was decided) "and (b) from May 29, 1957 to November 29, 1965" (when the decision in the present case was rendered).

After mature deliberation, and in the light of the reasons adduced in appellant's motion for reconsideration and in the reply thereto of
the Government, as well as of the data contained in the latter, the Court holds that the doctrine laid down in the Ong Son Cui case
shall apply and affect the validity of certificates of naturalization issued after, not on or before May 29, 1957.

Here We are met again by the same problem. In Gan Tsitung, the Court had to expressly enjoin the prospective application of its
construction of the law made in a previous decision, 24 which had already become final, to serve the ends of justice and equity. In
the case at bar, We do not have to go that far. As already observed, the decision in Burca still under reconsideration, while the ruling
in Lee Suan Ay, Lo San Tuang, Choy King Tee and others that followed them have at the most become the law of the case only for
the parties thereto. If there are good grounds therefor, all We have to do now is to reexamine the said rulings and clarify or modify
them.

For ready reference, We requote Section 15:

Sec. 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippines, and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.

Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have been born in the Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof.

A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at the time of naturalization of the parents, shall automatically become a
Philippine citizen, and a foreign-born minor child, who is not in the Philippines at the time the parent is naturalized, shall be deemed
a Philippine citizen only during his minority, unless he begins to reside permanently in the Philippines when still a minor, in which
case, he will continue to be a Philippine citizen even after becoming of age.

A child born outside of the Philippines after the naturalization of his parent, shall be considered a Philippine citizen, unless within
one year after reaching the age of majority, he fails to register himself as a Philippine citizen at the American Consulate of the
country where he resides, and to take the necessary oath of allegiance.

It is obvious that the main subject-matter and purpose of the statute, the Revised Naturalization Law or Commonwealth Act 473, as
a whole, is to establish a complete procedure for the judicial conferment of the status of citizenship upon qualified aliens. After laying
out such a procedure, remarkable for its elaborate and careful inclusion of all safeguards against the possibility of any undesirable
persons becoming a part of our citizenry, it carefully but categorically states the consequence of the naturalization of an alien
undergoing such procedure it prescribes upon the members of his immediate family, his wife and children, 25 and, to that end, in no
uncertain terms it ordains that: (a) all his minor children who have been born in the Philippines shall be "considered citizens" also;
(b) all such minor children, if born outside the Philippines but dwelling here at the time of such naturalization "shall automatically
become" Filipinos also, but those not born in the Philippines and not in the Philippines at the time of such naturalization, are also
redeemed citizens of this country provided that they shall lose said status if they transfer their permanent residence to a foreign
country before becoming of age; (c) all such minor children, if born outside of the Philippines after such naturalization, shall also be
"considered" Filipino citizens, unless they expatriate themselves by failing to register as Filipinos at the Philippine (American)
Consulate of the country where they reside and take the necessary oath of allegiance; and (d) as to the wife, she "shall be deemed
a citizen of the Philippines" if she is one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized". 26

No doubt whatever is entertained, so Burca holds very correctly, as to the point that the minor children, falling within the conditions
of place and time of birth and residence prescribed in the provision, are vested with Philippine citizenship directly by legislative fiat
or by force of the law itself and without the need for any judicial proceeding or declaration. (At p. 192, 19 SCRA). Indeed, the
language of the provision, is not susceptible of any other interpretation. But it is claimed that the same expression "shall be deemed
a citizen of the Philippines" in reference to the wife, does not necessarily connote the vesting of citizenship status upon her by
legislative fiat because the antecedent phrase requiring that she must be one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" implies that
such status is intended to attach only after she has undergone the whole process of judicial naturalization required of any person
desiring to become a Filipino. Stated otherwise, the ruling in Burca is that while Section 15 envisages and intends legislative
naturalization as to the minor children, the same section deliberately treats the wife differently and leaves her out for the ordinary
judicial naturalization.

Of course, it goes without saying that it is perfectly within the constitutional authority of the Congress of the Philippines to confer or
vest citizenship status by legislative fiat. (U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 42 L ed. 890 [1898]; See, 1 Taada & Carreon,
Political Law of the Philippines 152 [1961 ed.]) In fact, it has done so for particular individuals, like two foreign religious prelates, 27
hence there is no reason it cannot do it for classes or groups of persons under general conditions applicable to all of the members of
such class or group, like women who marry Filipinos, whether native-born or naturalized. The issue before Us in this case is whether
or not the legislature hag done so in the disputed provisions of Section 15 of the Naturalization Law. And Dr. Vicente G. Sinco, one
of the most respect authorities on political law in the Philippines 28 observes in this connection thus: "A special form of naturalization
is often observed by some states with respect to women. Thus in the Philippines a foreign woman married to a Filipino citizen
becomes ipso facto naturalized, if she belongs to any of the classes who may apply for naturalization under the Philippine Laws."
(Sinco, Phil. Political Law 498-499 [10th ed. 1954]; emphasis ours; this comment is substantially reiterated in the 1962 edition, citing
Ly Giok Ha and Ricardo Cua, supra.)

More importantly, it may be stated, at this juncture, that in construing the provision of the United States statutes from which our law
has been copied, 28a the American courts have held that the alien wife does not acquire American citizenship by choice but by
operation of law. "In the Revised Statutes the words "and taken" are omitted. The effect of this statute is that every alien woman who
marries a citizen of the United States becomes perforce a citizen herself, without the formality of naturalization, and regardless of
her wish in that respect." (USCA 8, p. 601 [1970 ed.], citing Mackenzie v. Hare, 1913, 134 P. 713, 165 Cal. 766, affirmed 36 S. Ct.
106, 239 U.S. 299, 60 L ed. 297.) .

We need not recount here again how this provision in question was first enacted as paragraph (a) of Section 13, by way of an
insertion into Act 2927 by Act 3448 of November 30, 1928, and that, in turn, and paragraph was copied verbatim from Section 1994
of the Revised Statutes of the United States, which by that time already had a long accepted construction among the courts and
administrative authorities in that country holding that under such provision an alien woman who married a citizen became, upon
such marriage, likewise a citizen by force of law and as a consequence of the marriage itself without having to undergo any
naturalization proceedings, provided that, it could be shown that at the time of such marriage, she was not disqualified to be
naturalized under the laws then in force. To repeat the discussion We already made of these undeniable facts would unnecessarily
make this decision doubly extensive. The only point which might be reiterated for emphasis at this juncture is that whereas in the
United States, the American Congress, recognizing the construction, of Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes to be as stated above,
and finding it desirable to avoid the effects of such construction, approved the Act of September 22, 1922 Explicitly requiring all such
alien wives to submit to judicial naturalization albeit under more liberal terms than those for other applicants for citizenship, on the
other hand, the Philippine Legislature, instead of following suit and adopting such a requirement, enacted Act 3448 on November
30, 1928 which copied verbatim the aforementioned Section 1994 of the Revised Statutes, thereby indicating its preference to adopt
the latter law and its settled construction rather than the reform introduced by the Act of 1922.

Obviously, these considerations leave Us no choice. Much as this Court may feel that as the United States herself has evidently
found it to be an improvement of her national policy vis-a-vis the alien wives of her citizens to discontinue their automatic
incorporation into the body of her citizenry without passing through the judicial scrutiny of a naturalization proceeding, as it used to
be before 1922, it seems but proper, without evidencing any bit of colonial mentality, that as a developing country, the Philippines
adopt a similar policy, unfortunately, the manner in which our own legislature has enacted our laws on the subject, as recounted
above, provides no basis for Us to construe said law along the line of the 1922 modification of the American Law. For Us to do so
would be to indulge in judicial legislation which it is not institutionally permissible for this Court to do. Worse, this court would be
going precisely against the grain of the implicit Legislative intent.

There is at least one decision of this Court before Burca wherein it seems it is quite clearly implied that this Court is of the view that
under Section 16 of the Naturalization Law, the widow and children of an applicant for naturalization who dies during the
proceedings do not have to submit themselves to another naturalization proceeding in order to avail of the benefits of the
proceedings involving the husband. Section 16 provides: .

SEC. 16. Right of widow and children of petitioners who have died. In case a petitioner should die before the final decision has
been rendered, his widow and minor children may continue the proceedings. The decision rendered in the case shall, so far as the
widow and minor children are concerned, produce the same legal effect as if it had been rendered during the life of the petitioner.

In Tan Lin v. Republic, G.R. No. L-13706, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 383, this Court held:

Invoking the above provisions in their favor, petitioners-appellants argue (1) that under said Sec. 16, the widow and minor children
are allowed to continue the same proceedings and are not substituted for the original petitioner; (2) that the qualifications of the
original petitioner remain to be in issue and not those of the widow and minor children, and (3) that said Section 16 applies whether
the petitioner dies before or after final decision is rendered, but before the judgment becomes executory.

There is force in the first and second arguments. Even the second sentence of said Section 16 contemplate the fact that the
qualifications of the original petitioner remains the subject of inquiry, for the simple reason that it states that "The decision rendered
in the case shall, so far as the widow and minor children are concerned, produce the same legal effect as if it had been rendered
during the life of the petitioner." This phraseology emphasizes the intent of the law to continue the proceedings with the deceased
as the theoretical petitioner, for if it were otherwise, it would have been unnecessary to consider the decision rendered, as far as it
affected the widow and the minor children.

xxx xxx xxx

The Chua Chian case (supra), cited by the appellee, declared that a dead person can not be bound to do things stipulated in the
oath of allegiance, because an oath is a personal matter. Therein, the widow prayed that she be allowed to take the oath of
allegiance for the deceased. In the case at bar, petitioner Tan Lin merely asked that she be allowed to take the oath of allegiance
and the proper certificate of naturalization, once the naturalization proceedings of her deceased husband, shall have been
completed, not on behalf of the deceased but on her own behalf and of her children, as recipients of the benefits of his
naturalization. In other words, the herein petitioner proposed to take the oath of allegiance, as a citizen of the Philippines, by virtue
of the legal provision that "any woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines and who might herself
be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines. Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who have
been born in the Philippines shall be considered citizens thereof." (Section 15, Commonwealth Act No. 473). The decision granting
citizenship to Lee Pa and the record of the case at bar, do not show that the petitioning widow could not have been lawfully
naturalized, at the time Lee Pa filed his petition, apart from the fact that his 9 minor children were all born in the Philippines.
(Decision, In the Matter of the Petition of Lee Pa to be admitted a citizen of the Philippines, Civil Case No. 16287, CFI, Manila,
Annex A; Record on Appeal, pp. 8-11). The reference to Chua Chian case is, therefore, premature.

Section 16, as may be seen, is a parallel provision to Section 15. If the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies
during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization preceeding, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen
hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. This is plain common sense and there is
absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them differently.

Additionally, We have carefully considered the arguments advanced in the motion for reconsideration in Burca, and We see no
reason to disagree with the following views of counsel: .

It is obvious that the provision itself is a legislative declaration of who may be considered citizens of the Philippines. It is a
proposition too plain to be disputed that Congress has the power not only to prescribe the mode or manner under which foreigners
may acquire citizenship, but also the very power of conferring citizenship by legislative fiat. (U. S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649,
42 L. Ed. 890 [1898] ; see 1 Taada and Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines 152 [1961 ed.]) The Constitution itself recognizes
as Philippine citizens "Those who are naturalized in accordance with law" (Section 1[5], Article IV, Philippine Constitution). Citizens
by naturalization, under this provision, include not only those who are naturalized in accordance with legal proceedings for the
acquisition of citizenship, but also those who acquire citizenship by "derivative naturalization" or by operation of law, as, for
example, the "naturalization" of an alien wife through the naturalization of her husband, or by marriage of an alien woman to a
citizen. (See Taada & Carreon, op. cit. supra, at 152, 172; Velayo, Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization 2 [1965 ed.]; 1 Paras,
Civil Code 186 [1967 ed.]; see also 3 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 3).

The phrase "shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines" found in Section 14 of the Revised Naturalization Law clearly manifests an
intent to confer citizenship. Construing a similar phrase found in the old U.S. naturalization law (Revised Statutes, 1994), American
courts have uniformly taken it to mean that upon her marriage, the alien woman becomes by operation of law a citizen of the United
States as fully as if she had complied with all the provisions of the statutes upon the subject of naturalization. (U.S. v. Keller, 13 F.
82; U.S. Opinions of the US Attorney General dated June 4, 1874 [14 Op. 4021, July 20, 1909 [27 Op. 507], December 1, 1910 [28
Op. 508], Jan. 15, 1920 [32 Op. 2091 and Jan. 12, 1923 [23 398]).

The phrase "shall be deemed a citizen," in Section 1994 Revised Statute (U.S. Comp. Stat. 1091, 1268) or as it was in the Act of
1855 (10 Stat. at L. 604, Chapt. 71, Sec. 2), "shall be deemed and taken to be a citizens" while it may imply that the person to whom
it relates has not actually become a citizen by the ordinary means or in the usual way, as by the judgment of a competent court,
upon a proper application and proof, yet it does not follow that such person is on that account practically any the less a citizen. The
word "deemed" is the equivalent of "considered" or "judged," and therefore, whatever an Act of Congress requires to be "deemed" or
"taken" as true of any person or thing must, in law, be considered as having been duly adjudged or established concerning such
person or thing, and have force and effect accordingly. When, therefore, Congress declares that an alien woman shall, under certain
circumstances, be "deemed" an American citizen, the effect when the contingency occurs, is equivalent to her being naturalized
directly by an Act of Congress or in the usual mode thereby prescribed. (Van Dyne, Citizenship of the United States 239, cited in
Velayo, Philippine Citizenship and Naturalization 146-147 [1965 ed.]; emphasis ours).

That this was likewise the intent of the Philippine legislature when it enacted the first paragraph of Section 15 of the Revised
Naturalization Law is shown by a textual analysis of the entire statutory provision. In its entirety, Section 15 reads:

(See supra).

The phrases "shall be deemed" "shall be considered," and "shall automatically become" as used in the above provision, are
undoubtedly synonymous. The leading idea or purpose of the provision was to confer Philippine citizenship by operation of law upon
certain classes of aliens as a legal consequence of their relationship, by blood or by affinity, to persons who are already citizens of
the Philippines. Whenever the fact of relationship of the persons enumerated in the provision concurs with the fact of citizenship of
the person to whom they are related, the effect is for said persons to become ipso facto citizens of the Philippines. "Ipso facto" as
here used does not mean that all alien wives and all minor children of Philippine citizens, from the mere fact of relationship,
necessarily become such citizens also. Those who do not meet the statutory requirements do not ipso facto become citizens; they
must apply for naturalization in order to acquire such status. What it does mean, however, is that in respect of those persons
enumerated in Section 15, the relationship to a citizen of the Philippines is the operative fact which establishes the acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by them. Necessarily, it also determines the point of time at which such citizenship commences. Thus, under
the second paragraph of Section 15, a minor child of a Filipino naturalized under the law, who was born in the Philippines, becomes
ipso facto a citizen of the Philippines from the time the fact of relationship concurs with the fact of citizenship of his parent, and the
time when the child became a citizen does not depend upon the time that he is able to prove that he was born in the Philippines.
The child may prove some 25 years after the naturalization of his father that he was born in the Philippines and should, therefore, be
"considered" a citizen thereof. It does not mean that he became a Philippine citizen only at that later time. Similarly, an alien woman
who married a Philippine citizen may be able to prove only some 25 years after her marriage (perhaps, because it was only 25 years
after the marriage that her citizenship status became in question), that she is one who might herself be lawfully naturalized." It is not
reasonable to conclude that she acquired Philippine citizenship only after she had proven that she "might herself be lawfully
naturalized." It is not reasonable to conclude that she acquired Philippine citizenship only after she had proven that she "might
herself be lawfully naturalized."

The point that bears emphasis in this regard is that in adopting the very phraseology of the law, the legislature could not have
intended that an alien wife should not be deemed a Philippine citizen unless and until she proves that she might herself be lawfully
naturalized. Far from it, the law states in plain terms that she shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines if she is one "who might
herself be lawfully naturalized." The proviso that she must be one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" is not a condition
precedent to the vesting or acquisition of citizenship; it is only a condition or a state of fact necessary to establish her citizenship as
a factum probandum, i.e., as a fact established and proved in evidence. The word "might," as used in that phrase, precisely replies
that at the time of her marriage to a Philippine citizen, the alien woman "had (the) power" to become such a citizen herself under the
laws then in force. (Owen v. Kelly, 6 DC 191 [1867], aff'd Kelly v. Owen, 76 US 496, 19 L ed 283 [1869). That she establishes such
power long after her marriage does not alter the fact that at her marriage, she became a citizen.

(This Court has held) that "an alien wife of a Filipino citizen may not acquire the status of a citizen of the Philippines unless there is
proof that she herself may be lawfully naturalized" (Decision, pp. 3-4). Under this view, the "acquisition" of citizenship by the alien
wife depends on her having proven her qualifications for citizenship, that is, she is not a citizen unless and until she proves that she
may herself be lawfully naturalized. It is clear from the words of the law that the proviso does not mean that she must first prove that
she "might herself be lawfully naturalized" before she shall be deemed (by Congress, not by the courts) a citizen. Even the "uniform"
decisions cited by this Court (at fn. 2) to support its holding did not rule that the alien wife becomes a citizen only after she has
proven her qualifications for citizenship. What those decisions ruled was that the alien wives in those cases failed to prove their
qualifications and therefore they failed to establish their claim to citizenship. Thus in Ly Giok Ha v. Galang, 101 Phil. 459 [l957], the
case was remanded to the lower court for determination of whether petitioner, whose claim to citizenship by marriage to a Filipino
was disputed by the Government, "might herself be lawfully naturalized," for the purpose of " proving her alleged change of political
status from alien to citizen" (at 464). In Cua v. Board, 101 Phil. 521 [1957], the alien wife who was being deported, claimed she was
a Philippine citizen by marriage to a Filipino. This Court finding that there was no proof that she was not disqualified under Section 4
of the Revised Naturalization Law, ruled that: "No such evidence appearing on record, the claim of assumption of Philippine
citizenship by Tijoe Wu Suan, upon her marriage to petitioner, is untenable." (at 523) It will be observed that in these decisions cited
by this Court, the lack of proof that the alien wives "might (themselves) be lawfully naturalized" did not necessarily imply that they
did not become, in truth and in fact, citizens upon their marriage to Filipinos. What the decisions merely held was that these wives
failed to establish their claim to that status as a proven fact.

In all instances where citizenship is conferred by operation of law, the time when citizenship is conferred should not be confused
with the time when citizenship status is established as a proven fact. Thus, even a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, whose
citizenship status is put in issue in any proceeding would be required to prove, for instance, that his father is a citizen of the
Philippines in order to factually establish his claim to citizenship.* His citizenship status commences from the time of birth, although
his claim thereto is established as a fact only at a subsequent time. Likewise, an alien woman who might herself be lawfully
naturalized becomes a Philippine citizen at the time of her marriage to a Filipino husband, not at the time she is able to establish
that status as a proven fact by showing that she might herself be lawfully naturalized. Indeed, there is no difference between a
statutory declaration that a person is deemed a citizen of the Philippines provided his father is such citizen from a declaration that an
alien woman married to a Filipino citizen of the Philippines provided she might herself be lawfully naturalized. Both become citizens
by operation of law; the former becomes a citizen ipso facto upon birth; the later ipso facto upon marriage.

It is true that unless and until the alien wife proves that she might herself be lawfully naturalized, it cannot be said that she has
established her status as a proven fact. But neither can it be said that on that account, she did not become a citizen of the
Philippines. If her citizenship status is not questioned in any legal proceeding, she obviously has no obligation to establish her status
as a fact. In such a case, the presumption of law should be that she is what she claims to be. (U.S. v. Roxas, 5 Phil. 375 [1905];
Hilado v. Assad, 51 O.G. 4527 [1955]). There is a presumption that a representation shown to have been made is true. (Aetna
Indemnity Co. v. George A. Fuller, Co., 73 A. 738, 74 A. 369, 111 ME. 321).

The question that keeps bouncing back as a consequence of the foregoing views is, what substitute is them for naturalization
proceedings to enable the alien wife of a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship settled and established so that
she may not have to be called upon to prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter in to a transaction or business or
exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos? The ready answer to such question is that as the laws of our country, both substantive
and procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure, but such paucity is no proof that the citizenship under discussion is not
vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the same
situation objections even as to native-born Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or
administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally
not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. This, as We view
it, is the sense in which Justice Dizon referred to "appropriate proceeding" in Brito v. Commissioner, supra. Indeed, only the good
sense and judgment of those subsequently inquiring into the matter may make the effort easier or simpler for the persons concerned
by relying somehow on the antecedent official findings, even if these are not really binding.

It may not be amiss to suggest, however, that in order to have a good starting point and so that the most immediate relevant public
records may be kept in order, the following observations in Opinion No. 38, series of 1958, of then Acting Secretary of Justice Jesus
G. Barrera, may be considered as the most appropriate initial step by the interested parties:

Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen in order to acquire Philippine citizenship,
the procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation of her
alien certificate of registration alleging, among other things, that she is married to a Filipino, citizen and that she is not disqualified
from acquiring her husband's citizenship pursuant to section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing of said
petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that
the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups disqualified by the cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen
(please see attached CEB Form 1), the Bureau of Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or
decision granting or denying the petition.

Once the Commissioner of Immigration cancels the subject's registration as an alien, there will probably be less difficulty in
establishing her Filipino citizenship in any other proceeding, depending naturally on the substance and vigor of the opposition.

Before closing, it is perhaps best to clarify that this third issue We have passed upon was not touched by the trial court, but as the
point is decisive in this case, the Court prefers that the matter be settled once and for all now.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Court a quo dismissing appellants' petition for injunction is hereby
reversed and the Commissioner of Immigration and/or his authorized representative is permanently enjoined from causing the arrest
and deportation and the confiscation of the bond of appellant Lau Yuen Yeung, who is hereby declared to have become a Filipino
citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to her co-appellant Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen on
January 25, 1962. No costs.