Consti 2 - Finals Reviewer

CONSTI 2 FINALS REVIEWER 1
1. MERCADO VS. MANZANO

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999]
ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano
were candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The
other one was Gabriel V. Daza III. The results of the election were as follows:
Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853
Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894
Gabriel V. Daza III 54,275[1]
The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending
petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private
respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998,[2] the Second Division of the COMELEC
granted the petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of
candidacy of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under
40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual citizenship are disqualified
from running for any elective position. The COMELECs Second Division said:
What is presented before the Commission is a petition for disqualification of Eduardo
Barrios Manzano as candidate for the office of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May 11,
1998 elections. The petition is based on the ground that the respondent is an American
citizen based on the record of the Bureau of Immigration and misrepresented himself as
a natural-born Filipino citizen.
In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent admitted that he is
registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate of
Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born
in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States, San
Francisco, California, on September 14, 1955, and is considered an American citizen
under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not
lose his Filipino citizenship.
Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent Manzano is both a
Filipino and a US citizen. In other words, he holds dual citizenship.
The question presented is whether under our laws, he is disqualified from the position
for which he filed his certificate of candidacy. Is he eligible for the office he seeks to be
elected?
Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual citizenship are
disqualified from running for any elective local position.
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the respondent Eduardo Barrios
Manzano DISQUALIFIED as candidate for Vice-Mayor of Makati City.
On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.[3] The
motion remained pending even until after the election held on May 11, 1998.
Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated May 10, 1998,
of the COMELEC, the board of canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of
Makati City but suspended the proclamation of the winner.
On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for
disqualification.[4] Petitioners motion was opposed by private respondent.
The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en
banc rendered its resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner abstaining, the
COMELEC en banc reversed the ruling of its Second Division and declared private
respondent qualified to run for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998
elections.[5] The pertinent portions of the resolution of the COMELEC en banc read:
As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States
Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli.
He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the age
of six (6), his parents brought him to the Philippines using an American passport as
travel document. His parents also registered him as an alien with the Philippine Bureau
of Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of registration. This, however, did not
result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine
citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the United States.
It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he registered
himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively
renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer
had U.S. citizenship.
At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division, adopted
on May 7, 1998, was not yet final. Respondent Manzano obtained the highest number
of votes among the candidates for vice-mayor of Makati City, garnering one hundred
three thousand eight hundred fifty three (103,853) votes over his closest rival, Ernesto
S. Mercado, who obtained one hundred thousand eight hundred ninety four (100,894)
votes, or a margin of two thousand nine hundred fifty nine (2,959) votes. Gabriel Daza
III obtained third place with fifty four thousand two hundred seventy five (54,275)
votes. In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in favor of the popular
choice than be embroiled in complex legal issues involving private international law
which may well be settled before the highest court (Cf. Frivaldo vs. Commission on
Elections, 257 SCRA 727).
WHEREFORE, the Commission en banc hereby REVERSES the resolution of the
Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, ordering the cancellation of the respondents
certificate of candidacy.
We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to be QUALIFIED as a
candidate for the position of vice-mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998, elections.
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the Makati City Board of Canvassers, upon
proper notice to the parties, to reconvene and proclaim the respondent Eduardo Luis
Barrios Manzano as the winning candidate for vice-mayor of Makati City.
Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers,
on the evening of August 31, 1998, proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor of the
City of Makati.
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the aforesaid resolution of
the COMELEC en banc and to declare private respondent disqualified to hold the office
of vice mayor of Makati City. Petitioner contends that
[T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:
A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen when he:
1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the age of majority when he
was already 37 years old; and,
2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) registered himself as a voter
and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City
of Makati;
C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division
adopted on 7 May 1998 was not yet final so that, effectively, petitioner may not be
declared the winner even assuming that Manzano is disqualified to run for and hold the
elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.
We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by private respondent
Manzano whether petitioner Mercado has personality to bring this suit considering that
he was not an original party in the case for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril nor
was petitioners motion for leave to intervene granted.
I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT
Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules of
Procedure of the COMELEC in support of his claim that petitioner has no right to
intervene and, therefore, cannot bring this suit to set aside the ruling denying his motion
for intervention:
Section 1. When proper and when may be permitted to intervene. Any person allowed
to initiate an action or proceeding may, before or during the trial of an action or
proceeding, be permitted by the Commission, in its discretion to intervene in such action
or proceeding, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of
either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be
adversely affected by such action or proceeding.

. . . .
Section 3. Discretion of Commission. In allowing or disallowing a motion for
intervention, the Commission or the Division, in the exercise of its discretion, shall
consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of
the rights of the original parties and whether or not the intervenors rights may be fully
protected in a separate action or proceeding.
Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in
litigation nor an interest to protect because he is a defeated candidate for the vice-
mayoralty post of Makati City [who] cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati
City even if the private respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and executory
judgment.
The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to
intervene in the proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already been a
proclamation of the results of the election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati City,
on the basis of which petitioner came out only second to private respondent. The fact,
however, is that there had been no proclamation at that time. Certainly, petitioner had,
and still has, an interest in ousting private respondent from the race at the time he
sought to intervene. The rule in Labo v. COMELEC,[6] reiterated in several cases,[7]
only applies to cases in which the election of the respondent is contested, and the
question is whether one who placed second to the disqualified candidate may be
declared the winner. In the present case, at the time petitioner filed a Motion for Leave
to File Intervention on May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner,
and petitioners purpose was precisely to have private respondent disqualified from
running for [an] elective local position under 40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto
Mamaril (who originally instituted the disqualification proceedings), a registered voter of
Makati City, was competent to bring the action, so was petitioner since the latter was a
rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
Nor is petitioners interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a
motion for intervention only on May 20, 1998, after private respondent had been shown
to have garnered the highest number of votes among the candidates for vice
mayor. That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the
disqualification against private respondent is clear from 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise
known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides:
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate
is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for
and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is
strong.
Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for
disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.
The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioners motion for
intervention was tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying petitioner in filing the
instant petition for certiorari. As the COMELEC en banc instead decided the merits of
the case, the present petition properly deals not only with the denial of petitioners
motion for intervention but also with the substantive issues respecting private
respondents alleged disqualification on the ground of dual citizenship.
This brings us to the next question, namely, whether private respondent
Manzano possesses dual citizenship and, if so, whether he is disqualified from being a
candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION
The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under 40
of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as disqualified
from running for any elective local position: . . . (d) Those with dual citizenship. This
provision is incorporated in the Charter of the City of Makati.[8]
Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as the Solicitor
General, who sides with him in this case, contends that through 40(d) of the Local
Government Code, Congress has command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of
persons possessing dual allegiance to hold local elective office.
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former
arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more
states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states.[9] For
instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a
state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the
doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part,
is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause
(Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the
Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which
follow the principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the
laws of their fathers country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are
considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced
Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without
performing any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly
possible given the constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the Constitution provides:
Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by
law. This provision was included in the 1987 Constitution at the instance of
Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained its necessity as follows:[10]
. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual citizenship. I
have circulated a memorandum to the Bernas Committee according to which a dual
allegiance and I reiterate a dual allegiance is larger and more threatening than that of
mere double citizenship which is seldom intentional and, perhaps, never insidious. That
is often a function of the accident of mixed marriages or of birth on foreign soil. And so,
I do not question double citizenship at all.
What we would like the Committee to consider is to take constitutional cognizance of the
problem of dual allegiance. For example, we all know what happens in the triennial
elections of the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce which consists
of about 600 chapters all over the country. There is a Peking ticket, as well as a Taipei
ticket. Not widely known is the fact that the Filipino-Chinese community is represented
in the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China in Taiwan. And until recently, the
sponsor might recall, in Mainland China in the Peoples Republic of China, they have the
Associated Legislative Council for overseas Chinese wherein all of Southeast Asia
including some European and Latin countries were represented, which was dissolved
after several years because of diplomatic friction. At that time, the Filipino-Chinese were
also represented in that Overseas Council.
When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this unsettled kind of allegiance
of Filipinos, of citizens who are already Filipinos but who, by their acts, may be said to
be bound by a second allegiance, either to Peking or Taiwan. I also took close note of
the concern expressed by some Commissioners yesterday, including Commissioner
Villacorta, who were concerned about the lack of guarantees of thorough assimilation,
and especially Commissioner Concepcion who has always been worried about minority
claims on our natural resources.
Dual allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to Taiwan, Singapore, China
or Malaysia, and this is already happening. Some of the great commercial places in
downtown Taipei are Filipino-owned, owned by Filipino-Chinese it is of common
knowledge in Manila. It can mean a tragic capital outflow when we have to endure a
capital famine which also means economic stagnation, worsening unemployment and
social unrest.
And so, this is exactly what we ask that the Committee kindly consider incorporating a
new section, probably Section 5, in the article on Citizenship which will read as
follows: DUAL ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO CITIZENSHIP AND SHALL BE DEALT
WITH ACCORDING TO LAW.
In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem of these
citizens with dual allegiance, thus:[11]
. . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their concern about dual
citizenship in the sense that it implies a double allegiance under a double sovereignty
which some of us who spoke then in a freewheeling debate thought would be repugnant
to the sovereignty which pervades the Constitution and to citizenship itself which implies
a uniqueness and which elsewhere in the Constitution is defined in terms of rights and
obligations exclusive to that citizenship including, of course, the obligation to rise to the
defense of the State when it is threatened, and back of this, Commissioner Bernas, is, of
course, the concern for national security. In the course of those debates, I think some
noted the fact that as a result of the wave of naturalizations since the decision to
establish diplomatic relations with the Peoples Republic of China was made in 1975, a
good number of these naturalized Filipinos still routinely go to Taipei every October 10;
and it is asserted that some of them do renew their oath of allegiance to a foreign
government maybe just to enter into the spirit of the occasion when the anniversary of
the Sun Yat-Sen Republic is commemorated. And so, I have detected a genuine and
deep concern about double citizenship, with its attendant risk of double allegiance which
is repugnant to our sovereignty and national security. I appreciate what the Committee
said that this could be left to the determination of a future legislature. But considering
the scale of the problem, the real impact on the security of this country, arising from, let
us say, potentially great numbers of double citizens professing double allegiance, will
the Committee entertain a proposed amendment at the proper time that will prohibit, in
effect, or regulate double citizenship?
Clearly, in including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the

Constitutional Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens
who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A.
No. 7854, 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently,
persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those
with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the
termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon
the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate
their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas,
one of the most perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission, pointed out:
[D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws
on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether
or not she is considered a citizen of another country is something completely beyond
our control.[12]
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear
allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate
their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state
and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively renounced his foreign
citizenship. That is of no moment as the following discussion on 40(d) between
Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows:[13]
SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41, page
17: Any person with dual citizenship is disqualified to run for any
elective local position. Under the present Constitution, Mr. President,
someone whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines but his father is a
foreigner is a natural-born citizen of the Republic. There is no
requirement that such a natural born citizen, upon reaching the age of
majority, must elect or give up Philippine citizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging to
the country of his or her father and one belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines, may such a situation disqualify the person to run for a local
government position?
SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the
moment when he would want to run for public office, he has to repudiate
one of his citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the
country of origin or the country of the father claims that person,
nevertheless, as a citizen? No one can renounce. There are such
countries in the world.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office
would, in effect, be an election for him of his desire to be considered as
a Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not
require an election. Under the Constitution, a person whose mother is a
citizen of the Philippines is, at birth, a citizen without any overt act to
claim the citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the
Gentlemans example, if he does not renounce his other citizenship, then
he is opening himself to question. So, if he is really interested to run, the
first thing he should do is to say in the Certificate of Candidacy that: I
am a Filipino citizen, and I have only one citizenship.
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr.
President. He will always have one citizenship, and that is the
citizenship invested upon him or her in the Constitution of the Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that
will prove that he also acknowledges other citizenships, then he will
probably fall under this disqualification.
This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must
renounce all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or
sovereignty[14] of which at the time he is a subject or citizen before he can be issued a
certificate of naturalization as a citizen of the Philippines. In Parado v. Republic,[15] it
was held:
[W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he
renounces his loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares that he
owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is
satisfied and complied with. The determination whether such renunciation is valid or
fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the province and is
an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by
the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with
its operation and application. If the requirement of the Chinese Law of Nationality were
to be read into our Naturalization Law, we would be applying not what our legislative
department has deemed it wise to require, but what a foreign government has thought
or intended to exact. That, of course, is absurd. It must be resisted by all means and at
all cost. It would be a brazen encroachment upon the sovereign will and power of the
people of this Republic.

III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP
The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco,
California on September 4, 1955, of Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to
the principle of jus sanguinis, while the United States follows the doctrine of jus soli, the
parties agree that, at birth at least, he was a national both of the Philippines and of the
United States. However, the COMELEC en banc held that, by participating in Philippine
elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998, private respondent effectively renounced his U.S.
citizenship under American law, so that now he is solely a Philippine national.
Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in
Philippine elections is not sufficient evidence of renunciation and that, in any event, as
the alleged renunciation was made when private respondent was already 37 years old, it
was ineffective as it should have been made when he reached the age of majority.
In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renounced
his American citizenship, the COMELEC must have in mind 349 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of the United States, which provided that A person who is a national of
the United States, whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: . . .
(e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or participating in an election or
plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory. To be sure this provision
was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in Afroyim v. Rusk[16] as
beyond the power given to the U.S. Congress to regulate foreign relations. However, by
filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent
elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. Private
respondents certificate of candidacy, filed on March 27, 1998, contained the following
statements made under oath:
6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF NATURAL-BORN OR
NATURALIZED) NATURAL-BORN
10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747-A,
BARANGAY SAN LORENZO, CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI,
PROVINCE OF NCR .
11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT
TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.
12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE
ELECTED. I WILL SUPPORT AND DEFEND THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WILL MAINTAIN
TRUE FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE THERETO; THAT I WILL OBEY
THE LAWS, LEGAL ORDERS AND DECREES PROMULGATED
BY THE DULY CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND THAT I IMPOSE THIS
OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT
MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF EVASION. I
HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FACTS STATED HEREIN ARE
TRUE AND CORRECT OF MY OWN PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE.
The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American
citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual
citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo v. COMELEC it was held:[17]
It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the
retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under Sec.
40 of the Local Government Code would disqualify him from running for any elective
local position? We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason to
hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance and
even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote that
he had long renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenship long before
May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim when he abandoned and
renounced his US citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino citizenship.
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:
By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when
he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in
1988, in 1992, and in 1995. Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of
allegiance to the Philippine Government.
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the
elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that
such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of
capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse.
There is, therefore, no merit in petitioners contention that the oath of
allegiance contained in private respondents certificate of candidacy is insufficient to
constitute renunciation of his American citizenship. Equally without merit is petitioners
contention that, to be effective, such renunciation should have been made upon private
respondent reaching the age of majority since no law requires the election of Philippine
citizenship to be made upon majority age.
Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted that he is
registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and that

he holds an American passport which he used in his last travel to the United States on
April 22, 1997. There is no merit in this. Until the filing of his certificate of candidacy on
March 21, 1998, he had dual citizenship. The acts attributed to him can be considered
simply as the assertion of his American nationality before the termination of his
American citizenship. What this Court said in Aznar v. COMELEC[18] applies mutatis
mutandis to private respondent in the case at bar:
. . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an American,
the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he
is not still a Filipino. . . . [T]he Certification that he is an American does not mean that
he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed,
there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even
no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation
needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be express, it stands to reason that there
can be no such loss of Philippine citizenship when there is no renunciation, either
express or implied.
To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino
citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will
defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance
thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far
as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American
citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines,
when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his
education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this
country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking
made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring
the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In
Yu v. Defensor-Santiago,[19] we sustained the denial of entry into the country of
petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for
the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial documents
executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken
against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality,
but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Quisumbing,
Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., on leave.
Pardo, J., no part.

DIGEST 1
FACTS:
Petition for disqualification was filed against Edu Manzano to hold elective office on the
ground that he is both an American citizen and a Filipino citizen, having been born in the
United States of Filipino parents. COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified
Manzano for being a dual citizen pursuant to the Local Government Code RA 7160, that
those with dual citizenship are disqualified from running any public position.

ISSUE:
Whether or not dual citizenship is a ground for disqualification to hold or run office in the
local position.

RULING:
No. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. What is inimical is not dual
citizenship per se, but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their
countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual citizenship in
RA 7160 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently, persons
with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.

DIGEST 2
FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were
candidates for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.
Respondent was then declared the winning candidate; however its proclamation was
suspended in view of a pending petition for disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto
Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a citizen of the Philippines but of
the United States.

In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998, the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the
petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private
respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code provides that persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from
running for any elective position.

Respondent admitted that he is registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration
under Alien Certificate of Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino
citizen because he was born in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was
born in the United States, San Francisco, California, on September 14, 1955, and is
considered an American citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as
an American citizen, he did not lose his Filipino citizenship. From these facts,
respondent is a dual citizen - both a Filipino and a US citizen.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Manzano is qualified to hold office as Vice-Mayor.

HELD:
The petition was dismissed. Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former
arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more
states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For
instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a
state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the
doctrine of jus soli. Private respondent is considered as a dual citizen because he is
born of Filipino parents but was born in San Francisco, USA. Such a person, ipso facto
and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both
states. Considering the citizenship clause under Article IV of the Constitution, it is
possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to posses dual
citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the
principle of jus soli;

(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of
their fathers country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are
considered citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person
simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition.

By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent
elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. The
filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship,
effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen.

By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a
permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the
Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he
does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this
country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything
which he may have said before as a dual citizen. On the other hand, private
respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippine, when considered with the fact that he
has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as
an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election
of Philippine citizenship.

2. MACALINTAL VS. COMELEC

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 157013. July 10, 2003]
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
HON. ALBERTO ROMULO, in his official capacity as Executive
Secretary, and HON. EMILIA T. BONCODIN, Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B.
Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions
of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003)[1] suffer from
constitutional infirmity. Claiming that he has actual and material legal interest in the
subject matter of this case in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used
and appropriated, petitioner filed the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.
The Court upholds the right of petitioner to file the present petition.
R.A. No. 9189, entitled, An Act Providing for A System of Overseas Absentee
Voting by Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating Funds Therefor,
and for Other Purposes, appropriates funds under Section 29 thereof which provides
that a supplemental budget on the General Appropriations Act of the year of its
enactment into law shall provide for the necessary amount to carry out its
provisions. Taxpayers, such as herein petitioner, have the right to restrain officials from
wasting public funds through the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute.[2] The
Court has held that they may assail the validity of a law appropriating public funds[3]
because expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of
executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds.[4]
The challenged provision of law involves a public right that affects a great

number of citizens. The Court has adopted the policy of taking jurisdiction over cases
whenever the petitioner has seriously and convincingly presented an issue of
transcendental significance to the Filipino people. This has been explicitly pronounced
in Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. vs. Tan,[5] where the
Court held:
Objections to taxpayers suit for lack of sufficient personality standing, or interest are,
however, in the main procedural matters. Considering the importance to the public of the
cases at bar, and in keeping with the Courts duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to
determine whether or not the other branches of government have kept themselves
within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the
discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and
has taken cognizance of these petitions.[6]
Indeed, in this case, the Court may set aside procedural rules as the
constitutional right of suffrage of a considerable number of Filipinos is involved.
The question of propriety of the instant petition which may appear to be visited
by the vice of prematurity as there are no ongoing proceedings in any tribunal, board or
before a government official exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions as
required by Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, dims in light of the importance of the
constitutional issues raised by the petitioner. In Taada vs. Angara,[7] the Court held:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the
Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of
the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes
not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. The question
thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure
that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. Once a controversy as to the
application or interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in
the instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional
mandate to decide.
In another case of paramount impact to the Filipino people, it has been expressed that it
is illogical to await the adverse consequences of the law in order to consider the
controversy actual and ripe for judicial resolution.[8] In yet another case, the Court said
that:
. . . despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with constitutional
issues, it will not hesitate to declare a law or act invalid when it is convinced that this
must be done. In arriving at this conclusion, its only criterion will be the Constitution and
God as its conscience gives it in the light to probe its meaning and discover its purpose.
Personal motives and political considerations are irrelevancies that cannot influence its
decisions. Blandishment is as ineffectual as intimidation, for all the awesome power of
the Congress and Executive, the Court will not hesitate to make the hammer fall
heavily, where the acts of these departments, or of any official, betray the peoples will
as expressed in the Constitution . . .[9]
The need to consider the constitutional issues raised before the Court is further
buttressed by the fact that it is now more than fifteen years since the ratification of the
1987 Constitution requiring Congress to provide a system for absentee voting by
qualified Filipinos abroad. Thus, strong reasons of public policy demand that the Court
resolves the instant petition[10] and determine whether Congress has acted within the
limits of the Constitution or if it had gravely abused the discretion entrusted to it.[11]
The petitioner raises three principal questions:
A. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing the registration of
voters who are immigrants or permanent residents in other countries by
their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their intention to return
to the Philippines, violate the residency requirement in Section 1 of Article
V of the Constitution?
B. Does Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to
proclaim the winning candidates for national offices and party list
representatives including the President and the Vice-President violate the
constitutional mandate under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution that
the winning candidates for President and the Vice-President shall be
proclaimed as winners by Congress?
C. May Congress, through the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee created in Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the power
to review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing Rules and
Regulations that the Commission on Elections shall promulgate without
violating the independence of the COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A
of the Constitution?
The Court will resolve the questions in seriatim.
A. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 violate Section 1, Article V of the
1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines?
Section 5(d) provides:
Sec. 5. Disqualifications. The following shall be disqualified from voting under this Act:
. . . . . . . . .
d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host country,
unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the
Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in
the Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of his/her registration under
this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for citizenship in
another country. Failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the name of the
immigrant or permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and
his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.
Petitioner posits that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates Section 1,
Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must be a resident in the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he proposes to vote for at least
six months immediately preceding an election. Petitioner cites the ruling of the Court in
Caasi vs. Court of Appeals[12] to support his claim. In that case, the Court held that a
green card holder immigrant to the United States is deemed to have abandoned his
domicile and residence in the Philippines.
Petitioner further argues that Section 1, Article V of the Constitution does not
allow provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be
qualified to vote in a political exercise;[13] that the legislature should not be allowed to
circumvent the requirement of the Constitution on the right of suffrage by providing a
condition thereon which in effect amends or alters the aforesaid residence requirement
to qualify a Filipino abroad to vote.[14] He claims that the right of suffrage should not be
granted to anyone who, on the date of the election, does not possess the qualifications
provided for by Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.
Respondent COMELEC refrained from commenting on this issue.[15]

In compliance with the Resolution of the Court, the Solicitor General filed his
comment for all public respondents. He contraposes that the constitutional challenge to
Section 5(d) must fail because of the absence of clear and unmistakable showing that
said provision of law is repugnant to the Constitution. He stresses: All laws are
presumed to be constitutional; by the doctrine of separation of powers, a department of
government owes a becoming respect for the acts of the other two departments; all laws
are presumed to have adhered to constitutional limitations; the legislature intended to
enact a valid, sensible, and just law.
In addition, the Solicitor General points out that Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution is a verbatim reproduction of those provided for in the 1935 and the 1973
Constitutions. Thus, he cites Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives[16] wherein the Court held that the term residence has been
understood to be synonymous with domicile under both Constitutions. He further
argues that a person can have only one domicile but he can have two residences, one
permanent (the domicile) and the other temporary;[17] and that the definition and
meaning given to the term residence likewise applies to absentee voters. Invoking
Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC[18] which reiterates the Courts ruling in Faypon vs.
Quirino,[19] the Solicitor General maintains that Filipinos who are immigrants or
permanent residents abroad may have in fact never abandoned their Philippine
domicile.[20]
Taking issue with the petitioners contention that green card holders are
considered to have abandoned their Philippine domicile, the Solicitor General suggests
that the Court may have to discard its ruling in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals[21] in so far
as it relates to immigrants and permanent residents in foreign countries who have
executed and submitted their affidavits conformably with Section 5(d) of R.A. No.
9189. He maintains that through the execution of the requisite affidavits, the Congress
of the Philippines with the concurrence of the President of the Republic had in fact given
these immigrants and permanent residents the opportunity, pursuant to Section 2,
Article V of the Constitution, to manifest that they had in fact never abandoned their
Philippine domicile; that indubitably, they would have formally and categorically
expressed the requisite intentions, i.e., animus manendi and animus revertendi; that
Filipino immigrants and permanent residents abroad possess the unquestionable right to
exercise the right of suffrage under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution upon
approval of their registration, conformably with R.A. No. 9189.[22]
The seed of the present controversy is the interpretation that is given to the
phrase, qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad as it appears in R.A. No. 9189, to
wit:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is the prime duty of the State to provide a system of
honest and orderly overseas absentee voting that upholds the secrecy and sanctity of
the ballot. Towards this end, the State ensures equal opportunity to all qualified
citizens of the Philippines abroad in the exercise of this fundamental right.
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Act:
a) Absentee Voting refers to the process by which qualified citizens of the
Philippines abroad, exercise their right to vote;
. . . (Emphasis supplied)
f) Overseas Absentee Voter refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is

qualified to register and vote under this Act, not otherwise disqualified by law, who is
abroad on the day of elections. (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 4. Coverage. All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise
disqualified by law, at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of elections, may
vote for president, vice-president, senators and party-list representatives. (Emphasis
supplied)
in relation to Sections 1 and 2, Article V of the Constitution which read:
SEC. 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided
in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for
at least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other
substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.
SEC. 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of
the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.
. . . . . . . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution specifically provides that suffrage may
be exercised by (1) all citizens of the Philippines, (2) not otherwise disqualified by law,
(3) at least eighteen years of age, (4) who are residents in the Philippines for at least
one year and in the place where they propose to vote for at least six months
immediately preceding the election. Under Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189, one of those
disqualified from voting is an immigrant or permanent resident who is recognized as
such in the host country unless he/she executes an affidavit declaring that he/she shall
resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three years
from approval of his/her registration under said Act.
Petitioner questions the rightness of the mere act of execution of an affidavit to
qualify the Filipinos abroad who are immigrants or permanent residents, to vote. He
focuses solely on Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in ascribing constitutional
infirmity to Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189, totally ignoring the provisions of Section 2
empowering Congress to provide a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos
abroad.
A simple, cursory reading of Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 may indeed give the
impression that it contravenes Section 1, Article V of the Constitution. Filipino
immigrants and permanent residents overseas are perceived as having left and
abandoned the Philippines to live permanently in their host countries and therefore, a
provision in the law enfranchising those who do not possess the residency requirement
of the Constitution by the mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their intent to
return to the Philippines within a given period, risks a declaration of
unconstitutionality. However, the risk is more apparent than real.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which
all other laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be
determined and all public authority administered.[23] Laws that do not conform to the
Constitution shall be stricken down for being unconstitutional.
Generally, however, all laws are presumed to be constitutional. In Peralta vs.
COMELEC, the Court said:
. . . An act of the legislature, approved by the executive, is presumed to be within
constitutional limitations. The responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not on the
courts alone but on the legislature as well. The question of the validity of every statute is
first determined by the legislative department of the government itself.[24]
Thus, presumption of constitutionality of a law must be overcome convincingly:
. . . To declare a law unconstitutional, the repugnancy of that law to the Constitution
must be clear and unequivocal, for even if a law is aimed at the attainment of some
public good, no infringement of constitutional rights is allowed. To strike down a law
there must be a clear showing that what the fundamental law condemns or prohibits, the
statute allows it to be done.[25]
As the essence of R.A. No. 9189 is to enfranchise overseas qualified Filipinos,
it behooves the Court to take a holistic view of the pertinent provisions of both the
Constitution and R.A. No. 9189. It is a basic rule in constitutional construction that the
Constitution should be construed as a whole. In Chiongbian vs. De Leon,[26] the Court
held that a constitutional provision should function to the full extent of its substance and
its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that great
document. Constitutional provisions are mandatory in character unless, either by
express statement or by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest.[27] The
intent of the Constitution may be drawn primarily from the language of the document
itself. Should it be ambiguous, the Court may consider the intent of its framers through
their debates in the constitutional convention.[28]
R.A. No. 9189 was enacted in obeisance to the mandate of the first paragraph
of Section 2, Article V of the Constitution that Congress shall provide a system for voting
by qualified Filipinos abroad. It must be stressed that Section 2 does not provide for the
parameters of the exercise of legislative authority in enacting said law. Hence, in the
absence of restrictions, Congress is presumed to have duly exercised its function as
defined in Article VI (The Legislative Department) of the Constitution.
To put matters in their right perspective, it is necessary to dwell first on the
significance of absentee voting. The concept of absentee voting is relatively new. It is
viewed thus:
The method of absentee voting has been said to be completely separable and distinct
from the regular system of voting, and to be a new and different manner of voting from
that previously known, and an exception to the customary and usual manner of voting.
The right of absentee and disabled voters to cast their ballots at an election is purely
statutory; absentee voting was unknown to, and not recognized at, the common law.
Absentee voting is an outgrowth of modern social and economic conditions devised to
accommodate those engaged in military or civil life whose duties make it impracticable
for them to attend their polling places on the day of election, and the privilege of
absentee voting may flow from constitutional provisions or be conferred by
statutes, existing in some jurisdictions, which provide in varying terms for the casting
and reception of ballots by soldiers and sailors or other qualified voters absent on
election day from the district or precinct of their residence.
Such statutes are regarded as conferring a privilege and not a right, or an absolute right.
When the legislature chooses to grant the right by statute, it must operate with
equality among all the class to which it is granted; but statutes of this nature may
be limited in their application to particular types of elections. The statutes should
be construed in the light of any constitutional provisions affecting registration
and elections, and with due regard to their texts prior to amendment and to
predecessor statutes and the decisions thereunder; they should also be construed in
the light of the circumstances under which they were enacted; and so as to carry
out the objects thereof, if this can be done without doing violence to their provisions and
mandates. Further, in passing on statutes regulating absentee voting, the court
should look to the whole and every part of the election laws, the intent of the
entire plan, and reasons and spirit of their adoption, and try to give effect to every
portion thereof.[29] (Emphasis supplied)
Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident and vice versa; a person cannot be at
the same time, both a resident and an absentee.[30] However, under our election laws
and the countless pronouncements of the Court pertaining to elections, an absentee
remains attached to his residence in the Philippines as residence is considered
synonymous with domicile.
In Romualdez-Marcos,[31] the Court enunciated:
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that [f]or the exercise of civil rights and the
fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual
residence. In Ong vs. Republic, this court took the concept of domicile to mean an
individuals permanent home, a place to which, whenever absent for business or for
pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense
that they disclose intent. Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements
of the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place and animus manendi, or the
intention of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to
a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or
country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that
residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken
up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or
health. If a persons intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave
as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. It is thus, quite perfectly normal for
an individual to have different residences in various places. However, a person can only
have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his
domicile in favor of another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, we laid this
distinction quite clearly:
There is a difference between domicile and residence. Residence is used to indicate a
place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; domicile denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have
a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but
domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man
can have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may have
numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally his place of domicile,
but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of residence without intention
of remaining will constitute domicile.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the
peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law,
what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election
purposes is used synonymously with domicile.[32] (Emphasis supplied)
Aware of the domiciliary legal tie that links an overseas Filipino to his residence
in this country, the framers of the Constitution considered the circumstances that
impelled them to require Congress to establish a system for overseas absentee voting,
thus:

MR. OPLE. With respect to Section 1, it is not clear whether the right of suffrage, which
here has a residential restriction, is not denied to citizens temporarily residing or working
abroad. Based on the statistics of several government agencies, there ought to be about
two million such Filipinos at this time. Commissioner Bernas had earlier pointed out that
these provisions are really lifted from the two previous Constitutions of 1935 and 1973,
with the exception of the last paragraph. They could not therefore have foreseen at that
time the phenomenon now described as the Filipino labor force explosion overseas.
According to government data, there are now about 600,000 contract workers and
employees, and although the major portions of these expatriate communities of workers
are to be found in the Middle East, they are scattered in 177 countries in the world.
In a previous hearing of the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies,
the Chairman of the Commission on Elections, Ramon Felipe, said that there was no
insuperable obstacle to making effective the right of suffrage for Filipinos
overseas. Those who have adhered to their Filipino citizenship notwithstanding strong
temptations are exposed to embrace a more convenient foreign citizenship. And those
who on their own or under pressure of economic necessity here, find that they have to
detach themselves from their families to work in other countries with definite tenures of
employment. Many of them are on contract employment for one, two, or three years.
They have no intention of changing their residence on a permanent basis, but are
technically disqualified from exercising the right of suffrage in their countries of
destination by the residential requirement in Section 1 which says:
Suffrage shall be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by
law, who are eighteen years of age or over, and who shall have resided in the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at
least six months preceding the election.
I, therefore, ask the Committee whether at the proper time they might entertain an
amendment that will make this exercise of the right to vote abroad for Filipino citizens an
effective, rather than merely a nominal right under this proposed Constitution.
FR. BERNAS. Certainly, the Committee will consider that. But more than just saying
that, I would like to make a comment on the meaning of residence in the Constitution
because I think it is a concept that has been discussed in various decisions of the
Supreme Court, particularly in the case of Faypon vs. Quirino, a 1954 case which dealt
precisely with the meaning of residence in the Election Law. Allow me to quote:
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for greener pastures, as the saying
goes, to improve his lot and that, of course, includes study in other places, practice of
his avocation, reengaging in business. When an election is to be held, the citizen who
left his birthplace to improve his lot may decide to return to his native town, to cast his
ballot, but for professional or business reasons, or for any other reason, he may not
absent himself from the place of his professional or business activities.
So, they are here registered as voters as he has the qualifications to be one, and is not
willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the
government especially in national elections. Despite such registration, the animus
revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of origin has not forsaken him.
This may be the explanation why the registration of a voter in a place other than his
residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient to consider abandonment or loss of
such residence of origin.
In other words, residence in this provision refers to two residence qualifications:
residence in the Philippines and residence in the place where he will vote. As far as
residence in the Philippines is concerned, the word residence means domicile, but as
far as residence in the place where he will actually cast his ballot is concerned, the
meaning seems to be different. He could have a domicile somewhere else and yet he is
a resident of a place for six months and he is allowed to vote there. So that there may
be serious constitutional obstacles to absentee voting, unless the vote of the person
who is absent is a vote which will be considered as cast in the place of his
domicile.
MR. OPLE. Thank you for citing the jurisprudence.
It gives me scant comfort thinking of about two million Filipinos who should enjoy the
right of suffrage, at least a substantial segment of these overseas Filipino
communities. The Committee, of course, is aware that when this Article of the
Constitution explicitly and unequivocally extends the right of effective suffrage to
Filipinos abroad, this will call for a logistical exercise of global proportions. In effect, this
will require budgetary and administrative commitments on the part of the Philippine
government, mainly through the COMELEC and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and
perhaps, a more extensive elaboration of this mechanism that will be put in place to
make effective the right to vote. Therefore, seeking shelter in some wise
jurisprudence of the past may not be sufficient to meet the demands of the right
of suffrage for Filipinos abroad that I have mentioned. But I want to thank the
Committee for saying that an amendment to this effect may be entertained at the proper
time. . . . . . . . . .
[33] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the Constitutional Commission recognized the fact that while millions of
Filipinos reside abroad principally for economic reasons and hence they contribute in no
small measure to the economic uplift of this country, their voices are marginal insofar as
the choice of this countrys leaders is concerned.
The Constitutional Commission realized that under the laws then existing and
considering the novelty of the system of absentee voting in this jurisdiction, vesting
overseas Filipinos with the right to vote would spawn constitutional problems especially
because the Constitution itself provides for the residency requirement of voters:
MR. REGALADO. Before I act on that, may I inquire from Commissioner Monsod if the
term absentee voting also includes transient voting; meaning, those who are, let us
say, studying in Manila need not go back to their places of registration, for instance, in
Mindanao, to cast their votes.
MR. MONSOD. I think our provision is for absentee voting by Filipinos abroad.
MR. REGALADO. How about those people who cannot go back to the places where
they are registered?
MR. MONSOD. Under the present Election Code, there are provisions for allowing
students and military people who are temporarily in another place to register and vote. I
believe that those situations can be covered by the Omnibus Election Code. The
reason we want absentee voting to be in the Constitution as a mandate to the
legislature is that there could be inconsistency on the residence rule if it is just a
question of legislation by Congress. So, by allowing it and saying that this is
possible, then legislation can take care of the rest.[34] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Section 2, Article V of the Constitution came into being to remove any doubt as to
the inapplicability of the residency requirement in Section 1. It is precisely to avoid any
problems that could impede the implementation of its pursuit to enfranchise the largest
number of qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines that the Constitutional
Commission explicitly mandated Congress to provide a system for overseas absentee
voting.
The discussion of the Constitutional Commission on the effect of the residency
requirement prescribed by Section 1, Article V of the Constitution on the proposed
system of absentee voting for qualified Filipinos abroad is enlightening:
MR. SUAREZ. May I just be recognized for a clarification. There are certain
qualifications for the exercise of the right of suffrage like having resided in the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place where they propose to vote for at least
six months preceding the elections. What is the effect of these mandatory requirements
on the matter of the exercise of the right of suffrage by the absentee voters like Filipinos
abroad?
THE PRESIDENT. Would Commissioner Monsod care to answer?
MR. MONSOD. I believe the answer was already given by Commissioner Bernas, that
the domicile requirements as well as the qualifications and disqualifications would be the
same.
THE PRESIDENT. Are we leaving it to the legislature to devise the system?
FR. BERNAS. I think there is a very legitimate problem raised there.
THE PRESIDENT. Yes.
MR. BENGZON. I believe Commissioner Suarez is clarified.
FR. BERNAS. But I think it should be further clarified with regard to the residence
requirement or the place where they vote in practice; the understanding is that it is
flexible. For instance, one might be a resident of Naga or domiciled therein, but he
satisfies the requirement of residence in Manila, so he is able to vote in Manila.
MR. TINGSON. Madam President, may I then suggest to the Committee to change the
word Filipinos to QUALIFIED FILIPINO VOTERS. Instead of VOTING BY FILIPINOS
ABROAD, it should be QUALIFIED FILIPINO VOTERS. If the Committee wants
QUALIFIED VOTERS LIVING ABROAD, would that not satisfy the requirement?
THE PRESIDENT. What does Commissioner Monsod say?
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I think I would accept the phrase QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS ABROAD because QUALIFIED would assume that he has the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications to vote.
MR. TINGSON. That is right. So does the Committee accept?

FR. BERNAS. QUALIFIED FILIPINOS ABROAD?
THE PRESIDENT. Does the Committee accept the amendment?
MR. REGALADO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Regalado is recognized.
MR. REGALADO. When Commissioner Bengzon asked me to read my proposed
amendment, I specifically stated that the National Assembly shall prescribe a system
which will enable qualified citizens, temporarily absent from the Philippines, to vote.
According to Commissioner Monsod, the use of the phrase absentee voting already
took that into account as its meaning. That is referring to qualified Filipino citizens
temporarily abroad.
MR. MONSOD. Yes, we accepted that. I would like to say that with respect to
registration we will leave it up to the legislative assembly, for example, to require where
the registration is. If it is, say, members of the diplomatic corps who may be
continuously abroad for a long time, perhaps, there can be a system of registration in
the embassies. However, we do not like to preempt the legislative assembly.
THE PRESIDENT. Just to clarify, Commissioner Monsods amendment is only to
provide a system.
MR. MONSOD. Yes.
THE PRESIDENT. The Commissioner is not stating here that he wants new
qualifications for these absentee voters.
MR. MONSOD. That is right. They must have the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications.
THE PRESIDENT. It is just to devise a system by which they can vote.
MR. MONSOD. That is right, Madam President.[35] (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly therefrom, the intent of the Constitutional Commission is to entrust to
Congress the responsibility of devising a system of absentee voting. The qualifications
of voters as stated in Section 1 shall remain except for the residency requirement. This
is in fact the reason why the Constitutional Commission opted for the term qualified
Filipinos abroad with respect to the system of absentee voting that Congress should
draw up. As stressed by Commissioner Monsod, by the use of the adjective qualified
with respect to Filipinos abroad, the assumption is that they have the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications to vote. In fine-tuning the provision on absentee voting,
the Constitutional Commission discussed how the system should work:
MR. SUAREZ. For clarification purposes, we just want to state for the record that in the
case of qualified Filipino citizens residing abroad and exercising their right of suffrage,
they can cast their votes for the candidates in the place where they were registered to
vote in the Philippines. So as to avoid any complications, for example, if they are
registered in Angeles City, they could not vote for a mayor in Naga City.
In other words, if that qualified voter is registered in Angeles City, then he can vote only
for the local and national candidates in Angeles City. I just want to make that clear for
the record.
MR. REGALADO. Madam President.
THE PRESIDENT. What does Commissioner Regalado say?
MR. REGALADO. I just want to make a note on the statement of
Commissioner Suarez that this envisions Filipinos residing
abroad. The understanding in the amendment is that the
Filipino is temporarily abroad. He may not be actually
residing abroad; he may just be there on a business trip. It
just so happens that the day before the elections he has to
fly to the United States, so he could not cast his vote. He is
temporarily abroad, but not residing there. He stays in a
hotel for two days and comes back. This is not limited
only to Filipinos temporarily residing abroad. But as
long as he is temporarily abroad on the date of the
elections, then he can fall within the prescription of
Congress in that situation.
MR. SUAREZ. I thank the Commissioner for his further clarification.
Precisely, we need this clarification on record.
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, to clarify what we mean by
temporarily abroad, it need not be on very short trips.
One can be abroad on a treaty traders visa. Therefore, when
we talk about registration, it is possible that his residence is
in Angeles and he would be able to vote for the candidates
in Angeles, but Congress or the Assembly may provide
the procedure for registration, like listing ones name, in
a registry list in the embassy abroad. That is still possible
under the system.
FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just one clarification if
Commissioner Monsod agrees with this.
Suppose we have a situation of a child of a diplomatic officer who
reaches the voting age while living abroad and he has never
registered here. Where will he register? Will he be a
registered voter of a certain locality in the Philippines?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, it is possible that the system will enable that
child to comply with the registration requirements in an
embassy in the United States and his name is then entered
in the official registration book in Angeles City, for instance.
FR. BERNAS. In other words, he is not a registered voter of Los
Angeles, but a registered voter of a locality here.
MR. MONSOD. That is right. He does not have to come home to the
Philippines to comply with the registration procedure here.
FR. BERNAS. So, he does not have to come home.
MR. BENGZON. Madam President, the Floor Leader wishes to
inquire if there are more clarifications needed from the body.
Also, the Floor Leader is happy to announce that there are no more registered
Commissioners to propose amendments. So I move that we close the period of
amendments.
It is clear from these discussions of the members of the Constitutional
Commission that they intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens
abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of origin. The Commission even
intended to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents
domicile of origin is in the Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the first
time.
It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided for Section 2
immediately after the residency requirement of Section 1. By the doctrine of necessary
implication in statutory construction, which may be applied in construing constitutional
provisions,[37] the strategic location of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional
Commission provided for an exception to the actual residency requirement of Section 1
with respect to qualified Filipinos abroad. The same Commission has in effect declared
that qualified Filipinos who are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even
though they do not satisfy the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution.
That Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an exception to the residency
requirement found in Section 1 of the same Article was in fact the subject of debate
when Senate Bill No. 2104, which became R.A. No. 9189, was deliberated upon on the
Senate floor, thus:
Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, this bill should be looked into in
relation to the constitutional provisions. I think the sponsor
and I would agree that the Constitution is supreme in any
statute that we may enact.
Let me read Section 1, Article V, of the Constitution entitled, Suffrage. It says:
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided
in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for
at least six months immediately preceding the election.
Now, Mr. President, the Constitution says, who shall have resided in
the Philippines. They are permanent immigrants. They
have changed residence so they are barred under the
Constitution. This is why I asked whether this committee
amendment which in fact does not alter the original text of
the bill will have any effect on this?
Senator Angara. Good question, Mr. President. And this has been
asked in various fora. This is in compliance with the
Constitution. One, the interpretation here of residence is
As the gentleman and I know, Mr. President, domicile is the intent to
return to ones home. And the fact that a Filipino may
have been physically absent from the Philippines and
may be physically a resident of the United States, for
example, but has a clear intent to return to the
Philippines, will make him qualified as a resident of the

Philippines under this law.
This is consistent, Mr. President, with the constitutional mandate that
we that Congress must provide a franchise to overseas
Filipinos.
If we read the Constitution and the suffrage principle literally as
demanding physical presence, then there is no way we
can provide for offshore voting to our offshore
kababayan, Mr. President.
Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, when the Constitution says, in
Section 2 of Article V, it reads: The Congress shall provide
a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot
as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos
abroad.
The key to this whole exercise, Mr. President, is qualified. In
other words, anything that we may do or say in granting
our compatriots abroad must be anchored on the
proposition that they are qualified. Absent the
qualification, they cannot vote. And residents (sic) is a
qualification.
I will lose votes here from permanent residents so-called green-card
holders, but the Constitution is the Constitution. We cannot
compromise on this. The Senate cannot be a party to
something that would affect or impair the Constitution.
Look at what the Constitution says In the place wherein they
propose to vote for at least six months immediately
preceding the election.
Mr. President, all of us here have run (sic) for office.
I live in Makati. My neighbor is Pateros where Senator Cayetano
lives. We are separated only by a creek. But one who votes
in Makati cannot vote in Pateros unless he resides in
Pateros for six months. That is how restrictive our
Constitution is. I am not talking even about the Election
Code. I am talking about the Constitution.
As I have said, if a voter in Makati would want to vote in Pateros, yes,
he may do so. But he must do so, make the transfer six
months before the election, otherwise, he is not qualified to
vote.
That is why I am raising this point because I think we have a
fundamental difference here.
Senator Angara. It is a good point to raise, Mr. President. But it is a
point already well-debated even in the constitutional
commission of 1986. And the reason Section 2 of Article
V was placed immediately after the six-month/one-year
residency requirement is to demonstrate unmistakably
that Section 2 which authorizes absentee voting is an
exception to the six-month/one-year residency
requirement. That is the first principle, Mr. President, that
one must remember.
The second reason, Mr. President, is that under our jurisprudence
and I think this is so well-entrenched that one need not
argue about it residency has been interpreted as
But the third more practical reason, Mr. President, is, if we follow
the interpretation of the gentleman, then it is legally and
constitutionally impossible to give a franchise to vote to
overseas Filipinos who do not physically live in the
country, which is quite ridiculous because that is
exactly the whole point of this exercise to enfranchise
them and empower them to vote.
Accordingly, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides for the coverage of the
absentee voting process, to wit:
SEC. 4. Coverage. All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise
disqualified by law, at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of elections, may vote
for president, vice-president, senators and party-list representatives.
which does not require physical residency in the Philippines; and Section 5 of the
assailed law which enumerates those who are disqualified, to wit:
SEC. 5. Disqualifications. The following shall be disqualified from voting under this
Act:
a) Those who have lost their Filipino citizenship in accordance with Philippine laws;
b) Those who have expressly renounced their Philippine citizenship and who have
pledged allegiance to a foreign country;
c) Those who have committed and are convicted in a final judgment by a court or
tribunal of an offense punishable by imprisonment of not less than one (1) year,
including those who have committed and been found guilty of Disloyalty as defined
under Article 137 of the Revised Penal Code, such disability not having been removed
by plenary pardon or amnesty: Provided, however, That any person disqualified to vote
under this subsection shall automatically acquire the right to vote upon expiration of five
(5) years after service of sentence; Provided, further, That the Commission may take
cognizance of final judgments issued by foreign courts or tribunals only on the basis of
reciprocity and subject to the formalities and processes prescribed by the Rules of Court
on execution of judgments;
d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host
country, unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose
by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent
residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of his/her
registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not applied for
citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the
name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the National Registry of Absentee
Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.
e) Any citizen of the Philippines abroad previously declared insane or incompetent by
competent authority in the Philippines or abroad, as verified by the Philippine
embassies, consulates or foreign service establishments concerned, unless such
competent authority subsequently certifies that such person is no longer insane or
incompetent.
As finally approved into law, Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specifically
disqualifies an immigrant or permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host
country because immigration or permanent residence in another country implies
renunciation of ones residence in his country of origin. However, same Section allows
an immigrant and permanent resident abroad to register as voter for as long as he/she
executes an affidavit to show that he/she has not abandoned his domicile in pursuance
of the constitutional intent expressed in Sections 1 and 2 of Article V that all citizens of
the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law must be entitled to exercise the right of
suffrage and, that Congress must establish a system for absentee voting; for otherwise,
if actual, physical residence in the Philippines is required, there is no sense for the
framers of the Constitution to mandate Congress to establish a system for absentee
voting.
Contrary to the claim of petitioner, the execution of the affidavit itself is not the
enabling or enfranchising act. The affidavit required in Section 5(d) is not only proof of
the intention of the immigrant or permanent resident to go back and resume residency in
the Philippines, but more significantly, it serves as an explicit expression that he had not
in fact abandoned his domicile of origin. Thus, it is not correct to say that the execution
of the affidavit under Section 5(d) violates the Constitution that proscribes provisional
registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a
political exercise.
To repeat, the affidavit is required of immigrants and permanent residents
abroad because by their status in their host countries, they are presumed to have
relinquished their intent to return to this country; thus, without the affidavit, the
presumption of abandonment of Philippine domicile shall remain.
Further perusal of the transcripts of the Senate proceedings discloses another
reason why the Senate required the execution of said affidavit. It wanted the affiant to
exercise the option to return or to express his intention to return to his domicile of origin
and not to preempt that choice by legislation. Thus:
Senator Villar. Yes, we are going back.
It states that: For Filipino immigrants and those who have acquired
permanent resident status abroad, a requirement for the
registration is the submission of a Sworn Declaration of
Intent to Return duly sworn before any Philippine embassy
or consulate official authorized to administer oath
Mr. President, may we know the rationale of this provision? Is the
purpose of this Sworn Declaration to include only those who
have the intention of returning to be qualified to exercise the
right of suffrage? What if the Filipino immigrant has no
purpose of returning? Is he automatically disbarred from
exercising this right to suffrage?
Senator Angara. The rationale for this, Mr. President, is that we
want to be expansive and all-inclusive in this law. That
as long as he is a Filipino, no matter whether he is a
green-card holder in the U.S. or not, he will be
authorized to vote. But if he is already a green-card
holder, that means he has acquired permanent
residency in the United States, then he must indicate an
intention to return. This is what makes for the definition
of domicile. And to acquire the vote, we thought that we
would require the immigrants and the green-card holders . . .

Mr. President, the three administration senators are leaving,
maybe we may ask for a vote [Laughter].
Senator Villar. For a merienda, Mr. President.
Senator Angara. Mr. President, going back to the business at
hand. The rationale for the requirement that an immigrant or
a green-card holder should file an affidavit that he will go
back to the Philippines is that, if he is already an immigrant
or a green-card holder, that means he may not return to the
country any more and that contradicts the definition of
domicile under the law.
But what we are trying to do here, Mr. President, is really provide
the choice to the voter. The voter, after consulting his
lawyer or after deliberation within the family, may decide
No, I think we are risking our permanent status in the United
States if we file an affidavit that we want to go back. But
we want to give him the opportunity to make that
decision. We do not want to make that decision for him.
The jurisprudential declaration in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals that green card
holders are disqualified to run for any elective office finds no application to the present
case because the Caasi case did not, for obvious reasons, consider the absentee voting
rights of Filipinos who are immigrants and permanent residents in their host countries.
In the advent of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 or R.A. 9189, they
may still be considered as a qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad upon fulfillment
of the requirements of registration under the new law for the purpose of exercising their
right of suffrage.
It must be emphasized that Section 5(d) does not only require an affidavit or a
promise to resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than
three years from approval of his/her registration, the Filipinos abroad must also declare
that they have not applied for citizenship in another country. Thus, they must return to
the Philippines; otherwise, their failure to return shall be cause for the removal of their
names from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent
disqualification to vote in absentia.
Thus, Congress crafted a process of registration by which a Filipino voter
permanently residing abroad who is at least eighteen years old, not otherwise
disqualified by law, who has not relinquished Philippine citizenship and who has not
actually abandoned his/her intentions to return to his/her domicile of origin, the
Philippines, is allowed to register and vote in the Philippine embassy, consulate or other
foreign service establishments of the place which has jurisdiction over the country where
he/she has indicated his/her address for purposes of the elections, while providing for
safeguards to a clean election.
Thus, Section 11 of R.A. No. 9189 provides:
SEC. 11. Procedure for Application to Vote in Absentia.
11.1. Every qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad whose application for registration
has been approved, including those previously registered under Republic Act No. 8189,
shall, in every national election, file with the officer of the embassy, consulate or other
foreign service establishment authorized by the Commission, a sworn written application
to vote in a form prescribed by the Commission. The authorized officer of such
embassy, consulate or other foreign service establishment shall transmit to the
Commission the said application to vote within five (5) days from receipt thereof. The
application form shall be accomplished in triplicate and submitted together with the
photocopy of his/her overseas absentee voter certificate of registration.
11.2. Every application to vote in absentia may be done personally at, or by mail to, the
embassy, consulate or foreign service establishment, which has jurisdiction over the
country where he/she has indicated his/her address for purposes of the elections.
11.3. Consular and diplomatic services rendered in connection with the overseas
absentee voting processes shall be made available at no cost to the overseas absentee
voter.
Contrary to petitioners claim that Section 5(d) circumvents the Constitution,
Congress enacted the law prescribing a system of overseas absentee voting in
compliance with the constitutional mandate. Such mandate expressly requires that
Congress provide a system of absentee voting that necessarily presupposes that the
qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad is not physically present in the country. The
provisions of Sections 5(d) and 11 are components of the system of overseas absentee
voting established by R.A. No. 9189. The qualified Filipino abroad who executed the
affidavit is deemed to have retained his domicile in the Philippines. He is presumed not
to have lost his domicile by his physical absence from this country. His having become
an immigrant or permanent resident of his host country does not necessarily imply an
abandonment of his intention to return to his domicile of origin, the Philippines.
Therefore, under the law, he must be given the opportunity to express that he has not
actually abandoned his domicile in the Philippines by executing the affidavit required by
Sections 5(d) and 8(c) of the law.
Petitioners speculative apprehension that the implementation of Section 5(d)
would affect the credibility of the elections is insignificant as what is important is to
ensure that all those who possess the qualifications to vote on the date of the election
are given the opportunity and permitted to freely do so. The COMELEC and the
Department of Foreign Affairs have enough resources and talents to ensure the integrity
and credibility of any election conducted pursuant to R.A. No. 9189.
As to the eventuality that the Filipino abroad would renege on his undertaking
to return to the Philippines, the penalty of perpetual disenfranchisement provided for by
Section 5(d) would suffice to serve as deterrence to non-compliance with his/her
undertaking under the affidavit.
Petitioner argues that should a sizable number of immigrants renege on their
promise to return, the result of the elections would be affected and could even be a
ground to contest the proclamation of the winning candidates and cause further
confusion and doubt on the integrity of the results of the election. Indeed, the probability
that after an immigrant has exercised the right to vote, he shall opt to remain in his host
country beyond the third year from the execution of the affidavit, is not
farfetched. However, it is not for this Court to determine the wisdom of a legislative
exercise. As expressed in Taada vs. Tuvera,[40] the Court is not called upon to rule
on the wisdom of the law or to repeal it or modify it if we find it impractical.
Congress itself was conscious of said probability and in fact, it has addressed
the expected problem. Section 5(d) itself provides for a deterrence which is that the
Filipino who fails to return as promised stands to lose his right of suffrage. Under
Section 9, should a registered overseas absentee voter fail to vote for two consecutive
national elections, his name may be ordered removed from the National Registry of
Overseas Absentee Voters.
Other serious legal questions that may be raised would be: what happens to
the votes cast by the qualified voters abroad who were not able to return within three
years as promised? What is the effect on the votes cast by the non-returnees in favor of
the winning candidates? The votes cast by qualified Filipinos abroad who failed to
return within three years shall not be invalidated because they were qualified to vote on
the date of the elections, but their failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the
names of the immigrants or permanent residents from the National Registry of Absentee
Voters and their permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.
In fine, considering the underlying intent of the Constitution, the Court does not
find Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 as constitutionally defective.
B. Is Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 in relation to Section 4 of the same Act in
contravention of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution?
Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides that the overseas absentee voter may vote
for president, vice-president, senators and party-list representatives.
Section 18.5 of the same Act provides:
SEC. 18. On-Site Counting and Canvassing.
. . . . . . . . .
18. 5 The canvass of votes shall not cause the delay of the proclamation of a winning
candidate if the outcome of the election will not be affected by the results
thereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Commission is empowered to order the
proclamation of winning candidates despite the fact that the scheduled election has
not taken place in a particular country or countries, if the holding of elections therein has
been rendered impossible by events, factors and circumstances peculiar to such country
or countries, in which events, factors and circumstances are beyond the control or
influence of the Commission. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner claims that the provision of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189
empowering the COMELEC to order the proclamation of winning candidates insofar as it
affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of winning candidates for president and
vice-president, is unconstitutional because it violates the following provisions of
paragraph 4, Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution:
SEC. 4 . . .
The returns of every election for President and Vice-President, duly certified by the
board of canvassers of each province or city, shall be transmitted to the Congress,
directed to the President of the Senate. Upon receipt of the certificates of canvass, the
President of the Senate shall, not later than thirty days after the day of the election,
open all the certificates in the presence of the Senate and the House of Representatives
in joint public session, and the Congress, upon determination of the authenticity and due
execution thereof in the manner provided by law, canvass the votes.
The person having the highest number of votes shall be proclaimed elected, but in case
two or more shall have an equal and highest number of votes, one of them shall
forthwith be chosen by the vote of a majority of all the Members of both Houses of the
Congress, voting separately.
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the certificates.

. . .
which gives to Congress the duty to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning
candidates for president and vice-president.
The Solicitor General asserts that this provision must be harmonized with
paragraph 4, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution and should be taken to mean that
COMELEC can only proclaim the winning Senators and party-list representatives but not
the President and Vice-President.[41]
Respondent COMELEC has no comment on the matter.
Indeed, the phrase, proclamation of winning candidates, in Section 18.5 of R.A.
No. 9189 is far too sweeping that it necessarily includes the proclamation of the winning
candidates for the presidency and the vice-presidency.
Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 appears to be repugnant to Section 4, Article VII
of the Constitution only insofar as said Section totally disregarded the authority given to
Congress by the Constitution to proclaim the winning candidates for the positions of
president and vice-president.
In addition, the Court notes that Section 18.4 of the law, to wit:
18.4. . . . Immediately upon the completion of the canvass, the chairman of the Special
Board of Canvassers shall transmit via facsimile, electronic mail, or any other means of
transmission equally safe and reliable the Certificates of Canvass and the Statements of
Votes to the Commission, . . . [Emphasis supplied]
clashes with paragraph 4, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution which provides that
the returns of every election for President and Vice-President shall be certified by the
board of canvassers to Congress.
Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that
constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach on the power
of Congress to canvass the votes for president and vice-president and the power to
proclaim the winners for the said positions. The provisions of the Constitution as the
fundamental law of the land should be read as part of The Overseas Absentee Voting
Act of 2003 and hence, the canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning
candidates for president and vice-president for the entire nation must remain in the
hands of Congress.
C. Are Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 in violation of Section 1, Article IX-
A of the Constitution?
Petitioner avers that Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 violate Article IX-A
(Common Provisions) of the Constitution, to wit:
Section 1. The Constitutional Commissions, which shall be independent, are the Civil
Service Commission, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on
Audit. (Emphasis supplied)
He submits that the creation of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee with the
power to review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations
promulgated by the COMELEC, R.A. No. 9189 intrudes into the independence of the
COMELEC which, as a constitutional body, is not under the control of either the
executive or legislative departments of government; that only the COMELEC itself can
promulgate rules and regulations which may be changed or revised only by the majority
of its members; and that should the rules promulgated by the COMELEC violate any
law, it is the Court that has the power to review the same via the petition of any
interested party, including the legislators.
It is only on this question that respondent COMELEC submitted its
Comment. It agrees with the petitioner that Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 are
unconstitutional. Like the petitioner, respondent COMELEC anchors its claim of
unconstitutionality of said Sections upon Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution
providing for the independence of the constitutional commissions such as the
COMELEC. It asserts that its power to formulate rules and regulations has been upheld
in Gallardo vs. Tabamo, Jr.[42] where this Court held that the power of the COMELEC to
formulate rules and regulations is implicit in its power to implement regulations under
Section 2(1) of Article IX-C[43] of the Constitution. COMELEC joins the petitioner in
asserting that as an independent constitutional body, it may not be subject to
interference by any government instrumentality and that only this Court may review
COMELEC rules and only in cases of grave abuse of discretion.
The COMELEC adds, however, that another provision, vis--vis its rule-making
power, to wit:
SEC. 17. Voting by Mail.
17.1. For the May, 2004 elections, the Commission shall authorize voting by mail in not
more than three (3) countries, subject to the approval of the Congressional
Oversight Committee. Voting by mail may be allowed in countries that satisfy the
following conditions:
a) Where the mailing system is fairly well-developed and secure to prevent
occasion for fraud;
b) Where there exists a technically established identification system that would
preclude multiple or proxy voting; and
c) Where the system of reception and custody of mailed ballots in the embassies,
consulates and other foreign service establishments concerned are adequate and well-
secured.
Thereafter, voting by mail in any country shall be allowed only upon review and approval
of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.
is likewise unconstitutional as it violates Section 1, Article IX-A mandating the
independence of constitutional commissions.
The Solicitor General takes exception to his prefatory statement that the
constitutional challenge must fail and agrees with the petitioner that Sections 19 and 25
are invalid and unconstitutional on the ground that there is nothing in Article VI of the
Constitution on Legislative Department that would as much as imply that Congress has
concurrent power to enforce and administer election laws with the COMELEC; and by
the principles of exclusio unius est exclusio alterius and expressum facit cessare
tacitum, the constitutionally enumerated powers of Congress circumscribe its authority
to the exclusion of all others.
The parties are unanimous in claiming that Sections 19, 25 and portions of
Section 17.1 are unconstitutional. Thus, there is no actual issue forged on this question
raised by petitioner.
However, the Court finds it expedient to expound on the role of Congress
through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOC) vis--vis the
independence of the COMELEC, as a constitutional body.
R.A. No. 9189 created the JCOC, as follows:
SEC. 25. Joint Congressional Oversight Committee. A Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee is hereby created, composed of the Chairman of the Senate Committee on
Constitutional Amendments, Revision of Codes and Laws, and seven (7) other Senators
designated by the Senate President, and the Chairman of the House Committee on
Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, and seven (7) other Members of the House of
Representatives designated by the Speaker of the House of Representatives: Provided,
That, of the seven (7) members to be designated by each House of Congress, four (4)
should come from the majority and the remaining three (3) from the minority.
The Joint Congressional Oversight Committee shall have the power to monitor
and evaluate the implementation of this Act. It shall review, revise, amend and
approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
Commission. (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 19. Authority of the Commission to Promulgate Rules. The Commission shall
issue the necessary rules and regulations to effectively implement the provisions of this
Act within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of this Act. The Implementing Rules and
Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
created by virtue of this Act for prior approval.
Composed of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOC) is a purely legislative body. There is no
question that the authority of Congress to monitor and evaluate the implementation of
R.A. No. 9189 is geared towards possible amendments or revision of the law itself and
thus, may be performed in aid of its legislation.
However, aside from its monitoring and evaluation functions, R.A. No. 9189
gives to the JCOC the following functions: (a) to review, revise, amend and approve the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) promulgated by the COMELEC [Sections
25 and 19]; and (b) subject to the approval of the JCOC [Section 17.1], the voting by
mail in not more than three countries for the May 2004 elections and in any country
determined by COMELEC.
The ambit of legislative power under Article VI of the Constitution is
circumscribed by other constitutional provisions. One such provision is Section 1 of
Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution ordaining that constitutional commissions such as
the COMELEC shall be independent.
Interpreting Section 1, Article X of the 1935 Constitution providing that there
shall be an independent COMELEC, the Court has held that [w]hatever may be the
nature of the functions of the Commission on Elections, the fact is that the framers of the
Constitution wanted it to be independent from the other departments of the
Government.[44] In an earlier case, the Court elucidated:
The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct
and important part in our scheme of government. In the discharge of its functions, it
should not be hampered with restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of a
less responsible organization. The Commission may err, so may this court also. It

should be allowed considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will insure
the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created free, orderly and
honest elections. We may not agree fully with its choice of means, but unless these are
clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of discretion, this court should not interfere.
Politics is a practical matter, and political questions must be dealt with realistically not
from the standpoint of pure theory. The Commission on Elections, because of its fact-
finding facilities, its contacts with political strategists, and its knowledge derived from
actual experience in dealing with political controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous
position to decide complex political questions.
The Court has no general powers of supervision over COMELEC which is an
independent body except those specifically granted by the Constitution, that is, to
review its decisions, orders and rulings.[46] In the same vein, it is not correct to hold
that because of its recognized extensive legislative power to enact election laws,
Congress may intrude into the independence of the COMELEC by exercising
supervisory powers over its rule-making authority.
By virtue of Section 19 of R.A. No. 9189, Congress has empowered the
COMELEC to issue the necessary rules and regulations to effectively implement the
provisions of this Act within sixty days from the effectivity of this Act. This provision of
law follows the usual procedure in drafting rules and regulations to implement a law
the legislature grants an administrative agency the authority to craft the rules and
regulations implementing the law it has enacted, in recognition of the administrative
expertise of that agency in its particular field of operation.[47] Once a law is enacted
and approved, the legislative function is deemed accomplished and complete. The
legislative function may spring back to Congress relative to the same law only if that
body deems it proper to review, amend and revise the law, but certainly not to approve,
review, revise and amend the IRR of the COMELEC.
By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR
for The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond the scope of its
constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of
independence of the COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court is left with no option
but to withdraw from its usual reticence in declaring a provision of law unconstitutional.
The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19 stating that [t]he
Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior approval, and the second
sentence of the second paragraph of Section 25 stating that [i]t shall review, revise,
amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
Commission, whereby Congress, in both provisions, arrogates unto itself a function not
specifically vested by the Constitution, should be stricken out of the subject statute for
constitutional infirmity. Both provisions brazenly violate the mandate on the
independence of the COMELEC.
Similarly, the phrase, subject to the approval of the Congressional Oversight
Committee in the first sentence of Section 17.1 which empowers the Commission to
authorize voting by mail in not more than three countries for the May, 2004 elections;
and the phrase, only upon review and approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee found in the second paragraph of the same section are unconstitutional as
they require review and approval of voting by mail in any country after the 2004
elections. Congress may not confer upon itself the authority to approve or disapprove
the countries wherein voting by mail shall be allowed, as determined by the COMELEC
pursuant to the conditions provided for in Section 17.1 of R.A. No. 9189.[48] Otherwise,
Congress would overstep the bounds of its constitutional mandate and intrude into the
independence of the COMELEC.
During the deliberations, all the members of the Court agreed to adopt the
separate opinion of Justice Reynato S. Puno as part of the ponencia on the
unconstitutionality of Sections 17.1, 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 insofar as they relate to
the creation of and the powers given to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.
WHEREFORE, the petition is partly GRANTED. The following portions of R.A.
No. 9189 are declared VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
a) The phrase in the first sentence of the first paragraph of Section
17.1, to wit: subject to the approval of the Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee;
b) The portion of the last paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: only
upon review and approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee;
c) The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19, to
wit: The Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be
submitted to the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee
created by virtue of this Act for prior approval; and
d) The second sentence in the second paragraph of Section 25, to wit: It shall
review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations
promulgated by the Commission of the same law;
for being repugnant to Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution mandating the
independence of constitutional commission, such as COMELEC.
The constitutionality of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is UPHELD with respect
only to the authority given to the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for the
Senators and party-list representatives but not as to the power to canvass the votes and
proclaim the winning candidates for President and Vice-President which is lodged with
Congress under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution.
The constitutionality of Section 5(d) is UPHELD.
Pursuant to Section 30 of R.A. No. 9189, the rest of the provisions of said law
continues to be in full force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., and Corona, JJ., concur.
Quisumbing, J., on leave.
Tinga, J., no part.
Bellosillo, and Carpio, JJ., see concurring opinion.
Puno, Ynares-Santiago, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., see concurring and dissenting
opinion.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion. On official
leave.
Vitug, and Panganiban, JJ., see separate opinion.
Carpio-Morales, and Azcuna, JJ., see separate (concurring) opinion.

[1] President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo approved the law on 13 February 2003. It was published in
the 16 February 2003 of Today and Daily Tribune.
[2] PHILCONSA vs. Mathay, 124 Phil. 890 (1966); 18 SCRA 300, 306.
[3] Id., citing PHILCONSA vs. Gimenez, 122 Phil. 894 (1965).
[4] Sanidad vs. COMELEC, L-44640, 12 October 1976, 73 SCRA 333, 358-359 citing Pascual vs.
Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 (1960).
[5] G.R. No. 81311, 30 June 1988, 163 SCRA 371, 378.
[6] Id., p. 378 cited in Tatad vs. The Secretary of the Department of Energy, 346 Phil. 321, 359
(1997).
[7] 338 Phil. 546, 574 (1997).
[8] Separate Opinion of Kapunan, J. in Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,
G.R. No. 135385, 6 December 2000, 347 SCRA 128, 256.
[9] Luz Farms vs. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 86889, 4 December
1990, 192 SCRA 51, 58-59.
[10] See: Gonzales vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 27833, 18 April 1969, 27 SCRA 835.
[11] Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Guingona, Jr. 232 SCRA 110 (1994) and Basco vs. Phil. Amusements and
Gaming Corporation, 197 SCRA 52 (1991).
[12] G.R. No. 88831, 8 November 1990, 191 SCRA 229.
[13] Petition, p. 7.
[14] Id., p. 9.
[15] Per Comment and Memorandum filed by Atty. Jose P. Balbuena, Director IV, Law Department,
COMELEC.
[16] 199 SCRA 692, 713 (1991).
[17] Comment, p. 9 citing Joaquin G. Bernas, Today, 5 February 2003.
[18] 318 Phil. 329 (1995); 248 SCRA 300.
[19] 96 Phil. 294 (1954).
[20] Comment, pp. 11-12.
[21] Caasi Case, supra.
[22] Comment, p. 13.
[23] Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS, 335 Phil. 82, 101 (1997).
[24] L-47771, 11 March 1978, 82 SCRA 30, 55 citing People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 95 (1937).
[25] Salas vs. Hon. Jarencio, 150-B Phil. 670, 690 (1972) citing Morfe vs. Mutuc, G.R. No. L-20387,
31 January 1968, 22 SCRA 424.
[26] 82 Phil. 771, 775 (1949).
[27] Separate opinion of Vitug, J. in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, supra, p. 387, citing
Marcelino vs. Cruz, Jr., L-42428, 18 March 1983, 121 SCRA 51.
[28] Luz Farms vs. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, supra, p. 56.
[29] 29 C.J.S. 575-577.
[30] 1 WORDS AND PHRASES 264 citing Savant vs. Mercadal, 66 So. 961, 962, 136 La. 248.
[31] 318 Phil. 329 (1995); 248 SCRA 300.

[32] Id., pp. 323-324.
[33] II RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION, pp. 11-12 (19 July 1986).
[34] Id., p. 33.
[35] Id., pp. 34-35.
[36] Id., pp. 35-36.
[37] Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, 56.
[38] TRANSCRIPTS OF SENATE PROCEEDINGS (1 October 2002), pp. 10-12.
[39] Transcripts of Senate Proceedings (6 August 2002), pp. 30-31.
[40] 146 SCRA 446, 454 (1986) cited in Garcia vs. Corona, 321 SCRA 218 (1999) and Pagpalain
Haulers, Inc. vs. Trajano, 310 SCRA 354 (1999).
[41] Comment, p. 15.
[42] G.R. No. 104848, 29 January 1993, 218 SCRA 253.
[43] SEC. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
. . .
[44] Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista, 85 Phil. 101, 107 (1949).
[45] Sumulong vs. Commission on Elections, 73 Phil. 288, 294-295 (1941), cited in Espino vs.
Zaldivar, 129 Phil. 451, 474 (1967).
[46] Nacionalista Party vs. De Vera, 85 Phil. 126, 129 (1949).
[47] In Grego vs. COMELEC (340 Phil. 591, 606 [1997]), the Court said: The COMELEC as an
administrative agency and a specialized constitutional body charged with the
enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall, has more than enough
expertise in its field that its findings or conclusions are generally respected and
even given finality.
[48] SEC. 17. Voting by Mail.
17.1 . . . Voting by mail may be allowed in countries that satisfy the following conditions:
a) Where the mailing system is fairly well-developed and secure to prevent
occasion for fraud;
b) Where there exists a technically established identification system that would
preclude multiple or proxy voting; and,
c) Where the system of reception and custody of mailed ballots in the embassies,
consulates and other foreign service establishments concerned are
adequate and well-secured.

DIGEST 1

FACTS:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B. Macalintal,
a member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of Republic
Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) suffer from constitutional
infirmity. Claiming that he has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of
this case in seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used and
appropriated, petitioner filed the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not Section 5(d) of Republic Act No. 9189 violates the residency
requirement in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution.
(2) Whether or not Section 18.5 of the same law violates the constitutional mandate
under Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution that the winning candidates for President
and the Vice-President shall be proclaimed as winners by Congress.

(3) Whether or not Congress may, through the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee created in Section 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189, exercise the power to review,
revise, amend, and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations that the
Commission on Elections, promulgate without violating the independence of the
COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of the Constitution.
HELD:
(1) No. Section 5 of RA No. 9189 enumerates those who are disqualified voting under
this Act. It disqualifies an immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such
in the host country. However, an exception is provided i.e. unless he/she executes,
upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission declaring
that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not
later than 3 years from approval of registration. Such affidavit shall also state that
he/she has not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be cause
for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the National
Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.

Petitioner claims that this is violative of the residency requirement in Section 1 Article V
of the Constitution which requires the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at
least one yr, and a resident in the place where he proposes to vote for at least 6 months
immediately preceding an election.

However, OSG held that ruling in said case does not hold water at present, and that the
Court may have to discard that particular ruling. Panacea of the controversy: Affidavit for
without it, the presumption of abandonment of Phil domicile shall remain. The qualified
Filipino abroad who executed an affidavit is deemed to have retained his domicile in the
Philippines and presumed not to have lost his domicile by his physical absence from this
country. Section 5 of RA No. 9189 does not only require the promise to resume actual
physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than 3 years after approval of
registration but it also requires the Filipino abroad, WON he is a green card holder, a
temporary visitor or even on business trip, must declare that he/she has not applied for
citizenship in another country. Thus, he/she must return to the Philippines otherwise
consequences will be met according to RA No. 9189.

Although there is a possibility that the Filipino will not return after he has exercised his
right to vote, the Court is not in a position to rule on the wisdom of the law or to repeal or
modify it if such law is found to be impractical. However, it can be said that the Congress
itself was conscious of this probability and provided for deterrence which is that the
Filipino who fails to return as promised stands to lose his right of suffrage. Accordingly,
the votes he cast shall not be invalidated because he was qualified to vote on the date
of the elections.

Expressum facit cessare tacitum: where a law sets down plainly its whole meaning, the
Court is prevented from making it mean what the Court pleases. In fine, considering that
underlying intent of the Constitution, as is evident in its statutory construction and intent
of the framers, which is to grant Filipino immigrants and permanent residents abroad the
unquestionable right to exercise the right of suffrage (Section 1 Article V) the Court finds
that Section 5 of RA No. 9189 is not constitutionally defective.

(2) Yes. Congress should not have allowed COMELEC to usurp a power that
constitutionally belongs to it. The canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the
winning candidates for President and Vice President for the entire nation must remain in
the hands of Congress as its duty and power under Section 4 of Article VII of the
Constitution. COMELEC has the authority to proclaim the winning candidates only for
Senators and Party-list Reps.

(3) No. By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend and revise the
Implementing Rules & Regulations for RA No. 9189, Congress went beyond the scope
of its constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate of
independence of the COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court is left with no option
but to withdraw from its usual silence in declaring a provision of law unconstitutional.

DIGEST 2

Political Law Election Laws Absentee Voters Act Proclamation of Winners in a
National Elections
Romulo Macalintal, as a lawyer and a taxpayer, questions the validity of the Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. 9189). He questions the validity of the said act on the
following grounds, among others:
1. That the provision that a Filipino already considered an immigrant abroad can be
allowed to participate in absentee voting provided he executes an affidavit
stating his intent to return to the Philippines is void because it dispenses of
the requirement that a voter must be a resident of the Philippines for at least
one year and in the place where he intends to vote for at least 6 months
immediately preceding the election;
2. That the provision allowing the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to proclaim
winning candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and
proclamation of winning candidates for president and vice-president, is
unconstitutional because it violates the Constitution for it is Congress which
is empowered to do so.
ISSUE: Whether or not Macalintals arguments are correct.
HELD: No.
1. There can be no absentee voting if the absentee voters are required to physically
reside in the Philippines within the period required for non-absentee voters.
Further, as understood in election laws, domicile and resident are
interchangeably used. Hence, one is a resident of his domicile (insofar as
election laws is concerned). The domicile is the place where one has the
intention to return to. Thus, an immigrant who executes an affidavit stating
his intent to return to the Philippines is considered a resident of the
Philippines for purposes of being qualified as a voter (absentee voter to be
exact). If the immigrant does not execute the affidavit then he is not qualified
as an absentee voter.
The said provision should be harmonized. It could not be the intention of Congress to
allow COMELEC to include the proclamation of the winners in the vice-presidential and
presidential race. To interpret it that way would mean that Congress allowed COMELEC
to usurp its power. The canvassing and proclamation of the presidential and vice
presidential elections is still lodged in Congress and was in no way transferred to the
COMELEC by virtue of RA 9189.


3. PEOPLE VS. AYSON RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED DURING TRIAL

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 85215 July 7, 1989
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE RUBEN AYSON,
Presiding over Branch 6, Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Baguio City,
and FELIPE RAMOS, respondents.
Nelson Lidua for private respondent.

NARVASA, J.:
What has given rise to the controversy at bar is the equation by the respondent Judge of
the right of an individual not to "be compelled to be a witness against himself" accorded
by Section 20, Article III of the Constitution, with the right of any person "under
investigation for the commission of an offense . . . to remain silent and to counsel, and
to be informed of such right," granted by the same provision. The relevant facts are not
disputed.
Private respondent Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines
(PAL), assigned at its Baguio City station. It having allegedly come to light that he was
involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets,
1
the PAL management notified him
of an investigation to be conducted into the matter of February 9, 1986. That
investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline,
and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines
Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained.
2

On the day before the investigation, February 8,1986, Ramos gave to his superiors a
handwritten notes
3
reading as follows:
2-8-86
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
THE UNDERSIGNED WOULD LIKE TO STATE THAT HE IS WILLING TO SETTLE
IRREGULARITIES ALLEGEDLY CHARGED VS. HIM IN THE AMT. OF P 76,000
(APPROX.) SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS AS MAY BE IMPOSED BY PAL ON OR
BEFORE 1700/9 FEB 86.
(s) Felipe Ramos
(Printed) F. Ramos
At the investigation of February 9, 1986, conducted by the PAL Branch Manager in
Baguio City, Edgardo R. Cruz, in the presence of Station Agent Antonio Ocampo, Ticket
Freight Clerk Rodolfo Quitasol, and PALEA Shop Steward Cristeta Domingo, Felipe
Ramos was informed "of the finding of the Audit Team." Thereafter, his answers in
response to questions by Cruz, were taken down in writing. Ramos' answers were to the
effect inter alia that he had not indeed made disclosure of the tickets mentioned in the
Audit Team's findings, that the proceeds had been "misused" by him, that although he
had planned on paying back the money, he had been prevented from doing so,
"perhaps (by) shame," that he was still willing to settle his obligation, and proferred a
"compromise x x to pay on staggered basis, (and) the amount would be known in the
next investigation;" that he desired the next investigation to be at the same place,
"Baguio CTO," and that he should be represented therein by "Shop stewardees ITR
Nieves Blanco;" and that he was willing to sign his statement (as he in fact afterwards
did).
4
How the investigation turned out is not dealt with the parties at all; but it would
seem that no compromise agreement was reached much less consummated.
About two (2) months later, an information was filed against Felipe Ramos charging him
with the crime of estafa allegedly committed in Baguio City during the period from March
12, 1986 to January 29, 1987. In that place and during that time, according to the
indictment,
5
he (Ramos)
.. with unfaithfulness and/or abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully ... defraud
the Philippine Airlines, Inc., Baguio Branch, ... in the following manner, to wit: said
accused ... having been entrusted with and received in trust fare tickets of passengers
for one-way trip and round-trip in the total amount of P76,700.65, with the express
obligation to remit all the proceeds of the sale, account for it and/or to return those
unsold, ... once in possession thereof and instead of complying with his obligation, with
intent to defraud, did then and there ... misappropriate, misapply and convert the value
of the tickets in the sum of P76,700.65 and in spite of repeated demands, ... failed and
refused to make good his obligation, to the damage and prejudice of the offended party
.. .
On arraignment on this charge, Felipe Ramos entered a plea of "Not Guilty," and trial
thereafter ensued. The prosecution of the case was undertaken by lawyers of PAL
under the direction and supervision of the Fiscal.
At the close of the people's case, the private prosecutors made a written offer of
evidence dated June 21, 1988,
6
which included "the (above mentioned) statement of
accused Felipe J. Ramos taken on February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office,"
which had been marked as Exhibit A, as well as his "handwritten admission x x given on
February 8, 1986," also above referred to, which had been marked as Exhibit K.
The defendant's attorneys filed "Objections/Comments to Plaintiff s Evidence."
7

Particularly as regards the peoples' Exhibit A, the objection was that "said document,
which appears to be a confession, was taken without the accused being represented by
a lawyer." Exhibit K was objected to "for the same reasons interposed under Exhibits 'A'
and 'J.'
By Order dated August 9, 1988,
8
the respondent judge admitted all the exhibits "as part
of the testimony of the witnesses who testified in connection therewith and for whatever
they are worth," except Exhibits A and K, which it rejected. His Honor declared Exhibit A
"inadmissible in evidence, it appearing that it is the statement of accused Felipe Ramos
taken on February 9, 1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office, in an investigation
conducted by the Branch Manager x x since it does not appear that the accused was
reminded of this constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel, and that when
he waived the same and gave his statement, it was with the assistance actually of a
counsel." He also declared inadmissible "Exhibit K, the handwritten admission made by
accused Felipe J. Ramos, given on February 8, 1986 x x for the same reason stated in
the exclusion of Exhibit 'A' since it does not appear that the accused was assisted by
counsel when he made said admission."
The private prosecutors filed a motion for reconsideration.
9
It was denied, by Order
dated September 14, 1988.
10
In justification of said Order, respondent Judge invoked
this Court's rulings in Morales, Jr. v. Juan Ponce Enrile, et al., 121 SCRA 538, People v.
Galit, 135 SCRA 467, People. v. Sison, 142 SCRA 219, and People v. Decierdo, 149
SCRA 496, among others, to the effect that "in custodial investigations the right to
counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the
assistance of counsel," and the explicit precept in the present Constitution that the rights
in custodial investigation "cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel." He pointed out that the investigation of Felipe Ramos at the PAL Baguio
Station was one "for the offense of allegedly misappropriating the proceeds of the tickets
issued to him' and therefore clearly fell "within the coverage of the constitutional
provisions;" and the fact that Ramos was not detained at the time, or the investigation
was administrative in character could not operate to except the case "from the ambit of
the constitutional provision cited."
These Orders, of August 9, 1988 and September 14, 1988 are now assailed in the
petition for certiorari and prohibition at bar, filed in this Court by the private prosecutors
in the name of the People of the Philippines. By Resolution dated October 26, 1988, the
Court required Judge Ayson and Felipe Ramos to comment on the petition, and directed
issuance of a "TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER . . . ENJOINING the respondents
from proceeding further with the trial and/or hearing of Criminal Case No. 3488-R
(People ... vs. Felipe Ramos), including the issuance of any order, decision or judgment
in the aforesaid case or on any matter in relation to the same case, now pending before
the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Br. 6, First Judicial Region." The Court also
subsequently required the Solicitor General to comment on the petition. The comments
of Judge Ayson, Felipe Ramos, and the Solicitor General have all been filed. The
Solicitor General has made common cause with the petitioner and prays "that the
petition be given due course and thereafter judgment be rendered setting aside
respondent Judge's Orders . . . and ordering him to admit Exhibits 'A' and 'K' of the
prosecution." The Solicitor General has thereby removed whatever impropriety might
have attended the institution of the instant action in the name of the People of the
Philippines by lawyers de parte of the offended party in the criminal action in question.
The Court deems that there has been full ventilation of the issue of whether or not it
was grave abuse of discretion for respondent Judge to have excluded the People's
Exhibits A and K. It will now proceed to resolve it.
At the core of the controversy is Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution,
11
to
which respondent Judge has given a construction that is disputed by the People. The
section reads as follows:
SEC. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself Any person
under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent
and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation,
or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession
obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.
It should at once be apparent that there are two (2) rights, or sets of rights, dealt with in
the section, namely:
1) the right against self-incrimination i.e., the right of a person not to be compelled to
be a witness against himself set out in the first sentence, which is a verbatim
reproduction of Section 18, Article III of the 1935 Constitution, and is similar to that
accorded by the Fifth Amendment of the American Constitution,
12
and

2) the rights of a person in custodial interrogation, i.e., the rights of every suspect "under
investigation for the commission of an offense."
Parenthetically, the 1987 Constitution indicates much more clearly the individuality and
disparateness of these rights. It has placed the rights in separate sections. The right
against self- incrimination, "No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself," is now embodied in Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The lights of
a person in custodial interrogation, which have been made more explicit, are now
contained in Section 12 of the same Article III.
13

Right Against Self-Incrimination
The first right, against self-incrimination, mentioned in Section 20, Article IV of the 1973
Constitution, is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or
under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding.
14

The right is NOT to "be compelled to be a witness against himself"
The precept set out in that first sentence has a settled meaning.
15
It prescribes an
"option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry."
16
It
simply secures to a witness, whether he be a party or not, the right to refue to answer
any particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to which has a tendency to
incriminate him for some crime. However, the right can be claimed only when the
specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be
claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena,
to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify
altogether. The witness receiving a subpoena must obey it, appear as required, take the
stand, be sworn and answer questions. It is only when a particular question is
addressed to him, the answer to which may incriminate him for some offense, that he
may refuse to answer on the strength of the constitutional guaranty.
That first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution does not impose on
the judge, or other officer presiding over a trial, hearing or investigation, any affirmative
obligation to advise a witness of his right against self-incrimination. It is a right that a
witness knows or should know, in accordance with the well known axiom that every one
is presumed to know the law, that ignorance of the law excuses no one. Furthermore, in
the very nature of things, neither the judge nor the witness can be expected to know in
advance the character or effect of a question to be put to the latter.
17

The right against self-incrimination is not self- executing or automatically operational. It
must be claimed. If not claimed by or in behalf of the witness, the protection does not
come into play. It follows that the right may be waived, expressly, or impliedly, as by a
failure to claim it at the appropriate time.
18

Rights in Custodial Interrogation
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution also treats of a second right, or better
said, group of rights. These rights apply to persons "under investigation for the
commission of an offense," i.e., "suspects" under investigation by police authorities; and
this is what makes these rights different from that embodied in the first sentence, that
against self-incrimination which, as aforestated, indiscriminately applies to any person
testifying in any proceeding, civil, criminal, or administrative.
This provision granting explicit rights to persons under investigation for an offense was
not in the 1935 Constitution. It is avowedly derived from the decision of the U.S.
Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona,
19
a decision described as an "earthquake in the
world of law enforcement."
20

Section 20 states that whenever any person is "under investigation for the commission
of an offense"--
1) he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such
right,
21

2) nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will
shall be used against him;
22
and
3) any confession obtained in violation of x x (these rights shall be inadmissible in
evidence.
23

In Miranda, Chief Justice Warren summarized the procedural safeguards laid down for a
person in police custody, "in-custody interrogation" being regarded as the
commencement of an adversary proceeding against the suspect.
24

He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that
anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed
for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise those rights
must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been
given, such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently
waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. But unless and until such
warnings and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence
obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.
The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-
dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statement without full warnings of
constitutional rights."
25

The rights above specified, to repeat, exist only in "custodial interrogations," or "in-
custody interrogation of accused persons."
26
And, as this Court has already stated, by
custodial interrogation is meant "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in
any significant way."
27
The situation contemplated has also been more precisely
described by this Court."
28

.. . After a person is arrested and his custodial investigation begins a confrontation
arises which at best may be tanned unequal. The detainee is brought to an army camp
or police headquarters and there questioned and "cross-examined" not only by one but
as many investigators as may be necessary to break down his morale. He finds himself
in strange and unfamiliar surroundings, and every person he meets he considers hostile
to him. The investigators are well-trained and seasoned in their work. They employ all
the methods and means that experience and study have taught them to extract the truth,
or what may pass for it, out of the detainee. Most detainees are unlettered and are not
aware of their constitutional rights. And even if they were, the intimidating and coercive
presence of the officers of the law in such an atmosphere overwhelms them into silence.
Section 20 of the Bill of Rights seeks to remedy this imbalance.
Not every statement made to the police by a person involved in some crime is within the
scope of the constitutional protection. If not made "under custodial interrogation," or
"under investigation for the commission of an offense," the statement is not protected.
Thus, in one case,
29
where a person went to a police precinct and before any sort of
investigation could be initiated, declared that he was giving himself up for the killing of
an old woman because she was threatening to kill him by barang, or witchcraft, this
Court ruled that such a statement was admissible, compliance with the constitutional
procedure on custodial interrogation not being exigible under the circumstances.
Rights of Defendant in Criminal Case
As Regards Giving of Testimony
It is pertinent at this point to inquire whether the rights just discussed, i.e., (1) that
against self-incrimination and (2) those during custodial interrogation apply to persons
under preliminary investigation or already charged in court for a crime.
It seems quite evident that a defendant on trial or under preliminary investigation is not
under custodial interrogation. His interrogation by the police, if any there had been
would already have been ended at the time of the filing of the criminal case in court (or
the public prosecutors' office). Hence, with respect to a defendant in a criminal case
already pending in court (or the public prosecutor's office), there is no occasion to speak
of his right while under "custodial interrogation" laid down by the second and
subsequent sentences of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, for the obvious
reason that he is no longer under "custodial interrogation."
But unquestionably, the accused in court (or undergoing preliminary investigation before
the public prosecutor), in common with all other persons, possesses the right against
self- incrimination set out in the first sentence of Section 20 Article IV of the 1973
Constitution, i.e., the right to refuse to answer a specific incriminatory question at the
time that it is put to him.
30

Additionally, the accused in a criminal case in court has other rights in the matter of
giving testimony or refusing to do so. An accused "occupies a different tier of protection
from an ordinary witness." Under the Rules of Court, in all criminal prosecutions the
defendant is entitled among others-
1) to be exempt from being a witness against himself,
31
and 2) to testify as witness in
his own behalf; but if he offers himself as a witness he may be cross-examined as any
other witness; however, his neglect or refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner
prejudice or be used against him.
32

The right of the defendant in a criminal case "to be exempt from being a witness against
himself' signifies that he cannot be compelled to testify or produce evidence in the
criminal case in which he is the accused, or one of the accused. He cannot be
compelled to do so even by subpoena or other process or order of the Court. He cannot
be required to be a witness either for the prosecution, or for a co-accused, or even for
himself.
33
In other words unlike an ordinary witness (or a party in a civil action) who
may be compelled to testify by subpoena, having only the right to refuse to answer a
particular incriminatory question at the time it is put to him-the defendant in a criminal
action can refuse to testify altogether. He can refuse to take the witness stand, be
sworn, answer any question.
34
And, as the law categorically states, "his neglect or
refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be used against him."
35

If he should wish to testify in his own behalf, however, he may do so. This is his right.
But if he does testify, then he "may be cross- examined as any other witness." He may
be cross-examined as to any matters stated in his direct examination, or connected
therewith .
36
He may not on cross-examination refuse to answer any question on the
ground that the answer that he will give, or the evidence he will produce, would have a
tendency to incriminate him for the crime with which he is charged.

It must however be made clear that if the defendant in a criminal action be asked a
question which might incriminate him, not for the crime with which he is charged, but for
some other crime, distinct from that of which he is accused, he may decline to answer
that specific question, on the strength of the right against self-incrimination granted by
the first sentence of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution (now Section 17 of
the 1987 Constitution). Thus, assuming that in a prosecution for murder, the accused
should testify in his behalf, he may not on cross-examination refuse to answer any
question on the ground that he might be implicated in that crime of murder; but he may
decline to answer any particular question which might implicate him for a different and
distinct offense, say, estafa.
In fine, a person suspected of having committed a crime and subsequently charged with
its commission in court, has the following rights in the matter of his testifying or
producing evidence, to wit:
1) BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT (or with the public prosecutor, for
preliminary investigation), but after having been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his liberty in some significant way, and on being interrogated by the police:
the continuing right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed thereof, not to be
subjected to force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates the
free will; and to have evidence obtained in violation of these rights rejected; and
2) AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT
37

a) to refuse to be a witness;
b) not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal;
c) to testify in his own behalf, subject to cross-examination by the prosecution;
d) WHILE TESTIFYING, to refuse to answer a specific question which tends to
incriminate him for some crime other than that for which he is then prosecuted.
It should by now be abundantly apparent that respondent Judge has misapprehended
the nature and import of the disparate rights set forth in Section 20, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution. He has taken them as applying to the same juridical situation,
equating one with the other. In so doing, he has grossly erred. To be sure, His Honor
sought to substantiate his thesis by arguments he took to be cogent and logical. The
thesis was however so far divorced from the actual and correct state of the constitutional
and legal principles involved as to make application of said thesis to the case before him
tantamount to totally unfounded, whimsical or capricious exercise of power. His Orders
were thus rendered with grave abuse of discretion. They should be as they are hereby,
annulled and set aside.
It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos was not in any sense
under custodial interrogation, as the term should be properly understood, prior to and
during the administrative inquiry into the discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which
he appeared to have had a hand. The constitutional rights of a person under custodial
interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did not therefore come
into play, were of no relevance to the inquiry. It is also clear, too, that Ramos had
voluntarily answered questions posed to him on the first day of the administrative
investigation, February 9, 1986 and agreed that the proceedings should be recorded,
the record having thereafter been marked during the trial of the criminal action
subsequently filed against him as Exhibit A, just as it is obvious that the note (later
marked as Exhibit K) that he sent to his superiors on February 8,1986, the day before
the investigation, offering to compromise his liability in the alleged irregularities, was a
free and even spontaneous act on his part. They may not be excluded on the ground
that the so-called "Miranda rights" had not been accorded to Ramos.
His Honor adverts to what he perceives to be the "greater danger x x (of) the violation of
the right of any person against self-incrimination when the investigation is conducted by
the complaining parties, complaining companies, or complaining employers because
being interested parties, unlike the police agencies who have no propriety or pecuniary
interest to protect, they may in their over-eagerness or zealousness bear heavily on their
hapless suspects, whether employees or not, to give statements under an atmosphere
of moral coercion, undue ascendancy and undue influence." It suffices to draw attention
to the specific and peremptory requirement of the law that disciplinary sanctions may not
be imposed on any employee by his employer until and unless the employee has been
accorded due process, by which is meant that the latter must be informed of the
offenses ascribed to him and afforded adequate time and opportunity to explain his side.
The requirement entails the making of statements, oral or written, by the employee
under such administrative investigation in his defense, with opportunity to solicit the
assistance of counsel, or his colleagues and friends. The employee may, of course,
refuse to submit any statement at the investigation, that is his privilege. But if he should
opt to do so, in his defense to the accusation against him, it would be absurd to reject
his statements, whether at the administrative investigation, or at a subsequent criminal
action brought against him, because he had not been accorded, prior to his making and
presenting them, his "Miranda rights" (to silence and to counsel and to be informed
thereof, etc.) which, to repeat, are relevant only in custodial investigations. Indeed, it is
self-evident that the employee's statements, whether called "position paper," "answer,"
etc., are submitted by him precisely so that they may be admitted and duly considered
by the investigating officer or committee, in negation or mitigation of his liability.
Of course the possibility cannot be discounted that in certain instances the judge's
expressed apprehensions may be realized, that violence or intimidation, undue pressure
or influence be brought to bear on an employee under investigation or for that matter,
on a person being interrogated by another whom he has supposedly offended. In such
an event, any admission or confession wrung from the person under interrogation would
be inadmissible in evidence, on proof of the vice or defect vitiating consent, not because
of a violation of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, but simply on the
general, incontestable proposition that involuntary or coerced statements may not in
justice be received against the makers thereof, and really should not be accorded any
evidentiary value at all.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted annulling and setting aside the Orders of
the respondent Judge in Criminal Case No. 3488-R, dated August 9, 1988 and
September 14, 1988, and he is hereby ordered to admit in evidence Exhibits "A" and "K"
of the prosecution in said Criminal Case No. 3488-R, and thereafter proceed with the
trial and adjudgment thereof. The temporary restraining order of October 26, 1988
having become functus officio, is now declared of no further force and effect.
Cruz, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

DIGEST 1

Facts: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines and was
allegedly involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets. The PAL management
notified him of an investigation to be conducted. That investigation was scheduled in
accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining
Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to
which Ramos pertained. A letter was sent by Ramos stating his willingness to settle the
amount of P76,000. The findings of the Audit team were given to him, and he refuted
that he misused proceeds of tickets also stating that he was prevented from settling said
amounts. He proffered a compromise however this did not ensue. Two months after a
crime of estafa was charged against Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the
prosecution contained Ramos written admission and statement, to which defendants
argued that the confession was taken without the accused being represented by a
lawyer. Respondent Judge did not admit those stating that accused was not reminded of
his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have counsel. A motion for
reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was denied. Hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible as
evidence the admission and statement of accused.

Held: No. The judge should admit the evidence in court as the accused was not under
custodial investigation when his statements were taken. One cannot invoke violation of
the right to counsel in administrative proceeding. The right to self incrimination and
custodial investigation are accorded only when the accused is subjected to custodial
inquest which involves the questioning initiated by police authorities after a person is
taken in custody or deprived of his freedom in any way. Because the statements were
obtained beyond the purview of custodial investigation the evidence should be admitted
in court.

---------------

Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in miranda v. Arizona: the rights of
the accused include:

right.
shall be used against him.
3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence.

He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that
anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed
for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise those rights
must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been
given, such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently
waive these rights and agree to answer or make a statement. But unless and until such
warnings and waivers are demonstrated by the prosecution at the trial, no evidence
obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.
The objective is to prohibit "incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-
dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statement without full warnings of
constitutional rights."


DIGEST 2

Facts: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines, assigned at its
Baguio City station. It was alleged that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of
plane tickets, the PAL management notified him of an investigation to be conducted.
That investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and
Discipline, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine
Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. A letter was sent
by Ramos stating his willingness to settle the amount of P76,000. The findings of the
Audit team were given to him, and he refuted that he misused proceeds of tickets also
stating that he was prevented from settling said amounts. He proffered a compromise
however this did not ensue. Two months after a crime of estafa was charged against
Ramos. Ramos pleaded not guilty. Evidence by the prosecution contained Ramos
written admission and statement, to which defendants argued that the confession was
taken without the accused being represented by a lawyer. Respondent Judge did not
admit those stating that accused was not reminded of his constitutional rights to remain
silent and to have counsel. A motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecutors was
denied. Hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not the respondent Judge correct in making inadmissible as
evidence the admission and statement of accused.

Held: No. Section 20 of the 1987 constitution provides that the right against self-
incrimination (only to witnesses other than accused, unless what is asked is relating to a
different crime charged- not present in case at bar).

This is accorded to every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under
compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is
not to "be compelled to be a witness against himself. It prescribes an "option of refusal
to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of inquiry." the right can be
claimed only when the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the
witness. It cannot be claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to
disregard a subpoena, to decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to
refuse to testify altogether. It is a right that a witness knows or should know. He must
claim it and could be waived.

Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in miranda v. Arizona: the rights of the
accused include:

right.
shall be used against him.
3) any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in evidence.

The individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer or
make a statement. But unless and until such rights and waivers are demonstrated by the
prosecution at the trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used
against him.

DIGEST 3

4. People v. Ayson
irregularity in the sale of plane tickets Right against self incrimination is accorded to
every person who gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena
in any proceeding. The right is NOT to be compelled to be a witness against himself and
NOT a prohibition of inquiry; The right can only be claimed when the specific question,
incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness; It does not give the right to
refuse a subpoena. This right must be claimed, it is not automatically operational |
Miranda rights | Custodial investigation questioning initiated by law enforcement
officers after a person has been taken away into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any way; A defendant on a trial or preliminary investigation is NOT
under custodial investigation; Accused

RIGHTS: BEFORE THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT
(or with public prosecutor for preliminary investigation; taken into custody) a.
right to remain silent b. right to counsel c. right to be informed d. right to have
evidence obtained in violation of those above rejected

RIGHTS: AFTER THE CASE IS FILED IN COURT
a. right to refuse to be a witness b. not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to
him because of such refusal c. right to testify in his own behalf , subject to cross
examination by the prosecution d. while testifying: to refuse to answer an specific
question which tends to incriminate him for some crime other that which he is
being prosecuted

4. PEOPLE VS. COURT OF SILAY DOUBLE JEOPARDY

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-43790 December 9, 1976
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE CITY COURT OF SILAY,
ERNESTO DE LA PAZ, PACIFICO SENECIO, JR. y SEBUSA, ROMEO MILLAN y
DELEJERO and WILFREDO JOCHICO y MAGALONA, respondents.
Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., Assistant Solicitor General Octavio R.
Ramirez and Solicitor Enrique M. Reyes for petitioner.
Hilado, Hagad & Hilado as private prosecutors.
Benjamin Z. Yelo, Sr. for private respondent Romeo Millan.
Ciceron Severino and Emeterio Molato for other private respondents.
MUOZ PALMA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review jointly filed by the City Fiscal of Silay City, Marcelino M.
Paviera, and the Law Offices of Hilado, Hagad & Hilado, the latter as private
prosecutors, praying that an order of the City Court of Silay dated December 19, 1975,
issued by Judge Reynaldo M. Alon, dismissing Criminal Case No. 7124-C entitled
"People vs. Ernesto de la Paz, et al." be set aside and that respondent court be directed
to continue with the trial of the aforementioned case. *
In compliance with Our Resolution of July 21, J976, the Office of the Solicitor General
filed its comment on October 13, 1974, joining the Petitioner's prayer that the order of
respondent court of December 19, 1975, be reversed and the case remanded for further
proceedings.
The record shows that private respondent herein, Ernesto de la Paz, Pacifico Senecio,
Jr. y Sebusa Romeo Millan y Delejero and Wilfredo Jochico y Magalona, were charged
with "falsification by private individuals and use of falsified document" under Par. 2,
Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code, alleged to have been committed as follows.
That sometime on January 4, 1974, at Hawaiian-Philippine Company, Silay City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused Ernesto de
la Paz, overseer of Hda. Malisbog belonging to Deogracias de la Paz, and the other
three accused, scalers of Hawaiian-Philippine Company, with intent of gain and to cause
damage by conniving, cooperating and mutually helping one another did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously alter or falsify the sugar cane weight report card or
"tarjeta", a private document showing the weight of sugarcane belonging to Deogracias
de la Paz, particularly those loaded in cane cars Nos. 1686, 1743 and 1022 by
increasing the total actual weight of 22.005 tons to 27.160 tons for said three cane cars,
thereby causing damage to the central and other cane planters of about 8.68 piculs of
sugar valued in the total amount of P618.19, to the damage and prejudice of Hawaiian
Central and other sugarcane planters adhered thereto in the aforestated amount of
P618.19.
IN VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH 2, ART. 172, R.P.C. (p. 14, rollo) Evidence was
presented by the prosecution showing that:
On January 4, 1974, accused Pacifico Senecio, Jr. Romeo Millan and Wilfredo Jochico
who were then scalers on duty that day at the Hawaiian-Philippine Company, weighed
cane cars Nos. 1743,1686 and 1022 loaded with sugar canes belonging to Deogracias
de la Paz. The weight of the sugar canes were reflected on the weight report cards (H.P.
Co. Lab. Form No. 1) or "tarjetas" showing that for car No. 1743 8.920 tons (Exhibit
"B-1"), for Car No. 1686 8.970 tons (Exhibit "C-1") for car No. 1022 8.875 tons or a
total weight of 26.765 tons. However, they did not submit said "tarjetas" to the laboratory
section, instead, they substituted "tarjetas" showing a heavier weight for car No. 1743
10.515 tons (Exhibit "B"), car No. 1686 10.525 tons (Exhibit "C") and car No. 1022
10.880 tons (Exhibit "D") with a total of 27.160 tons or an additional of 5.155 tons. These
were the "tarjetas" submitted to the laboratory section. Exhibits "B-1", "C-1" and "D-1"
were taken later by the prosecution witness PC Sgt. Rogelio Sevilla from the wife of
Pacifico Senecio, Jr. (pp. 15-16, rollo, Order of December 19, 1975).
After the prosecution had presented its evidence and rested its case, private
respondents moved to dismiss the charge against them on the ground that the evidence
presented was not sufficient to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Acting on
this motion, respondent court issued its order of December 19, 1975, dismissing the
case with costs de oficio principally on the ground that the acts committed by the
accused as narrated above do not constitute the crime of falsification as charged.
Reasoning out his order, Judge Alon said:
To be convicted under paragraph 2, Article 172, an accused should have committed one
of the eight acts of falsification enumerated under Article 171, R.P.C. Is the act of
substituting the "tarjetas" with higher cane weight for the ones with lower cane weight
fall under one of the acts enumerated. After going over the acts of falsification one by
one and trying to correlate the act of the accused with each of them, the Court finds that
the said act could not possibly be placed under any of them. Inclusio unius est exclusio
alterius, the inclusion of one is the exclusion of the other. Following this maxim, we
cannot just include the act of substitution as among those acts enumerated under Article
171. And, under the rule of statutory construction, penal laws should be liberally

construed in favor of the accused. This Court, therefore, is of the opinion that the
accused have not committed the act of falsification with which they are charmed.
Obviously, it follows that there could be no use of falsified document since there is no
falsified document.
The imputed acts of the accused in making the substitution, if true, is repugnant to the
human sense of right and wrong. But, however reprehensible the act may be, it is not
punishable unless there is a showing that there is a law which defines and penalizes it
as a crime. Unless there be a particular provision in the Penal Code or Special Law that
punishes the act, even if it be socially or morally wrong, no criminal liability is incurred by
its commission. (U.S. vs. Taylor, 28 Phil. 599)
xxx xxx xxx
Wherefore, the motion is hereby granted and the case dismissed with costs de oficio ...
(pp. 17-18, rollo)
In their comment on this Petition, private respondents claim that there was no error
committed by respondent court in dismissing the case against them for insufficiency of
evidence and that for this Court to grant the present petition would place said
respondents in double jeopardy.
On the other hand, the People asserts that the plea of double jeopardy is not tenable
inasmuch as the case was dismissed upon motion of the accused, and the dismissal
having been made with their consent, they waived their defense of double jeopardy,
citing various cases in support thereof. (pp. 58-59, rollo, Comment of the Solicitor
General)
We disagree with the position taken by the Acting Solicitor General Hugo E. Gutierrez,
Jr. that the plea of double jeopardy is not available in the instant situation.
It is true that the criminal case of falsification was dismissed on motion of the accused;
however, this was a motion filed after the prosecution had rested its case, calling for an
appreciation of the evidence adduced and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond
reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an
acquittal of the accused.
Thus, in People vs. Acosta, L-23657, October 29, 1968, this Court dismissed an appeal
taken by the People against an order of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte
dismissing a criminal case upon motion of the accused after the presentation of
evidence by the prosecution as such appeal if allowed would place the accused in
double jeopardy. There the accused was charged with estafa by obtaining from Pedro
Miguel a ring valued at P16,500.00 and issuing a check for $5,000.00 in Payment
thereof which turned out later to be counterfeit to the damage and prejudice of said
Pedro Miguel in the aforementioned amount of P16,500.00. After the presentation of the
evidence of the prosecution, the accused moved to dismiss the case on the ground that
the evidence showed that the ring belonged to somebody else, Banang Jaramillo, and
not to Pedro Miguel as alleged in the information and that the element of damage was
absent. This motion was opposed by the Assistant Provincial Fiscal but notwithstanding
said opposition, the trial court dismissed the case on the ground that Pedro Miguel was
a mere agent of the true owner of the ring and therefore not the real offended party. The
Assistant Provincial Fiscal appealed to this Court, but the Solicitor General moved for
the dismissal of the appeal on the ground that it would place the accused in double
jeopardy, and the Court agreed with the Solicitor General, stating that it cannot be
seriously questioned that the trial court had grievously erred in his conclusion and
application of the law, and in dismissing outright the case; however, the error cannot
now be remedied by an appeal because it would place the accused in double jeopardy.
(per Eugenio Angeles, J., 25 SCRA 823,826)
In the earlier case of Catilo vs. Hon. Abaya, May 14, 1954, petitioner Catilo was charged
with murder before the Court of First Instance of Batangas presided by respondent
Judge. Petitioner was arraigned and after the prosecution had rested its case petitioner
moved for the dismissal of the charge for insufficiency of evidence. This motion was
granted by the Judge and his order was promulgated in open court to the accused. Later
in the day, Judge Abaya set aside his order of dismissal motu proprio and scheduled the
case for continuation of the trial on specific dates. A motion for reconsideration was filed
by the defense counsel but because respondent Judge failed to take action, the
accused filed an original action for certiorari with this Court. In granting relief to petitioner
Catilo, the Court, through Justice Marcelino R. Montemayor, held:
From whatever angle we may view the order of dismissal Annex "A", the only conclusion
possible is that it amounted to an acquittal. Whether said acquittal was due to some
"misrepresentation of facts" as stated in the order of reconsideration, which alleged
misrepresentation is vigorously denied by the defendant-petitioner, or to a
misapprehension of the law or of the evidence presented by the prosecution, the fact is
that it was a valid order or judgment of acquittal, and thereafter the respondent Judge
himself advised the accused in open court that he was a free man and could not again
be prosecuted for the same offense.
The inherent powers of a court to modify its order or decision, under section 5, Rule 124
of the Rules of Court claimed for the respondent to set aside his order of dismissal, does
not extend to an order of dismissal which amounts to a judgment of acquittal in a
criminal case; and the power of a court to modify a judgment or set it aside before it has
become final or an appeal has been perfected, under section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of
Court, refers to a judgment of conviction and does not and cannot include a judgment of
acquittal.
In conclusion, we hold that to continue the criminal case against the petitioner after he
had already been acquitted would be putting him twice in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense. ... (94 Phil. 1017)
The cases cited by the Acting Solicitor General are not applicable to the situation now
before Us because the facts are different. In Co Te Hue vs. Judge Encarnacion , 94
Phil. 258, the case was dismissed provisionally with the express consent of the accused.
The same occurred in People vs. Togle, 105 Phil. 126 there was a provisional dismissal
upon express request of the counsel for the accused, In Gandicela vs. Lutero, 88 Phil.
299, it was the accused who asked for the dismissal of the case because the private
prosecutor was not in court to present the prosecution's evidence and the Municipal
Court of the City of Iloilo dismissed the case without prejudice to the refiling of the
charge against the accused.
1
In People vs. Romero, 89 Phil. 672, the dismissal was
made at the instance of the accused because the prosecution was also not ready with
its evidence. The case of People vs. Belosillo, 9 SCRA 836, is not applicable either,
because the order of dismissal of the Information was made before arraignment, hence,
the accused was not yet placed in jeopardy of punishment for the offense charged.
In the case of the herein respondents, however, the dismissal of the charge against
them was one on the merits of the case which is to be distinguished from other
dismissals at the instance of the accused. All the elements of double jeopardy are here
present, to wit: (1) a valid information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction of the crime charged, (2) a court of competent jurisdiction, and (3) an
unconditional dismissal of the complaint after the prosecution had rested its case,
amounting to the acquittal of the accused. The dismissal being one on the merits, the
doctrine of waiver of the accused to a plea of double jeopardy cannot be invoked.
It is clear to Us that the dismissal of the criminal case against the private respondents
was erroneous.
As correctly stated in the Comment of the Acting Solicitor General, the accused were not
charged with substitution of genuine "tarjetas" with false ones. The basis for the
accusation was that the accused entered false statements as to the weight of the sugar
cane loaded in certain cane cars in "tarjetas" which were submitted to the laboratory
section of the company. The act of making a false entry in the "tarjetas" is undoubtedly
an act of falsification of a private document, the accused having made untruthful
statements in a narration of facts which they were under obligation to accomplish as part
of their duties- Ernesto de la Paz, as overseer of Hda. Malisbog, and the other accused
as scalers of the offended party, the Hawaiian-Philippine Company, thereby causing
damage to the latter.
However erroneous the order of respondent Court is, and although a miscarriage of
justice resulted from said order, to paraphrase Justice Alex Reyes in People vs. Nieto,
103 Phil, 1133, such error cannot now be righted because of the timely plea of double
jeopardy.
In Nieto, the background of the case is as follows: On September 21, 1956, an
Information for homicide was filed with the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija against
Gloria Nieto who, upon arraignment pleaded guilty to the charge but -notwithstanding
that plea, the trial judge acquitted her on the Page 254 ground that although the
accused was a minor "over 9 and under 15 years old" the Information failed to allege
that she acted with discernment. Thereafter the prosecution filed another Information for
the same offense stating therein that the accused Gloria Nieto was "a child between 9
and 15 years" and alleging in express terms that she acted with discernment. The
defense filed a motion to quash this second Information on grounds of double jeopardy,
and the trial court already presided by another Judge, Hon. Felix V. Makasiar, now
Justice of this Court, granted the motion. The prosecution appealed to this Court from
said order. In its Decision, the Court dismissed the appeal and sustained the order of
then Judge Makasiar, deploring that as a result of a mistaken view taken by the trial
judge who acquitted the accused Gloria Nieto despite her plea of guilty there was a
miscarriage of justice which cannot be righted and which leaves the Court no choice bat
to affirm the dismissal of the second Information for reasons of double jeopardy.
2

We cannot but express Our strong disapproval of the precipitate action taken by Judge
Alon in dismissing the criminal case against the private respondents at that stage of the
trial. A thorough and searching study of the law, the allegations in the Information, and
the evidence adduced plus a more circumspect and reflective exercise of judgment,
would have prevented a failure of justice in the instant case. We exhort Judge Alon to
take into serious consideration what We have stated so as to avoid another miscarriage
of justice.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, We are constrained to DISMISS this Petition of the
People. Without pronouncement as to costs. Let copy of this Decision be entered in the
personal file of Judge Reynaldo Alon.
So Ordered.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Concepcion, and Martin, JJ., concur.


DIGEST

Facts: That sometime on January 4,1974, accused Pacifico Sensio, Romeo Millan and
Wilfredo Jochico who were then scalers at the Hawaiian-Philippine Company, weighed
cane cars No.1743,1686 and 1022 loaded with sugar canes which were placed in
tarjetas (weight report cards), Apparently, it was proven and shown that there was
padding of the weight of the sugar canes and that the information on the tarjetas were to
be false making it appear to be heavier than its actual weight. The three accused then
were charged with Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified document.
After the prosecution had presented, the respondent moved to dismiss the charge
against them on the ground that the evidences presented were not sufficient to establish
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Acting on the motion, respondent court issued its
order dismissing the case on the ground that the acts committed by the accused do not
constituted the crime of falsification as strictly enumerated in the revised penal code
defining the crime of falsification which was charged earlier and that their case be
dismissed. People asserts that the plea of double jeopardy is not tenable even if the
case at bar was dismissed because according to them, it was done with the consent of
the accused therefore waiving there defense of double jeopardy. The accused on the
other hand, reiterated the fact that the dismissal was due to lack of merits of the
prosecution which would have the same effect as an acquittal which will bar the
prosecution from prosecuting the accused for it will be unjust and unconstitutional for the
accused due to double jeopardy rule thus the appeal of the plaintiff.

Issue: Whether or Not the grant of petition by the court would place the accused
Sensio, Millan and Jochico in double jeopardy

Held: Yes the revival of the case will put the accused in double jeopardy for the very
reason that the case has been dismissed earlier due to lack of merits. It is true that the
criminal case of falsification was dismissed on a motion of the accused however this
was a motion filed after the prosecution had rested its case, calling for the evidence
beyond reasonable ground which the prosecution had not been able to do which would
be tantamount to acquittal therefore will bar the prosecution of another case. As it was
stated on the requirements of a valid defense of double jeopardy it says: That there
should be a valid complaint, second would be that such complaint be filed before a
competent court and to which the accused has pleaded and that defendant was
previously acquitted, convicted or dismissed or otherwise terminated without express
consent of the accused in which were all present in the case at bar. There was indeed a
valid, legitimate complaint and concern against the accused Sensio, Millan and Jochico
which was filed at a competent court with jurisdiction on the said case. It was also
mentioned that the accused pleaded not guilty and during the time of trial, it was proven
that the case used against the accused were not sufficient to prove them guilty beyond
reasonable doubt therefore dismissing the case which translates to acquittal. It
explained further that there are two instances when we can conclude that there is
jeopardy when first is that the ground for the dismissal of the case was due to
insufficiency of evidence and second, when the proceedings have been reasonably
prolonged as to violate the right of the accused to a speedy trial. In the 2 requisites
given, it was the first on that is very much applicable to our case at bar where there was
dismissal of the case due to insufficiency of evidence which will bar the approval of the
petition in the case at bar for it will constitute double jeopardy on the part of the accused
which the law despises.

5. CHAVEZ VS. CA

24 SCRA 663 (1968)
Facts: Judgment of conviction was for qualified theft of a motor vehicle(thunderbird car
together with accessories). An information was filed against the accused together with
other accused,that they conspired, with intent to gain and abuse of confidence without
theconsent of owner Dy Lim, took the vehicle.All the accused plead not guilty. During
the trial, the fiscal grecia (prosecution) asked roger Chavez to be thefirst witness.
Counsel of the accused opposed. Fiscal Grecia contends that the accused (Chavez) will
only be an ordinary witness not an state witness. Counsel of accused answer that it will
only incriminate his client. But the jugde ruled in favor of the fiscal.
Petitioner was convicted.
ISSUE: Whether or not constitutional right of Chavez against self incrimination had
been violated to warrant writ of HC?
HELD: YES. Petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full breach of his
constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot be said now that he has waived his right.
He did not volunteer to take the stand and in his own defense; he did not offer himself
as a witness;
Juxtaposed with the circumstances of the case heretofore adverted to, make waiver a
shaky defense. It cannot stand. If, by his own admission, defendant proved his guilt, still,
his original claim remains valid. For the privilege, we say again, is a rampart that gives
protection even to the guilty
Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is traditionally considered as an
exceptional remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such
as when the accuseds constitutional rights are disregarded. Such defect results in
the absence or loss of jurisdiction and therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent
conviction of the accused whose fundamental right was violated. That void judgment
of conviction may be challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the
function of habeas corpus. This writ may issue even if another remedy which is less
effective may be availed of by the defendant. Thus, failure by the accused to perfect his
appeal before the Court of Appeals does not preclude a recourse to the writ. The writ
may be granted upon a judgment already final. For, as explained in Johnson vs. Zerbst,
the writ of habeas corpus as an extraordinary remedy must be liberally given effect so
as to protect well a person whose liberty is at stake. The propriety of the writ was given
the nod in that case, involving a violation of another constitutional right, in this wise:
A courts jurisdiction at the beginning of trial may be lost in the course of the
proceedings due to failure to complete the court as the Sixth Amendment requires
by providing Counsel for an accused who is unable to obtain Counsel, who has not
intelligently waived this constitutional guaranty, and whose life or liberty is at stake. If
this requirement of the Sixth Amendment is not complied with, the court no longer has
jurisdiction to proceed. The judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without
jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain release of habeas
corpus.
Under our own Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to the accused Roger Chavez
whose case presents a clear picture of disregard of a constitutional right is
absolutely proper. Section 1 of Rule 102 extends the writ, unless otherwise
expressly provided by law, to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of
any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.

6. TERRY VS. OHIO SEARCHES AND SEIZURES

On October 31, 1963, while on a downtown beat which he had been patrolling for many
years, Cleveland Police Department detective Martin McFadden, aged 62,[2] saw two
men, John W. Terry and Richard Chilton, standing on a street corner at 1276 Euclid
Avenue and acting in a way the officer thought was suspicious. Detective McFadden,
who was well-known on the Cleveland police force for his skill in apprehending
pickpockets,[2] observed the two proceed alternately back and forth along an identical
route, pausing to stare in the same store window. Each completion of the route was
followed by a conference between the two on a corner. The two men repeated this ritual
alternately between five and six times apiecein all, roughly a dozen trips. After one of
these trips, they were joined by a third man (Katz) who left swiftly after a brief
conversation. Suspecting the two men of "casing a job, a stick-up", detective McFadden
followed them and saw them rejoin the third man a couple of blocks away in front of a
store.
The plainclothes officer approached the three, identified himself as a policeman, and
asked their names. The men "mumbled something", whereupon McFadden spun Terry
around, patted down his outside clothing, and felt a pistol in his overcoat pocket. He
reached inside the overcoat pocket, but was unable to remove the gun. The officer
ordered the three into the store. He removed Terry's overcoat, took out a revolver, and
ordered the three to face the wall with their hands raised. He patted down the outer
clothing of Chilton and Katz and seized a revolver from Chilton's outside overcoat
pocket. He did not put his hands under the outer garments of Katz (since he discovered
nothing in his pat-down which might have been a weapon), or under Terry's or Chilton's
outer garments until he felt the guns. The three were taken to the police station. Terry
and Chilton were subsequently charged with carrying concealed weapons.
The defense of the charged individuals moved to suppress the use of the seized
weapons as evidence on grounds that the search and subsequent seizure were a
violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Though the trial
court rejected the prosecution theory that the guns had been seized during a search
incident to a lawful arrest, the court denied the motion to suppress and admitted the
weapons into evidence on the ground that the officer had cause to believe that Terry
and Chilton were acting suspiciously, that their interrogation was warranted, and that the
officer for his own protection had the right to pat down their outer clothing having
reasonable cause to believe that they might be armed. The trial court made a distinction
between an investigatory "stop" and an arrest, and between a "frisk" of the outer clothing
for weapons and a full-blown search for evidence of crime.
Terry and Chilton were found guilty, an intermediate appellate court affirmed the
conviction, and the Ohio State Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on the ground that
"no substantial constitutional question" was involved.

When is a person seized and what constitutes a search?[edit]
The Supreme Court first had to determine, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, when
is a person "seized" and what constitutes a "search". The Court rejected the idea that a
"stop and frisk" could categorically never be a search or seizure subject to the protection
of the Fourth Amendment. Instead, it made room for the idea that some police action
short of a traditional arrest could constitute a seizurethat is, "whenever a police officer
accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 'seized' that
person." The Court also noted that "... it is nothing less than sheer torture of the English
language to suggest that a careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's
clothing all over his or her body in an attempt to find weapons is not a 'search.' "
Thus, when the police detective took hold of Terry and patted him down on that
Cleveland street, the detective "seized" Terry and subjected him to a "search" within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. But the Fourth Amendment protects only against

unreasonable searches and seizures, so the Court next had to determine whether
Terrys seizure and search were "reasonable".

The stop and frisk of Terry was very reasonable[edit]
These principles led the Court to conclude that the evidence found on Terry's person
was properly admitted because the search was reasonable. The detective had observed
Terry and his companions acting in a manner he took to be a preface to a stick-up. A
reasonable person in the detective's position would have thought that Terry was armed
and thus presented a threat to his safety while he was investigating the suspicious
behavior he was observing. The events he had witnessed made it reasonable for him to
believe that either Terry or his cohorts were armed. "The record evidences the tempered
act of a policeman who in the course of an investigation had to make a quick decision as
to how to protect himself and others from possible danger, and took limited steps to do
so."
The police detective here limited his search to the outer surfaces of Terry's clothing.
Thus, the search was reasonably related in scope to the concern for his own safety that
justified the stop from the beginning. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the revolver
found on Terry's person was properly admitted into evidence.
The sole justification for the search is protection of the officer and public[edit]
The Ohio Court of Appeals allowed the search, but made it clear that such a search was
limited to discovering dangerous weapons that could be used against the officer, as
Chief Justice Warren noted:
"In this case, for example, the Ohio Court of Appeals stated that 'we must be careful to
distinguish that the "frisk" authorized herein includes only a "frisk" for a dangerous
weapon. It by no means authorizes a search for contraband, evidentiary material, or
anything else in the absence of reasonable grounds to arrest. Such a search is
controlled by the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, and probable cause is
essential.' " (392 U.S. 1, at 16, Fn 12, quoting State v. Terry, 5 Ohio App. 2d 122, at
130)
Chief Justice Warren later made it clear that this was also the opinion of the Court:
"The sole justification of the search ... is the protection of the police officer and others
nearby, and it must therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed
to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police
officer."[3]
Is such a search a "petty indignity"?[edit]
"... it is simply fantastic to urge that such a procedure performed in public by a
policeman while the citizen stands helpless, perhaps facing a wall with his hands raised,
is a 'petty indignity.' It is a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may
inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be undertaken lightly.

SUMMARY

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), was a landmark decision by the United States
Supreme Court which held that the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable
searches and seizures is not violated when a police officer stops a suspect on the street
and frisks him or her without probable cause to arrest, if the police officer has a
reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to
commit a crime and has a reasonable belief that the person "may be armed and
presently dangerous."[1]
For their own protection, police may perform a quick surface search of the persons
outer clothing for weapons if they have reasonable suspicion that the person stopped is
armed. This reasonable suspicion must be based on "specific and articulable facts" and
not merely upon an officer's hunch. This permitted police action has subsequently been
referred to in short as a "stop and frisk," or simply a "Terry frisk". The Terry standard
was later extended to temporary detentions of persons in vehicles, known as traffic
stops; see Terry stop for a summary of subsequent jurisprudence.
The rationale behind the Supreme Court decision revolves around the understanding
that, as the opinion notes, "the exclusionary rule has its limitations." The meaning of the
rule is to protect persons from unreasonable searches and seizures aimed at gathering
evidence, not searches and seizures for other purposes (like prevention of crime or
personal protection of police officers).

7. TECSON VS. COMELEC

FPJ CASE: Tecson, et. al. v. Commission on Elections

On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known
as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of
President of the Republic of the Philippines for the May 2004 national elections under
the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party. In his certificate of candidacy,
FPJ represented himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
Various petitioners sought to disqualify FPJ in his bid for the presidency
on the contention that he made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, his parents
were foreigners; his mother an American and his father, a Spanish national since his
father was the son of Lorenzo Pou, who was a Spanish subject. Moreover, they argue
that granting Allan F. Poe, his father, was a Filipino citizen, he could not have
transmitted his Filipino citizenship to his son, since FPJ is an illegitimate child of an alien
mother, Bessy Kelley. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ on
two assertions first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita
Gomez before his marriage to Bessy Kelley and second, even if no such prior marriage
existed, Allan Poe married Bessie Kelley only a year after the birth of FPJ.
The Supreme Court, in this case, held that Fernando Poe Jr. is a natural-
born Filipino citizen and must be allowed to continue his bid for the Presidency of the
Republic.
Justice Vitug, being the ponente in this case, cited five conclusions that
can be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents presented by both
sides. First, the parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessy Kelley. Second, FPJ was
born to them on August 20, 1939. Third, Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to
each other on September 16, 1940. Fourth, the father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Pou.
And fifth, at the time of his death on September 11, 1954, Lorenzo Pou was 84 yrs. old.
Petitioners presented documentary evidence that indicate that the
earliest established direct ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou,
married to Marta Reyes and the father of Allan Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo
Pou was not presented in evidence, his death certificate, however, identified him to be a
Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the time of his death
on September 11, 1954. The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ showed that he was
born on May 17, 1915 to an Espaol father, Lorenzo Pou, and a mestiza mother, Marta
Reyes. Petitioners also introduced an uncertified copy of a supposed certificate of the
alleged marriage of Allan Poe and Paulita Gomez on 5 July 1936. The marriage
certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of their marriage to be on
September 16, 1940. In the same certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five
years old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years
old, unmarried, and an American citizen. The birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose that
he was born on August 20, 1939 to Allan Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old, married
to Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, twenty-one years old and married.
The marriage certificate of Allan Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth
certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public
record in the custody of a public officer. Both contending parties have submitted these
documents in evidence during the proceedings before the COMELEC. In line with this
fact, Section 3 Rule 130, Rules of Court states When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original
document itself, except in the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or is recorded in
a public office.
Being public documents, therefore, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage
certificate of Allan Poe and Bessie Kelley, and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute
prima facie proof of their contents in line with Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
Consequently, since a certification was issued by the Officer-in-Charge of the Archives
Division of the National Archives that no available information about the marriage of
Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez can be found and that the certificate of their marriage
presented was only an uncertified photocopy, it was not greatly considered by the
Court in this case.

Citizenship of Grandfather
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11
September 1954, at the age of 84 years old, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be
assumed that Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the year 1870 when the Philippines
was still a colony of Spain. Petitioner argued that Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines
during the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902 considering that there was no existing
record about such fact in the Records Management and Archives Office. Petitioner,
however, likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place during the
same period. In his death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be San
Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the Court
presumed that the residence of the person at the time of his death was also his
residence before death. In fact, it would be extremely doubtful if the Records
Management and Archives Office had complete records of all residents of the
Philippines from 1898 to 1902.
Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that if Lorenzo Pou is assumed to
be in the Philippines in 11 April 1891, being a Spanish subject who continued to reside
in the Philippines without preserving his allegiance to the Crown of Spain, then he was
converted to a Filipino citizen in accordance with the Philippine Bill of 1902. Lorenzo
Pou now being a Filipino, Allan Poe is also a Filipino upon birth and Fernando Poe Jr. is
likewise held to be a natural-born Filipino in accordance with the 1935 Constitution.

On Legitimacy or Illegitimacy
The opinion of Joaquin Bernas, SJ is most convincing in the issue at
hand. He stated that the Court must ask what the lis mota was in each of the cases cited
by the petitioners to support their contention that birth to unmarried parents would make
FPJ an illegitimate child and therefore he would follow the citizenship of his mother, an
American.
Among the cases cited were Morano v. Vivo (20 SCRA 562), which was
about a stepson of a Filipino but the child of a Chinese mother and a Chinese father,
Chiongbian v. de Leon (82 Phil. 771), which was about a legitimate son of a father who
had become Filipino by election to public office before the 1935 Constitution, and Serra
v. Republic (91 Phil. 914), which was about an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and
a Filipino mother. The facts in these cases were not the same as those in the case at
bar. Moreover, in another case, Paa v. Chan (21 SCRA 753), which was about the son
of an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino mother, the argument was
based from an obiter dictum, which was absolutely unnecessary for the case and cannot
be given great weight.
Father Bernas further stated that aside from the fact that such
pronouncement that an illegitimate child of a Filipino father cannot run for public office
would have no textual foundation in the Constitution, it would also violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. First, it would make an illegitimate distinction
between a legitimate child and an illegitimate child, and second, it would make an
illegitimate distinction between the illegitimate child of a Filipino father and the
illegitimate child of a Filipino mother.

In the case of People v. Cayat, jurisprudence has established a test to
determine valid classification. Although distinction between legitimate and illegitimate
children rests on real differences, these differences may justify distinction for one
purpose but not for another. In fact, it must be considered that it was not the fault of the
child that his parents had illicit liaison. To disqualify the illegitimate child from holding an
important public office is to punish him for the indiscretion of his parents. There is
neither justice nor rationality in that. Thus, it transgresses the equal protection clause.
Another amicus curiae, Mr. Justice Mendoza, also reiterated that where
jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its mother, it
did so for the benefit of the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the illegitimate
child of an alien father in line with the assumption that the mother had custody, would
exercise parental authority and had the duty to support her illegitimate child. It was to
help the child, not prejudice or discriminate him.
The Convention on the Rights of the Child was also used as basis in this
case since it abolished all discriminations on account of birth or other status. The
Convention protects in the most comprehensive way all rights of children: political rights,
civil rights, social rights, economic rights and cultural rights. A violation of one right is
considered a violation of the other rights. It also embraced the rule that all actions of a
State concerning the child should consider the best interests of the child. This was,
however, attacked by Justice Carpio in his dissent by stating that FPJ cannot invoke the
Convention since he is no longer a child when the convention was ratified in the
Philippines in September 1990 and, thus, has no retroactive effect. Moreover, he stated
that the Convention has the status of a municipal law and its ratification could not have
amended the express requirement in the Constitution that only natural-born citizens of
the Philippines are qualified to be President. He further noted that the Convention does
not guarantee a child a citizenship at birth, but merely the right to acquire a nationality
in accordance with municipal law. When FPJ was born in 1939, he was apparently
under United States law an American citizen at birth. After his birth FPJ also had the
right to acquire Philippine citizenship by proving his filiations to his alleged Filipino father
in accordance with Philippine law. At no point in time was FPJ in danger of being
stateless. Clearly, FPJ cannot invoke the Convention to claim he is a natural-born
Philippine citizen.
The majority opinion and the dissenting opinions also discussed the concepts derived
from the Civil Code in relation to this issue. However, this was not given great weight by
the Court since the distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy codified in the Civil
Code should remain only in the sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or infringe on
the domain of political law.

DIGEST

TECSON VS. COMELEC

G.R. No. 161434, March 3 2004

FACTS:
Respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ) filed his
certificate of candidacy on 31 December 2003 for the position of President of the
Republic of the Philippines in the forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of
candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20
August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.

Petitioner Fornier filed before the COMELEC a petition to disqualify FPJ and cancel his
certificate of candidacy by claiming that FPJ is not a natural-born Filipino citizen, his
parents were foreigners: his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his
father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish
subject.

The COMELEC dismissed the petition for lack of merit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.

HELD:
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the
day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately
preceding such election.
Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Based on the
evidence presented which the Supreme consider as viable is the fact that the death
certificate of Lorenzo Poe, father of Allan Poe, who in turn was the father of private
respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. indicates that he died on September 11, 1954 at the age
of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. Evidently, in such death certificate, the
residence of Lorenzo Poe was stated to be San Carlos, Pangansinan. In the absence of
any evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that
the place of residence of a person at the time of his death was also his residence before
death. Considering that the allegations of petitioners are not substantiated with proof
and since Lorenzo Poe may have been benefited from the en masse Filipinization that
the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902, there is no doubt that Allan Poe father of private
respondent Fernando Poe, Jr. was a Filipino citizen. And, since the latter was born on
August 20, 1939, governed under 1935 Constitution, which constitution considers as
citizens of the Philippines those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines, Fernando
Poe, Jr. was in fact a natural-born citizen of the Philippines regardless of whether or not
he is legitimate or illegitimate.

8. LABO VS. COMELEC

EN BANC
G.R. No. 105111 July 3, 1992
RAMON L. LABO, Jr., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and ROBERTO
ORTEGA, respondents.
G.R. No. 105384 July 3, 1992
ROBERTO C. ORTEGA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAMON
L. LABO, Jr., respondents.
BIDIN, J.:
This is the second time
1
that this Court is called upon to rule on the citizenship of
Ramon Labo, Jr., who, believing that he is a Filipino citizen launched his candidacy for
mayor of Baguio City in the last May 11, 1992 elections by filing his certificate of
candidacy on March 23, 1992.
Petitioner Roberto Ortega (GR No. 105384), on other hand, also filed his certificate of
candidacy for the same office on March 25, 1992.
Shortly after petitioner Labo filed his certificate of candidacy, petitioner Ortega filed on
March 26, 1992, a disqualification proceeding against Labo before the Commission on
Elections (Comelec), docketed as SPA No. 92-029, seeking to cancel Labo's certificate
of candidacy on the ground that Labo made a false representation when he stated
therein that he (Labo) is a "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines.
Summons in the disqualification case was issued by the Comelec on March 27, 1992 to
petitioner Labo followed by a telegram dated April 1, 1992, requiring him to file his
Answer within three (3) non-extendible days but the latter failed to respond.
On April 15, 1992, Ortega filed a motion to declare Labo in default for failure to file his
Answer.
On April 24, 1992, the Comelec issued another order directing the Election Registrar of
Baguio City to personally deliver the summons. On May 4, 1992, the disqualification
case was set for reception of evidence. At the said hearing, Ortega presented the
decision of this Court in Labo v. Commission on Elections (176 SCRA 1 [1989])
declaring Labo not a citizen of the Philippines. Labo, on the other hand, though
represented by counsel, did not present any evidence. It was only on May 5, 1992 that
petitioner submitted his Answer claiming Filipino citizenship.
On May 9, 1992, respondent Comelec issued the assailed resolution, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby
resolves, to grant the petition; respondent's (Labo's) certificate of candidacy is hereby
DENIED due course and ordered CANCELLED; the City Election Registrar of Baguio
City is hereby directed to delete the name of the respondent (Labo) from the list of
candidates for City Mayor of Baguio City. (Rollo, pp. 47-48; GR No. 105111)
On the same date, Labo filed a motion to stay implementation of said resolution until
after he shall have raised the matter before this Court.
On May 10, 1992, respondent Comelec issued an Order which reads:
Acting on the "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Clarification", filed by respondent (Labo) on
May 9, 1992, the Commission resolves that the decision promulgated on May 9, 1992
disqualifying respondent Ramon L. Labo, Jr., shall become final and executory only after
five (5) days from promulgation pursuant to Rule 18, Section 13, Paragraph (b) of the
Comelec Rules of Procedure.
Accordingly, respondent (Labo) may still continue to be voted upon as candidate for City
Mayor of Baguio City on May 11, 1992 subject to the final outcome of this case in the
event the issue is elevated to the Supreme Court either on appeal or certiorari. (Rollo, p.
53; GR No. 105111; emphasis supplied)
On May 13, 1992, respondent Comelec resolved, motu proprio to suspend the
proclamation of Labo in the event he wins in the elections for the City Mayor of Baguio.
(Rollo, pp. 64-65; GR No. 105111)
On May 15, 1992, petitioner Labo filed the instant petition for review docketed as G.R.
No. 105111 with prayer, among others, for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
to set aside the May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec; to render judgment

declaring him as a Filipino citizen; and to direct respondent Comelec to proceed with his
proclamation in the event he wins in the contested elections.
On the same date, or on May 15, 1992 petitioner Ortega filed before the Comelec an
urgent motion for the implementation of its May 9, 1992 resolution cancelling Labo's
certificate of candidacy.
After an exchange of pleadings, respondent Comelec, in its resolution dated May 26,
1992, denied Ortega's motion in view of the pending case (G.R. No. 105111) earlier filed
by Labo of the same nature before this Court.
On June 1, 1992, Ortega filed a petition for mandamus docketed as G.R. No. 105384
praying for the implementation of the Comelec's May 9, 1992 resolution.
Petitioner Ortega argues that respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion
when it refused to implement its May 9, 1992 resolution notwithstanding the fact that
said resolution disqualifying Ramon Labo has already become final and executory.
After the parties have submitted their respective pleadings, the Court, on June 16, 1992,
Resolved to consider the case submitted for decision.
I. GR No. 105111
In essence, it is the contention of petitioner Labo that he is a Filipino citizen. Alleging
lack of trial on the merits as well as the lack of opportunity to be heard in Labo v.
Commission on Elections (supra), it is the submission of petitioner that he can prove his
Filipino citizenship.
Petitioner cites the 1980 US case of Vance v. Terrazas (444 US 252), wherein it was
held that in proving expatriation, an expatriating act an intent to relinquish citizenship
must be proved by a preponderance of evidence.
Petitioner contends that no finding was made either by the Commission on Immigration
or the Comelec as regards his specific intent to renounce his Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner also faults the Comelec for the supposed abbreviated proceedings in SPA No.
92-029 which denied him adequate opportunity to present a full-dress presentation of
his case. Thus: a) only one (1) day was set for hearing of the case, i.e., May 4, 1992; b)
two days later, May 6, 1992 the hearing was set; c) instead of holding a hearing, the
Comelec issued the questioned resolution on May 9, 1992.
If only to refresh the mind of petitioner Labo, as well as that of his counsel, records
disclose that summons were issued by respondent Comelec as early as March 27, 1992
followed by a telegram on April 1, 1992. But petitioner chose to ignore the same. Came
April 15, 1992, petitioner Ortega filed a motion to declare petitioner Labo in default.
Over-extending him (Labo) the benefit of due process, respondent Comelec issued
another order dated April 24, 1992, this time directing the Acting City Election Registrar
of Baguio to personally serve the summons. The alleged delay in the resolution of SPA
No. 92-029 can only be attributed to petitioner Labo and no one else. Thus, the
respondent Comelec in its resolution dated May 9, 1992 stated:
On May 4, 1992, the Acting Regional Election Registrar called this case for reception of
evidence. Surprisingly, while as of that date respondent had not yet filed his Answer, a
lawyer appeared for him.
The petitioner (Ortega) presented the certificate of candidacy of respondent Ramon L.
Labo, Jr., which contained in item 9 thereof the verified statement that respondent is a
"natural-born" Filipino citizen. To prove that respondent is not a Filipino citizen, petitioner
submitted the decision of the Supreme Court in "Ramon L. Labo, Jr., petitioner, v.
Comelec, et al.," GR No. 86564, August 1, 1989, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, petitioner Ramon J. (sic) Labo, Jr. is hereby declared NOT a citizen of
the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to serve as Mayor of
Baguio City. He is ordered to VACATE his office and surrender the same to the Vice-
Mayor of Baguio City once this decision becomes final and executory.
No evidence was adduced for the respondent as in fact he had no Answer as of the
hearing.
On May 5, 1992, respondent (Labo) filed his verified Answer, insisting that he is a
Filipino citizen and continue to maintain and preserve his Filipino citizenship; that he
does not hold an Australian citizenship; that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply
in citizenship; and that "existing facts support his continuous maintenance and holding
of Philippine citizenship" and "supervening events now preclude the application of the
ruling in the Labo v. Comelec case and the respondent (Labo) now hold and enjoys
No evidence has been offered by respondent to show what these existing facts and
supervening events are to preclude the application of the Labo decision. (emphasis
supplied)
The Commission is bound by the final declaration that respondent is not a Filipino
citizen. Consequently, respondent's verified statement in his certificate of candidacy that
he is a "natural-born" Filipino citizen is a false material representation." (Rollo, pp. 45-
48; GR No. 105111)
Up to this moment, petitioner Labo still failed to submit a scintilla of proof to shore his
claim before this Court that he has indeed reacquired his Philippine citizenship.
Instead, petitioner relies in the US case of Vance v. Terrazas (supra). Suffice it to state
that petitioner has already pleaded Vance in his motion for reconsideration in Labo v.
Comelec (supra; Rollo, p. 375). Having been previously passed upon, the Court sees no
pressing need to re-examine the same and make a lengthy dissertation thereon.
At any rate, the fact remains that he has not submitted in the instant case any evidence,
if there be any, to prove his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship either before this Court
or the Comelec. On this score alone, We find no grave abuse of discretion committed by
respondent Comelec in cancelling his (Labo's) certificate of candidacy and declaring that
he is NOT a Filipino citizen pursuant to our ruling in the 1989 case of Labo v. Comelec
(supra).
Petitioner Labo claims, however, that Sec. 72
2
of the Omnibus Election Code "operates
as a legislatively mandated special repatriation proceeding" and that it allows his
proclamation as the winning candidate since the resolution disqualifying him was not yet
final at the time the election was held.
The Court finds petitioner Labo's strained argument quixotic and untenable. In the first
place, Sec. 72 of the Omnibus Election Code has already been repealed by Sec. 6 of
RA No. 6646, to wit:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes
in such election, the Court or the Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of
the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,
may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (emphasis supplied)
A perusal of the above provision would readily disclose that the Comelec can legally
suspend the proclamation of petitioner Labo, his reception of the winning number of
votes notwithstanding, especially so where, as in this case. Labo failed to present any
evidence before the Comelec to support his claim of reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship.
Furthermore, we need only to reiterate what we have stated in Labo v. Comelec (supra),
viz.,:
Under CA No. 63, as amended by P.D. No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be
reacquired by a direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not
appear in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine
citizenship by any of these methods. He does not point to any judicial decree of
naturalization or to any statute directly conferring Philippine citizenship upon him. . . .
Petitioner Labo's status has not changed in the case at bar. To reiterate, he (Labo) was
disqualified as a candidate for being an alien. His election does not automatically restore
his Philippine citizenship, the possession of which is an indispensable requirement for
holding public office (Sec. 39, Local Government Code).
Still, petitioner takes pains in raising a new argument not litigated before the respondent
Comelec. Petitioner claims that he has reacquired his Filipino citizenship by citing his
application for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship filed before the Office of the
Solicitor General pursuant to PD 725 and Letter of Instruction No. 270
3
(Rollo, pp. 116-
119; G.R. No. 105111).
To date, however, and despite favorable recommendation by the Solicitor General, the
Special Committee on Naturalization had yet acted upon said application for repatriation.
Indeed, such fact is even admitted petitioner. In the absence of any official action or
approval by the proper authorities, a mere application for repratriation, does not, and
cannot, amount to an automatic reacquisition of the applicant's Philippine citizenship.
II. GR No. 105384
Petitioner Ortega submits that since this Court did not issue a temporary restraining
order as regards the May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec cancelling Labo's
certificate of candidacy, said resolution has already become final and executory. Ortega
further posits the view that as a result of such finality, the candidate receiving the next
highest number of votes should be declared Mayor of Baguio City.
We agree with Ortega's first proposition.
At the time petitioner Labo filed his petition (GR No. 105111) on May 15, 1992, the May

9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec cancelling his (Labo's) certificate of
candidacy had already become final and executory a day earlier, or on May 14, 1992,
said resolution having been received by petitioner Labo on the same day it was
promulgated, i.e., May 9, 1992 and in the interim no restraining order was issued by this
Court.
Thus, Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
xxx xxx xxx
(e) The decision, order, or ruling of the Commission shall, after five (5) days from receipt
of a copy thereof by the parties, be final and executory unless stayed by the Supreme
Court. (emphasis supplied)
A similar provision is also found in Sec. 3, Rule 39 of the Comelec Rules of procedure,
to wit:
Sec. 3. Decisions final after five days. Decisions in pre-proclamation cases and
petitions to deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy, to declare a
candidate as nuisance candidate or to disqualify a candidate, and to postpone or
suspend elections shall become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days from
their promulgation, unless restrained by the Supreme Court. (emphasis supplied)
The resolution cancelling Labo's certificate of candidacy on the ground that he is not a
Filipino citizen having acquired finality on May 14, 1992 constrains Us to rule against his
proclamation as Mayor of Baguio City.
To begin with, one of the qualifications of an elective official is that he must be a citizen
of the Philippines. Thus, the Local Government Code provides:
Sec. 39. Qualifications. (a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the
Philippines; a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the
case of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod,
sangguniang bayan, the district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein for at
least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election; and able to read and
write Filipino or any other local language or dialect. (emphasis supplied)
Undoubtedly, petitioner Labo, not being a Filipino citizen, lacks the fundamental
qualification for the contested office. Philippine citizenship is an indispensable
requirement for holding an elective office. As mandated by law: "An elective local official
must be a citizen of the Philippines."
The issue here is citizenship and/or Labo's alienage the very essence which strikes
at the very core of petitioner Labo's qualification to assume the contested office, he
being an alien and not a Filipino citizen. The fact that he was elected by the majority of
the electorate is of no moment. As we have held in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections
(174 SCRA 245 [1989]):
. . . The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent
violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of
this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the
electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the
vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the
candidate was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the
deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the
Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all
fealty and fidelity to any other state.
This brings us to the second issue raised by petitioner Ortega, i.e., whether the
disqualification of petitioner Labo entitles the candidate (Ortega) receiving the next
highest number of votes to be proclaimed as the winning candidate for mayor of Baguio
City.
We hold in the negative. The disqualification of petitioner Labo does not necessarily
entitle petitioner Ortega as the candidate with the next highest number of votes to
proclamation as the Mayor of Baguio City.
We make mention of petitioner Ortega because in his petition, he alleges that:
. . . the May 11, 1992 elections were held with both herein petitioner (Roberto Ortega)
and respondent LABO having been voted for the position of Mayor and unofficial results
indicate that if the name of respondent LABO were deleted from the list of candidates,
herein petitioner (Ortega) will be entitled to be proclaimed as Mayor-elect of Baguio City.
(Rollo, p. 7, GR No. 105384; emphasis supplied)
and further prays this Court "to proclaim as the Mayor-elect of Baguio City the candidate
who may have garnered the most number of votes after the exclusion of the name of
respondent candidate LABO." (Rollo, p. 15, Ibid.) Implicit, therefore, is petitioner
Ortega's desire to be proclaimed Mayor-elect of Baguio City.
As discussed hereunder, however, the Court finds Ortega's prayer devoid of merit.
While Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of votes for the office of
city mayor, the fact remains that he was not the choice of the sovereign will. Petitioner
Labo was overwhelmingly voted by the electorate for the office of mayor in the belief
that he was then qualified to serve the people of Baguio City and his subsequent
disqualification does not make respondent Ortega the mayor-elect. This is the import of
the recent case of Abella v. Comelec (201 SCRA 253 [1991]), wherein we held that:
While it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was originally a petition to deny due course to the
certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal and was filed before Larrazabal could be
proclaimed, the fact remains that the local elections of Feb. 1, 1988 in the province of
Leyte proceeded with Larrazabal considered as a bona fide candidate. The voters of the
province voted for her in the sincere belief that she was a qualified candidate for the
position of governor. Her votes was counted and she obtained the highest number of
votes. The net effect is that petitioner lost in the election. He was repudiated by the
electorate. . . . What matters is that in the event a candidate for an elected position who
is voted for and who obtains the highest number of votes is disqualified for not
possessing the eligibility requirements at the time of the election as provided by law, the
candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes for the same position cannot
assume the vacated position. (emphasis supplied)
Our ruling in Abella applies squarely to the case at bar and we see no compelling
reason to depart therefrom. Like Abella, petitioner Ortega lost in the election. He was
repudiated by the electorate. He was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio
City.
Thus, while respondent Ortega (GR No. 105111) originally filed a disqualification case
with the Comelec (docketed as SPA-92-029) seeking to deny due course to petitioner's
(Labo's) candidacy, the same did not deter the people of Baguio City from voting for
petitioner Labo, who, by then, was allowed by the respondent Comelec to be voted
upon, the resolution for his disqualification having yet to attain the degree of finality
(Sec. 78. Omnibus Election Code).
And in the earlier case of Labo v. Comelec (supra), We held:
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo
warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is
that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was
obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.
The latest ruling of the Court in this issue is Santos v. Commission on Election, (137
SCRA 740) decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate who placed second was
proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified as a
turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all disregarded as stray. In effect, the
second placer won by default. That decision was supported by eight members of the
Court then (Cuevas, J., ponente, with Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Relova, De la
Fuente, Alampay, and Aquino JJ., concurring) with three dissenting (Teehankee, acting
C.J., Abad Santos and Melencio-Herrera) and another two reserving their votes (Plana
and Gutierrez, Jr.). One was on official leave (Fernando, C.J.)
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in
favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Santos (136 SCRA 435), which represents the
more logical and democratic rule. That case, which reiterated the doctrine first
announced in 1912 in Topacio vs. Paredes (23 Phil. 238) was supported by ten
members of the Court (Gutierrez, Jr., J., ponente, with Teehankee, Abad Santos,
Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ.,
concurring), without any dissent, . . . . There the Court held:
. . . it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality
of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the
majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they did not choose
him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received
the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental
idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no
measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the
legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676)
The fact that a candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to
be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily
entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared
the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible
person may be valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the
absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on
the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that that candidate was alive,
qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless.
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not
entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared
elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.

Indeed, this has been the rule in the United States since 1849 (State ex rel. Dunning v.
Giles, 52 Am. Dec. 149).
It is therefore incorrect to argue that since a candidate has been disqualified, the votes
intended for the disqualified candidate should, in effect, be considered null and void.
This would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides. At
the risk of being repetitious, the people of Baguio City opted to elect petitioner Labo
bona fide, without any intention to misapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that
Labo was then qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the
powers of the government. Unfortunately, petitioner Labo turned out to be disqualified
and cannot assume the office.
Whether or not the candidate whom the majority voted for can or cannot be installed,
under no circumstances can a minority or defeated candidate be deemed elected to the
office. Surely, the 12,602 votes cast for petitioner Ortega is not a larger number than the
27,471 votes cast for petitioner Labo (as certified by the Election Registrar of Baguio
City; rollo, p. 109; GR No. 105111).
The rule would have been different if the electorate fully aware in fact and in law of a
candidate's disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of notoriety,
would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible candidate. In such case, the
electorate may be said to have waived the validity and efficacy of their votes by
notoriously misapplying their franchise or throwing away their votes, in which case, the
eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of votes may be deemed elected.
But this is not the situation obtaining in the instant dispute. It has not been shown, and
none was alleged, that petitioner Labo was notoriously known as an ineligible candidate,
much less the electorate as having known of such fact. On the contrary, petitioner Labo
was even allowed by no less than the Comelec itself in its resolution dated May 10,
1992 to be voted for the office of the city mayor as its resolution dated May 9, 1992
denying due course to petitioner Labo's certificate of candidacy had not yet become final
and subject to the final outcome of this case.
As aforesaid, the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not entitle the
candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. Ortega
failed to satisfy the necessary requisite of winning the election either by a majority or
mere plurality of votes sufficient to elevate him in public office as mayor of Baguio City.
Having lost in the election for mayor, petitioner Ortega was obviously not the choice of
the people of Baguio City.
As a consequence of petitioners' ineligibility, a permanent vacancy in the contested
office has occurred. This should now be filled by the vice-mayor, in accordance with
Sec. 44 of the Local Government Code, to wit:
Chapter 2. Vacancies and Succession
Sec. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor
and Vice-Mayor. (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or
mayor, the vice-governor or the vice-mayor concerned shall become the governor or
mayor. . . . (emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioners both
being ineligible for the Office of the City Mayor of Baguio City and in view of the vacancy
created in said office, the vice-mayor elect of said city in the May 11, 1992 elections is
hereby declared Mayor of Baguio City after proclamation by the City Board of
Canvassers. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado,
Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: concurring and dissenting
There is no need for me to discuss Mayor Ramon L. Labo, Jr.'s reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship. In the first case brought to us, Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, 176 SCRA
1 [1989], I dissented from the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration.
It is my view that since Mayor Labo never validly acquired Australian citizenship, he
never lost his Philippine citizenship. His oath of allegiance to Australia was null and void
because he was not qualified to be an Australian citizen. This is clear from the
certification of Australia's Embassy officials. To me, a null and void act cannot have the
positive and serious effect of stripping a Filipino of his natural-born citizenship.
Labo's taking an oath as citizen of a foreign country was based on his marriage to a
citizen of that country. It turns out, however, that Labo's marriage was bigamous and
void because his Australian wife had an existing valid marriage when she tied the knot
with him. Not being married to her, Labo could not become an Australian. Not being
qualified to become an Australian citizen, his oath of allegiance to that country was
meaningless act. It should not deprive him of his Philippine citizenship. I cannot believe
that Mayor Labo gave up his citizenship in order to acquire a stateless status.
I, however, concur in the Court's reiteration of the rule that it is the vice-mayor elect who
succeeds the disqualified mayor-elect and not the losing candidate for mayor.
I have to be consistent with my ponencia in Geronima v. Santos, 136 SCRA 435 [1985].
The Geronimo ruling is even more applicable to this case because on May 11, 1992, the
day of the elections, Labo was not yet disqualified. He was allowed to vote and to be
voted for. The COMELEC decision disqualifying him became final and executory only on
May 14, 1992. In the meantime, the citizens of Baguio had already stated who was their
choice for Mayor. He had already been elected.
I would like to repeat some observations made in my dissent in the first Labo case:
xxx xxx xxx
I agree with the Court that the citizen of the Philippines must take pride in his status as
such and cherish this priceless gift that, out of more than a hundred other nationalities,
God has seen fit to grant it to him. We love the Philippines; it is the land of our birth; it is
the home of our people. The emotions kindled by love of country cannot be described.
But precisely because of the inestimable value of Philippine citizenship, we should never
declare a Filipino as having lost his citizenship except upon the most compelling
consideration.
Let us be realistic. There must be over two million Filipinos who are scattered all over
the world desperately trying to earn a living. They endure loneliness and separation from
loved ones, bear with racial discrimination, suffer rape and other forms of abuse, brave
the perils of foreign cultures, and put up with the failings of their own Government in
looking after their welfare. Being in foreign countries, most of them yearn for their
homeland and realize what they have lost. Only now do they appreciate what they used
to take for granted.
If some of them may have been forced by circumstances to seemingly renounce their
citizenship, let us not summarily condemn them.
xxx xxx xxx
Citizenship is a political and civil right no less important than freedom of speech, liberty
of abode, right against unreasonable searches and seizures, and other basic
guarantees of the Bill of Rights.
In deciding cases involving citizenship, I believe that the presumptions should be in
favor of its retention and against its loss. We apply this principle to cases involving civil
liberties. We should also apply it to a sincere invocation of Philippine citizenship. We
should not lightly strip a person of his natural born status but should accord to him every
possible interpretation consistent with the exercise of a right that was vested in him from
birth.
In view of the foregoing, I vote to GRANT the petition and to order the proclamation and
assumption of office of Baguio Mayor Ramon Labo, Jr.
Footnotes
1 The first time was in Ramon L. Labo, Jr., v. Comelec (176 SCRA 1 [1989])
2 Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. The Commission and the
courts shall give priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to
the end that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the
election in which the disqualification is sought.
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any
reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his
proclamation and assumption to office.
3 PD 725 authorizes the Special Committee on Naturalization (created under LOI 270)
to accept and process petitions for repatriation, as follows: (1) Filipino women who lost
their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens: and (2) natural born Filipinos who have
lost their Philippine citizenship may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repratriation
by applying with the Special Committee on Naturalization by applying with the Special
Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No. 270, and, if their
applications are approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship.
The Commission on Immigration shall thereupon cancel certificate of registration.


DIGEST 1

FACTS: Herein petitioner, claiming for recognition as a Philippine citizen is a mayor-
elect who, through his marriage with an Australian national, was naturalized and took an
oath of allegiance as an Australian citizen. Said marriage was found to be bigamous and
therefore was annulled. Petitioner claims that his naturalization made him only a dual
national and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was divested of his Philippine citizenship.
HELD: Yes, because Commonwealth Act No. 63 clearly stated that Philippine citizenship
may be lost through naturalization in a foreign country; express renunciation of
citizenship; and by oath of allegiance to a foreign country, all of which are applicable to
the petitioner.

DIGEST 2

Facts: Petitioner and Respondent were candidates for the office of the Mayor of Baguio
City during Elections. Having garnered the highest number of votes, Petitioner was
elected and proclaimed winner while Respondent garnered the second highest number
of votes. Subsequently Respondent filed a petition for quo warranto contesting the
election of the Petitioner on the ground that the latter is a naturalized Australian citizen
and was divested of his Philippine citizenship having sworn allegiance to the Queen of
Australia. Petitioner opposes to the contrary.
Section 42 of the Local Government Code provides for the qualifications that an elective
official must be a citizen of the Philippines.
From the evidence adduced, it was found out that citizenship requirements were not
possessed by the petitioner during elections. He was disqualified from running as mayor
and, although elected, is not now qualified to serve as such.
Issue: WON private respondent, having garnered the 2nd highest number of votes, can
replace the petitioner as mayor.
Held: No. The simple reason is that he obtained only the second highest number of
votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared
to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not
necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be
declared the winner of the elective office.
Note:
3. Dual citizenship is not a bar in running for elections, dual allegiance is.
4. Mere repatriation is not enough to run for elections.
A written certification of an oath of allegiance to the Philippines must be attached
together with the COC.

9. GALMAN VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

DIGEST 1

Facts: An investigating committee was created to determine the facts on the case
involving the assassination of Ninoy Aquino. It appears that majority and minority reports
showed that they are unconvinced on the participation of Galman as the assassin of late
Sen. Aquino and branded him instead as the fall guy as opposed to the military reports.
Majority reports recommended the 26 military respondents as indictable for the
premeditated killing of Aquino and Galman which the Sandiganbayan did not give due
consideration.The office of the Tanod Bayan was originally preparing a resolution
charging the 26 military accused as principal to the crime against Aquino but was
recalled upon the intervention of President Marcos who insist on the innocence of the
accused. Marcos however recommended the filing of murder charge and to implement
the acquittal as planned so that double jeopardy may be invoked later on.The petitioners
filed an action for miscarriage of justice against the Sandiganbayan and gross violation
of constitutional rights of the petitioners for failure to exert genuine efforts in allowing the
prosecution to present vital documentary evidence and prayed for nullifying the bias
proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and ordering a re-trial before an impartial
tribunal.

Issue: Whether or not there was due process in the acquittal of the accused from the
charges against them.

Held: The Supreme Court held that the prosecution was deprived of due process and
fair opportunity to prosecute and prove their case which grossly violates the due process
clause. There could be no double jeopardy since legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a
valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea
having been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
the express consent of the accused (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851). The lower court
that rendered the judgment of acquittal was not competent as it was ousted of its
jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to due process. In effect the first
jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for further hearing
and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first
jeopardy, and does not expose the accused to a second jeopardy.The court further
contends that the previous trial was a mock trial where the authoritarian President
ordered the Sandiganbayan and Tanod Bayan to rig and closely monitor the trial which
was undertaken with due pressure to the judiciary. The courts decision of acquittal is
one void of jurisdiction owing to its failure in observing due process during the trial
therefore the judgment was also deemed void and double jeopardy cannot be invoked.
More so the trial was one vitiated with lack of due process on the account of collusion
between the lower court and Sandiganbayan for the rendition of a pre-determined
verdict of the accused.The denial on the motion for reconsideration of the petitioners by
the court was set aside and rendered the decision of acquittal of the accused null and
void. An order for a re-trial was granted.

DIGEST 2

FACTS: Assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. He was killed from
his plane that had just landed at the Manila International Airport. His brain was smashed
by a bullet fired point-blank into the back of his head by an assassin. The military
investigators reported within a span of three hours that the man who shot Aquino
(whose identity was then supposed to be unknown and was revealed only days later as
Rolando Galman) was a communist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts gunned
him down in turn.

President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate due to large
masses of people who joined in the ten-day period of national mourning yearning for the
truth, justice and freedom.

The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military
version stating that "the evidence shows to the contrary that Rolando Galman had no
subversive affiliations. Only the soldiers in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have
shot him; that Ninoy's assassination was the product of a military conspiracy, not a
communist plot. Only difference between the two reports is that the majority report found
all the twenty-six private respondents above-named in the title of the case involved in
the military conspiracy; " while the chairman's minority report would exclude nineteen of
them.

Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows that Galman was the killer.

Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court from rendering a
decision in the two criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11
to issue the restraining order prayed for. The Court also granted petitioners a five-day
period to file a reply to respondents' separate comments and respondent Tanodbayan a
three-day period to submit a copy of his 84-page memorandum for the prosecution.

But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in reverse, resolved to
dismiss the petition and to lift the TRO issued ten days earlier enjoining the
Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. The same Court majority denied petitioners'
motion for a new 5-day period counted from receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's
memorandum for the prosecution (which apparently was not served on them).

Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did not
indicate the legal ground for such action and urging that the case be set for a full
hearing on the merits that the people are entitled to due process.

However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of
the crime charged, declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil
liability. Respondents submitted that with the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the
instant case had become moot and academic. Thereafter, same Court majority denied
petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

Hence, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration
alleging that respondents committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and
resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the
petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law.

ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused.

(2) Whether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardy clause.

RULING: Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted and ordering a re-trial
of the said cases which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful
regard for the requirements of due process.

Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera (made his expose 15 months later when former
Pres. was no longer around) affirmed the allegations in the second motion for
reconsideration that he revealed that the Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan
prosecutors were ordered by Marcos to whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case.
Malacaang wanted dismissal to the extent that a prepared resolution was sent to the

Investigating Panel. Malacaang Conference planned a scenario of trial where the
former President ordered then that the resolution be revised by categorizing the
participation of each respondent; decided that the presiding justice, Justice Pamaran,
(First Division) would personally handle the trial. A conference was held in an inner room
of the Palace. Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant Justice Lazaro were
with the President. The conferees were told to take the back door in going to the room
where the meeting was held, presumably to escape notice by the visitors in the
reception hall waiting to see the President. During the conference, and after an
agreement was reached, Pres. Marcos told them 'Okay, mag moro-moro na lamang
kayo;' and that on their way out of the room Pres. Marcos expressed his thanks to the
group and uttered 'I know how to reciprocate'.

The Court then said that the then President (code-named Olympus) had stage-managed
in and from Malacaang Palace "a scripted and predetermined manner of handling and
disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder case;" and that "the prosecution in the Aquino-
Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the
compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist. Also
predetermined the final outcome of the case" of total absolution of the twenty-six
respondents-accused of all criminal and civil liability. Pres. Marcos came up with a
public statement aired over television that Senator Aquino was killed not by his military
escorts, but by a communist hired gun. It was, therefore, not a source of wonder that
President Marcos would want the case disposed of in a manner consistent with his
announced theory thereof which, at the same time, would clear his name and his
administration of any suspected guilty participation in the assassination. such a
procedure would be a better arrangement because, if the accused are charged in court
and subsequently acquitted, they may claim the benefit of the doctrine of double
jeopardy and thereby avoid another prosecution if some other witnesses shall appear
when President Marcos is no longer in office.

More so was there suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses. The
disappearance of witnesses two weeks after Ninoy's assassination. According to J.
Herrera, "nobody was looking for these persons because they said Marcos was in
power. The assignment of the case to Presiding Justice Pamaran; no evidence at all
that the assignment was indeed by virtue of a regular raffle, except the uncorroborated
testimony of Justice Pamaran himself. The custody of the accused and their
confinement in a military camp, instead of in a civilian jail. The monitoring of proceedings
and developments from Malacaang and by Malacaang personnel. The partiality of
Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: That President Marcos had wanted all of the
twenty-six accused to be acquitted may not be denied. In rendering its decision, the
Sandiganbayan overdid itself in favoring the presidential directive. Its bias and partiality
in favor of the accused was clearly obvious. The evidence presented by the prosecution
was totally ignored and disregarded.

The record shows that the then President misused the overwhelming resources of the
government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial
process in the Aquino-Galman murder cases. "This is the evil of one-man rule at its very
worst." Our Penal Code penalizes "any executive officer who shall address any order or
suggestion to any judicial authority with respect to any case or business coming within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of justice."

Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. This criminal collusion as to
the handling and treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret Malacaang
conference (and revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera)
completely disqualified respondent Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. The
courts would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of
injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth. More so, in the case
at bar where the people and the world are entitled to know the truth, and the integrity of
our judicial system is at stake.

There was no double jeopardy. Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for
having been issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void
judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. It neither
binds nor bars anyone. All acts and all claims flowing out of it are void.

Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved ahead. In this case, petitioners'
motion for reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal of their petition and lifting of the TRO
enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision had been taken cognizance of
by the Court which had required the respondents', including the Sandiganbayan's,
comments. Although no restraining order was issued anew, respondent Sandiganbayan
should not have precipitately issued its decision of total absolution of all the accused
pending the final action of this Court. All of the acts of the respondent judge manifest
grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting to lack of jurisdiction which
substantively prejudiced the petitioner.

With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now be tried before an
impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. Respondents accused must now face trial
for the crimes charged against them before an impartial court with an unbiased
prosecutor with all due process.

The function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the people, under our
system of government, is to fill the public posts. Justices and judges must ever realize
that they have no constituency, serve no majority nor minority but serve only the public
interest as they see it in accordance with their oath of office, guided only the
Constitution and their own conscience and honor.

DIFFERENT WRITS

Writ of Kalikasan Writ means Legal action From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

A Writ of Kalikasan is a legal remedy under Philippine law which provides for the
protection ones right to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature, as provided for in Section 16, Article II of the Philippine Constitution.
It is compared with the writ of amparo but protects ones right for a healthy environment
rather than constitutional rights.
Provision for the Writ of Kaliksaan was made in 2010 by the Supreme Court of the
Philippines under Rule 7 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases as a
Special Civil Action. The Supreme Court under Chief Justice Reynato Puno took the
initiative and issued Rules of Procedure for Environmental Case because Section 16,
Article II of the Philippines 1986 Constitution was not a self-executing provision.
The writ of Kailkasan may be sought to deal with environmental damage of such
magnitude that it threatens life, health, or property of inhabitants in two or more cities or
provinces.

Writ of Amparo Recurso de amparo From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The writ of amparo (also called recurso de amparo or juicio de amparo) is a remedy
for the protection of constitutional rights, found in certain jurisdictions. In some legal
systems, predominantly those of the Spanish-speaking world, the amparo remedy or
action is an effective and inexpensive instrument for the protection of individual rights.
Amparo, generally granted by a supreme or constitutional court, serves a dual
protective purpose: it protects the citizen and his basic guarantees, and protects the
constitution itself by ensuring that its principles are not violated by statutes or actions of
the state that undermine the basic rights enshrined therein.
It resembles, in some respects, constitutional remedies such as the writ of security
available in Brazil and the constitutional complaint (Verfassungsbeschwerde) procedure
found in Germany. In many countries, an amparo action is intended to protect all rights
other than physical liberty, which may be protected instead by habeas corpus remedies.
Thus, in the same way that habeas corpus guarantees physical freedom, amparo
protects other basic rights. It may therefore be invoked by any person who believes
that any of his rights, implicitly or explicitly protected by the constitution (or by applicable
international treaties), is being violated.

Habeas corpus From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Habeas corpus ; Latin: you must present the person in court) is a writ (legal action)
which requires a person under arrest to be brought before a judge or into court. This
ensures that a prisoner can be released from unlawful detention, in other words,
detention lacking sufficient cause or evidence. The remedy can be sought by the
prisoner or by another person coming to the prisoners aid. The legal right to apply for a
habeas corpus is also called by the same name. This right originated in the English legal
system to assist wealthy landowners, but it is now available in many nations. It has
historically been an important legal instrument safeguarding individual freedom of
certain individuals against arbitrary state action.
A writ of habeas corpus, also known as the Great Writ, is a summons with the force of a
court order; it is addressed to the custodian (a prison official for example) and demands
that a prisoner be taken before the court, and that the custodian present proof of
authority, allowing the court to determine whether the custodian has lawful authority to
detain the person. If the custodian does not have authority to detain the prisoner, then
they must be released from custody. The prisoner, or another person acting on his or
her behalf, may petition the court, or a judge, for a writ of habeas corpus. One reason
for the writ to be sought by a person other than the prisoner is that the detainee might
be held incommunicado.
Most civil law jurisdictions provide a similar remedy for those unlawfully detained, but
this is not always called habeas corpus. For example, in some Spanish-speaking
nations, the equivalent remedy for unlawful imprisonment is the amparo de libertad
(protection of freedom).
Habeas corpus has certain limitations. It is technically only a procedural remedy; it is a
guarantee against any detention that is forbidden by law, but it does not necessarily
protect other rights, such as the entitlement to a fair trial. So if an imposition such as
internment without trial is permitted by the law then habeas corpus may not be a useful
remedy. Furthermore, in many countries, the process may be suspended due to a
national emergency.
The right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus has nonetheless long been celebrated
as the most efficient safeguard of the liberty of the subject. The jurist Albert Venn Dicey
wrote that the British Habeas Corpus Acts declare no principle and define no rights, but
they are for practical purposes worth a hundred constitutional articles guaranteeing
individual liberty.
The writ of habeas corpus is one of what are called the extraordinary, common law,
or prerogative writs, which were historically issued by the English courts in the name
of the monarch to control inferior courts and public authorities within the kingdom. The
most common of the other such prerogative writs are quo warranto, prohibito,
mandamus, procedendo, and certiorari.
The due process for such petitions is not simply civil or criminal, because they
incorporate the presumption of non-authority. The official who is the respondent has the
burden to prove his authority to do or not do something. Failing this, the court must
decide for the petitioner, who may be any person, not just an interested party. This
differs from a motion in a civil process in which the movant must have standing, and
bears the burden of proof.
_________________


W R I T O F K A L I K A S A N

Rationale to the Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases 23 PART
III SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS RULE 7 WRIT OF KALIKASAN
SECTION 1. Nature of the writ.The writ is a remedy available to a natural or
juridical person, entity authorized by law, peoples organization, non-
governmental organization, or any public interest group accredited by or
registered with any government agency, on behalf of persons whose
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology is violated, or
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or
employee, or private individual or entity, involving environmental damage of
such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in
two or more cities or provinces.
SEC. 2. Contents of the petition.The verified petition shall contain the
following:
(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent or if the name
and personal circumstances are unknown and uncertain, the respondent may
be described by an assumed appellation;
(c) The environmental law, rule or regulation violated or threatened to be
violated, the act or omission complained of, and the environmental damage of
such magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in
two or more cities or provinces;
(d) All relevant and material evidence consisting of the affidavits of
witnesses, documentary evidence, scientific or other expert studies, and if
possible, object evidence;
(e) The certification of petitioner under oath that: (1) petitioner has not
commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any
court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency, and no such other action or claim is
pending A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC therein; (2) if there is such other pending action
or claim, a complete statement of its present status; (3) if petitioner should
learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending,
petitioner shall report to the court that fact within five (5) days therefrom; and
The reliefs prayed for which may include a prayer for the issuance of a TEPO.
SEC. 3. Where to file.The petition shall be filed with the Supreme Court or
with any of the stations of the Court of Appeals.
SEC. 4. No docket fees.The petitioner shall be exempt from the payment of
docket fees.
SEC. 5. Issuance of the writ.Within three (3) days from the date of filing of
the petition, if the petition is sufficient in form and substance, the court shall
give an order: (a) issuing the writ; and (b) requiring the respondent to file a
verified return as provided in Section 8 of this Rule. The clerk of court shall
forthwith issue the writ under the seal of the court including the issuance of a
cease and desist order and other temporary reliefs effective until further order.
SEC. 6. How the writ is served.The writ shall be served upon the
respondent by a court officer or any person deputized by the court, who shall
retain a copy on which to make a return of service. In case the writ cannot be
served personally, the rule on substituted service shall apply.
SEC. 7. Penalty for refusing to issue or serve the writ.A clerk of court who
unduly delays or refuses to issue the writ after its allowance or a court officer
or deputized person who unduly delays or refuses to serve the same shall be
punished by the court for contempt without prejudice to other civil, criminal or
administrative actions.
SEC. 8. Return of respondent; contents.Within a non- extendible period of
ten (10) days after service of the writ, the respondent shall file a verified return
which shall contain all defenses to show that respondent did not violate or
threaten to violate, or allow the violation of any environmental law, rule or
regulation or commit any act resulting to environmental damage of such
magnitude as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or
more cities or provinces.
All defenses not raised in the return shall be deemed waived.
The return shall include affidavits of witnesses, documentary evidence,
scientific or other expert studies, and if possible, object evidence, in support
of the defense of the respondent.
A general denial of allegations in the petition shall be considered as an
admission thereof.
SEC. 9. Prohibited pleadings and motions.The following pleadings and
motions are prohibited:
(a) Motion to dismiss; (b) Motion for extension of time to file return; (c) Motion
for postponement; (d) Motion for a bill of particulars; (e) Counterclaim or
cross-claim; (f) Third-party complaint; (g) Reply; and (h) Motion to declare
respondent in default.
SEC. 10. Effect of failure to file return.In case the respondent fails to file a
return, the court shall proceed to hear the petition ex parte.
SEC. 11. Hearing.Upon receipt of the return of the respondent, the court
may call a preliminary conference to simplify the issues, determine the
possibility of obtaining stipulations or admissions from the parties, and set the
petition for hearing.
The hearing including the preliminary conference shall not extend beyond
sixty (60) days and shall be given the same priority as petitions for the writs of
habeas corpus, amparo and habeas data.
SEC. 12. Discovery Measures.A party may file a verified motion for the
following reliefs:
(a) Ocular Inspection; order.The motion must show that an ocular
inspection order is necessary to establish the magnitude of the violation or the
threat as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more
cities or provinces. It shall state in detail the place or places to be inspected. It
shall be supported by affidavits of witnesses having personal knowledge of
the violation or threatened violation of environmental law.
After hearing, the court may order any person in possession or control of a
designated land or other property to permit entry for the purpose of inspecting or
photographing the property or any relevant object or operation thereon.
The order shall specify the person or persons authorized to make the inspection
and the date, time, place and manner of making the inspection and may prescribe
other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of all parties.
Production or inspection of documents or things; order. The motion must show
that a production order is necessary to establish the magnitude of the violation or
the threat as to prejudice the life, health or property of inhabitants in two or more
cities or provinces.
After hearing, the court may order any person in possession, custody or control of
any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects
or tangible things, or objects in digitized or electronic form, which constitute or
contain evidence relevant to the petition or the return, to produce and permit their
inspection, copying or photographing by or on behalf of the movant.
The production order shall specify the person or persons authorized to make the
production and the date, time, place and manner of making the inspection or
production and may prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional rights of
all parties.
(b)
SEC. 13. Contempt.The court may after hearing punish the respondent who
refuses or unduly delays the filing of a return, or who makes a false return, or any
person who disobeys or resists a
lawful process or order of the court for indirect contempt under
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
SEC. 14. Submission of case for decision; filing of memoranda. After hearing, the
court shall issue an order submitting the case for decision. The court may require
the filing of memoranda and if possible, in its electronic form, within a non-
extendible period of thirty (30) days from the date the petition is submitted for
decision.
SEC. 15. Judgment.Within sixty (60) days from the time the petition is submitted
for decision, the court shall render judgment granting or denying the privilege of the
writ of kalikasan.
The reliefs that may be granted under the writ are the following:
(a) Directing respondent to permanently cease and desist from committing acts or

neglecting the performance of a duty in violation of environmental laws resulting in
environmental destruction or damage;
(b) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private person or
entity to protect, preserve, rehabilitate or restore the environment;
(c) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, private person or
entity to monitor strict compliance with the decision and orders of the court;
(d) Directing the respondent public official, government agency, or private person
or entity to make periodic reports on the execution of the final judgment; and
(e) Such other reliefs which relate to the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology or to the protection, preservation, rehabilitation or restoration of
the environment, except the award of damages to individual petitioners.
SEC. 16. Appeal.Within fifteen (15) days from the date of notice of the adverse
judgment or denial of motion for reconsideration, any party may appeal to the
Supreme Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The appeal may raise
questions of fact.

BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY
Benevolent neutrality-accommodation[edit]
The Supreme Court of the Philippines, ruling in 2003[1] and 2006[2] in the
landmark case of Estrada vs. Escritor, established the doctrine of benevolent
neutrality-accommodation. The 2006 ruling, penned by former Chief Justice Puno,
explained benevolent-neutrality in the context of U.S. jurisprudence as follows:
Under the benevolent-neutrality theory, the principle underlying the First
Amendment is that freedom to carry out ones duties to a Supreme Being is an
inalienable right, not one dependent on the grace of legislature. Religious freedom
is seen as a substantive right and not merely a privilege against discriminatory
legislation. With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent
neutrality allows accommodation of religion under certain circumstances.[2]
The ruling went on to cite a U.S. Supreme Court decision which had held that if
prohibiting the exercise of religion is merely the incidental effect of a generally
applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been
offended.[3] Though concurring in the decision, Justice O'Connor dissented
strongly from the rationale, arguing that a compelling state interest test should have
been applied.[4]
Echoing Justice O'Connor's point from the U.S. case, the ruling in Estrada vs.
Escritor went on to quote her as having said that strict scrutiny is appropriate for
free exercise challenges because [t]he compelling interest test reflects the First
Amendments mandate of preserving religious liberty to the fullest extent possible
in a pluralistic society.[2]
The ruling then declared Underlying the compelling state interest test is the notion
that free exercise is a fundamental right and that laws burdening it should be
subject to strict scrutiny, and summarized a three-part compelling state interest test
by quoting Michael W. McConnell as follows:
If the plaintiff can show that a law or government practice inhibits the free exercise
of his religious beliefs, the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate that the
law or practice is necessary to the accomplishment of some important (or
compelling) secular objective and that it is the least restrictive means of achieving
that objective. If the plaintiff meets this burden and the government does not, the
plaintiff is entitled to exemption from the law or practice at issue. In order to be
protected, the claimants beliefs must be sincere, but they need not necessarily be
consistent, coherent, clearly articulated, or congruent with those of the claimants
religious denomination. Only beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the Free
Exercise Clause; secular beliefs, however sincere and conscientious, do not
suffice.[5]
The ruling noted that the then-current prevailing view under U.S. law is that that
there are no required accommodation under the First Amendment, although it
permits of legislative accommodations. Considering Philippine jurisprudence,
though, the ruling said:
By juxtaposing the American Constitution and jurisprudence against that of the
Philippines, it is immediately clear that one cannot simply conclude that we have
adoptedlock, stock and barrelthe religion clauses as embodied in the First
Amendment, and therefore, the U.S. Courts interpretation of the same. Unlike in
the U.S. where legislative exemptions of religion had to be upheld by the U.S.
Supreme Court as constituting permissive accommodations, similar exemptions for
religion are mandatory accommodations under our own constitutions.[2]
These landmark decisions in Estrada vs. Escritor established that benevolent
neutrality-accommodation is the framework by which free exercise cases must be
decided in the Philippines. This amounts to a requirement that any law which
conflicts with a violator's sincerely held religious beliefs must pass a strict scrutiny
test in order to be enforceable.

Consti 2 - Finals Reviewer

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CONSTI 2 FINALS REVIEWER 1

1. MERCADO VS. MANZANO

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