CARL G.

HEMPEL
P ROVI S OE S : A P ROBL E M CONCE RNI NG T HE
I NF E RE NT I AL F UNCT I ON OF S CI E NT I F I C
T HE ORI E S .1
1. I NTRODUCTI ON
Th e pri nci pal goal and t he pr oudes t a c hi e ve me nt of scientific i nqui r y
is t he cons t r uct i on of compr ehens i ve t heor i es whi ch gi ve us an under -
st andi ng of l ar ge classes of empi r i cal phe nome na and enabl e us t o
pr edi ct , t o r et r odi ct , and t o expl ai n t hem.
The s e var i ous f unot i ons of t heor i es ar e usual l y r egar ded as havi ng
t he char act er of i nf er ences whi ch l ead, by way of t heor et i cal pri n-
ci pl es, f r om s ent ences expr essi ng initial and boundar y condi t i ons t o
s t at ement s descr i bi ng t he oc c ur r e nc e s t o be pr edi ct ed, r et r odi ct ed, or
expl ai ned.
In this paper , I pr opos e t o exami ne a basi c difficulty whi ch f aces this
i nf er ent i al const r ual of sci ent i fi c t heor i zi ng and whi ch has i mpl i cat i ons
f or some cent r al issues in t he phi l osophy of sci ence. I will first pr es ent
t he pr obl em by r e f e r e nc e t o a pur el y deduct i vi st c onc e pt i on of
t heor et i cal r easoni ng and will t hen br oaden its scope.
2. THE STANDARD DEDUCTI VI ST MODEL
Th e bes t - known pr eci se el abor at i on of a deduct i vi st concept i on is
pr ovi ded by t he so- cal l ed st andar d empi r i ci st const r ual of t heor i es and
t hei r appl i cat i on. It vi ews a t heor y T as char act er i zabl e by an or de r e d
pai r consi st i ng of a set C cont ai ni ng t he basic pr i nci pl es of t he t heor y
and a set I of i nt er pr et at i ve st at ement s:
( l ) T=<C, I >
Th e sent ences, or f or mul as, of C ser ve t o char act er i ze t he specific
ent i t i es and pr ocesses posi t ed by t he t heor y (e.g., el ement ar y par t i cl es
and t hei r i nt er act i ons) and t o st at e t he basic laws t o whi ch t hey ar e
assumed to conf or m. The s e s ent ences ar e f or mul at ed wi t h t he hel p of
a t heor et i cal vocabul ar y, Vc, whose t er ms r ef er t o t he ki nds and
char act er i st i cs of t he t heor et i cal ent i t i es and pr ocesses in quest i on.
Th e s ent ences of t he i nt er pr et at i ve set I ser ve t o link t he t heor et i cal
Erkennmis 28 (1988) 147-164.
O 1988 by Carl G. Hempel
148 CARL G. HEMPEL
scenario represent ed by C to the empirical phenomena to which the
t heory is to be applied. These phenomena are taken to be formul at ed
in a vocabul ary VA which is ant ecedent l y underst ood, i.e., which is
available and underst ood i ndependent l y of the theory. Thus, the
sentences of I are said to provi de partial interpretations, t hough not
necessarily full definitions, of the theoretical terms in Vc by means of
the ant ecedent l y underst ood terms of VA. So-called operational
definitions and reduct i on sent ences in Carnap' s sense may be vi ewed
as special kinds of interpretative sentences.
By way of a simple example, assume that T is an el ement ary t heory
of magnetism whose theoretical vocabul ary Vc contains such terms as
' magnet ' , ' north pole' , ' south pole' , and whose theoretical principles
include the laws of magnetic attraction and repulsion and the law that
the parts of a magnet are magnet s again, while the class ! includes
some operational criteria for the terms of Vc.
Consi der now the following application of the theory. From the
sent ence " b is a metal bar to which iron filings are clinging" (S~), by
means of a suitable operational criterion contained in the set I, infer
" b is a magnet " (S~c); then, by way of theoretical principles in C, infer
"If b is broken into two bars bt and b2, then bot h are magnets and
their poles will attract or repel each ot her " ($2); finally, using further
operational criteria from I, deri ve the sent ence "If b is broken into
two shorter bars and these are suspended by long thin threads close to
each ot her at the same distance from the ground, t hey will orient
t hemsel ves so as to fall into a straight line" (S~). (Note that VA is here
taken to contain not only predi cat es like ' metal bar' , but also in-
dividual constants such as ' b' . )
The basic structure thus attributed to a theoretical inference is
suggest ed by the following schema, in which the notation P - q R is to
indicate that R can be inferred from P by using sent ences from Q as
additional premisses.
C
st
(2) I [ I I
sk
Thus, if the inferential steps in question are indeed all deduct i ve, then
T HE I NF E R E NT I AL F UNC T I ON OF S C I E NT I F I C T HE OR I E S 149
t he t heor y provi des a deduct i ve i nf er ence bri dge l eadi ng f r om one
VA-sent ence, t hr ough t he t heor et i cal real m of C, to anot her VA-
sent ence. Mor e preci sel y: S~ in combi nat i on wi t h the t heor y T
deduct i vel y implies S~; this, in t urn, is t ant amount to sayi ng t hat T
deduct i vel y implies a cor r espondi ng VA-sentence, namel y, the con-
di t i onal S), D S~.
Car nap and ot her logical empiricists assumed t hat the vocabul ar y
VA, whi ch serves to descri be the phenomena to be expl ai ned by the
t heory, consists of t erms t hat are "obs er vat i onal " at least in a broad
sense, i.e., t hat t hey refer to feat ures of the worl d whose pr esence or
absence can be est abl i shed by means of mor e or less di rect obser-
vat i on. In r ecogni t i on of t he difficulties t hat face t he not i on of obser-
vability, I want to avoi d any such assumpt i on here. I ndeed, I want to
pr ovi de specifically for cases in whi ch, as of t en happens, t he vocabu-
lary VA was ori gi nal l y i nt r oduced in t he cont ext of an earl i er t heory.
All t hat t he st andar d const rual needs to assume is t hat the phenomena
for whi ch the t heor y is t o account are descr i bed by means of a
vocabul ar y VA t hat is " ant ecedent l y avai l abl e" in the sense t hat it is
well under st ood and is used with hi gh i nt er subj ect i ve agr eement by
the scientists in t he field. The i nt er pr et at i ve sent ences in I may t hen be
vi ewed as i nt er pr et i ng t he new t erms i nt r oduced by the t heory, i.e.,
t hose in Vc, by means of t he ant ecedent l y under st ood t erms in VA.
Thi s deduct i vi st const rual 2 faces two basic difficulties. I will call
t hem the pr obl em of t heor et i cal ascent and t he pr obl em of provi soes.
Let me spell t hem out in turn.
3. T HE OR E T I C AL OR I NDUC T I VE AS C E NT
The first i nferent i al step in t he schemat i c ar gument about t he bar
magnet presupposes t hat wi t h t he hel p of i nt er pr et at i ve sent ences
bel ongi ng to part I of t he t heor y of magnet i sm, S t is deduci bl e from
S~,. Act ual l y, however , the t heor y of magnet i sm surel y cont ai ns no
gener al pri nci pl e to the ef f ect t hat when i ron filings cling t o a met al
bar, t hen t he bar is a magnet . The t heor y does not pr ecl ude the
possibility, for exampl e, t hat t he bar is made of l ead and is cover ed
wi t h an adhesi ve to whi ch t he filings stick, or t hat the filings are hel d
in pl ace by a magnet hi dden under a wooden boar d suppor t i ng t he
l ead bar. Thus, the t heor y does not war r ant a deduct i ve t ransi t i on
f r om S~, to S~:. It is mor e plausible to assume t hat t he t heor y cont ai ns
150 CARL G. HEMPEL
an i nt erpret at i ve principle which is the converse of the one just
consi dered, namel y that if a bar is a magnet , t hen iron filings will cling
to it. But even this is not strictly correct , as will be argued shortly.
Hence, the transition from S~ to S~ is not deduct i ve even if the
entire t heory of magnet i sm is used as an additional premiss. Rat her,
the transition involves what I will call inductive or theoretical ascent,
i.e., a transition from a dat a sent ence expressed in VA to a t heoret i cal
hypothesis S~ which, by way of the t heory of magnetism, would
explain what the dat a sent ences describes.
This illustrates one of the two probl ems ment i oned before that face
a strictly deduct i vi st construai of the systematic connect i ons which a
t heory establishes bet ween VA-sentences, i.e., bet ween sent ences
describing empirical phenomena in terms of VA. Thi s probl em has
been widely discussed and various efforts have been made to resolve it
by const ruct i ng t heori es of inductive reasoni ng that would govern
such theoretical ascent. I will not consi der those efforts here, but will
rat her turn to the probl em of provisoes, which has not, it seems to me,
been investigated in the same detail.
4. PROVISOES
Consi der the third step in our exampl e, the transition from S 2 to S~.
Again, the t heory of magnet i sm does not provi de i nt erpret at i ve hypo-
theses which would turn this into a strictly deduct i ve i nference. The
t heory clearly allows for the possibility that two bar magnets, suspen-
ded by fine threads close to each ot her at the same level, will not
arrange t hemsel ves in a straight line; for exampl e, if a strong magnet i c
field of suitable direction should be present in addition, then the bars
would ori ent t hemsel ves so as to be parallel to each ot her; similarly, a
strong air current would foil the predi ct i on, and so forth.
The t heory of magnet i sm does not guarant ee the absence of such
disturbing factors. Hence, the i nference from S 2 to S 2 presupposes
the additional assumption that the suspended pieces are subj ect to no
disturbing influence or, to put it positively, that their rotational
mot i ons are subject only to the magnet i c forces they exert upon each
ot her,
Incidentally, the expl anat ory i nference ment i oned a moment ago,
from S 1 to S~A, presupposes an anal ogous tacit premiss and thus is
not deduct i ve.
T HE I NF E R E NT I AL F UNC T I ON OF S C I E NT I F I C T HE OR I E S 151
I will use the term ' provisoes' to refer to assumpt i ons of the kind just
illustrated, whi ch are essential, but generally unst at ed, presuppositions
of theoretical inferences.
Provisoes are presupposed also in ostensibly deductive inferences
that lead from one Vc-sentence to another. This holds, for example,
in the inference from S~ to St in the case of the magnet: for if the
breaking of the magnet takes place at a high temperature, the pieces
may become demagnetized.
Or consider the application of the Newtonian theory of gravitation
and of motion to a system of physical bodies like our solar system. In
predicting, from a specification of the state of the system at a time to,
subsequent changes of state, the basic idea is that the force acting on
any one of the bodies is the vector sum of the gravitational forces
exerted on it by the other bodies in accordance with the law of
gravitation. That force then determines, via the second law of motion
( f = ma), the resulting change of velocity and of position for the given
body. But the quantity f in the second law is understood to be the total
force acting on the given body; and the envisaged application of the
theory therefore presupposes a proviso to the effect that the con-
stituent bodies of the system are subject to no forces other than their
mutual gravitational attraction. This proviso precludes not only gravi-
tational forces that might be exerted by bodies outside the system, but
also any electric, magnetic, frictional, or other forces to which the
bodies in the system might be subject.
The absence of such forces is not, of course, vouchsafed by the
principles of Newton' s theory, and it is for this reason that the proviso
is needed.
5 . E S C AP E B Y I NT E R P R E T AT I VE OF P R OB AB I L I S T I C F OR M?
The foregoing considerations show in particular that when a theory
contains interpretative sentences in the form of explicit definitions or
of Carnapian reduction chains based on the antecedent vocabulary,
the applicability of these sentences is usually subject to the fulfillment
of provisoes; they cannot be regarded as unequivocal complete or
partial criteria of applicability for theoretical expressions.
This thought might suggest a construal of the interpretative sen-
tences of a theory as expressing only probabilistic rather than strictly
general connections between theoretically described states or events
152 C AR L G. HE MP E L
and certain associated manifestations, or indicator phenomena, des-
cribed in antecedently available terms. Such a construal might seem to
come closer to scientific usage and at the same time to obviate the
need for provisoes: for with probabilistic interpretation sentences, a
theory would establish at best probabilistic connections between VA-
sentences. And what would otherwise appear as occasional violations
of provisoes would be automatically anticipated by the merely prob-
abilistic character of the theoretical inferences.
Interpretative sentences of probabilistic form have in fact been
envisaged by several writers. Carnap did so already in his (1956) essay
' The Methodological Character of Theoretical Concepts' , which is, I
think, his earliest full presentation of the standard empiricist construal
of theories. He argues there that many terms functioning in scientific
theories cannot be regarded as linked to antecedent terms ("obser-
vational terms") by interpretative sentences ("rules of correspon-
dence") of strictly universal form. For such sentences would specify
strictly necessary or sufficient observational conditions of applicability
for the theoretical terms, whereas scientists, Carnap argues, will treat
such conditions not as strictly binding, but as qualified by an "escape
clause" to the effect that the observational criteria hold "unless there
are disturbing factors", or "provided the environment is in a normal
state". 3 Such escape clauses clearly have the character of provisoes in
the sense adumbrated earlier. Carnap views them as probabilistic
qualifiers functioning in interpretative sentences for theoretical terms.
These sentences would state probabilistic rather than strictly necessary
or sufficient connections between theoretical expressions and VA-
sentences. Indeed, while Carnap countenances dispositional terms,
linked to VA by strict reduction chains, he suggests that the terms
characteristic of scientific theories have only probabilistic links to the
observational basis. 4
But while Carnap thus explicitly eschews a purely deductivist con-
strual of the inferential function of theories, he does not specify the
form of the probabilistic interpretation sentences he envisages. In-
deed, in response to a proposal by Pap 5 concerning probabilistic
reduction sentences, Carnap remarks: "it seems to me that for the
time being the problem of the best form for [interpretative sentences]
has not yet been sufficiently clarified". 6
However that may be, a probabilistic construal of provisoes faces
THE I NFERENTI AL FUNCTI ON OF SCI ENTI FI C THEORI ES 153
the difficulty that scientific theories do not, in general, provi de prob-
abilistic laws that woul d obvi at e the need for provisoes.
Consider, for example, the interpretative sent ences that woul d be
required for the term ' magnet ' . They would have to take the form "In
cases where iron filings stick to a metal bar, the probability of the bar
being a magnet is pl"; or, for inferences in the opposi t e direction:
"Gi ven that a metal bar is magnetic, the probability that iron filings
will cling to it is p2". But surely, the t heory of magnetism contains no
sent ences of this kind; it is a mat t er quite beyond its scope to state
how frequent l y air currents, disturbing further magnetic fields, or
ot her factors will interfere with the effect in question. It seems to me
that no scientific t heory provi des probabilistic interpretation state-
ments of this sort, whose application is not itself subj ect to provisoes.
The same basic consideration applies also, I think, where no well-
devel oped and sharply formul at ed theories are available; for example,
probabilification cannot avoid the need for provi soes in the ap-
plication of theoretical sent ences linking psychological states or event s
to their behavioral manifestations.
6. SOME CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEED FOR PROVI SOES
The conclusion that a scientific t heory even of non-probabilistic form
does not, in general, establish deduct i ve bridges bet ween VA-sen-
t ences has significant consequences for ot her issues in the philosophy
of science.
I will briefly indicate four of these: ( a) t he idea of falsifiability, (b)
the significance of so-called elimination programs for theoretical
terms, (c) the instrumentalist construal of scientific theories, and (d)
the idea of "t he empirical cont ent " of a theory.
(a) Falsifiability
One obvi ous consequence of the need for provisoes is that normally a
t heory is not falsifiable by VA-sentences; otherwise, it woul d deduc-
tively imply the negations of the falsifying VA-sentences, which again
are VA-sent ences.
This consideration differs from the Duhem- Qui ne argument that
individual hypot heses cannot be falsified by experiential findings
154 C AR L G. HE MP E L
because the deduction from the hypothesis of falsifying VA-sentences
requires an extensive system of background hypotheses as additional
premisses, so that typically only a comprehensive set of hypotheses
will entail or contradict VA-sentences. The argument from provisoes
leads rather to the stronger conclusion that even a comprehensive
system of hypotheses or theoretical principles will not entail any
VA-sentences because the requisite deduction is subject to provisoes.
Note that a proviso as here understood is not a clause that can be
attached to a theory as a whole and vouchsafe its deductive potency
by asserting that in all particular situations to which the theory is
applied, disturbing factors are absent. Rather, a proviso has to be
conceived as a clause which pertains to some particular application of
a given theory and which asserts that in the case at hand, no effective
factors are present other than those explicitly taken into account.
(b) Elimination programs for theoretical terms
The need for provisoes also has a bearing on the so-called elimination
programs for theoretical terms. These programs are of particular
significance for philosophical qualms about the use, in scientific
theories, of terms that are not explicitly defined by means of an
antecedently understood vocabulary.
The ingenious and logically impeccable methods designed by Ram-
sey and by Craig 7 circumvent these qualms by showing that the use of
theoretical expressions can always be avoided in the following sense:
If a theory T consisting of two sentence classes C and I as charac-
terized earlier does yield deductive connections between certain VA-
sentences, then it is possible to formulate a corresponding theory
(class of sentences) TA such that
(i) TA is expressed in terms of VA alone
(ii) TA is logically implied by T
(iii) TA entails ' S~ D S 2' (and in this sense establishes a deduc-
tive bridge from S~ to S 2) if and only if T entails ' S~
S ~ ' . 8
If the function of a theory is taken to consist in establishing deductive
bridges among VA-sentences, then the theory T.~, which avoids the
use of theoretical terms, might be called functionally equivalent to the
theory T. This result might suggest the reassuring conclusion that, in
THE I NFERENTI AL FUNCTI ON OF SCI ENTI FI C THEORI ES 155
principle, the use of theoretical expressions can .always be avoided
without any change in the "empirical content" of a theory as it is
expressed by the class of VA-sentences deducible from it, and that talk
in terms of theoretical expressions is just a convenient far de parler
about matters that are fully expressible in the antecedently understood
vocabulary VA. Analogously, it may seem that all the problems about
theoretical ascent and provisoes simply disappear if T is replaced by
its functional equivalent TA.
This impression is illusory, however. For a theory TA constructed
from T in the manner of Ramsey or of Craig yields deductive
connections between VA-sentences if and only if T yields such con-
nections: and scientific theories do not, in general, satisfy this con-
dition. The need for provisoes precludes the general avoidability of
theoretical expressions by those elimination methods.
The verdict does not hold, however, if the provisoes qualifying the
inferential applications of a theory are themselves expressible in the
antecedent vocabulary. For if PA is such a proviso governing the
transition, by means of T, from S~ to S 2, then T entails the sentence
(PA" S 1) D S 2 and thus establishes a deductive bridge between two
VA-sentences.
But it seems that, in general, the requisite provisoes cannot be
expressed in terms of VA alone. In the case of the theory of magnetism
referred to earlier, the provisoes may assert, for example, the absence
of other magnetic fields, or of disturbing forces, etc., and will then
require at least the use of terms from Vc in their formulation.
(c) Provisoes and the instrumentalist perspective
The preceding considerations analogously cast some doubt on the
instrumentalist conception of theories as purely inferential devices
which, from an input in the form of VA-sentences, generate an output
of other VA-sentences. For the need for provisoes shows that theories
do not render this service. In each particular case, the applicability of
the theoretical instrument would be subject to the condition that the
pertinent provisoes are fulfilled; and the assertion that they are
fulfilled could not just be added to the input into the theoretical
calculating machine, for that assertion would not generally be expres-
sible in VA.
Thus, if a theory is to be thought of as a calculating instrument that
156 C AR L G. HE MP E L
gener at es new VA-sent ences f r om gi ven ones, t hen it must be con-
cei ved as s uppl ement ed by an i nst r uct i on manual speci fyi ng t hat t he
i nst r ument shoul d be used onl y in cases in whi ch cer t ai n pr ovi soes ar e
satisfied. But t he f or mul at i on of t hose pr ovi soes will make use of Vc
and per haps e ve n of t er ms not cont ai ned in Vc. Thus , one has t o
check whet her cer t ai n empi r i cal condi t i ons not expressi bl e in VA are
satisfied: and t hat sur el y pr ovi des a t ug away f r om i nst r ument al i sm
and in t he di r ect i on of real i sm concer ni ng t heor et i cal ent i t i es.
(d) Provisoes and "the empirical content" of a theory
Si mi l ar quest i ons arise in r egar d t o t he not i on of t he exper i ent i al " cas h
val ue" or "empi r i cal c ont e nt " of a t heor y as r epr es ent ed by t he set of
all VA-sent ences ent ai l ed by t he t heor y.
Not e first, and i nci dent al l y, t hat t hus cons t r ued t he empi r i cal con-
t ent of a t heor y is r el at i ve t o t he vocabul ar y VA t hat count s as
ant ecedent l y avai l abl e, so t hat one woul d pr oper l y have t o speak, not
of " t h e " empi r i cal cont ent of T, but of t he VA-Content of T.
But t he poi nt her e t o be made is r at her t hat usual l y a t heor y does
not ent ai l VA-sent ences and t he pr opos ed const r ual of empi r i cal
cont ent misfires.
To be sure, t her e ar e some deduct i ve t heor et i cal i nf er ences t hat
pr es uppos e no pr ovi soes; f or exampl e, t he i nf er ence, medi at ed by t he
law of gr avi t at i on, f r om a s ent ence S ~ speci fyi ng t he masses and t he
di st ance of t wo bodi es t o a s ent ence S 2 speci fyi ng t he gr avi t at i onal
at t r act i on t hat t he bodi es exer t upon each ot her .
But t he f ur t her t heor et i cal i nf er ence f r om S 2 t o a s ent ence S 3
speci f yi ng t he accel er at i ons t he bodi es will under go r equi r es a pr ovi s o
t o t he ef f ect t hat no ot her f or ces act upon t he bodi es. If S 2 and S 3 are
r epr es ent ed as t heor et i cal sent ences, t hen we have her e an exampl e of
t he need f or pr ovi soes not onl y in est abl i shi ng t heor et i cal i nf er ence
br i dges bet ween VA-sent ences and Vc- s ent ences , but also in bui l di ng
such br i dges bet ween s ent ences expr essed sol el y in t er ms of Vc. We
will shor t l y r et ur n t o this poi nt .
7 . F UR T HE R T HOUGHT S ON T HE C HAR AC T E R OF P R OVI S OE S
How mi ght t he not i on of pr ovi so be f ur t her i l l umi nat ed? To say t hat
pr ovi soes ar e j ust ceteris paribus cl auses is unhel pf ul , f or t he i dea of a
ceteris paribus cl ause is itself vague and el usi ve. " Ot h e r t hi ngs bei ng
T HE I NF E R E NT I AL F UNC T I ON OF S C I E NT I F I C T HE OR I E S 157
equal , s uch- and- s o is t he cas e". What ot her t hi ngs, and equal to what ?
How is t he cl ause t o f unct i on in t heor et i cal r easoni ng?
Pr ovi s oes mi ght r at her be vi ewed as assumptions of completeness.
Th e pr ovi s o r equi r ed f or a t heor et i cal i nf er ence f r om one s ent ence,
S 1, t o anot her , S 2, assert s, br oadl y speaki ng, t hat in a gi ven case (e. g. ,
in t hat of t he met al bar cons i der ed earl i er) no f act or s ot he r t han t hose
speci fi ed in S 1 ar e pr es ent whi ch coul d af f ect t he e ve nt des cr i bed by
S 2"
For exampl e, in t he appl i cat i on of Newt oni an t heor y t o a doubl e st ar
it is pr es uppos ed t hat t he c ompone nt s of t he syst em ar e subj ect t o no
f or ces ot her t han t hei r mut ual gr avi t at i onal at t r act i on and hence, t hat
t he speci f i cat i on gi ven in S 1 of t he initial and boundar y condi t i ons
whi ch de t e r mi ne t hat gr avi t at i onal at t r act i on is a compl et e or exhaus-
t i ve speci f i cat i on of all t he f or ces af f ect i ng t he c ompone nt s of t he
syst em.
Such compl et enes s is of a speci al kind. It di ffers sharpl y, f or
exampl e, f r om t hat i nvoked in t he r equi r ement of compl et e or t ot al
evi dence. Thi s is an epi st emol ogi cal condi t i on t o t he ef f ect t hat in a
probabi l i st i c i nf er ence concer ni ng, say, a f ut ur e oc c ur r e nc e , t he t ot al
body of e vi de nc e avai l abl e at t he t i me must be chos en as t he evi den-
tial basis f or t he i nf er ence. 9
A pr ovi so, on t he ot he r hand, calls not f or epi st emi c, but f or ont i c
compl et eness: t he speci fi cs expr essed by S 1 must i ncl ude, not all t he
i nf or mat i on avai l abl e at t he t i me ( i nf or mat i on whi ch may well i ncl ude
false i t ems), but r at her all t he f act or s pr esent in t he gi ven case whi ch
in f act af f ect t he out c ome t o be pr edi ct ed by t he t heor et i cal i nf er ence;
t he f act or s in quest i on mi ght be said t o be t hose whi ch ar e " nomi cal l y
r e l e va nt " t o t he out c ome , i.e., t hose on whi ch t he out c ome depends in
vi r t ue of nomi c connect i ons .
Cons i der onc e agai n t he use of Newt oni an t heor y t o deduce, f r om a
speci f i cat i on S 1 of t he st at e of a bi nar y st ar syst em at t i me h, a
speci f i cat i on S 2 of its st at e at t2. Let us suppose, f or si mpl i ci t y, t hat S ~
and S 2 ar e c ouc he d in t he l anguage of t he t heor y; this enabl es us t o
l eave on one side t he pr obl em of t he i nduct i ve ascent f r om
ast r onomi cal obs er vat i on dat a t o a t heor et i cal r e- des cr i pt i on in t er ms
of masses, posi t i ons, and vel oci t i es of t he t wo obj ect s.
Th e t heor et i cal i nf er ence mi ght t hen be s chemat i zed thus:
(3) ( P . S l - T ) - o S 2
158 CARL G. HF_, MPEL
wher e P is a pr ovi s o t o t he ef f ect t hat apar t f r om t he ci r cums t ances
speci fi ed in S 1 t he t wo bodi es are, bet ween tl and rE, s ubj ect t o no
i nfl uences f r om wi t hi n or f r om out si de t he syst em t hat woul d af f ect
t hei r mot i ons. Th e pr ovi s o must t hus i mpl y t he absence, in t he case at
hand, of el ect r i c, magnet i c, and f r i ct i onal f or ces, of r adi at i on pr essur e
and of any t el eki net i c, angel i c, or di abol i c i nfl uences.
One may well wonde r whet her this pr ovi s o can at all be expr essed in
t he l anguage of cel est i al mechani cs, or e ve n in t he combi ned lan-
guages of mechani cs and ot her physi cal t heor i es. At any r at e, nei t her
singly nor j oi nt l y do t hose t heor i es assert t hat f or ces of t he ki nds t hey
deal wi t h are t he onl y ki nds by whi ch t he mot i on of a physi cal body
can be af f ect ed. A scientific t heor y pr opounds an a c c ount of cer t ai n
ki nds of empi r i cal phe nome na , but it does not pr onounc e on what
ot her ki nds t her e are. Th e t heor y of gr avi t at i on nei t her asserts nor
deni es t he exi st ence of non- gr avi t at i onal f or ces, and it of f er s no means
of char act er i zi ng or di st i ngui shi ng t hem.
It mi ght seem, t her ef or e, t hat t he f or mul at i on of t he pr ovi so t r an-
scends t he concept ual r es our ces of t he t heor y whose deduct i ve ap-
pl i cabi l i t y it is t o secur e. That , however , is not t he case in t he exampl e
at hand. For in Newt on' s s econd law, f = ma, ' / ' st ands f or t he total
f or ce i mpr essed on t he body; and our pr ovi s o can t her ef or e be
expr essed by assert i ng t hat t he t ot al f or ce act i ng on each of t he t wo
bodi es equal s t he gr avi t at i onal f or ce exer t ed upon it by t he ot her
body; and t he l at t er f or ce is det er mi ned by t he law of gr avi t at i onJ ~
But t he appl i cat i on of t he t heor y t o par t i cul ar cases is cl ear l y
subj ect agai n t o pr ovi soes t o t he ef f ect t hat in comput i ng t he t ot al
f or ce, all r el evant i nfl uences af f ect i ng t he bodi es c onc e r ne d have been
t aken i nt o account .
When t he appl i cat i on of a t heor y t o empi r i cal subj ect mat t er is
schemat i cal l y r epr es ent ed in t he f or m (3) wi t h t he pr ovi soes P as one
of t he premi sses, it must be bor ne in mi nd t hat t he l anguage and t he
specific f or m in whi ch P is expr essed ar e l eft qui t e vague. The
not at i on is not meant t o be a shar p expl i cat i on, but r at her a con-
veni ent way of r ef er r i ng t o t he subj ect at issue in t he cont ext of an
at t empt t o shed some f ur t her light on it.
Not e t hat t he pr ovi so P does not i ncl ude cl auses t o t he af f ect t hat
t he est abl i shment of S 1 has not been af f ect ed by er r or s of obs er vat i on
or meas ur ement , by decei t or t he like: t hat is al r eady i mpl i ed by t he
premi ss S 1 itself, whi ch t ri vi al l y asserts t hat S 1 is t rue. Th e pr ovi so is
THE I NFERENTI AL FUNCTI ON OF SCI ENTI FI C THEORI ES 159
t o t he ef f ect , not t hat S ~ is t r ue, but t hat it st at es t he whole t r ut h about
t he r el evant ci r cums t ances pr esent .
Not e f ur t her t hat t he per pl exi t i es of t he r el i ance on pr ovi soes
c a nnot be avoi ded by adopt i ng a st ruct ural i st , or non- s t at ement ,
c onc e pt i on of t heor i es br oadl y in t he ma nne r of Sneed and St eg-
miiller. ~1 Tha t c onc e pt i on const r ues t heor i es not as classes of st at e-
ment s, but as deduct i vel y or gani zed syst ems of s t at ement f unct i ons,
whi ch make no assert i ons and have no t r ut h val ues. But such syst ems
ar e pr es ent ed as havi ng empi r i cal model s; f or exampl e, t he sol ar
syst em mi ght be cl ai med t o be a model of a st r uct ur al i st f or mal i zat i on
of Newt oni an cel est i al mechani cs. But a f or mul at i on of this cl ai m, and
its i nf er ent i al appl i cat i on t o par t i cul ar ast r onomi cal occur r ences , agai n
cl ear l y assumes t he ful fi l l ment of per t i nent pr ovi soes.
8. METHODOLOGI CAL ASPECTS OF PROVI SOES
Th e el usi ve c ha r a c t e r of pr ovi s o cl auses raises t he quest i on of how a
t heor et i cal i nf er ence of t ype (3) can be appl i ed t o par t i cul ar occur -
r ences, and mor e speci fi cal l y, on what gr ounds pr ovi s o P may be
t aken t o be satisfied or vi ol at ed in specific cases.
The r e ar e ci r cums t ances t hat pr ovi de such gr ounds. If t he t heor y T
has st r ong pr evi ous suppor t , but its appl i cat i on t o a new case yields
i ncor r ect pr edi ct i ons S 2, t hen doubt s may arise about $1; but in t he
abs ence of specific gr ounds f or such doubt s, a vi ol at i on of P - i.e., t he
pr es ence of di st ur bi ng f act or s - may suggest itself. If this c onj e c t ur e
can be expr essed in t he l anguage of t he t heor y T and r epl aci ng S 1 by
a cor r es pondi ngl y modi f i ed s ent ence S r yields successful pr edi ct i ons,
t hen this success will const i t ut e gr ounds f or at t r i but i ng t he pr edi ct i ve
fai l ure of t he ori gi nal t heor et i cal i nf er ence t o a vi ol at i on of its pr ovi so
cl ause.
Thus, t he fai l ure of Newt on' s ot her wi se hi ghl y successful t heor y to
pr edi ct cer t ai n per t ur bat i ons in t he or bi t of Ur anus in t er ms of t he
gr avi t at i onal at t r act i on exer t ed on it by t he sun and by t he pl anet s
known bef or e 1846 l ed t o t he c onj e c t ur e of a pr ovi so- vi ol at i on,
namel y t he assumpt i on t hat Ur anus was subj ect t o t he addi t i onal
at t r act i on of a hi t her t o unknown pl anet - a c onj e c t ur e bor ne out by
t he s ubs equent di s cover y of Nept une.
Somet i mes pr edi ct i ve fai l ure of a t heor y is at t r i but ed t o pr ovi so-
160 C AR L G. HE MP E L
violations even though the presumably disturbing factors cannot be
adequately specified.
Consider, for example, the controversy between Robert A. Millikan
and Felix Ehrenhaft over the results of the famous experiments in
which Millikan measured the rates at which small electrically charged
oil drops rose and sank in the electric field between two horizontal
electrically charged metal plates. From those rates he computed, by
means of accepted theoretical principles, the size of the charges of
those oil drops and found that all of them were integral multiples of a
certain minimum charge e, whose numerical value he specified. Mil-
likan presented his findings as evidence for the claim that electricity
had an atomistic structure and that the atoms of electricity all had the
specified charge e.
Ehrenhaft objected that in similar experiments, he had found in-
dividual charges which were not integral multiples of Millikan's value
e and which, in fact, were often considerably smaller than e, sugges-
ting the existence of "sub-electrons". 12 Ehrenhaft accordingly rejec-
ted Millikan's theoretical claims T on grounds of predictive failure.
Millikan replied in careful detail. Referring to difficulties he had
encountered in his own work, he argued that Ehrenhaft' s deviant
results could be due to disturbing factors of various kinds. Among
them, he mentions the possibility that tiny dust particles might have
settled on the falling oil droplets, thus changing the total force acting
on them; the possibility that evaporation might have reduced the mass
of an observed drop; the possibility that the strength of the electric
field might have decreased as a result of battery fatigue, and so forth.
Ehrenhaft repeated his experiments, taking great pains to screen out
such disturbing factors, but he continued to obtain deviant findings.
The sources of these deviations have never been fully determined; in
fact, Ehrenhaft' s results turned out not to be generally reproducible.
Millikan's ideas, on the other hand, were sustained in various quite
different applications. Thus, eventually Ehrenhaft' s claims were
gradually disregarded by investigators in the field, and Millikan won
the day and the Nobel prize.
Interestingly, as has been pointed out by Holton, 13 Millikan himself
had recorded in his laboratory diaries several sets of quite deviant
measurements, but he had not published them, attributing them to
disturbing factors of various kinds and sometimes not even offering a
guess as to the source of the deviation.
But evidently, it cannot be made a general policy of scientific
THE I NFERENTI AL FUNCTI ON OF SCI ENTI FI C THEORI ES 161
r es ear ch t o at t r i but e pr edi ct i ve fai l ures of t heor et i cal i nf er ences to t he
vi ol at i on of some unspeci fi ed pr ovi so; f or this " convent i onal i s t st ra-
t e ge m" , as Poppe r has cal l ed it, woul d depr i ve a t heor y of any
pr edi ct i ve or expl anat or y f or ce. | 4
I t hi nk t hat at l east in per i ods of what Kuhn calls nor mal sci ence a
sear ch f or di st ur bi ng i nfl uences will consi der onl y f act or s of such ki nds
as are c ount e na nc e d by one or a not he r of t he cur r ent l y a c c e pt e d
scientific t heor i es as bei ng nomi cal l y r el evant to t he phe nome na under
consi der at i on.
Thus , if a pr edi ct i on based on Newt oni an mechani cs fails, one mi ght
l ook f or di st ur bi ng gr avi t at i onal , el ect r i c, magnet i c, and fri ct i onal
f or ces and f or still some ot her kinds, but not f or t el eki net i c or di abol i c
ones. I ndeed, si nce t her e ar e no cur r ent l y a c c e pt e d t heor i es f or such
f or ces, we woul d be unabl e t o tell under what condi t i ons and in what
ma nne r t hey act ; cons equent l y, t her e is no way of checki ng on t hei r
pr es ence or abs ence in any par t i cul ar case.
Th e mode of pr oc e dur e j ust ment i oned is cl ear l y f ol l owed also in
exper i ment s t hat r equi r e s cr eeni ng- out of di st urbi ng out si de i nfl uences
- f or exampl e, in exper i ment al st udi es of t he f r e que nc y wi t h whi ch a
cer t ai n ki nd of subat omi c e ve nt occur s under speci fi ed condi t i ons.
What out si de i nfl uences - such as cosmi c rays - woul d af f ect t he
f r e que nc y in quest i on, and what shi el di ng devi ces can ser ve to bl ock
t hem and t hus t o ens ur e sat i sfact i on of t he r el evant pr ovi so, is usually
de t e r mi ne d in t he l i ght of avai l abl e scientific knowl edge, whi ch agai n
woul d i ndi cat e no way of scr eeni ng out , say, t el eki net i c i nfl uences.
If a t heor y fails t o yi el d c or r e c t pr edi ct i ons f or a r epeat abl e
p h e n o me n o n by r ef er ence t o f act or s it qualifies as r el evant , t hen
cer t ai n changes wi t hi n t hat t heor y may be t ri ed, i nt r oduci ng a new
ki nd of nomi cal l y r el evant f act or . Roe nt ge n' s di s cover y of a phot o-
gr aphi c pl at e t hat had been bl ackened whi l e lying in a cl osed desk
dr awer is, I t hi nk, a case in poi nt ; it l ed t o t he a c knowl e dgme nt of a
new ki nd of radi at i on.
Fi nal l y, per si st ent seri ous fai l ures of a t heor y may l ead t o a r ev-
ol ut i on in Kuhn' s sense, whi ch pl aces t he phe nome na i nt o a novel
t heor et i cal f r amewor k r at her t han modi f y t he ol d one by pi ecemeal
changes. In this case, t he fai l ures of t he ear l i er t heor y ar e not
at t r i but ed t o pr ovi s o vi ol at i ons; i ndeed it is qui t e uncl ear what such an
at t r i but i on woul d a mount to.
Cons i der a t heor et i cal i nf er ence t hat mi ght have been of f er ed some
250 year s ago on t he basis of t he cal or i c fluid t heor y of heat or t he
1 6 2 C AR L G. HE MP E L
phlogiston theory of combustion. The relevant provisoes would then
have to assert, for example, that apart from the factors explicitly taken
into account in the inference, no other factors are present that affect,
say, the flow of caloric fluid between bodies or the degree of deph-
Iogistication of a body. But from our present vantage point, we have
to say that there are no such substances as caloric fluid or phlogiston,
and that therefore there could be no proper proviso claim of the
requisite sort at all.
And yet, it appears that the claims and the inferential applications of
any theory have to be understood as subject to those elusive pro-
visoes.
There is a distinct affinity, I think, between the perplexing questions
concerning the appraisal of provisoes in the application of scientific
theories and the recently much discussed problems of theory choice in
science.
As Kuhn in particular has argued in detail, the choice between
competing theories is influenced by considerations concerning the
strength and the relative importance of various desirable features
exhibited by the rival theories; but these considerations resist adequate
expression in the form of precise explicit criteria. The choice between
theories in the light of those considerations, which are broadly shared
within the scientific community, is not subject to, nor learned by
means of, unambiguous rules. Scientists acquire the ability to make
such choices in the course of their professional training and careers,
somewhat in the manner in which we acquire the use of our language
largely without benefit of explicit rules, by interaction with competent
speakers.
Just as, in the context of theory choice, the relevant idea of
superiority of one theory to another has no precise explication and yet
its use is strongly affected by considerations shared by scientific
investigators, so in the inferential application of theories to empirical
contexts, the idea of the relevant provisoes has no precise explication,
yet it is by no means arbitrary and its use appears to be significantly
affected by considerations akin to those affecting theory choice.
NOT E S
* Th i s ar t i cl e h a s g r o wn o u t of a p a p e r r e a d in No v e mb e r 1980 at a wo r k s h o p he l d
u n d e r t he a us pi c e s of t he Ce n t e r f or Phi l os ophy of Sci ence at t he Uni ve r s i t y of
T HE I NF E R E NT I AL F UNC T I ON OF S C I E NT I F I C T HE OR I E S 163
Pi t t sburgh. The present , much revi sed, versi on was wri t t en for inclusion in a vol ume, to
be publ i shed by t he Uni ver si t y of Cal i forni a Press, whi ch is to cont ai n t he pr oceedi ngs
of t hat workshop.
Pendi ng t he compl et i on of t hat proj ect , whi ch has been consi derabl y delayed, t he
art i cl e appear s here wi t h t he consent of t he edi t ors of t he proceedi ngs.
i Thi s paper is based upon work suppor t ed by Nat i onal Sci ence Foundat i on Gr ant No.
SES 80-25399.
2 I have l i mi t ed myself here to a schemat i c account of t hose feat ures of t he empi ri ci st
model whi ch are of r el evance of t he pr obl ems subsequent l y t o be discussed. For fuller
exposi t i ons and critical discussions, and for r ef er ences to t he ext ensi ve l i t erat ure, see,
for exampl e, Car nap (1956, 1966, chaps. 23- 26) ; Feigl (1970); Hempel (1958, 1969,
1970); Put nam (1962); and Suppe (1974), a compr ehensi ve st udy whi ch i ncl udes a l arge
bi bl i ography.
3 Car nap (1956), p. 69.
4 Cf. Car nap (1956), pp. 49, 72.
Pap (1963), sect i on II.
6 Car nap (1963), p. 950.
7 For details, see Ramsey (1931, ' Theor i es' , sect i on I XA) ; Car nap (1966, ' The Ramsey
Sent ence' , chap. 26); Crai g (1956); Put nam (1965); Hempel (1965, pp. 210-17).
8 The t heory TA obt ai nabl e by Ramsey' s met hod is quite di fferent , in ot her respects,
from t hat gener at ed by Cr ai g' s pr ocedur e. But t he di fferences are i r r el evant to t he poi nt
her e under discussion.
9 Cf. Car nap (1950), pp. 211- 13; 494.
lo I am i ndebt ed t o Mi chael Fri edman for havi ng poi nt ed this out to me.
11 Cf. Sneed (1979), Stegmiiller (1976), especially chap. 7.
12 Millikan gives a det ai l ed account of his i nvest i gat i ons in Millikan (1917); Ehr enhaf t ' s
claims are discussed in Chapt er VIII. The cont roversy is exami ned in a br oader
scientific and historical perspect i ve in Hol t on (1978).
13 Hol t on (1978, esp. pp. 58-83).
14 See, for exampl e, Popper (1962, pp. 33- 39) ; Stegmiiller (1976, chap. 14).
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Manuscript recei ved 1 June 1987
Department of Philosophy
Princeton University
Princeton, NJ08544
U. S. A.