Taada vs Tuvera

Invoking the peoples right to be informed on matters of public concerns as well as the principle that laws to be valid
and enforceable they must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, Taada et al
seek a writ of mandamus to compel Tuvera to publish andor to cause the publication in the Official Gazette of
various !residential "ecrees #!"s$, %etters of Instructions#%OIs$, !roclamations#!!s$, &'ecutive Orders#&Os$, and
(dministrative Orders#(Os$)
ISSUE: *hether or not the various !"s et al must be published before they shall take effect)
HELD: The +upreme ,ourt held that the fact that a !" or %OI states its date of effectivity does not preclude their
publication in the Official Gazette as they constitute important legislative acts, particularly in the present case where
the president may on his own issue laws) The clear ob-ective of this provision is to give the public general ade.uate
notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct) *ithout such notice and publication, there
would be no basis for the application of the ma'im ignorantia legis non excusat. !ublication is indispensable)

T(/("( 0) T10&2(
3o) %456789865 +,2( :; #(pril :<, 87=9$
>acts
? In procuring the enforcement of public duty, a petition was sought by Taada,+armiento, and @ovement of (ttorneys for Arotherhood
Integrity and 3ationalism, Inc#@(AI3I$ seeking a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish,and or cause the
publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees,letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, e'ecutive orders, letter
of implementation and administrative orders) There is a need for !ublication of %aws tostrengthen its binding force and effect? giving access to
legislative records, givingawareness to the public of the law promulgated) The Official Gazette, however, does notcontain publications of
administrative and e'ecutive orders that affect only a particular class of persons) The Official Gazette, as mandated by law, presents all
presidentialissuances Bof a public natureC or Bof general applicability)C (lso, (rticle : of the ,ivil,ode e'pressly recognized that the rule as to
laws takes effect after 89 days unless it isotherwise #for some do specify the date of effectivity$ following the completion of thepublication in
the Official Gazette) Dowever, the decree has been misread by manyE for ithas no -uridical force, but a mere legislative enactment of 2( 6=5)
Issue
? *O3 to provide publications of the law elsewhere, aside from the Official Gazette, as itwould be essential to the
effectivity of the said legislative or e'ecutive act that regulatesthe acts and conduct of people as citizens)
Deld
? 2espondents were granted petition to publish all unpublished issuances in the OfficialGazette, serving as a response to the ma'im Bignorance
as an e'cuse for noncompliance)C The effectivity of laws shall follow the notice to parties concerned, for such is a public right) There will be
no retroactive effect for laws with dates which appliedthe 894day rule of publication in the Official Gazette

,ustoms officer must first assess anddetermine the classification of theimported article before tariff may beimposed)
>acts?
The ,ommissioner of ,ustoms issued ,@ :;4:FF6 classifying wheat as #8$importer or consigneeE #:$ country of originE and #6$ port of
discharge anddepending on these factors, wheat would be classified further as either foodgrade with a tariff rate of 6G or feed grade
with a tariff rate of ;G) The regulationalso provides for an e'clusive list of corporations, ports of discharge, commoditydescriptions
and countries of origin) On "ecember 87, :FF6, the respondentfiled a !etition for "eclaratory 2elief with the 2egional Trial
,ourt of %as !inascontending the following? #8$ the regulation was issued without following themandate of the 2evised (dministrative
,ode, #:$ that the regulation classifiedthem to be a feed grade supplier without prior assessment and e'amination, #6$the e.ual protection clause
of the ,onstitution was violated when the regulationtreated the non4flour millers differently from flour millers for no reason at all, and#<$ the
retroactive application of the regulation is confiscatory) The petitionersthereafter filed a motion to dismiss contending that? #8$ the 2T, does not
have -urisdiction of the sub-ect matter, #:$ an action for declaratory relief was improper,#6$ ,@ :;4:FF6 was an internal
administrative rule and not legislative in natureEand #<$ the claims of the respondent were speculative and premature) On @arch8F, :FF9, the
2egional Trial ,ourt rendered a decision ruling in favour of therespondent) It held that the -urisdiction is properly held because the
sub-ectmatter is .uasi4legislative in nature) It also held that the petition for declaratoryrelief was proper remedy and that the
respondent was the proper party to file it)On matters relating to the validity of the regulation, the court held that theregulation is invalid
because the basic re.uirements of hearing and publicationwere not complied with) The petitioners then appealed to ,ourt of
(ppeals but itwas, however, dismissed) Dence, this petition for review on certiorari under 2ule<9 assailing the decision of the ,ourt of
(ppeals)Issue? *as the issuance of ,@O :;4:FF6 within the powers of the ,ommissioner of ,ustomsHDeld? The provision mandates that
the customs officer must first assess and determinethe classification of the imported article before tariff may be
imposed)1nfortunately, ,@O :64:FF; has already classified the article even before thecustoms officer had the chance to e'amine it) In
effect, petitioner ,ommissioner of ,ustoms diminished the powers granted by the Tariff and ,ustoms ,ode withregard to wheat importation
when it no longer re.uired the customs
officers
prior e'amination and assessment of the proper classification of thewheat)It is well4settled that rules and regulations, which are the product of a
delegatedpower to create new and additional legal provisions that have the effect of law,should be within the scope of the statutory authority
granted by the legislature tothe administrative agency) It is re.uired that the regulation be germane to theob-ects and purposes of the lawE and
that it be not in contradiction to, but inconformity with, the standards prescribed by law)
#,ommissioner of ,ustoms and the "istrict ,ollector of the !ort of +ubic vs Dypermi' >eeds ,orporation, G)2) 3o 8;79;7, >ebruary 8,
:F8:$
Commissioner of Customs vs. Hypermix Feeds
(ccordingly, in considering a legislative rule a court is free to make three in.uiries? (i !"et"er t"e ru#e is !it"in
t"e de#e$ated aut"ority of t"e administrative a$en%y& (ii !"et"er it is reasona'#e& and (iii !"et"er it !as
issued pursuant to proper pro%edure. Aut the court is not free to substitute its -udgment as to the desirability or
wisdom of the rule for the legislative body, by its delegation of administrative -udgment, has committed those
.uestions to administrative -udgments and not to -udicial -udgments) In the case of an interpretative rule, the in.uiry
is not into the validity but into the correctness or propriety of the rule) (s a matter of power a court, when
confronted with an interpretative rule, is free to (i $ive t"e for%e of #a! to t"e ru#e& (ii $o to t"e opposite extreme
and su'stitute its (ud$ment& or (iii $ive some intermediate de$ree of aut"oritative !ei$"t to t"e interpretative
ru#e.
Considerin$ t"at t"e )uestioned re$u#ation !ou#d affe%t t"e su'stantive ri$"ts of respondent as e'plained
above, it therefore follows that petitioners should have applied the pertinent provisions of Aook 0II, ,hapter : of
the 2evised (dministrative ,ode, to wit?
+ection 6) Fi#in$. I #8$ &very agency shall file with the 1niversity of the !hilippines %aw ,enter three #6$ certified
copies of every rule adopted by it) 2ules in force on the date of effectivity of this ,ode which are not filed within
three #6$ months from that date shall not thereafter be the bases of any sanction against any party of persons)
+ection 7) *u'#i% *arti%ipation) 4 #8$ If not otherwise re.uired by law, an agency shall, as far as practicable, publish
or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the
adoption of any rule)
#:$ In the fi'ing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a
newspaper of general circulation at least two #:$ weeks before the first hearing thereon)
#6$ In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed)
+asi#a$ vs ,odri$ue- (./ *"i# 012
F3CTS
*,4CEDU,3L F3CTS: This is an appeal taken by the defendant4petitioner #Jasilag$ from the decision of the
,ourt of (ppeals which modified that rendered by the court of >irst Instance of Aataan) The said court held? that the
contract is entirely null and void and without effectE that the plaintiffs4respondents #2odriguez, et)al)$, then
appellants, are the owners of the disputed land, with its improvements, in common ownership with their brother
Gavino 2odriguez, hence, they are entitled to the possession thereofE that the defendant4petitioner should yield
possession of the land in their favor, with all the improvements thereon and free from any lien)
SU5ST36TI7E F3CTS: The parties entered into a contract of loan to which has an accompanying accessory
contract of mortgage) The e'ecuted accessory contract involved the improvements on a piece land, the land having
been ac.uired by means of homestead) !etitioner for his part accepted the contract of mortgage)
Aelieving that there are no violations to the prohibitions in the alienation of lands !etitioner, acting in good faith
took possession of the land) To wit, the !etitioner has no knowledge that the en-oyment of the fruits of the land is an
element of the credit transaction of (ntichresis)
ISSUE
8) *hether or not the principal contract entered into is null and void)
:) *hether or not the subse.uent contract is null and void)
6) *hether or not the Jasilag is a possessor in good faith of the land)
HELD
8) The cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts is to the effect that the intention of the contracting parties should
always prevail because their will has the force of law between them) (rticle 8:=8 #now (rt) 86;F$ of the ,ivil ,ode
consecrates this rule and provides, that if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of
the contracting parties, the literal sense of its stipulations shall be followedE and if the words appear to be contrary to
the evident intention of the contracting parties, the intention shall prevail) The contract should be interpreted in
accordance with these rules) (s the terms thereof are clear and leave no room for doubt, it should be interpreted
according to the literal meaning of its clauses)
The words used by the contracting parties in the contract clearly show that they intended to enter into the principal
contract of loan in the amount of !8,FFF, with interest at 8: per cent per annum, and into the accessory contract of
mortgage of the improvements on the land ac.uired as homestead, the parties having moreover, agreed upon the
pacts and conditions stated in the deed) In other words, the parties entered into a contract of mortgage of the
improvements on the land ac.uired as homestead, to secure the payment of the indebtedness for !8,FFF and the
stipulated interest thereon)
(nother fundamental rule in the interpretation of contracts, not less important than those indicated, is to the effect
that the terms, clauses and conditions contrary to law, morals and public order should be separated from the valid
and legal contract and when such separation can be made because they are independent of the valid contract which
e'presses the will of the contracting parties)
!rincipal contract is that of loan and the accessory that of mortgage of the improvements upon the land ac.uired as a
homestead) There is no .uestion that the first of these contract is valid as it is not against the law)
:) !arties entered into another verbal contract whereby the petitioner was authorized to take possession of the land, to
receive the fruits thereof and to introduce improvements thereon, provided that he would renounce the payment of
stipulated interest and he would assume payment of the land ta') The possession by the petitioner and his receipt of
the fruits of the land, considered as integral elements of the contract of antichresis, are illegal and void agreements
because the contract of antichresis is a lien and such is e'pressly prohibited by section 885 of (ct 3o) :=;<)
6) "espite the foregoing, +, found the defendant4petitioner Jasilag as a possessor of the land in good faith) +ec <66
of the ,ivil ,ode of the !hilippines provides B&very person who is unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner
of its ac.uisition by which it is invalidated shall be deemed a possessor of good faith)C (nd in this case, the
petitioner acted in good faith) Good faith maybe a basis of e'cusable ignorance of the law, the petitioner acted in
good faith in his en-oyment of the fruits of the land to which was done through his apparent ac.uisition thereof)
+asi#a$ v. ,odri$ue-8 ./ *HIL 012
>(,T+? Jasilag and &miliana (mbrosio entered a contract of mortgage of improvements of land ac.uired as
homestead to secure the payment of the indebtedness og !8,FFF plus interest) The parties stipulated that (mbrosio
was to pay the debt with interest within < K years), and in such case, mortgage would not have any effect) They
agreed that (mbrosio would e'ecute a deed of sale if it would not be paid within < K years and that she would pay
the ta' on the land) (fter a year, it turned out that she wasnt able to pay the ta') Dence, they entered a verbal
agreement whereby she conveyed to the latter the possession of the land on the condition that they would not collect
the interest of the loan, would attend to the payment of the land ta', would benefit by the fruits of the land, L would
introduce improvement thereof)
I++1&? *3 the petitioner should be deemed the possessor of the land in good faith because he was unaware of any
flaw in his title or in the manner of its ac.uisition by which it is invalidated
D&%"? The possession of the land is illegal and void because such contract is e'pressly prohibited by +ec 885 of
(ct 3o 8=;< as amended) !etitioner acted in bad faith in taking possession of the land because he knew that the
contract he made with (mbrosio was an absolute sale and that the latter could not sell the land because it is
prohibited by +ec 885 of (ct :=;<) Gross and ine'cusable ignorance of the law may not be the basis of good faith)
Case Di$est of +asi#a$ vs. ,odri$ue-
J(+I%(G 0) 2O"2IG1&M N 57 ! :8;O 4 >? 2esponds, 2afaela 2odriguez, et al), children and heirs of the deceased
&miliana (mbrosio, commenced a civil case to recover from the petitioner the possession of the land and its
improvements granted by way of homestead to &miliana (mbrosio #&($)
The parties entered into a contract of mortgage of the improvements on the land ac.uired as homestead to secure the
payment of the indebtedness for !8,FFF plus interest) In clause 0, the parties stipulated that &( was to pay, win <
8: yrs, the debt w interest thereon, in wc event the mortgage would not have any effectE in clause 0I, the parties
agreed that the ta' on the land and its improvements, during the e'istence of the mortgage, should be paid by the
owner of the landE in clause 0II, it was covenanted that win 6F days from the date of the contract, the owner of the
land would file a motion in the ,>I of Aataan asking that cert) of title no) 6:9 be cancelled and that in lieu thereof
another be issued under the provisions of 2( <75E in clause 0III the parties agreed that should &( fail to redeem the
mortgage win the stipulated period of < 8: yrs, she would e'ecute an absolute deed of sale of the land in favor of
the mortgagee, the petitioner, for the same amount of the loan including unpaid interestE and in clause IP it was
stipulated that in case the motion to be presented under clause 0II should be disapproved by the ,>I4Aataan, the
contract of sale of sale would automatically become void and the mortgage would subsist in all its force)
One year after the e'ecution of the mortgage deed, it came to pass that &( was unable to pay the stipulated interest
as well as the ta' on the land and its improvements) >or this reason, she and the petitioner entered into another
verbal contract whereby she conveyed to the latter the possession of the land on condition that the latter would not
collect the interest on the loan, would attend to the payment of the land ta', would benefit by the fruits of the land,
and would introduce improvements thereon)
D&%"? The possession by the petitioner and his receipts of the fruits of the land, considered as integral elements of
the contract of antichresis, are illegal and void agreements, bec) the such contract is a lien and as such is e'pressly
prohibited by +ec 885 of (ct 3o) :=;<, as amended) The ,( held that petitioner acted In A> in taking possession of
the land bec) he knew that the contract he made w &( was an absolute sale, and further, that the latter could not sell
the land bec) it is prohibited by +ec) 885 of (ct :=;<)
''' N(O person is deemed a possessor in A> when he knows that there is a flaw in his title or in the manner of its
ac.uisition, by wc it is invalidated)
The .uestion to be answered is wn the petitioner should be deemed a possessor in G> bec) he was unaware of any
flaw in his title or in the manner of its ac.uisition by wc it is invalidated) Ignorance of the flaw is the keynote of the
rule) >rom the facts as found by the ,(, we can neither deduce nor presume that the petitioner was aware of a flaw
in his title or in the manner of its ac.uisition, aside from the prohibition contained in +ec) 885) This being the case,
the .uestion is wn G> may be premised upon ignorance of the laws)
Gross and ine'cusable ignorance of the law may not be the basis of G> but e'cusable ignorance may be such basis
#if it is based upon ignorance of a fact)$ It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant w the laws bec) he is not a
lawyer) In accepting the mortgage of the improvements he proceeded on the well4grounded belief that he was not
violating the prohibition regarding the alienation of the land) In taking possession thereof and in consenting to
receive its fruits, he did not know, as clearly as a -urist does, that the possession and en-oyment of the fruits are
attributes of the contract of antichresis and that the latter, as a lien, was prohibited by +ec) 885) Thus, as to the
petitioner, his ignorance of the provisions of sec) 885 is e'cusable and may be the basis of G>)
The petitioners being in G>, the respondents may elect to have the improvements introduced by the petitioner by
paying the latter the value thereof, !6,FFF, or to compel the petitioner to buy and have the land where the
improvements or plants are found, by paying them its market value to be fi'ed by the court of origin, upon hearing
the parties)
&%&G("O v) ,O12T O> (!!&(%+ #>irst "ivision$Ildefonso O) &legado, as (ncillary (dministrator of the
Testate &state of the late *arren Taylor Graham,vs) Don) ,( L ,ommissioner of Internal 2evenue,ruz, @ay 8:,
87=7
Topic? Ignorance of the %aw #for foreigners$
>acts?4

*arren Taylor Graham died #@arch 8<, 87;5$ and left certain shares of stock in the !hilippines4

Dis son *ard Graham filed an estate ta' return on +eptember 85, 87;54

AI2 ,ommissioner assessed estate with estate ta' of !75, 9F7)694protested on @arch ;, 87;= #by a foreign law firm
on behalf of the estate$, denied by,ommissioner on Quly ;, 87;=, no further action4

Qanuary 8=, 87;;? *ill had been admitted to probate in the ,ircuit ,ourt of Oregon4&legado appointed as attorney4
in4fact of *ar
d Graham for wills allowance in the
!hilippines4*ill was allowed on "ecember 8=, 87;= with petitioner as ancillary administrator4

&legado filed a :
nd
estate ta' return with AI2 on Qune <, 87=F4

I2 ,ommissioner imposed assessment of !;:, 7<=)=;4protested on (ugust 86, 87=F4

,ommissioner filed a motion for the allowance of the basic estate ta' of !75, 9F7)694petitioner regarded this as
implied denial of (ugust 86, 87=F protest4he filed a petition for review with ,ourt of Ta' (ppeals on +eptember 89,
87=8challenging the first assessment4,ommissioner cancelled the protested assessmentE letter dated @arch 68,87=:4
,ourt granted motion on (pril :9, 87=<
Issues?
8) *o3 the respondent ,ourt of Ta' (ppeals erred in dismissing the petitioners appeal on
grounds of -urisdiction and lack of a cause of action
:) *o3 the shares of stock left by the decedent should be treated as his e'clusive and not con-ugalproperty
6)*o3 the said stocks should be assessed on the time of the
owners death or si' months
thereafter
<)*o3 the appeal filed with the respondent count should be considered moot and academic
9) *o3 the first assessment is invalid because the foreign lawyers were not familiar with our ta'laws and
procedurea)

#The petitioners argument is that it is invalid)$

Deld and 2atio?
8)3o) ,ourt of T( cannot act on appeal from an assessment already cancelled)
:)Immaterial in proceedings)
6)Immaterial in proceedings)
<)Res) +econd assessment was e'pressly cancelled by letter dated @ar) 68, 87=:) 3o cause of action for petitioner)
9)3o) >oreigners are not e'cused from compliance with our laws and procedure because of ignorance)
173 scra 285
Applicability of Laws
On @arch 8<, 87;5, *arren Taylor Graham, an (merican national, formerly resident of the !hilippines, died in
Oregon, 1+() (s certain shares of stock are left in the !hilippines, his son *ard Graham filed an estate ta' return)
N@eanwhile, *) Graham designated e'ecutor, appointed Ildefonso &legado as his attorney4in4fact for the allowance
of the will in the !hilippines)O
On the basis of such return, the respondent ,ommission of Internal 2evenue assessed the descendants estate in the
amount of !75,9F7)69) The assessment was protested by the law firm of Aump, Rang, and *alker on behalf of the
estates which was denied by the ,ommissioner)
&legado as an ancillary administrator filed a second estate ta' return) The ,ommissioner imposed an assessment on
the estate in the amount of !;:,7<=)=; based on the +&, return, which was protested by the (grava %aw Office on
behalf of the estate) *hile the protest was pending, the petitioner filed a motion for the allowance of the basic estate
ta' of !75,9F7)69) De said that this liability had not yet been paid although the assessment had long become final
and e'ecutory) !etitioner was denied contending that the first assessment is not binding on him because it was based
on a return filed for by lawyers)
ISSUE: *hether or not the first assessment is binding being filed for by lawyers)
HELD: The +upreme ,ourt held that &legados contention is flimsy) The petitioner cannot be serious when he
argues that the first assessment was invalid because the foreign lawyers who filed the return on which it was based
were not familiar with our ta' laws and procedure) If our own lawyers and ta'payers cannot claim similar
preferences, it follows that foreigners cannot be any less bound by laws in our country)
Simon v. C"an

Deirs of &duardo +imon #!etitioner$ vs &lvin ,han and ,ourt of (ppeals #2espondent$G2) 3O) 89;9<;>ebruary
:6, :F88
>acts?In 88 Quly 877; the ,ity !rosecutor of @anila filed a criminal case in the @etropolitan Trial ,ourt of @anila
charging &duardo +imon of violating A!::)
+ometime in "ecember 8775, +imon issued to &lvin ,han a %andbank check with a declared amount of !665,FFF)
The accuse did not have sufficient fund in his account to fund the check he issued, contrary to the information he
had given to the respondent) "espite notice insufficiency of his accounts funds, the petitioner failed to pay the
respondent the value of the check within 9 days after receiving the notice)
Three years later on 6 (ugust :FFF, &lvin ,han commenced in the @T, in !asay ,ity a ,ivil (ction for the
collection of the principal amount of ! 665,FFF)FF)
On 8; (ugust :FFF, +imon filed an urgent @otion to "ismiss with application to change plaintiffs attachmnent bond
for damages on the ground of litis pendentia asa conse.uence of the pendency of another action between parties for
the same cause)
The plaintiff countered the argument of +imon by pointing out he did not make any allegation as to the e'act amount
of his claim in the criminal case, consitituting an implied right to initiate civil action) The !laintiff also cited 2ule
888 +ection :, e'ception to file separate civil action during the pendency of a criminal case under (rt) 68, 6:, 66, 6<,
and :8;; of the ,,!) The case falls under(rt) 66 of the ,,!)
On :6 October :FFF, the @,T, in !asay ,ity granted +imons urgent @otion to "ismiss with application to charge
plaintiffs attachment bond for damages) On 68 Quly :FF8, the 2T, of !asay ,ity upheld @,T,s dismissal of ,hans
initiated ,ivil ,ase)
,han appealed to the ,( by petition for review with the following issueE *hether or not the 2T, erred in the
dismissal of his case on the ground of litis pendetia)
The ,( overturened the decision of the 2T, with following legal basisE Though the ,( recognized that civil case
cannot anymore initiated following the filling of a criminal case, the following case falls under the e'ception under
2ule 888 sec) :) The case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings)
+imon appealed to the +upreme ,ourt for petition for review)
IssueIssues?
8) *hether or not ,hans ,ivil action to recover the amount of the bounced check as an independent civil action)
:) *hether or not new +upreme ,ourt circular pertaining to A!:: can be applied retroactively)
2uling?The +, set aside the decision promulgated by the ,ourt of (ppeals on Qune :9, :FF:) >urthermore, the +,
reinstate the decision rendered on October :6, :FFF by the @etropolitan Trial ,ourt, Aranch <9, in !asay ,ity)
TE,ESIT3 C. F,36CISC48 petitioner8 vs. H46. C4U,T 4F 3**E3LS8 et a#8 respondents
)
G)2) 3o) 8F:66F) 3ovember :9, 877=) S1I+1@AI3G, Q
>(,T+?
!etitioner, the legal wife of private respondent &usebio >rancisco #&usebio$ by hissecond marriage filed a suit for
damages and for annulment of general power of attorneyauthorizing ,onchita &vangelista #&usebios daughter in his
first marriage$ to administer thehouse and lot together with the apartments allegedly ac.uired by petitioner and
&usebio duringtheir con-ugal partnership) The trial court rendered -udgment in favor of private respondents dueto
petitioners failure to establish proof that said properties were ac.uired during the e'istence of the second con-ugal
partnership, or that they pertained e'clusively to the petitioner) (s such, the,( ruled that those properties belong
e'clusively to &usebio, and that he has the capacity toadminister them)
I++1&?
*hether or not the appellate court committed reversible error in affirming the trialcourtTs ruling that the properties,
sub-ect matter of controversy, are not con-ugal but the capitalproperties of &usebio e'clusively)
21%I3G?
+, resolved the issue of the nature of the contested properties based on theprovisions of the 3ew ,ivil ,ode)
Indeed, (rticles 89= and 85F of the 3ew ,ivil ,ode have beenrepealed by the >amily ,ode of the !hilippines)
3onetheless, +, cannot invoke the new law inthis case without impairing prior vested rights pursuant to (rticle :95
in relation to (rticle 8F9#second paragraph$ of the >amily ,ode) (ccordingly, the repeal of (rticles 89= and 85F of
the3ew ,ivil ,ode does not operate to pre-udice or otherwise affect rights which have becomevested or accrued
while the said provisions were in force)
D&%"?
!etition is denied) The "ecision of the ,( is affirmed
FRANCISCO vs. CA
GR# 102330, November 25, 1998
FACTS: Petitioner is private respondent Eusebio Franciscos legal wife by his 2
nd

marriage. The other private respondents are his children by his 1
st
marriage.
Allegedly the Franciscos have ac!uired several properties since their marriage in February 1"#2. Eusebio administered these
realties until he was invalidated by various diseases rendering him unfit to administer them. Petitioner averred that his children
convinced their father to sign a general power of attorney which authori$ed one of his children %onchita to administer the house
and lot as well as the apartments. %onse!uently petitioner filed a suit for damages and for annulment of said &eneral Power
Attorney and thus en'oining its enforcement. (he also sought to be declared as the administratri) of all the properties.
HE!: T"e #$r%& '"o ()vo*es %"e #res+m#%(o) #rov(,e, b& A.1-0, NCC m+s% .(rs% #rove %"$% %"e #ro#er%& () /+es%(o)
'$s $0/+(re, ,+r()1 %"e m$rr($1e. 2roo. o. $0/+(s(%(o) ,+r()1 %"e 0over%+re (s $ 0o),(%(o) s()e /+$ )o) .or %"e
o#er$%(o) o. %"e #res+m#%(o) () .$vor o. %"e 0o)3+1$4 #$r%)ers"(#. T"e #$r%& '"o $sser%s %"(s #res+m#%(o) m+s% .(rs%
#rove s$(, %(me e4eme)%. The presumption refers only to the property ac!uired during the marriage and does not operate when
there is no showing as to when the property alleged to be con'ugal was ac!uired. F+r%"er, %"(s #res+m#%(o) () .$vor o.
0o)3+1$4(%& (s reb+%%$b4e, b+% o)4& '(%" s%ro)1, 04e$r $), 0o)v()0()1 ev(,e)0e5 %"ere m+s% be $ s%r(0% #roo. o. e604+s(ve
o')ers"(# o. o)e o. %"e s#o+ses. *n the case at bar petitioner failed to adduce ample evidence to show that the properties
which she claimed to be con'ugal were ac!uired during her marriage to Eusebio.
Pesca v. Pesca, G.R. No. 136921, April 17, 2001
FACTS: The petitioner and respondent were married and had four children. Lorna fled a
petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity
on the part of her husband. She alleged that he is emotionally immature and irresponsible.
He was cruel and iolent. He was a habitual drin!er. "heneer she tells him to stop or at
least minimi#e his drin!ing$ her husband would hurt her. There was een a time when she
was chased by a loaded shotgun and threatened to !ill her in the presence of their children.
The children also su%ered physical iolence. &etitioner and their children left the home. Two
months later$ they returned upon the promise of respondent to change. 'ut he didn(t. She
was battered again. Her husband was imprisoned for )) days for slight physical in*uries. +TC
declared their marriage null and oid. CA reersed +TC(s ruling. Hence$ this petition.
,SS-.: "/0 the guidelines for psychological incapacity in the case of +epublic s CA 1 2olina
should be ta!en in consideration in deciding in this case.
H.L3: 4es. ,n the 2olina case$ guidelines were laid down by the SC before a case would fall
under the category of psychological incapacity to declare a marriage null and oid. This
decision has force and e%ect of a law. These guidelines are mandatory in nature. &etition
denied.
The 5doctrine of stare decisis$5 ordained in Article 6 of the Ciil Code$ e7presses that *udicial
decisions applying or interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the
&hilippines. The rule follows the settled legal ma7im 8 9legis interpretado legis im obtinet:
8 that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of
law.
*es%a v. *es%a
>acts?
&etitioner Lorna ;. &esca and respondent <osimo A. &esca frst met sometime in )=>? while
on board an inter@island esselbound for 'acolod City. After a whirlwind courtship$ they got
married on AB 2arch )=>?. They did not lie together as petitioner wasstill a student in
college and respondent$ a seaman$ had to leae the country on board an ocean@going essel
barely a month after themarriage. Si7 months later$ the young couple established their
residence in Cue#on City until they were able to build their own housein Caloocan City where
they fnally resided. ,t was blissful marriage for the couple during the two months of the year
that they couldstay together @ when respondent was on acation. The union begot four
children$ )=@year old +uhem$ )>@year old +e#$ ))@year old+yan$ and =@year old +ichie.,t
started in )=66$ petitioner said$ when she noticed that respondent surprisingly showed signs
of 5psychological incapacity5 toperform his marital coenant. His 5true color5 of being an
emotionally immature and irresponsible husband became apparent. He wascruel$ iolent and
a habitual drin!er. At one time$ he chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun and threatened
to !ill her in thepresence of the children. The children themseles were not spared from
physical iolence.Finally$ on )= 0oember )==D$ petitioner and her children left the con*ugal
abode. Two months later$ petitioner decided toforgie respondent$ and she returned home to
gie him a chance to change. 'ut$ to her dismay$ things did not so turn out ase7pected.
,ndeed$ matters became worse. &etitioner fled a complaint with the barangay authorities$
and a case was fled againstrespondent for slight physical in*uries. He was conicted by the
2etropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City and sentenced to eleendays of
imprisonment.&etitioner and her children left the con*ugal home for good and stayed with
her sister. &etitioner sued respondent before the+egional Trial Court for the declaration of
nullity of their marriage ino!ing psychological incapacity. &etitioner li!ewise sought
thecustody of her minor children and prayed for support pendente lite. The Court of Appeals
reersed the decision of the trial court anddeclared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent alid and subsisting. &etitioner$ in her plea to this Court$ would hae thedecision
of the Court of Appeals reersed on the thesis that the doctrine enunciated in Santos s.
Court of Appeals$ promulgated on )E Fanuary )==?$ as well as the guidelines set out in
+epublic s. Court of Appeals and 2olina$ promulgated on )B February )==>$ shouldhae no
retroactie application and$ on the assumption that the 2olina ruling could be applied
retroactiely$ the guidelines thereinoutlined should be ta!en to be merely adisory and not
mandatory in nature. ,n any case$ petitioner argues$ the application of theSantos and 2olina
dicta should warrant only a remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings and
not its dismissal.
,ssue:
"hether or not psychological incapacity is present in this case.
Held:
.&etitioner Lorna ;. &esca and respondent <osimo A. &esca frst met sometime in )=>? while
on board an inter@island esselbound for 'acolod City. After a whirlwind courtship$ they got
married on AB 2arch )=>?. They did not lie together as petitioner wasstill a student in
college and respondent$ a seaman$ had to leae the country on board an ocean@going essel
barely a month after themarriage. Si7 months later$ the young couple established their
residence in Cue#on City until they were able to build their own housein Caloocan City where
they fnally resided. ,t was blissful marriage for the couple during the two months of the year
that they couldstay together @ when respondent was on acation. The union begot four
children$ )=@year old +uhem$ )>@year old +e#$ ))@year old+yan$ and =@year old +ichie.,t
started in )=66$ petitioner said$ when she noticed that respondent surprisingly showed signs
of 5psychological incapacity5 toperform his marital coenant. His 5true color5 of being an
emotionally immature and irresponsible husband became apparent. He wascruel$ iolent and
a habitual drin!er. At one time$ he chased petitioner with a loaded shotgun and threatened
to !ill her in thepresence of the children. The children themseles were not spared from
physical iolence.Finally$ on )= 0oember )==D$ petitioner and her children left the con*ugal
abode. Two months later$ petitioner decided toforgie respondent$ and she returned home to
gie him a chance to change. 'ut$ to her dismay$ things did not so turn out ase7pected.
,ndeed$ matters became worse. &etitioner fled a complaint with the barangay authorities$
and a case was fled againstrespondent for slight physical in*uries. He was conicted by the
2etropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan City and sentenced to eleendays of
imprisonment.&etitioner and her children left the con*ugal home for good and stayed with
her sister. &etitioner sued respondent before the+egional Trial Court for the declaration of
nullity of their marriage ino!ing psychological incapacity. &etitioner li!ewise sought
thecustody of her minor children and prayed for support pendente lite. The Court of Appeals
reersed the decision of the trial court anddeclared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent alid and subsisting. &etitioner$ in her plea to this Court$ would hae thedecision
of the Court of Appeals reersed on the thesis that the doctrine enunciated in Santos s.
Court of Appeals$ promulgated on )E Fanuary )==?$ as well as the guidelines set out in
+epublic s. Court of Appeals and 2olina$ promulgated on )B February )==>$ shouldhae no
retroactie application and$ on the assumption that the 2olina ruling could be applied
retroactiely$ the guidelines thereinoutlined should be ta!en to be merely adisory and not
mandatory in nature. ,n any case$ petitioner argues$ the application of theSantos and 2olina
dicta should warrant only a remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings and
not its dismissal.The phrase 5psychological incapacity5 borrowed from Canon law$ is an
entirely noel proision in our statute boo!s$ and$ untilthe relatiely recent enactment of the
Family Code$ the concept has escaped *urisprudential attention.At all eents$ petitioner has
utterly failed$ both in her allegations in the complaint and in her eidence$ to ma!e out a
case of psychological incapacity on the part of respondent$ let alone at the time of
solemni#ation of the contract$ so as to warrant adeclaration of nullity of the marriage.
.motional immaturity and irresponsibility$ ino!ed by her$ cannot be eGuated with
psychologicalincapacity.The Court reiterates its reminder that marriage is an iniolable social
institution and the foundation of the familyHthat the Statecherishes and protects. "hile the
Court commiserates with petitioner in her unhappy marital relationship with respondent$
totallyterminating that relationship$ howeer$ may not necessarily be the ftting denouement
to it. ,n these cases$ the law has not Guitegien up$ neither should we.
&etition is 3enied
Nerwin v. PNOC, G.R. No. 167057, April 11, 2012
FACTS: ,n )===$ 0ational .lectrifcation Administration I0.AJ published an initation to pre@
Gualify and to bid for a contract !nown as ,&' 0o. 6A for the supply and deliery of about
HA$AAA pieces of wood poles and DA$AAA of cross@arms. 0erwin was one of the bidders The
contract was awarded to him being the lowest bidder. Howeer$ 0.A(s board of directors
passed a resolution reducing by ?AK the material reGuirements for ,&' 6A to which 0erwin
protested. A losing bidder$ Tri State and &acifc Synergy fled a complaint alleging the
documents 0erwin submitted during the pre@Gualifcation bid were falsifed. Finding a way to
nullify the bid$ 0.A sought the opinion of ;o(t Corporate Counsel who upheld the eligibility
of 0erwin. 0.A allegedly held negotiations with other bidders for ,&' 6A contract. As a result$
0erwin fled a complaint with prayer of in*unction which was grabted by +TC 2anila. &0LC 8
.nergy 3e(t Corp issued an initation to pre@Gualify and bid for L@,LA" pro*ect. 0erwin fled
a ciil action in +TC alleging that it was an attempt to sub*ect portions of ,&' 6A to another
bidding. He prayed for T+L to en*oin respondents to the proposed bidding. +espondents
aerred that this is in iolation of a rule that goernment infrastructure are not sub*ect to
T+Ls. +TC granted T+L neertheless. CA ruled in faor of respondents. Hence$ this petition.
,SS-.: "/0 CA erred in dismissing the case pursuant to +A 6=>? which prohibits issuance of
T+L e7cept SC to go(t pro*ects
H.L3: 3ecision of CA aMrmed. Sec B of +A 6=>? clearly prohibits issuance of T+L$
preliminary in*unctions$ and preliminary mandatory in*unctions against go(t.

3erwin v !3O,, G)2) 3o) 85;F9;, (pril 88, :F8:
>acts?
8) In 8777, the 3ational &lectrification (dministration #3&($ published an invitation to pre4.ualify and to bid for a
contract, otherwise known as I!A 3o) =F, for the supply and delivery of about si'ty thousand #5F,FFF$ pieces of
woodpoles andtwenty thousand #:F,FFF$ pieces of crossarms needed in the countrys 2ural &lectrification !ro-ect)
:) Thereafter, the .ualified bidders submitted their financial bids where private respondent N3erwinO emerged as the
lowest bidder for all schedulescomponentsof the contract) 3&( then conducted a pre4award inspection of private
respondents N3erwinsO manufacturing plants and facilities, including its identified supplier in @alaysia, to determine
its capability to supply and deliver 3&(s re.uirements)
6) 1pon learning of the issuance of 2e.uisition 3o) >GQ 6F7F<28 for the O4I%(* !ro-ect, 3erwin filed a civil
action in the 2T, in @anila, docketed as ,ivil ,ase3o) F68F57:8 entitled 3erwin Industries ,orporation v) !3O,4
&nergy "evelopment ,orporation and &ster 2) Guerzon, as ,hairman, Aids and (wards ,ommittee, alleging that
2e.uisition 3o) >GQ 6F7F<28 was an attempt to sub-ect a portion of the itemscovered by I!A 3o) =F to another
biddingE and praying that a T2O issue to en-oinrespondentsproposed bidding for the wooden poles)
<) 2espondents sought the dismissal of ,ivil ,ase 3o) F68F57:8, stating that the complaint averred no cause of
action, violated the rule that government infrastructure pro-ects were not to be sub-ected to T2Os, contravened the
mandatory prohibition against non4forum shopping, and the corporate president had no authorityto sign and file the
complaint)
9) Thence, respondents commenced in the ,ourt of (ppeals #,($ a special civil action for certiorari #,(4G2 +! 3o)
=68<<$, alleging that the 2T, had thereby committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or e'cess of
-urisdiction in holding that 3erwin had been entitled to the issuance of the writ of preliminary in-unction despite the
e'press prohibition from the law and from the +upreme ,ourtEin issuing the T2O in blatant violation of the 2ules of
,ourt and established -urisprudenceE in declaring respondents in defaultE and in dis.ualifying respondents counsel
from representing them)
Issuess
8) *hether or not the ,( erred in dismissing the case on the basis of 2ep) (ct =7;9 prohibiting the issuance of
temporary restraining orders and preliminary in-unctions, e'cept if issued by the +upreme ,ourt, on government
pro-ects)2uling
8) The petition fails)
In its decision of October ::, :FF<, the ,( e'plained why it annulled and set aside the assailed orders of the 2T,
issued on Quly :F, :FF6 and "ecember :7, :FF6,and why it altogether dismissed ,ivil ,ase 3o) F68F57:8, as
follows?
a) It is beyond dispute that the cru' of the instant case is the propriety of respond Qudges issuance of a preliminary
in-unction, or the earlier T2O, for that matter)
b) 2espondent Qudge gravely abused his discretion in entertaining an application forpreliminary in-unction, and
worse, in issuing a preliminary in-unction throughthe assailed order en-oining petitioners sought bidding for its O4
I%(* !ro-ect) The same is a palpable violation of 2( =7;9 which was approved on 3ovember ;, :FFF, thus,
already e'isting at the time respondent Qudge issued the assailed Orders dated Quly :F and "ecember :7, :FF6)
:) The said proscription is not entirely new) 2( =7;9 merely supersedes !" 8=8= whicunderscored the prohibition
to courts from issuing restraining orders or preliminary in-unctions in cases involving infrastructure or 3ational
2esources "evelopment pro-ects of, and public utilities operated by, the government) This law was, in fact, earlier
upheld to have such a mandatory nature by the +upreme ,ourt
Consuni vs. Cour! o" Appeals, G. R. No. 137#73, April 20, 2001
Fa%ts : Qose Quego, a construction worker of ") @) ,onsun-i, Inc), fell 8< floors from the 2enaissance Tower, !asig
,ity to his death) De was crushed to death when the platform he was then on board and performing work, fell) (nd
the falling of the platform was due to the removal or getting loose of the pin which was merely inserted to the
connecting points of the chain block and platform but without a safety lock) Qose Quegos widow, @aria, filed in the
2egional Trial ,ourt #2T,$ of !asig a complaint for damages against the deceaseds employer, ")@) ,onsun-i, Inc)
The employer raised, among other defenses, the widows prior availment of the benefits from the +tate Insurance
>und) 2espondent avers, among others that the widow cannot recover for from the company anymore an civil
damages on the account that it has recovered damages under the %abor ,ode)
(fter trial, the 2T, rendered a decision in favor of the widow and awarded actual and compensatory damages) On
appeal, the ,( affirmed the 2T, in toto)
Issue: *hether or not private respondent is barred from availing of death benefits under the ,ivil ,ode after
recovering from damages provided for under the %abor ,ode)
He#d: The +upreme ,ourt has already ruled in various cases that a recovery of damages under the *orkers
,ompensation (ct is a bar to a recovery under an ordinary civil action) It ruled that an in-ured worker has a choice
of either remedies) The +upreme ,ourt allowed some e'ceptions) In the case at bar, the ,( ruled that the widow had
a right to file an ordinary action for civil actions because she was not aware and was ignorant of her rights and
courses of action)
*hen a party having knowledge of the facts makes an election between inconsistent remedies, the election is final
and bars any action, suit, or proceeding inconsistent with the elected remedy, in the absence of fraud by the other
party) The first act of election acts as a bar) &.uitable in nature, the doctrine of election of remedies is designed to
mitigate possible unfairness to both parties) It rests on the moral premise that it is fair to hold people responsible for
their choices) The purpose of the doctrine is not to prevent any recourse to any remedy, but to prevent a double
redress for a single wrong) The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by election)
Dowever, waiver re.uires a knowledge of the facts basic to the e'ercise of the right waived, with an awareness of its
conse.uences) That a waiver is made knowingly and intelligently must be illustrated on the record or by the
evidence) ( person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that person knows that a right e'ists and has
ade.uate knowledge upon which to make an intelligent decision)
In the case at bar, the widow was not aware of her rights and remedies and thus her election to claim from the
Insurance >und does not constitute a waiver on her part to claim from the petitioner4company) !etitioners argument
that (rt 6 of the 3ew ,ivil ,ode, stating that BIgnorance of the law e'cuses no oneC cannot stand) The +upreme
,ourt ruled that the application of (rticle 6 is limited to mandatory and prohibitory laws) This may be deduced from
the language of the provision, which, notwithstanding a persons ignorance, does not e'cuse his or her compliance
with the laws) The rule in >loresca allowing private respondent a choice of remedies is neither mandatory nor
prohibitory) (ccordingly, her ignorance thereof cannot be held against her )
GR No. 137873 April 20, 2001
Consunji vs. Court of Appeals
FACTS:
At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14
foors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. On May 9, 1991, Jose Juegos widow, Maria,
fled in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceaseds employer,
D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widows prior availment of the
benefts from the State Insurance Fund. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow
Maria Juego.
On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) afrmed the decision of the RTC in toto.
D. M. Consunji then sought the reversal of the CA decision.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioner is held liable under the grounds of negligence.
2. Whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a right of selection or
choice of action between availing themselves of the workers right under the Workmens Compensation
Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and
exemplary) from the employers by virtue of the negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may
avail themselves cumulatively of both actions,
RULING:
1. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (the thing or transaction speaks for itself) is peculiar to the
law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof
and furnishes a substitute for specifc proof of negligence. It has the following requisites: (1) the accident
was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or
agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence;
and (3)the injury sufered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the
person injured. All the requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are present in the case
at bar, thus a reasonable presumption or inference of appellants negligence arises. Petitioner does not
cite any other evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of negligence arising from the application of
res ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the incident.
D. The claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their employment could be fled
only under the Workmens Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further claims under other laws. In
the course of availing the remedies provided under the Workmens Compensation law, the claimants are
deemed to have waived theirknown right of the remedies provided by other laws. The Court of Appeals,
however, held that the case at bar came under exception because private respondent was unaware of
petitioners negligence when she fled her claim for death benefts from the State Insurance Fund. Had
the claimant been aware, she wouldve opted to avail of a better remedy than that of which she already
had.
$.%. CON&'N() vs. CO'R* O+ APP,A-&
GR No. 137#73
April 20, 2001
FACTS: Ln 0oember D$ )==A$ Fose Fuego$ a construction wor!er of 3.2. Consun*i$
,nc.$ fell )E Noors from the +enaissance Tower$ &asig City to his death. Ln 2ay =$ )==)$ Fose
FuegoOs widow$ fled in the +TC of &asig a complaint for damages against the deceasedOs
employer$ 3.2. Consun*i$ ,nc. The employer raised$ among other defenses$ the widowOs prior
aailment of the benefts from the State ,nsurance Fund. The +TC rendered a decision in
faor of the widow 2aria Fuego$ ordering the defendant to pay plainti%. Ln appeal by 3.2.
Consun*i$ the CA aMrmed the decision of the +TC in toto. Hence$ this petition.
,ssue: "hether or not the petitioner IConsun*iJ is negligent and should be liable.
Held:
The decision of the CA is aMrmed.
The claims for damages sustained by wor!ers in the course of their employment could be
fled only under the "or!menOs Compensation Law$ to the e7clusion of all further claims
under other laws. The CA held that the case at bar came under e7ception because priate
respondent was unaware of petitionerOs negligence when she fled her claim for death
benefts from the State ,nsurance Fund.
H9*TE ,. 3U:E,48 *ETITI46E,8 7S. *HILI**I6E C4;;U6IC3TI46S S3TELLITE
C4,*4,3TI468 ,ES*46DE6T.
<.,. 6o. 1/=>?>8 :anuary 1?8 0@10
Fa%ts:
It was in 875; that the petitioner started working for respondent !hilippine ,ommunications +atellite ,orporation
#!hilcomsat$ as an accountant in the latters >inance "epartment) On (ugust 89, :FF8 or after 6< years of service,
the petitioner applied for early retirement) Dis application for retirement was approved, effective +eptember 89,
:FF8, entitling him to receive retirement benefits at a rate e.uivalent to one and a half of his monthly salary for
every year of service) (t that time, the petitioner was !hilcomsats +enior 0ice4!resident with a monthly salary of
!:;<,=F9)FF)
On +eptember 8:, :FF8, the petitioner e'ecuted a "eed of 2elease and Suitclaim in !hilcomsats favor, following
his receipt from the latter of a check in the amount of !7,<67,6:;)78)
(lmost three #6$ years thereafter, the petitioner filed a complaint for unpaid retirement benefits, claiming that the
actual amount of his retirement pay is !8<,F89,F99)FF and the !7,<67,6:;)78 he received from !hilcomsat as
supposed settlement for all his claims is unconscionable, which is more than enough reason to declare his .uitclaim
as null and void) (ccording to the petitioner, he had no choice but to accept a lesser amount as he was in dire need
thereof and was all set to return to his hometown and he signed the .uitclaim despite the considerable deficiency as
no single centavo would be released to him if he did not e'ecute a release and waiver in !hilcomsats favor)
The petitioner claims that his right to receive the full amount of his retirement benefits, which is e.uivalent to one
and a half of his monthly salary for every year of service, is provided under the 2etirement !lan that !hilcomsat
created on Qanuary 8, 87;; for the benefit of its employees)
Issue: *hether the .uitclaim e'ecuted by the petitioner in !hilcomsats favor is valid, thereby foreclosing his right
to institute any claim against !hilcomsat)
He#d:
*hile the law looks with disfavor upon releases and .uitclaims by employees who are inveigled or pressured into
signing them by unscrupulous employers seeking to evade their legal responsibilities, a legitimate waiver
representing a voluntary settlement of a laborers claims should be respected by the courts as the law between the
parties)
N:7O
,onsidering the petitioners claim of fraud and bad faith against !hilcomsat to be unsubstantiated, this
,ourt finds the .uitclaim in dispute to be legitimate waiver)
*hile the petitioner bewailed as having been coerced or pressured into signing the release and waiver, his failure to
present evidence renders his allegation self4serving and inutile to invalidate the same) That no portion of his
retirement pay will be released to him or his urgent need for funds does not constitute the pressure or coercion
contemplated by law)
A.sen! an/ evi0ence !1a! an/ o" !1e vices o" consen! is presen!, !1e 2ui!clai3
e4ecu!e0 ./ a par!/ cons!i!u!es a vali0 an0 .in0in5 a5ree3en!.
>(,T+?
!etitioner Dypte (u-ero was the 0ice !resident of respondent company !hilippine ,ommunications +atellite
,orporation #!hilcomsat$) (fter 6< years, he applied for an early retirement which was approved) This entitled
(u-ero to receive his retirement benefits at a rate e.uivalent to one and a half of his monthly salary for every year of
service)
(u-ero subse.uently e'ecuted a "eed of 2elease and Suitclaim in !hilcomsats favor following his receipt from the
latter of a check in the amount of !7,<67,6:;)78) (fter 6 years, (u-ero filed a complaint for unpaid retirement
benefits claiming that the actual amount of his retirement pay is !8<,F89,F99)FF) (u-ero contends that the
significantly deficient amount he previously received was more than an enough reason to declare his .uitclaim null
and void) (u-ero further claimed that he had no choice but to accept the lesser amount as he was in dire need of
money)
The %abor (rbiter #%($ ruled in favor of (u-ero and directed !hilcomsat to pay the balance of his retirement pay)
The %( maintained that !hilcomsat failed to substantiate its claim that the amount received by (u-ero was a product
of negotiations between the parties) On appeal, the 3ational %abor 2elations ,ommissions #3%2,$ reversed the
decision of the %( and decided in favor of !hilcomsat) The ,ourt of (ppeals affirmed the decision of the 3%2,)
I++1&?
*hether the .uitclaim e'ecuted by the petitioner in !hilcomsats favor is valid, thereby foreclosing his right to
institute any claim against !hilcomsat
D&%"?
!etition G2(3T&"
*hile the law looks with disfavor upon releases and .uitclaims by employees who are inveigled or pressured into
signing them by unscrupulous employers seeking to evade their legal responsibilities, a legitimate waiver
representing a voluntary settlement of a laborerTs claims should be respected by the courts as the law between the
parties) ,onsidering (u-eros claim of fraud and bad faith against !hilcomsat to be unsubstantiated, the ,ourt finds
the .uitclaim in dispute to be legitimate waiver)
That (u-ero was all set to return to his hometown and was in dire need of money would likewise not .ualify as
undue pressure sufficient to invalidate the .uitclaim) "ire necessity may be an acceptable ground to annul .uitclaims
if the consideration is unconscionably low and the employee was tricked into accepting it, but is not an acceptable
ground for annulling the release when it is not shown that the employee has been forced to e'ecute it) *hile it is the
,ourts duty to prevent the e'ploitation of employees, it also behooves this ,ourt to protect the sanctity of contracts
that do not contravene our laws)
(u-eros educational background and employment stature render it improbable that he was pressured, intimidated or
inveigled into signing the sub-ect .uitclaim) The ,ourt cannot permit the petitioner to relieve himself from the
conse.uences of his act, when his knowledge and understanding thereof is e'pected) (lso, the period of time that
(u-ero allowed to lapse before filing a complaint to recover the supposed deficiency in his retirement pay clouds his
motives, leading to the reasonable conclusion that his claim of being aggrieved is a mere afterthought, if not a mere
pretention)
DR!T& 2) (1Q&2O 0+)!DI%I!!I3& ,O@@13I,(TIO3+ +(T&%%IT& ,O2!O2(TIO3
>acts
!etitioner started working for !hilcomsat in 875; as an accountant) On (ugust 89, :FF8 orafter 6< years of service,
he applied for early retirement and the same was approved on +eptember 89,:FF8) "uring that time, he was the
+enior 0ice4!resident) De e'ecuted a "eed of 2elease and Suitclaim in !hilcomsats favor on +eptember 8:, :FF:
with a receipt from the latter of a check in theamount of ! 7,<67, 6:;)78)
(fter almost 6 years, petitioner filed a complaint for unpaid retirement benefits claiming thatthe actual amount of his
retirement pay is ! 8<, F89, F99)FF and the ! 7, <67, 6:;)78 that he receivedas supposed settlement is
unconscionable) Thus, his .uitclaim must be declared as null and void) Desaid that he had no choice but to accept
said amount because he was in dire need thereof and he wasready to return to his hometown so he signed the
.uitclaim despite the deficiency as no money wouldbe released if he did not e'ecute a release and waiver in
!hilcomsats favor) (ccording to him, theletter of !hilcomsats chairman and president addressed to 1,!A for the
release of ! 7,<67,6:;)78 tohim and ! <,9;9,;:;)F7 to !hilcomsat, which predated the e'ecution of his .uitclaim,
indicates the companys pre4conceived plans to deprive him of a portion of his retirement pay)
The %( decided in favor of the petitioner and ordered !hilcomsat to pay him ! <,9;9,;:;)F7and ! :;<,=F9)FF as
balance of his retirement benefits and salary for the period from (ugust 89 to+eptember 89, :FF8) !etitioners
complaint for unpaid retirement benefits and salary was dismissedbecause he failed to prove that !hilcomsat
employed means to vitiate his consent to the .uitclaim)
!hilcomsats appeal to the 3%2, from %(s decision was filed and its surety bond posted beyond the prescribed
period of 8F days but since it was only one day delayed, the 3%2, disregardthe procedural lapse L proceeded with
the appeal)
!etitioner later filed for a petition for certiorari accusing 32%, with grave abuse of discretion for proceeding
despite respondents belated appeal) De claimed that when !hilcomsat filedits appeal and posted its surety bond,
%(s decision became final and e'ecutory and the failure of !hilcomsats counsel to verify the copy does not
constitute e'cusable negligence)
The ,( however, found no merit in the claim of petitioner and ruled that the 3%2, wascorrect in upholding the
validity of the .uitclaim because the terms of the "eed of 2elease andSuitclaim were reasonable and there was no
showing that !hilcomsat employed coercion, fraud orundue influence upon petitioner to compel him to sign the
same)
Issues
8) *hether or not the delay in the filing of !hilcomsats appeal and posting of surety bond is ine'cusableE and
:) *hether or not the .uitclaim e'ecuted by the petitioner in !hilcomsats favor is valid, thereby foreclosing his
right to institute any claim against !hilcomsat
2uling
The ,ourt rules in !hilcomsats favor since procedural rules may be waived or dispensed with inabsolutely
meritorious cases) (ccording to !hilcomsat, when petitioner made the e'ecution of the.uitclaim, it was voluntary)
Dis educational attainment and the position he occupied also militateagainst his claim that he was pressured or
coerced into signing the .uitclaim) (bsent any evidence that any vices of consent is present and considering the
petitioners position and education, the .uitclaim e'ecuted by the petitioner constitutes a valid and binding
agreement)
7i##area# v. *eop#e
>)>) ,21M L ,O), I3,
vs)
D2 ,O3+T21,TIO3 ,O2!) @arch 8<,:F8:
>(,T+?
>>,,I entered into a contract with "!*D for the construction of the @agsaysay 0iaduct)>>,,I, in turn, entered
into a +ubcontract (greement with D2,, for the supply of materials,labor, e.uipment, tools and supervision for the
construction of a portion of the said pro-ect)!ursuant to the +ubcontract (greement, D2,, would submit to >>,,I
a monthly progress billing which the latter would then pay within 6F days from receipt thereof) The parties
agreedthat the re.uests of D2,, for payment should include progress accomplishment of its completedworks as
approved by >>,,I) &ventually, >>,,I did not pay the amount stated in the secondand third progress billing, even
though D2,, submitted its progress billins claiming that it hadalready paid D2,, for the completed works for the
period stated therein) D2,, demanded payment but still was not paid so D2,, halted the construction of the
subcontracted pro-ect)
I++1&?
*hether >>,,Is non4compliance with their contract make D2,, rescission valid
21%I3G
3O, D2,, had waived its right to rescind the +ubcontract agreementThe determination of the validity of D2,,s
work stoppage depends on a determination of thefollowing? first, whether D2,, has the right to e'tra-udicially
rescind the +ubcontract(greementE and second, whether >>,,I is already barred from disputing the work stoppage
of D2,,) D2,, had waived its right to rescind the +ubcontract (greement)The right of rescission is statutorily
recognized in reciprocal obligations) (rticle 8878 of the,ivil ,ode pertinently reads?(rt) 8878) The power to rescind
obligations is implied in reciprocalones, in case one of the obligors should not comply with what is incumbent upon
him)Thein-ured party may choose between the fulfillment and the rescission of the obligation, with the payment of
damages in either case) De may also seek rescission, even after he has chosenfulfillment, if the latter should become
impossible),ontrary to the respective dispositions of the ,I(, and the ,(, we find that D2,, had no rightto
rescind the +ubcontract (greement in the guise of a work stoppage, the latter having waivedsuch right in its
+ubcontract (greement, Dence, in spite of the e'istence of dispute or controversy between the parties during the
course of the +ubcontract (greement, D2,, hadagreed to continue the performance of its obligations pursuant to
the +ubcontract (greement) Inview of the provision of the +ubcontract (greement .uoted above, D2,, is deemed
to haveeffectively waived its right to effect e'tra-udicial rescission of its contract with >>,,I)
8Uwphi8
(ccordingly, D2,,, in the guise of rescinding the +ubcontract (greement, was not -ustified inimplementing a
work stoppage)
>)>) ,21M L ,O), I3,) vs) D2 ,O3+T21,TIO3 ,O2!O2(TIO3 G)2) 3o) 8=;9:8 @arch 8<, :F8:
>acts?
+ometime in :FF<, >>,,I entered into a contract with the "epartment of !ublic *orks and Dighways #"!*D$ for
the construction of the @agsaysay 0iaduct, known as the %ower (gusan "evelopment !ro-ect) On (ugust 7, :FF<,
>>,,I, in turn, entered into a +ubcontract (greement with D2 ,onstruction ,orporation #D2,,$ for the supply of
materials, labor, e.uipment, tools and supervision for the construction of a portion of the said pro-ect called the &ast
Aank %evee and ,ut4Off ,hannel in accordance with the specifications of the main contract) !ursuant to the
+ubcontract (greement, D2,, would submit to >>,,I a monthly progress billing which the latter would then pay,
sub-ect to stipulated deductions, within 6F days from receipt thereof) The parties agreed that the re.uests of D2,,
for payment should include progress accomplishment of its completed works as approved by >>,,I) (dditionally,
they agreed to conduct a -oint measurement of the completed works of D2,, together with the representative of
"!*D and consultants to arrive at a common .uantity) Thereafter, D2,, commenced the construction of the works
pursuant to the +ubcontract (greement) Dowever, before the pro-ect was completed, D2,, pursuant to the
arbitration clause in the subcontract agreement filed with the ,onstruction Industry (rbitration ,ommission a
complaint praying that >>,I pay the overdue application plus legal interests they have not paid) >>,,I maintained
that D2,, failed to comply with the condition stated under the +ubcontract (greement for the payment of the
latterVs progress billings, i)e) -oint measurement of the completed works, and, hence, it was -ustified in not paying
the amount stated in D2,,Vs progress billings)

Issue?
*hether or not >>,,I is already barred from contesting D2,,Vs valuation of the completed works having waived
its right to demand the -oint measurement re.uirement)
2uling?
The +upreme ,ourt held that >>,,I had waived its right to demand for a -oint
measurement of D2,,Vs completed works under the +ubcontract (greement) >urther, on account of its failure to
demand the -oint measurement of D2,,Vs completed works, had effectively waived
its right to ask for the conduct of the same as a condition sine .ua non to D2,,Vs submission of its monthly
progress billings) Aasically, the instant issue calls for a determination as to which of the partiesV respective
valuation of accomplished works should be given credence) >>,,I claims that its valuation should be upheld since
the same was the result of a measurement of the completed works conducted by it and the "!*D) On the other
hand, D2,, maintains that its valuation should be upheld on account of >>,,IVs failure to observe the -oint
measurement re.uirement in ascertaining the e'tent of its completed works) >>,,I admits that in all three instances
where it paid D2,, for its progress billings, it never re.uired compliance with the afore.uoted contractual
provision of a prior -oint .uantification) +uch repeated omission may reasonably be construed as a waiver by >>,,I
of its contractual right to re.uire compliance of said condition and it is now too late in the day to so impose it)
(rticle 5 of the ,ivil ,ode e'pressly provides that Wrights may be waived unless the waiver is contrary to law,
public order, public policy, morals or good customs ) The tribunal cannot see any such violation in this case