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INFANT MENTAL HEALTH JOURNAL, Vol. 22(12), 95131 (2001)
2001 Michigan Association for Infant Mental Health
A R T I C L E
INTRINSIC MOTIVES FOR COMPANIONSHIP
IN UNDERSTANDING: THEIR ORIGIN,
DEVELOPMENT, AND SIGNIFICANCE FOR
INFANT MENTAL HEALTH
COLWYN TREVARTHEN
Department of Psychology, The University of Edinburgh
ABSTRACT: Human beings are not merely social, they are inherently cultural. Infants are born with motives
in their complex brains that lead them to learn through communicating about intentions, interests, and
feelings with trusted companions, and to interpret with them a common reality. A baby is weak, immature
in behaviour, and dependent on parental care and external regulation of emotions and protection from
stress. But the baby is also capable and interested from birth in engaging protoconversationally with
the dynamic thoughts and enthusiams of caregivers. Long before speaking, infants imitate purposeful
actions and recognise objects that others treat as meaningful, responding sympathetically to emotions
that evaluate these objects. How they do this, their motives for cooperative intersubjectivity or joint
consciousness in companionship, has been elucidated by detailed analysis of the purposeful regulation
of expressions between parents and infants from birth to the threshold of language.
The emotions of relating to share intelligent awareness of a world are additional to those self-
regulatory emotions that express pleasure or pain, interest, fatigue, hunger, and so on. They are relational
emotions, anticipating contingent rhythms and sympathy of interest from others, and collaboration in
purposes. The so-called complex emotions, the interpersonal sense of pride in admired accomplish-
ment, and shame in being misunderstood or disliked, are part of the innate human moral condition.
Powerful innate emotions of human relating, evident in infants, and different from those that establish
and regulate attachment for care and protection, bring risks of mental illness associated with failure in
collaborative intersubjectivity. The principles of infant mental health dene the fundamental interpersonal
needs for the whole life cycle.
RESUMEN: El ser humano no es solamente un ser social sino que inherentemente tambien es cultural. Los
infantes nacen con fuerzas motrices en sus complejos cerebros, las cuales los llevan a aprender por medio
de comunicarse sobre sus intenciones, intereses y sentimientos con personas en quienes conf an, y a
interpretar con esas personas una realidad comun. En cuanto a su comportamiento, todo infante es debil
y no ha alcanzado la madurez necesaria, y tambien depende del cuidado de los padres, de regulaciones
exteriores de las emociones y de la proteccion contra la tension. Por otra parte, desde el nacimiento el
infante es capaz de y se interesa por participar protoconversacionalmente en los pensamientos dinamicos
y el entusiasmo de quienes lo cuidan. Mucho antes de poder hablar, los infantes imitan intencionalmente
las acciones y reconocen los objetos que otros consideran importantes, respondiendo as , comprensiva-
Direct correspondence to: C. Trevarthen, Department of Psychology, University of Edinburgh, 7 George Square,
Edinburgh, EH8 9JZ, Scotland.
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mente, a las emociones que evaluan estos objetos. Como lo hacen, cuales son sus intenciones de mantener
una intersubjetividad cooperadora o una consciencia conjunta en lo que respecta al estar acompanado ha
sido aclarado por medio del analisis detallado de la intencionada regulacion de las expresiones entre los
padres y sus infantes, desde el nacimiento hasta el momento en que aparecen las primeras senas del habla.
Las emociones de asociarse para compartir el despertar inteligente de un mundo van mas alla de aquellas
emociones autorregulatorias que expresan placer o dolor, interes, fatiga, hambre, etc. Son emociones de
la relacion, anticipando eventuales ritmos y comprension de interes de parte de otros, as como la cola-
boracion en cuanto a los propositos. Las as llamadas emociones complejas, el sentido interpersonal
de orgullo en la admiracion del talento, y la verguenza de que no se le entienda o se le acepte, son parte
de la innata condicion moral humana. Las poderosas innatas emociones de relaciones humanas, evidentes
en los infantes, y diferentes de aquellas que establecen y reglamentan la union afectiva en cuanto al
cuidado y la proteccion, presentan riesgos de enfermedad mental asociados con las fallas en la intersub-
jetividad de colaboracion. Los principios de la salud mental infantil denen las necesidades interperson-
ales fundamentales para el ciclo vital completo.
RE
SUME
: Les etres humains ne sont pas uniquement des tre`s sociaux, ils sont fondamentalement culturels.
Les bebes sont nes avec des motifs dans leurs cerveaux complexes, motifs qui les ame`nent a` apprendre
en communiquant les intentions, les interets et les sentiments, avec des compagnons de conance, et qui
les me`nent a` interpreter avec eux une realite commune. Un bebe est faible, manque de maturite dans son
comportement, et il depend du soin parental et de la reglementation exterieure des emotions et de pro-
tection contre le stress. Mais le bebe est aussi capable de et veut de`s la naissance confronter protocon-
versationnellement les pensees dynamiques et lenthousiasme des modes de soin. Bien avant de parler,
les bebes imitent des actions determinees et reconnaissent des objets que dautres traitent comme impor-
tants, repondant avec comprehension aux emotions qui evaluent ces objets. La manie`re dont ils le font
et leurs motifs dintersubjectivite cooperative ou de conscience conjuguee ont ete elucides par une analyse
detaillee de la regulation determinee dexpressions entre les parents et les bebes, de la naissance a`
lapparition du language. Les emotions liees au rapport an de partager la conscience intelligente dun
monde sajoutent aux emotions autoregulatrices qui expriment le plaisir ou la douleur, linteret, la fatigue,
la faim, etc. Ce sont des emotions relationnelles, anticipant des rythmes contingents et la sympathie
dinteret de la part des autres, et la collaboration dans les motifs. Les emotions soit-disant complexes,
le sens interpersonnel de erte dans la reussite admiree, et la honte a` etre mal compris ou mal aime`
font partie de la condition morale humaine innee. Les puissantes emotions innees des relations humaines,
evidentes chez les bebes, et differentes de celles qui etablissent et regulent lattachement pour le soin et
la protection, entra nent des risques de maladie mentale associes a` lechec de lintersubjectivite collab-
orative. Les principes de sante mentale du nourrisson denissent les besoins interpersonnels fondamentaux
pour le cycle de vie entier.
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG: Menschliche Wesen sind eigentlich nicht sozial, sie sind angeboren kulturell. Kinder
werden in ihrem komplexen Gehirn mit dem Motiv geboren uber Absichten, Interessen und Gefuhle mit
vertrauenswurdigen Gefahrten zu kommunizieren, und mit ihnen die gewohnliche Realitat zu beurteilen.
Ein Baby ist schwach, unreif im Verhalten und von elterlicher Betreuung, der aussern Regulation von
Gefuhlen und dem Schutz vor Stress abhangig. Aber das Baby kann und will sich ab Geburt mit den
dynamischen Gedanken und der Begeisterung der Betreuungspersonen in einer vor-dialogischen Weise
auseinandersetzen. Lange vor dem Sprechen machen Kleinkinder nutzliche Aktionen nach, erkennen
Objekte, die von anderen als bedeutend behandelt werden und reagieren gleichsinnig auf die Emotionen,
die diese Objekte beurteilen. Wie sie das machen, ihre Motive fur die kooperative Intersubjektivitat, oder
die gemeinsame Erkenntnishaltung in der Gemeinsamkeit, wurde in detaillierten Analysen der absichts-
vollen Regulation der Ausdrucke zwischen Eltern und Kleinkindern von der Geburt bis zum Erlernen der
Sprache feinsinnig untersucht.
Die Gefuhle des Bezogenseins, um intelligente Wachheit in einer Welt zu teilen, sind zusatzlich zu
den selbstregulierenden Gefuhlen, die Lust, Schmerz, Interesse, Mudigkeit, oder Hunger und so weiter,
ausdrucken. Dies sind bezogene Gefuhle, die kontingente Rhythmen und die Einfuhlung durch das
Interesse von Anderen und die Zusammenarbeit bei Aufgaben voraussehen. Die sogenannten kom-
Motives for Companionship in Understanding

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plexen Gefuhle, das zwischenmenschliche Verstandnis von Stolz bei bewunderten Erfolgen, von
Scham, wenn man missverstanden, oder nicht geliebt wird, all das ist ein Teil dessen, um menschlich-
moralische Kenntnisse zu etablieren. Machtige angeborene Emotionen menschlichen Bezogenseins, deu-
tlich vorhanden bei menschlichen Kleinkindern und unterschiedlich von denen, die die Bindung fur die
Versorgung und den Schutz aufbauen und regulieren, bringen das Risiko von seelischer Krankheit in
Verbindung mit dem Versagen in den gemeinsamen Intersubjektivitat mit sich. Die Prinzipien der see-
lischen Gesundheit des Kleinkinds denieren die fundamentalen zwischenmenschlichen Bedurfnisse fur
das gesamte Leben.
* * *
A LARGER VIEW OF HUMAN NATURE
In 30 years it has become clear that a newborn human is by no means psychologically inco-
herent, and the developments that occur in the rst year of infancy give further testimony to
the adaptive organization of innate human motives that guide knowing and learning (Trevar-
then, 1982a, 1993a, 1998b). From the start, these motives are intersubjective they attract and
engage with other persons (BraEten, 1988; Trevarthen, 1979, 1998a; Trevarthen & Aitken,
2000). The emotions that infants express, as well as those expressions of emotion they excite
in parents and others, young or old, are powerful signs of their complex readiness for engage-
ment of purposes and consciousness by means, which, incertain important respects, change
little with age (Izard 1994; Rothbart, 1994; Trevarthen, 1984a, 1993a, 1998c; Tronick, 1989).
These same human motives and emotional regulations that motivate development of
knowledge, skill, and personality carry potential for pathology, and infants can display psy-
chological disorders of self-regulation and of relating to objects and persons (Aitken & Tre-
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base of text varthen, 1997; Schore, 1994, 1996, 1997; Sroufe, 1996; Trevarthen & Aitken, 1994). Failure
of the primary motive mechanisms of the mind are such that it is inevitable that they will have
effects, some potentially very serious, in the future life of the child, adolescent, and adult. To
perceive how such mental health problems can be caused, and how they might best be re-
sponded to in therapy or education, we must possess a comprehensive and accurate idea of
what the infants motives are adapted to achieve in their transactions with the outside world,
and, especially, we must know how understanding with other human beings is achieved (Beebe
& Lachmann, 1988; Brazelton, Tronick, Adamson, Als, & Wise, 1975; Fogel, 1993; Fogel &
Thelen, 1987; Gergeley & Watson, 1999; Neisser, 1994; Papousek & Papousek, 1997; Schore,
1994; Stern, 1985, 1993; Tronick & Field, 1986; Tronick & Weinberg, 1997).
Advances in brain science bring greater appreciation of the intricate relations between in-
trinsic hormonal and neuro-humoral systems that link the internal physiological systems of the
body and its viscera to the cognitive systems that engage with the environment (Damasio, 1994,
1999; Panksepp, 1998a; Pennington & Ozonoff, 1991; Schore, 1994, 1998; Tucker, Derryberry,
& Luu, 2000). Brain functions have an organization in themselves that determines what the
effects of experience will be. It is also becoming very clear that the human central nervous
system, with the human body, is designed for an exceptionally elaborate brain-to-brain linking
so the motive regulations of one brain can powerfully interact with those of the brain in another
person (Aitken & Trevarthen, 1997; Trevarthen, 1989, 1990b). A major change in brain theory
now gives emotions and their interpersonal transmission a regulatory role in both brain growth
and cognitive mastery of experience (Damasio, 1999; Panksepp, 1998b; Tucker, 2000).
The expressive-receptive channel of communication for mind processes has a special im-
portance for an infant, when growth of brain and body are most rapid. Elaborate intuitive
behaviors on both sides facilitate communication between the infant and adult caregiver, and
when there is a fault in either one, the infant is unable to benet from care, and its psychological
development will be affected (Aitken & Trevarthen, 1997). Young infants are usually cared
for by their mothers, but whether it is the biological mother or a mother substitute who attends
to the needs of the infant, the same principles apply. The adaptive motives of the infant specify
needs that can only be met by a sympathetic person who is ready to intuitively respond with
enhanced expression of feelings in immediate, though varied, contingent response to what the
infant expresses (Biglow, 1999; Fogel, 1985, 1993; Hobson, 1993a; Papousek & Papousek,
1987; Stern, 1995; Tronick, 1989; Tronick, Als, & Brazelton, 1980). The importance of motive
coordinations between infants and adults is demonstrated by research on the early stages of
neurodevelopmental disorders, such as autism, Rett syndrome, and Specic Language Impair-
ment, as it is by work on the effects of maternal emotional illness on infant emotions and
psychological growth (Aitken & Trevarthen, 1997; Burford & Trevarthen, 1997; Field, 1992,
1998; Fraiberg, 1980; Hobson, 1993b; Murray & Cooper, 1997; Papousek & Papousek, 1997;
Tager-Flusberg, 1999; Trevarthen & Burford, 2000; Trevarthen & Aitken, 1994, 2000; Tre-
varthen, Aitken, Papoudi, & Robarts, 1998; Tronick & Field, 1986).
Anatomical research on human brains at all stages of development, from the early embryo
to senescence, brings out the pervasive role of intrinsic motive systems in the core of the brain.
These extend forward from the junction of the hindbrain with the spinal cord to the prefrontal
cortex (Holstege, Bandler, & Saper, 1997; Morecraft, Geula, & Mesulam, 1993; ORahilly &
Muller, 1994; Tucker, Derryberry, & Luu, 2000). Limbic structures of the forebrain are recip-
rocally coupled to a network of neurons in the brain stem, and these same brain stem neurons
project monoamine regulator transmitters throughout the cerebellar and neocortical mantles
(Panksepp, 1998a; Trevarthen & Aitken, 1994). The potential of early regulation, by genes and
gene products, in the formation of these core neural systems is indicated by research on Rett
syndrome (Kerr & Witt-Engerstrom, 2000), and by the recent discovery of faults at the level

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base of text of the facial nucleus and superior olive in autism, anatomical deviations that point to a mor-
phogenetic error in the embryo within three weeks of conception (Rodier, 2000; Rodier, Ingram,
Tisdale, Nelson, & Romano, 1996).
New understanding of the role of the prefrontal cortex in higher intersubjective processes
and in their development in the nal phase of infancy, before language is learned, prove that the
human mind is endowed with mechanisms for mirroring narrative thought through the medi-
ation of vocal and gestural expression, and by interactants monitoring each others shifts of both
attention and emotion (Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998; Schore, 1994, 1996, 1998). There is evidence
that infants as young as six months are motivated to share cognitive topics, or purposes and
interests, directed to the surrounding environment as well as to persons, and not just emotions
related to regulation of physiological states or levels of arousal and excitement or direct inter-
personal exchanges (Adamson & Russell, 1999; Hood, 1995; Johnson & Morton, 1991; Moore,
1999; Muir & Hains, 1999; Posner & Rothbart, 1998; Trevarthen, 1982a; Trevarthen, Murray,
& Hubley, 1981). This gives a different signicance to relational emotions (Stern, 1993, 1999),
the intricate blends and transitions of expression that affect the way a person relates to changing
consciousness of themselves in a companion (Adamson & Russell, 1999; Reddy, 1991; Draghi-
Lorenz, Reddy, & Costall, 2000). The discovery, in the 1960s, of conversational abilities in
infants only a few weeks old (Bateson, 1979) paved the way for acceptance that human mental
development begins with anticipation of shared purposes and interests through rhythmic mirroring
of expressive movements. This adds a new chapter to the story of human needs for sympathetic
relationships, and must carry implications for how emotional disorders, especially those affecting
the infant or young child, may be understood and treated.
INFANTS AS PERSONS WITH PERSONS: INNATE
INTERSUBJECTIVITY THEORY
Descriptive microanalysis of lm records of spontaneous play between infants and their moth-
ers begun in the 1960s gave indications for a radical new approach to human communication
and a new concept of social experience (Trevarthen, 1998a). The theory that grew from this
work aimed to change the view that human social awareness is mediated by instructive or
corrective actions of adults who are intending to constrain impulsive self-serving actions of
children, so they become more socially responsible. New value was given to a primary sharing
of subjective impulses behind conscious experience and intentions, and an understanding was
developed of why a set of motives for this sharing, and for regulating both cognitive and
emotional contacts with other persons, must be innate in their origins and in their strategy of
development (Trevarthen, 1974, 1979, 1982a).
The theory of innate intersubjectivity has been further developed, and its foundations
explained (Trevarthen, 1998a, 1999b). It claims that human beings are equipped at birth with
abilities prepared for sympathetic and cooperative mental life in a society that creates cultural
meanings, seeks to be governed by them, and transmits them to the young (Trevarthen, 1980,
1988). Detailed descriptions of how infants behave in spontaneous response to the intuitive
expressions and shifts of attention of adults who address them as if they were aware and socially
interested persons helps explain the path of development to cultural responsibility and language
(Adamson & Bakeman, 1991; Bruner, 1983; Butterworth & Cochran, 1980; Halliday, 1975;
Locke, 1993; Rommetveit, 1998; Rynn, 1974; Tomasello, 1988; Trevarthen, 1987, 1990a,
1994). The primary aim of this development appears to be to sustain mutually supportive
companionship in experience and purposes, thus preparing the way to a life in a cultural
community with its inventions and history (Bruner, 1996; Trevarthen, 1988).
The key facts are these. Even at birth, an infant may respond with discrimination to expres-
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base of text sions of an adults motive states, showing signs of monitoring their changing direction of interest
and emotional evaluations (Als, 1995; Blass, 1999; Hofer, 1990; Trevarthen, 1997). Newborns
may use all their senses, some more effectively than others, to perceive manifestations of motives
in movements of another human body. They are not only selecting support for internal physio-
logical regulations, nor are they only responsive to caregiving that aims directly to regulate
emotional displaysto stimulate pleasure and to assuage distress or discomfort. Even a pre-
maturely born infant can, if approached with sufcient gentleness, interact within rhythmic
proto-conversational patterns in time with the adults vocalizations, touches, and expressions
of face or hands, turn-taking with the evenly spaced and emotionally enhanced movements that
are characteristically displayed by an attentive and affectionate adult (Trevarthen, 1999a; Tre-
varthen, Kokkinaki, & Fiamenghi, 1999; van Rees & de Leeuw, 1987).
It is important to stress that the psychological state of a human baby at birth is much more
developed than that of a rat pup or kitten, the species of newborns that have been intensively
researched to reveal the intricate signaling and neurohumoral regulatory mechanisms of phys-
iological care and attachment between a mammalian mother and her offspring (Blass, 1999;
Hofer, 1990; Rosenblatt, 1994). This kind of regulation is similar in all mammals, but a human
babys interest in interactions mediated by vocal expressions and eye contact is different in
important respects.
This human competence must come from prenatal developments (Als, 1995; Trevarthen,
1997). Indeed, as will be discussed below, preferential recognition of the voice of a mother
acquired in utero can be demonstrated by the baby in appropriately timed and well-directed
orienting and attending behaviors from a few hours after birth. Often a newborn smiles when
it hears the mothers voice. Immediately after birth this hearing the mother, backed by recog-
nition of her odor and touch, attracts the infant to look at her face, recognition of which is
then quickly learned (Bushnell, Sai, &Mullin, 1989; Field, Cohen, Garcia, &Greenberg, 1984).
Observation of the systematic, age-related transformations in infants skills and preferences
through infancy and toddlerhood to culture-related play and language shows that every change
in the infants interests and motor powers transforms communication with attentive parents,
and siblings too, affecting their attempts to gain playful reactions until, by the end of the rst
year an infant is expected to be an alert partner in many recognized games and collaborative
activities, and to have interesting ideas of how to do things (Adamson, 1996; Bruner & Sher-
wood, 1975; Fivaz-Depeursinge & Corboz-Warnery, 1999; Nadel & Tremblay-Leveau, 1999;
Trevarthen, 1990a; Trevarthen & Hubley, 1978). A sequence of elaborations has been dened
by descriptive research that constitute the unique human capacity for generating and acquiring
arbitrary meanings by joint purposeful and cooperative interest in objects and situations. It has
become clear that the young childs antecedent motives for joint interest with companions in
the common environment is no less than the key to language learning, both declarative iden-
tication of objects or actions of interest and narrative cohesion in social and mimetic fantasy
play being thoroughly mastered at least a year before any words are used (Halliday, 1975;
Harris, 1998; Trevarthen, 1987, 1990a, 1994, 1999a).
THE EMOTIONAL VALUE OF MEANING SHARED BY
MIRRORING PURPOSES
It was seen early on that a need exists in infants for joyful dialogic companionship over and
above any need for physical support, affectionate care, and protection (Stern, 1974; Trevarthen,
1979). A capacity was perceived in the infant for negotiation of contingencies of communi-
cative response, and an appetite for play with assertive expressions. The infants dynamic
emotions can even be seen to give communicative assertions particular relational or moral

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base of text value (Emde, Biringen, Clyman, & Oppenheim, 1991; Trevarthen, 1995). Early recognition by
the infant of a partners intentions, detectable from their goal-directed actions, shifts of interest,
and emotional expressions signifying different qualities of interest and different expectations,
was demonstrated (Trevarthen & Hubley, 1978; Trevarthen, Murray, & Hubley, 1981). Ex-
perimental studies with two-month-olds showed that unresponsive or noncontingent behavior
from the mother precipitated well-organized negative emotional reactions, indicative of frus-
tration, depression, or shame (Murray & Trevarthen, 1985; Tronick, Als, Adamson, Wise, &
Brazelton, 1978).
Age-related changes were charted in the infants awareness of self as the target of the
familiar others interest and evaluation, and in the pleasure taken from the others recognition
of declarations or demonstrations of the self (Stern, 1985). These developments were found to
be linked to changes in appraisal of invitations to communication by strangers, as well as
changes in the infants demands for emotional regulation from a sympathetic caregiver (Tre-
varthen, 1990a). Infants appeals for adults help to contain or calm the infants negative states
of feeling, caused by fatigue, hunger, or thirst, physiological distress, or pain, and frustrations
leading to demonstrations of fear or anger (Rothbart, 1994), are different in form and function
from joyful behaviors that attract and regulate play (Emde, 1992; Stern, 1990).
Further transformation in capacity to perceive and meet cooperative intentions and to take
part in shared tasks observed towards the end of the rst year (Trevarthen & Hubley, 1978)
were followed by increasing recognition of the permanence of meaning. That is to say, once
an expressive behavior or intentional gesture is taken to be an agreed sign and it is represented
as such in memory, the infant can see the value of repeating signs that take the form of
previously recognized actions, rituals, or ways of taking up objects intentionally (Bruner, 1983;
Bruner & Sherwood, 1975; Meltzoff, 1995; Trevarthen, 1990a, 1998a). Any well-dened in-
strumental action becomes a potential act of meaning (Halliday, 1975).
A foundation for all these sensibilities of infants for other persons mental life was hy-
pothesized to reside in an intuitive mirroring of the impulses and felt values behind other
persons body movements i.e., in a matching of the motives and emotions that generated the
movements through detection of their transmodal dynamic invariants and physiognomic signs.
Imitations, even those performed by newborns, were seen as offerings in a transaction of
motives to communicate, or to gain purposes and ideas in common. No clear transition was
seen to a stage where representation of the others motives could be said to begin.
In summary: cultural learning was seen as the outcome of a natural progression: from
imitation of salient expressions by neonates, to imitation of histrionic displays and mannerisms,
and then to imitation of purposeful object use (Trevarthen, Kokkinaki, & Fiamenghi, 1999).
Awareness of acts of object use by another is founded on the capacity to imitate signicant
movements, and communication of exploratory activities or problem solving depends on de-
tection of the syntax of attention that reveals a purposeful strategy.
PROTOCONVERSATIONS ARE ACTIVE BEFORE THE
OBJECT CONCEPT
The rst signicant discovery was that an infant could, in the second month after birth, enter
into an intricately timed, sympathetic face-to-face dialogue with an affectionately attentive
adult. At this stage the capacity of the infant for visual capture and tracking of objects followed
by reaching and grasping is rudimentary, indeed essentially ineffectual, a fact that lead
Piaget (1954) to conclude, erroneously, that eyehand coordination is achieved only in the
second three months. We now know that newborns can coordinate gaze and a rudimentary
prehensile movement in prereaching, which regresses in the second month (Trevarthen,
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base of text 1974, 1984b; Trevarthen, Aitken, & Plooij, 2000; von Hofsten, 1983), but Piaget did not
observe newborns.
The beginning of the so-called social smile had been identied with the maturation of
the infants focused attention to the adults eye region (Rochat & Striano, 1999), and it has
often been conceived as a reex smile to a sign stimulus. It was not until the timing and
sequencing of vocal, gestural, and facial emissions of adult and infant in early interactions had
been accurately observed and charted that it was understood that the infant can be involved,
even at six weeks, in a comprehensive mutual and reciprocal engagement of motive states
colored by subtle emotional expressions.
The pioneering reports of Mary Catherine Bateson (1979) gave denitive recognition and
the name of proto-conversation to this behavior, and she identied it as a form of instinctive
communication that lays the ground for learning of language and ritual healing practices.
Dissanayake (1999, 2000) now claims that it is the foundation for all the temporal arts, and
we have found it to give abundant evidence of the innateness of communicative musicality
(Malloch, 1999; Trevarthen, 1999a). Its sympathetic vitality is creative and attractive.
PLEASURE IN DYNAMICS OF PLAY AND
MUSICALITY, AND EMOTIONAL NARRATIVES
Observing mothers at play with slightly older infants, in the third and fourth month, Stern and
colleagues pioneered discovery of the importance of more animated emotional displays and
rhythmic collaboration (Beebe, Jaffe, Feldstein, Mays, & Alson, 1985; Felstein et al., 1993;
Stern, 1974; Stern, Beebe, Jaffe, & Bennett, 1977; Stern, Hofer, Haft, & Dore, 1985). They
described vocalization in synchrony and alternation, intermodal coordination in the production
and perception of facial gestural and vocal expressions, and the amplifying effects of maternal
affect attunement, which Stern felt was primarily used by the mother to help the infant gain
coherence and denition of felt emotions, after, as he puts it, the infant has gained a capacity
to represent his or her own mental states (Stern, 1985).
In our longitudinal studies, we found that new more lively playfulness appeared at the
same time as the infant was becoming much more adept at searching into space away from the
body, following objects and attempting to capture them in the hands, which new kind of interest
was clearly at the expense of sustained attention to the mother in face-to-face protoconversation
(Trevarthen, 1982a, 1986; Trevarthen & Marwick, 1986). In fact, the infant had already shown
a tendency to look away from the mother at moments of excitement in the rst weeks, but
around 12 weeks after birth and in the following months, curiosity about surroundings and
nearby objects greatly intensied, and mothers found that they could attract the attention of
the infant to themselves best by more animated vocal, facial, and gestural displays, and by
taking hold of the infants body and moving it in action games (Trevarthen & Hubley, 1978).
At the same time, the infants quick response to rhythmic and melodic chanting and singing
and shared expressions of joy greatly encouraged the singing of nursery songs (Trevarthen,
1986, 1987).
In recent years this evident interest of the infant in mothers speech and singing has led
us to explore and give denition to the communicative musicality of maternal behavior and
to use acoustic analyses of vocal interchanges with infants to identify the temporal and emotive/
expressive parameters of the most satisfying performances (Trevarthen, 1999a; Trevarthen,
Kokkinaki, & Fiamenghi, 1999), which are characterized by what Stern (1993, 1999) calls
dynamic narrative envelopes. We see the mother eliciting the infants recognition and par-
ticipation in emotional narratives, which carry rich evidence not only of the infants discrim-
inating awareness of many features of musical emotion in the mothers voice and the concurrent

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base of text dynamics of her dancing gestures, but also of an emergent sense of narrative cohesion and
emotional syntax that enables appreciation of the story in the beginning, development,
climax, and resolution of a baby song (Malloch, 1999; Trevarthen, 1999a). The infants accurate
anticipations in response to games and songs show that the mind is already capable at this stage
of thinking ahead for many seconds.
Musicality of expression and human relating is exploited in improvisational music therapy,
which can assist establishment of relationships and self-regulation with affective disturbances
over all ages, from prematurely born infants to the aged and senile (Aldridge, 1996; Wigram
& De Backer, 1999).
THE MUSIC OF MOTHERESE
In the 1970s, research began on the special characteristics of mothers speech to infants, largely
in an attempt to nd evidence that mothers were giving systematic graded instruction in the
features of speech and language (Snow, 1977). A more fruitful theory came from the obser-
vation that the communication with an infant is, from the beginning, fundamentally intersub-
jective and emotional, valuable to both infant and adult in itself as an interpersonal exchange
of feelings and states of animation, no matter what the language content (Bateson, 1979; Stern,
1974; Trevarthen, 1979). Experimental studies of infants perceptual discriminations and pref-
erences for maternal voicing have since made it clear that the infants are not so much studying
the mothers speech as attending and replying to her affection, eagerness, purposefulness, and
repetition of the harmonies, melodies, and phrases of her performance (Fernald, 1989, 1992;
Kitamura & Burnham, 1998a, 1998b; Rollins & Snow, 1998). The infant is quickly learning
how to anticipate salient developments in the drama of mothers melodious talk (Trevarthen,
1999a). That said, it is also evident that the measured rhythms and melody of motherese
vocalizations, or infant-directed speech, with repetitions and accented and prolonged vowels
and rhyming, is giving clear pointers to the basic phonology of the language in the human
world of the child (Grieser & Kuhl, 1988; Papousek, 1994; Papousek & Papousek, 1981;
Papousek, Papousek, & Symmes, 1991). When infants vocalize in response to the mothers
singing or repetitive speaking, they target the prolonged vowels at the ends of phrases, and
imitate them (Malloch. 1999; Trevarthen, 1999a; Trevarthen, Kokkinaki, & Fiamenghi, 1999).
Recent analysis of infants body and hand movements when they are listening to song or
music takes up an observation rst made by Condon and Sander (1974), that even newborns
are capable of becoming entrained, i.e., synchronizing oscillatory movements of their bodies
with the rhythms and expressive changes in speech. As we now know, they do so to the same
features of song or music (Trevarthen, 1999a). The response to the impulses within human
communication of this affectively loaded kind is made by the whole baby (Stern, 1974;
Weinberg & Tronick, 1994).
INTERSUBJECTIVE READINESS OF NEWBORNS
MADE CLEAR
Medical science, concerned for the survival and the bringing to physiological health of trau-
matized or sick newborns, and psychologists primarily occupied with the measurement and
explanation of sophisticated adult perceptions, thinking and language, or differences of tem-
perament and personality, have given a negative or impoverished description of the infant mind
at birth. Careful observation of infants optimal voluntary performances in supportive circum-
stances has been correcting this view of modern science (Als, 1995; Blass, 1999; Hepper, 1995;
Fifer & Moon, 1998; Zeifmann, Delaney, & Blass, 1996; Trevarthen, 1997). One can now see
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base of text justication for acceptance of the newborn as a subject capable, in a rudimentary but effective
degree, of prospectively conscious purposes, and learned representations of benets in expe-
rienceand endowed with complex emotions for a vital intersubjectivity, emotions that esti-
mate and activate affectionate and alert engagements with caregiving persons.
In the 1970s and 1980s, two kinds of evidence of the readiness of newborns for commu-
nication of motives and emotions radically challenged the traditional conservative view. Al-
though neonatal imitation had been observed earlier, notably by Zazzo (1957), it was author-
itatively rejected on theoretical grounds by Piaget and Guillaume as well as Skinner, and it
was not until the projects of Maratos (1982) and Meltzoff (1985; Meltzoff & Moore, 1977)
that irrefutable demonstrations of its existence were presented. Kugiumutzakis (1993, 1998,
1999), by using skilled demonstrations of imitation dialogues with newborns, brought attention
to the interpersonal or communicative function of the imitations, a function identied for infant
imitation by Uzgiris (1981). Other researches have conrmed the ubiquitous potential for neo-
natal imitation, and gained information on its variations, regulation, and development (Field,
Woodson, Greenberg, & Cohen, 1982; Field, Woodson, Cohen, Greenberg, Garcia, & Collins,
1983; Heimann, 1989, 1998; Reissland, 1988). A most recent advance has been made by Nagy
and Molna`r (1994), who have shown that the different motive states for making an imitation
in response to a model made by the adult, and for repeating it to the adult as an invitation or
provocation, are associated in the newborn with different autonomic adjustments. Preparing
to imitate is accompanied with heart-rate acceleration, and provocating with an anticipatory
deceleration of the heart. It may be concluded that neonatal imitation is an intentional behavior
in the sense that it is part of a coordinated activation of the body that seeks certain consequences,
and adjusts both internal functions and externally directed body action to obtain them. Several
researchers have recorded newborns repeatedly emitting imitative activities in a progressively
improved approximation to match the model act. This is one more sign of the intention behind
the performance.
The second research nding also afrmed the capacity of the newborn to make voluntary
reactions to communicative signals. DeCasper and colleagues (De Casper & Fifer, 1980; De
Casper & Spence, 1986; Fifer & Moon, 1995) have employed a non-nutritive sucking rein-
forcement paradigm to record newborns discrimination of, and preference for, the mothers
heartbeat sounds and voice, and preference for the voice sounds has been shown to extend to
a preference for the prosodic and phonetic characteristics of the mothers language (Mehler,
Jusczyk, Lamperz, Halstead, Bertoncini, & Amel-Tison, 1988). These preferences must have
been acquired in utero. Thus, auditory recognition by the newborn child of expressive char-
acteristics of the human voice as these are transmitted through the mothers body, with selective
attention to indexical features of her voice, has a clear precedence over any visual recognition
of the mother as a conversational partner (Hepper, 1995; Hepper, Scott, & Shahidullah, 1993).
This fact is overlooked in standard accounts of how attachment is established, which give
primary importance to visual recognition of the mother, thought to require a period of postnatal
learning (Bowlby, 1978; Schore, 1999). Nevertheless, despite the visual deprivation of the fetal
condition, newborns can be visually as well as acoustically alert, and ready to see and to draw
emotional support from a mothers eyes (Blass, 1999; Goren, Sarty, & Wu, 1975; Zeifman et
al., 1996). They enter an entirely new visible world equipped to make sense of certain things
they see, and are especially ready to see their mother. They have been shown to rapidly learn
to recognize her by appearance, within a few days (Blass, 1999; Bushnell et al., 1989; Field
et al., 1984). Clearly, hearing and seeing are used together to set up mutual awareness, to begin
an attachment, and to regulate the rst communicative exchanges.
The dominance of scientic interest in the visual sense in psychological research on dis-
crimination, attention, and memory favors the theory that realistic images of things outside the

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base of text body are the rst elements of consciousness in a baby. The auditory and tactile senses, which
are particularly well developed in a newborn, give more information on dynamic states of the
motor impulse, and to qualities, tones or colors of moving that can be called expressive.
They transmit more direct evidence of the energy of internal impulses that make images of the
body moving and the marshalling of its physiological resources, images that serve also as the
evaluative foundations for all of the subjects awareness of the outside world (Trevarthen,
1999a).
Experience, as the etymology of the word shows, comes from the effort to do, and thence
the need to know how. Strategies of purpose arise from narratives of an agent seeking to nd
a way through contingencies of experience. Sympathy for these inner motive factors in another
subject is at the source of intersubjective communication (Trevarthen, 1998a, 1999b).
EXPERIMENTS TO TEST YOUNG INFANTS
EMOTIONS IN CONTACT WITH A PERSON
Soon after the discovery of protoconversation, experiments were made that demonstrated its
dependence on contingent rhythmic timing, and that tested its emotionality. These involved
observing the reactions of the infant to the mother becoming still faced and silent while she
kept looking at her baby (Murray & Trevarthen, 1985; Trevarthen et al., 1981; Tronick, Als,
Adamson, Wise, & Brazelton, 1978; Weinberg & Tronick, 1996). The infants reactions (re-
moval of gaze from the mother, and expressions of agitation, confusion and distress, then
withdrawal into a depressed state) clearly demonstrated that the infant had expectations of
affectionate or friendly expressions, and that absence of these signals was disturbing. The
behaviors of these very young infants resembled the sequence of emotional states that John
Bowlby described for much older infants after loss of maternal attention (Bowlby, 1978).
Observations of the young babys reactions to strangers indicated that a specic emotional
attachment to the mother exists much earlier than had been hypothesized (Trevarthen, 1984a).
A more stringent experiment by Murray demonstrated, with the aid of mother infant
communication mediated by a Double Television link, that a replayed televised image of the
mother, talking in an attentive and friendly way, could not satisfy the motives for coordinated
and happy response from a two-month-old infant (Murray & Trevarthen, 1985; Trevarthen et
al., 1981). The replay situation, in a similar way to the still face test, caused the infants to
become withdrawn and distressed. This proof of the young infants sensitivity to the contin-
gency of a mothers responses has been challenged very recently, largely on theoretical grounds
(Rochat, Neisser, & Marian, 1998), but the evidence has been replicated, with identical results
to those reported by Murray and Trevarthen, after the institution of important controls for other
possible explanations of the infants distress (Nadel, Carchon, Kervella, Marcelli, & Reserbat-
Plantey, 1999; Nadel & Tremblay-Leveau, 1999) and after taking account of changes in the
infants response beyond three months (Muir & Harris, 1999). The original interpretation, that
the communicative one- to two-month-old is anticipating a sympathetic and immediately re-
sponsive reaction from the mother, is proved correct.
THREE FUNCTIONS OF EMOTION: REGULATING
ACTION WITH THE BODY, THINGS, AND PERSONS
Human sympathy and shared consciousness is governed by powerful emotions of pride and
shame, of generosity and guilt, of moral goodness or evil. A case can be made that such
complex emotions have primary importance in the development of human consciousness
(Draghi-Lorenz et al., 2000).
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base of text Two points require clarication. These feelings of human relating can neither be reduced
to, nor derived from, the cognitive emotions of surprise, curiosity, and pleasure in mastery,
which are appropriate for regulating actions on nonsentient objects. As Papousek (1967) dem-
onstrated long ago, emotions of satisfaction, or of disappointment and annoyance, expressed
by young infants solving, or failing to solve, instrumental problems, are signicant to others
as manifestations of knowing and discovering in a human way. They communicate what
is going on in the infants mind. The second point is that relational emotions are, from early
infancy, elaborate enough to signal subtle equilibria between assertion and apprehension,
between bold condence and sad or angry fear of being misperceived by the other (Trevarthen
et al., 1999).
The emotions of infants, like those of adults, appear to be organized in a set of opponent
pairs, or along gradients between contrasting extreme states (Plutchik, 1980). Two main axes
are the easiest to dene. The rst, which can be labeled ergic or work related following a
classication of the physiologist Hess (1954), denes a range between the most attentive and
strong or forceful energetic states and the weakest inattentive states. Orthogonal to this may
be states, which Hess (1954) labeled trophic or nurturing, that, at one extreme, are strongly
positive between the subject and the objects or other persons that they are attending to, and
opposite states that are negative or avoidant. With these two axes one can dene a two-dimen-
sional eld of emotions in which most descriptive categories of emotion can be placed (Tre-
varthen, 1993a). These can be related to four basic functions of animal emotions in regulation
of behaviour and of the organism: seeking/curosity; fear/escape; rage/attack; distress/affection
(Panksepp, 1998a).
However, such a spatial array of emotions, while it may t well the impression obtained
from relations between discrete categories of facial expression, does not grasp the features and
relations of dynamic emotions. These are much more evident in acoustic plots of vocal ex-
pression, or in continuous recordings of postures and gestures, which bring out the rhythmic
and prosodic or tonal variations by which emotion is conveyed. Stern (1993, 1999) has insisted
on the importance for communication with infants of dynamic and relational emotions that
cannot be described by the names of categorical emotions. For the former Stern uses the
descriptive terms: crescendo, decrescendo, fading, exploding, bursting, elongated,
eeting, pulsing, wavering, effortful, easy. These invite comparison with the sentic
forms of the musician Manfred Clynes, which attempt to identify specic momentary feelings
conveyed by musical sounds with a set of different force curves or gesture shapes (Clynes &
Nettheim, 1982).
Infants as subjects can act voluntarily in the world in two ways, with different expectations.
They can at any moment be anticipating the consequences that arise from attending to and
acting upon an object, or they can be looking and listening to what will happen from com-
municating with another person (Trevarthen, 1993a, 1998a; Trevarthen & Hubley, 1978). They
can be expected to have different emotions in anticipation in these two kinds of encounter, and
to evaluate their progress differently. I have called the emotions that appraise objects aes-
thetic, and those that engage with the potentialities for purposeful and self-regulated con-
sciousness of other subjects moral. A third kind of emotional regulation is concerned with
internal states and feelings of the subjects body. These I have called autonomic. The terms
are just convenient labels for theoretical differences between the anticipatory and regulatory
functions of emotion when a subject is acting in different ways, with different expectations
and different goals (see Figure 1, top; Trevarthen, 1998a). They are not adequate descriptions
to explain the different way the emotions actually work together and in sequence in the subjects
mind.
As they are actually expressed in patterns of muscular activity of the body, hands, eyes,

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FIGURE 1. (Top) The three primary facets of emotion and action of the self; in relation to the body
and its internal physiology, to objects of the inanimate, asocial world, and in social communication with
live partners (see Trevarthen, 1998a). (Bottom) Coordinations between these adaptations of behavior to
the body (A), to objects (B), and to other persons (C) dene three realms of psychological life: respec-
tively, these integrate bodily self-regulation with cognitive and practical action on physical reality, (I);
attachment to persons that offer care and comfort to the body (II); and companionship with partners
in experience and purposes (III).
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base of text face, and voice, emotions appear to be naturally much more concerned with integrating across
these three facets of the active self. The affective domains of purposeful psychological activity
labeled Cognition, Attachment, and Companionship in Figure 1 (bottom), may be of more
fundamental functional importance (Reddy, Hay, Murray, & Trevarthen, 1997; Trevarthen,
1982, 1998a; Trevarthen & Aitken, 2000). Each of these integrates transitions between two of
the three facets of brain output concerned with things, persons, and the subjects body. Thus,
emotions signify transitional equilibria in the whole subjects changing motives and the ac-
companying internal autonomic processes, and in the expression of outwardly directed actions
and interests that the motives are generating.
Evidently the relational emotions of companionship are by far the most elaborate and
signicant for human mental growth and integration of the child into society, even though the
emotions implicated in the making and breaking of attachments may have greater immediate
importance in psychosomatic health and well-being.
COMPLEX EMOTIONS EVALUATING
SELF-OTHER AWARENESS
Coyness in front of a mirror, indicated by turning away from the mirror image with a smile,
has been shown in three-month-old infants by Reddy (2000), who concludes that the emotions
of interpersonal relating are by no means as simple as the classical account would have it
(Reddy, 1991). Self-other awareness is, even in the rst six months, colored and regulated by
explicit relational states such as pride, coyness, shame, and mistrust. This accords with the
observation that after four months infants are drawn to look at their mirror images, and that
after an initial period when they show staring as if fascinated, they may manifest momentary
but complex self-conscious reactions to their reected selves, including, besides looking
away, both coyness and showing off (Trevarthen, 1984, 1990a, 1998a; Trevarthen et al.,
1999). Emotional expressions linked to displacements of gaze play an important part with
babies over three months in regulating the infants communication with peers, in family triads,
and with strangers (Adamson & Russell, 1999; Fivaz-Depeursinge & Corboz-Warnery, 1999;
Nadel & Temblay-Leveau, 1999).
It seems certain that awareness of the perfect synchrony of movements of self and the
image in the mirror is a factor in the infants evident awareness that the image is not another
infant (Biglow, 1999; Rochat, 1998). Mirror recognition of self-expressiveness (as distinct from
reaching to touch a spot on the face when looking in a mirror) evidently does not require a
long period of learning extending beyond infancy, as has been supposed (Kagan, 1981; Lewis,
1993; Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979). The self-other awareness that has been active from birth
provides a foundation that can be used by the infant to discriminate the immediate feedback
of effects of the infants own expressive behavior seen in a mirror (Trevarthen et al., 1999). It
has been demonstrated, by the way, that newborns distinguish the recorded sound of their own
cries from those of another infant (Sagi & Hoffman, 1976).
After ve months, if not before, infants can also display lively interest in a peer and engage
in friendly, humorous exchanges in which imitation of postures, gestures, vocalizations, and
grimaces may occur (Fiamenghi, 1997; Trevarthen et al., 1999). There is too little research
with younger infants, but we have clear evidence that interactions with peers and siblings are
important for development of social impulses and ways of expressing emotions from the last
half of the rst year (Dunn, 1994; Reddy et al., 1997).
The willfulness of six-month-olds is allied to a new demonstrativeness or showing off
(Trevarthen, 1990a, 1998a). Intense pleasure in repeating a clever action that familiar persons
nd very entertaining, and to which they give praise, is linked to an apprehension that strangers

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base of text will not understand and are to be feared. From this age, infants may be very timid and cry
when a stranger approaches them, or they may make apprehensive attempts to show some trick
they have learned in play in the family. Such brave attempts usually fail to get comprehension
and a satisfying response from the stranger. Social referencing at this age, where the infant
looks to the mother for an emotional appraisal of a difcult or unusual experience (Klinnert,
Campos, Sorce, Emde, & Svejda, 1983), arises from the increased occasions for distancing
from the mother as the infant crawls about, and the need to be able to nd her to get support.
The fear of being separated is, of course, used in Ainsworths attachment tests to gain a measure
of the emotions of different infants in their relationships with their mothers (Ainsworth, Blehar,
Waters, & Wall, 1978; Sroufe, 1996).
EMOTIONS AND ACTIONS IN THE NARRATIVES OF
GAMES AND SONGS AND THE EDUCATIONAL
MERITS OF FUN AND AFFECTIONATE TEASING
Research on infants perception of songs and instrumental music (Fassbender, 1996; Trehub,
1990; Trehub, Trainor, & Unyk, 1993), and particularly observation of how they actively
participate in musical play, led to the theory of communicative musicality as an intuitive
expression of human vitality and feelings (Malloch, 1999). Humans have unique ways of
coordinating their body parts that follow from their upright bipedal way of locomotion, and it
is proposed that this confers new capacities for polyrhythmic expression in the body (Trevar-
then, 1999a). The essential rhythmic periods and expressive dynamics of human moving appear
to be already present in the motive machinery of an infants brain, and this confers immediate
sensitivity for the beat and melody in human gesture and voice. Musical instruments mimic
this and can evoke strong responses in infants.
Of particular interest is evidence that the successive ordering of elements in a verse of
simple song or poetry, their pulse and phrasing, rhyming, and melody composed of changes
in the pitch and timbral quality, are attended to closely by infants, who often time their vocal
and gestural responses to chime in with salient moments in the music, and change their ex-
pression to match musical qualities of certain key sounds with their voice (Malloch, 1999;
Trevarthen, 1999a). The musical quality of a happy mothers voice, measured by acoustic
techniques, has been shown to be important for sustaining mutually satisfying communication
with an infant, and the lack of musicality in a depressed mothers voice leads the infant to
avoid joining in and to make depressed sounds (Bettes, 1988; Gratier, 1999; Robb, 1999).
Humor and teasing provide the bridge between the introspective/contemplative state of
isolation in object awareness, and communicated awareness that seeks company. In the period
of increased attention to objects and events outside the body and the development of behavior
guided by an object concept, i.e., in the second trimester after birth, infants are also becoming
more playful. Now pleasure can be shared with them in a teasing game. The motivation for
such games is like that which leads other young mammals into play ghting, which, as the
ethologists say, is afliative or constructive of collaborative social bonds. But, in the human
case the ghting begins early in life, and with the caregiver, and it is much more concerned
with tracking and dodging foci of attention, eliciting manifestations of surprise and pleasure
in recognition, and making misleading variations in expression of intentions to manipulate, and
to give or take, all of which bring out moments of coincidence in experience. In carnivores
and monkeys, this play is conspicuously developed as chasing and rough-and-tumble play with
peers, or real or imaginary prey (Hall, 1998). Human parents are more playful than monkey
parents, and they share fun with infants from early months.
Study of the games mothers and fathers play with infants in the second and third trimesters
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base of text after birth also shows how their attractive invitations and rituals are guided by the infants
changing interests and purposes (Bruner & Sherwood, 1975; Ratner & Bruner, 1978; Stern,
1974; Stern et al., 1977; Trevarthen, 1986, 1987, 1993a, 1993b, 1999a; Trevarthen & Hubley,
1978). Nakano, who has studied the playful teasing that is so characteristic of good affectionate
relationships with infants (Nakano & Kanaya, 1993), has introduced a Japanese concept of the
space of the We, and he shows that it is not just cognitivenot just a participating in
knowing that one another exists and that each may behave in a certain way. It is also, and more
fundamentally, a space of sympathy in purposes, where images of body movement are trans-
ferred and joined between persons emotionally. This is evident in the communicative musi-
cality of interactions between infants of all ages in play with their parents. The cognitive,
object-knowing component of shared interest only becomes strong when the infant has devel-
oped more distinct powers of attending and more effective actions of manipulation. We de-
scribed this as the transition from personperson games, to personpersonobject games
(Trevarthen & Hubley, 1978). Once joint purposes are dened with regard for particular objects
or objectives, the consciousness that is shared becomes a progressively enriched consciousness
of mutually recognized meanings, or ways of doing, which have been invented and given
value in companionship.
The incorporation of objects on which the infants attention is focused into a game of
teasing and joking with a playmate invites the invention of routines of activity and roles
or uses for objects that can be remembered as mutually valued inventions. Thus, a babys
surprise reactions to peek-a-boo (Bruner & Sherwood, 1975), imitations of exaggerated
funny faces, or the eager imitation of clap a handies become signs or proto-symbols
that can be repeated to evoke laughter or admiration in companions (Trevarthen, 1990a). The
rst developed of these jokes seem to be ways of moving expressively, or intended acts that
are marked by their exaggerated unusual form and by the purposeful way they are offered and
adjusted to the attention of others. Soon afterwards, favorite objects become triggers for ritual
use in future games. These games can be played in a family triad, infants shifting gaze between
father and mother to share the pleasure of a game (Fivaz-Depeursinge & Corboz-Warnery,
1999).
Winnicotts transitional objects serve in this wayto make meaning out of things ex-
perienced in a relationship, things that may come to stand for the relationship, as a soft
blanket may stand for the mothers body (Winnicott, 1965). The consciousness that is shared
changes as the infant understands new ways of acting and using experience, but the ability to
share purposes and interests, as well as the emotions that govern how the sharing is valued,
remain the same as that which enabled a newborn to join in reciprocal imitation, or a two-
month-old to play an active part in a protoconversation. This intersubjective part of conscious-
ness is innate alongside the motives for subjective awareness of self and object. In this sense,
the superego is present with the ego from the start!
THE BIRTH OF MEANING: SECONDARY
INTERSUBJECTIVITY, THEN COLLABORATIVE,
IMAGINATIVE PLAY, AND FINALLY MIMETIC
STORY-MAKING
When we followed infants companionship with their mothers through to the end of the rst
year, we were impressed with a big transformation in motives that occurs around nine months
(Trevarthen & Hubley, 1978). This was rst recorded as a deliberate acceptance by the infant,
for the rst time, of a systematic combination of purposes and attentional orientations of two
kinds: to act on things, and to communicate with the mother. We called it Secondary Intersub-

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base of text jectivity, personpersonobject awareness or cooperative understanding, and noted that
it transformed the condence of purposes and conding of experiences between adult and baby.
The change brings independent experience into purposeful coordination with others interests
and actions, and identies both the gestures of object use and the chosen objects themselves
as having attractive meaning. Actions by the infant to either attract others interest, or to accept
it, are becoming routine at the end of the rst year, and expressions of interest and emotional
evaluation are coupled with purposeful object use in declarative as well as instrumental
expressions (Adamson, 1996; Adamson & Bakeman, 1991; Akhtar & Tomasello, 1998; Breth-
erton, McNew, & Beeghley-Smith, 1981; Halliday, 1975; Stern, 1985; Tomasello, Kruger, &
Ratner1993).
It is now accepted that at the mid-point of infancy the infant is gaining a new capacity for
cultural learning and the willingness and ability to make acts of meaning to which others
readily respond (Tomasello er al., 1993). The change of cooperativeness has profound effects
on the forms of communication used by those adults who are familiar companions with the
infant. Thus, for example, the speech acts of the mother change for soliciting questioning
and appealing forms, or attractives, to matter of fact requests and instructions or directives
(Kitamura & Burnham, 2000; Trevarthen & Marwick, 1986).
The second year sees the emergence of increasingly elaborate imaginative play and mi-
mesis, with, at rst, gradual incorporation of imitated word-like sounds applied to objects and
actions and mingled with expressive sounds the meaning of which can only be translated by
attention to the concurrent orientations and manipulations of the toddler (Bruner, 1983; Hal-
liday, 1975; Papaeliou, 1998). Thus, for a 14- or 15-month-old, vocal expression is as much
emotional as referential, serving to share purposes, interests, and feelings of interest, pleasure,
surprise, etc., with a closely involved partner. Vocal expression and vocal imitation are quite
limited in comparison with miming of actions and roles, as is very evident in the immediate
imitation that toddlers, who can speak little, show in play when they have the opportunity to
choose matching objects and to do matching actions (Nadel & Peze, 1993).
WHY INFANTS AND TODDLERS CARE TO SHARE
The motives we nd in infants when they are condently sharing consciousness with sympa-
thetic and admiring adults are not expensive luxuries burdening the initial state of the human
mind, but essential factors promoting change that will regulate development of a cooperative
cultural intelligence. Infants are born ready to begin learning collaboratively how the society
around them knows and uses meaning in the world, and how it makes a narrative of the
circumstances in which collective life can be sustained and transformed from generation to
generation (Harris, 1998; Trevarthen, 1988; Trevarthen & Logotheti, 1987). They are emo-
tionally involved with meaning, and with being persons whose sense of meaning is valued by
others.
From this perspective it is not surprising that there is transgenerational continuity of per-
sonality characteristics and mental health or mental style (Fonagy, Steele, Steele, Higgittt, &
Target, 1994; Main & Goldwyn, 1984). This is not a sign of weakness or plasticity of human
moral ber, nor is it evidence in every case of carry over by a gene factor, but it is evidence
that the emotions we use to relate to one another epigenetically can become part of the sub-
consciously dened traditions or personal narratives by which we build dependable relation-
ships and gain roles in a collaborative life. We do, in a sense, learn our roles in the drama
of life in the family and community, and we do tend to adopt both imitative and complementary
habits of self-expression in relation to our principal companions or mentors.
But, these acquired characteristics of personality are modications of a universal human
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base of text need to be in relationships that are qualied by feelings of pride and shame, love and hate,
celebrating and grieving, triumph and despair. We are born with a degree of readiness for all
this, and that is what makes an infant such a potent companion in spite of his or her rational
innocence and wordless thinking. It is also what makes it possible for an infant to suffer from
a disorder of emotions and understanding in relationships (Gillberg, 1991). In some cases, the
disorder can be related to an identied genetic factor inherited from parents that affects the
way the brain is formed (Tager-Flusberg, 1999). In most, there will also be a large component
that represents the individuals learning of how to be a person in relation to others, with a
character and emotionally valued beliefs, knowledge and skills.
THE PSYCHOBIOLOGY OF INSTINCTS
FOR CULTURE
Comparative and developmental brain science has long possessed evidence to support the idea
that unconscious motive processes in the subcortex have the power to regulate the prenatal
morphogenesis of cognitive and learning systems of the forebrain, and that they also, by a
continuation of this process, play an essential role in the motivation of postnatal learning
(Maclean, 1990; Ploog, 1992; Porges, 1997; Trevarthen, 1990b, 1996, 1989; Trevarthen &
Aitken, 1994). In the past few decades such evidence has been augmented and summarized in
such a degree that it is now necessary to make a new theory of the relationships between
physiology of the whole body, brain anatomy, emotion, and cognition (Damasio, 1994, 1999;
Panksepp, 1998a). Now we see that the enormously complex neocortex is impressionable from
within the body and brain, as well as from stimulation coming from the environment outside
(Trevarthen & Aitken, 1994; Tucker, 2000; Trevarthen, 2001). Its circuitry is woven by neu-
rochemical inuences from inside to take in the pattern of experiences.
An evolutionary process can be traced that enlarged and transformed ancient brain stem
mechanisms of brain morphogenesis and motive regulation. In primitive vertebrates, these were
formed to serve coordination of visceral and autonomic functions in the body with impulses
of the individual to act. With evolution of the head carrying more powerful distance receptors
that contribute to an elaboration of richer anticipatory images of the world outside the body
and more discriminatory evaluation of environmental affordances, the midbrain, diencephalon,
and telencephalon have gained ever increasing complexity and psychological power (Trevar-
then & Aitken, 1994). At the same time, new components around cranial nuclei became centers
for making the internal self-regulatory events perceptible on the surface of the body, so they
may also serve in social signaling and thus allow mutual regulation of motives and concerted
action between individuals (Porges, 1997). These expressive body movements evolved from
self-regulatory mechanisms. They became capable of engaging through communication with
motive processes in other individuals that are made manifest by the ways their bodies move.
At the end of this evolutionary trend, mammals deploy intricate postural, gestural, vocal, and
facial signaling powers that serve intense social collaborations, and that entail a need for ex-
tended periods of social learning in the young. Human conversation is a brainbrain regulation,
mediated by an exceptionally elaborate array of special expressive movements that instantly
reect motives (Trevarthen & Aitken, 2000; Trevarthen, 2001). It engages dynamic purposes,
interests, and feelings between the participants, and it does so according to innate parameters
of timing and expressive morphology that are built into the motive activity of all human brains
(Trevarthen, 1999a).
We have seen that infants have motive processes and expressions that can integrate their
internal states of body and mind with those of another person, and that they develop ways of
coupling their explorations and actions in the world with the impulses of companions. This

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base of text entails evolutionary adaptations of every level of the hierarchically organized brain, from the
hindbrain to the most recently evolved and slowmaturing association or transitional limbic/
cognitive cortices in frontal, temporal, and parietal lobes. Of these, the prefrontal cortex has
special importance as a center of integration between limbic/emotional processes and the cog-
nitive elaborations of intention and experience in the rest of the neocortex (Schore, 1994, 1996,
1998; Trevarthen & Aitken, 1994; Trevarthen et al., 2000). The frontal lobes have anatomical
systems that represent actions of all the expressive organs the eyes, vocal apparatus, hands
which are also organs that have special responsibilities in deploying the subjects conscious
experience and strategic action on the world. Thus, this part of the brain, but certainly not only
this part of the brain, is important in the making of purposeful narrative thought and the
expressions by which it is conveyed to others (Rogers, 1998). Development of functions in the
prefrontal cortex occupies years of a childs life and through adolescence. It begins in a highly
signicant way at the end of the rst year, when cooperative awareness is coming to effective
activity, changing memory capacities, triggering acquisition of meaningful understanding and
cultural learning, paving the way for language (Dawson & Fischer, 1994; Diamond, 1990;
Goldman-Rakic, 1987).
The frontal lobes organize the deployment of organs that assimilate sensory information
intelligentlyintelligent looking, reaching, and manipulating, taking with mouth, teeth, and
tongue. They mediate what is called executive functioning (Shallice, 1988). Rizzolatti and
Arbib (1998) have found that neurons, which are the apparent antecedents in the monkey brain
of the frontal language expressive system of humans, and that are active when the monkey
makes a reaching movement, can mirror the same form of purposeful hand movement that
another individual, such as a human experimenter, is directing to an object. Jeannerod (1994)
presents physiological and behavioral evidence for the dependence of perception on the cou-
pling of autonomic and somatic expectancies in motor images, images that anticipate the
information that will be needed to guide the coming movement. Mirroring these motives and
strategies of purpose lies at the basis of intersubjectivity (Trevarthen, 1999a). The evidence
from infant psychology, and from comparative neurology, indicates that there must also be
extensive mirroring mechanisms operating at subcortical levels, and in all modalities of aware-
ness, from the hindbrain to the diencephalon, to account for the imitative and conversational
abilities of subjects whose prefrontal cortices are still very immature and rudimentary in or-
ganization (Heimann, 1991; Sparks & Groh, 1995; Stein & Meredith, 1993).
THE FUNDAMENTAL COHERENCE OF SELF-
AND OTHER-AWARENESS, AND THE
SELF-WITH-OTHER SYSTEM
All of the cognitive and learning functions of the mammalian brain are transformed by evolution
of the capacity for intersubjectivity, which makes possible social collaboration in anticipating
and using environmental affordances (Trevarthen, 1998b, 1999b, 2001). Young humans are
adapted to elicit sympathetic action by caregivers who know more and have greater powers of
effective action in obtaining benets and giving protection. But from birth, an infant human is
also building his or her own purposes and awareness. Therefore, part of the adaptations of
intersubjectivity that enable the infant to engage with the motives of a parent is on the parents
side. It is concerned with perceiving the infants motives, with generously shared cognition,
and participation in sympathetic narratives of action and discovery aimed to engage with the
world from the infants point of view. For this to work the infant, for his or her part, has to be
able to detect and interpret the adults orientations of interest, actions of commitment or inten-
tions, and emotional evaluations, and link them with his or her experiences in the shared
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base of text proximal reality. It is, from the start, a mutual adaptation. In time, the reality they build together
extends away from the present in both time and space, and the engagement becomes increas-
ingly occupied with things that had been appreciated together somewhere at a previous time,
or that can be anticipated to become shared sources of pleasure in a future reality.
Throughout all the developments in cognitive systems and language, emotions hold the
self together they link embodied agency with evaluations of environmental affordances and
give sense to objects and constructions (operations) of intention. Intentionality gives individual
experience the incentive and the means to dene categories of objects in the environment that
can be relied on to provide particular benets, to satisfy needs that arise rst from vital re-
quirements for sustaining life and well-being. Because the signs of benets in a natural world
depend upon the patterns of a complex terrain and its ecological structures, seeking benets
requires remembering layouts and causal relations between real objects their aggregations and
the processes that change them. Time for acting becomes translated through experience and
remembering to time of planning over longer and longer spans, more and more complex pat-
terns of event. The intrinsic dynamic and structural potency of phenomena in the environment
become part of the world anticipated in the mind. All these potentialities are relative to the
subjects agency and capacity to anticipate consequences of acting in particular ways. Their
phenomenology is essentially subjective as the subject learns to live with the consequences
of doing things, and develops strategies for ndings benets, and evading mishaps, ill health,
and injury.
TOP-DOWN RATIONALISM HAS MADE THE
INFANTS MOTIVES INCOMPREHENSIBLE
To perceive why the psychological endowment of infants has been so misrepresented or over-
looked, we must examine the cultural orthodoxy of the modern world, with its elaborate social
and practical organization, which entails formal discipline of individual impulses, and education
of citizens in an intricate partnership of beliefs and skills.
Great conceptual difculties have resulted from the rational empiricist position that a
coherent, socially situated self-awareness must be acquired from experience and training
that subjectivity of the individual is primary, and that all intersubjectivity is an acquisition of
social experience (Trevarthen, 1999b). Our philosophers and psychologists have asserted over
and over again that a newborn infant is not merely devoid of any symbolic communication,
but indeed lacking a capacity for psychological representations of any kind. As reactive bio-
logical matter, it must accumulate instances that afrm regular recurrent consequences of en-
gaging with events and objects in the environment, and build up representations, models,
or schemata to recall and recognize them. It follows, and so it has been assumed, that before
this self-object differentiation has been learned, no child can have any notion or selective
awareness of other persons as beings like the self, and yet separately active. The infant, ac-
cording to this argument, comes to the world with many senses and moving parts, but is
incoherently mindless, reexively acting, lacking all sense of time and space, and lacking
morality.
Now we know that these assumptions are false. Moreover, it is increasingly clear that they
have closed our minds to perception of the fundamental motives of human life that are not
only active at birth, or even some time before, but that remain in that essential form throughout
the life cycle. The evidence that refutes the reductive conception of the human minds initial
state is in part behavioral, in part the result of careful experimentation with infants preferences
and problem-solving inclinations, and in increasing part also from a new more inclusive un-

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base of text derstanding of the anatomical and physiological organization of the human brain, and its re-
lation with the body.
The nativistic theory of Chomsky might seem to offer a way out, but this is explicitly a
theory of an endowment for acquiring language, and more specically the grammatical structure
of text, and infants, as Pinker (1994) is pleased to remind us, do not speak or understand
speech. Structural linguistic theory does not seek to explain intersubjective communication.
Nor has the cognitive revolution brought enlightenment. The cognitive powers of infants
demonstrated since the 1970s by laboratory experimentation (almost exclusively with their
visual and manipulative discriminations, preferences, and problem solving propensities) have
left the impression that younger infants are unclear about their separateness of their selves from
the world, and, of course, unable to conceive and prospectively regulate any communication
with the mental processes in another person.
Inadequate observation of the psychological capacities of newborns and infants too young
to look cleverly and manipulate objects leaves us in ignorance of the all important initial
state. In the logic of dynamic systems theory, this is a cardinal sin. We are at sea about what
an infant needs to function consciously while it can count on adult care and support. The
feebleness of a human baby can be seen as adaptive simply because the its social readiness is
so advanced. A robust and autonomously mobile body is not needed for an intimate human
communicator. Indeed, human parental attention and foresight frees an innate capacity
for intersubjectivity that goes far beyond any instinctive appetites of other species, even
the sociable and family-supported primates (Freud, 1911; Macmurray, 1961; Winnicott,
1965).
Innate psychological properties endow a human newborn individual with purposes and
experiences, and they grow in such a way that systematic age-related changes occur that can
be seen to be intrinsically adaptive for emergence of the full range of human cultural achieve-
ments. In a real and unique way, the human brain is born for a new kind of brain-to-brain
interaction and for a unique capacity for cultural learning. The motives and emotions of the
human mind and the ways they inuence both evaluation of the objects or goals for purposeful
action of the individual and the communication with other human beings have a central role
in governing brain growth and differentiation. They determine the direction of development of
psychological functions by seeking specic satisfactions from experience.
Problems arise in mental health, learning, and the establishment and maintenance of re-
lationships as a consequence of what the human brain has evolved to do. They can neither be
understood nor treated effectively without an accurate conception of the initial state of the
human mind, and its capacity for directed change.
FALSE STARTS, AND INTRINSIC DEVELOPMENTAL
TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE INFANTS MIND
Claims of the moment of the psychological birth of the infant vary from several years after
biological birth to 18 months, one year, ten months, seven to nine months, three months, six
weeks. As we make more detailed observations, there is a trend for it to be earlier! All such
claims are supported by negative statements drawing attention to what younger infants lack
in awareness, motor coordination, and volition, cognitive representation of objects separated
from the image of a self, intersubjectivity or awareness of an other, memory, problem-
solving ability, and at length, language. The infants activities are viewed from the position of
a thinking, believing, and speaking adult, who is capable of making rational and articulate
explanations, and exercising reasoned control over emotions.
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base of text A recently popular idea is that consciousness of mental life in another depends upon a
metacognitive ability to recognize ones own mental images, and thence to have beliefs that
others have beliefs (Baron-Cohen, 1994). But such a Theory of Mind, or the argument that, I
think that I think, therefore I am conscious and can believe you too have beliefs, is not
necessary for most adult communication and cooperative awareness, which is too spontane-
ously efcient, and it would not work for a young child. This would appear to be a notion
dependent upon language, and especially on that special meta-language fostered by text and
academic/philosophical analysis of text. Narratives of other persons feelings and purposes are
certainly conceived by infants, even those only a few months old, in some inarticulate form
that nevertheless enables them to predict and evaluate the contingent behaviors of adults with
whom they are fully involved in a reciprocal mental engagement. The adults are, for their part,
acting with intuitive respect for, and belief in, the infants initiatives and consciousness of
them, and they enjoy this activity.
Periods of Rapid Change in the form and functions of developing organisms certainly
occur, as in the extreme case of insect metamorphosis (Trevarthen, 1982b). They signal critical
intersections between intrinsic, autopoetic processes, and the molding and differentiating
inuence of the environment. They have adaptive power by virtue of their genetically
or morphogenetically regulated anticipation of functional growth, or environmental expect-
ancy.
In the life of a young child, there are critical periods in which dependency on parental
care changes (Brazelton, 1993; Rijt-Plooij & Plooij, 1993). Such events are manifestations of
the motives and impulses that seek experience, and that seek to engage with the motives and
experience of other human beings to obtain social validation of experiences according to es-
tablished understanding or uses. They reect changes in the balance between body-sustaining
trophotropic activities of the brain, and motives that seek to engage with and transform the
environment by ergotropic movements of the body directed by the exteroceptive senses
(Trevarthen et al., 2000).
Although many motor skills and powers of perception and understanding of developing
humans change, aspects of motives and emotions remain as constant factors in regulation of
action and awareness. Among the principles of mental life that are conserved through devel-
opmental transitions are the following: (1) a hierarchy of rhythms of moving and attending
(Jasnow & Feldstein, 1986); (2) the temporal scope of immediate consciousness, or the psy-
chological present (Poppel, 1994; Trevarthen, 1999a); (3) the coordinates of body-related
action-space extending out beyond the surface of body; and (4) the opponent values of emotion
that modulate both individual action and experience, and contacts and relationships with other
persons (Trevarthen, 1993a, 1999a).
These age-invariant motive principles intrinsic to the mind in body constitute the funda-
mental regulators of cognitive change and learning. If there are growth errors in them, or if
trauma changes their functioning signicantly, the whole organization of the mind will be at
risk (Aitken & Trevarthen, 1997). On the other hand, they are potentially key factors in
any strategy of education or therapy, as they will, if supportively engaged, give energy for
recovery of improved functioning, and this may restart positive developmental change (Hun-
deide, 1991). This is the foundation for any form of intersubjective therapy (Burford, 1998;
Burford & Trevarthen, 1997; Trevarthen & Aitken, 2000; Wigram & De Backer, 1999).
PROTECTING EMOTIONAL HEALTH
IN COMPANIONSHIP
Self-related emotions and other-related emotions are inseparable in the economy of adult human
feelings. Well-being and the enjoyment of life depend on how private experience is built

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base of text into memories of events that have been shared. Pain or sickness in ones body or mind can be
endured more peacefully if there is sympathy from the other for the awareness of it. Exuberant
discovery and skillful mastery of object use gains value if it becomes part of a project that
others value. The misery of depression may debilitate the body and reduce the capacity for
noticing or doing anything, but the more grievous effect is that it brings a sense of poor worth,
of shame in relation to the will that others have to share and act together.
In early life, too, mental health depends on an active balance between a childs natural
eagerness, activity, affection, calm attentiveness, playfulness, and need for sympathy. Along-
side frankly sensory or motor problems of childhood we identify disorders of empathy (Gill-
berg, 1991), of hyperactivity and decits in attention and social sensitivity (Pennington &
Ozonoff, 1996), of disordered emotional self-regulation (Hobson, 1993a, 1993b; Schore, 1994,
1996), and we nd that in any individual case all these are present in some degree (Tager-
Flusberg, 1999). Effective treatment compensates by meeting the childs decient or distorted
motivations with stimulation of experiences and activities, emotional containing and modulat-
ing, affectionate imitation and playfulness, and by demonstration and instruction that ts the
childs capacities in the zone of proximal developmentwhere the child is. Purely cog-
nitive intervention, aimed to facilitate intelligent mastery of objective situations, or training in
social skills that reinforces acceptable behaviors and seeks to train out unacceptable ones, or
therapeutic engagement with strong emotions to give them a realistic context for purposeful
external regulation, all may leave the core need for pride in meaning with and for others
weak, and a persistent source of sadness or anger.
Rich and accurate accounts of how different infants take the path to understanding of the
meaning in the language, tools, and tasks of their familiar social world portray impulses for
mixing attentive exploration and cognitive discovery with enjoyment of companionship. They
give us a standard against which the demoralization of isolated children can be understood.
They provide indicators for diagnosis of the problem and guidance for therapy. The relationship
between the child and parents and others in the family is a component of the childs conscious-
ness and emotions because a human being is born motivated to discover a common world in
a small group of close companions.
What additional emotional investment is there in this kind of intersubjectivity, where the
feelings that are shared, right from the earliest experiences of relationships, include those that
evaluate common experience, not just self-sustaining nourishment, comfort, security, and a
feeling of familiarity with the caregiver?
The responses that the infant seeks must minister to more than the infants expressions of
pleasure and displeasure with the state of his or her body. They must notice fascination with
orientation to objects and events, and the fun of games that play with intentions, expectations,
and cognitive recognition. They will bring together the consciousness and willfulness of at
least two persons, and enable them to collaborate in making the world a place they can know
together. The emotions of vitality and depression have more to do with actions made in this
shared reality than they have with the integrity of the infants biological organism, or even
with the dependability of the caregivers attentions.
I submit that emotions of companionship play a crucial part in emotional health of infants
as well as adults, because they are part of the innate motive machinery and needs of the human
mind. It is much easier to conceptualize emotions and attitudes of pride and humiliation, of
guilt and virtue, of love and hate, of jealousy and admiration, of cleverness and stupidity, of
boldness and timidity or shyness, of joy and sadness, if we accept that human emotions are
both relational or interpersonal and referential from the beginning of experiencethat they
include the prospect of a shared conscious life and enterprise.
All the states of mind and temperament that have been described for an infant can be
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base of text related to what the character in question, the infants Me, knows in common with other
persons. They have aboutness oriented to a reality outside the self that is potentially registered
and assessed by another who is a known friend, or by others in a community of understanding
a reference that could be missed or devalued by someone with different shared reality (Hobson,
1993a). I think there can be no mental illness of an adult or a child that does not interfere with
the management of what one is about in a world of shareable meanings, and reduce its value.
The worst feelings of depression seem to relate to a sense of worthlessness, of meaninglessness
in purposes and in the expectation of others regard. I think that even an infant can feel this
kind of diminishment. The evidence of the effects of a mothers depression on an infants mood
and behavior with others, which is capable of passing on the stress and depression from the
infant to other persons, bears out this conclusion.
The efcacy of therapies that engage and lift the spirit of action and awareness, and that
especially support sharing of any vitality, conrms the diagnosis (Rollins, Wambacq, Dowell,
Mathews, & Reese, 1998). Improvisational music therapy, for example, modies emotional
states by engaging them in dialogues of action, with no attempt to rationally or verbally interpret
or explain (Wigram & De Backer, 1999). Similarly, personal narrative therapy allows the
revision of past opportunities for pride and affection, and reinstatement of belief in these, with
no elaborate rational interpretation (Cooper & Murray, 1997).
I am not persuaded that the lasting effects of early emotional insecurity or suffering can
be centered around what happens in the single mind and body of the individual sufferer. In the
light of what we have learned about infants motives and emotions for companionship in
experience and action, I believe that the quality of friendship, of moving events shared, will
be a crucial component in affection for a parent, sibling, or other close acquaintance, even for
an infant. Daniel Stern (1985, 1995) speaks of climactic moments of high intensity in the
emotional life of an infant with the mother, and of their representation in the infants memory
of life shared with the mother. But, the infants favorite companion may not be the same person
as the preferred caregiver or attachment gure, and their roles may be quite different. Of course,
health, comfort, pleasure, and general well-being are important, but much can be endured if
there is complete condence in the fellow-feeling and good will of a rm friend. Being mean-
ingful to someone important is what a young child strives for from the rst protoconversations.
THE PSYCHODYNAMIC APPROACH
AND THE INFANT THAT ATTACHMENT THEORY
DOES NOT EXPLAIN
Bowlby, by his detailed analysis of the effects of loss of maternal care on the emotional health
and development of infants, revolutionized medical scientic awareness of the psychological
needs of infants (Bowlby, 1958, 1988). He was witness to the young childs intense distress
and hopeless resignation following loss of a mothers care and he saw this as a potential source
of future emotional disorder. His Attachment Theory necessarily focuses on parental protection,
especially maternal protection, as a provider of vital support and external emotional regulation
for the young child. He conceived the primary emotions in the traditional way, as agents of
biological self-regulation in a being lacking representations of things outwith its own body.
Affectionate representation of the mother as an object of attachment is, he concluded, acquired
towards the end of the rst year. Research on the separation distress of a one-year-old when
the mother leaves the child in a strange place and with a stranger, and the childs reactions
when the mother returns has demonstrated strong correlatiuon with the sensitivity of maternal
responses to the infants calls for contact (Ainsworth & Bell, 1970; Ainsworth et al., 1978).
Maternal sensitivity and infant attachment are signicantly related to the childs subsequent

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base of text condence in social life (Sroufe, 1996). Transgenerational effects (Main, 1991; Main & Gold-
wyn, 1984) conrm that lasting features of emotional health can be acquired, and that the
parents can transmit the insecurity of their representations of childhood attachments to their
offspring (Fonagy, Steele, Steele, Moran, & Higgitt, 1991).
Psychoanalysts have all been protective of the infants need for psychological support or
holding. Klein (1952) saw displays of distress and depression as evidence that the infant had
a psychic life, but one that was anarchic and demanding of maternal services. Bion (1962) sees
the mother as a container, more or less receptive in form, and the infant as falling to pieces
if not contained. Mahler describes the relationship of mother with baby as a symbiosis, some-
thing akin to that between a parasite and its host (Stephansky, 1988). Fairbairn (Grotstein &
Rinsley, 1994) gave the infant more independent awareness, and ego from the start, and Win-
nicott (1965) brought light to the creativity of play, which he appreciated even in the early
stages when the infant is receiving essential life support within the maternal container.
None of these portraits takes full account of the young infants sensitive and joyful ap-
preciation of expression in the human voice, nor were infants expressive and gestural behaviors
noticed that are adapted to talk to the ongoing imaginations and narratives of purpose that
are implicit in talk and gesture addressed to them by their playful parents. They mostly missed
the babys need for exuberance and enthusiasm with clear anticipation of success, and evident
pride, though Winnicott did share this part of the babys life. Sympathy and shared pleasure
in the trials and risks of experience are companions to adventure in meaning (Emde, 1992;
Stern, 1990). The infant hero can suffer shame if submitted to the dull gaze and tuneless voice
of indifference, even if kept warm and well fed (Field, 1992; Murray &Cooper, 1997; Papousek
& Papousek, 1997; Stern, 1985, 1995).
Modern psychodynamic accounts, better informed about the capacities of normally de-
veloping child for relating to persons, and for cultural learning under the tutelage of intuitive
parenting, acknowledge that the classical theory of Anna Freud, Mahler, or Klein underesti-
mates the self-organized motivations and interpersonal shrewdness of the young infant (Stern,
1985/2000). Methods of supporting emotional functioning, communication and learning in
distressed, neglected, abused, or handicapped children now address the sociable motives that
the child can be assumed to have been born withmotives that seek live company (Alvarez,
1992).
Bowlbys synthesis of theories about animal and human motives and the creation of con-
scious understanding magnicently dened the specic affective dependency of the infant, and
its evolutionary purpose or adaptation (Bowlby, 1958; Soumi, 1997). Schore (2000) has made
clear the range of this achievement, and its importance for understanding the human brain, and
how it grows in good fellowship. However, the sharing of consciousness Bowlby could envis-
age has been generally undervalued by subsequent developmentalists who, in taking up At-
tachment Theory, have focused on the dependence of the infant for emotional regulation and
security within an attachment relation. Bowlby, we must conclude, though he himself was
interested in these motives in a generous way, as was Winnicott, left the way open for this
limited view of infant motives.
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