EN BANC

[G.R. No. 132339. February 4, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE CAMACHO TORREJA, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
PER CURIAM:
On automatic review is the decision,
[1]
dated November 27, 1997, of the Regional Trial Court of Las
Pias City, Branch 275, convicting appellant, Jose Camacho Torreja, of rape in Criminal Case No. 97-0050 and
sentencing him to suffer the death penalty.
On January 17, 1997, appellant was charged as follows:
That on or about the 7th day of January, 1997 in the Municipality of Las Pias, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a member of the Las Pias Police,
PNP, by means of force, violence and intimidation, with lewd designs, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously have carnal knowledge with one BING TABERARA Y GONZALES, who was then under the
custody of the Las Pias Police, against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
[2]

When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The first witness for the prosecution was private complainant, BING TABERARA, a 16-year-old
housemaid residing at Pulanglupa, Las Pias. She testified that on January 7, 1997, her employer Yolanda
Rodel brought her to the police precinct in front of the Bamboo Organ Church in Las Pias, and filed a
complaint, for qualified theft against her. She was with her grandmother who was also implicated in said
crime. Bing recalled that on January 7, 1997, at about 11:00 P.M., appellant SPO3 Torreja was drinking liquor
with his four (4) other companions. Appellant approached her cell, let her out and brought her to the other
room where the drinking session was on-going. He asked her questions about her case and offered to help her.
She said, she would be most grateful if he did. He then brought her back to her cell. She recounted that
sometime thereafter, appellant once again brought her out of the cell to the office of Lt. Leyva
[3]
who was then
not around. The office was just one arms length away from her cell. Once inside the office, appellant turned off
the lights and kissed her. He started to undress her. She was then wearing garterized pants. Appellant, she
observed, had his gun on his waist. She shouted for him to turn on the lights, but he didnt. She remembered
she rushed to the door and tried to open it but appellant stopped her and forced her to lie on the cement floor.
She resisted his advances but he forced her down and lay on top of her. He forcibly tried to insert his penis into
her vagina but she struggled. Eventually she felt weak so appellant succeeded in having sex with her. She
recalled she felt pain. Appellant then removed his penis from inside her and she managed to stand up. When
one of his companions suddenly knocked on the door, she was led, back to her cell. Appellant then gave
her P50 for food. Once inside her cell, she told her grandmother her ordeal. It was by then 12:00 midnight.
[4]

The prosecution next presented FELICISIMA BACSAL, the 50-year old grandmother of private
complainant. She testified that sometime in January of 1997, Bing and she were brought to the police precinct
by Bings employer allegedly because they stole some valuables belonging to the latter. Because the incident
happened a long time ago, she could no longer recall the exact date, but she remembered they were detained
for two days and two nights. She recounted when Bing was brought out of the cell for the third time by
appellant. When Bing returned, she was crying and she said she was raped by Torreja.
[5]

On cross-examination, Felicisima testified that she heard Bing shouting for help while banging on the
walls/doors of the office where Bing was being raped.
[6]

DR. TOMAS SUGUITAN, Medico-Legal Officer and Police Senior Inspector at the PNP, Camp Crame,
Crime Laboratory Group, was presented as third witness for the prosecution. He testified that on January 8,
1997, he received a request from the Chief of the Intelligence and Investigation Bureau for Las Pias Police
Station to examine one Bing Taberara. In his genital examination of Ms. Taberara, he said he found shallow
healed lacerations of her hymen more than seven days-old, involving less than half of the hymen at three
oclock position. These lacerations were caused by the insertion of a hard object, possibly a penis, into the
vagina.
[7]
He further testified that the lacerations were already healed. Nonetheless, the lacerations were
compatible with his findings of forcible penetration, even if the penetration was as early as January 7,
1997. On cross-examination, Dr. Suguitan affirmed that indeed the common signs of rape by means of force or
violence are lacerations of the hymen and congestion at the lavia minora, or any redness and the presence of
spermatozoa. He explained that there were cases where the finding of rape was based on bodily injuries but
there were also cases where there were no such injuries.
[8]

Finally, the prosecution presented INSPECTOR LUCAS LEYBA, the Commander of the Kabayan. Center
at the police station, Las Pias. He testified that on January 8, 1997, at exactly 8:00 A.M., police officers
Eduardo Gillera
[9]
and Gil Leyba informed him that Jose Torreja raped one of the inmates. He immediately
placed Torreja in a restricted area and later brought him to the office of the Chief of Police.
[10]

In his defense, appellant JOSE CAMACHO TORREJA testified that prior to his detention, he was
assigned at Block 1 Police Station, at the area of the Bamboo Organ Church, Las Pias. He stated that
on January 7, 1997, he reported for work at around 9:00 P.M.. Since Lt. Leyba, the station commander, was
not around that night, he was officer-in-charge. When he arrived, he searched Lt. Leybas table for instructions
that the latter might have left for him. He found a partial investigation report on a qualified theft case against
Bing Taberara. He decided to continue the investigation and got her out of her cell. In the office of Lt. Leyba,
he talked with Bing, asked if she had dinner. He gave her P50 for food. She accepted. As he asked her
questions, he advised her that if she told the truth, he would try to help her, otherwise he could give her no
assistance. He said Bing denied the charges against her. Unconvinced, he raised his voice and told her that
she was lying. The girl then cried and confessed. He also warned her that if she continued to lie, he would
personally file the charges against her. Bing got angry, protested, and insisted she was not lying. He brought
her back to her cell and heard her mumble, Lintik lang ang walang ganti (literally, Only lightning has no
pay-back).
Appellant said that at that time he was wearing his police uniform and his gun was inside the drawer of
Lt. Leyba. He vehemently denied raping Bing. He added that in 1985, he had an operation for which he had
been medically advised not to engage in strenuous activities nor to carry heavy objects. Since Bing was big,
raping her would have been impossible for him. Further, he said he could not rape her since that would
jeopardize his retirement benefits due him in three years time. When asked why Bing would make up such a
charge, he answered that he did not know.
[11]

Giving credence to the testimony of witnesses for the prosecution while disregarding the denial of the
accused, the trial court rendered its decision on November 27, 1997, decreeing thus:
WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused JOSE CAMACHO TORREJA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT of the crime of RAPE under Article 335, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659.
ACCORDINGLY, considering the qualifying circumstance that accused is a member of the Philippine National
Police and that the victim was in his custody when the crime was committed, the accused is sentenced to
suffer the extreme penalty of DEATH with the means prescribed by law and to pay the victim BING
TABERARA the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,00.00) as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
[12]

Hence, this appeal where appellant assigns that the trial court erred in convicting him for the following
reasons:
I
THE DECISION OF THE HON. TRIAL COURT CONVICTING THE ACCUSED WAS BASED ON
ASSUMPTION, PRESUMPTION, CONJECTURE AND INCREDIBLE EVIDENCE.
II
THE TESTIMONY OF THE COMPLAINANT WHICH SERVED AS THE BASIS OF THE HONORABLE
TRIAL COURT IN CONVICTINGTHE ACCUSED IS CONTRARY TO HUMAN EXPERIENCE.
III
PHYSICAL EVIDENCE DOES NOT SHOW THAT COMPLAINANT WAS RAPED.
[13]

Principally, appellant questions the credibility of private complainants testimony. In addition, he asserts
that there was lack of physical evidence sufficient to find him guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor General maintains that the evidence for the prosecution,
particularly the testimony of private complainant, passes the test necessary for a conviction of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. Appellant, a police officer, employed force and intimidation against the complainant
in committing the crime of rape. However, the OSG seeks modification of the judgment, insofar as the award
for damages is concerned. It asks for P75,000 as civil indemnity and reduction of the award of P100,000 as
moral damages to P50,000.
The principal issue for our resolution is whether the trial court erred in convicting the appellant SPO3
Jose Torreja and sentencing him to death for the rape of detainee Bing Taberara, a 16-year-old housemaid.
Secondarily, we shall also consider the propriety of the amounts of civil indemnity and damages awarded to
the private complainant.
First, it is well-settled that the trial courts assessment of credibility of witnesses is generally accorded
great respect because the court had the opportunity to hear the witnesses and observe their demeanor as they
testified under oath. Only when the trial court overlooked or misapplied some facts which could have affected
the result of the case is trial courts assessment of the credibility of witnesses reviewed by this Court.
[14]
In this
case, nothing on record shows that this case should fall under the exception. We agree with the trial court in
its findings complainant Bing Taberaras testimony was straightforward and convincing, while that of the
appellant consisted of bare denials which uncorroborated and self-serving.
As found by the trial court in the decision:
Two versions were presented on what transpired inside the office of Insp. Leyba: the victims version that she
was raped and the accused[s] version that he merely conducted further investigation on the victim relative to
the case filed against her. The [Regional Trial] Court finds the victims testimony to be credible and relies on
her credibility as against the credibility of the accused. It is inconceivable that Bing, who was 16 years old at
the time of the incident, would make up a story on the commission of rape against her and falsely testify
against the accused whom she never knew before. The natural flow and logic in her testimony as well as her
facial and emotional reactions to questions and answers during the hearing of the case strengthened the
theory of the prosecution that the victim was raped. The defense is banking on the alleged lack of resistance
exerted by the victim. This was amply explained by the victim when she testified that she was so scared of the
accused[s] gun and that the accused was so strong. Nonetheless, the status alone of the accused, being a
policeman and custodian of the victim would be sufficient to cast fear and threat and influence on the
victim.
[15]

When a woman testifies that she had been raped, and if her testimony meets the test of credibility, the
appellant may be convicted on the basis of the womans testimony alone.
[16]
In this case, the defense asked the
victim minute details of the rape incident, and tried to make the court believe that her inconsistency on minor
details was sufficient to acquit appellant on grounds of reasonable doubt. However, a rape victim is not
expected to remember every ugly detail of her ordeal. A rape victim might even unconsciously block out
certain details of her humiliation and debasement.
[17]
The victim cried on the witness stand when she was
made to recall the horrifying details of her ordeal. As borne by human nature and experience
[18]
such reaction
is a badge of honesty, showing that she is being candid, sincere, and truthful in her testimony. The victim
here testified, in this wise:
Atty. Nazal (defense counsel):
So the accused asked you to stand up, is that right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And did you ask him the very reason why he was asking you to stand?
A: No, sir because I was so scared because of his gun.
Q: You just stood up?
A: He helped me in standing sir.
Q: And your jeans, is there any strap or lock in front?
A: None, sir.
Q: There is no belt?
A: None, sir.
Q: Madam Witness, when you were standing, did you extend any assistance in removing your jeans?
A: No, sir.
Q: ...Was your jeans totally removed form your feet?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So, when the accused pulled down the jeans you have to move in order to remove your jeans from
your feet?
A: He forcibly pulled down my jeans, sir.
Q: Madam Witness, while the accused was pulling down your jeans, you just remained standing?
A: No, sir.
Q: What do you mean by no?
A: While he removed my jeans, I tried to pull it back but he forced me.
Q: But finally, he managed to pull down the jeans?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How many times Madam Witness you tried to pull up your jeans?
A: Twice, sir.
Q: ...What kind of panty were you wearing at that time?
A: Garter panty, sir.
Q: Is that a bikini panty?
A: No, sir.
Q: Who also removed your panty, Madam Witness?
A: Also the accused.
Q: ...You just allow the accused to pull down your panty?
A: No sir.
Q: What do you mean by no?
A: I did not allow him to remove my panty, he forcibly removed it.
Q: ...Did you try to prevent the accused in removing your panty?
A: I told him not to do what he intended to do.
Q: ...After removing your jeans and your panty, he managed to insert his organ to your organ?
A: Yes, sir.
[19]

In a further attempt to discredit the complainants testimony, appellant suggests that she filed the case
because she wanted to get even with appellant for promising that he would help her, falsely. This suggestion
appears most unlikely. First, Bing did not ask for the help. In fact, it was appellant who offered to help
her.
[20]
Second, nothing in the records supports appellants suggestion that she had an ill-motive to implicate
him. A victim of sexual assault ordinarily would be unwilling to under go the humiliation of a public trial,
testifying on the details of a sexual assault and subjecting herself to an embarrassing ordeal were it not her
intent to condemn an injustice.
[21]
The suggestion of the defense that a 16-year-old housemaid would brazenly
accuse a policeman of raping her and lie in her testimony before the court surely taxes ones credulity without
serving the cause of the appellant.
Bare denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-
culpability to merit credibility.
[22]
Here appellants bare-faced denial of the charge against him constitutes self-
serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of
credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.
[23]

While the defense wants us to believe that complainant did not show any resistance to the sexual assault
on her person, the records of this case show otherwise. We agree with the trial court that the victim was
scared, intimidated, threatened and coerced by appellant. The law does not require great and irresistible
coercion. What is required only is enough physical or psychological coercion to consummate the lewd design in
the mind of the offender.
[24]
In our view, the presence of a gun in the possession of appellant and the
ascendancy of a police officer over a detainee under his custody are sufficient to constitute coercion to
intimidate a 16-year-old housemaid to submit to the lewd intention of the malefactor.
The defense likewise makes an issue of the lack of physical evidence such as bruises or marks on the
victims body. Note, however, that as testified to by the medico-legal officer,
[25]
the healed laceration found on
the victims genitalia was consistent with the fact that rape had taken place. Likewise, the absence of
spermatozoa in the victims vagina would not necessarily negate the commission of rape.
[26]
Neither would the
absence of fresh lacerations prove that she was not raped.
[27]
In this case, the medico-legal officer, Dr. Tomas
Suguitan, testified:
Prosecutor:
Mr. Witness, could it be possible that even an erected penis was inserted to the hymen, still the
hymen would suffer no laceration at all?
A: It is possible, sir.
Q: In what way would it be possible, Mr. Witness?
A: In a highly elastic hymen sir.
Q: In this case of Bing Taberara, could it be possible that there is no laceration despite the fact that
a hard penis was inserted to the vagina?
A: There are lacerations.
Q: And you said while ago that in your report the hymen of Bing Taberara is elastic?
A: Yes sir.
Q: And you said that if the hymen is elastic, even though a hard penis was inserted to the hymen,
no laceration would be caused.
xxx
A: There are cases where there would be no laceration even if the penis is inserted in the vagina,
sir.
Q: And this happened in the case of Bing Taberara.
A: Yes sir.
[28]

Since the victim was under the custody of appellant who was a police officer, when he raped her,
appellants crime is qualified under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Section 11, R.A.
7659. Hence, the trial court properly imposed the penalty therefor, which is death.
[29]

On the amount of damages awarded by the trial court, however, modifications are called for. The amount
that should be awarded to the victim of qualified rape as civil indemnity ex delictoshould be increased
to P75,000 pursuant to current jurisprudence. But the amount awarded as moral damages should be reduced
to P50,000 in accordance with applicable case law.
[30]

Four members of the Court maintain their position that capital punishment is
unconstitutional. However, they submit to the decision of the majority of the court upholding the legality of
the law re-imposing the death penalty for heinous crimes.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City, Branch 275, finding appellant
Jose Camacho Torreja GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape qualified by the circumstance
that the victim was a detainee under the custody of appellant as a member of the Philippine National Police,
and imposing upon him the supreme penalty of death, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the award of
damages. Appellant is ordered to pay the amount of P75,000 as civil indemnity ex delicto and further amount
of P50,000 as moral damages.
Upon promulgation of this decision, let the records of this case be promptly forwarded to the Office of the
President for possible exercise of her constitutional prerogative to grant executive clemency.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo,
Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ.,concur.




Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 91745 March 4, 1992
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JULIO MANLIGUEZ, SHIRLEY IGNACIO y AGATIA and LUCIA GUIRAL, Accused-Appellant.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
The information dated April 25, 1988 in Criminal Case No. 16207-88 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City, Branch 15, charged the accused-appellant, Julio Manliguez, and his two co-accused, Shirley A. Ignacio
and Lucia Guiral, with the crime of kidnapping, committed as follows:
... That on or about April 16, 1988, in the City of Davao, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, conspiring, confederating and
cooperating together and helping one another willfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnapped
one Diana Grace Ali, a minor, seven (7) years of age while the latter was sleeping in her room,
accused brought and carried away the herein minor at 171 Fatima Boulevard, Davao City and
detained her in a house of one accused Jose Manliguez from April 16, 1988 up to April 22,
1988, but until now the victim child has not been recovered. (p. 21, Rollo.)
When arraigned, the three defendants entered pleas of not guilty.
As summarized in the Solicitor General's "Manifestation (In Lieu of Appellee's Brief)," the facts of the case are
the following;
Diana Grace Ali, the "kidnap victim," is an adopted child and was 7 years old when the
incident at issue occurred on April 16. 1988.
At about noontime on April 16, 1988, Priscilla, the widowed adoptive mother of Diana Grace,
was about to sleep in the sala of their house located in Bangkal, Davao City. Diana Grace was
in her room accompanied by a certain Susan and Lucia Guiral (one of the accused),the latter
being the Ali's househelper. Priscilla woke up at about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon and found
that Diana Grace was missing. She then instructed Lucia Guiral and Susan to look for the girl
in the neighborhood. Diana Grace was nowhere to be found (pp. 54-67, tsn, October 4, 1988)
Earlier, at about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same date, Lori Jean Ali, the 16-year-old
daughter of Priscilla Ali, left their residence and proceeded to Santa Cruz to get her report
card. On her way out, she saw a maroon colored Minica cab parked in front of their house (p. 8,
tsn, June 28, 1988). She saw two persons seated inside the back, one male and a female. She
later pointed to the accused-appellant Julio Manliguez, as the man standing near their gate
beside the parked Minica cab, and to the accused, Shirley Ignacio, as the female occupant of
the Minica cab (pp. 13-14, Ibid.).
Susan Caberte, Lucia Guiral and Priscilla Ali searched for Diana Grace around the
neighborhood. Failing to find her, Priscilla Ali left her house with daughter Lori Jean. Accused
Guiral also left and went home to her place at Guihing, Davao del Sur. She was fetched on
April 21, 1988 by Lori Jean Ali. Susan Caberte and Shirley Albarico who told her that Mrs. Ali
wanted her back. She obliged and went back with them to Davao City. Upon arrival in Davao
City, accused Lucia Guiral was immediately brought to the Ulas Police Station where she was
accused of hiding Diana Grace Ali (pp. 80-83, tsn, Nov. 14, 1988).
The police conducted a thorough investigation, but the police investigators comported
themselves in a manner beyond the constitutional prohibition. Accused Lucia Guiral was
subjected to torture to extract a confession. Guiral was undressed. her body was soaked wet
and then she was subjected to electric shocks. The agony prompted her to concoct a story. She
pointed at a house in Juna Subdivision as the place where Diana Grace was supposedly being
kept. It turned out to be the house of a certain Major Payo. She was tortured some more and
brought to a garbage dump where a police officer fired shots near her ear (pp. 83-86, tsn, Nov.
14, 1988).
As the policemen kept hitting her head with their pistols and fired shots near her head when
she was brought again to the garbage dump, Guiral told another lie so the police would stop
torturing her. She told them that the kidnappers were in the Fatima Village. She was shoved
into a Ford Fiera vehicle and brought to Fatima Village where she mentioned the accused Julio
Manliguez because he is the only person she knows who was staying at Fatima Village.
Manliguez was roused from his sleep at 6:00 o'clock in the morning of. April 22, 1988 and
boarded into the Ford Fiera (pp. 88-91, Ibid; p. 145, tsn. Nov. 28, 1988). Inside the Fiera, a
police officer pushed the barrel of his armalite rifle on Manliquez's chest. He asked the police
officer not to do that because it hurt. The policeman was irked and fired shots near his ear (pp.
147-148, tsn, Nov. 28, 1988).
Afterwards, Manliguez was brought to the Talomo Police Station where he was detained. He
was not given any food to eat nor water to drink. At 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same
day, the police brought him out of his cell and interrogated him on the whereabouts of the
child. After repeated denials, Manliguez was also tortured. A cellophane bag was put over his
head and tightened around his neck. He lost consciousness. Manliguez refused to admit any
complicity in the alleged kidnapping. In the evening of that day, Manliguez was brought out of
his cell and taken to the office of the police investigator. There, he was hit on the head with a
rattan chair (pp. 152-154, Ibid.).
Reports were lodged against the abusive policeman in the office of Colonel Miguel Abaya. An
investigator, Lt. Camorongan. was sent together with a doctor. Manliguez was brought to the
Regional Hospital where he was treated. After treatment, Lt. Camorongan brought Manliguez
to the headquarters of the 431st Metrodiscom (Metropolitan District Command) and
investigated regarding his complaint of police brutality. He executed a statement (Exh. "4"
Manliguez) and was transferred to the Ma-a City Jail to identify his tormentors. He pointed to
policemen Plaza and Mirando as among those who tortured and beat him (pp. 155-161, ibid.).
Meanwhile, Shirley Ignacio was arrested in her house at Piapi Boulevard in connection with
the disappearance of Diana Grace Ali. Before going with the policemen, she asked for
permission to call up her brother but the policemen refused to let her. She was brought to the
Talomo Police Station and was placed in the cell occupied by accused Lucia Guiral. A Lt.
Obrero asked Guiral if "this is Shirley," and Guiral said "she is the one" Shirley Ignacio
vehemently denied knowing Guiral (pp. 114-117, TSN, Nov. 15, 1988; p. 118, ibid).
She was tortured and brought to places she falsely pointed to as the hiding place of the child, to
avoid further torture (pp. 120-131, ibid).
On their return to Davao City, Shirley Ignacio tried to kill herself by jumping from the jeep in
which they were riding. She was brought to a hospital for treatment of the injuries she
sustained (pp. 131-132, ibid).
About two (2) months later, on June 12, 1988, Diana Grace Ali was reunited with her family. It
turned out that the Solon family took Diana Grace into their custody after she was found
roaming the street that rainy afternoon of April 16, 1989 when she was first missed by her
family (pp. 215-254, tsn, July 31, 1989 and August 28, 1989, pp. 76-81, Rollo):
After trial on the merits. the lower court rendered a decision on May 2, 1988, finding Manliguez guilty as
charged, but it exonerated his co-accused, Shirley A. Ignacio and Lucia Guiral, because their extra-judicial
confessions were found to have been obtained through "third-degree" methods in violation of their
constitutional right against self-incrimination, The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proved the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, Julio Manliguez is hereby sentenced to be imprisoned to (sic) reclusion perpetua.
Lucia Guiral and Shirley Ignacio are hereby acquitted since the prosecution failed to prove
their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. (P. 51, Rollo.)
On June 13, 1989, Manliguez filed a motion for new trial on the ground of newly-discovered evidence.
The trial court, after granting a new trial and hearing the testimonies of Esmeraldo Solon, Sr., Anastacia
Solon and Esmeraldo Solon, Jr., still maintained his conviction (p. 61, Rollo). He appealed to this Court.
The only issue in this case is whether the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt that
Manliguez kidnapped the seven-year old child, Diana Grace Ali, on April 16, 1988.
The Solicitor General, in his "Manifestation (In Lieu of Appellee's Brief)," opined that the prosecution's
evidence is insufficient to prove that the child was kidnapped, much less that the accused-appellant was the
kidnapper. The Solicitor General noted that the lone witness to the kidnapping, the 7-year-old victim,
admitted that she had been coached by her mother to point to Manliguez as her kidnapper. The following
excerpt from her testimony is revealing:
CROSS-EXAMINATION
xxx xxx xxx.
Q. Before you came here you were still in that house, what did you talk about
with your mother?
A. (The child does not understand, she nodded her head sidewise).
Q. While you were in the jeep, did you talk with your mother?
A. Yes, sir
Q. What did you talk about?
A. (The child does not answer).
Q. When you went down and came to this building; where were you brought?
A. Here.
Q. And when you arrived here, somebody talked with you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Who was he?
A. (The child does not answer).
Q. The man who talked with you, he is here in Court?
A. He is not here.
Q. Before we entered this room, you were there in the other room?
A. No, sir.
Q. When you arrived here, you were told to point at that man, is that right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. That is why when you were asked that man is here, you pointed at him?
A. (The child is nodding her head signifying yes).
Q. The one who told you to point at that man is your mother?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Tell us, did your mother tell you to point to other persons?
A. No, sir.
Q. I point to you this person, did he talk to you a while ago?
A. No, sir.
Q. This man, did he talk with your mother?
A. Yes, sir.,
Q. Do you know what day is today?
A. (The child cannot answer).
Q. Do you know what is a month?
A. (The child cannot answer).
Q. You don't understand what is the month of May?
A (The child cannot answer).
ATTY. CAETE:
That is all, your Honor. (pp. 87-89, Rollo.)
The Solicitor General further noted that the only other prosecution witness, Lori Jean Ali, the victim's
adoptive sister, linked Manliguez to the "kidnapping" by testifying that on April 16, 1988 she saw Manliguez
near the gate of a house across the street from their house (p. 90. Rollo). That lone circumstance, even if it
were true, proves nothing. The constitutional presumption of innocence that the accused enjoys is not shaken
by it (People vs. Tolentino, 145 SCRA 597). Before there can be conviction upon circumstantial evidence, there
should be more than one circumstance present. The facts from which the inferences are derived must be
proven, and the circumstances should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the author of the crime (Sec. 5, Rule 133,
Rules of Court; People vs.Magallanes, 147 SCRA 92; People vs. Colinares, 163 SCRA 313).
The testimonies of the defense witnesses Esmeraldo Solon, Sr. and Esmeraldo Solon, Jr., disprove the alleged
kidnapping of Diana Grace. True, she disappeared from her residence in the afternoon of April 16, 1988, but
Esmeraldo Solon, Jr. testified that he found her in front of his parents' house at about 4:00 o'clock, of that
rainy afternoon roaming on the highway to Toril. Because it was raining, he called her and brought her inside
the house. He asked her why she was roaming the street but she did not answer. His mother changed her wet
clothes with those of his sister's (p. 234, tsn, August 28, 1989). Esmeraldo, Jr. reported to the police how he
found the child (p. 236, ibid.). Not knowing whose child she was, the police advised the Solons to keep her with
them until they could locate her parents, Esmeraldo Solon, corroborated his son's testimony on how the child,
Diana Grace Ali, came to live with them since April 16, 1988 and up to June 12, 1988, a Sunday, when after
hearing mass with Diana Grace, he brought her around the neighborhood of the church and Diana recognized
the Ali residence and pointed it out to him (p. 249, tsn, Ibid. p. 93. Rollo).
In rushing to convict Manliguez, the trial court carelessly overlooked the following significant facts which
would have normally engendered doubts as to the credibility of the prosecution's evidence:
1. The conflicting "confessions" of Lucia Guiral and Shirley Ignacio were forced out of them by torture inflicted
on them by the Talomo police led by a Lt. Obrero. As a result of torture, Guiral was forced to falsely implicate
Manliguez, her brother-in-law, as the kidnapper. Shirley Ignacio was likewise forced to falsely admit that she
herself kidnapped the child and hid her in her sister's (Chillita Rallos) house in Ma-a. Midland Village. Surely,
the conflicting confessions could not both be true.
2 Those "confessions" were disproved by Solon's admission that the child had been in his house since April 16,
1988 after she had been picked up from the street at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon by his 14-year old son,
Esmeraldo, Jr.
3. Manliguez never admitted the, kidnapping despite the torture which he suffered in the hands of the Talamo
police. Instead, he reported to a CLAO lawyer, Attorney Caete his ordeal in the police station. Upon
complaint lodged with the PC's Col. Abaya, a PC doctor was sent to examine his injuries. Only after he was
brought to the Regional Hospital for treatment of his injuries and transferred, first to the 431st PC company
headquarters, and later, to the Ma-a City Jail, did the torture of Manliguez stop.
4. Neither in Manliguez's house at the Fatima Village, nor in Chillita Rallos' house at Ma-a, did the police find
tht missing minor.
5. During the more than two (2) months that Mary Grace Ali was missing, her family did not receive any
ransom note from her supposed kidnappers.
6. The child herself led Esmeraldo Solon. Sr. to her house after they had attended a mass in Bangkal. While
they were walking around looking at the house, she recognized her home.
7. During her two-months' stay with the Solon family. Mary Grace never mentioned that she had been
kidnapped.
Under this state of the evidence, it can not be said with moral conviction that it was proven beyond reasonable
doubt that the child, Mary Grace Ali, had been kidnapped and that the appellant did it. On the contrary, it is
extremely doubtful that she was kidnapped at all. It appears that, being somewhat intellectually deficient, she
had wandered away from home in the afternoon of April 16, 1988, got lost and could not find her way back.
She also could not tell the Solons (who found her) her correct address.
The Court is inclined to reject the kidnapping charge for there is not the slightest hint of a motive for the
crime. There is no evidence of any demand for ransom, nor proof that the child's widowed mother was in a
position to satisfy the demand if it were made. The kidnapping theory appears to be the hobgoblin of the
distraught mind of the child's mother. who wildly unleashed her arrows of suspicion at everyone who bad been
seen anywhere near her child, or her house, on the day the child disappeared, mindless of the pain and misery
her reckless charge would cause the innocent victims of her wrath.
The Court sympathizes with the appellant, Julio Manliguez and his co-accused, Shirley Ignacio y Agatia and
Lucia Guiral, who suffered horrible torture in the hands of some members of the Talomo Police Force on
account of false accusations levelled against them by the child's mother, Priscilla Ali, and sister, Lori Jean Ali.
We cannot conclude this decision without recommending to the Commission on Human Rights and the
Philippine National Police that they undertake a thorough and speedy investigation of, and impose proper
disciplinary sanctions on, Police Lieutenant Obrero and Patrolmen Plaza and Miranda members of the Police
Force of Talomo, Davao City in April 1988, for the alleged torture of the three (3) accused, Julio Manliguez,
Shirley Ignacio and Lucia Guiral, to extort confessions from them during the investigation of the alleged
kidnapping of the child, Mary Grace Ali. Inhuman physical torture is the easiest means of obtaining "evidence"
from helpless civilians when police investigators are neither sufficiently trained for detective work, nor
adequately equipped, with the scientific tools of criminal investigation. An end should be put to such police
brutality.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is reversed and set aside. The appellant, Julio Manliquez, is acquitted of
the crime charged and his immediate release from custody is ordered.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Commission of Human Rights and the Philippine National
Police.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Medialdea, JJ., concur.