#8 AGRA LAW

RAFAEL GELOS vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO ALZONA
G.R. No. 86186 May 8, 1992

FACTS: The subject land is a 25,000 square meter farmland situated in Cabuyao, Laguna, and belonging originally to
private respondent Ernesto Alzona and his parents in equal shares. On July 5, 1970, they entered into a written contract
with petitioner Rafael Gelos employing him as their laborer on the land at the stipulated daily wage of P5. On September
4, 1973, after Alzona had bought his parents' share and acquired full ownership of the land, he wrote Gelos to inform
him of the termination of his services and to demand that he vacate the property. Gelos refused and continued working
on the land.

On October 1, 1973, Gelos went to the Court of Agrarian Relations and asked for the fixing of the agricultural lease
rental on the property. He later withdrew the case and went to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform, which granted his
petition. For his part, Alzona filed a complaint for illegal detainer against Gelos in the Municipal Court of Cabuyao, but
this action was declared "not proper for trial" by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform because of the existence of a tenancy
relationship between the parties. Alzona was rebuffed for the same reason when he sought the assistance of the
Ministry of Labor and later when he filed a complaint with the Court of Agrarian Relations for a declaration of non-
tenancy and damages against Gelos. On appeal to the Office of the President, however, the complaint was declared
proper for trial and so de-archived and reinstated.

After hearing, the Regional Trial Court of San Pablo City (which had taken over the Court of Agrarian Relations under PB
129) rendered a decision dated April 21, 1987, dismissing the complaint. It found Gelos to be a tenant of the subject
property and entitled to remain thereon as such.

The decision was subsequently reversed by the Court of Appeals. In its judgment promulgated on November 25, 1988, it
held that Gelos was not a tenant of the land in question and ordered him to surrender it to Alzona.

ISSUE: WON Gelos is a tenant of the private respondent and entitled to the benefits of tenancy laws

HELD: NO. It is noted that the agreement provides that "ang Ikalawang Panig (Gelos) ay may ibig na magpaupa sa
paggawa sa halagang P5.00 sa bawa't araw, walong oras na trabaho" (The 2nd Party desires to lease his services at the
rate of P5.00 per day, eight hours of work) and that "Ipinatatanto ng Ikalawang Panig na siya ay hindi kasama sa bukid
kundi upahan lamang na binabayaran sa bawa't araw ng kanyang paggawa sa bukid na nabanggit.'' (The Second Party
makes it known that he is not a farm tenant but only a hired laborer who is paid for every day of work on the said farm.)

These stipulations clearly indicate that the parties did not enter into a tenancy agreement but only a contract of
employment. The agreement is a lease of services, not of the land in dispute. This intention is quite consistent with the
undisputed fact that three days before that agreement was concluded, the former tenant of the land, Leocadio
Punongbayan, had executed an instrument in which he voluntarily surrendered his tenancy rights to the private
respondent. It also clearly demonstrates that, contrary to the petitioner's contention, Alzona intended to cultivate the
land himself instead of placing it again under tenancy.

As this Court has stressed in a number of cases, "tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the
alleged tenant does upon the land. It is also a legal relationship. The intent of the parties, the understanding when the
farmer is installed, and as in this case, their written agreements, provided these are complied with and are not contrary
to law, are even more important."

The petitioner's payment of irrigation fees from 1980 to 1985 to the National Irrigation Administration on the said
landholding is explained by the fact that during the pendency of the CAR case, the Agrarian Reform Office fixed a
provisional leasehold rental after a preliminary finding that Gelos was the tenant of the private respondent. As such, it
was he who had to pay the irrigation fees. Incidentally, Section 12, subpar. (r) of PD 946 provides that the Secretary's
determination of the tenancy relationship is only preliminary and cannot be conclusive on the lower court.

A tenant is defined under Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 1199 as a person who himself and with the aid available from
within his immediate farm household cultivates the land belonging to or possessed by another, with the latter's consent,
for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or paying to the
landholder a price-certain or ascertainable in produce or in money or both, under the leasehold tenancy system.

For this relationship to exist, it is necessary that: 1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; 2) the subject is
agricultural land; 3) there is consent; 4) the purpose is agricultural production; 5) there is personal cultivation; and 6)
there is sharing of harvest or payment of rental. In the absence of any of these requisites, an occupant of a parcel of
land, or a cultivator thereof, or planter thereon, cannot qualify as a de jure tenant.

On the other hand, the indications of an employer-employee relationship are: 1) the selection and engagement of the
employee; 2) the payment of wages; 3) the power of dismissal; and 4) the power to control the employee's
conduct although the latter is the most important element.

According to a well-known authority on the subject, tenancy relationship is distinguished from farm employer-farm
worker relationship in that: "In farm employer-farm worker relationship, the lease is one of labor with the agricultural
laborer as the lessor of his services and the farm employer as the lessee thereof. In tenancy relationship, it is the
landowner who is the lessor, and the tenant the lessee of agricultural land. The agricultural worker works for the farm
employer and for his labor be receives a salary or wage regardless of whether the employer makes a profit. On the other
hand, the tenant derives his income from the agricultural produce or harvest."

The private respondent, instead of receiving payment of rentals or sharing in the produce of the land, paid the petitioner
lump sums for specific kinds of work on the subject lot or gave him vales, or advance payment of his wages as laborer
thereon.

This Court has stressed more than once that social justice or any justice for that matter is for the deserving,
whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is true that, in case of reasonable doubt, we are
called upon to tilt the balance in favor of the poor, to whom the Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and
compassion. But never is it justified to prefer the poor simply because they are poor, or to reject the rich simply because
they are rich, for justice must always be served, for poor and rich alike, according to the mandate of the law.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the petition is DENIED.





TRINIDAD GABRIEL vs. EUSEBIO PANGILINAN
G.R. No. L-27797 August 26, 1974

FACTS: Gabriel filed a complaint against Pangilinan claiming she is the owner of a 169,507 sqm fishpond in barrio Sta.
Ursula, Pampanga. An oral contract of lease with a yearly rental was entered between them. Defendant was notified
that the contract would be terminated, but upon request was extended for another year.

Defendant moved for the dismissal of the complaint claiming that the trial court had no jurisdiction. It should properly
pertain to the Court of Agrarian Relations, there being an agricultural leasehold tenancy relationship between the
parties. Upon opposition by plaintiff, the motion was denied. The defendant filed his answer that the land was originally
verbally leased to him by the plaintiff's father, Potenciano for as long as the defendant wanted, subject to the condition
that he would convert the major portion into a fishpond and that which was already a fishpond be improved at his
expense, which would be reimbursed by Potenciano Gabriel or his heirs at the termination of the lease. Plaintiff also
assured him that he could continue leasing as long as he wanted since she was not in a position to attend to it
personally.

Parties were ordered to adduce evidence for the purpose of determining which Court shall take cognizance of the case.
It appears that the defendant ceased to work on planting fingerlings, repairing dikes and such, personally with the aid of
helpers since he became ill and incapacitated. His daughter, Pilar Pangilinan, took over who said that she helps her
father in administering the leased property, conveying his instructions to the workers. Excepting Pilar who is residing
near the fishpond, defendants other children are all professionals; a lawyer, an engineer, and a priest all residing in
Manila. None of these has been seen working on the fishpond.

Defendant: relationship between the parties is an agricultural leasehold tenancy governed by Republic Act No. 1199, as
amended, pursuant to section 35 of Republic Act No. 3844, and the present case is within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.

Plaintiff: defendant ceased to work the fishpond personally or with the aid of the members of his immediate farm
household (Section 4, Republic Act No. 1199) the tenancy relationship between the parties has been extinguished
(Section 9, id.) and become of civil lease and therefore the trial court properly assumed jurisdiction over the case.

Trial Court: The lease contract is a civil lease governed by the New Civil Code. No tenancy relationship exists between
the plaintiff and the defendant as defined by Republic Act No. 1199. Court is vested with jurisdiction to try and decide
this case.

Reconsideration by the defendant was denied. He appealed to this Court.

ISSUES:
Lower court erred in considering the relationship of appellee and appellant as that of a civil lease and not a
leasehold tenancy under Rep. Act No. 1199 as amended.
The lower court erred in not holding that the Court of First Instance is without jurisdiction, the cue being that of
an agrarian relation in nature pursuant to Rep Act. No. 1199.

HELD: Important differences between a leasehold tenancy and a civil law lease. The leasehold tenancy is limited to
agricultural land; that of civil law lease may be either rural or urban property. As to attention and cultivation, the law
requires the leasehold tenant to personally attend to, and cultivate the agricultural land, whereas the civil law lessee
need not personally cultivate or work the thing leased. As to purpose, the landholding in leasehold tenancy is devoted to
agriculture, whereas in civil law lease, the purpose may be for any other lawful pursuits. As to the law that governs, the
civil law lease is governed by the Civil Code, whereas leasehold tenancy is governed by special laws.
The requisites for leasehold tenancy under the Agricultural Tenancy Act to exist:
1. land worked by the tenant is an agricultural land;
2. land is susceptible of cultivation by a single person together with members of his immediate farm household;
3. must be cultivated by the tenant either personally or with the aid of labor available from members of his
immediate farm household;
4. land belongs to another; and
5. use of the land by the tenant is for a consideration of a fixed amount in money or in produce or in both

There is no doubt that the land is agricultural land. It is a fishpond and the Agricultural Tenancy Act, which refers to
"agricultural land", specifically mentions fishponds and prescribes the consideration for the use thereof. The mere fact
that a person works an agricultural land does not necessarily make him a leasehold tenant within the purview of Sec 4 of
Republic Act No. 1199. He may still be a civil law lessee unless the other requisites as above enumerated are complied
with.
The court doesnt want to decide on the second requisite since it wasnt raised. For the third requisite, the tenancy
agreement was severed in 1956 when he ceased to work the fishpond personally because he became ill and
incapacitated. Not even did the members of appellant's immediate farm household work the land. Only the members of
the family of the tenant and such other persons, whether related to the tenant or not, who are dependent upon him for
support and who usually help him to operate the farm enterprise are included in the term "immediate farm household".
Republic Act No. 1199 is explicit in requiring the tenant and his immediate family to work the land. A person, in order to
be considered a tenant, must himself and with the aid available from his immediate farm household cultivate the land.
Persons, therefore, who do not actually work the land cannot be considered tenants; and he who hires others whom he
pays for doing the cultivation of the land, ceases to hold, and is considered as having abandoned the land as tenant
within the meaning of sections 5 and 8 of Republic Act. No. 1199, and ceases to enjoy the status, rights, and privileges of
one.
We are, therefore, constrained to agree with the court a quo that the relationship between the appellee Trinidad
Gabriel and appellant Eusebio Pangilinan was not a leasehold tenancy under Republic Act No. 1199. Hence, this case was
not within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in its Civil Case No. 1823, appealed
from, is affirmed, with costs against the appellants.