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774 F.2d 1116, 54 USLW 2232, 227 U.S.P.. 417

U!"ted States #o$rt o% &ppea's,
Federa' #"r($"t.
I! re )W*+S,#)R+I+- FI.*R-L&S #)RP)R&/I)+.
&ppea' +o. 04,1416.
)(t. 0, 1105.
2a!$%a(t$rer appea'ed %rom a de("s"o! o% t3e /rademar4 /r"a' a!d &ppea' .oard a%%"rm"!g t3e
de!"a' o% reg"strat"o! o% t3e (o'or 5p"!46 as a trademar4 %or ma!$%a(t$rer7s %"8ro$s g'ass res"de!t"a'
"!s$'at"o!. /3e #o$rt o% &ppea's, Pa$'"!e +e9ma!, #"r($"t :$dge, 3e'd t3at; (1) (o'or 5p"!46 3ad !o
$t"'"tar"a! p$rpose, d"d !ot depr"<e (ompet"tors o% a!= reaso!a8'e r"g3t or (ompet"t"<e !eed, a!d,
t3$s, 9as !ot 8arred %rom reg"strat"o! as a trademar4 o! t3e 8as"s o% %$!(t"o!a'"t=, a!d (2)
ma!$%a(t$rer 9as e!t"t'ed to reg"ster t3e (o'or 5p"!46 as a trademar4 %or "ts %"8ro$s g'ass
res"de!t"a' "!s$'at"o! $!der se(t"o! o% La!3am /rade>2ar4 &(t (od"%="!g t3e (ommo!>'a9 do(tr"!e
o% se(o!dar= mea!"!g.
Re<ersed.
."sse'', #"r($"t :$dge, d"sse!ted a!d %"'ed op"!"o!.
West ?ead!otes
@1A Be=#"te #"t"!g Re%ere!(es %or t3"s ?ead!ote
302/ /rademar4s
302/I I! -e!era'
302/41CC3 #o!st"t$t"o!a' a!d Stat$tor= Pro<"s"o!s
302/41CC5 4. P$rpose a!d (o!str$(t"o! "! ge!era'. 2ost #"ted #ases
(Former'= 30243 /rade Reg$'at"o!)
Pr"!("pa' p$rpose o% La!3am /rade>2ar4 &(t, D 1 et seE., 15 U.S.#.&. D 1C51 et seE., 9as t3e
moder!"Fat"o! o% trademar4 'a9, to %a("'"tate (ommer(e a!d to prote(t t3e (o!s$mer.
@2A Be=#"te #"t"!g Re%ere!(es %or t3"s ?ead!ote
302/ /rademar4s
302/II 2ar4s Prote(ted
302/41C5C Format or #ompo!e!ts o% /erm or 2ar4
302/41C57 +o!'"tera' *'eme!ts
302/41C57(2) 4. #o'or. 2ost #"ted #ases
(Former'= 302444 /rade Reg$'at"o!)
302/ /rademar4s
302/II 2ar4s Prote(ted
302/41C61 Form, Feat$res, or Des"g! o% Prod$(t as 2ar4sG /rade Dress
302/41C64 4. F$!(t"o!a'"t=. 2ost #"ted #ases
(Former'= 302444 /rade Reg$'at"o!)
W3ere (o'or app'"ed to good ser<es a pr"mar"'= $t"'"tar"a! p$rpose, "t "s !ot s$8He(t to prote(t"o!
as a 5trademar4.6 La!3am /rade>2ar4 &(t, D 45, 15 U.S.#.&. D 1127.
@3A Be=#"te #"t"!g Re%ere!(es %or t3"s ?ead!ote
Side 1 af 17 774 F.2d 1116
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302/ /rademar4s
302/II 2ar4s Prote(ted
302/41C5C Format or #ompo!e!ts o% /erm or 2ar4
302/41C57 +o!'"tera' *'eme!ts
302/41C57(2) 4. #o'or. 2ost #"ted #ases
(Former'= 302444 /rade Reg$'at"o!)
#o'or o% goods, as ot3er "!d"("a, ma= ser<e as a 5trademar46 "% stat$tor= reE$"reme!ts are met.
La!3am /rade>2ar4 &(t, D 45, 15 U.S.#.&. D 1127.
@4A Be=#"te #"t"!g Re%ere!(es %or t3"s ?ead!ote
302/ /rademar4s
302/II 2ar4s Prote(ted
302/41C5C Format or #ompo!e!ts o% /erm or 2ar4
302/41C57 +o!'"tera' *'eme!ts
302/41C57(2) 4. #o'or. 2ost #"ted #ases
(Former'= 302444 /rade Reg$'at"o!)
302/ /rademar4s
302/II 2ar4s Prote(ted
302/41C61 Form, Feat$res, or Des"g! o% Prod$(t as 2ar4sG /rade Dress
302/41C65 Part"($'ar #ases or Prod$(ts
302/41C65(3) 4. F$!(t"o!a'"t=. 2ost #"ted #ases
(Former'= 302444 /rade Reg$'at"o!)
#o'or 5p"!46 as app'"ed to res"de!t"a' %"8ro$s g'ass "!s$'at"o! 3ad !o $t"'"tar"a! p$rpose, d"d !ot
depr"<e (ompet"tors o% a!= reaso!a8'e r"g3t or (ompet"t"<e !eed, a!d, t3$s, 9as !ot 8arred %rom
reg"strat"o! as a trademar4 o! 8as"s o% %$!(t"o!a'"t=. La!3am /rade>2ar4 &(t, D 45, 15 U.S.#.&. D
1127.
@5A Be=#"te #"t"!g Re%ere!(es %or t3"s ?ead!ote
302/ /rademar4s
302/II 2ar4s Prote(ted
302/41C5C Format or #ompo!e!ts o% /erm or 2ar4
302/41C57 +o!'"tera' *'eme!ts
302/41C57(1) 4. I! ge!era'. 2ost #"ted #ases
(Former'= 302436 /rade Reg$'at"o!)
W3"'e or!ame!tat"o! "s !ot "!(ompat"8'e 9"t3 trademar4 %$!(t"o!, $!'ess des"g! "s o% s$(3
!at$re t3at "ts d"st"!(t"<e!ess "s o8<"o$s, (o!<"!("!g e<"de!(e m$st 8e %ort3(om"!g to pro<e t3at
"! %a(t p$r(3as"!g p$8'"( does re(og!"Fe des"g! as trademar4 93"(3 "de!t"%"es so$r(e o% t3e goods.
La!3am /rade>2ar4 &(t, D 2(%), 15 U.S.#.&. D 1C52(%).
@6A Be=#"te #"t"!g Re%ere!(es %or t3"s ?ead!ote
302/ /rademar4s
302/III Reg"strat"o!
302/III(.) Pro(eed"!gs #o!(er!"!g Federa' Reg"strat"o!
302/413C6 *<"de!(e
302/4131C 4. We"g3t a!d s$%%"("e!(=. 2ost #"ted #ases
(Former'= 302423C /rade Reg$'at"o!)
302/ /rademar4s
302/III Reg"strat"o!
302/III(.) Pro(eed"!gs #o!(er!"!g Federa' Reg"strat"o!
302/413C6 *<"de!(e
Side 2 af 17 774 F.2d 1116
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302/41311 4. Degree o% proo%. 2ost #"ted #ases
(Former'= 302423C /rade Reg$'at"o!)
*Ja(t 4"!d a!d amo$!t o% e<"de!(e !e(essar= to reg"ster a mar4 $!der La!3am /rade>2ar4
&(t, D 2(%), 15 U.S.#.&. D 1C52(%), (od"%="!g (ommo!>'a9 do(tr"!e o% se(o!dar= mea!"!g,
!e(essar"'= depe!ds o! t3e ("r($msta!(es o% t3e part"($'ar (aseG eJa(t degree o% proo% !e(essar=
to E$a'"%= a mar4 %or reg"strat"o! $!der t3at stat$te "s 'e%t to t3e H$dgme!t o% t3e Pate!t )%%"(e a!d
t3e (o$rts.
@7A Be=#"te #"t"!g Re%ere!(es %or t3"s ?ead!ote
302/ /rademar4s
302/III Reg"strat"o!
302/III(.) Pro(eed"!gs #o!(er!"!g Federa' Reg"strat"o!
302/413C6 *<"de!(e
302/4131C 4. We"g3t a!d s$%%"("e!(=. 2ost #"ted #ases
(Former'= 3024224 /rade Reg$'at"o!)
*<"de!t"ar= s3o9"!g o% se(o!dar= mea!"!g, adeE$ate to s3o9 t3at mar4 3as a(E$"red
d"st"!(t"<e!ess "!d"(at"!g or"g"! o% goods so as to perm"t "ts reg"strat"o! $!der La!3am /rade>2ar4
&(t, D 2(%), 15 U.S.#.&. D 1C52(%), "!('$des e<"de!(e o% trademar4 o9!er7s met3od o% $s"!g t3e
mar4, s$pp'eme!ted 8= e<"de!(e o% e%%e(t"<e!ess o% s$(3 $se to (a$se p$r(3as"!g p$8'"( to
"de!t"%= mar4 9"t3 so$r(e o% prod$(t.
@0A Be=#"te #"t"!g Re%ere!(es %or t3"s ?ead!ote
302/ /rademar4s
302/III Reg"strat"o!
302/III(.) Pro(eed"!gs #o!(er!"!g Federa' Reg"strat"o!
302/413C6 *<"de!(e
302/4131C 4. We"g3t a!d s$%%"("e!(=. 2ost #"ted #ases
(Former'= 3024224 /rade Reg$'at"o!)
S$8sta!t"a''= eJ('$s"<e $se o% mar4 %or per"od o% %"<e =ears "mmed"ate'= pre(ed"!g %"'"!g o%
app'"(at"o! ma= 8e (o!s"dered pr"ma %a("e e<"de!(e o% se(o!dar= mea!"!g o% mar4, %or p$rposes
o% reg"ster"!g mar4 $!der La!3am /rade>2ar4 &(t, D 2(%), 15 U.S.#.&. D 1C52(%), (od"%="!g
(ommo!>'a9 do(tr"!e o% se(o!dar= mea!"!g.
@1A Be=#"te #"t"!g Re%ere!(es %or t3"s ?ead!ote
302/ /rademar4s
302/II 2ar4s Prote(ted
302/41C21 #apa("t= to D"st"!g$"s3 or S"g!"%=G D"st"!(t"<e!ess
302/41C32 4. &(E$"red d"st"!(t"<e!ess a!d se(o!dar= mea!"!g "! ge!era'. 2ost #"ted
#ases
(Former'= 302465 /rade Reg$'at"o!)
302/ /rademar4s
302/II #reat"o! a!d Pr"or"t= o% R"g3ts
302/41132 Use o% 2ar4
302/41136 +at$re a!d *Jte!t o% Use
302/41136(1) 4. I! ge!era'. 2ost #"ted #ases
(Former'= 302465 /rade Reg$'at"o!)
D"st"!(t"<e!ess "s a(E$"red 8= s$8sta!t"a''= eJ('$s"<e a!d (o!t"!$o$s $se o% a mar4 "!
(ommer(e.
@1CA Be=#"te #"t"!g Re%ere!(es %or t3"s ?ead!ote
Side 3 af 17 774 F.2d 1116
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302/ /rademar4s
302/II 2ar4s Prote(ted
302/41C5C Format or #ompo!e!ts o% /erm or 2ar4
302/41C57 +o!'"tera' *'eme!ts
302/41C57(2) 4. #o'or. 2ost #"ted #ases
(Former'= 302444 /rade Reg$'at"o!)
#o'or 93"(3 "s emp'o=ed 8= ot3ers "! t3e "!d$str= a(ts !ot as a! "!d"(ator o% so$r(e o% a
prod$(t 8$t as mere or!ame!tat"o!.
@11A Be=#"te #"t"!g Re%ere!(es %or t3"s ?ead!ote
302/ /rademar4s
302/II 2ar4s Prote(ted
302/41C5C Format or #ompo!e!ts o% /erm or 2ar4
302/41C57 +o!'"tera' *'eme!ts
302/41C57(2) 4. #o'or. 2ost #"ted #ases
(Former'= 302444 /rade Reg$'at"o!)
.= t3e"r !at$re, (o'or mar4s (arr= a d"%%"($'t 8$rde! "! demo!strat"!g d"st"!(t"<e!ess a!d
trademar4 (3ara(terG ea(3 (ase m$st 8e (o!s"dered o! "ts mer"ts. La!3am /rade>2ar4 &(t, D 2(%),
15 U.S.#.&. D 1C52(%).
@12A Be=#"te #"t"!g Re%ere!(es %or t3"s ?ead!ote
302/ /rademar4s
302/II 2ar4s Prote(ted
302/41C5C Format or #ompo!e!ts o% /erm or 2ar4
302/41C57 +o!'"tera' *'eme!ts
302/41C57(2) 4. #o'or. 2ost #"ted #ases
(Former'= 302444 /rade Reg$'at"o!)
U!der La!3am /rade>2ar4 &(t, D 2(%), 15 U.S.#.&. D 1C52(%), (od"%="!g (ommo!>'a9 do(tr"!e
o% se(o!dar= mea!"!g, ma!$%a(t$rer (o$'d reg"ster t3e (o'or 5p"!46 as a 5trademar46 %or "ts
%"8ro$s g'ass res"de!t"a' "!s$'at"o!, 93ere ma!$%a(t$rer spe!t approJ"mate'= K42,421,CCC o!
(o!s$mer ad<ert"s"!g %or "ts p"!4 "!s$'at"o! "! med"a o% te'e<"s"o!, rad"o, !e9spapers, a!d
(o!s$mer magaF"!es d$r"!g per"od o% 1172 t3ro$g3 1101, a!d (o!s$mer re(og!"t"o! "! 1101 as to
so$r(e o% p"!4 "!s$'at"o! 9as 5C per(e!t.
*1118 Patr"(4 P. Pa(e''a, )9e!s>#or!"!g F"8erg'as #orp., /o'edo, )3"o, arg$ed %or appe''a!tG 9"t3
3"m o! 8r"e% 9as 2ar4 #. S(3a%%er, *m(3, S(3a%%er L S(3a$8 #o., L.P.&., /o'edo, )3"o.
2"(3ae' L. -e''!er, &sst. So'., U.S. Pate!t a!d /rademar4 )%%"(e, &r'"!gto!, Ia., arg$ed %or
appe''eeG 9"t3 3"m o! 8r"e% 9ere :osep3 F. +a4am$ra, So'. a!d :ere W. Sears, Dep$t= So'.,
Was3"!gto!, D.#.
.e%ore +*W2&+, #"r($"t :$dge, #)W*+, Se!"or #"r($"t :$dge, a!d .ISS*LL, #"r($"t :$dge.
P&ULI+* +*W2&+, #"r($"t :$dge.
)9e!s>#or!"!g F"8erg'as #orporat"o! ()#F) appea's %rom t3e de("s"o! o% t3e U!"ted States
Pate!t a!d /rademar4 )%%"(e7s /rademar4 /r"a' a!d &ppea' .oard (t3e .oard) a%%"rm"!g t3e
eJam"!"!g attor!e=7s de!"a' o% reg"strat"o! o% t3e (o'or 5p"!46 as a trademar4 %or %"8ro$s g'ass
res"de!t"a' "!s$'at"o!. We re<erse.
I.
&''eg"!g $se "! (ommer(e s"!(e 1156, )#F app'"ed o! :a!$ar= 25, 110C, app'"(at"o! Ser"a' +o.
247,7C7, %or reg"strat"o! o! t3e Pr"!("pa' Reg"ster o% t3e (o'or 5p"!46 as $!"%orm'= app'"ed to )#F7s
%"8ro$s g'ass res"de!t"a' "!s$'at"o!. /3e .oard 3e'd t3at t3e o<era'' (o'or o% goods "s (apa8'e o%
%$!(t"o!"!g as a trademar4, 8$t a%%"rmed t3e eJam"!er7s de!"a' o% reg"strat"o! o! t3e gro$!d t3at
Side 4 af 17 774 F.2d 1116
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)#F 3ad !ot adeE$ate'= demo!strated t3at t3e (o'or 5p"!46 "s d"st"!(t"<e o% )#F7s goods. In re
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 221 USP 1115 (//&. 1104).
/3e .oard7s (o!('$s"o! t3at t3ere "s !o "!3ere!t 8ar to trademar4 reg"strat"o! o% t3e (o'or o%
goods, 93e! t3e (o'or "s a! o<era'' (o'or rat3er t3a! "! t3e %orm o% a des"g!, "s "! 3armo!= 9"t3
moder! trademar4 t3eor= a!d H$r"spr$de!(e. Pr"or to passage o% t3e /rademar4 &(t o% 1146, 15
U.S.#. D 1C51 et seq. (t3e La!3am &(t), (o'or a'o!e (o$'d !ot 8e reg"stered as a trademar4. I!
11C6 t3e S$preme #o$rt 9rote;
W3et3er mere (o'or (a! (o!st"t$te a <a'"d trade>mar4 ma= adm"t o% do$8t. Do$8t'ess "t ma=, "%
"t 8e "mpressed "! a part"($'ar des"g!, as a ("r('e, sE$are, tr"a!g'e, a (ross, or a star. .$t t3e
a$t3or"t"es do !ot go %art3er t3a! t3"s.
A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Broeric! & Basco" Rope Co., 2C1 U.S. 166, 171, 26 S.#t. 425,
426, 5C L.*d. 71C (11C6). /3e Pate!t )%%"(e a!d t3e (o$rts %o''o9ed t3"s <"e9. For eJamp'e,
app'"(at"o!s 9ere reHe(ted to reg"ster t3e (o'or <"o'et %or gaso'"!e, In re #eneral $etrole%" Corp.
o& Cali&ornia, 41 F.2d 166, 1 USP 511 (##P& 1131)G a!d a 8'$e>a!d>a'$m"!$m (o'or %or o"' 9e''
reamers, In re Sec%rit' (ngineering Co., Inc., 113 F.2d 414, 46 USP 211 (##P& 114C).
Desp"te t3e pro3"8"t"o! o! reg"strat"o!, d$r"!g t3"s ear'= per"od some (o$rts a((orded o9!ers o%
(o'or mar4s prote(t"o! aga"!st $!%a"r (ompet"t"o! $po! a s3o9"!g o% se(o!dar= mea!"!g "! t3e
mar4. I! Cli&ton )&g. Co. v. Craw&or-A%stin )&g. Co., 12 S.W.2d 1C10 (/eJ.#"<.&pp.1121), %or
eJamp'e, t3e de%e!da!t 9as e!Ho"!ed %rom (op="!g p'a"!t"%%7s d"st"!(t"<e redd"s3>8ro9! (o'or"!g %or
te!ts, tarpa$'"!s, a!d 9ago! (o<ersG a!d "! *ellow Cab +ransit Co. v. Lo%isville +a,icab & +rans&er
Co., 147 F.2d 4C7, 64 USP 340 (6t3 #"r.1145), t3e (o'or =e''o9 %or taJ"(a8 ser<"(es
re(e"<ed*1119 prote(t"o! o! pr"!("p'es o% $!%a"r (ompet"t"o!.
@1A /3e pr"!("pa' p$rpose o% t3e La!3am &(t 9as t3e moder!"Fat"o! o% trademar4 'a9, to
%a("'"tate (ommer(e a!d to prote(t t3e (o!s$mer. &s !oted 8= t3e S$preme #o$rt "! $ar! -. Fl',
Inc. v. /ollar $ar! an Fl', Inc., 461 U.S. 101, 1C5 S.#t. 650, 664, 03 L.*d.2d 502, 224 USP
327, 331 (1105);
/3e La!3am &(t pro<"des !at"o!a' prote(t"o! o% trademar4s "! order to se($re to t3e o9!er o%
t3e mar4 t3e good 9"'' o% 3"s 8$s"!ess a!d to prote(t t3e a8"'"t= o% (o!s$mers to d"st"!g$"s3
amo!g (ompet"!g prod$(ers.
Se(t"o! 45 o% t3e &(t de%"!es 5trademar46 to "!('$de 5a!= 9ord, !ame, s=m8o', or de<"(e or
a!= (om8"!at"o! t3ereo% adopted a!d $sed 8= a ma!$%a(t$rer or mer(3a!t to "de!t"%= 3"s goods
a!d d"st"!g$"s3 t3em %rom t3ose ma!$%a(t$red or so'd 8= ot3ers.6 /3"s 9as a depart$re %rom t3e
past, as pr"or stat$tes o!'= perm"tted reg"strat"o! o% 5te(3!"(a'6 (ommo! 'a9 trademar4s. See
generall' W. Dere!8erg, +rae-)ar! $rotection an 0n&air +raing DD 16, 10, 23 (1136).
/3e pream8'e o% se(t"o! 2 o% t3e La!3am &(t states t3at 5@!Ao trademar4 ... s3a'' 8e re%$sed
reg"strat"o! o! t3e pr"!("pa' reg"ster o! a((o$!t o% "ts !at$re6, $!'ess o!e or more spe("%"(
eJ(ept"o!s to reg"stra8"'"t= set %ort3 "! t3at se(t"o! app'=. #o'or "s !ot s$(3 a! eJ(ept"o!.
#o!gress "!te!ded, as s3o9! "! t3e 'eg"s'at"<e 3"stor= o% t3e La!3am &(t, a 8road re<"s"o! o%
trademar4 'a9 a(3"e<"!g 5s$8sta!t"<e as d"st"!g$"s3ed %rom mere'= pro(ed$ra' r"g3ts "! trade>
mar4s6. S.Rep. +o. 1333, 71t3 #o!g., 2d Sess. 5, reprinte in 1146 U.S.#ode #o!g. L &d.+e9s
1274, 1277. $ot"!g t3"s report, t3e S$preme #o$rt 3as re"terated t3at;
#o!gress determ"!ed t3at 5a so$!d p$8'"( po'"(= reE$"res t3at trademar4s s3o$'d re(e"<e
!at"o!a''= t3e greatest prote(t"o! t3at (a! 8e g"<e! t3em.6
$ar! -. Fl', 1C5 S.#t. at 661, 224 USP at 321.
Imp'eme!t"!g t3"s "!te!t, post>La!3am &(t (o$rts 3a<e de('"!ed to 8e 8o$!d 8= pr"or
de("s"o!a' 'a9 t3at appeared "!(o!s"ste!t 9"t3 "ts p$rpose. Re(og!"F"!g t3e !eed o% 8$s"!ess to
prote(t "ts good9"'' a!d t3e !eed o% t3e p$8'"( to 8e prote(ted aga"!st sp$r"o$s goods, o$r
prede(essor (o$rt remar4ed;
/3e 'eg"s'at"<e 3"stor= o% t3e &(t as a 93o'e des(r"8es "ts o8He(t"<e as ma4"!g reg"strat"o! 5more
Side 5 af 17 774 F.2d 1116
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liberal, dispensing with mere technical prohibitions and arbitrary provisions and modernizing
the trademark statutes so that they will conform to legitimate present-day business practice.
The basic goal of the Act, which dealt with a good deal more than registration, was the
protection of trademarks, securing to the owner the good will of his business and protecting the
public against spurious and falsely marked goods. Accordingly, we consider the pre-anham Act
decisions presented here to be inapt.
In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., !"# $.%d &'(", &'#), &"" *+,- (#', (## .//,A &0"'1
.footnotes omitted1.
*nder the anham Act trademark registration became available to many types of previously
e2cluded indicia. /hange was gradual and evolutionary, as the ,atent and Trademark 3ffice and
the courts were presented with new concepts. 4egistration has been granted, for e2ample, for
containers5
$6&
product configurations5
$6%
and packaging,
$6'
even if sub7ect to design patent
protection5*1120
$6!
for tabs having a particular location on a garment5
$6(
slogans5
$6#
sounds5
$6"
ornamental labels5
$68
and goods which take the form of the mark itself.
$60
The 7urisprudence
under the anham Act developed in accordance with the statutory principle that if a mark is
capable of being or becoming distinctive of applicant9s goods in commerce, then it is capable of
serving as a trademark.
$6&. Ex parte Haig & Haig, Ltd., &&8 *+,- %%0 ./omm9r ,at.&0(81 .whiskey bottle15
Cf. In re Morton-Norwic Products, Inc., #"& $.%d &''%, %&' *+,- 0 .//,A &08%1
.household cleaner spray pump container held registrable upon a showing of
distinctiveness1.
$6%. In re Minnesota Mining and Mfg. Co., ''( $.%d 8'#, &!% *+,- '## .//,A &0#!1
.triangular shape of a cake of chemical, on the +upplemental 4egister1.
$6'. In re !or"d#s $inest Coco"ate, Inc., !"! $.%d &)&%, &"" *+,- %)( .//,A &0"'1
.candy bar wrapping1.
$6!. Id. %ee a"so In re Mogen Da&id !ine Corp., '%8 $.%d 0%(, &!) *+,- ("( .//,A
&0#!1 .wine bottle1.
$6(. Compare In re Le&i %trauss & Co., &#( *+,- '!8 .TTA: &0")1 wit In re 'ot(in,
%"# $.%d !&&, &%( *+,- '!" .//,A &0#)1.
$6#. )oux La*oratories, Inc. &. C"airo" Inc., !%" $.%d 8%', &## *+,- '! .//,A &0")1
.;air /olor +o 6atural 3nly ;er ;airdresser <nows $or +ure1.
$6". 4egistration 6o. 0&#,(%% issued to the 6ational :roadcasting /o., =nc. .the
notes >?/ on chimes1 discussed in >. >ottlieb, =n /ase @ou Aissed =t ..., #% Trade-
Aark 4ep. #)( .&0"%1.
$68. In re %wift & Co., %%' $.%d 0(), &)# *+,- %8# .//,A &0((1 .polka dot bands1.
$60. In re Pentouse Int#" Ltd., (#( $.%d #"0, &0( *+,- #08 .//,A &0""1 .stylized
key logo as 7ewelry design1.
/olor marks, as other indicia, were no longer barred from registration. As for all marks,
compliance with the legal reBuirements for registration depends on the particular mark and its
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circumstances of use. =n determining registrability of color marks, courts have considered
factors such as the nature of the goods, how the color is used, the number of colors or color
combinations available, the number of competitors, and customary marketing practices. =n the
case of Camp*e"" %oup Co. &. +rmour & Co., &"( $.%d "0(, "08, 8& *+,- !'), !'% .'d /ir.1, cert.
denied, ''8 *.+. 8!", ") +./t. 88, 0! .?d. (&8, 8' *+,- (!' .&0!01, the court refused to
protect the red and white colors of /ampbell9s labels on the ground that if /ampbell were to
monopolize red in all of its shades competition would be affected in an industry where colored
labels were customary.
The court in Camp*e"" %oup referred to the color depletion theoryC that there are a limited
number of colors in the palette, and that it is not wise policy to foster further limitation by
permitting trademark registrants to deplete the reservoir. %ee, e.g., Diamond Matc Co. &.
%aginaw Matc Co., &!% $. "%" .#th /ir.1, cert. denied, %)' *.+. (80, %" +./t. ""#, (& .?d. '')
.&0)#15 Internationa" ,raid Co. &. -omas $renc & %ons, Ltd., &() $.%d &!%, ## *+,- &)0 .//,A
&0!(1. This theory is not faulted for appropriate application, but following passage of the anham
Act courts have declined to perpetuate its per se prohibition which is in conflict with the liberating
purposes of the Act.
6ote the following e2amples where, in determining registrability of trademarks based on color,
the anham Act has been applied with e2ercise of 7udgment, as /ongress intended. =n In re Her
Mfg. Co., %"0 $.%d (%#, &%# *+,- '8& .//,A &0#)1, the court allowed registration of a sBuare
red label for use on automobile trailer windows wherein the only distinctiveness of the label was
its color. =n In re Data Pac.aging Corp., !(' $.%d &')), &"% *+,- '0# .//,A &0"%1, the court
allowed registration of a mark consisting of a colored band applied to a computer tape reel of
contrasting color. =n P"asti"ite Corp. &. 'assnar Imports, ()8 $.%d 8%!, &8! *+,- '!8 .//,A
&0"(1, registration was denied to a combination of yellow and orange colors for fishing floats, on
the basis that the color scheme lacked distinctiveness. =n In re %aw, &8! *+,- %(' .TTA: &0"!1,
the :oard denied trademark registration for green suede book covers on the ground of lack of
distinctiveness. The standard for registrability was that the color be arbitrarily applied to the
goods, in a distinctive way. /ontrary to an absolute prohibition on registrability of color marks,
administrative and 7udicial implementation of the statute illustrates that each case is decided upon
its facts.
D%E As with utilitarian features in general, when the color applied to goods serves a
primarily utilitarian purpose it is not sub7ect*1121 to protection as a trademark. %ee, e.g., In re
Po""a. %tee" Co., '&! $.%d (##, &'# *+,- #(& .//,A &0#'1 .registration of reflective fence post
coating refused despite de facto secondary meaning1, and %/"&ania E"ectric Products, Inc. &. Dura
E"ectric Lamp Co., %!" $.%d "'), &&! *+,- !'! .'d /ir.&0("1 .blue dot on flashbulb not a valid
trademark because functional, whether or not a de facto secondary meaning had been acBuired1.
=n !i""iam ). !arner & Co. &. E"i Li""/ & Co., %#( *.+. (%#, !! +./t. #&(, #8 .?d. &&#& .&0%!1,
the +upreme /ourt refused to authorize e2clusive rights in the brown color of a Buinine
preparation which was due to the presence of chocolate as a masking agent and suspension
medium. The /ourt carefully distinguished that situation from one where the ingredient was non-
essential, a mere matter of dress, or one where it merely serveDsE the incidental use of
identifying the respondent9s preparation. %#( *.+. at ('&, !! +./t. at #&". =n Deere & Co. &.
$armand, Inc., (#) $.+upp. 8(, %&" *+,- %(% .+.F.=owa &08%1, aff#d, "%& $.%d %(' .8th
/ir.&08'1, the court refused to enforce the color Gohn Feere green as a common law trademark
for front end loaders on the bases that the color green was aesthetically functional in that
purchasers wanted their farm eBuipment to match, and that secondary meaning had not been
established. +uch conditions limit an applicant9s right to register a color for its goods, in order to
prevent the appropriation of functional product features from the public domain. He thus consider
whether the color pink may be so characterized.
The +upreme /ourt has stated a product feature is functional if it is essential to the use or
purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or Buality of the article. Inwood La*oratories, Inc. &.
I&es La*oratories, Inc., !(# *.+. 8!!, 8() n. &), &)% +./t. %&8%, %&8" n. &), "% .?d.%d #)#,
%&! *+,- &, ! n. &) .&08'1, citing %ears, )oe*uc. & Co. &. %tiffe" Co., '"# *.+. %%(, %'%, 8!
+./t. "8!, "80, && .?d.%d ##&, &!) *+,- (%!, (')I'& .&0#!1. =n In re Morton-Norwic
Products, Inc., #"& $.%d &''%, &'!)I!&, %&' *+,- 0, &(I&# .//,A &08%1, the court looked at
the following factors to determine functionalityC .&1 whether a particular design yields a utilitarian
advantage, .%1 whether alternative designs are available in order to avoid hindering competition,
and .'1 whether the design achieves economies in manufacture or use.
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6o argument has been raised that the color pink for 3/$9s fibrous glass residential insulation
violates any of these factors, or that alternative, eBually arbitrary designs are not available to
other producers of fibrous glass insulation. To the contrary, when the arbitrary color arrangement
distinguishes the goods from other sources of the same product, as in In re +$+ Corp., &0# *+,-
""% .TTA: &0""1, or where a variety of color designs has been utilized by other producers, courts
have viewed this as evidence that such design features are primarily non-functional in nature. %ee
In re -ec -orc Co., Inc., &!' *+,- &%! .TTA: &0#!1 .colors of cables for welding torch serve as
trademark15 Ex parte 0io 'nife Co., &&" *+,- !!0 ./omm9r ,at.&0(81 .color markings on knife
handles may serve as indications of origin1.
As with all trademarks, practices in the industry and competitive needs may reBuire
recognition, as discussed in In re Mogen Da&id !ine Corp., '%8 $.%d 0%(, &!) *+,- ("( .//,A
&0#!1 .4ich, G., concurring1. :y analogy to the shape of the wine bottle in Mogen Da&id, depriving
the public of the right to color fibrous residential insulation pink .&1 does not hinder competition
and .%1 does not take from the goods ... something of su*stantia" value. Id. at 0'', &!) *+,- at
(8%.
=n addition to registration under section % of the anham Act, color marks have been protected
by courts under section !'.a1 of the Act and under state laws of unfair competition. $or e2ample,
in +rtus Corp. &. Nordic Co., Inc., (&% $.+upp. &&8!, %&' *+,- (#8 .H.F.,a.&08&1, Artus
adopted an arbitrary color scheme for its shims utilizing a different color to represent each of
fourteen shim thicknesses. 6ordic, a competitor, copied the color scheme. The court re7ected
6ordic9s argument*1122 that Artus9 color scheme should be denied protection because of
functionality and the risk of monopoly, and granted an in7unction to prevent a likelihood of
confusion in the marketplace.
The colors of cube puzzles have been protected, when such colors were found to have acBuired
a secondary meaning and were primarily non-functional in nature. %ee, e.g., Idea" -o/ Co. &.
P"awner -o/ Mfg. Corp., %&( *+,- #&) .F.6.G.&08&1, modified, #8( $.%d "8, %&# *+,- &)% .'d
/ir.&08%1. Hhen these reBuirements were not met, protection has been denied. %ee, e.g., 0"a/
Co., Inc. &. Cococare Products, Inc., %&8 *+,- &)%8, &)!( .+.F.6.@.1, aff#d mem. "!% $.%d &!'0
.%d /ir.&08'1 .pink color of beauty lotion had not acBuired a secondary meaning15 !ater 1rem"in
Co. &. Idea" $ising $"oat Co., Inc., !)& $.+upp. 8)0, 8&%, &88 *+,- '88, '0& .F.Ainn.&0"(1
.color coded fishing floats had not acBuired a secondary meaning1.
Trademark status of the colors of pharmaceutical products has been vigorously litigated, and
although some 7udicial decisions proceeded on a theory of palming off, many have afforded relief
against imitation of capsule or tablet colors when the facts established that such features were
non-functional and had acBuired a secondary meaning in the marketplace. %ee, e.g., Ci*a-1eig/
Corp. &. ,o"ar Parmaceutica" Co., Inc., (!" $.+upp. &)0(, %&( *+,- "#0 .F.6.G.&08%1, aff#d per
curiam, "&0 $.%d (# .'d /ir.&08'1, cert. denied, !#( *.+. &)8), &)! +./t. &!!!, "0 .?d.%d "#'
.&08!1, grant of perm. in2. aff#d, "!" $.%d 8!!, %%! *+,- '!0 .'d /ir.&08!1. $ollowing this
pattern the :oard allowed registration of a tri-colored analgesic tablet where the colors were non-
functional and secondary meaning was established, In re +merican Home Products Corp., %%#
*+,- '%" .TTA: &08(1, and denied registration to a colored drug capsule where distinctiveness
had not been made out, In re %tar Parmaceutica"s, Inc., %%( *+,- %)0 .TTA: &08(1.
D'E Thus gradually the courts have re7ected the dictum, even as it appeared in some cases
after passage of the anham Act, to the effect that color alone is not sub7ect to trademark. This
result is manifest throughout the circuits, e2emplified in the decisions cited herein and by the
:oard. 3ver the thirty-nine years of the anham Act, it has become established that the color of
goods, as other indicia, may serve as a trademark if the statutory reBuirements are met.
As the :oard observed, there is no overriding public policy which reBuires that the color pink
applied to residential fibrous glass insulation be e2cluded from the statutory definition of a
trademark. =t appears from the record that 3/$ is the only manufacturer that colors this
insulation, and that there are only a small number of producers. Applying these considerations the
:oard foundC
Thus, in a case where there is no competitive need .whether characterized as aesthetic or
otherwise1 for colors to remain available to all competitors, the color depletion argument is an
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unreasonable restriction on the acBuisition of trademark rights. He are confronted with such a
case. The record indicates that fibrous glass insulation ordinarily has a light yellow-white
coloring. Aoreover, there is no evidence in this record of widespread industry practice of dyeing
fibrous glass insulation a color different from that which it has as a result of the manufacturing
process, nor is there anything in the record suggesting a need to do so.
In re 0wens-Corning $i*erg"as Corp., %%& *+,- at &&08.
D!E He agree with the :oard that the color pink has no utilitarian purpose, does not
deprive competitors of any reasonable right or competitive need, and is not barred from
registration on the basis of functionality.
The :oard also correctly observed that even if the pink color is considered to be ornamental,
this does not prevent it from acting as a trademark. /ourts have noted that the line
distinguishing between mere ornamentation and ornamentation which is *1123 merely an
incidental Buality of a trademark is not always clearly ascertainable, the application of legal
principles to fit one situation or the other reBuires proper reflection upon the impression likely to
govern the ordinary purchaser in the marketplace. In re %wift & Co., %%' $.%d 0(), 0(!, &)#
*+,- %8#, %88 .//,A &0((1. %ee a"so Da""as Cow*o/s Ceer"eaders, Inc. &. Puss/cat Cinema,
Ltd., #)! $.%d %)), %)!, %)' *+,- &#&, &#! .%d /ir.&0"01.
An overall color is akin to an over-all surface design, for which trademark registration has been
held to be available when the statutory reBuirements are met. %ee, e.g., In re -odd Co., %0) $.%d
(0", #)), &%0 *+,- !)8, !&) .//,A &0#&1 .registration on the +upplemental 4egister of a
pattern of green parallel lines for safety paper products15 3uitton et $i"s %.+. &. 4. 5oung
Enterprises, Inc., #!! $.%d "#0, ""(, %&% *+,- 8(, 80 .0th /ir.&08&1 .protection granted to a
mark consisting of an overall pattern of florets and letters1. Cf. In re %occer %port %upp"/ Co.,
Inc., ()" $.%d &!)), &!)', &8! *+,- '!(, '!" .//,A &0"(1 .registration refused for an overall
design covering a soccer ball, for lack of distinctiveness1.
He agree with the :oard that DdEeciding likelihood of confusion among color shades ... is no
more difficult or subtle than deciding likelihood of confusion where word marks are involved. %%&
*+,- at &&08. The :oard has engaged in such shade confusion analysis in the past without
apparent difficulty. %ee, e.g., !ire )ope Corp. of +merica, Inc. &. %eca"t %.+., &0# *+,- '&%
.TTA: &0""1 .red and yellow strand wire versus red strand wire15 5oungstown %eet and -u*e Co.
&. +rmco %tee" Corp., &") *+,- &#% .TTA: &0"&1 .:oard can make its own comparison of grey
and orange banded fence post versus orange banded pipe15 In re Hodes-Lange Corp., &#" *+,-
%(( .TTA: &0")1 .registration of yellow banded ampul allowed despite prior registration of bronzy
gold banded ampul5 it is of no conseBuence that the ,T3 color designating lines are the same for
yellow and gold1.
He conclude that 3/$9s use of the color pink performs no non-trademark function, and is
consistent with the commercial and public purposes of trademarks. A pink color mark registered
for fibrous glass insulation does not confer a monopoly or act as a barrier to entry in the market.
=t has no relationship to production of fibrous glass insulation. =t serves the classical trademark
function of indicating the origin of the goods, and thereby protects the public, as discussed in the
legislative history of the anham ActC
Trade-marks, indeed, are the essence of competition, because they make possible a choice
between competing articles by enabling the buyer to distinguish one from the other. Trade-
marks encourage the maintenance of Buality by securing to the producer the benefit of the good
reputation which e2cellence creates. To protect trade-marks, therefore, is to protect the public
from deceit, to foster fair competition, and to secure to the business community the advantages
of reputation and good will by preventing their diversion from those who have created them to
those who have not. This is the end to which this bill is directed.
+.4ep. 6o. &''', "0th /ong., %d +ess. !, reprinted in &0!# *.+./ode /ong. J Ad.6ews &%"!,
&%"(.
That a trademark confers no monopoly was settled by the +upreme /ourt in 6nited Drug Co. &.
)ectanus Co., %!8 *.+. 0), 0"I08, '0 +./t. !8, ()I(&, #' .?d. &!& .&0&81C
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DTEhe right to a particular mark grows out of its use, not its mere adoption5 its function is simply
to designate the goods as the product of a particular trader and to protect his good will against
the sale of another9s product as his....
=n truth, a trade-mark confers no monopoly whatever in the proper sense, but is merely a
convenient means for facilitating the protection of one9s good-will in trade by placing a
distinguishing mark or symbolKa commercial signatureKupon the merchandise or the package
in which it is sold.
*1124 3/$9s pink color mark performs this role. =t gives the public a reliable indication of
source and thus facilitates responsible marketplace competition. Le&i %trauss & Co. &. ,"ue ,e"",
Inc., #'% $.%d 8&", 8%& n. (, %)8 *+,- "&', "&" n. ( .0th /ir.&08)1 .Aarkey, /.G., sitting by
designation1. He do not share the view e2pressed by the dissent that 3/$, having built product
goodwill in its pink color mark, must have no recourse but product labeling should another
manufacturer color its insulation pink.
==.
The :oard, having established the potential trademark character of the color pink for fibrous
glass residential insulation, nonetheless refused registration on the ground that 3/$ had not met
its burden of proving that pink functions as a trademark for that insulation. In re 0wens-Corning
$i*erg"as Corp., %%& *+,- at &&00.
3/$ argues that the color pink has become distinctive of its insulation by virtue of e2clusive
and continuous use since &0(#, and has acBuired a secondary meaning in the marketplace. 3/$
had taken the position before the e2aminer and the :oard that its mark was registrable under
section %.f1 of the anham Act .&( *.+./. L &)(%.f1 1, and had submitted e2tensive evidence in
support of acBuired distinctiveness.
+ection %.f1 provides that nothing in this chapter shall prevent the registration of a mark used
by the applicant which has become distinctive of applicant9s goods in commerce, codifying the
common-law doctrine of secondary meaning. The :oard re7ected this legal theory, stating that a
claim of distinctiveness under section %.f1 is inappropriate when the sub7ect matter to be
registered is believed to be mere ornamentationC
The better approach is to refuse registration of a mark believed to be mere ornamentation on
the grounds that applicant has not shown that the ornamentation functions as a mark. ?vidence
similar to the type of evidence that would be submitted under +ection %.f1 may make out a
convincing showing that the ornamentation functions as a trademark, and the mark can be
registered upon such a showing. %ee In re Paramount Pictures Corp., %&' *+,- &&&&, &&&!
.note 81 .TTA: &08%1.
In re 0wens-Corning $i*erg"as Corp., %%& *+,- at &&08 n. '.
Paramount Pictures held that an applicant can rebut an e2aminer9s presumption that a
proposed mark is principally ornamental and does not function as a trademark, with evidence that
the mark is inherently distinctive. :ut if a proposed mark is not inherently distinctive, then it can
be registered under section %.f1 upon an adeBuate evidentiary showing that it had acBuired a
secondary meaning sufficient to identify an applicant9s goods. Her, %"0 $.%d at (%8, &%# *+,-
at '8%. %ee a"so In re %cenectad/ 3arnis Co., Inc., %8) $.%d &#0, &"), &%# *+,- '0(, '0#
.//,A &0#)1 .registration of a design mark under section %.f1 1.
D(E The :oard stated that color is really nothing other than a type of product
ornamentation. In re 0wens-Corning $i*erg"as Corp., %%& *+,- at &&08. He agree that color is
usually perceived as ornamentation. Hhile ornamentation is not incompatible with trademark
function, unless the design is of such nature that its distinctiveness is obvious, convincing
evidence must be forthcoming to prove that in fact the purchasing public does recognize the
design as a trademark which identifies the source of the goods. In re Da&id Cr/sta", Inc., %0#
$.%d ""&, ""', &'% *+,- &, % .//,A &0#&1 .registration denied for red and blue bands on white
socks1.
The :oard treated applicant9s proffered evidence under section %.f1 as evidence to show that
the pink color per se functioned as a trademark for 3/$9s goods, remarking that the evidence for
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one is much like the evidence for the other. In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 221 USPQ
at 1198. Although !" has not *1125 dis#uted the $oard%s legal theor&' !" continues to argue
for registration under section 2(f). *e see no reason in la+ or #olic& to #rohi,it !"%s attem#ted
reliance on section 2(f)' and +e o,serve that the Solicitor does not #ress the $oard%s a##roach'
,ut in this a##eal argues the sufficienc& of !"%s evidence on the ,asis of the re-uirements of
section 2(f). !" has the right to dra+ on the ,enefits of its t+ent&.nine &ears of use and to seek
registration in terms of section 2(f).
/01 !"%s evidence +as e2amined ,& the $oard and found +anting. *e revie+ this
conclusion from the vie+#oint of com#liance +ith section 2(f). As o,served ,& our #redecessor
court' the e2act kind and amount of evidence necessaril& de#ends on the circumstances of the
#articular case' and !ongress has chosen to leave the e2act degree of #roof necessar& to -ualif&
a mark for registration to the 3udgment of the Patent ffice and the courts. Hehr, 249 ".2d at
528' 120 USPQ at 686.
/41 /81
ac-uired distinctiveness indicating the origin of the goods' includes evidence of the trademark
o+ner%s method of using the mark' su##lemented ,& evidence of the effectiveness of such use to
cause the #urchasing #u,lic to identif& the mark +ith the source of the #roduct. 7he statute is
silent as to the +eight of evidence re-uired for a sho+ing under section 2(f) e2ce#t for the
suggestion that su,stantiall& e2clusive use for a #eriod of five &ears immediatel& #receding filing
of an a##lication ma& ,e considered #rima facie evidence. Hehr, 249 ".2d at 528' 120 USPQ at
682886.
!" su,mitted e2tensive affidavit and documentar& evidence. 9ose#h :ohert&' !"%s ;ice
President of <arketing !ommunications' averred that !" has advertised the #ink color mark as
a##lied to fi,rous glass residential insulation since 1950= that !" s#ent a##ro2imatel&
>?2'?21'@@@ on consumer advertising for its #ink insulation in the media of television' radio'
ne+s#a#ers' and consumer magaAines during the #eriod of 1942 through 1981' +ith an estimated
e2#enditure of >11'?@@'@@@ in 1981 alone= and that additional sums +ere s#ent on ,rochures'
dis#la&s' and other #romotional items that highlighted the #ink color as a##lied to a##licant%s
insulation.
7he $oard found !"%s totalit& of evidence insufficient ,ecause it does not indicate to +hat
e2tent that advertising has em#hasiAed B#inkC as a mark and ,ecause it does not #rovide an&
indication of the e2tent to +hich the sam#le advertising materials of record (+hich em#hasiAe the
B#inkC mark) have ,een used. In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 221 USPQ at 1199. *e have
revie+ed the sho+ing in light of the $oard%s criticisms.
Dn Roux Laboratories, Inc. v. Clairol Inc., ?24 ".2d 826' 829 n. 1@' 100 USPQ 6?' 69 n. 1@
(!!PA 194@)' our #redecessor court noted that /t1he siAe of advertising e2#enditures alone has
,een found to serve as strong evidence of secondar& meaning. 7he $oard has held that it is not
essential that evidence of advertising e2#enditures ,e directed s#ecificall& to the #romotion of an
a##licant%s mark' given the rather su,stantial evidence of a##licant%s vigorous #romotional efforts
in this regard. In re American Home ro!ucts Corp., 220 USPQ 624' 66@ (77A$ 1985) (the
tricolor design of ta,lets held to have ac-uired secondar& meaning).
"E1@
"E1@. "ee also In re Holl#woo! $ran!s, Inc., 21? ".2d 169' 1?1' 1@2 USPQ 29?' 290
(!!PA 195?) (secondar& meaning found +hen one.third of >1'165'@@@ for advertising
over si2 &ears +as devoted to #u,liciAing the mark= affidavits from consumers not
essential)= R%R Foo!s, Inc. v. &hite Roc' Corp., 0@6 ".2d 1@58' 1@0@' 2@6 USPQ ?@1'
?@2 (2d !ir.1949) (court #ro#erl& considered evidence of #laintiff%s e2tensive
advertising and sales)= I!eal (o# Corp. v. lawner (o# )*g. Corp., 085 ".2d 48' 82'
210 UPSQ 1@2' 1@0 (6d !ir.1982) (factors such as length of use' ,u&er association'
e2tent of sales and advertising ma& ,e considered in testing secondar& meaning)= In
re +uverno# , "ons, Inc., 212 ".2d 2@2' 1@1 USPQ 288 (!!PA 195?) (e2tensive
advertising of !onsistentl& Su#erior accom#an&ing trade name inade-uate to confer
trademark status to laudator& statement not relied on to denote origin)= 64 !.".F. G
2.?1 (an a##licant ma& su,mit evidence sho+ing duration' e2tent and nature of use
and advertising e2#enditures ... to su##ort a claim of distinctiveness).
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*1126 !" su,mitted to the H2aminer and to the $oard its net+ork television advertising
schedule for the #eriod August 14' 198@ through <arch 6@' 1981. 7his schedule sho+s that !"
#urchased nearl& t+o hundred se#arate ,locks of net+ork time during ,roadcasts of ma3or
s#orting events such as the Su#er $o+l' the Fose $o+l' the U.S. 7ennis #en' and the *orld
Series= #rime time net+ork series including Si2t& <inutes' <IAISIJI ' and <agnum' P.D.=
and net+ork sho+ing of theatrical movies= all to advertise its #ink insulation. 7he ,readth of this
e2#osure +as not challenged ,& the $oard' unlike the su,missions in In re "occer "port "uppl#
Co., 5@4 ".2d at 1?@6' 18? USPQ at 6?8' +here the evidence fail/ed1 to disclose information from
+hich the num,er of #eo#le e2#osed to the design could ,e estimated.
7he record contains detailed stor&,oards for t+o different commercials aired during this time
#eriod featuring the Pink Panther' a #ink cartoon character #romoting the use of #ink +ens.
!orning "i,erglas insulation. 7he narration for these commercials discusses ho+ homeo+ners can
cut the high cost of fuel if the& +ould onl& /a1dd another la&er of #ink in their attics. 7he scenes
em#hasiAe the distinctive #ink color of !"%s #roduct and reinforce the image +ith the slogan
Put &our house in the #ink.
Earration from another television commercial of record told consumers that /,1lankets of #ink
"i,erglas insulation around &our house could cut &our air conditioning ,ills &ear after &ear. 7he
#hotogra#hic stills for this commercial sho+ an Hskimo in :eath ;alle& sta&ing cool in an igloo
encased in a #ink ,lanket of !"%s insulation.
!"%s advertising +as discussed in an article of record entitled <fr. Promotions $oost
Dnsulation 7raffic in the 9anuar& 5' 1981 issue of -ational Home Center -ews. 7he article states
that +ens.!orning%s Pink Panther television cam#aign made the ,iggest s#lash of an&
manufacturer #romotion that &ear' and descri,es a nation+ide "e,ruar& Pink Sale event #lanned
,& !" to include more net+ork 7; Pink Panther commercials' #oint.of.sale materials and
ne+s#a#er advertising +ith dealer listings. Dt also notes that 8! has increased its consumer ad
,udget ,& several million dollars over last &ear. 7he article states that "orest !it& ,u&er' 9ohn
gden re#orted the #o+erful im#act of the 8! ad cam#aign at store level. Je said some
sho##ers +ill no longer ,u& fi,erglass insulation unless it is #ink.
"urther evidence of #romotion of #ink +as su,mitted in the form of a transcri#t of a radio
commercial. 7he te2t includedK
Df &ou%d like to kee# &our house +armer in +inter' cooler in summer ... &ou%ll love that #ink.
$ecause no+ &ou can +ra# &our home in the comfort of #ink +ens.!orning "i,erglas
insulation.... And' right no+' in stores +here &ou ,u& #ink +ens.!orning "i,erglas insulation'
&ou can take advantage of our ,est ever sales event.... Lou%ll never have a ,etter o##ortunit& to
think #ink ... ,u& #ink ... install #ink in time for the severe +eather ahead. So' look for the
s#ecial Pink Panther dis#la&sM+ith com#lete detailsMsee ho+ eas& it is to #ut &our house in
the #ink at /&our local dealer1.
7he record states that !" advertised in #o#ular consumer magaAines including Jouse N Oarden'
$etter Jomes and Oardens' <echani2 Dllustrated' Po#ular <echanics' Po#ular Science' !hanging
7imes' Jome Hnerg& :igest' and Jouse $eautiful= these ads also featured the Pink Panther
character. A##licant%s su,missions sho+ the use of slogans in its advertising' e.g., Pink of
Perfection= 7he Pink !ooler= $ig Pink= Pove that Pink= Pink Po+er= America%s "avorite Pink
Product= 7ickled Pink= Put &our Jouse in the Pink= U# +ith Pink%= Prime 7ime *1127 Pink=
7hink Pink= 7hink <ore Pink= $eat the !old +ith Pink= All that Pink= and Plant Some Pink
Dnsulation in &our Attic.
!"%s earl& advertising efforts introduced the #ink #roduct to its dealers +ith the e2#lanation
that it +as colored #ink so &our customers +ill recogniAe it as the latest and the ,estQ !" also
su,mitted evidence of #oint.of.sale advertising materials that it has su##lied to its dealers
through the &ears' man& of +hich +ere coordinated +ith !"%s television cam#aigns. 7he $oard
o,3ected that this evidence did not sho+ the e2tent to +hich these advertising materials had
actuall& ,een used ,& dealers. *e conclude that this o,3ection does not out+eigh the total
evidence of ,road distri,ution and sales efforts in this case.
7he record also descri,es #romotion to real estate develo#ers' +ho +ere encouraged to /s1
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#ecif& and #urchase #ink +ens.!orning "i,erglas in each of &our houses. !" offered a
variet& of #ink #romotional items such as coffee mugs and stuffed animals to develo#ers as
sales aids in model homes' stating that the dis#la& of such items lets customers kno+ that &ou
have invested in -ualit& insulationM+ens.!orning "i,erglas. Dn con3unction +ith the other
evidence su,mitted' this ,road #romotion of #ink in association +ith !"%s fi,rous glass
residential insulation is of evidentiar& value.
Dn addition' the record contains consumer surve& evidence. 7his surve& +as conducted to
ena,le !" to evaluate an advertising #rogram' ,ut its data are #ertinent to the issue. Dn 9une
198@ male homeo+ners +ere asked the -uestion 7o the ,est of &our kno+ledge' +hat
manufacturer makes #ink insulationR. "ort&.one #ercent res#onded +ith a##licant%s name and
1?S res#onded +ith the name of some other insulation manufacturer. A similar surve& in 9anuar&
1981' after the first Pink Panther television commercial ,litA' sho+ed that a##licant%s recognition
rate had increased to 5@S.
/91 /1@1
esta,lish that those res#ondents associate #ink insulation +ith a single source. In re Owens-
Corning Fiberglas Corp., 221 USPQ at 1198. 7he Solicitor further criticiAed the surve& on the ,asis
that the +a& the -uestion +as #resented inhi,ited #lural res#onses from #ersons +ho might have
,elieved that more than one manufacturer makes #ink insulation. *e do not agree that such
criticism re-uires outright re3ection of surve& data sho+ing that 5@S of the res#ondents named
!"' the onl& manufacturer to color its insulation #ink.
"E11
*hether or not this surve& alone is
conclusive' the results sho+ a s&ndetic relationshi# ,et+een the color #ink and +ens.!orning
"i,erglas in the minds of a significant #art of the #urchasing #u,lic.
"E11. :istinctiveness is ac-uired ,& su,stantiall& e2clusive and continuous use of
the mark in commerce. Levi "trauss , Co. v. .enesco, Inc., 4?2 ".2d 1?@1' 1?@5'
222 USPQ 969' 9?2 ("ed.!ir.198?). A color +hich is em#lo&ed ,& others in the
industr& acts not as an indicator of source ,ut as mere ornamentation. "ee, e.g., /an
$ro!e )illing Co., Inc. v. Cox Air .auge "#stem, Inc., 249 ".2d 616' 619' 125 USPQ
51@' 51? (9th !ir.190@) (red for automotive accessories)= $lac' , +ec'er )*g. Co. v.
0ver-Rea!# Appliance )*g. Co., 518 ".Su##. 0@4' 014' 216 USPQ 8?2' 85@
(H.:.<o.1981)' a**1!, 08? ".2d 5?0' 215 USPQ 94 (8th !ir.1982) (almond for kitchen
accessories)= +elamere Co., Inc. v. (a#lor-$ell Co., Inc., 2?9 ".Su##. ?41' ?49' 1?8
USPQ 608' 64? (S.:.E.L.1900) (#ink for cosmetic #roducts).
/111 /121
distinctiveness and trademark character. Hach case must ,e considered on its merits. !"%s
evidence sho+s advertising e2#enditures e2ceeding >?2'@@@'@@@= in Hehr the advertising
e2#enditures that +ere deemed ade-uate to sho+ secondar& meaning +ere a,out >112'@@@.
!onsumer recognition in 1981 as to the source of #ink insulation +as 5@S' a #ercentage
considera,l& greater than that held sufficient in man& cases. "ee, e.g., 2atarains, Inc. v. Oa'
.rove "mo'ehouse, Inc., 098 ".2d 480' 214 USPQ 988 (5th !ir.1986)' +here 26828S correct
res#onses +ere held sufficient to esta,lish *1128 secondar& meaning. *e conclude that the
$oard #laced an ina##ro#riatel& heav& evidentiar& ,urden on !". As stated in In re Holl#woo!
$ran!s, Inc., 21? ".2d 169' 1?1' 1@2 USPQ 29?' 290 (!!PA 195?)' there is nothing in the statute
+hich e2#ressl& or im#liedl& im#oses an unreasona,le ,urden of #roof u#on an a##licant for
registration thereunder' nor is it +ithin our #rovince to read such rigid #rovisions into it.
n the totalit& of the evidence' the $oard%s finding that the color #ink does not function as a
trademark for !"%s fi,rous glass residential insulation is clearl& erroneous.
7he re-uirements of the statute having ,een met' !" is entitled to register its mark under 15
U.S.!. G 1@52(f).
FH;HFSH:.
$DSSHPP' !ircuit 9udge' dissenting.
D res#ectfull& dissent.
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D
D adhere to the vie+ that the la+ is +ell.settled toda& that the overall color of a #roduct ...
cannot ,e a trade identit& designation' nor is it entitled to registration. 6 F. !allman' (he Law o*
3n*air Competition (ra!emar's an! )onopolies G 18.16 (?th ed. 1986). 7hat +as the la+ long
,efore the 19?0 Panham Act' it continued to ,e the la+ after the Act' and it ought to ,e the la+ in
this case.
"E1
"E1. 7he onl& issue +hich the #arties treated as #resent in this case +as the
esta,lishment of secondar& meaning. Accordingl&' D ,elieve that the issue of
registra,ilit& of color #er se remains o#en in an o##osition #roceeding or in litigation
res#ecting this a##lication or a resulting registration.
A
<ore than t+o decades ,efore the Panham Act the Su#reme !ourt a##lied that rule of la+ in
den&ing trademark #rotection to the color of a ,everage' announcing that the coloring matter is
free to all +ho can make it if no e2trinsic deceiving element is #resent. Coca-Cola Co. v. 4o'e
Co., 25? U.S. 1?6' 1?4' ?1 S.!t. 116' 11?' 05 P.Hd. 189 (192@). 7he district courts also a##lied
the rule #rior to the Act. Dn holding that a raAor ,lade manufacturer #revailed in a suit to #rohi,it
#assing off' the court nevertheless held that the manufacturer could not have e2clusive use of the
color ,lue' stating that /a1 concern' ho+ever' must clearl& identif& its #roduct ,& something more
distinctive and individual than mere color. ... !olor itself is free. .illette "a*et# Ra5or Co. v.
(riangle )echanical Laboratories Corp., ? ".Su##. 619' 62? (H.:.E.L.1966). Shortl& ,efore the
Act' another district court o,served that color must ,e in the form of a design to constitute a
trademark and held that a #honogra#h record manufacturer could have no trademark rights in the
color red for color -ua color ma& not ,e a trademark. Ra!io Corporation o* America v. +ecca
Recor!s, 51 ".Su##. ?96' ?95 (S.:.E.L.19?6)= c*. 6ellow Cab (ransit Co. v. Louisville (axicab ,
(rans*er Co., 1?4 ".2d ?@4' ?15 (0th !ir.19?5) (ta2ica, com#an& has no e2clusive right to the use
of the color &ello+).
$
After the Act' all the regional circuit courts that confronted the issue continued to recogniAe the
validit& of the rule.
"E2
"E2. 7uabaug Rubber Co. v. Fabiano "hoe Co., 504 ".2d 15?' 101' 195 USPQ 089'
09? (1st !ir.1944) (&ello+.colored oval mark= color alone cannot ,e a##ro#riated as a
trademark)= +allas Cowbo# Cheerlea!ers, Inc. v. uss#cat Cinema, Lt!., ?04 ".Su##.
600' 64? (S.:.E.L.) (one cannot ac-uire a trademark ,& color alone)' a**1!, 0@? ".2d
2@@ (2d !ir.1949)= -orwich harmacal Co. v. "terling +rug, Inc., 241 ".2d 509' 542'
126 USPQ 642' 645 (2d !ir.1959) (#ink medicinal li-uid= that a color ma& ,ecome
someone%s e2clusive #ro#ert& has ,een re3ected ,& the courts throughout the &ears)'
cert. !enie!, 602 U.S. 919' 8@ S.!t. 041' ? P.Hd.2d 469 (190@)= Campbell "oup Co.
v. Armour , Co., 145 ".2d 495' 498' 81 USPQ ?6@' ?66 (6d !ir.19?9) (no e2clusive
use of half red and half +hite la,els= one cannot ac-uire a trademark ,& color alone)=
-orth "hore Laboratories Corp. v. Cohen, 421 ".2d 51?' 526 (5th !ir.1986) (courts
have uniforml& re3ected sanctioning e2clusive rights to #roduct color)=
/ol'swagenwer' A'tiengesellscha*t v. Ric'ar!, ?92 ".2d ?4?' ?8@' 181 USPQ 011'
015 (5th !ir.194?) (automo,ile manufacturer has no rights in color ,lue #er se)= (as-
(--ut Co. v. /ariet# -ut , +ate Co., 2?5 ".2d 6' 0' 116 USPQ ?96' ?95 (0th
!ir.1954) (clear that one could ac-uire no #ro#rietar& right in the color or colors used
on its #ackages' as such)= Li*e "avers Corp. v. Curtiss Can!# Co., 182 ".2d ?' 9' 85
USPQ ??@' ??6 (4th !ir.195@) (no e2clusive use of multi.colored stri#es on
#ackaging= color cannot ,e mono#oliAed to distinguish a #roduct)= +eere , Co. v.
Farmhan!, Inc., 50@ ".Su##. 85 (S.:.Do+a 1982)' a**1!, 421 ".2d 256 (8th !ir.1986)=
)ershon Co. v. achma#r, 22@ ".2d 849' 886' 1@5 USPQ ?' 4 (9th !ir.) (+hite line on
green recoil.#ad= color alone cannot ,e #rotected as a mark)' cert. !enie!, 65@ U.S.
885' 40 S.!t. 169' 1@@ P.Hd. 48@ (1955).
Similarl&' the !ourt of !ustoms and Patent A##eals has a##lied the rule. $efore *1129 the Act
the court held that a mark is not registra,le if color alone is its distinguishing characteristic. In
re Cana!a +r# .inger Ale, 80 ".2d 86@' 866 (!!PA 1960). After the Act' the court continued to
recogniAe the validit& of the rule as it had ,een e2#ressed in other federal courts. Eearl& a decade
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after the Act the !!PA recogniAed the +ell settled rule that trade.mark rights cannot ,e
ac-uired in color alone. In re "wi*t , Co., 226 ".2d 95@' 955' 1@0 USPQ 280' 289 (!!PA 1955)
(citing Campbell "oup Co. v. Armour , Co., 145 ".2d 495' 498' 81 USPQ ?6@' ?66 (6d
!ir.19?9) ). <ore than t+o decades after the Act the court recogniAed the validit& of the +ecca
Recor!s decision that the use of color must ,e in the form of a design to constitute a trademarkK
Eor are +e #ersuaded that our decision here is contrar& to +hat +as said in the :ecca Fecords
case. In re +ata ac'aging Corp., ?56 ".2d 16@@' 16@6' 142 USPQ 690' 698 (!!PA 1942). <ore
recentl&' in den&ing registration to a &ello+ and orange fishing float' the court statedK !olor or
colors used as mere surface decoration cannot ,e mono#oliAed ,& a claim to trademark rights
therein. lastilite Corp. v. 4assnar Imports, 5@8 ".2d 82?' 820' 18? USPQ 6?8' 65@ (!!PA 1945).
7he develo#ment of the 3uris#rudence under the Panham Act distills into this ruleK A color' #er
se' is not ca#a,le of a##ro#riation as a tra!emar'. 1 9. <c!arth&' (ra!emar's an! 3n*air
Competition G 4K10 (2d ed. 198?) (em#hasis added).
!
7he Act does not re-uire the result the ma3orit& reaches' nor is there an& #ersuasive reason for
this court to discard decades of 3uris#rudence in order to e2tend tra!emar' #rotection to color #er
se. 7here are at least four reasons for this court not to discard this esta,lished 3uris#rudence.
"irst' the ma3orit&%s result ignores the #rinci#le of comit&. Unlike our e2clusive 3urisdiction over
#atent la+' this court%s 3urisdiction over trademark la+ is shared +ith the regional circuits. *hile
the decisions of the regional circuits are certainl& not ,inding #recedent on this court' the& are
entitled to at least a modicum of res#ect and deference. 7his deference is es#eciall& due +here
there is such a unanimit& among circuit courts +hich have #rimar& res#onsi,ilit& for determining
infringement and e-ual res#onsi,ilit& +ith this court for determining registra,ilit& of a mark under
15 U.S.!. G 1@41(,)(1) (1982).
"E6
Hven if +e had e2clusive 3urisdiction over trademark la+' +e
should not lightl& cast aside a settled inter#retation of a statute. 7here is a valua,le #u,lic interest
in consistenc& and #redicta,ilit& in the la+. Pa+&ers have advised clients' clients have conducted
their affairs' litigants have +on and lost and settled' all in light of the inter#retation universall&
a##lied in the federal courts. :iscarding the esta,lished 3uris#rudence and ,reaking a+a& from the
lines of decisions in the regional circuits +ill have a divisive effect on the trademark la+. 7o create
such a fundamental division in the la+ is directl& contrar& to this court%s mandate to ,ring
uniformit& to the la+ and +ill inevita,l& invite forum.sho##ing.
"E6. <oreover' there is no #oint in granting a registration +hich +ill not ,e
recogniAed ,& the regional circuits (nor' for that matter' ,& this circuit +hich must
follo+ the la+ of a regional circuit on -uestions of trademark infringement).
Second' there is no need to create such a division in the la+. 7he current inter#retation*1130
of the Act ade-uatel& #rotects the use of color as an element of a trademark.
Hven though color itself alone cannot ,e #rotected as a trademark' this court and the regional
circuit courts' consistent +ith the rule e2#ressed in +ecca Recor!s, have #ermitted registration of
a trademark +hich used color in a #articular design or in an ar,itrar& or distinctive design. "ee,
e.g., In re +ata ac'aging Corp., ?56 ".2d at 16@6' 142 USPQ at 698= In re (o!! Co., 29@ ".2d
594' 0@@' 129 USPQ ?@8' ?1@ (!!PA 1901)= In re Hehr )anu*acturing Co., 249 ".2d 520' 528'
120 USPQ 681' 686 (!!PA 190@)= 7uabaug Rubber Co. v. Fabiano "hoe Co., 504 ".2d 15?' 101'
195 USPQ 089' 09? (1st !ir.1944)= Campbell "oup Co. v. Armour , Co., 145 ".2d 495' 498' 81
USPQ ?6@' ?66 (6rd !ir.19?9)= Li*e "avers Corp. v. Curtiss Can!# Co., 182 ".2d ?' 9' 85 USPQ
??@' ??6 (4th !ir.195@)= )ershon Co. v. achma#r, 22@ ".2d 849' 886' 1@5 USPQ ?' 4 (9th
!ir.1955).
Unfortunatel& for +ens.!orning' the +ecca Recor!s rule cuts against it in this case. !olor
uniforml& a##lied to a #roduct is not a design ,ecause it has not ,een used in connection or
com,ination +ith or im#ressed in some definite ar,itrar& s&m,ol or design. 7his is the crucial
distinction ,et+een this case and the In re (o!! Co. and /uitton et Fils cases cited ,& the
ma3orit&.
7hird' there is a reason not to change the la+ on the factual setting of this case. !hanging the
la+ ,ased on the #eculiar factual circumstances of this case might create a ,arrier to other+ise
la+ful com#etition in the home insulation trade. Since +ens.!orning on the record ,efore us
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appears to be the only manufacturer in the trade applying a color to its product and since the
majority disparages the color depletion doctrine, the majority finds no public policy reasons for
refusal of registration. However, by reason of the dominance of Owens-Corning in the field (its
advertising claims a 7 percent mar!et share", pin! insulation has become virtually synonymous
with home insulation. #hus, new entrants may be unable to effectively compete if barred from
ma!ing pin! insulation. $ndeed, the record reveals that Owens-Corning dominates the field to such
an e%tent that &some shoppers will no longer buy fiberglass insulation unless it is pin!.' Cf. Deere
& Co. v. Farmhand, Inc., () *.+upp. ,, -, (+...$owa /-,0" (green farm e1uipment2 protecting
&3ohn .eere green' would hinder competition", aff'd, 70/ *.0d 04 (,th Cir./-,5".
#he &property' in a trademar! is the right to prevent confusion, not to bar new entrants into
the mar!et. 6s was stated by Chief 3udge 7ar!ey in a trademar! infringement case8
6 &trademar!' is not that which is infringed. 9hat is infringed is the right of the public to be
free of confusion and the synonymous right of a trademar! owner to control his product:s
reputation.
....
... #he trademar! laws e%ist not to &protect' trademar!s, but, as above indicated, to protect
the consuming public from confusion, concomitantly protecting the trademar! owner:s right to a
non-confused public.
James Burroughs, Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 4) *.0d 0((, 074, 07(, /-0 ;+<= , (0,
(5 (7th Cir./-7(" (7ar!ey, C.J., sitting by designation".
$ believe the law in these circumstances limits protection against confusion with respect to such
goods to effective labeling. 6s another court stated8
<alming off is the proper issue, not color.
>ven though &mere inability of the public to tell two identical articles apart is not enough to
support an injunction against copying,' we recogni?e that the right to copy unpatented articles is
not absolute. Sears [Roeuc! & Co. v. Stiffe"#, 57( ;.+. at 050, ,4 +.Ct. at 7,- @/-(4A. #he
+upreme Court suggests that when there is confusion as to who manufactured nearly identical
goods, a court may appropriately re1uire that &goods, whether patented or unpatented, be
labeled or that other precautionary steps be ta!en to prevent customers from being misled as to
the source.'
*1131 $orth Shore Laoratories Cor%. v. Cohen, 70/ *.0d /4, 05 (th cir./-,5".
6ccordingly, refusal of registration does not mean that Owens-Corning is without relief should a
competitor attempt to &palm off' its goods as those of Owens-Corning. See &inthro% Chemica" Co.
v. 'merican (harmaceutica" Co., -4 *.0d ,7, ,, (0d Cir./-5," (use of pin! as color of tube of
same si?e and shape as plaintiff:s tube enjoined as a part of plan to palm off products". However,
even under the doctrine of unfair competition, there may be a legitimate purpose to consumers
which is served by a competitor producing a product of the same color. See In)ood Laoratories,
Inc. v. Ives Laoratories, Inc., 4( ;.+. ,44, ,,, /)0 +.Ct. 0/,0, 0/-), 70 B.>d.0d ()( (/-,0"
(blue capsules2 &legitimate reason for producing imitative product'".
#he final reason for the general rule that denies to one the appropriation of a particular color is
that infringement actions could soon denigrate into 1uestions of shade confusion. 6s one trial
court stated concerning its discussion with counsel regarding the practical difficulty of enjoining
the use of &3ohn .eere green'8 &#he practical problems identified in this discussion lend credence
to the Cshade confusionD rationale for denying protection of color under the Banham 6ct.' Deere &
Co., () *.+upp. at -7 n. 0). Considering that registrations are printed only in blac! and white, 57
C.*.E. F 0.0(e", and have only code linings for color (pin! and red being the same", registration
will add only greater imprecision.
#here are such sound reasons against altering the rule that $ am convinced this rule should
continue to be applied. +ince color per se does not have trademar! significance and does not fall
into the realm of registrable matter as contemplated by the 6ct, $ would affirm the result that
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Owens-Corning is not entitled to register its asserted mar!.
$$
6lternatively, even if color itself could be capable of trademar! significance, $ would affirm
based on the Goard:s finding that Owens-Corning failed to prove secondary meaning. #hat finding
is not clearly erroneous. See In re Loe)'s *heatres, Inc., 7(- *.0d 7(4, 7(-H7) (*ed.Cir./-,"2
Stoc! (ot Restaurant, Inc. v. Stoc!%ot, Inc., 757 *.0d /7(, /7,, 000 ;+<= ((, (((
(*ed.Cir./-,4".
Owens-Corning relied on affidavit evidence to establish the ac1uired distinctiveness of its
asserted mar!. #he Goard carefully considered the evidence and concluded that the proof was
insufficient2 the Goard found that pin! did not function as a trademar! for the insulation. $ agree
with the majority that color mar!s carry a difficult burden and that each case must be considered
on its own merits. $ do not agree that the Goard placed too heavy a burden on Owens-Corning.
6s the Goard e%plained8
#he affidavit evidence of record recites applicant:s advertising e%penditures for its insulation
but does not indicate to what e%tent that advertising has emphasi?ed &pin!' as a mar!. #here is,
moreover, no indication of the e%tent to which the sample advertising material of record (which
emphasi?e the &pin!' mar!" have been used. >ven that survey evidence of consumer recognition
does not ma!e a convincing showing that purchasers of insulation associate pin! insulation
e+c"usive", with applicant. +tated differently, that some )I of male homeowners who
responded to the survey 1uestion !new that applicant ma!es insulation that is pin! does not
establish that those respondents associate pin! insulation with a sing"e source.
In re -)ens.Corning Fierg"as Cor%., 00/ ;+<= //-, //-- (##6G /-,4" (emphasis added".
*or e%ample, what is wrong with the survey can be illustrated by comparing a different
product, yellow legal pads. Owens-Corning:s 1uestion about insulation is li!e as!ing lawyers
whether they !now any company that puts out yellow legal pads. #he 1uestion does not evo!e an
answer *1132 that relates to the source of all such goods. 9hat is wrong with the advertising
evidence is that it fails to give any indication of the proportion of e%penses allocated to promoting
pin! as an indication of source, a failure which can only result in guesswor! by the court. +ince
Owens-Corning failed to carry its burden under the most minimal standard of proof it is difficult to
understand how the Goard imposed an improperly heavy burden.
#he Goard:s evaluation of the evidence leading to its finding that Owens-Corning failed to
establish that pin! insulation is associated with a single source does not evo!e a &definite and firm
conviction that a mista!e has been made.' /nited States v. /nited States 0,%sum Co., 555 ;.+.
5(4, 5(, (, +.Ct. 0, -0 B.>d. 74( (/-4,". 6ccordingly, its finding cannot be regarded as
clearly erroneous and must be affirmed.
C.6.*ed.,/-,.
$n re Owens-Corning *iberglas Corp.
774 *.0d ///(, 4 ;+B9 0050, 007 ;.+.<.=. 4/7
>J. O* .OC;7>J#
9est Eeporter $mage (<.*"
(c" 0)/4 #homson Eeuters. Jo Claim to Orig. ;+ Kov. 9or!s.
Side 17 af 17 774 F.2d 1116
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