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Making the Case For Bail in Canada

M A R T I N D . G L A Z E R


n theory, people accused of a crime are entitled to be released on bail
pending trial. However, making a successful bail application often
turns out to be a defence lawyers challenge. This paper will focus on
effective arguments and supporting case law that can make the difference
between success and failure.
I. THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE
As aptly noted by Malouf JA for the majority in R v Perron (1989) 51
CCC (3d) 518 at page 530:
The presumption of innocence underlies our principles concerning individual
freedom. It is the cornerstone of our criminal law.

According to s. 11(e) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the accused
must not be denied reasonable bail without just cause.
It is important to remind bail judges that the presumption of innocence
takes priority over the prosecutions claim that the case against the accused
is strong.
When confronted by a bail judge who asks how can I determine the
validity of an accused persons defence since I am not the trial judge and
have no idea if it will succeed at trial? the defence lawyer should refer that

Martin D. Glazer is a criminal defence lawyer and was called to the Manitoba Bar in
1982. Copyright 2014 Martin Glazer. All Rights Reserved. No part of this summary
service may be reproduced in any form by any photographic, electronic, mechanical or
other means, or used in any information storage and retrieval system, without the
written permission of Martin Glazer. Originally published at www.cite-on-site.ca.
Please direct any questions to 1-888-259-4700. Martin Glazer Law Office. Criminal
Defence Lawyer. 1210-363 Broadway, Winnipeg, MB, R3C 3N9. Phone: 204-942-
6560. Fax: 204-942-2696. Email:mglazlaw@mymts.net. Website:
http://members.shaw.ca/martinglazerlaw
I
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judge to R v Braun (1994) 91 CCC (3d) 237 (Sask CA), where Vancise J.A.
cited R v Lamothe (1990) 58 CCC (3d) 530 (Que CA) as follows at page
254:
a judge hearing the application need not decide at this stage the results of the
trial He must first consider the presumption of innocence and not get ahead
of the trial on the merits.
It is an error of law to detain someone in custody just because the
Crown has a strong case. The bail judge is not to decide guilt in advance of
the trial. The law is clear that even if it appears that the prosecution has a
strong case, that factor is not decisive and should take a backseat to the
presumption of innocence. See R v Blind (1999) 139 CCC (3d) 87 (Sask
CA) at paragraph 15, R v Everette-Dorland (2004) 185 Man R (2d) 243 at
paragraph 9, R v Thomson (2004) 203 CCC (3d) 492 (Ont SCJ) at
paragraph 46, and R v Laframboise (2005) OJ 5785 (Ont CA) at paragraph
32.
In R v Stevenson (1998) OJ 4390 (Ont CJ) where the prosecutors case
was supported by video and audiotape recordings of the drug trafficking
offences and therefore quite strong, bail was nevertheless granted. The
court noted as follows at paragraphs 29 31 and 37:
In such circumstances, is detention necessary in order to maintain confidence
in the administration of justice? It comes down to a question of whether the
public would think justice was not being properly administered if an accused was
released in circumstances where it is said that some of the crimes charged were
captured on audio and videotape, thereby lending further support to the
evidence of a police agent.

In this context, my view is that the public should notionally be represented by
the concept of a fair minded, right thinking and informed person.

Such a person would support the presumption of innocence as a cornerstone of
our justice system and would support the Charter right not to be denied
reasonable bail without just cause.

In my opinion, the notional member of the public whose confidence we should
seek to maintain is that reasonable, fair minded and informed individual who
would take all of the circumstances into account. In my best assessment, that
person would remain confident in the administration of justice if a person were
released on bail, even on a serious charge, and even in the face of what appears at
the initial stages to be a strong Crown case, as long as it is likely that the accused
would attend for trial would not commit further offences, and would not
otherwise interfere with the administration of justice. If those concerns are
satisfied, then the granting of bail does nothing more than delay incarceration, if
Making the Case for Bail in Canada 3

in fact the Crowns case is as strong as it is billed. To deny bail, in circumstances
of an allegedly strong case, in order to maintain public confidence, runs the risk
of invoking the end result prior to the proper unfolding of the due process.
Although Stevenson dealt with the tertiary ground, it is helpful to cite
it when submitting that bail is justified on the basis of the presumption of
innocence even where the case against the accused appears to be
overwhelming because he is caught on camera in the act.
II. IMPROBABILITY OF CONVICTION
Where based on the disclosure made at the bail hearing a conviction
appears to be unlikely, release on bail is facilitated. In R v Baltovich (1991)
6 OR (3d) 11 at page 13 (Ont CA) the court noted that the lack of
likelihood of conviction is a relevant factor in granting bail. That case
involved a first degree murder charge. In R v Beyenne (2007) ABQB 474, it
was held that it was an error, on a bail hearing, for a judge to give weight
to evidence that was likely to be ruled inadmissible at trial. The court
stated, jail is a sanction for convicted persons, not for persons who might
commit crimes. An individual who is unlikely to be convicted at trial
should not be kept in custody pending trial.
III. GRAVITY OF THE ALLEGED OFFENCE(S)
When confronted with a prosecution argument that the charge is too
serious for bail to be granted, the defence lawyer should point to the case
law which clearly enunciates that gravity is not an obstacle to bail. As
noted by McEachern CJ in R v Nguyen (1997) 119 CCC (3d) 269 (BCCA)
at paragraph 13:
The circumstances of the offence, and the gravity of the offence, however are
something else. Murder is the most serious offence under our law, with the
exception, perhaps, of treason. But gravity by itself is not conclusive because if
it were, no one convicted of murder could be released, contrary to what has been
long established practice.
See also R v Blind supra at paragraphs 15 and 16, R v Laframboise supra at
paragraph 31, R v Thomson supra at paragraph 5 and R v Everette-Dorland
supra at paragraph 25.
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IV. THE PRIMARY GROUND
Where the prosecution alleges that the accused person is a flight risk,
cannot be trusted to obey bail conditions, or to attend court; the strategy
to employ is to argue that the person charged a) has roots in the
community and is willing to surrender his or her passport b) if a criminal
record for breaches of bail conditions exists, the availability of one or more
sureties overcomes any concern in this regard and c) depending on the
persons financial situation he or she lacks the means to flee or conversely,
if the person has considerable financial funds he or she can post
substantial bail to the extent that fleeing would financially cripple the
accused. In those cases where the case is weak, the defence is strong, or at
the very least, triable issues exist, it is arguable that the accused has no
reason to avoid trial and every reason to remain in the jurisdiction to face
trial in order to clear his or her name and be vindicated. Bail conditions
including a curfew with police monitored curfew checks, reporting to bail
supervision once or more weekly and attending in court on every remand
date are additional safeguards which effectively address the prosecutions
concerns.
V. THE SECONDARY GROUND
In the case of an alleged first offender or someone with a minor
record, this ground is easy to overcome. After all, such a person falls into
the category of those accused of crime who have little or no baggage with
them to indicate a prospect of re-involvement or a propensity to breach
court orders. Where there is little or no record it cannot be said that there
is any inclination to commit crime, let alone a substantial likelihood of re-
involvement and therefore the secondary ground does not apply. However,
for those persons with a lengthy criminal record or who have already been
released on bail only to allegedly reoffend, the secondary ground becomes
a challenge. The solution is to carefully plot the gaps in the persons
record and explain away the circumstances of each prior offence where
special or mitigating facts apply. Ask the court to carefully scrutinize the
prior record. Is it an old record? A history of crime means convictions over
a long period of time, not just dated convictions. Is the accused on
probation or parole? Has he or she ever received a jail sentence despite the
fact a long prior record exists? If not then it is arguable that since the
Making the Case for Bail in Canada 5

accused has spent his or her whole life out of custody that he or she can be
trusted to remain in the community without the need for custodial
intervention. Has the accused previously offended while on bail? If not
then does that not reflect a good track record in terms of obeying bail
orders?
A prior criminal record is only one factor for the court to consider. It
is not decisive. Where the accused is a gang member and the prosecution
emphasizes this fact in an effort to portray him or her as a danger to the
public, referring the court to the following statement by MacDonald J. In
R v Campbell (2007) OJ 1269 (SCJ) is helpful:
In a bail application or review, a persons criminal record is a factor to be
considered along with all other factors. However, there is no legal presumption
or invariable inference that an applicant for bail who is a member of an
organization held to be a criminal organization will run afoul of the secondary
ground or the tertiary ground solely because of that membership and regardless
of any other circumstances. Whether either membership in the Hells Angels
Motorcycle Club or an applicants criminal record is or is not either influential
or decisive in a bail decision turns on the totality of the evidence and on the
issues in the case. Everyone has the right not to be denied reasonable bail
without just cause pursuant to s. 11(e) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.
It is important to remind the court that the test for detention on this
ground is not the possibility of re-involvement but the substantial
likelihood of it. Reference to R v Morales (1992) 77 CCC (3d) 91 (SCC)
per Lamer C.J. at page 107 is often effective:
Bail is not denied for all individuals who pose a risk of committing an offence or
interfering with the administration of justice while on bail. Bail is denied only
for those who pose a substantial likelihood of committing an offence or
interfering with the administration of justice, and only where this substantial
likelihood endangers the protection or safety of the public. Moreover,
detention is justified only when it is necessary for public safety. It is not
justified where detention would merely be convenient or advantageous. Such
grounds are sufficiently narrow to fulfil the first requirement of just cause under
s. 11(e).
Defence counsel can also point to R v Siemens (1991) 70 Man R (2d)
319 (CA) where Scott CJM noted:
I can do no better than quote the comments of OSullivan J.A. of this court in R
v Crellin, ([1976] 6 WWR 661): While it is possible that he may be re-involved in
a criminal offence if he is released on bail. I cannot find that there is substantial
likelihood that he will be taking this and all other circumstances into account, I
hold that the accused has satisfied me that it is not necessary in the public
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interest or for the protection or safety of the public that the accused should be
denied bail (p 668).
Reminding the court that nobody will compensate the accused for the
months or years he or she remains locked up once he or she is acquitted
and stressing the triable issues and availability of stringent bail conditions
including release to a residential treatment program where substance
abuse is a problem, can often tip the scales in favour of judicial interim
release. Where the onus is on the accused to show cause why he or she
should be released is a good idea to note that the reverse onus is merely
one of a balance of probabilities and therefore is not an onerous onus to
meet. If the accused is on bail for a prior offence or offences it is
instructive to emphasize if it is for a type of charge unrelated to the current
allegations, the length of time he or she has been on bail, and what
compliance level was attained with bail conditions to date. If a breach of
bail conditions is alleged then reliance on R v Thomson supra at paragraphs
7 9 can assist:
A breach of a release condition is a proper basis for refusing subsequent interim
release only if the accused does not satisfy the court that she may be safely
released again, on appropriate conditions. The new release conditions should be
tailored to all of the circumstances of the case, and should not to be made more
stringent automatically because there has been a breach.

Punishment for breach of release conditions is not a proper consideration on an
application for interim release.

These principles arise from the presumption of innocence, the requirement that
the Crown prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and the right of an accused
to trial before punishment. They are fundamental to our freedom and to the rule
of law, and are reflected in the guarantee in s. 11(e) of the Charter that no one
shall be denied reasonable bail without just cause. These principles are not
displaced by a rhetorical appeal to public opinion.
If the accused person has a lengthy record for property crime and the
charge involves violence, then pointing to the absence of any violent
record will justify an order of release with suitable conditions including no
contact with the complainant, not to attend his or her residence, place of
employment, school or place of worship and not to possess weapons. In
those cases where the Crown appears to have a strong case, the accused
comes to court with a lengthy and related record and the charges are
serious it is important to remind the court that risk management is what
bail is all about and that rather than denying bail the court should impose
Making the Case for Bail in Canada 7

bail conditions designed to manage the risk level of the accused in the
community. In such cases it is important to argue that bail should be
denied only as a last resort where there are no alternatives available and to
present the court with a viable and realistic bail plan tailor made for the
individual client. Although each case will be decided on its own merits,
often a designer bail plan with creative bail conditions designed to address
the primary, secondary and tertiary grounds can make the difference
between failure and success. For example, a bail plan whereby the accused
resides with his or her surety, complies with an absolute curfew with
certain exceptions, including work or school attendance, medical
emergencies and lawyer appointments can go a long way in terms of
convincing a bail judge that there is an alternative to detention.
VI. THE TERTIARY GROUND
The law is clear that this ground applies only in rare and narrow
circumstances. Therefore bail judges should be reminded that it catches a
very minute category of cases and that the accused person applying for bail
does not fall into that category.
In R v Hall (2002) 3 SCR 309, the tertiary ground was judicially
analyzed in a case where a woman was brutally murdered in her home. She
had sustained 37 slash wounds to her face, neck, shoulder, forearms and
hands. The evidence on her neck pointed to a decapitation attempt. The
alleged killer was not charged until one month later and in the meantime
the community lived in fear. Forensic evidence linked the accused to the
crime. The horrific nature of the murder made this case exceptional.
In R v Everette-Dorland, supra Oliphant J. noted the factual basis for
the Hall decision and emphasized how rarely the tertiary ground will apply
at paragraphs 16 and 18 as follows:
I think its important to remember that the Hall case was decided upon the
factual basis that underpinned it. Chief Justice McLachlin wrote for the majority
of the court in Hall, and had this to say at paragraph 40:

Section 515(10)(c) sets out specific factors which delineate a narrow set of
circumstances under which bail can be denied on the basis of maintaining
confidence in the administration of justice. As discussed earlier, situations may
arise where, despite the fact the accused is not likely to abscond or commit
further crimes while awaiting trial, his presence in the community will call into
question the publics confidence in the administration of justice. Whether such a
situation has arisen is judged by all of the circumstances, but in particular the
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four factors that Parliament has set out in Section 515(10)(c) the apparent
strength of the prosecutions case, the gravity of the nature of the offence, the
circumstances surrounding its commission and the potential for lengthy
imprisonment.

Where, as here, the crime is horrific, inexplicable and strongly linked to the
accused, a justice system that cannot detain the accused risks losing the public
confidence upon which the bail system and the justice system as a whole repose.

I quote now from a decision of Mr. Justice Durno of the Superior Court of
Justice in Ontario in The Queen v Qaiser, reported at [2003] OJ No 3668, Justice
Durno goes through what Chief Justice McLachlin said, talks about the four
factors articulated in Section 515(10)(c) and then has this to say about the
tertiary ground even where the charge is one of first degree murder, Paragraph
29, the tertiary ground is to be used sparingly. The cases which call for its use
will be few and far between given the thousands of bail applications heard
annually.
In R v Trout (2006) 205 Man R (2d) 277, Monnin JA noted that the
alleged murder was horrific but not inexplicable. In reversing the lower
courts order of detention he noted at paragraph 17:
Finally, it should be noted that in Hall, McLachlin CJ alludes to the fact that
reliance on the tertiary ground to deny ones release is a situation that may not
arise frequently. I do not consider the circumstances of this case to one of those
situations.
When faced with a bail application in which the prosecution relies on
the tertiary ground, defence counsel can also rely on R v Laframboise supra
at paragraph 30, R v Thomson supra at paragraphs 39 41 and R v Bhullar
(2005) BCCA 409 at paragraphs 65 and 66.
VII. DELAY
In serious or major crime cases, there is generally a backlog in the
court calendar for the scheduling of preliminary hearings and trials.
Keeping an accused person in jail for what can turn out to be a year or
longer pending the hearing of the case is a prospect that bail judges are
inclined to avoid. Therefore, as courts have held, the delay factor is a
relevant consideration in deciding the issue of bail. In Trout supra Monnin
JA noted that the preliminary hearing in a murder case was scheduled to
be held some 15 months after arrest. Subsequently he based his decision
to grant bail partly due to the delay and stated at paragraph 15:
Making the Case for Bail in Canada 9

The first has to do with the length of time required to bring an individual to
trial. The public expects offenders to be tried within a reasonable period of time
and that same public is well aware of the adage that justice delayed is justice
denied. The fact that the applicant will not have a preliminary inquiry until
November of 2006, some 15 months after being arrested, is bordering on the
unreasonable and must certainly be considered as a factor in deciding whether an
individual should remain in detention. Based on the length of time to
commence the preliminary inquiry, it is conceivable that if the applicant is then
committed to trial, that trial would not occur until 2008. Such a delay, in and of
itself, can serve as much of a challenge in maintaining confidence in the
administration of justice as ensuring an accuseds detention.
In R v Khan (1998) 129 CCC (3d) 443 (Man. CA), bail was granted on
two counts of first degree murder, one pending his new trial for the
alleged murder of his sister and one pending his appeal from conviction
for the murder of his wife. Twaddle J.A. noted that the appeal was
meritorious and took into account the delay in hearing the appeal in his
decision to grant bail at paragraph 21:
Taking into account the delay already encountered, the further delay due to
counsels ability to argue this case on a timely basis and the strength of the
prisoners appeal, I am of the view that the prisoner should be released pending
his appeal to this court from his conviction on the charge of murdering his wife.
A reasonable, well-informed member of the public is less likely, in my view, to
lose confidence in a system which admits a person to bail in such circumstances
than one which tolerates delay and ignores the strength of the prisoners appeal.
In those cases where a preliminary hearing or trial date has been fixed
and the delay between arrest and that date is lengthy or in those cases
where although a date has not yet been fixed, defence counsel is aware that
the earliest available date is far off in the future, bringing the delay factor
to the bail judges attention will support and strengthen the accused
persons application for release.
VIII. PUBLIC OPINION OR PUBLIC CONFIDENCE
In extremely serious cases, bail applications may take place in an
atmosphere of media frenzy and public outrage. When faced with a high
profile case and a prosecution argument that public confidence will be lost
if bail is granted it is helpful to stress these points:
a) Every person is entitled to the benefit of the law and is not to be
treated harsher just because this is a high profile case.
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b) Judges are immune from media sensationalism and the shifting
winds of public opinion.
c) Public outrage runs just as high when innocent people are locked
up and later exonerated.
d) Bail cannot be denied because it might be popular in the eyes of
some segment of the pubic.
e) It is an informed public, not a biased public, familiar with the
presumption of innocence and the Charter guarantees that counts.
In cases where guns and drugs are involved and the public is alarmed,
reference to R v Byrd (2009) OJ 3092 (Ont SCJ) at paragraph 15 will assist:
There is no doubt that, in this community and many others, the availability of
drugs and firearms is becoming a serious concern and with very good reason. On
the other hand, the fundamental rights to the presumption of innocence and the
right to bail which are enshrined in our Charter cannot be undermined and
eroded by our fear. It simply cannot become automatic that it is necessary in all
cases in which drugs and firearms are involved to deny bail on tertiary grounds.
See also R v AB (2006) 204 CCC (3d) 490 (Ont SCJ) at paragraphs 26
27:
The bail hearing judge did not suggest, and it cannot be seriously maintained,
that todays climate of public opinion requires that every person charged with
the commission of an offence involving handguns must be denied bail pending
their trial. Ms. Strosberg very fairly conceded that the Crown could not credibly
advance such a sweeping argument. Given the constitutional requirements of s.
11(e) such a result could likely never be achieved in all cases. Indeed, even to
achieve such a result in most cases would require significant amendments to the
Code or a very clear direction from our Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court
of Canada.
Thus, as Ms. Strosberg concedes, the appropriateness of bail can only be
determined on a case-by-case basis. In considering the circumstances surrounding
these offences, I acknowledge the current level of justifiable public concern about
gun violence in Toronto. However, it must also be said that, while all handgun
offences are matters of serious concern, the charges A.B. is facing are among the
least serious of such offences. Moreover, persons charged with far more serious
offences involving handguns have been granted bail.
In R v White (2006) AJ 179 (Alta CA), public confidence was
addressed eloquently as follows at paragraphs 17 19:
pre-trial detention in the name of public confidence in the administration of
justice must be seen in context with other basic legal principles and Charter
rights. Specifically, in our system of justice all those accused of crime are
presumed to be innocent a presumption which remains with the accused
person unless and until the contrary is found to have been proven at trial. Also s.
Making the Case for Bail in Canada 11

11(e) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees that the accused persons
shall not be denied reasonable bail without just cause. Furthermore, a person is
not to be punished before having been found guilty. These are not merely
concepts to which we pay lip service; they are some of the fundamental tenets on
which our system of justice is based.

In attempting to measure public confidence in the administration of justice, we
must ignore the excitable and irrational citizen: R v MacDougal (1999), 138 CCC
(3d) 38 (BCCA). We can consider only the view of the reasonable, informed
citizen, who is aware of the factual allegations and the applicable legal principles.

So it will be an unusual case where public confidence in the administration of
justice is so imperiled that it requires an accused be detained prior to trial
before being found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
In sensational cases where emotions run high and the media frenzy
envelops the case, it is crucial that defence counsel be vigilant and ensure
that the bail court is provided with logical and well reasoned case law
supported submissions to justify release. Bail judges, by law, must be blind
to emotion and to the misguided mob mentality that my manifest itself in
such cases. It is helpful to refer to R v Lamothe (1990) 58 CCC (3d) 530
(Que CA) per Baudoin at pages 541 542:
With respect to the perception of the public, as we know, a large part of the
Canadian public often adopts a negative and even emotional attitude towards
criminals or powerful criminals. The public wants to see itself protected, see
criminals in prison and see them punished severely. To get rid of a criminal is to
get rid of crime. It perceives the judicial system harshly and the administration of
justice in general as too indulgent, too soft, too good to the criminal. This
perception, almost visceral in respect of crime, is surely not the perception,
which a judge must have in deciding the issue of interim release. If this were the
case, persons charged with certain types of offences would never be released
because the perception of the public is negative with respect to the type of crime
committed while others, on the contrary, would almost automatically be released
where the publics perception is neutral or more indulgent. The criminal law and
its application also has, and must have, an educational value for the public. An
informed public must understand that the existence of the presumption of
innocence at all stage of the criminal process is not a purely theoretical notion,
but a concrete reality and that, despite what may happen, in its perception, for
certain inconveniences with respect to effectiveness in the repression of crime, it
is the price that must be paid for life in a free and democratic society. Therefore,
the perception of the public must be situated at another level, that of a public
reasonably informed about our system of criminal law and capable of judging
and perceiving without emotion that the application of the presumption of
innocence, even with respect to interim release, has the effect that people, who
may later be found guilty of even serious crimes, will be released for the period
12 MANITOBA LAW JOURNAL

between the time of their arrest and the time of their trial. In other words, the
criterion of the public perception must not be that of the lowest common
denominator. An informed public understands that there exists in Canada a
constitutionally guaranteed presumption of innocence (s. 11(d) of the Charter)
and the right not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause (s. 11(e) of the
Charter).

Weighing the public reaction, the judge must then ask whether the release of the
accused pending his trial would provoke among a reasonably informed pubic a
reaction which would discredit the administration of criminal justice. It would
perhaps be appropriate to refer in this regard, although made in a totally
different context, to the comments of Antonio Lamer J. in R v Collins (1987), 33
CCC (3d) 1 at p 17, 38 DLR. (4
th
) 508, [1987] 1 SCR 265:

The concept of disrepute necessarily involves some element of community views,
and the determination of disrepute thus requires the judge to refer to what he
conceives to be the views of the community at large. This does not mean that
evidence of the publics perception of the repute of the administration of justice,
which Professor Gibson suggested could be presented in the form of public
opinion polls (supra pp. 236-47), will be determinative of the issue: see Therens,
supra, pp. 653-4. The position is different with respect to obscenity, for example,
where the court must assess the level of tolerance of the community, whether or
not it is reasonable, and may consider public opinion polls; R v Prairie Schooner
News Ltd and Powers (1970), 1 CCC (2d) 251 at p 266, 12 Crim LQ 462 at p.
477, 75 WWR. 585 at page 599 (Man. CA), cited in Towne Cinema Theatres Ltd v
The Queen (1985), 18 CCC (3d) 193 at pp. 208-9, 18 DLR (4
th
) 1 at p. 17, 1 SCR
494 at p. 513. It would be unwise, in my respectful view, to adopt a similar
attitude with respect to the Charter. Members of the public generally become
conscious of the importance of protecting the rights and freedoms of accused
only when they are in some way brought closer to the system either personally or
through the experience of friends or family. Professor Gibson recognized the
danger of leaving the exclusion of evidence to uninformed members of the
public when he stated at p. 246: The ultimate determination must be with the
courts, because they provide what is often the only effective shelter for
individuals and unpopular minorities from the shifting winds of public passion.

The dangerousness of the individual, the circumstances of the crime charged, the
type of offence, the existence and contents of a criminal record, the probability
of recidivism, the situation of the victim are factors which may assist the judge in
forming an idea with respect to this reaction. The criminal justice system must
not give rise to scandal. It must cultivate an image of serene, impartial and
exemplary justice.
See also R v Thomson supra at paragraph 51 as follows:
There is nothing before me to indicate that the public has a particular concern
about Thomsons release. On the record before me, there would be no
reasonable basis for such a reaction in any event. An appeal to public opinion
Making the Case for Bail in Canada 13

must be based on more than a knee-jerk reaction that crime is a bad thing and
more ought to be done about it. It must be based on reason, not emotion. The
crime alleged here is dreadful but that is not enough to deprive Thomson of her
liberty for months or years before she has been found guilty. In my view, respect
for the administration of justice would be diminished, not enhanced, by
detaining Thomson without bail.
Finally it is instructive to remind bail judges of the painful lesson that
legal history has taught to the effect that innocent people do end up falsely
accused or even wrongfully convicted and languish in jail for lengthy
periods of time. Therefore the best way to avoid such human damage
before it is too late is to grant those accused of crime bail.

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