Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 72694 December 1, 1987
AURORA DEL BANCO, EVELYN DEL BANCO, FEDERICO TAINO, SOLEDAD TAINO,
JOVENCIO TAINO, SAMSON TAINO, NOE TAINO, SOCORRO TAINO and CLEOFAS
TAINO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Second Civil Cases Division), ALEJANDRA
PANSACOLA, LEONILA ENCALLADO, VEDASTO ENCALLADO, JOSE YEPES, et
al., respondents.

PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari by way of appeal from: (a) the decision of
respondent Court of Appeals (Intermediate Appellate Court) * promulgated on May 17,
1985 in AC-G.R. CV No. 70460, entitled "Alejandra Pansacola, et al. vs. Domen Villabona
del Banco, et al." which reversed and set aside the judgment ** of the trial court; and (b)
its resolution ** of October 15, 1985 in the same case, denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration of the aforementioned decision and their supplement to motion for
reconsideration.
The dispositive portion of the questioned decision (Rollo, p. 97) reads, as follows:
ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE
insofar as it dismisses the complaint, and another one entered
(1) Declaring plaintiffs-appellants and defendants-appellees, in their
respective capacities as described in par. V of the complaint, as co-
owners of the property in dispute, but subject to the four-part pro-
indiviso division already made by said property;
(2) Ordering the cancellation of all certificates of title that may have
been issued to any of the parties hereto; and
(3) Ordering the complete and final partition of the subject property
in conformity with law.
For this purpose, this case is hereby remanded to the Court of origin
so that a final partition shall be made in accordance with Sections 2,
3, et. seq., Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Register of Deeds for the
Province of Quezon.
The facts of the case are taken from the decision of the Appellate Court (Rollo, p. 39) as
follows:
In a document executed in the Municipality of San Rafael, Bulacan, on February 11, 1859,
three brothers, Benedicto Pansacola, Jose Pansacola and Manuel Pansacola (known as Fr.
Manuel Pena) entered into an agreement which provided, among others:
(1) That they will purchase from the Spanish Government the lands comprising the
Island of Cagbalite which is located within the boundaries of the Municipality of Mauban,
Province of Tayabas (now Quezon) and has an approximate area of 1,600 hectares;
(2) That the lands shall be considered after the purchase as their common property;
(3) That the co-ownership includes Domingo Arce and Baldomera Angulo, minors at that
time represented by their father, Manuel Pansacola (Fr. Manuel Pena) who will
contribute for them in the proposed purchase of the Cagbalite Island;
(4) That whatever benefits may be derived from the Island shall be shared equally by the
co-owners in the following proportion: Benedicto Pansacola-1/4 share; Jose Pansacola-
1/4 share; and, Domingo Arce and Baldomera Angulo-2/4 shares which shall be placed
under the care of their father, Manuel Pansacola (Fr. Manuel Pena).
On August 14, 1866, co-owners entered into the actual possession and enjoyment of the
Island purchased by them from the Spanish Government. On April 11, 1868 they agreed
to modify the terms and conditions of the agreement entered into by them on February
11, 1859. The new agreement provided for a new sharing and distribution of the lands,
comprising the Island of Cagbalite and whatever benefits may be derived therefrom, as
follows:
(a) The first one-fourth (1/4) portion shall belong to Don Benedicto
Pansacola;
(b) The second one-fourth (1/4) portion shall belong to Don Jose
Pansacola;
(c) The third one-fourth(1/4) portion shall henceforth belong to the
children of their deceased brother, Don Eustaquio Pansacola,
namely: Don Mariano Pansacola,- Maria Pansacola and Don Hipolito
Pansacola;
(d) The fourth and last one-fourth (1/4) portion shall belong to their
nephews and nieces (1) Domingo Arce, (2) Baldomera Angulo,
(3) Marcelina Flores, (4) Francisca Flores, (5) Candelaria dela Cruz, and
(6) Gervasio Pansacola who, being all minors, are still under the care
of their brother, Manuel Pansacola (Fr. Manuel Pena). The latter is the
real father of said minors.
About one hundred years later, on November 18, 1968, private respondents brought a
special action for partition in the Court of First Instance of Quezon, under the provisions
of Rule 69 of the Rules of Court, including as parties the heirs and successors-in-interest
of the co-owners of the Cagbalite Island in the second contract of co-ownership dated
April 11, 1968. In their answer some of the defendants, petitioners herein, interposed
such defenses as prescription, res judicata, exclusive ownership, estoppel and laches.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a decision *** dated November 6, 1981
dismissing the complaint, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, and in the fight of all the foregoing this Court finds and
so holds that the Cagbalite Island has already been partitioned into
four (4) parts among the original co-owners or their successors-in-
interest.
Judgment is therefore rendered for the defendants against the
plaintiffs dismissing the complaint in the above entitled case.
Considering that the cross claims filed in the above entitled civil case
are not compulsory cross claims and in order that they may be
litigated individually the same are hereby dismissed without
prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
The motion for reconsideration filed by the plaintiffs, private respondents herein, was
denied by the trial court in an order dated February 25, 1982 (Record on Appeal, p. 241).
On appeal, respondent Court reversed and set aside the decision of the lower court
(Rollo, p. 117). It also denied the motion for reconsideration and the supplement to
motion for reconsideration filed by private respondents, in its resolution dated October
15, 1983 (Rollo, p. 86).
Instant petition was filed with the Court on December 5, 1985 (Rollo, p. 12). Petitioners
Josefina Pansacola, et al. having filed a separate petition (G.R. No. 72620) on the same
subject matter and issues raised in the instant 'petition, the counsel for private
respondents filed a consolidated comment on the separate petitions for review on
February 24, 1986 with the First Division of the Court (Rollo, p. 119). It appears that
counsel for petitioners also filed a consolidated reply to the consolidated comment of
private respondents as required by the Second Division of the Court (Rollo, p. 151).
However, petitioners filed a separate reply in the instant case on February 18,1987
(Rollo, p. 168)as required by the Court in a Resolution of the Second Division dated
November 24, 1986 (Rollo, p. 160).
On May 19, 1987, private respondents in the instant petition filed a manifestation
praying for the denial of the instant petition in the same manner that G.R. No. 72620 was
denied by the Court in its Resolution dated July 23, 1986 (Rollo, p. 151). Their rejoinder
to the reply of petitioners was filed on May 25,1987 (Rollo, p. 179).
On June 8, 1987, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition (Rollo, p. 192). The
memorandum of private respondents was mailed on July 18, 1987 and received in the
Court on July 29, 1987 (Rollo, p. 112); the memorandum for petitioners was mailed on
August 18, 1987 and received in the Court on September 7, 1987 (Rollo, p. 177).
The sole issue to be resolved by the Court is the question of whether or not Cagbalite
Island is still undivided property owned in common by the heirs and successors-in-
interest of the brothers, Benedicto, Jose and Manuel Pansacola.
The Pansacola brothers purchased the Island in 1859 as common property and agreed
on how they would share in the benefits to be derived from the Island. On April 11, 1868,
they modified the terms and conditions of the agreement so as to include in the co-
ownership of the island the children of their deceased brothers Eustaquio and the other
children of Manuel Pansacola (Fr. Manuel Pena) who were committed in the agreement
of February 11, 1859. The new agreement provided for a new sharing proportion and
distribution of the Island among the co-owners.
On January 20, 1907, the representative of the heirs of all the original owners of
Cagbalite Island entered into an agreement to partition the Island, supplemented by
another agreement dated April 18, 1908. The contract dated January 20, 1907 provides
as follows:
Sa Mauban, Tayabas, ika 20 ng Enero ng 1907 caming mga
quinatawan ng mga ibang co-herederos na hindi caharap, sa pulong na
ito, sa nasa naming lahat na magcaroon na ng catahimikan ang aming-
aming cabahagui sa Pulong Kagbalete sumacatuid upang mapagtoos
ang hangahan ng apat na sapul na pagcacabahagui nitong manang ito,
pagcacausap na naming lahat at maihanay at mapagtalonan ang
saysay ng isa't isa, ay cusa naming pinagcasunduan at pinasiya ang
nangasosonod:
Una: Ang malaquing calupaan, alis ang lahat na pacatan ay babahaguin
alinsunod sa pagcabaki na guinawa sa croquis na niyari ng practico
agrimensor Don Jose Garcia.
Icalawa: Ang Lomingoy, doon ang tuid na guhit sa ilong ng Pait ay
pagaapatin ding sinlaqui ayon sa dating pagkakabaki.
Icatlo: Cung magawa na ang tunay na piano at icapit na sa lupa,
paglalagay ng nadarapat na mojon, ang masacupan ng guhit,
sumacatuid ang caingin at pananim ng isa na nasacupan ng pucto na
noocol sa iba, ay mapapasulit sa dapat mag-ari, na pagbabayaran nito
ang nagtanim sa halagang:- bawat caponong niog na nabunga, P 1.00
'un peso); cung ang bias ay abot sa isang vara, P 0.50; cung bagong
tanim o locloc P 0. 50 ang capono.
Icapat: Ang lahat na pacatan ay bacod na pagaapatin at bawat bahagui
ay noocol sa isat-isa sa apat na sanga ng paganacang nagmana.
Icalima: Upang ang naipatanim ng bawat isa ay matama sa canya ng
mailagan ang hirap ng loob ng nagatikha; ay pagtotolong-tolongan ng
lahat naiba na mahusay ang dalawang partes na magcalapit na mapa
ayong tumama, hangang may pagluluaran, sa nagsikap at maoyanam,
maidaco sa lugar na walang cailangang pagusapan.
Icanim: Ang casulatang ito, cung mapermahan na na magcacaharap
sampong ng mga ibang co-herederos na notipicahan nitong lahat na
pinagcasundoan ay mahahabilin sa camay ng agrimensor, Amadeo
Pansacola, upang canyang mapanusugan ang maipaganap ang dito'y
naootos.
Na sa catunayan at catibayan ng lahat na nalalagda dito, sa pag galang
at pag ganap dito sa paingacaisahan ay pumirma sampo ng mga
sacsing caharap at catanto ngayong fecha ayon sa itaas.
The contract dated April 18, 1908 provides as follows:
Sa Mauban, ika 18 ng Abril ng 1908, sa pagcacatipon ng lahat na
firmantes nito ay pinagcaisahan itong nangasosonod:
Una Pinagtitibay ang mga pinagcasundoan sa itaas noong 20 ng
Enero ng 1907, liban na lamang sa mga pangcat na una at icapat at
tongcol doon pinasiya naming bahaguinin ng halohalo at paparejo ang
calupaan at pacatan.
Ycalawa Sa pagsucat ng agrimensor na si Amadeo at paggawa ng
piano at descripcion ay pagbabayaran siya ng sa bawat isa naoocol sa
halagang isang piso sa bawat hectares.
Icatlo Ang counting pucto sa 'Mayanibulong' na may caingin ni G.
Isidro Altamarino, asawa ni Restitute ay tutumbasan naman cay G.
Norberto Pansacola sa lugar ng Dapo calapit ng Pinangalo ng gasing
sucat.
Icapat Sa inilahad na piano ay pinasiya nang itoloy at upang maca
pagparehistro ang isa't isa ay pinagcaisahang magcacagastos na
parepareho para sa tablang pangmohon at ibat iba pang cagastusan.
Sa catunayan at catibayan ay cami, pumirma. (Record on Appeal, p.
224)
There is nothing in all four agreements that suggests that actual or physical partition of
the Island had really been made by either the original owners or their heirs or
successors-in-interest. The agreement entered into in 1859 simply provides for the
sharing of whatever benefits can be derived from the island. The agreement, in fact,
states that the Island to be purchased shall be considered as their common property. In
the second agreement entered in 1868 the co-owners agreed not only on the sharing
proportion of the benefits derived from the Island but also on the distribution of the
Island each of the brothers was allocated a 1/4 portion of the Island with the children of
the deceased brother, Eustaquio Pansacola allocated a 1/4 portion and the children of
Manuel Pansacola (Fr. Manuel Pena) also allocated a 1/4 portion of the Island. With the
distribution agreed upon each of the co-owner is a co-owner of the whole, and in this
sense, over the whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same time the
sole owner of a portion, in the instant case, a 1/4 portion (for each group of co-owners)
of the Island which is truly abstract, because until physical division is effected such
portion is merely an Ideal share, not concretely determined (3 Manresa, Codigo Civil, 3rd
Ed., page 486, cited in Lopez vs. Cuaycong, 74 Phil. 601; De la Cruz vs. Cruz, 32 SCRA 307
[1970]; Felices vs. Colegado, 35 SCRA 173 [1970],; Dultra vs. CFl 70 SCRA 465 [1976];
Gatchalian vs. Arlegui, 75 SCRA 234 [1977].)
In the agreement of January 20, 1907, the heirs that were represented agreed on how the
Island was to be partitioned. The agreement of April 18, 1908 which supplements that of
January 20, 1907 reveals that as of the signing of the 1908 agreement no actual partition
of the Island had as yet been done. The second and fourth paragraphs of the agreement
speaks of a survey yet to be conducted by a certain Amadeo and a plan and description
yet to be made. Virgilio Pansacola, a son of the surveyor named Amadeo who is referred
to in the contract dated April 18, 1908 as the surveyor to whom the task of surveying
Cagbalite Island pursuant to said agreement was entrusted, however, testified that said
contracts were never implemented because nobody defrayed the expenses for surveying
the same (Record on Appeal, p. 225).
Petitioners invoke res judicata to bar this action for partition in view of the decision of
the Court in G.R. No. 21033,"Domingo Arce vs. Maria Villabona, et al.," 21034, "Domingo
Arce vs. Francisco Pansacola, et al.," and 21035,"Domingo Arce vs. Emiliano Pansacola, et
al." promulgated on February 20, 1958 (Rollo, p. 141) and Brief for Defendants-
Appellees, p. 87 Appendix 1), wherein the Court said:
Considering the facts that he waited for a period of nearly 23 years
after the return from his deportation before taking any positive action
to recover his pretended right in the property in question, gives great
credit, in our opinion, to the declaration of the witnesses for the
defense (a) that the original parcel of land was partitioned as they
claim, and (b) that the plaintiff had disposed of all the right and
interest which he had in the portion which had been given to him.
The issue in the aforementioned case which were tried together is not whether there has
already been a partition of the Cagbalite Island. The actions were brought by the plaintiff
to recover possession of three distinct parcels of land, together with damages. In fact the
word partition was used in the metaphysical or Ideal sense (not in its physical sense).
Commenting on the above ruling of the Court in connection with the instant case, the
respondent Court said:
Concededly, the Supreme Court decision in G.R. Nos. 21033-35 (Exh.
X) did use or employ the word "partition." A careful reading of the
said decision will, however, reveal, and we so hold, that the
employment or use of the word "partition" therein was made not in its
technical and legal meaning or sense adverted to above, but, rather in
its Ideal, abstract and spiritual sense, this is (at) once evident from the
bare statement in said decision to the effect that the property was
divided into four parts, without any reference to the specific parts of
the property that may have been adjudicated to each owner. There
being no such reference in the decision and in the judgment affirmed
therein to the adjudication of specific and definite portions of the
property to each co-owner, there is a clear and logical inference that
there was indeed no adjudication of specific and definite portions of
the property made to each co-owner.
It must be admitted that the word "partition" is not infrequently used both in popular
and technical parlance (Fule vs. Fule, 52 Phil. 750 [1929]). For purposes of the
aforementioned case, evidently the Court used the word "partition" to refer to the
distribution of the Cagbalite Island agreed upon by the original owners and in the later
agreements, by the heirs and their subsequent successors-in-interest. There need not be
a physical partition; a distribution of the Island even in a state of indiviso or was
sufficient in order that a co-owner may validly sell his portion of the co-owned property.
The sale of part of a particular lot thus co-owned by one co-owner was within his
right pro-indiviso is valid in its entirety (Pamplona vs. Moreto, 96 SCRA 775 [1980]) but
he may not convey a physical portion with boundaries of the land owned in common
(Mercado vs. Liwanag, 5 SCRA 472 [1962]). Definitely, there was no physical partition of
the Island in 1859. Neither could there have been one in 1894 because the manner of
subdividing the Island was only provided for in the later agreements entered into by the
heirs in 1907 and 1908. There was a distribution of the Island in 1868 as agreed upon by
the original co-owners in their agreement of April 11, 1868. Any agreement entered into
by the parties in 1894 could be no more than another agreement as to the distribution of
the Island among the heirs of the original co-owners and the preparation of a tentative
plan by a practical surveyor, a Mr. Jose Garcia, mentioned in the first paragraph of the
1907 agreement, preparatory to the preparation of the real plan to be prepared by the
surveyor Amadeo, mentioned in the agreement of April 18, 1908.
What is important in the Court's ruling in the three aforementioned cases is that, the fact
that there was a distribution of the Island among the co-owners made the sale of
Domingo Arce of the portion allocated to him though pro-indiviso, valid. He thus
disposed of all his rights and interests in the portion given to him.
It is not disputed that some of the private respondents and some of the petitioners at the
time the action for partition was filed in the trial court have been in actual possession
and enjoyment of several portions of the property in question (Rollo, p. 148). This does
not provide any proof that the Island in question has already been actually partitioned
and co-ownership terminated. A co-owner cannot, without the conformity of the other
co-owners or a judicial decree of partition issued pursuant to the provision of Rule 69 of
the Rules of Court (Rule 71 of the Old Rules), adjudicate to himself in fee simple a
determinate portion of the lot owned in common, as his share therein, to the exclusion of
other co-owners (Santos, Jr. vs. Buenconsejo, 14 SCRA 407 [1965]; Carvajal vs. Court of
Appeals, 112 SCRA 237 [1982]). It is a basic principle in the law of co-ownership both
under the present Civil Code as in the Code of 1889 that no individual co- owner can
claim any definite portion thereof (Diversified Credit Corporation vs. Rosada 26 SCRA
470 [1968]). lt is therefore of no moment that some of the co-owners have succeeded in
securing cadastral titles in their names to some portions of the Island occupied by them
(Rollo, p. 10).
It is not enough that the co-owners agree to subdivide the property. They must have a
subdivision plan drawn in accordance with which they take actual and exclusive
possession of their respective portions in the plan and titles issued to each of them
accordingly (Caro vs. Court of Appeals, 113 SCRA 10 [1982]). The mechanics of actual
partition should follow the procedure laid down in Rule 69 of the Rules of Court.
Maganon vs. Montejo, 146 SCRA 282 [1986]).
Neither can such actual possession and enjoyment of some portions of the Island by
some of the petitioners herein be considered a repudiation of the co-ownership. It is
undisputed that the Cagbalite Island was purchased by the original co-owners as a
common property and it has not been proven that the Island had been partitioned among
them or among their heirs. While there is co-ownership, a co-owner's possession of his
share is co-possession which is linked to the possession of the other co-owners
(Gatchalian vs. Arlegui, 75 SCRA 234 [1977]).
Furthermore, no prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner against his co-owners or
co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership (Valdez vs.
Olonga, 51 SCRA 71 [1973], Tero vs. Tero, 131 SCRA 100 [1984]). Co-owners cannot
acquire by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent a clear repudiation of
the co-ownership clearly communicated to the other co-owners (Mariano vs. De Vega,
148 SCRA 342 [1987]).
An action for partition does not prescribe. Article 403 of the Old Civil Code, now Article
497, provides that the assignees of the co-owners may take part in the partition of the
common property, and Article 400 of the Old Code, now Article 494 provides that each
co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the common property, a provision
which implies that the action to demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred
by laches (Budlong vs. Pondoc, 79 SCRA 24 [1977]). An action for partition does not lie
except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the co- owner (Jardin vs.
Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532 [1982]).
On July 23, 1986, the Court through its Second Division denied the petition for the review
of G.R. No. 72620, the petition for review on certiorari separately filed by Josefina
Pansacola (Rollo, p. 151).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is likewise DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Cruz and Gancayco, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4656 November 18, 1912
RICARDO PARDELL Y CRUZ and
VICENTA ORTIZ Y FELIN DE PARDELL, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
GASPAR DE BARTOLOME Y ESCRIBANO and
MATILDE ORTIZ Y FELIN DE BARTOLOME, defendants-appellants.
Gaspar de Bartolome, in his own behalf.
B. Gimenez Zoboli, for appellees.

TORRES, J.:
This is an appeal by bill of exceptions, from the judgment of October 5, 1907, whereby
the Honorable Dionisio Chanco, judge, absolved the defendants from the complaint, and
the plaintiff from a counterclaim, without special finding as to costs.
Counsel for the spouses Ricardo y Cruz and Vicente Ortiz y Felin de Pardell, the first of
whom, absent in Spain by reason of his employment, conferred upon the second
sufficient and ample powers to appear before the courts of justice, on June 8, 1905, in his
written complaint, alleged that the plaintiff, Vicente Ortiz, and the defendant, Matilde
Ortiz, are the duly recognized natural daughters of the spouses Miguel Ortiz and Calixta
Felin y Paula who died in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, in 1875 and 1882, respectively; that Calixta
Felin, prior to her death, executed on August 17, 1876, a nuncupative will in Vigan
whereby she made her four children, named Manuel, Francisca, Vicenta, and Matilde,
surnamed Ortiz y Felin, her sole and universal heirs of all her property; that, of the
persons enumerated, Manuel died before his mother and Francisca a few years after her
death, leaving no heirs by force of law, and therefore the only existing heirs of the said
testatrix are the plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz and the defendant Matilde Ortiz; that, aside from
some personal property and jewelry already divided among the heirs, the testatrix
possessed, at the time of the execution of her will, and left at her death the real
properties which, with their respective cash values, are as follows:
1. A house of strong material, with the lot on which it is built, P6,000.00
situated on Escolta Street, Vigan, and valued at
2. A house of mixed material, with the lot on which it stands, at No.
88 Washington Street, Vigan; valued at
1,500.00
3. A lot on Magallanes Street, Vigan; valued at 100.00
4. A parcel of rice land, situated in the barrio of San Julian, Vigan;
valued at
60.00
5. A parcel of rice land in the pueblo of Santa Lucia; valued at 86.00
6. Three parcels of land in the pueblo of Candon; valued at 150.00
Total 7,896.00
That, on or about the first months of the year 1888, the defendants, without judicial
authorization, nor friendly or extrajudicial agreement, took upon themselves the
administration and enjoyment of the said properties and collected the rents, fruits, and
products thereof, to the serious detriment of the plaintiffs' interest; that,
notwithstanding the different and repeated demands extrajudicially made upon Matilde
Ortiz to divide the aforementioned properties with the plaintiff Vicente and to deliver to
the latter the one-half thereof, together with one-half of the fruits and rents collected
therefrom, the said defendant and her husband, the self-styled administrator of the
properties mentioned, had been delaying the partition and delivery of the said properties
by means of unkept promises and other excuses; and that the plaintiffs, on account of the
extraordinary delay in the delivery of one-half of said properties, or their value in cash,
as the case might be, had suffered losses and damages in the sum of P8,000. Said counsel
for the plaintiffs therefore asked that judgment be rendered by sentencing the
defendants, Gaspar de Bartolome, and Matilde Ortiz Felin de Bartolome, to restore and
deliver to the plaintiffs one-half of the total value in cash, according to appraisal, of the
undivided property specified, which one-half amounted approximately to P3,948, or if
deemed proper, to recognize the plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz to be vested with the full and
absolute right of ownership to the said undivided one-half of the properties in question,
as universal testamentary heir thereof together with the defendant Matilde Ortiz, to
indemnify the plaintiffs in the sum of P8,000, for losses and damages, and to pay the
costs.
Counsel for the defendants, in his answer denied the facts alleged in paragraphs 1, 4, 6, 7,
and 8 thereof, inasmuch as, upon the death of the litigating sister's brother Manuel, their
mother, who was still living, was his heir by force of law, and the defendants had never
refused to give to the plaintiff Vicente Ortiz her share of the said properties; and stated
that he admitted the facts alleged in paragraph 2, provided it be understood, however,
that the surname of the defendant's mother was Felin, and not Feliu, and that Miguel
Ortiz died in Spain, and not in Vigan; that he also admitted paragraph 3 of the complaint,
with the difference that the said surname should be Felin, and likewise paragraph 5,
except the part thereof relating to the personal property and the jewelry, since the latter
had not yet been divided; that the said jewelry was in the possession of the plaintiffs and
consisted of: one Lozada gold chronometer watch with a chain in the form of a bridle
curb and a watch charm consisting of the engraving of a postage stamp on a stone
mounted in gold and bearing the initials M. O., a pair of cuff buttons made of gold coins,
four small gold buttons, two finger rings, another with the initials M. O., and a gold
bracelet; and that the defendants were willing to deliver to the plaintiffs, in conformity
with their petitions, one-half of the total value in cash, according to appraisement, of the
undivided real properties specified in paragraph 5, which half amounted to P3,948.
In a special defense said counsel alleged that the defendants had never refused to divide
the said property and had in fact several years before solicited the partition of the same;
that, from 1886 to 1901, inclusive, there was collected from the property on Calle Escolta
the sum of 288 pesos, besides a few other small amounts derived from other sources,
which were delivered to the plaintiffs with other larger amounts, in 1891, and from the
property on Calle Washington, called La Quinta, 990.95 pesos, which proceeds, added
together, made a total of 1,278.95 pesos, saving error or omission; that, between the
years abovementioned, Escolta, and that on Calle Washington,La Quinta, 376.33, which
made a total of 1,141.71, saving error or omission; that, in 1897, the work of
reconstruction was begun of the house on Calle Escolta, which been destroyed by an
earthquake, which work was not finished until 1903 and required an expenditure on the
part of the defendant Matilde Ortiz, of 5,091.52 pesos; that all the collections made up to
August 1, 1905, including the rent from the stores, amounted to only P3,654.15, and the
expenses, to P6,252.32, there being, consequently, a balance of P2,598.17, which divided
between the sisters, the plaintiff and the defendant, would make the latter's share
P1,299.08; that, as shown by the papers kept by the plaintiffs, in the year 1891 the
defendant Bartolome presented to the plaintiffs a statement in settlements of accounts,
and delivered to the person duly authorized by the latter for the purpose, the sum of
P2,606.29, which the said settlement showed was owing his principals, from various
sources; that, the defendant Bartolome having been the administrator of the undivided
property claimed by the plaintiffs, the latter were owing the former legal remuneration
of the percentage allowed by law for administration; and that the defendants were
willing to pay the sum of P3,948, one-half of the total value of the said properties,
deducting therefrom the amount found to be owing them by the plaintiffs, and asked that
judgment be rendered in their favor to enable them to recover from the latter that
amount, together with the costs and expenses of the suit.
The defendants, in their counter claim, repeated each and all of the allegations contained
in each of the paragraphs of section 10 of their answer; that the plaintiffs were obliged to
pay to the administrator of the said property the remuneration allowed him by law; that,
as the revenues collected by the defendants amounted to no more than P3,654.15 and
the expenditures incurred by them, to P6,252.32, it followed that the plaintiffs owed the
defendants P1,299.08, that is one-half of the difference between the amount collected
from and that extended on the properties, and asked that judgment be therefore
rendered in their behalf to enable them to collect this sum from the plaintiffs, Ricardo
Pardell and Vicenta Ortiz, with legal interest thereon from December 7, 1904, the date
when the accounts were rendered, together with the sums to which the defendant
Bartolome was entitled for the administration of the undivided properties in question.
By a written motion of August 21, 1905, counsel for the plaintiffs requested permission
to amend the complaint by inserting immediately after the words "or respective
appraisal," fifth line of paragraph 5, the phrase "in cash in accordance with the assessed
value," and likewise further to amend the same, in paragraph 6 thereof, by substituting
the following word in lieu of the petition for the remedy sought: "By reason of all the
foregoing, I beg the court to be pleased to render the judgment by sentencing the
defendants, Gaspar de Bartolome and Matilde Ortiz Felin de Bartolome, to restore and
deliver to the plaintiffs an exact one-half of the total vale of the undivided properties
described in the complaint, such value to be ascertained by the expert appraisal of two
competent persons, one of whom shall be appointed by the plaintiffs and the other by the
defendants, and, in case of disagreement between these two appointees such value shall
be determined by a third expert appraiser appointed by the court, or, in a proper case, by
the price offered at public auction; or, in lieu thereof, it is requested that the court
recognize the plaintiff, Vicenta Ortiz, to be vested with a full and absolute right to an
undivided one-half of the said properties; furthermore, it is prayed that the plaintiffs be
awarded an indemnity of P8,000 for losses and damages, and the costs."
Notwithstanding the opposition of the defendants, the said amendment was admitted by
the court and counsel for the defendants were allowed to a period of three days within
which to present a new answer. An exception was taken to this ruling.
The proper proceedings were had with reference to the valuation of the properties
concerned in the division sought and incidental issues were raised relative to the
partition of some of them and their award to one or the other of the parties. Due
consideration was taken of the averments and statements of both parties who agreed
between themselves, before the court, that any of them might at any time acquire, at the
valuation fixed by the expert judicial appraiser, any of the properties in question, there
being none in existence excluded by the litigants. The court, therefore, by order of
December 28, 1905, ruled that the plaintiffs were entitled to acquire, at the valuation
determined by the said expert appraiser, the building known as La Quinta, the lot on
which it stands and the warehouses and other improvements comprised within the
inclosed land, and the seeds lands situated in the pueblos of Vigan and Santa Lucia; and
that the defendants were likewise entitled to acquire the house on Calle Escolta, the lot
on Calle Magallanes, and the three parcels of land situated in the pueblo of Candon.
After this partition had been made counsel for the defendants, by a writing of March 8,
1906, set forth: That, having petitioned for the appraisement of the properties in
question for the purpose of their partition, it was not to be understood that he desired
from the exception duly entered to the ruling made in the matter of the amendment to
the complaint; that the properties retained by the defendants were valued at P9,310, and
those retained by the plaintiffs, at P2,885, one-half of which amounts each party had to
deliver to the other, as they were pro indivisoproperties; that, therefore, the defendants
had to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P3,212.50, after deducting the amount which the
plaintiffs were obliged to deliver to the defendants, as one-half of the price of the
properties retained by the former; that, notwithstanding that the amount of the
counterclaim for the expenses incurred in the reconstruction of the pro indiviso property
should be deducted from the sum which the defendants had to pay the plaintiffs, the
former, for the purpose of bringing the matter of the partition to a close, would deliver to
the latter, immediately upon the signing of the instrument of purchase and sale, the sum
of P3,212.50, which was one-half of the value of the properties alloted to the defendants;
such delivery, however, was not to be understood as a renouncement of the said
counterclaim, but only as a means for the final termination of the pro indiviso status of
the property.
The case having been heard, the court on October 5, 1907, rendered judgment holding
that the revenues and the expenses were compensated by the residence enjoyed by the
defendant party, that no losses or damages were either caused or suffered, nor likewise
any other expense besides those aforementioned, and absolved the defendants from the
complaint and the plaintiffs from the counterclaim, with no special finding as to costs. An
exception was taken to this judgment by counsel for the defendants who moved for a
new trial on the grounds that the evidence presented did not warrant the judgment
rendered and that the latter was contrary to law. This motion was denied, exception
whereto was taken by said counsel, who filed the proper bill of exceptions, and the same
was approved and forwarded to the clerk of this court, with a transcript of the evidence.
Both of the litigating sisters assented to a partition by halves of the property left in her
will by their mother at her death; in fact, during the course of this suit, proceedings were
had, in accordance with the agreement made, for the division between them of the said
hereditary property of common ownership, which division was recognized and approved
in the findings of the trial court, as shown by the judgment appealed from.
The issues raised by the parties, aside from said division made during the trial, and
which have been submitted to this court for decision, concern: (1) The indemnity
claimed for losses and damages, which the plaintiffs allege amount to P8,000, in addition
to the rents which should have been derived from the house on Calle Escolta, Vigan; (2)
the payment by the plaintiffs to the defendants of the sum of P1,299.08, demanded by
way of counterclaim, together with legal interest thereon from December 7, 1904; (3) the
payment to the husband of the defendant Matilde Ortiz, of a percentage claimed to be
due him as the administrator of the property of common ownership; (4) the division of
certain jewelry in the possession of the plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz; and (5) the petition that
the amendment be held to have been improperly admitted, which was made by the
plaintiffs in their written motion of August 21, 1905, against the opposition of the
defendants, through which admission the latter were obliged to pay the former
P910.50.lawphil.net
Before entering upon an explanation of the propriety or impropriety of the claims made
by both parties, it is indispensable to state that the trial judge, in absolving the
defendants from the complaint, held that they had not caused losses and damages to the
plaintiffs, and that the revenues and the expenses were compensated, in view of the fact
that the defendants had been living for several years in the Calle Escolta house, which
was pro indivisoproperty of joint ownership.
By this finding absolving the defendants from the complaint, and which was acquiesced
in by the plaintiffs who made no appeal therefrom, the first issue has been decided which
was raised by the plaintiffs, concerning the indemnity for losses and damages, wherein
are comprised the rents which should have been obtained from the upper story of the
said house during the time it was occupied by the defendants, Matilde Ortiz and her
husband, Gaspar de Bartolome.
Notwithstanding the acquiescence on the part of the plaintiffs, assenting to the said
finding whereby the defendants were absolved from the complaint, yet, as such
absolution is based on the compensation established in the judgment of the trial court,
between the amounts which each party is entitled to claim from the other, it is
imperative to determine whether the defendant Matilde Ortiz, as coowner of the house
on Calle Escolta, was entitled, with her husband, to reside therein, without paying to her
coowner, Vicenta Ortiz, who, during the greater part of the time, lived with her husband
abroad, one-half of the rents which the upper story would have produced, had it been
rented to a stranger.
Article 394 of the Civil Code prescribes:
Each coowner may use the things owned in common, provided he uses them in
accordance with their object and in such manner as not to injure the interests
of the community nor prevent the coowners from utilizing them according to
their rights.
Matilde Ortiz and her husband occupied the upper story, designed for use as a dwelling,
in the house of joint ownership; but the record shows no proof that, by so doing, the said
Matilde occasioned any detriment to the interest of the community property, nor that
she prevented her sister Vicenta from utilizing the said upper story according to her
rights. It is to be noted that the stores of the lower floor were rented and accounting of
the rents was duly made to the plaintiffs.
Each coowner of realty held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and
may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the
interests of his coowners, for the reason that, until a division be made, the respective
part of each holder can not be determined and every one of the coowners exercises,
together with his other coparticipants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in
addition to his use and enjoyment of the same.
As the hereditary properties of the joint ownership of the two sisters, Vicenta Ortiz,
plaintiff, and Matilde Ortiz, defendant, were situated in the Province of Ilocos Sur, and
were in the care of the last named, assisted by her husband, while the plaintiff Vicenta
with her husband was residing outside of the said province the greater part of the time
between 1885 and 1905, when she left these Islands for Spain, it is not at all strange that
delays and difficulties should have attended the efforts made to collect the rents and
proceeds from the property held in common and to obtain a partition of the latter,
especially during several years when, owing to the insurrection, the country was in a
turmoil; and for this reason, aside from that founded on the right of coownership of the
defendants, who took upon themselves the administration and care of the properties of
joint tenancy for purposes of their preservation and improvement, these latter are not
obliged to pay to the plaintiff Vicenta one-half of the rents which might have been
derived from the upper of the story of the said house on Calle Escolta, and, much less,
because one of the living rooms and the storeroom thereof were used for the storage of
some belongings and effects of common ownership between the litigants. The defendant
Matilde, therefore, in occupying with her husband the upper floor of the said house, did
not injure the interests of her coowner, her sister Vicenta, nor did she prevent the latter
from living therein, but merely exercised a legitimate right pertaining to her as coowner
of the property.
Notwithstanding the above statements relative to the joint-ownership rights which
entitled the defendants to live in the upper story of the said house, yet in view of the fact
that the record shows it to have been proved that the defendant Matilde's husband,
Gaspar de Bartolome, occupied for four years a room or a part of the lower floor of the
same house on Calle Escolta, using it as an office for the justice of the peace, a position
which he held in the capital of that province, strict justice, requires that he pay his sister-
in-law, the plaintiff, one half of the monthly rent which the said quarters could have
produced, had they been leased to another person. The amount of such monthly rental is
fixed at P16 in accordance with the evidence shown in the record. This conclusion as to
Bartolome's liability results from the fact that, even as the husband of the defendant
coowner of the property, he had no right to occupy and use gratuitously the said part of
the lower floor of the house in question, where he lived with his wife, to the detriment of
the plaintiff Vicenta who did not receive one-half of the rent which those quarters could
and should have produced, had they been occupied by a stranger, in the same manner
that rent was obtained from the rooms on the lower floor that were used as stores.
Therefore, the defendant Bartolome must pay to the plaintiff Vicenta P384, that is, one-
half of P768, the total amount of the rents which should have been obtained during four
years from the quarters occupied as an office by the justice of the peace of Vigan.
With respect to the second question submitted for decision to this court, relative to the
payment of the sum demanded as a counterclaim, it was admitted and proved in the
present case that, as a result of a serious earthquake on August 15, 1897, the said house
on Calle Escolta was left in ruins and uninhabitable, and that, for its reconstruction or
repair, the defendants had to expend the sum of P6,252.32. This expenditure,
notwithstanding that it was impugned, during the trial, by the plaintiffs, was duly proved
by the evidence presented by the defendants. Evidence, unsuccessfully rebutted, was
also introduced which proved that the rents produced by all the rural and urban
properties of common ownership amounted, up to August 1, 1905, to the sum of
P3,654.15 which, being applied toward the cost of the repair work on the said house,
leaves a balance of P2,598.17, the amount actually advanced by the defendants, for the
rents collected by them were not sufficient for the termination of all the work
undertaken on the said building, necessary for its complete repair and to replace it in a
habitable condition. It is therefore lawful and just that the plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz, who
was willing to sell to her sister Matilde for P1,500, her share in the house in question,
when it was in a ruinous state, should pay the defendants one-half of the amount
expanded in the said repair work, since the building after reconstruction was worth
P9,000, according to expert appraisal. Consequently, the counterclaim made by the
defendants for the payment to them of the sum of P1,299.08, is a proper demand, though
from this sum a reduction must be made of P384, the amount of one-half of the rents
which should have been collected for the use of the quarters occupied by the justice of
the peace, the payment of which is incumbent upon the husband of the defendant
Matilde, as aforesaid, and the balance remaining, P915.08, is the amount which the
plaintiff Vicenta must pay to the defendants.
The defendants claim to be entitled to the collection of legal interest on the amount of the
counterclaim, from December 7, 1904. This contention can not be sustained, inasmuch
as, until this suit is finally decided, it could not be known whether the plaintiffs would or
would not be obliged to pay the sum whatever in reimbursement of expenses incurred
by the plaintiffs in the repair work on the said house on Calle Escolta, whether or not the
defendants, in turn, were entitled to collect any such amount, and, finally, what the net
sum would be which the plaintiff's might have to pay as reimbursement for one-half of
the expenditure made by the defendants. Until final disposal of the case, no such net sum
can be determined, nor until then can the debtor be deemed to be in arrears. In order
that there be an obligation to pay legal interest in connection with a matter at issue
between the parties, it must be declared in a judicial decision from what date the interest
will be due on the principal concerned in the suit. This rule has been established by the
decisions of the supreme court of Spain, in reference to articles 1108, 1109, and 1110 of
the Civil Code, reference on April 24, 1867, November 19, 1869, and February 22, 1901.
With regard to the percentage, as remuneration claimed by the husband of the defendant
Matilde for his administration of the property of common ownership, inasmuch as no
stipulation whatever was made in the matter by and between him and his sister-in-law,
the said defendant, the claimant is not entitled to the payment of any remuneration
whatsoever. Of his own accord and as an officious manager, he administered the said pro
indivisoproperty, one-half of which belonged to his wife who held it in joint tenancy, with
his sister-in-law, and the law does not allow him any compensation as such voluntary
administrator. He is merely entitled to a reimbursement for such actual and necessary
expenditures as he may have made on the undivided properties and an indemnity for the
damages he may have suffered while acting in that capacity, since at all events it was his
duty to care for and preserve the said property, half of which belonged to his wife; and in
exchange for the trouble occasioned him by the administration of his sister-in-law's half
of the said property, he with his wife resided in the upper story of the house
aforementioned, without payment of one-half of the rents said quarters might have
produced had they been leased to another person.
With respect to the division of certain jewelry, petitioned for by the defendants and
appellants only in their brief in this appeal, the record of the proceedings in the lower
court does not show that the allegation made by the plaintiff Vicenta is not true, to the
effect that the deceased mother of the litigant sisters disposed of this jewelry during her
lifetime, because, had she not done so, the will made by the said deceased would have
been exhibited in which the said jewelry would have been mentioned, at least it would
have been proved that the articles in question came into the possession of the plaintiff
Vicenta without the expressed desire and the consent of the deceased mother of the said
sisters, for the gift of this jewelry was previously assailed in the courts, without success;
therefore, and in view of its inconsiderable value, there is no reason for holding that the
said gift was not made.
As regards the collection of the sum of P910.50, which is the difference between the
assessed value of the undivided real properties and the price of the same as determined
by the judicial expert appraiser, it is shown by the record that the ruling of the trial judge
admitting the amendment to the original complaint, is in accord with the law and
principles of justice, for the reason that any of the coowners of a pro indiviso property,
subject to division or sale, is entitled to petition for its valuation by competent expert
appraisers. Such valuation is not prejudicial to any of the joint owners, but is beneficial to
their interests, considering that, as a general rule, the assessed value of a building or a
parcel of realty is less than the actual real value of the property, and this being appraiser
to determine, in conjunction with the one selected by the plaintiffs, the value of the
properties of joint ownership. These two experts took part in the latter proceedings of
the suit until finally, and during the course of the latter, the litigating parties agreed to an
amicable division of the pro indiviso hereditary property, in accordance with the price
fixed by the judicial expert appraiser appointed as a third party, in view of the
disagreement between and nonconformity of the appraisers chosen by the litigants.
Therefore it is improper now to claim a right to the collection of the said sum, the
difference between the assessed value and that fixed by the judicial expert appraiser, for
the reason that the increase in price, as determined by this latter appraisal, redounded to
the benefit of both parties.
In consideration of the foregoing, whereby the errors assigned to the lower court have
been duly refuted, it is our opinion that, with a partial reversal of the judgment appealed
from, in so far as it absolves the plaintiffs from the counterclaim presented by the
defendants, we should and hereby do sentence the plaintiffs to the payment of the sum of
P915.08, the balance of the sum claimed by the defendants as a balance of the one-half of
the amount which the defendants advanced for the reconstruction or repair of the Calle
Escolta house, after deducting from the total of such sum claimed by the latter the
amount of P384 which Gaspar de Bartolome, the husband of the defendant Matilde,
should have paid as one-half of the rents due for his occupation of the quarters on the
lower floor of the said house as an office for the justice of the peace court of Vigan; and
we further find: (1) That the defendants are not obliged to pay one-half of the rents
which could have been obtained from the upper story of the said house; (2) that the
plaintiffs can not be compelled to pay the legal interest from December 7, 1904, on the
sum expanded in the reconstruction of the aforementioned house, but only the interest
fixed by law, at the rate of 6 per cent per annum, from the date of the judgment to be
rendered in accordance with this decision; (3) that the husband of the defendant Matilde
Ortiz is not entitled to any remuneration for the administration of the pro
indivisoproperty belonging to both parties; (4) that, neither is he entitled to collect from
the plaintiffs the sum of P910.50, the difference between the assessed valuation and the
price set by the expert appraisal solicited by the plaintiffs in their amendment to the
complaint; and, (5) that no participation shall be made of jewelry aforementioned now in
the possession of the plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz. The said judgment, as relates to the points
appealed, is affirmed, in so far as its findings agree with those of this decision, and is
reversed, in so far as they do not. No special finding is made regarding the costs of both
instances. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Trent, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-46001 March 25, 1982
LUZ CARO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and BASILIA LAHORRA VDA. DE BENITO, AS
ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF MARIO BENITO, respondents.

GUERRERO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking a
review of the decision of the Court of Appeals,
1
promulgated on February 11, 1977, in
CA-G.R. No. 52570-R entitled "Basilia Lahorra Vda. de Benito, as Administratrix of the
Intestate Estate of Mario Benito vs. Luz Caro", as well as the resolution of the respondent
Court, dated May 13, 1977, denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Alfredo Benito, Mario Benito and Benjamin Benito were the original co-owners of two
parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-609 and T-610 of the
Registry of Deeds of Sorsogon. Mario died sometime in January, 1957. His surviving wife,
Basilia Lahorra and his father, Saturnino Benito, were subsequently appointed in Special
Proceeding No. 508 of the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon as joint administrators of
Mario's estate.
On August 26, 1959, one of the co-owners, Benjamin Benito, executed a deed of absolute
sale of his one-third undivided portion over said parcels of land in favor of herein
petitioner, Luz Caro, for the sum of P10,000.00. This was registered on September 29,
1959. Subsequently, with the consent of Saturnino Benito and Alfredo Benito as shown in
their affidavits both dated September 15, 1960, Exhibits G and F respectively, a
subdivision title was issued to petitioner Luz Caro over Lot I-C, under T.C.T. No. T-4978.
Sometime in the month of May, 1966, private respondent Basilia Lahorra Vda. de Benito
learned from an allegation in a pleading presented by petitioner in Special Proceeding
No. 508 that the latter acquired by purchase from Benjamin Benito the aforesaid one-
third undivided share in each of the two parcels of land. After further verification, she
sent to petitioner thru her counsel, a written offer to redeem the said one-third
undivided share dated August 25, 1966. Inasmuch as petitioner ignored said offer,
private respondent sought to intervene in Civil Case No. 2105 entitled "Rosa Amador
Vda. de Benito vs. Luz Caro" for annulment of sale and mortgage and cancellation of the
annotation of the sale and mortgage involving the same parcels of land, but did not
succeed as the principal case was dismissed on a technicality, that is, for failure to
prosecute and the proposed intervenor failed to pay the docketing fees. Private
respondent, thus, filed the present case as an independent one and in the trial sought to
prove that as a joint administrator of the estate of Mario Benito, she had not been
notified of the sale as required by Article 1620 in connection with Article 1623 of the
New Civil Code.
On the other hand, petitioner presented during the hearing of the case secondary
evidence of the service of written notice of the intended sale to possible redemptioners
in as much as the best thereof, the written notices itself sent to and Saturnino Benito,
could not be presented for the reason that said notices were sent to persons who were
already dead when the complaint for legal redemption was brought. Instead, the affidavit
of Benjamin Benito, executed ante litem motam, attesting to the fact that the possible
redemptioners were formally notified in writing of his intention to sell his undivided
share, was presented in evidence. The deposition of Saturnino's widow was likewise
taken and introduced in evidence, wherein she testified that she received and gave to her
husband the written notice of the intended sale but that the latter expressed disinterest
in buying the property.
After hearing the evidence, the trial judge dismissed the complaint on the grounds that:
(a) private respondent, as administratrix of the intestate estate of Mario Benito, does not
have the power to exercise the right of legal redemption, and (b) Benjamin Benito
substantially complied with his obligation of furnishing written notice of the sale of his
one-third undivided portion to possible redemptioners.
Private respondent's Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court's decision having been
denied, she appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals contending that the trial Judge
erred in
I. . . not inhibiting himself from trying and deciding the case because
his son is an associate or member of the law office of Atty. Rodolfo A.
Madrid, the attorney of record of defendant-appellee in the instant
case;
II. . contending that Benjamin Benito complied with the provisions of
Article 1623 of the Revised Civil Code that before a co-owner could
sell his share of the property owned in common with the other co-
heirs, he must first give written notice of his desire to his co-heirs; (p.
49, R.A.)
III. concluding that the fact that one of the administrators who was
actively managing the estate was furnished a written notice by the co-
owner of his desire to sell his share was enough compliance of the
provisions of Article 1623 of the Civil Code for the reason that the
intention of the law is only to give a chance to the new co-owner to
buy the share intended to be sold if he desires to buy the same; (p. 50,
R.A.)
IV. . refusing to allow plaintiff to redeem the subject property upon
authority of Butte vs. Manuel Uy & Sons, L-15499, Feb. 28, 1962 (p. 51,
R.A.) and in consequently dismissing the complaint (p. 52, R.A.).
In disposing of the aforesaid errors, the Court of Appeals finding for plaintiff (herein
private respondent) held:
1. That it is not clear that Atty. Arcangel, son of the trial Judge, was legally associated as
practitioner with counsel for Luz Caro; that it is not shown at any rate that plaintiff had
asked for Judge Arcangel's disqualification and that at any rate also, in such factual
situation, an optional ground for disqualification is addressed to his sound discretion
with which it would not be correct for appellate court to interfere or overrule.
2. That since the right of the co-owner to redeem in case his share be sold to a stranger
arose after the death of Mario Benito, such right did not form part of the hereditary
estate of Mario but instead was the personal right of the heirs, one of whom is Mario's
widow. Thus, it behooved either the vendor, Benjamin, or his vendee, Luz Caro, to have
made a written notice of the intended or consummated sale under Article 1620 of the
Civil Code.
3. That the recital in the deed of sale that the vendor notified his co-owners of his desire
to dispose of his share, who all declined to buy, was but a unilateral statement and could
not be proof of the notice required by the law.
4. That the registration of the deed of sale did not erase that right.
5. That the affidavit of notice executed on January 20, 1960 of Benjamin Benito declaring
that written notices of the sale as required by law were duly sent to Alfredo Benito and
Saturnino Benito, the latter in his capacity as administrator of the estate of Mario Benito,
as well as the sworn statement of Saturnino Benito's widow dated November 18, 1968
confirming that her husband received the written notice of the sale referred to in
Benjamin Benito's affidavit of notice would not satisfy that there was clear notice in
writing of the specific term of the intended sale. Worse, Saturnino was only a co-
administrator and hence, his unilateral act could not bind the principal because there
was no less than a renunciation of a right pertaining to the heirs, under Article 1818,
NCC, apart from the fact that the right of redemption is not within their administration.
6. That the further claim of defendant that offer to redeem was filed out of time and that
there was no actual tender loses all importance, there being no date from which to count
the 30-day period to redeem because there was no notice given.
The dispositive part of the decision of the Court of Appeals reads as follows:
IN VIEW THEREOF, this Court is constrained to reverse, as it now
reverses, judgment appealed from, upon payment by plaintiff or
deposit in Court, within 30 days after this judgment should have
become final, of the sum of P10,000.00, defendant is ordered to
execute a deed of redemption over the one-third share of BENJAMIN
BENITO in favor of plaintiff for herself and as representative of the
children of Mario Benito and therefrom, to deliver said one-third
share of BENJAMIN BENITO, costs against defendant-appellee.
SO ORDERED.
Upon denial of the motion for reconsideration, petitioner brought this petition for review
raising the following errors:
1. Respondent Court erred in allowing the exercise of the right of legal redemption with
respect to the lots in question.
2. Respondent Court erred when it made the finding that there was no notice in law from
which to count the tolling of the period of redemption and that the sale was not made
known at all to private respondent.
The alleged first error of respondent Court is premised on the fact that the lot in question
sought to be redeemed is no longer owned in common. Petitioner contends that the right
sought to be exercised by private respondent in the case assumes that the land in
question is under co-ownership, the action being based on Article 1620 of the New Civil
Code which provides:
A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the
shares of all the other co-owners or any of them, are sold to a third
person. If the price of alienation is grossly excessive, the petitioner
shall pay only a reasonable price.
Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of
redemption, they may only do so in proportion to the share they may
respectively have in the thing owned in common.
However, the fact is that as early as 1960, co-ownership of the parcels of land covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-609 and T-610 was terminated when Alfredo Benito,
Luz Caro and the Intestate Estate of Mario Benito, represented by administrators
Saturnino Benito, as trustee and representative of the heirs of Mario Benito, agreed to
subdivide the property.
An agreement of partition, though oral, is valid and consequently
binding upon the parties. (Hernandez vs. Andal, et al., 78 Phil. 196)
A petition for subdivision was then filed for the purpose. This was accompanied by the
affidavits of Alfredo Benito and Saturnino Benito, both dated September 15, 1960 to the
effect that they agree to the segregation of the land formerly owned in common by Mario
Benito, Alfredo Benito and Benjamin Benito. A subdivision plan was made and by
common agreement Lot I-C thereof, with an area of 163 hectares, more or less, was
ceded to petitioner. Thereafter, the co-owners took actual and exclusive possession of
the specific portions respectively assigned to them. A subdivision title was subsequently
issued on the lot assigned to petitioner, to wit, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-4978.
In Caram, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 101 Phil. 315, a case squarely in point, this
Court held:
Inasmuch as the purpose of the law in establishing the right of legal
redemption between co-owners is to reduce the number of
participants until the community is done away with (Viola vs. Tecson,
49 Phil. 808), once the property is subdivided and distributed among
the co-owners, the community has terminated and there is no reason
to sustain any right of legal redemption.
Although the foregoing pronouncement has reference to the sale made after partition,
this Court therein saw no difference with respect to a conveyance which took
place before the partition agreement and approval by the court. Thus, it held:
Nevertheless, the result is the same, because We held in Saturnino vs.
Paulino, 97 Phil. 50, that the right of redemption under Article 1067
may be exercised only before partition. In this case the right was
asserted not only after partition but after the property inherited had
actually been subdivided into several parcels which were assigned by
lot to the several heirs.
In refutation, private respondent argues that petitioner Luz Caro acted in bad faith and in
fraud of the rights of the heirs of a deceased Mario Benito in obtaining a subdivision title
over a one-third portion of the land in question which she brought from Benjamin
Benito, and for this reason, she is deemed to hold said property in trust for said heirs.
The rule, however, is it fraud in securing the registration of titles to the land should be
supported by clear and convincing evidence. (Jaramil vs. Court of Appeals, 78 SCRA 420).
As private respondent has not shown and proved the circumstances constituting fraud, it
cannot be held to exist in this case.
As aforesaid, a subdivision title has been issued in the name petitioner on the lot ceded
to her. Upon the expiration of the term of one year from the date of the entry of the
subdivision title, the Certificate of Title shall be incontrovertible (Section 38, Act 496).
Since the title of petitioner is now indefeasible, private respondent cannot, by means of
the present action, directly attack the validity thereof.
Even on the assumption that there still is co-ownership here and that therefore, the right
of legal redemption exists, private respondent as administratrix, has no personality to
exercise said right for and in behalf of the intestate estate of Mario Benito. She is on the
same footing as co-administrator Saturnino Benito. Hence, if Saturnino's consent to the
sale of the one-third portion to petitioner cannot bind the intestate estate of Mario
Benito on the ground that the right of redemption was not within the powers of
administration, in the same manner, private respondent as co-administrator has no
power exercise the right of redemption the very power which the Court of Appeals
ruled to be not within the powers of administration.
While under Sec. 3, Rule 85, Rules of Court, the administrator has the
right to the possession of the real and personal estate of the deceased,
so far as needed for the payment of the expenses of administration,
and the administrator may bring and defend action for the recovery or
protection of the property or right of the deceased (Sec. 2, Rule 88),
such right of possession and administration do not include the right of
legal redemption of the undivided share sold to a stranger by one of
the co-owners after the death of another, because in such case, the
right of legal redemption only came into existence when the sale to
the stranger was perfected and formed no part of the estate of the
deceased co-owner; hence, that right cannot be transmitted to the heir
of the deceased co-owner. (Butte vs. Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc., 4 SCRA
526).
Private respondent cannot be considered to have brought this action in her behalf and in
behalf of the heirs of Mario Benito because the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint
specifically stated that she brought the action in her capacity as administratrix of the
intestate estate of Mario Benito.
It is petitioner's contention that, assuming that private respondent may exercise the
right of redemption, there was no compliance with the conditions precedent for the valid
exercise thereof.
In Conejero et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 16 SCRA 775, this Court explained the nature
of the right of redemption in this wise:
While the co-owner's right of legal redemption is a substantive right,
it is exceptional in nature, limited in its duration and subject to strict
compliance with the legal requirements. One of these is that the
redemptioner should tender payment of the redemption money
within thirty (30) days from written notice of the sale by the co-
owner.
It has been held that this thirty-day period is peremptory because the policy of the law is
not to leave the purchaser's title in uncertainty beyond the established 30-day period.
(Butte vs. Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc., 4 SCRA 526). It is not a prescriptive period but is
more a requisite or condition precedent to the exercise of the right of legal redemption.
In the case at bar, private respondent alleged in her complaint that she learned of the
sale sometime in May, 1966 upon receipt of a pleading in Special Proceeding No. 508 of
the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon. She likewise alleged that she gave a letter
informing petitioner of her desire to redeem the land on August 25, 1966. Clearly, three
months have elapsed since the notice of the sale. Hence, petitioner claims that the thirty-
day period of redemption has already expired. In addition, petitioner makes capital of
the admission of private respondent that she already knew of the said transaction even
before receipt of the said pleading (t.s.n., p. 16) as well as of the evidence presented that
Saturnino Benito, the admittedly active administrator until 1966, duly received a written
notice of the intended sale of Benjamin Benito's share. Said evidence consists of the
affidavit of the vendor stating that the required notice had been duly given to possible
redemptioners, the statement in the deed of sale itself and the deposition of Saturnino
Benito's widow with respect to her receipt of the written notice. Finally, petitioner points
to the records which disclose that private respondent knew of the subdivision (t.s.n., p.
25) and hence, rationalized that private respondent should have known also of the
previous sale.
Since We have ruled that the right of legal redemption does not exist nor apply in this
case because admittedly a subdivision title (T.C.T. No. T-4978) has already been issued in
the name of the petitioner on Lot I-C sold to her, it becomes moot and academic, if not
unnecessary to decide whether private respondent complied with the notice
requirements for the exercise of the right of legal redemption under Article 1623 of the
New Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the
complaint.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Fernandez and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., took no part.
Plana, J., concur in the result.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 78178 April 15, 1988
DELIA BAILON-CASILAO, LUZ PAULINO-ANG, EMMA PAULINO-YBANEZ, NILDA
PAULINO-TOLENTINO, and SABINA BAILON, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CELESTINO AFABLE, respondents.
Veronico E. Rubio for petitioners.
Mario G. Fortes for private-respondent.

CORTES, J.:
The fate of petitioners' claim over a parcel of land rests ultimately on a determination of
whether or not said petitioners are chargeable with such laches as may effectively bar
their present action.
The petitioners herein filed a case for recovery of property and damages with notice
of lis pendens on March 13, 1981 against the defendant and herein private respondent,
Celestino Afable. The parcel of land involved in this case, with an area of 48,849 square
meters, is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 1771 issued on June 12, 1931, in the
names of Rosalia, Gaudencio, Sabina Bernabe, Nenita and Delia, all surnamed Bailon, as
co-owners, each with a 1/6 share. Gaudencio and Nenita are now dead, the latter being
represented in this case by her children. Luz, Emma and Nilda. Bernabe went to China in
1931 and had not been heard from since then [Decision of the Court of Appeals, Rollo, p.
39].
It appears that on August 23, 1948, Rosalia Bailon and Gaudencio Bailon sold a portion of
the said land consisting of 16,283 square meters to Donato Delgado. On May 13, 1949,
Rosalia Bailon alone sold the remainder of the land consisting of 32,566 square meters to
Ponciana V. Aresgado de Lanuza. On the same date, Lanuza acquired from Delgado the
16,283 square meters of land which the latter had earlier acquired from Rosalia and
Gaudencio. On December 3, 1975, John Lanuza, acting under a special power of attorney
given by his wife, Ponciana V. Aresgado de Lanuza, sold the two parcels of land to
Celestino Afable, Sr.
In all these transfers, it was stated in the deeds of sale that the land was not registered
under the provisions of Act No. 496 when the fact is that it is. It appears that said land
had been successively declared for taxation first, in the name of Ciriaca Dellamas, mother
of the registered co-owners, then in the name of Rosalia Bailon in 1924, then in that of
Donato Delgado in 1936, then in Ponciana de Lanuza's name in 1962 and finally in the
name of Celestino Afable, Sr. in 1983.
In his answer to the complaint filed by the herein petitioners, Afable claimed that he had
acquired the land in question through prescription and contended that the petitioners
were guilty of laches.He later filed a third-party complaint against Rosalia Bailon for
damages allegedly suffered as a result of the sale to him of the land.
After trial, the lower court rendered a decision:
1. Finding and declaring Celestino Afable, a co-owner of the land
described in paragraph III of the complaint having validly bought the
two-sixth (2/6) respective undivided shares of Rosalia Bailon and
Gaudencio Bailon;
2. Finding and declaring the following as pro-indiviso co-owners,
having 1/6 share each, of the property described in paragraph III of
the complaint, to wit:
a. Sabina Bailon
b. Bernabe Bailon
c. Heirs of Nenita Bailon-Paulino
d. Delia Bailon-Casilao;
3. Ordering the segregation of the undivided interests in the property
in order to terminate co-ownership to be conducted by any Geodetic
Engineer selected by the parties to delineate the specific part of each
of the co-owners.
4. Ordering the defendant to restore the possession of the plaintiffs
respective shares as well as all attributes of absolute dominion;
5. Ordering the defendant to pay the following:
a. P5,000.00 as damages;
b. P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and;
c. to pay the costs.
[Decision of the Trial Court, Rollo, p. 37-38].
On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court
insofar as it held that prescription does not he against plaintiffs-appellees because they
are co-owners of the original vendors. However, the appellate court declared that,
although registered property cannot be lost by prescription, nevertheless, an action to
recover it may be barred by laches, citing the ruling in Mejia de Lucaz v. Gamponia [100
Phil. 277 (1956)]. Accordingly, it held the petitioners guilty of laches and dismissed their
complaint. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals.
The principal issue to be resolved in this case concerns the applicability of the equitable
doctrine of laches. Initially though, a determination of the effect of a sale by one or more
co-owners of the entire property held in common without the consent of all the co-
owners and of the appropriate remedy of the aggrieved co-owners is required.
The rights of a co-owner of a certain property are clearly specified in Article 493 of the
Civil Code.Thus:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of
the acts and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate
assign or mortgage it and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of
the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be
limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon
the termination of the co-ownership. [Emphasis supplied.]
As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as
his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did
not consent to the sale [Punsalan v. Boon Liat 44 Phil. 320 (1923)]. This is because under
the aforementioned codal provision, the sale or other disposition affects only his
undivided share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor in
the partition of the thing owned in common.[Ramirez v. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528 (1909)].
Consequently, by virtue of the sales made by Rosalia and Gaudencio Bailon which are
valid with respect to their proportionate shares, and the subsequent transfers which
culminated in the sale to private respondent Celestino Afable, the said Afable thereby
became a co-owner of the disputed parcel of land as correctly held by the lower court
since the sales produced the effect of substituting the buyers in the enjoyment thereof
[Mainit v. Bandoy, 14 Phil. 730 (1910)].
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his
undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the
other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are
transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.
The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the recovery
of possession of the thing owned in common from the third person who substituted the co-
owner or co-owners who alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the common property
as if it continued to remain in the possession of the co-owners who possessed and
administered it [Mainit v. Bandoy, supra.]
Thus, it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases where their
consent were not secured in a sale of the entire property as well as in a sale merely of the
undivided shares of some of the co-owners is an action. for PARTITION under Rule 69 of
the Revised Rules of Court. Neither recovery of possession nor restitution can be granted
since the defendant buyers are legitimate proprietors and possessors in joint ownership
of the common property claimed [Ramirez v. Bautista, supra].
As to the action for petition, neither prescription nor laches can be invoked.
In the light of the attendant circumstances, defendant-appellee's defense of prescription
is a vain proposition. Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil Code, '(n)o co-owner shall be
obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Such co-owner may demand at anytime the
partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.' [Emphasis
supplied.] In Budiong v. Bondoc [G.R. No. L-27702, September 9, 1977, 79 SCRA 241, this
Court has interpreted said provision of law to mean that the action for partition is
imprescriptible or cannot be barred by prescription. For Article 494 of the Civil Code
explicitly declares: "No prescription shall lie in favor of a co-owner or co- heir so long as
he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership."
Furthermore, the disputed parcel of land being registered under the Torrens System, the
express provision of Act No. 496 that '(n)o title to registered land in derogation to that of
the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession' is squarely
applicable. Consequently, prescription will not lie in favor of Afable as against the
petitioners who remain the registered owners of the disputed parcel of land.
It is argued however, that as to the petitioners Emma, Luz and Nelda who are not the
registered co-owners but merely represented their deceased mother, the late Nenita
Bailon, prescription lies.Respondents bolster their argument by citing a decision of this
Court in Pasion v. Pasion [G.R.No. L-15757, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 486, 489] holding that
"the imprescriptibility of a Torrens title can only be invoked by the person in whose name
the title is registered" and that 'one who is not the registered owner of a parcel of land
cannot invoke imprescriptibility of action to claim the same.'
Reliance on the aforesaid Pasion case is futile. The ruling therein applies only against
transferees other than direct issues or heirs or to complete strangers. The rational is
clear:
If prescription is unavailing against the registered owner, it must be
equally unavailing against the latter's hereditary successors, because
they merely step into the shoes of the decedent by operation of law
(New Civil Code, Article 777; Old Civil Code, Article 657), the title or
right undergoing no change by its transmission mortis causa [Atus, et
al., v. Nunez, et al., 97 Phil. 762, 764].
The latest pronouncement of this Court in Umbay v. Alecha [G. R. No. 67284, March 18,
1985, 135 SCRA 427, 429], which was promulgated subsequent to the Pasion case
reiterated the Atus doctrine. Thus:
Prescription is unavailing not only against the registered owner but
also against his hereditary successors, because they merely step into
the shoes of the decedent by operation of law and are merely the
continuation of the personality of their predecessor-in-interest.
[Barcelona v. Barcelona, 100 Phil. 251, 257].
Laches is likewise unavailing as a shield against the action of herein petitioners.
Well-stated in this jurisdiction are the four basic elements of laches, namely: (1) conduct
on the part of the defendant or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation
of which complaint is made and for which the complainant seeks a remedy; (2) delay in
asserting the corporations complainant's rights, the complainant having had knowledge
or notice of the defendant's conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute
suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant
would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and, (4) injury or prejudice to the
defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be
barred [Go China Gun, et al. v. Co Cho et al., 96 Phil. 622 (1955)].
While the first and last elements are present in this case, the second and third elements
are missing.
The second element speaks of delay in asserting the complainant's rights. However, the
mere fact of delay is insufficient to constitute, laches. It is required that (1) complainant
must have had knowledge of the conduct of defendant or of one under whom he claims and
(2) he must have been afforded an opportunity to institute suit. This court has pointed out
that laches is not concerned with the mere lapse of time. Thus:
Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence could or
should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a
right within a reasonable time warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert
it. Tijam, et al., v. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450, April 25, 1968, 23
SCRA 29,35; Tendo v. Zamacoma, G.R. No. L-63048, August 7, 1985,
138 SCRA 78, 90].
The doctrine of "laches" or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds
of public policy which requires for the peace of society, the
discouragement of stale claims and unlike the statute of limitations,
is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of inequity or
unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted,"
[Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, supra, p. 35]. [Emphasis supplied.]
It must be noted that while there was delay in asserting petitioners' rights, such delay
was not attended with any knowledge of the sale nor with any opportunity to bring suit.
In the first place, petitioners had no notice of the sale made by their eldest sister. It is
undisputed that the petitioner co-owners had entrusted the care and management of the
parcel of land to Rosalia Bailon who was the oldest among them [TSN, July 27, 1983, p.
14]. In fact, Nicanor Lee, a son of Rosalia, who was presented as a witness by the
plaintiffs-petitioners, testified on cross-examination that his mother was only the
administrator of the land as she is the eldest and her brothers and sisters were away
[TSN, October 5, 1983, p. 15]. Indeed, when Delia Bailon-Casilao left Sorsogon in 1942
after she got married, it was only in 1983 that she returned. Sabina on the other hand, is
said to be living in Zamboanga while Bernabe who left for China in 1931 has not been
heard from since then. Consequently, when Rosalia, from whom the private respondent
derived his title, made the disputed sales covering the entire property, the herein
petitioners were unaware thereof.
In the second place, they were not afforded an opportunity to bring suit inasmuch as
until 1981, they were kept in the dark about the transactions entered into by their sister.
It was only when Delia Bailon-Casilao returned to Sorsogon in 1981 that she found out
about the sales and immediately, she and her co-petitioners filed the present action for
recovery of property. The appellate court thus erred in holding that 'the petitioners did
nothing to show interest in the land." For the administration of the parcel of land was
entrusted to the oldest co-owner who was then in possession thereof precisely because
the other co-owners cannot attend to such a task as they reside outside of Sorsogon
where the land is situated. Her co-owners also allowed her to appropriate the entire
produce for herself because it was not even enough for her daily consumption [TSN,
October 5, 1983, pp. 17-18]. And since petitioner was the one receiving the produce, it is
but natural that she was the one to take charge of paying the real estate taxes. Now, if
knowledge of the sale by Rosalia was conveyed to the petitioners only later, they cannot
be faulted for the acts of their co-owner who failed to live up to the trust and confidence
expected of her. In view of the lack of knowledge by the petitioners of the conduct of
Rosalia in selling the land without their consent in 1975 and the absence of any
opportunity to institute the proper action until 1981, laches may not be asserted against
the petitioners.
The third element of laches is likewise absent. There was no lack of knowledge or notice
on the part of the defendant that the complainants would assert the right on which they
base the suit. On the contrary, private respondent is guilty of bad faith in purchasing the
property as he knew that the property was co-owned by six persons and yet, there were
only two signatories to the deeds of sale and no special authorization to self was granted
to the two sellers by the other co-owners.
Even as the land here was misrepresented in the deeds of sale as "unregistered," the
truth was that Afable already had notice that the land was titled in the name of six
persons by virtue of the Certificate of Title which was already in his possession even
before the sale. Such fact is apparent from his testimony before the court a quo:
COURT:
Q: From whom did you get the certificate of Title?
A: When it was mortgaged by Ponciana Aresgado.
Q: It was mortgaged to you before you bought it?
A: Yes, Your Honor. (TSN, March 5, 1984, p. 12)
When cross-examined, he stated:
Q: Mr. Witness, the original Certificate of Title was
given to you in the year 1974, was it not?
A: 1975.
Q: In 1975, you already discovered that the title
was in the name of several persons, is it not?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When you discovered that it is in the name of
several persons, you filed a case in court for
authority to cancel the title to be transferred in
your name, is it not?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that was denied by the Court of First
Instance of Sorsogon because there was ordinary
one signatory to the deed of sale instead of six, was
it not?
A: Not one but two signatories.
[Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Rollo, p. 35]
Such actual knowledge of the existence of other co-owners in whose names the lot
subject of the sale was registered should have prompted a searching inquiry by Afable
considering the well- known rule in this jurisdiction that:
... a person dealing with a registered land has a right to rely upon the
face of the Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of
inquiring further, except when the party concerned has actual
knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably
cautions man to make such inquiry. [Gonzales v. IAC and Rural Bank
of Pavia, Inc., G.R. No. 69622, January 29, 1988).
Moreover, the undisputed fact is that petitioners are relatives of his wife. As a genuine
gesture of good faith, he should have contacted the petitioners who were still listed as
co-owners in the certificate of title which was already in his possession even before the
sale. In failing to exercise even a minimum degree of ordinary prudence required by the
situation, he is deemed to have bought the lot at his own risk. Hence any prejudice or
injury that may be occasioned to him by such sale must be borne by him.
Indeed, aware of the flaws impairing his title, Afable went to the herein petitioner Delia
Bailon-Casilao, asking the latter to sign a document obviously to cure the flaw [TSN, July
27, 1983, p.6]. Later, he even filed a petition in the Court of First Instance to register the
title in his name which was denied as aforesaid.
It may be gleaned from the foregoing examination of the facts that Celestino Afable is not
a buyer in good faith. Laches being an equitable defense, he who invokes it must come to
the court with clean hands.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED, the challenged decision of
the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE, and the decision of the trial court is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 75886 August 30, 1988
CONCEPCION ROQUE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ERNESTO ROQUE, FILOMENA OSMUNDO,
CECILIA ROQUE, MARCELA ROQUE, JOSE ROQUE and RUBEN ROQUE, respondents.
Lorenzo J. Liwag for petitioner.
Dominador Ad Castillo for private respondents.

FELICIANO, J.:
The subject of the present Petition for Review is the 31 July 1986 Decision of the former
Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. CV No. 02248 (entitled, "Concepcion Roque,
plaintiff-appellee, vs. Ernesto Roque, Filomena Osmunda Cecilia Roque, Marcela Roque,
Jose Roque and Ruben Roque, defendants-appellants") which reversed and set aside on
appeal the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Branch 9.
The controversy here involves a 312 square meter parcel of land situated in San Juan,
Malolos, Bulacan and designated as Lot No. 1549 of the Cadastral Survey of Malolos. The
property was registered originally in the name of Januario Avendao, a bachelor who
died intestate and without issue on 22 October 1945.
On 21 September 1959, the intestate heirs of Januario Avendafio executed a document
entitled "Paghahati at Pagtagabuyan ng Mana sa Labas ng Hukuman."
1
Through this
instrument, extrajudicial partition of Lot No. 1549 was effected among the intestate heirs
as follows:
a. One-fourth (1/4) undivided portion to Illuminada Avendao.
b. One-fourth (1/4) undivided portion to Gregorio Avendafio and
Miguel Avendao.
c. One-fourth (1/4) undivided portion to Bernardino, Bienvenido,
Numeriano and Rufina, all surnamed Avendao.
d. One-fourth (1/4) undivided portion to respondent Emesto Roque
and Victor Roque.
2

On 28 September 1959, co-owners Illuminada, Gregorio, Miguel, Bernardino, Bienvenido,
Numeriano and Rufina, all surnamed Avendao, in consideration of the aggregate
amount of P500.00, transferred their collective and undivided threefourths (3/4) share
in Lot No. 1549 to respondent Ernesto Roque and Victor Roque, thereby vesting in the
latter full and complete ownership of the property. The transactions were embodied in
two (2) separate deeds of sale both entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihang Patuluyan"
3
and both
duly notarized. Subsequently, in an unnotarized "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan"
4
dated 27
November 1961, Emesto and Victor Roque purportedly sold a three-fourths (3/4)
undivided portion of Lot No. 1549 to their half-sister, petitioner Concepcion Roque, for
the same amount. The property, however, remained registered in the name of the
decedent, Januario Avendao.
Upon the instance of petitioner Concepcion Roque and allegedly of respondent Ernesto
Roque, Lot No. 1549 was surveyed on 20 September 1975. Consequent thereto, a
Subdivision Plan
5
was drawn up by the Geodetic Engineer Identifying and delineating a
one-fourth (1/4) portion (78 square meters) of the property as belonging to respondent
Ernesto Roque and Victor Roque (who had died on 14 April 1962), upon the one hand,
and a three-fourths (3/4) portion (234 square meters) of the same property as belonging
to petitioner Concepion Roque, upon the other hand. Petitioner claimed that preparation
of the Subdivision Plan, which was approved on 3 November 1975 by the Land
Registration Commission was a preliminary step leading eventually to partition of Lot
No. 1549, partition allegedly having been previously agreed upon inter seby the co-
owners. Respondents Ernesto Roque and the legal heirs of Victor Roque, however,
refused to acknowledge petitioner's claim of ownership of any portion of Lot No. 1549
and rejected the plan to divide the land.
Attempts at amicable settlement having fallen through, petitioner Concepcion Roque, on
6 December 1977, filed a Complaint for "Partition with Specific
Performance"
6
(docketed as Civil Case No. 5236-M) with Branch 2 of the then Court of
First Instance of Malolos against respondents Emesto Roque and the heirs of Victor
Roque. In her complaint, petitioner (plaintiff below) claimed legal ownership of an
undivided threefourths (3/4) portion of Lot No. 1549, by virtue of the 27 November
1961 "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan" executed in her favor by Emesto Roque and Victor
Roque. In support of this claim, petitioner also presented an undated and unnotarized
"Kasulatang Pagkilala sa Bilihan Patuluyan ng Bahagui at Pagmamana sa Labas ng
Hukuman at Paghahati-hati at Abuyan ng Bahagui"
7
said to have been signed by the
respondents in acknowledgment of the existence and validity of the Bilihan in favor of
petitioner. Finally, petitioner alleged that, as a coowner of Lot No. 1549, she had a right
to seek partition of the property, that she could not be compelled to remain in the
coownership of the same.
In an Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim
8
filed on 28 December 1977, respondents
(defendants below) impugned the genuineness and due execution of the "Bilihan Lubos
at Patuluyan" dated 27 November 1961 on the ground "that the signatures appearing
thereon are not the authentic signatures of the supposed signatories ...." It was also
alleged that petitioner Concepcion Roque, far from being a co-owner of Lot No. 1549,
"occupied a portion of the lot in question by mere tolerance of the [defendants]."
Respondents also refused to honor the unnotarized Kasulatan and, additionally, denied
having had any participation in the preparation of the Subchvision Plan.
On 27 June 1983, the trial court (now Branch 9, Regional Trial Court of Malolos)
rendered a Decision,
9
the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendants;
1. Ordering the heirs of the late Victor Roque namely Filomena
Osmunda his spouse, his children, Cecilia Roque, Marcela Roque, Jose
Roque and Ruben Roque and their uncle and co-defendant Emesto
Roque, to execute a deed of confirmation of the sale made by Emesto
and Victor Roque in favor of plaintiff Concepcion Roque, entitled
"Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan," executed on November 27, 1961, Exh. E,
over the 3/4 portion of the subject property;
2. Ordering the partition of the parcel of land described in par. 3 of tie
complaint covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 1442 Bulacan
issued in the name of Januario Avendafio, in the proportion of 3/4 to
pertain to Concepcion Roque, and 1/4 to pertain to Emesto Roque and
his co- defendants, his sister-in-law, nephews and nieces, in
accordance with the approved subdivision plan (LRC Psd-230726).
3. Ordering defendants,jointly and severally, to pay to plaintiff the
sum of P2,000.00 as and for attomey's fees and the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
The respondents appealed from this decision alleging the following errors:
I
The lower court erred when it decided and ordered
defendantsappellants to execute a confirmation of the "Bilihan Lubos
at Patuluyan," Exh. "E."
II
The lower court erred when it decided and ordered the
defendantsappellant,s to deliver unto the plaintiff [a] 3/4 share of the
land in question.
III
The lower court erred in deciding this case in favor of the plaintiff-
appellee, based on an unnotarized and forged signature of
defendantappellant Ernesto Roque.
IV
The lower court erred in giving credence to the testimony of the
plaintiff-appellee Concepcion Roque despite [its] gross
inconsistencies.
10

Acting on the appeal (docketed as A.C.-G.R. CV No. 02248), the Intermediate Appellate
Court, in a Decision
11
dated 31 July 1986, reversed the judgment of the trial court and
dismissed both the petitioner's complaint and the respondents' appeal. A Motion for
Reconsideration of petitioner Concepcion Roque was denied.
The present Petition for Review was filed with this Court on 18 September 1986. In a
resolution dated 27 July 1987, we gave due course to the Petition and required the
parties to submit their respective Memoranda.
1. On the matter of dismissal of petitioner's complaint, the Intermediate Appellate Court
stated in its decision:
While the action filed by the plaintiff is for partition, the defendantz,
after denying plaintiff's assertion of co-ownership, asserted that they
are the exclusive and sole owners of the 314 portion of the parcel of
land claimed by the plaintiff.
Upon the issue thusjoined by the pleadings, it is obvious that the case
has become one ofownership of the disputed portion of the subject lot.
It is well settled that an action for partition will not prosper as such
from the moment an alleged co-owner asserts an adverse title. The
action that may be brought by an aggrieved co-owner is accion
reivindicatoria or action for recovery of title and possession (Jardin
vs. Hallasgo, 11 7 SCRA 532, 536, 537; Paner vs. Gaspar, 3 CA Rep.
155, 158). (Emphasis supplied)
Viewed in the light of the facts of the present case, the Intermediate Appellate Court's
decision appears to imply that from the moment respondents (defendants below) alleged
absolute and exclusive ownership of the whole of Lot No. 1549 in their Answer, the trial
court should have immediately ordered the dismissal of the action for partition and
petitioner (plaintiff below), if she so desired, should have refiled the case but this time as
an accionreinvindicatoria. Taking this analysis a step further should the reivindicatory
action prosper i.e., a co-ownership relation is found to have existed between the
parties a second action for partition would still have to be instituted in order to effect
division of the property among the co-owners.
We do not agree with the above view. An action for partition-which is typically brought
by a person claiming to be co-owner of a specified property against a defendant or
defendants whom the plaintiff recognizes to be co-owners may be seen to present
simultaneously two principal issues. First, there is the issue of whether the plaintiff is
indeed a co-owner of the property sought to be partitioned. Second, assuming that the
plaintiff successfully hurdles the first issue, there is the secondary issue of how the
property is to be divided between plaintiff and defendant(s) i.e., what portion should
go to which co-owner.
Should the trial court find that the defendants do not dispute the status of the plaintiff as
co-owner, the court can forthwith proceed to the actual partitioning of the property
involved. In case the defendants assert in their Answer exclusive title in themselves
adversely to the plaintiff, the court should not dismiss the plaintiffs action for partition
but, on the contrary and in the exercise of its general jurisdiction, resolve the question of
whether the plaintiff is co-owner or not. Should the trial court find that the plaintiff was
unable to sustain his claimed status as co-owner, or that the defendants are or have
become the sole and exclusive owners of the property involved, the court will necessarily
have to dismiss the action for partition. This result would be reached, not because the
wrong action was commenced by the plaintiff, but rather because the plaintiff having
been unable to show co-ownership rights in himself, no basis exists for requiring the
defendants to submit to partition the property at stake. If, upon the other hand, the court
after trial should find the eidstence of co-ownership among the parties litigant, the court
may and should order the partition of the property in the same action. Judgment for one
or the other party being on the merits, the losing party (respondents in this case) may
then appeal the same. In either case, however, it is quite unnecessary to require the
plaintiff to file another action, separate and independent from that for partition
originally instituted. Functionally, an action for partition may be seen to be at once an
action for declaration of coownership and for segregation and conveyance of a
determinate portion of the property involved. This is the import of our jurisprudence on
the matter.
12
and is sustained by the public policy which abhors multiplicity of actions.
The question of prescription also needs to be addressed in this connection. It is
sometimes said that "the action for partition of the thing owned in common (actio
communi dividendo or actio familiae erciscundae) does not prescribe."
13
This statement
bears some refinement. In the words of Article 494 of the Civil Code, "each co-owner may
demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is
concemed." No matter how long the co-ownership has lasted, a co-owner can always opt
out of the co-ownership, and provided the defendant co-owners or co-heirs have
theretofore expressly or impliedly recognized the co-ownership, they cannot set up as a
defense the prescription of the action for partition. But if the defendants show that they
had previously asserted title in themselves adversely to the plaintiff and for the requisite
period of time, the plaintiffs right to require recognition of his status as a co-owner will
have been lost by prescription and the court cannot issue an order requiring partition.
This is precisely what happened in Jardin v. Hallasgo, 117 SCRA 532 (1982), which the
respondent appellate court cited to support its position quoted above.
The case of Jardin involved, among others, two (2) parcels of land which were inherited
in 1920 by the brothers Catalino jardin and Galo Jardin together with their half-brother,
Sixto Hallasgo. The three (3) held these lands in co-ownership until Sixto later (the date
was not specified) repudiated the coownership and occupied and possessed both parcels
of land, claiming the same exclusively as his own. Sometime in 1973, the heirs of Catalino
and Galo instituted an action for partition of the two (2) properties against Sixto's heirs,
who had refused to surrender any portion of the same to the former. The trial court,
assuming that prescription had started to run in that case even before the Civil Code took
effect, held that the action for partition filed by the heirs of Catalino and Galo had already
prescribed. On appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court on this point in the following
terms:
Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that "no co-owner shall be
obliged to remain in the co- ownership" and that "each co-owner may
demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common,
insofar as his share is concerned." It also provides that 'no
prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-
owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the
co-ownership.
While the action for the partition of the thing owned in common (actio
communi dividendo or actio familiae erciscundae) does not prescribe,
the co-ownership does not last forever since it may be repudiated by a
co-owner [i.e., Sixto]. In such a case, the action for partition does not lie.
What may be brought by the aggrieved co-owner [i.e., the heirs of
Catalino and Galo] is an accion reivindicatoria or action for recovery of
title and possession. That action may be barred by prescription.
If the co-heir or co-owner having possession of the hereditary or
community property, holds the same in his own name, that is, under
claim of exclusive ownership, he may acquire the property by
prescription if his possession meets all the other requirements of the
law, and after the expiration of the prescriptive period, his co-heir or
co-owner may lose their right to demand partition, and their action
may then be held to have prescribed (De los Santos vs. Santa Teresa,
44 Phil. 811).
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
In the light of the foregoing discussion, it will be seen that the underscored portion of the
Court's opinion in Jardinis actually obiter. For there, the Court simply held the action for
partition by the heirs of Catalino and Galo had prescribed and did not require such heirs
to start a new action (which would have been quite pointless); on the other hand, the
Court remanded the case to the lower court for further proceedings in respect of the
recovery of a 350 square meter lot which the evidence showed was owned by the
plaintiffs but wrongfully included by Sixto in the cadastral survey of his share of the
adjoining lot.
In Jardin, the claim of co-ownership asserted by the heirs of Catalino and Galo was
effectively refuted by the heirs of Sixto, who not only claimed for themselves absolute
and exclusive ownership of the disputed properties but were also in actual and adverse
possesion thereof for a substantial length of time. The Court found, further, that the
action for partition initially available to the heirs of Catalino and Galo had, as a result of
the preceding circumstance, already prescribed.
An entirely different situation, however, obtains in the case at bar. First of all, petitioner
Concepcion Roque-the co-owner seeking partition has been and is presently in open
and continuous possession of a three-fourths (3/4) portion of the property owned in
common. The Court notes in this respect the finding of the trial court that petitioner,
following execution of the "Bilihan Lubos at Pattlluyan" on 27 November 1961, had been
in "continuous occupancy of the 3/4 portion of the lot ... up to the present, and whereon
plaintifrs house and that of her son are erected. "
14
Respondents do not dispute this
finding of fact, although they would claim that petitioner's possession is merely tolerated
by them. Second, prior to filing in 1977 of the Complaint in Civil Case No. 5236-M, neither
of the parties involved had asserted or manifested a claim of absolute and exclusive
ownership over the whole of Lot No. 1549 adverse to that of any of the other co-owners: in
other words, co-ownership of the property had continued to be recognized by all the
owners. Consequently, the action for partition could not have and, as a matter of fact, had
not yet prescribed at the time of institution by Concepcion of the action below.
2. Coming now to the matter regarding dismissal of the respondents'appeal, the
Intermediate Appellate Court held that inasmuch as the attack on the validity of the
"Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan" was predicated on fraud and no action for annulment of the
document had been brought by respondents within the four (4) year prescriptive period
provided under Article 1391 of the Civil Code, such action had already prescribed.
We find it unnecessary to deal here with the issue of prescription discussed by the
respondent court in its assailed decision. The facts on record clearly show that petitioner
Concepcion Roque had been in actual, open and continuous possession of a three-fourths
(3/4) portion of Lot No. 1549 ever since execution of the "Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan" in
November of 1961. The Court notes that it was only in their Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim filed with the trial court in December of 1977 more than sixteen (16)
years later that respondents first questioned the genuineness and authenticity of the
"Bilihan Lubos at Patuluyan." Not once during those sixteen (16) years did respondents
contest petitioner's occupation of a three-fourths (3/4) portion of Lot No. 1549.
Furthermore, if indeed it is true that respondents, as they claim, are the absolute owners
of the whole of Lot No. 1549, it is most unusual that respondents would have allowed or
tolerated such prolonged occupation by petitioner of a major portion (3/4) of the land
while they, upon the other hand, contented themselves with occupation of only a fourth
thereof. This latter circumstance, coupled with the passage of a very substantial length of
time during which petitioner all the while remained undisturbed and uninterrupted in
her occupation and possession, places respondents here in laches: respondents may no
longer dispute the existence of the co-ownership between petitioner and themselves nor
the validity of petitioner's claim of a threefourths (3/4) interest in Lot No. 1549, as they
are deemed, by their unreasonably long inaction, to have acquiesced in the
coow,aership.
15
In this respect, we affirm the decision of the respondent appellate court
presently under review.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court dated 31 July 1986 in
A.C.-G.R. CV No. 02248 is SET ASIDE with respect to that portion which orders the
dismissal of the Complaint in Civil Case No. 5236-M, but is AFFIRMED with respect to
that portion which orders the dismissal of the respondents'appeal in A.C.-G.R. CV No.
02248. The Decision of Branch 9 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos dated 27 June
1983 in Civil Case No. 5236-M is hereby REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr. and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Bidin, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-46296 September 24, 1991
EPITACIO DELIMA, PACLANO DELIMA, FIDEL DELIMA, VIRGILIO DELIMA, GALILEO
DELIMA, JR., BIBIANO BACUS, OLIMPIO BACUS and PURIFICACION
BACUS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, GALILEO DELIMA (deceased), substituted by his legal
heirs, namely: FLAVIANA VDA. DE DELIMA, LILY D. ARIAS, HELEN NIADAS,
ANTONIO DELIMA, DIONISIO DELIMA, IRENEA DELIMA, ESTER DELIMA AND FELY
DELIMA, respondents.
Gabriel J. Canete for petitioners.
Emilio Lumontad, Jr. for private respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:p
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing
the trial court's judgment which declared as null and void the certificate of title in the
name of respondents' predecessor and which ordered the partition of the disputed lot
among the parties as co-owners.
The antecedent facts of the case as found both by the respondent appellate court and by
the trial court are as follows:
During his lifetime, Lino Delima acquired Lot No. 7758 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar
Lands Estate in Cebu by sale on installments from the government. Lino Delima later
died in 1921 leaving as his only heirs three brothers and a sister namely: Eulalio Delima,
Juanita Delima, Galileo Delima and Vicente Delima. After his death, TCT No. 2744 of the
property in question was issued on August 3, 1953 in the name of the Legal Heirs of Lino
Delima, deceased, represented by Galileo Delima.
On September 22, 1953, Galileo Delima, now substituted by respondents, executed an
affidavit of "Extra-judicial Declaration of Heirs." Based on this affidavit, TCT No. 2744
was cancelled and TCT No. 3009 was issued on February 4,1954 in the name of Galileo
Delima alone to the exclusion of the other heirs.
Galileo Delima declared the lot in his name for taxation purposes and paid the taxes
thereon from 1954 to 1965.
On February 29, 1968, petitioners, who are the surviving heirs of Eulalio and Juanita
Delima, filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu (now Regional Trial Court) an
action for reconveyance and/or partition of property and for the annulment of TCT No.
3009 with damages against their uncles Galileo Delima and Vicente Delima,. Vicente
Delima was joined as party defendant by the petitioners for his refusal to join the latter
in their action.
On January 16, 1970, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioners, the
dispositive portion of which states:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the following are
the declared owners of Lot No. 7758 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar
Lands Estate presently covered by transfer Certificate of Title No.
3009, each sharing a pro-indiviso share of one-fourth;
1) Vicente Delima (one-fourth)
2) Heirs of Juanita Delima, namely: Bibiano Bacus, Olimpio Bacus and
Purificacion Bacus (on-fourth);
3) Heirs of Eulalio Delima, namely Epitacio, Pagano, Fidel, Virgilio and
Galileo Jr., all surnamed Delima (one-fourth); and
4) The Heirs of Galileo Delima, namely Flaviana Vda. de Delima, Lily D.
Arias, Helen Niadas and Dionisio, Antonio, Eotu Irenea, and Fely, all
surnamed Delima (one-fourth).
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3009 is declared null and void and the
Register of Deeds of Cebu is ordered to cancel the same and issue in
lieu thereof another title with the above heirs as pro-indiviso owners.
After the payment of taxes paid by Galileo Delima since 1958, the
heirs of Galileo Delima are ordered to turn a over to the other heirs
their respective shares of the fruits of the lot in question computed at
P170.00 per year up to the present time with legal (interest).
Within sixty (60) days from receipt of this decision the parties are
ordered to petition the lot in question and the defendants are directed
to immediately turn over possession of the shares here awarded to
the respective heirs.
Defendants are condemned to pay the costs of the suit.
The counterclaim is dismissed.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 54-55, Rollo)
Not satisfied with the decision, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. On May 19,
1977, respondent appellate court reversed the trial court's decision and upheld the claim
of Galileo Delima that all the other brothers and sister of Lino Delima, namely Eulalio,
Juanita and Vicente, had already relinquished and waived their rights to the property in
his favor, considering that he (Galileo Delima) alone paid the remaining balance of the
purchase price of the lot and the realty taxes thereon (p. 26, Rollo).
Hence, this petition was filed with the petitioners alleging that the Court of Appeals
erred:
1) In not holding that the right of a co-heir to demand partition of
inheritance is imprescriptible. If it does, the defenses of prescription
and laches have already been waived.
2) In disregarding the evidence of the petitioners.(p.13, Rollo)
The issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not petitioners' action for
partition is already barred by the statutory period provided by law which shall enable
Galileo Delima to perfect his claim of ownership by acquisitive prescription to the
exclusion of petitioners from their shares in the disputed property. Article 494 of the
Civil Code expressly provides:
Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership.
Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing
owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain
period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may
be extended by a new agreement.
A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not
exceed twenty years.
Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law.
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his
co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes
the co-ownership.
As a rule, possession by a co-owner will not be presumed to be adverse to the others, but
will be held to benefit all. It is understood that the co-owner or co-heir who is in
possession of an inheritance pro-indiviso for himself and in representation of his co-
owners or co-heirs, if, as such owner, he administers or takes care of the rest thereof
with the obligation of delivering it to his co-owners or co-heirs, is under the same
situation as a depository, a lessee or a trustee (Bargayo v. Camumot, 40 Phil, 857; Segura
v. Segura, No. L-29320, September 19, 1988, 165 SCRA 368). Thus, an action to compel
partition may be filed at any time by any of the co-owners against the actual possessor.
In other words, no prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner against his co-owners or
co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership (Del Blanco v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, No. 72694, December 1, 1987, 156 SCRA 55).
However, from the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute and
exclusive owner of the properties and denies the others any share therein, the question
involved is no longer one of partition but of ownership (De Castro v. Echarri, 20 Phil. 23;
Bargayo v. Camumot, supra; De los Santos v. Santa Teresa, 44 Phil. 811). In such case, the
imprescriptibility of the action for partition can no longer be invoked or applied when
one of the co-owners has adversely possessed the property as exclusive owner for a
period sufficient to vest ownership by prescription.
It is settled that possession by a co-owner or co-heir is that of a trustee. In order that
such possession is considered adverse to the cestui que trust amounting to a repudiation
of the co-ownership, the following elements must concur: 1) that the trustee has
performed unequivocal acts amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust; 2) that such
positive acts of repudiation had been made known to the cestui que trust; and 3) that the
evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive (Valdez v. Olorga, No. L-22571, May 25,
1973, 51 SCRA 71; Pangan v. Court of Appeals, No. L-39299, October 18, 1988, 166 SCRA
375).
We have held that when a co-owner of the property in question executed a deed of
partition and on the strength thereof obtained the cancellation of the title in the name of
their predecessor and the issuance of a new one wherein he appears as the new owner of
the property, thereby in effect denying or repudiating the ownership of the other co-
owners over their shares, the statute of limitations started to run for the purposes of the
action instituted by the latter seeking a declaration of the existence of the co-ownership
and of their rights thereunder (Castillo v. Court of Appeals, No. L-18046, March 31, 1964,
10 SCRA 549). Since an action for reconveyance of land based on implied or constructive
trust prescribes after ten (10) years, it is from the date of the issuance of such title that
the effective assertion of adverse title for purposes of the statute of limitations is counted
(Jaramil v. Court of Appeals, No. L-31858, August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 420).
Evidence shows that TCT No. 2744 in the name of the legal heirs of Lino Delima,
represented by Galileo Delima, was cancelled by virtue of an affidavit executed by Galileo
Delima and that on February 4, 1954, Galileo Delima obtained the issuance of a new title
in Ms name numbered TCT No. 3009 to the exclusion of his co-heirs. The issuance of this
new title constituted an open and clear repudiation of the trust or co-ownership, and the
lapse of ten (10) years of adverse possession by Galileo Delima from February 4, 1954
was sufficient to vest title in him by prescription. As the certificate of title was notice to
the whole world of his exclusive title to the land, such rejection was binding on the other
heirs and started as against them the period of prescription. Hence, when petitioners
filed their action for reconveyance and/or to compel partition on February 29, 1968,
such action was already barred by prescription. Whatever claims the other co-heirs
could have validly asserted before can no longer be invoked by them at this time.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals dated May 19, 1977 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 76351 October 29, 1993
VIRGILIO B. AGUILAR, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and SENEN B. AGUILAR, respondents.
Jose F. Manacop for petitioner.
Siruello, Muyco & Associates Law Office for private respondent.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 03933 declaring null and void the orders of 23 and
26 April, 1979, the judgment by default of 26 July 1979, and the order of 22 October
1979 of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City, Branch 30, and directing the
trial court to set the case for pre-trial conference.
Petitioner Virgilio and respondent Senen are brothers; Virgilio is the youngest of seven
(7) children of the late Maximiano Aguilar, while Senen is the fifth. On 28 October 1969,
the two brothers purchased a house and lot in Paraaque where their father could spend
and enjoy his remaining years in a peaceful neighborhood. Initially, the brothers agreed
that Virgilio's share in the co-ownership was two-thirds while that of Senen was one-
third. By virtue of a written memorandum dated 23 February 1970, Virgilio and Senen
agreed that henceforth their interests in the house and lot should be equal, with Senen
assuming the remaining mortgage obligation of the original owners with the Social
Security System (SSS) in exchange for his possession and enjoyment of the house
together with their father.
Since Virgilio was then disqualified from obtaining a loan from SSS, the brothers agreed
that the deed of sale would be executed and the title registered in the meantime in the
name of Senen. It was further agreed that Senen would take care of their father and his
needs since Virgilio and his family were staying in Cebu.
After Maximiano Aguilar died in 1974, petitioner demanded from private respondent
that the latter vacate the house and that the property be sold and proceeds thereof
divided among them.
Because of the refusal of respondent to give in to petitioner's demands, the latter filed on
12 January 1979 an action to compel the sale of the house and lot so that the they could
divide the proceeds between them.
In his complaint, petitioner prayed that the proceeds of the sale, be divided on the basis
of two-thirds (2/3) in his favor and one-third (1/3) to respondent. Petitioner also prayed
for monthly rentals for the use of the house by respondent after their father died.
In his answer with counterclaim, respondent alleged that he had no objection to the sale
as long as the best selling price could be obtained; that if the sale would be effected, the
proceeds thereof should be divided equally; and, that being a co-owner, he was entitled
to the use and enjoyment of the property.
Upon issues being joined, the case was set for pre-trial on 26 April 1979 with the lawyers
of both parties notified of the pre-trial, and served with the pre-trial order, with private
respondent executing a special power of attorney to his lawyer to appear at the pre-trial
and enter into any amicable settlement in his behalf.
1

On 20 April 1979, Atty. Manuel S. Tonogbanua, counsel for respondent, filed a motion to
cancel pre-trial on the ground that he would be accompanying his wife to Dumaguete
City where she would be a principal sponsor in a wedding.
On 23 April 1979, finding the reasons of counsel to be without merit, the trial court
denied the motion and directed that the pre-trial should continue as scheduled.
When the case was called for pre-trial as scheduled on 26 April 1979, plaintiff and his
counsel appeared. Defendant did not appear; neither his counsel in whose favor he
executed a special power of attorney to represent him at the pre-trial. Consequently, the
trial court, on motion of plaintiff, declared defendant as in default and ordered reception
of plaintiff's evidence ex parte.
On 7 May 1979, defendant through counsel filed an omnibus motion to reconsider the
order of default and to defer reception of evidence. The trial court denied the motion and
plaintiff presented his evidence.
On 26 July 1979, rendering judgment by default against defendant, the trial court found
him and plaintiff to be co-owners of the house and lot, in equal shares on the basis of
their written agreement. However, it ruled that plaintiff has been deprived of his
participation in the property by defendant's continued enjoyment of the house and lot,
free of rent, despite demands for rentals and continued maneuvers of defendants, to
delay partition. The trial court also upheld the right of plaintiff as co-owner to demand
partition. Since plaintiff could not agree to the amount offered by defendant for the
former's share, the trial court held that this property should be sold to a third person and
the proceeds divided equally between the parties.
The trial court likewise ordered defendant to vacate the property and pay plaintiff
P1,200.00 as rentals
2
from January 1975 up to the date of decision plus interest from the
time the action was filed.
On 17 September 1979, defendant filed an omnibus motion for new trial but on 22
October 1979 the trial court denied the motion.
Defendant sought relief from the Court of Appeals praying that the following orders and
decision of the trial court be set aside: (a) the order of 23 April 1970 denying defendants
motion for postponement of the pre-trial set on 26 April 1979; (b) the order of 26 April
1979 declaring him in default and authorizing plaintiff to present his evidenceex-parte;
(e) the default judgment of 26 July 1979; and, (d) the order dated 22 October 1979
denying his omnibus motion for new trial.
On 16 October 1986, the Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court of 26 April
1979 as well as the assailed judgment rendered by default., The appellate court found the
explanation of counsel for defendant in his motion to cancel pre-trial as satisfactory and
devoid of a manifest intention to delay the disposition of the case. It also ruled that the
trial court should have granted the motion for postponement filed by counsel for
defendant who should not have been declared as in default for the absence of his
counsel.
Petitioner now comes to us alleging that the Court of Appeals erred (1) in not holding
that the motion of defendant through counsel to cancel the pre-trial was dilatory in
character and (2) in remanding the case to the trial court for pre-trial and trial.
The issues to be resolved are whether the trial court correctly declared respondent as in
default for his failure to appear at the pre-trial and in allowing petitioner to present his
evidence ex-parte, and whether the trial court correctly rendered the default judgment
against respondent.
We find merit in the petition.
As regards the first issue, the law is clear that the appearance of parties at the pre-trial is
mandatory.
3
A party who fails to appear at a pre-trial conference may be non-suited or
considered as in default.
4
In the case at bar, where private respondent and counsel failed
to appear at the scheduled pre-trial, the trial, court has authority to declare respondent
in default.
5

Although respondent's counsel filed a motion to postpone pre-trial hearing, the grant or
denial thereof is within the sound discretion of the trial court, which should take into
account two factors in the grant or denial of motions for postponement, namely: (a) the
reason for the postponement and (b) the merits of the case of movant.
6

In the instant case, the trial court found the reason stated in the motion of counsel for
respondent to cancel the pre-trial to be without merit. Counsel's explanation that he had
to go to by boat as early as 25 March 1979 to fetch his wife and accompany her to a
wedding in Dumaguete City on 27 April 1979 where she was one of the principal
sponsors, cannot be accepted. We find it insufficient to justify postponement of the pre-
trial, and the Court of Appeals did not act wisely in overruling the denial. We sustain the
trial court and rule that it did not abuse its discretion in denying the postponement for
lack of merit. Certainly, to warrant a postponement of a mandatory process as pre-trial
would require much more than mere attendance in a social function. It is time indeed we
emphasize that there should be much more than mere perfunctory treatment of the pre-
trial procedure. Its observance must be taken seriously if it is to attain its objective, i.e.,
the speedy and inexpensive disposition of cases.
Moreover, the trial court denied the motion for postponement three (3) days before the
scheduled pre-trial. If indeed, counsel for respondent could not attend the pre-trial on
the scheduled date, respondent at least should have personally appeared in order not to
be declared as in default. But, since nobody appeared for him, the order of the trial court
declaring him as in default and directing the presentation of petitioner's evidence ex
parte was proper.
7

With regard to the merits of the judgment of the trial court by default, which respondent
appellate court did not touch upon in resolving the appeal, the Court holds that on the
basis of the pleadings of the parties and the evidence presented ex parte, petitioner and
respondents are co-owners of subject house and lot in equal shares; either one of them
may demand the sale of the house and lot at any time and the other cannot object to such
demand; thereafter the proceeds of the sale shall be divided equally according to their
respective interests.
Private respondent and his family refuse to pay monthly rentals to petitioner from the
time their father died in 1975 and to vacate the house so that it can be sold to third
persons. Petitioner alleges that respondent's continued stay in the property hinders its
disposal to the prejudice of petitioner. On the part of petitioner, he claims that he should
be paid two-thirds (2/3) of a monthly rental of P2,400.00 or the sum of P1,600.00.
In resolving the dispute, the trial court ordered respondent to vacate the property so that
it could be sold to third persons and the proceeds divided between them equally, and for
respondent to pay petitioner one-half (1/2) of P2,400.00 or the sum of P1,200.00 as
monthly rental, conformably with their stipulated sharing reflected in their written
agreement.
We uphold the trial court in ruling in favor of petitioner, except as to the effectivity of the
payment of monthly rentals by respondent as co-owner which we here declare to
commence only after the trial court ordered respondent to vacate in accordance with its
order of 26 July 1979.
Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the
co-ownership, and that each co-owner may demand at any time partition of the thing
owned in common insofar as his share is concerned. Corollary to this rule, Art. 498 of the
Code states that whenever the thing is essentially, indivisible and the co-owners cannot
agree that it be, allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold
and its proceeds accordingly distributed. This is resorted to (1) when the right to
partition the property is invoked by any of the co-owners but because of the nature of
the property it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would prejudice the interests of
the co-owners, and (b) the co-owners are not in agreement as to who among them shall
be allotted or assigned the entire property upon proper reimbursement of the co-
owners. In one case,
8
this Court upheld the order of the trial court directing the holding
of a public sale of the properties owned in common pursuant to Art. 498 of the Civil
Code.
However, being a co-owner respondent has the right to use the house and lot without
paying any compensation to petitioner, as he may use the property owned in common
long as it is in accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in a manner not
injurious to the interest of the other co-owners.
9
Each co-owner of property held pro
indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and may use and enjoy the same
with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his co-owners, the
reason being that until a division is made, the respective share of each cannot be
determined and every co-owner exercises, together with his co-participants joint
ownership over the pro indivisoproperty, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the
same.
10

Since petitioner has decided to enforce his right in court to end the co-ownership of the
house and lot and respondent has not refuted the allegation that he has been preventing
the sale of the property by his continued occupancy of the premises, justice and equity
demand that respondent and his family vacate the property so that the sale can be
effected immediately. In fairness to petitioner, respondent should pay a rental of
P1,200.00 per month, with legal interest; from the time the trial court ordered him to
vacate, for the use and enjoyment of the other half of the property appertaining to
petitioner.
When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the property and the trial court
granted the petition and ordered the ejectment of respondent, the co-ownership was
deemed terminated and the right to enjoy the possession jointly also ceased. Thereafter,
the continued stay of respondent and his family in the house prejudiced the interest of
petitioner as the property should have been sold and the proceeds divided equally
between them. To this extent and from then on, respondent should be held liable for
monthly rentals until he and his family vacate.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 16 October 1986 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the trial court in
Civil Case No. 69.12-P dated 16 July 1979 is REINSTATED, with the modification that
respondent Senen B. Aguilar is ordered to vacate the premises in question within ninety
(90) days from receipt of this and to pay petitioner Virgilio B. Aguilar a monthly rental of
P1,200.00 with interest at the legal rate from the time he received the decision of the
trial court directing him to vacate until he effectively leaves the premises.
The trial court is further directed to take immediate steps to implement this decision
conformably with Art. 498 of the Civil Code and the Rules of Court. This decision is final
and executory.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Davide, Jr., Quiason, JJ., concur.
Synopsis/Syllabi
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124262. October 12, 1999]
TOMAS CLAUDIO MEMORIAL COLLEGE, INC., petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. ALEJANDRO S. MARQUEZ, CRISANTA DE CASTRO, ELPIDIA DE
CASTRO, EFRINA DE CASTRO, IRENEO DE CASTRO and ARTEMIO DE
CASTRO ADRIANO, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court
Appeals dated August 14, 1995, in CA-G.R. SP No. 36349, and its Resolution dated March
15, 1996, which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
On December 13, 1993, private respondents filed an action for Partition before the
Regional Trial Court of Morong, Rizal. They alleged that their predecessor-in-interest,
Juan De Castro, died intestate in 1993 and they are his only surviving and legitimate
heirs. They also alleged that their father owned a parcel of land designated as Lot No.
3010 located at Barrio San Juan, Morong, Rizal, with an area of two thousand two
hundred sixty nine (2,269) square meters more or less. They further claim that in 1979,
without their knowledge and consent, said lot was sold by their brother Mariano to
petitioner. The sale was made possible when Mariano represented himself as the sole
heir to the property. It is the contention of private respondents that the sale made by
Mariano affected only his undivided share to the lot in question but not the shares of the
other co-owners equivalent to four fifths (4/5) of the property.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss contending, as its special defense, lack of
jurisdiction and prescription and/or laches. The trial court, after hearing the motion,
dismissed the complaint in an Order dated August 18, 1984. On motion for
reconsideration, the trial court, in an Order dated October 4, 1994, reconsidered the
dismissal of the complaint and set aside its previous order. Petitioner filed its own
motion for reconsideration but it was denied in an Order dated January 5, 1995.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action
for certiorari anchored on the following grounds: a) the RTC has no jurisdiction to try
and take cognizance of the case as the causes of actions have been decided with finality
by the Supreme Court, and b) the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion and authority
in taking cognizance of the case.
After the parties filed their respective pleadings, the Court of Appeals, finding no
grave abuse of discretion committed by the lower court, dismissed the petition in a
Decision dated August 14, 1995. Petitioner filed a timely motion for reconsideration but
it was denied in a Resolution dated March 15, 1996. Hence this petition.
Petitioner submits the following grounds to support the granting of the writ
of certiorari in the present case:
FIRST GROUND
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (BR. 79) HAD NO
JURISDICTION TO TRY SUBJECT CASE (SP. PROC. NO. 118-M). THE CAUSES OF
ACTION HEREIN HAVE BEEN FINALLY DECIDED BY THE HON. COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF RIZAL (BR. 31) MAKATI, METRO MANILA, AND SUSTAINED IN A
FINAL DECISION BY THE HON. SUPREME COURT.
SECOND GROUND
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND
AUTHORITY WHEN IT SUSTAINED THE ORDERS OF THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT (BR. 79) DATED OCTOBER 4, 1994, AND THE ORDER DATED JANUARY 5,
1995, WHEN SAID RTC (BR. 79) INSISTED IN TRYING THIS CASE AGAINST TCMC
WHEN IT HAS RULED ALREADY IN A FINAL ORDER THAT PETITIONER IS NOT A
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST BY THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (BR. 79) IN
CIVIL CASE NO. 170, ENTITLED ELPIDIA A. DE CASTRO, ET. AL. vs. TOMAS CLAUDIO
MEMORIAL COLLEGE, ET. AL., WHICH CASE INVOLVED THE SAME RELIEF, SAME
SUBJECT MATTER AND THE SAME PARTIES.
THIRD GROUND
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND
AUTHORITY WHEN IT CAPRICIOUSLY AND WHIMSICALLY DISREGARDED THE
EXISTENCE OF RES JUDICATA IN THIS CASE.
The pivotal issues to be resolved in this case are: whether or not the Regional Trial
Court and/or the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the case, and if so, whether or
not the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the decision of
the Regional Trial Court.
In assailing the Orders of the appellate court, petitioner invokes Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court as its mode in obtaining a reversal of the assailed Decision and
Resolution. Before we dwell on the merits of this petition, it is worth noting, that for a
petition for certiorari to be granted, it must be shown that the respondent court
committed grave abuse of discretion equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction and not
mere errors of judgment, forcertiorari is not a remedy for errors of judgment, which are
correctible by appeal.
[1]
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and mere abuse of
discretion is not enough -- it must be grave.
[2]

In the case at hand, there is no showing of grave abuse of discretion committed by
the public respondent. As correctly pointed out by the trial court, when it took
cognizance of the action for partition filed by the private respondents, it acquired
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.
[3]
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a
case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations of the complaint
irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted
therein.
[4]
Acquiring jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case does not necessarily
mean that the lower court meant to reverse the decision of the Supreme Court in the land
registration case mentioned by the petitioner.
Moreover, settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint, hence the courts jurisdiction
cannot be made to depend upon defenses set up in the answer or in a motion to
dismiss.
[5]
This has to be so, for were the principle otherwise, the ends of justice would
be frustrated by making the sufficiency of this kind of action dependent upon the
defendant in all cases.
Worth stressing, as long as a court acts within its jurisdiction any alleged errors
committed in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than errors of judgment
which are revisable by timely appeal and not by a special civil action
of certiorari.
[6]
Based on the foregoing, even assuming for the sake of argument that the
appellate court erred in affirming the decision of the trial court, which earlier denied
petitioners motion to dismiss, such actuation on the part of the appellate court cannot
be considered as grave abuse of discretion, hence not correctible by certiorari, because
certiorari is not available to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in the judges
findings and conclusions.
In addition, it is now too late for petitioner to question the jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeals. It was petitioner who elevated the instant controversy to the Court of
Appeals via a petition for certiorari. In effect, petitioner submitted itself to the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals by seeking affirmative relief therefrom. If a party
invokes the jurisdiction of a court, he cannot thereafter challenge that courts jurisdiction
in the same case.
[7]
To do otherwise would amount to speculating on the fortune of
litigation, which is against the policy of the Court.
On the issue of prescription, we have ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole
property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-
owners who did not consent to the sale.
[8]
Under Article 493 of the Civil Code, the sale or
other disposition affects only the sellers share pro indiviso, and the transferee gets only
what corresponds to his grantors share in the partition of the property owned in
common. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire
property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and
void. However, only the rights of the co-owner/seller are transferred, thereby making
the buyer a co-owner of the property. The proper action in a case like this, is not for the
nullification of the sale, or for the recovery of possession of the property owned in
common from the third person, but for division or partition of the entire property if it
continued to remain in the possession of the co-owners who possessed and administered
it.
[9]
Such partition should result in segregating the portion belonging to the seller and its
delivery to the buyer.
In the light of the foregoing, petitioners defense of prescription against an action
for partition is a vain proposition. Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil Code, no co-
owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Such co-owner may demand at
anytime the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.
In Budlong vs. Bondoc,
[10]
this Court has interpreted said provision of law to mean that
the action for partition is imprescriptible. It cannot be barred by prescription. For
Article 494 of the Civil Code explicitly declares: No prescription shall lie in favor of a co-
owner or co-heirs as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Mendoza (Acting Chairman), and Buena, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J. (Chairman), on official leave.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-49731 September 29, 1988
ALFREDO SERING, petitioner,
vs.
RESTITUTO PLAZO and GERTRUDES SUAN, respondents.
Manuel Tesiorna and Noel P. Catre for petitioner.
Timoteo R. Quimpo, Jr. for respondents.

NARVASA, J.:
The application of settled principles is all that is needed to resolve the instant appeal.
Article 487 of the Civil Code provides that anyone of the co-owners of an immovable may
bring an action in ejectment. A co-owner may thus bring an ejectment action without
joining the other co-owners, the suit being deemed instituted for the benefit of all.
1
And
the term, "action in ejectment," includes a suit of forcible entry (detentacion) or unlawful
detainer (desahucio).
2

The proceeding at bar had its inception in a forcible entry suit filed by petitioner Sering
against respondent Spouses Restituto Plazo and Gertrudes Suan with the then Municipal
Court of del Carmen, Surigao del Norte.
3
The case resulted in a judgment against the
Plazos who thereupon appealed to the Court of First Instance of Surigao del Norte. In the
latter court the Plazos learned that the property subject of the suit was not owned solely
by Sering but was owned in common by him and others. This prompted the Plazos to
move for the impleading of the other co-owners as parties plaintiff, on the theory that
they were indispensable parties.
4
The Court agreed and ordered Sering to amend his
complaint so as to include his co-owners as co-plaintiffs. Sering demurred claiming that
under the law anyone of the co-owners could bring suit for ejectment without joining the
others.
5
The Plazos contended, on the other hand, that the provision invoked by Sering
had no application to forcible entry actions, but only to suits of unlawful detainer.
Because Sering failed to comply with the Courts order for amendment of the complaint,
the Trial Court dismissed his complaint.
6
It also thereafter denied his motion for
reconsidereration
7
Sering has come to this Court praying for the nullification and
reversal of said order of dismissal and that denying his plea for reconsideration.
The orders complained of are indeed tainted by serious error and should therefore be
reversed and set aside, upon the considerations set out in the opening paragraph of this
resolution. The same issues had been raised and resolved as early as eight (8) years
before promulgation of the contested orders. In Vencilao v. Camarento,decided in
1969,
8
this Court pertinently ruled as follows:
9

2. Anent the question of whether an action of forcible entry and
detainer should be brought in the name of all co-owners, We hold that
under Article 487 of the new Civil Code, any of the co-owners may
bring the action ... . In forcible entry and detainer action(s) the matter
to be determined is simply the question of prior physical possession.
It having been alleged in the complaint that the plaintiff was in actual
possession of the properties, certainly the plaintiff alone, who was in
actual possession, could file the complaint.
The Court has been cited to no reason of substance for modifying or overruling this
doctrine.
WHEREFORE, the challenged Orders dismissing the petitioner's complaint for ejectment
and denying reconsideration of the dismissal decree
10
are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE,
and the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court for resolution, with all deliberate
dispatch, of the respondents' appeal from the judgment of the inferior court. This
Resolution is immediately executory.
Cruz, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION


ARNELITO ADLAWAN, G.R. No. 161916
Petitioner,
Present:

Panganiban, C.J.
(Chairman),
- versus - Ynares-Santiago,
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
EMETERIO M. ADLAWAN and
NARCISA M. ADLAWAN, Promulgated:
Respondents.
January 20, 2006

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION


YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:


Assailed in this petition for review is the September 23, 2003 Decision
[1]
of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74921 which set aside the September 13, 2002
Decision
[2]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 7, in Civil Case No. CEB-
27806, and reinstated the February 12, 2002 Judgment
[3]
of the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Minglanilla, Metro Cebu, in Civil Case No. 392, dismissing petitioner Arnelito
Adlawans unlawful detainer suit against respondents Emeterio and Narcisa Adlawan.
Likewise questioned is the January 8, 2004 Resolution
[4]
of the Court of Appeals which
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The instant ejectment suit stemmed from the parties dispute over Lot 7226 and the
house built thereon, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 8842,
[5]
registered in the
name of the late Dominador Adlawan and located at Barrio Lipata, Municipality of
Minglanilla, Cebu. In his complaint, petitioner claimed that he is an acknowledged
illegitimate child
[6]
of Dominador who died on May 28, 1987 without any other issue.
Claiming to be the sole heir of Dominador, he executed an affidavit adjudicating to
himself Lot 7226 and the house built thereon.
[7]
Out of respect and generosity to
respondents who are the siblings of his father, he granted their plea to occupy the
subject property provided they would vacate the same should his need for the property
arise. Sometime in January 1999, he verbally requested respondents to vacate the house
and lot, but they refused and filed instead an action for quieting of title
[8]
with the RTC.
Finally, upon respondents refusal to heed the last demand letter to vacate dated August
2, 2000, petitioner filed the instant case on August 9, 2000.
[9]


On the other hand, respondents Narcisa and Emeterio, 70 and 59 years of age,
respectively,
[10]
denied that they begged petitioner to allow them to stay on the
questioned property and stressed that they have been occupying Lot 7226 and the house
standing thereon since birth. They alleged that Lot 7226 was originally registered in the
name of their deceased father, Ramon Adlawan
[11]
and the ancestral house standing
thereon was owned by Ramon and their mother, Oligia Maacap Adlawan. The spouses
had nine
[12]
children including the late Dominador and herein surviving respondents
Emeterio and Narcisa. During the lifetime of their parents and deceased siblings, all of
them lived on the said property. Dominador and his wife, Graciana Ramas Adlawan, who
died without issue, also occupied the same.
[13]
Petitioner, on the other hand, is a stranger
who never had possession of Lot 7226.

Sometime in 1961, spouses Ramon and Oligia needed money to finance the
renovation of their house. Since they were not qualified to obtain a loan, they
transferred ownership of Lot 7226 in the name of their son Dominador who was the only
one in the family who had a college education. By virtue of a January 31, 1962 simulated
deed of sale,
[14]
a title was issued to Dominador which enabled him to secure a loan with
Lot 7226 as collateral. Notwithstanding the execution of the simulated deed, Dominador,
then single, never disputed his parents ownership of the lot. He and his wife, Graciana,
did not disturb respondents possession of the property until they died on May 28, 1987
and May 6, 1997, respectively.

Respondents also contended that Dominadors signature at the back of petitioners
birth certificate was forged, hence, the latter is not an heir of Dominador and has no right
to claim ownership of Lot 7226.
[15]
They argued that even if petitioner is indeed
Dominadors acknowledged illegitimate son, his right to succeed is doubtful because
Dominador was survived by his wife, Graciana.
[16]


On February 12, 2002, the MTC dismissed the complaint holding that the
establishment of petitioners filiation and the settlement of the estate of Dominador are
conditions precedent to the accrual of petitioners action for ejectment. It added that
since Dominador was survived by his wife, Graciana, who died 10 years thereafter, her
legal heirs are also entitled to their share in Lot 7226. The dispositive portion thereof,
reads:

In View of the foregoing, for failure to prove by preponderance
of evidence, the plaintiffs cause of action, the above-entitled case is
hereby Ordered DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
[17]


On appeal by petitioner, the RTC reversed the decision of the MTC holding that
the title of Dominador over Lot 7226 cannot be collaterally attacked. It thus ordered
respondents to turn over possession of the controverted lot to petitioner and to pay
compensation for the use and occupation of the premises. The decretal portion thereof,
provides:

Wherefore, the Judgment, dated February 12, 2002, of the
Municipal Trial Court of Minglanilla, Cebu, in Civil Case No. 392, is
reversed. Defendants-appellees are directed to restore to plaintiff-
appellant possession of Lot 7226 and the house thereon, and to pay
plaintiff-appellant, beginning in August 2000, compensation for their
use and occupation of the property in the amount of P500.00 a month.

So ordered.
[18]


Meanwhile, the RTC granted petitioners motion for execution pending
appeal
[19]
which was opposed by the alleged nephew and nieces of Graciana in their
motion for leave to intervene and to file an answer in intervention.
[20]
They contended
that as heirs of Graciana, they have a share in Lot 7226 and that intervention is necessary
to protect their right over the property. In addition, they declared that as co-owners of
the property, they are allowing respondents to stay in Lot 7226 until a formal partition of
the property is made.

The RTC denied the motion for leave to intervene.
[21]
It, however, recalled the
order granting the execution pending appeal having lost jurisdiction over the case in
view of the petition filed by respondents with the Court of Appeals.
[22]


On September 23, 2003, the Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the RTC
and reinstated the judgment of the MTC. It ratiocinated that petitioner and the heirs of
Graciana are co-owners of Lot 7226. As such, petitioner cannot eject respondents from
the property via an unlawful detainer suit filed in his own name and as the sole owner of
the property. Thus

WHEEFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision
dated September 13, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 7, in Civil Case No. CEB-27806 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
and the Judgment dated February 12, 2002 of the Municipal Trial
Court of Minglanilla, Metro Cebu, in Civil Case No. 392 is
REINSTATED. Costs against the respondent.

SO ORDERED.
[23]


Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the instant
petition.

The decisive issue to be resolved is whether or not petitioner can validly
maintain the instant case for ejectment.

Petitioner averred that he is an acknowledged illegitimate son and the sole heir
of Dominador. He in fact executed an affidavit adjudicating to himself the controverted
property. In ruling for the petitioner, the RTC held that the questioned January 31, 1962
deed of sale validly transferred title to Dominador and that petitioner is his
acknowledged illegitimate son who inherited ownership of the questioned lot. The Court
notes, however, that the RTC lost sight of the fact that the theory of succession invoked
by petitioner would end up proving that he is not the sole owner of Lot 7226. This is so
because Dominador was survived not only by petitioner but also by his legal wife,
Graciana, who died 10 years after the demise of Dominador on May 28, 1987.
[24]
By
intestate succession, Graciana and petitioner became co-owners of Lot 7226.
[25]
The
death of Graciana on May 6, 1997, did not make petitioner the absolute owner of Lot
7226 because the share of Graciana passed to her relatives by consanguinity and not to
petitioner with whom she had no blood relations. The Court of Appeals thus correctly
held that petitioner has no authority to institute the instant action as the sole owner of
Lot 7226.

Petitioner contends that even granting that he has co-owners over Lot 7226, he
can on his own file the instant case pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code which
provides:

ART. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in
ejectment.

This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession. Article
487 includes forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of
possession (accion publiciana), and recovery of ownership (accion de reivindicacion).
[26]

A co-owner may bring such an action without the necessity of joining all the other co-
owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is presumed to have been filed to benefit his co-
owners. It should be stressed, however, that where the suit is for the benefit of the
plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the possession of the
litigated property, the action should be dismissed.
[27]


The renowned civilist, Professor Arturo M. Tolentino, explained

A co-owner may bring such an action, without the necessity of joining
all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to
be instituted for the benefit of all. If the action is for the benefit of
the plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for himself and
not for the co-ownership, the action will not prosper. (Emphasis
added)
[28]


In Baloloy v. Hular,
[29]
respondent filed a complaint for quieting of title claiming
exclusive ownership of the property, but the evidence showed that respondent has co-
owners over the property. In dismissing the complaint for want of respondents
authority to file the case, the Court held that

Under Article 487 of the New Civil Code, any of the co-
owners may bring an action in ejectment. This article covers all kinds
of actions for the recovery of possession, including an accion
publiciana and a reinvidicatory action. A co-owner may bring such an
action without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-
plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of
all. Any judgment of the court in favor of the co-owner will benefit the
others but if such judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the
rights of the unimpleaded co-owners. If the action is for the benefit of
the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the
possession thereof, the action will not prosper unless he impleads the
other co-owners who are indispensable parties.

In this case, the respondent alone filed the complaint,
claiming sole ownership over the subject property and praying that he
be declared the sole owner thereof. There is no proof that the other
co-owners had waived their rights over the subject property or
conveyed the same to the respondent or such co-owners were aware
of the case in the trial court. The trial court rendered judgment
declaring the respondent as the sole owner of the property and
entitled to its possession, to the prejudice of the latters siblings.
Patently then, the decision of the trial court is erroneous.

Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the respondent
was mandated to implead his siblings, being co-owners of the
property, as parties. The respondent failed to comply with the rule. It
must, likewise, be stressed that the Republic of the Philippines is also
an indispensable party as defendant because the respondent sought
the nullification of OCT No. P-16540 which was issued based on Free
Patent No. 384019. Unless the State is impleaded as party-defendant,
any decision of the Court would not be binding on it. It has been held
that the absence of an indispensable party in a case renders
ineffective all the proceedings subsequent to the filing of the
complaint including the judgment. The absence of the respondents
siblings, as parties, rendered all proceedings subsequent to the filing
thereof, including the judgment of the court, ineffective for want of
authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those
present.
[30]


In the instant case, it is not disputed that petitioner brought the suit for
unlawful detainer in his name alone and for his own benefit to the exclusion of the heirs
of Graciana as he even executed an affidavit of self- adjudication over the disputed
property. It is clear therefore that petitioner cannot validly maintain the instant action
considering that he does not recognize the co-ownership that necessarily flows from his
theory of succession to the property of his father, Dominador.

In the same vein, there is no merit in petitioners claim that he has the legal
personality to file the present unlawful detainer suit because the ejectment of
respondents would benefit not only him but also his alleged co-owners. However,
petitioner forgets that he filed the instant case to acquire possession of the property and
to recover damages. If granted, he alone will gain possession of the lot and benefit from
the proceeds of the award of damages to the exclusion of the heirs of Graciana. Hence,
petitioner cannot successfully capitalize on the alleged benefit to his co-owners.
Incidentally, it should be pointed out that in default of the said heirs of Graciana, whom
petitioner labeled as fictitious heirs, the State will inherit her share
[31]
and will thus be
petitioners co-owner entitled to possession and enjoyment of the property.

The present controversy should be differentiated from the cases where the
Court upheld the right of a co-owner to file a suit pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil
Code. InResuena v. Court of Appeals,
[32]
and Sering v. Plazo,
[33]
the co-owners who filed
the ejectment case did not represent themselves as the exclusive owner of the property.
InCelino v. Heirs of Alejo and Teresa Santiago,
[34]
the complaint for quieting of title was
brought in behalf of the co-owners precisely to recover lots owned in common.
[35]

Similarly in Vencilao v. Camarenta,
[36]
the amended complaint specified that the plaintiff
is one of the heirs who co-owns the controverted properties.

In the foregoing cases, the plaintiff never disputed the existence of a co-
ownership nor claimed to be the sole or exclusive owner of the litigated lot. A favorable
decision therein would of course inure to the benefit not only of the plaintiff but to his
co-owners as well. The instant case, however, presents an entirely different backdrop as
petitioner vigorously asserted absolute and sole ownership of the questioned lot. In his
complaint, petitioner made the following allegations, to wit:

3. The plaintiff was the only son (illegitimate) and sole
heir of the late DOMINADOR ADLAWAN who died intestate on 28 May
1987 without any other descendant nor ascendant x x x.

x x x x

5. Being the only child/descendant and, therefore, sole
heir of the deceased Dominador Adlawan, the plaintiff became the
absolute owner, and automatically took POSSESSION, of the
aforementioned house and lot x x x. (Emphasis added)
[37]


Clearly, the said cases find no application here because petitioners action
operates as a complete repudiation of the existence of co-ownership and not in
representation or recognition thereof. Dismissal of the complaint is therefore proper. As
noted by Former Supreme Court Associate Justice Edgrado L. Paras [i]t is understood, of
course, that the action [under Article 487 of the Civil Code] is being instituted for all.
Hence, if the co-owner expressly states that he is bringing the case only for himself, the
action should not be allowed to prosper.
[38]


Indeed, respondents not less than four decade actual physical possession of the
questioned ancestral house and lot deserves to be respected especially so that petitioner
failed to show that he has the requisite personality and authority as co-owner to file the
instant case. Justice dictates that respondents who are now in the twilight years of their
life be granted possession of their ancestral property where their parents and siblings
lived during their lifetime, and where they, will probably spend the remaining days of
their life.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 23, 2003 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74921 which reinstated the February 12, 2002
Judgment of the Municipal Trial Court of Minglanilla, Metro Cebu, dismissing petitioners
complaint in Civil Case No. 392, and its January 8, 2004 Resolution, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.


SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 121069. February 7, 2003]
BENJAMIN CORONEL AND EMILIA MEKING VDA. DE CORONEL, petitioners,
vs. FLORENTINO CONSTANTINO, AUREA BUENSUCESO, AND THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
This refers to the petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated March 27, 1995, in CA-G.R. CV No. 44023
[1]
which affirmed the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 8, dated April 12, 1993 in Civil Case No. 105-
M-91
[2]
; and the resolution of said appellate court, dated July 4, 1995, denying the motion
for reconsideration of its decision.
The factual background of the case is as follows:
The subject property consists of two parcels of land situated in Sta. Monica,
Hagonoy, Bulacan, designated as Cadastral Lots Nos. 5737 and 5738. The property is
originally owned by Honoria Aguinaldo. One-half (1/2) of it was inherited by Emilia
Meking Vda. de Coronel together with her sons Benjamin, Catalino and Ceferino, all
surnamed Coronel. The other half was inherited by Florentino Constantino and Aurea
Buensuceso.
On February 20, 1991, Constantino and Buensuceso filed a complaint for
declaration of ownership, quieting of title and damages with prayer for writ of
mandatory and/or prohibitory injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan
(Branch 8) against Benjamin, Emilia and John Does, docketed as Civil Case No. 105-M-
91. Plaintiffs allege that: on April 23, 1981, Jess C. Santos and Priscilla Bernardo
purchased the property belonging to Emilia and her sons by virtue of a deed of sale
signed by Emilia; on June 21, 1990, Santos and Bernardo in turn sold the same to
Constantino and Buensuceso by virtue of a compromise agreement in Civil Case No.
8289-M; they are the owners of the subject property and defendants have illegally
started to introduce construction on the premises in question; and pray that defendants
respect, acknowledge and confirm the right of ownership of the plaintiffs to the share,
interest and participation of the one-third (1/3) portion of the above described
property.
After defendants filed their Answer, pre-trial ensued wherein the parties stipulated
that: (1) the property in question was previously owned by Honoria Aguinaldo, one-half
(1/2) of which was inherited by the defendants while the other half was inherited by the
plaintiffs from the same predecessor; (2) it was admitted by counsel for the defendants
that there was a sale between Jess Santos and the plaintiffs covering the subject
property; and (3) that there was no evidence presented in Civil Case No. 8289-M by
either of the parties and that the decision therein was based on a compromise
agreement.
[3]

After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the plaintiffs,
the decretal portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby made in favor of plaintiffs, the Court hereby declares
plaintiffs as the sole and absolute owners of the properties covered by Tax Declarations
Nos. 28960 and 28961 of Hagonoy, Bulacan, and orders the defendants to respect,
acknowledge and confirm the right of ownership of plaintiffs over the whole property
described above, to remove whatever improvements introduced by them thereon, and to
pay the plaintiffs, solidarily and severally P10,000.00 as attorneys fees and costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
[4]

On appeal brought by defendants, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
lower court and denied defendants motion for reconsideration.
Hence, herein petition brought by defendants, raising the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE CONTRACT [OF] SALE EXECUTED BY A PARENT-CO-
OWNER, IN HER OWN BEHALF, IS UNENFORCEABLE WITH RESPECT TO
THE SHARES OF HER CO-HEIRS-CHILDREN;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE MINOR CHILDREN CAN RATIFY UNAUTHORIZED
ACTIONS OF THEIR PARENTS;
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE CO-HEIRS ARE INDISPENSABLE DEFENDANTS IN
AN ACTION FOR DECLARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND QUIETING OF
TITLE;
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT THE DEED OF SALE WHICH IS A PRIVATE DOCUMENT
WAS SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED WHEN THE COUNSEL FOR THE
DEFENDANTS-PETITIONERS ADMITTED ONLY ITS EXISTENCE BUT NOT
ITS CONTENTS.
[5]

The third issue was raised by the petitioners for the first time with the Court of
Appeals. They claim that the complaint should have been dismissed because private
respondents failed to implead the heirs of Ceferino and Catalino who died in 1983 and
1990,
[6]
respectively, in their complaint as indispensable parties. We do not agree.
A careful reading of the Kasulatan ng Bilihang Patuluyan which is a private
document, not having been duly notarized, shows that only the share of Emilia in the
subject property was sold because Benjamin did not sign the document and the shares of
Ceferino and Catalino were not subject of the sale. Pertinent portions of the document
read as follows:
KASULATAN NG BILIHANG PATULUYAN
PANIWALAAN NG LAHAT:
Kaming mag-iinang Emilia Micking Vda. Coronel at Benjamin M. Coronel kapwa may
sapat na gulang, Pilipino, naninirahan sa nayon ng Sta. Monica, Hagonoy, Bulacan, sa
kasulatang ito ay malaya naming:
P I N A T U T U N A Y A N
Na, kami ay tunay na nagmamay-ari ng isang lagay na lupang Bakuran na minana namin
sa aming Lolong yumaong Mauricio Coronel, na ang ayos, takal at kalagayan ay ang
sumusunod:
ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 5737
Bakuran sa nayon ng Sta. Monica, Hagonoy, Bulacan na may sukat na 416 Square Meters
ang kabuuan 208 Square Meters Lot A-1 ang kalahati nito na kanilang ipinagbibili.
x x x x x x x x x
Na, dahil at alang-alang sa halagang DALAWAMPUT LIMANG LIBONG PISO (P25,000)
salaping Pilipino, na aming tinanggap sa kasiyahang loob namin, buhat sa mag-asawang
Jess C. Santos at Prescy Bernardo, kapwa may sapat na gulang, Pilipino at naninirahan sa
nayon ng Sta. Monica, Hagonoy, Bulacan, sa bisa ng kasulatang ito, ay aming isinasalin,
inililipat at ipinagbibili ng bilihang patuluyan ang lahat ng aming dapat na makaparte sa
lupang Bakuran Nakasaad sa dakong unahan nito, sa nabanggit na Jess C. Santos at
Prescy Bernardo o sa kanilang tagapagmana at kahalili.
Na, ako namang Jess C. Santos, bilang nakabili, ay kusang loob ding nagsasaysay sa
kasulatang ito na ako ay kasangayon sa lahat ng ditoy nakatala, bagaman ang lupang
naturan ay hindi pa nahahati sa dapat magmana sa yumaong Honoria Aguinaldo.
Na, sa aming kagipitan inari naming ipagbili ang aming karapatan o kaparte na minana
sa yumaong Guillermo Coronel ay napagkasunduan namin mag-iina na ipagbili ang
bakurang ito na siyang makalulunas sa aming pangangailangan x x x.
Na, kaming nagbili ang magtatanggol ng katibayan sa pagmamayari sa lupang naturan,
sakaling may manghihimasok.
SA KATUNAYAN NITO, kami ay lumagda sa kasulatang ito sa bayan ng Malabon, Rizal
ngayong ika-23 ng Abril, 1981.
(Signed) (Signed)
EMILIA MICKING Vda. CORONEL JESS C. SANTOS
Nagbili Nakabili
(Unsigned) (Signed)
BENJAMIN M. CORONEL PRISCILLA BERNARDO
Nagbili Nakabili
[7]

Thus, it is clear, as already stated, that petitioner Benjamin did not sign the
document and that the shares of Catalino and Ceferino in the subject property were not
sold by them.
Since the shares of Catalino and Ceferino were not sold, plaintiffs Constantino and
Buensuceso have no cause of action against them or against any of their heirs. Under
Rule 3, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, indispensable parties are parties in
interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action. In the present
case, the heirs of Catalino and Ceferino are not indispensable parties because a complete
determination of the rights of herein petitioners and respondents can be had even if the
said heirs are not impleaded.
Besides, it is undisputed that petitioners never raised before the trial court the
issue of the private respondents failure to implead said heirs in their complaint. Instead,
petitioners actively participated in the proceedings in the lower court and raised only the
said issue on appeal with the Court of Appeals. It is a settled rule that jurisdictional
questions may be raised at any time unless an exception arises where estoppel has
supervened.
[8]
In the present case, petitioners participation in all stages of the case
during trial, without raising the issue of the trial courts lack of jurisdiction over
indispensable parties, estops them from challenging the validity of the proceedings
therein.
Further, the deed of sale is not a competent proof that petitioner Benjamin had sold
his own share of the subject property. It cannot be disputed that Benjamin did not sign
the document and therefore, it is unenforceable against him.
Emilia executed the instrument in her own behalf and not in representation of her
three children.
Article 493 of the Civil Code states:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved.
But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be
limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination
of the co-ownership.
Consequently, the sale of the subject property made by Emilia in favor of Santos
and Bernardo is limited to the portion which may be allotted to her upon the termination
of her co-ownership over the subject property with her children.
As to the first, second and fourth issues it has been established that at the time of
execution of the Kasulatan ng Bilihang Patuluyan on April 23, 1981
[9]
, the subject
property was co-owned,pro-indiviso, by petitioner Emilia together with her petitioner
son Benjamin, and her two other sons, Catalino and Ceferino. No proof was presented to
show that the co-ownership that existed among the heirs of Ceferino and Catalino and
herein petitioners has ever been terminated.
Applying Articles 1317 and 1403 of the Civil Code, the Court of Appeals ruled that
through their inaction and silence, the three sons of Emilia are considered to have
ratified the aforesaid sale of the subject property by their mother.
Articles 1317 and 1403 (1) of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 1317. No one may contract in the name of another without being authorized by the
latter, or unless he has by law a right to represent him.
A contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority or legal
representation or who has acted beyond his powers shall be unenforceable, unless it is
ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has been executed,
before it is revoked by the other contracting party.
Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been given no
authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers.
x x x x x x x x x
We do not agree with the appellate court. The three sons of Emilia did not ratify
the sale. In Maglucot-Aw vs. Maglucot
[10]
we held that:
Ratification means that one under no disability voluntarily adopts and gives sanction to
some unauthorized act or defective proceeding, which without his sanction would not be
binding on him. It is this voluntary choice, knowingly made, which amounts to a
ratification of what was theretofore unauthorized, and becomes the authorized act of the
party so making the ratification.
No evidence was presented to show that the three brothers were aware of the sale made
by their mother. Unaware of such sale, Catalino, Ceferino and Benjamin could not be
considered as having voluntarily remained silent and knowingly chose not to file an
action for the annulment of the sale. Their alleged silence and inaction may not be
interpreted as an act of ratification on their part.
We also find no concrete evidence to show that Ceferino, Catalino and Benjamin
benefited from the sale. It is true that private respondent Constantino testified that
Benjamin took money from Jess Santos but this is mere allegation on the part of
Constantino. No other evidence was presented to support such allegation. Bare
allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to proof under our Rules of
Court.
[11]
Neither do the records show that Benjamin admitted having received money
from Jess Santos. Even granting that Benjamin indeed received money from Santos,
Constantinos testimony does not show that the amount received was part of the
consideration for the sale of the subject property.
To repeat, the sale is valid insofar as the share of petitioner Emilia Meking Vda. de
Coronel is concerned. The due execution of the Kasulatan ng Bilihang Patuluyan was
duly established when petitioners, through their counsel, admitted during the pre-trial
conference that the said document was signed by Emilia.
[12]
While petitioners claim that
Emilia erroneously signed it under the impression that it was a contract of mortgage and
not of sale, no competent evidence was presented to prove such allegation.
Hence, Jess C. Santos and Priscilla Bernardo, who purchased the share of Emilia,
became co-owners of the subject property together with Benjamin and the heirs of
Ceferino and Catalino. As such, Santos and Bernardo could validly dispose of that portion
of the subject property pertaining to Emilia in favor of herein private respondents
Constantino and Buensuceso.
However, the particular portions properly pertaining to each of the co-owners are
not yet defined and determined as no partition in the proper forum or extrajudicial
settlement among the parties has been effected among the parties. Consequently, the
prayer of respondents for a mandatory or prohibitory injunction lacks merit.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. Plaintiffs-private respondents Florentino Constantino and Aurea Buensuceso are
declared owners of one-half (1/2) undivided portion of the subject property plus the
one-fourth () undivided share of defendant-petitioner Emilia Meking Vda. de Coronel;
and, defendant-petitioner Benjamin Coronel together with the heirs of Catalino Coronel
and the heirs of Ceferino Coronel are declared owners of one-fourth () share each of
the other one-half (1/2) portion of the subject property, without prejudice to the parties
entering into partition of the subject property, judicial or otherwise.
2. The order of removal of the improvements and the award of the amount of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as attorneys fees and costs of suit are DELETED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 121157. July 31, 1997]
HEIRS OF SEGUNDA MANINGDING, represented by DELFIN, GIL, EMMA, MANUEL,
RACQUEL, ESTER, REMEDIOS and JESSIE, all surnamed PARAYNO, MAXIMA
PARAYNO, LEONARDO PARAYNO and FELICISIMA
PARAYNO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ROQUE BAUZON
(deceased), represented by his heirs and co-defendants Luis and Eriberta
Bauzon; LUIS BAUZON, ERIBERTA BAUZON (deceased), substituted by her
husband PLACIDO ZULUETA, and JOSE PARAYNO, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is an action for annulment of documents, accounting and partition of two (2)
parcels of land, a riceland and a sugarland, situated in Calasiao, Pangasinan. Petitioners
claim that they, together with private respondents Luis and Eriberta Bauzon, own the
disputed lots in common and pro-indiviso. Luis and Eriberta, the latter represented by
her husband Placido Zulueta, aver that their father Roque Bauzon was the owner of the
subject lots by virtue of a deed of donation propter nuptias. Roque, together with Juan
Maningding, Maria Maningding and Segunda Maningding were the surviving children of
Ramon Bauzon y Untalan who died intestate in 1948. According to petitioners, Roque
Bauzon repudiated the co-ownership over the sugarland in 1965 and adjudicated it to
himself,
[1]
and that in 1970 Juan and Maria Maningding renounced and quitclaimed their
shares over the riceland in favor of Roque Bauzon by virtue of an Affidavit of Quitclaim
and Renunciation.
[2]
Subsequently, Roque Bauzon transferred the riceland to his son Luis
Bauzon and the sugarland to his daughter Eriberta Bauzon, both transactions being
evidenced by deeds of sale.
On 31 July 1979 Segunda Maningding died. Her heirs allegedly discovered the
transfers made by Roque Bauzon in favor of his children only in 1986. Consequently, the
heirs sought the partition of the properties as well as the accounting of the produce but
were unsuccessful.
On the other hand private respondents aver that the Affidavit of Quitclaim and
Renunciation over the riceland was executed not only by Juan Maningding and Maria
Maningding but also by Segunda Maningding. With regard to the sugarland, Roque
Bauzon denied having executed the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication presented
by petitioners. He claimed that he acquired ownership over both the sugarland and
the riceland by donation propter nuptias from his parents Ramon Bauzon and Sotera
Zulueta on 21 April 1926 in consideration of his marriage to Petra Loresco. Since the
death of Ramon Bauzon in 1948, Roque had been in open, continuous, notorious, adverse
and actual possession of the subject properties.
The trial court found that the parcels of land formed part of the estate of Ramon
Bauzon and his wife Sotera Zulueta which, upon their death, devolved by right of
succession to their children Segunda Maningding, Maria Maningding, Juan Maningding
and Roque Bauzon in equal pro-indiviso shares. The court a quo however awarded both
parcels to Segunda Maningding and Roque Bauzon as co-owners in equal shares after
finding that Juan Maningding and Maria Maningding had already executed an Affidavit of
Quitclaim and Renunciation. It rejected the deed of donation for failure to prove its due
execution and authenticity and ruled that the same was negated by the Affidavit of
Quitclaim and Renunciation of Juan Maningding and Maria Maningding in favor of Roque
Bauzon and nullified the deed of sale by Roque Bauzon in favor of Luis Bauzon as regards
the riceland and to Eriberta Bauzon with respect to the sugarland. It concluded that
Roque Bauzon could not have validly conveyed both parcels as one-half (1/2) of each
parcel rightfully belonged to Segunda Maningding and her heirs.
The Court of Appeals however ruled that the properties validly pertained to Roque
Bauzon by virtue of the donation propter nuptias. Consequently, the transfers made by
Roque Bauzon must be given effect. However, upon motion for reconsideration, the
same deed of donation was declared null and void by the appellate court for failure to
comply with Art. 633 of the old Civil Code, the law then applicable, which required for
the validity of the deed of donation to be in a public instrument. Nevertheless, the same
court maintained that the properties belonged to Roque Bauzon by virtue of acquisitive
prescription.
We agree with the Court of Appeals. Roque Bauzon acquired ownership over the
subject properties by acquisitive prescription. Prescription, in general, is a mode of
acquiring (or losing) ownership and other real rights through the lapse of time in the
manner and under conditions laid down by law, namely, that the possession should be in
the concept of an owner, public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse.
[3]
Acquisitive
prescription is either ordinary or extraordinary.
[4]

Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith and with just
title for ten (10) years. In extraordinary prescription ownership and other real rights
over immovable property are acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession
thereof for thirty (30) years, without need of title or of good faith.
[5]

The disputed lots are unregistered lands, both parcels being covered only by tax
declarations formerly in the name of Ramon Bauzon and now transferred to Luis and
Eriberta Bauzon. While tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, yet, when coupled with proof of actual possession, as in the instant case, tax
declarations and receipts are strong evidence of ownership.
[6]

Even assuming that the donation proper nuptias is void for failure to comply with
formal requisites,
[7]
it could still constitute a legal basis for adverse possession. With
clear and convincing evidence of possession, a private document of donation may serve
as basis for a claim of ownership.
[8]
In Pensader v. Pensader
[9]
we ruled that while the
verbal donation under which the defendant and his predecessors-in-interest have been
in possession of the lands in question is not effective as a transfer of title, still it is a
circumstance which may explain the adverse and exclusive character of the
possession. In Espique v. Espique
[10]
we held -
There is no question that the donation in question is invalid because it involves an
immovable property and the donation was not made in a public document as required by
Article 633 of the old Civil Code, in connection with Article 1328 of the same Code
(concerning gifts propter nuptias), but it does not follow that said donation may not
serve as basis of acquisitive prescription when on the strength thereof the done has
taken possession of the property adversely and in the concept of owner, or, as this Court
well said: While the verbal donation, under which the defendants and his predecessors-
in-interest have been in possession of the lands in question, is not effective as a transfer
of title, yet it is a circumstance which may explain the adverse and exclusive character of
the possession (Pensader v. Pensader, 47 Phil. 673, 680). This is also an action for
partition. It was shown that the donation of the property was made not even in a private
document but only verbally. It was also shown that the defendants, through their
predecessors-in-interest, were in adverse and continuous possession of the lands for a
period of over 30 years. Yet, the court decided the case in favor of defendants on the
ground of acquisitive prescription. There is a close parallelism between the facts of this
case and the present.
x x x x
We do not need to stretch our mind to see that under such allegations plaintiffs intended
to convey the idea that defendant has possessed the lands openly, adversely and without
interruption from 1916 to 1949 for he is the one who has possessed and reaped the
whole benefit thereof. As to the character of the possession held by defendant during
that period one cannot also deny that it is in the concept of owner considering that the
lands were donated to him by his predecessors-in-interest on the occasion of his
marriage even if the same was not embodied in a public instrument. The essential
elements constituting acquisitive prescription are therefore present which negative the
right of plaintiffs to ask for partition of said properties. On this point we find pertinent
the following observation of the trial court: Any person who claims right of ownership
over immovable properties and does not invoke that right but instead tolerated others in
possession for thirty years is guilty of laches and negligence and he must suffer the
consequence of his acts.
In the instant case, Roque Bauzon possessed the subject parcels of land in the
concept of owner by virtue of the donation propter nuptias. The possession was public as
it was Roque Bauzon who personally tilled and cultivated the lots. The acts of reaping
the benefits of ownership were manifest and visible to all. These acts were made more
pronounced and public considering that the parcels of land are located in a municipality
wherein ownership and possession are particularly and normally known to the
community. Roque peacefully possessed the properties as he was never ousted
therefrom nor prevented from enjoying their fruits. His possession was uninterrupted
and in good faith because of his well-founded belief that the donationpropter nuptias was
properly executed and the grantors were legally allowed to convey their respective
shares in his favor. He likewise appropriated to himself the whole produce of the parcels
of land to the exclusion of all others.
The donation propter nuptias was effected as early as 21 April 1926. It was only in
1986 when the heirs of Segunda Maningding demanded partition of the properties and
conveyance of the produce. Sixty (60) years have already elapsed. Even granting that
Roque Bauzon possessed the properties only upon the death of his father in 1948, more
than thirty (30) years have already passed. In either case, acquisitive prescription has
already set in in favor of Roque Bauzon.
Again, even if we assume the absence of good faith and just title, the ownership of
the two (2) parcels would still appertain to Roque Bauzon. As testified to by Delfin
Parayno, one of petitioners, Roque Bauzon and his heirs had been in continuous, adverse
and public possession of the property since 1948 up to 1986, or a period of thirty-six
(36) years, which is more than the required thirty-year extraordinary prescription.
Prescription, as a rule, does not run in favor of a co-heir or co-owner as long as he
expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
[11]
Co-owners cannot acquire by
prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent a clear repudiation of the co-
ownership. In order that title may prescribe in favor of one of the co-owners, it must be
clearly shown that he has repudiated the claims of the others, and that they were
apprised of his claim of adverse and exclusive ownership, before the prescriptive period
would begin to run. Mere refusal to accede to a partition, without specifying the grounds
for such refusal, cannot be considered as notice to the other co-owners of the occupants
claim of title in himself in repudiation of the co-ownership. The evidence relative to the
possession, as a fact upon which the alleged prescription is based, must be clear,
complete and conclusive in order to establish said prescription without any shadow of
doubt; and when upon trial it is not shown that the possession of the claimant has been
adverse and exclusive and opposed to the rights of the others, the case is not one of
ownership, and partition will lie.
[12]

Therefore while prescription among co-owners cannot take place when the acts of
ownership exercised are vague and uncertain, such prescription arises and produces all
its effects when the acts of ownership do not evince any doubt as to the ouster of the
rights of the other co-owners.
[13]
As disclosed by the records, Roque Bauzon and his heirs
possessed the property from 1948 to 1986 to the exclusion of petitioners who were
never given their shares of the fruits of the properties, for which reason they demanded
an accounting of the produce and the conveyance to them of their shares. Unfortunately
they slept on their rights and allowed almost thirty-six (36) years to lapse before
attempting to assert their right. Perforce, they must suffer the consequence of their
inaction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Resolution of the Court of Appeals of 7
July 1995 which modified its Decision of 29 November 1994 and holding that the
deceased Roque Bauzon acquired the disputed two (2) parcels of land by acquisitive
prescription is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, (Chairman), Vitug, Kapunan, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-57062 January 24, 1992
MARIA DEL ROSARIO MARIATEGUI, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JACINTO MARIATEGUI, JULIAN MARIATEGUI and
PAULINA MARIATEGUI,respondents.
Montesa, Albon & Associates for petitioners.
Parmenio B. Patacsil, Patacsil Twins Law Office for the heirs of the late Maria del Rosario
Mariategui.
Tinga, Fuentes & Tagle Firm for private respondents.

BIDIN, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of the Court of Appeals dated
December 24, 1980 in CA-G.R. No. 61841, entitled "Jacinto Mariategui, et al. v. Maria del
Rosario Mariategui, et al.," reversing the judgment of the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch VIII ** at Pasig, Metro Manila.
The undisputed facts are as follows:
Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 (Brief for respondents, Rollo, pp.
116; 8). During his lifetime, Lupo Mariategui contracted three (3) marriages. With his
first wife, Eusebia Montellano, who died on November 8, 1904, he begot four (4)
children, namely: Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbana and Ireneo. Baldomera died and
was survived by her children named Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia
and Federico, all surnamed Espina. Ireneo also died and left a son named Ruperto. With
his second wife, Flaviana Montellano, he begot a daughter named Cresenciana who was
born on May 8, 1910 (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 36).
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco (Lupo's third wife) got married sometime in 1930.
They had three children, namely: Jacinto, born on July 3, 1929, Julian, born on February
16, 1931 and Paulina, born on April 19, 1938. Felipa Velasco Mariategui died in 1941
(Rollo, Ibid).
At the time of his death, Lupo Mariategui left certain properties which he acquired when
he was still unmarried (Brief for respondents, Rollo, pp. 116; 4). These properties are
described in the complaint as Lots Nos. 163, 66, 1346 and 156 of the Muntinglupa Estate
(Rollo, Annex "A", p. 39).
On December 2, 1967, Lupo's descendants by his first and second marriages, namely,
Maria del Rosario, Urbana, Ruperto, Cresencia, all surnamed Mariategui and Antero,
Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina, executed a
deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated unto themselves Lot No. 163 of
the Muntinglupa Estate. Thereafter, Lot No. 163 was the subject of a voluntary
registration proceedings filed by the adjudicatees under Act No. 496, and the land
registration court issued a decree ordering the registration of the lot. Thus, on April 1,
1971, OCT No. 8828 was issued in the name of the above-mentioned heirs. Subsequently,
the registered owners caused the subdivision of the said lot into Lots Nos. 163-A to 163-
H, for which separate transfer certificates of title were issued to the respective parties
(Rollo, ibid).
On April 23, 1973, Lupo's children by his third marriage with Felipa Velasco (Jacinto,
Julian and Paulina) filed with the lower court an amended complaint claiming that Lot
No. 163 together with Lots Nos. 669, 1346 and 154 were owned by their common father,
Lupo Mariategui, and that, with the adjudication of Lot No. 163 to their co-heirs, they
(children of the third marriage) were deprived of their respective shares in the lots.
Plaintiffs pray for partition of the estate of their deceased father and annulment of the
deed of extrajudicial partition dated December 2, 1967 (Petition, Rollo, p. 10). Cresencia
Mariategui Abas, Flaviana Mariategui Cabrera and Isabel Santos were impleaded in the
complaint as unwilling defendants as they would not like to join the suit as plaintiffs
although they acknowledged the status and rights of the plaintiffs and agreed to the
partition of the parcels of land as well as the accounting of their fruits (Ibid., Rollo, p. 8;
Record on Appeal, p. 4).
The defendants (now petitioners) filed an answer with counterclaim (Amended Record
on Appeal, p. 13). Thereafter, they filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of
cause of action and prescription. They specifically contended that the complaint was one
for recognition of natural children. On August 14, 1974, the motion to dismiss was
denied by the trial court, in an order the dispositive portion of which reads:
It is therefore the opinion of the Court that Articles 278 and 285 of the
Civil Code cited by counsel for the defendants are of erroneous
application to this case. The motion to dismiss is therefore denied for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. (Ibid, p. 37).
However, on February 16, 1977, the complaint as well as petitioners' counterclaim were
dismissed by the trial court, in its decision stating thus:
The plaintiffs' right to inherit depends upon the acknowledgment or
recognition of their continuous enjoyment and possession of status of
children of their supposed father. The evidence fails to sustain either
premise, and it is clear that this action cannot be sustained.
(Ibid, Rollo, pp. 67-68)
The plaintiffs elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the trial court
committed an error ". . . in not finding that the parents of the appellants, Lupo Mariategui
and Felipa Velasco (were) lawfully married, and in holding (that) they (appellants) are
not legitimate children of their said parents, thereby divesting them of their inheritance .
. . " (Rollo, pp. 14-15).
On December 24, 1980, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision declaring all the
children and descendants of Lupo Mariategui, including appellants Jacinto, Julian and
Paulina (children of the third marriage) as entitled to equal shares in the estate of Lupo
Mariategui; directing the adjudicatees in the extrajudicial partition of real properties
who eventually acquired transfer certificates of title thereto, to execute deeds of
reconveyance in favor, and for the shares, of Jacinto, Julian and Paulina provided rights of
innocent third persons are not prejudiced otherwise the said adjudicatees shall
reimburse the said heirs the fair market value of their shares; and directing all the
parties to submit to the lower court a project of partition in the net estate of Lupo
Mariategui after payment of taxes, other government charges and outstanding legal
obligations.
The defendants-appellees filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision but it was
denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition which was given due course by the court on
December 7, 1981.
The petitioners submit to the Court the following issues: (a) whether or not prescription
barred private respondents' right to demand the partition of the estate of Lupo
Mariategui, and (b) whether or not the private respondents, who belatedly filed the
action for recognition, were able to prove their successional rights over said estate. The
resolution of these issues hinges, however, on the resolution of the preliminary
matter, i.e., the nature of the complaint filed by the private respondents.
The complaint alleged, among other things, that "plaintiffs are the children of the
deceased spouses Lupo Mariategui . . . and Felipa Velasco"; that "during his lifetime, Lupo
Mariategui had repeatedly acknowledged and confirmed plaintiffs as his children and the
latter, in turn, have continuously enjoyed such status since their birth"; and "on the basis
of their relationship to the deceased Lupo Mariategui and in accordance with the law on
intestate succession, plaintiffs are entitled to inherit shares in the foregoing estate
(Record on Appeal, pp. 5 & 6). It prayed, among others, that plaintiffs be declared as
children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and adjudication in favor of plaintiffs their lawful
shares in the estate of the decedent (Ibid, p. 10).
A perusal of the entire allegations of the complaint, however, shows that the action is
principally one of partition. The allegation with respect to the status of the private
respondents was raised only collaterally to assert their rights in the estate of the
deceased. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly adopted the settled rule that the nature
of an action filed in court is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint constituting
the cause of action (Republic vs. Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282 [1988]).
It has been held that, if the relief demanded is not the proper one which may be granted
under the law, it does not characterize or determine the nature of plaintiffs' action, and
the relief to which plaintiff is entitled based on the facts alleged by him in his complaint,
although it is not the relief demanded, is what determines the nature of the action (1
Moran, p. 127, 1979 ed., citing Baguioro vs. Barrios, et al., 77 Phil. 120).
With respect to the legal basis of private respondents' demand for partition of the estate
of Lupo Mariategui, the Court of Appeals aptly held that the private respondents are
legitimate children of the deceased.
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been lawfully married in or
about 1930. This fact is based on the declaration communicated by Lupo Mariategui to
Jacinto who testified that "when (his) father was still living, he was able to mention to
(him) that he and (his) mother were able to get married before a Justice of the Peace of
Taguig, Rizal." The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known
in the community to be such. Although no marriage certificate was introduced to this
effect, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere
fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all
requisites for its validity are present (People vs. Borromeo, 133 SCRA 106 [1984]).
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between
Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as
husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in
lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and
that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary
habits of life (Section 5 (z), (bb), (cc), Rule 131, Rules of Court; Corpus v. Corpus, 85
SCRA 567 [1978]; Saurnaba v. Workmen's Compensation, 85 SCRA 502 [1978]; Alavado
v. City Gov't. of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]; Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439
[1985]).
Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great favor as it is founded on the
following rationale:
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of
marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but
it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the
public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law
leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in
apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counterpresumption or evidence special to that case, to be in fact
married. The reason is that such is the common order of society and if
the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being,
they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of
law . . . (Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 56 [1922] quoted in
Alavado vs. City Government of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]).
So much so that once a man and a woman have lived as husband and wife and such
relationship is not denied nor contradicted, the presumption of their being married must
be admitted as a fact (Alavado v. City Gov't. of Tacloban, supra).
The Civil Code provides for the manner under which legitimate filiation may be proven.
However, considering the effectivity of the Family Code of the Philippines, the case at bar
must be decided under a new if not entirely dissimilar set of rules because the parties
have been overtaken by events, to use the popular phrase (Uyguangco vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 76873, October 26, 1989). Thus, under Title VI of the Family Code,
there are only two classes of children legitimate and illegitimate. The fine distinctions
among various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated (Castro vs. Court of
Appeals, 173 SCRA 656 [1989]).
Article 172 of the said Code provides that the filiation of legitimate children may be
established by the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment or by
the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child.
Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the private respondents. Jacinto's
birth certificate is a record of birth referred to in the said article. Again, no evidence
which tends to disprove facts contained therein was adduced before the lower court. In
the case of the two other private respondents, Julian and Paulina, they may not have
presented in evidence any of the documents required by Article 172 but they
continuously enjoyed the status of children of Lupo Mariategui in the same manner as
their brother Jacinto.
While the trial court found Jacinto's testimonies to be inconsequential and lacking in
substance as to certain dates and names of relatives with whom their family resided,
these are but minor details. The nagging fact is that for a considerable length of time and
despite the death of Felipa in 1941, the private respondents and Lupo lived together
until Lupo's death in 1953. It should be noted that even the trial court mentioned in its
decision the admission made in the affidavit of Cresenciana Mariategui Abas, one of the
petitioners herein, that " . . . Jacinto, Julian and Paulina Mariategui ay pawang mga
kapatid ko sa
ama . . ." (Exh. M, Record on Appeal, pp. 65-66).
In view of the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that private respondents
are legitimate children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and therefore, the time limitation
prescribed in Article 285 for filing an action for recognition is inapplicable to this case.
Corollarily, prescription does not run against private respondents with respect to the
filing of the action for partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription is
invoked, have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the co-ownership. In other words,
prescription of an action for partition does not lie except when the co-ownership is
properly repudiated by the co-owner (Del Banco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 156
SCRA 55 [1987] citing Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532 [1982]).
Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co-
owners absent a clear repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to the other co-
owners (Mariano vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342 [1987]). Furthermore, an action to demand
partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches (Del Banco vs. IAC, 156 SCRA
55 [1987]). On the other hand, an action for partition may be seen to be at once an action
for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a determinate
portion of the property involved (Roque vs. IAC, 165 SCRA 118 [1988]).
Petitioners contend that they have repudiated the co-ownership when they executed the
extrajudicial partition excluding the private respondents and registered the properties in
their own names (Petition, p. 16; Rollo, p. 20). However, no valid repudiation was made
by petitioners to the prejudice of private respondents. Assuming petitioners' registration
of the subject lot in 1971 was an act of repudiation of the co-ownership, prescription had
not yet set in when private respondents filed in 1973 the present action for partition
(Ceniza vs. C.A., 181 SCRA 552 [1990]).
In their complaint, private respondents averred that in spite of their demands,
petitioners, except the unwilling defendants in the lower court, failed and refused to
acknowledge and convey their lawful shares in the estate of their father (Record on
Appeal, p. 6). This allegation, though denied by the petitioners in their answer (Ibid, p.
14), was never successfully refuted by them. Put differently, in spite of petitioners'
undisputed knowledge of their relationship to private respondents who are therefore
their co-heirs, petitioners fraudulently withheld private respondent's share in the estate
of Lupo Mariategui. According to respondent Jacinto, since 1962, he had been inquiring
from petitioner Maria del Rosario about their (respondents) share in the property left by
their deceased father and had been assured by the latter (Maria del Rosario) not to
worry because they will get some shares. As a matter of fact, sometime in 1969, Jacinto
constructed a house where he now resides on Lot No. 163 without any complaint from
petitioners.
Petitioners' registration of the properties in their names in 1971 did not operate as a
valid repudiation of the co-ownership. In Adille vs. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 455, 461-
462 [1988]), the Court held:
Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership,
must have been preceded by repudiation (of the co-ownership). The
act of repudiation, in turn, is subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-
owner repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is
clearly made known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon
is clear and conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession through
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property
for the period required by law.
xxx xxx xxx
It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive
notice of title, but it has likewise been our holding that the Torrens
title does not furnish shield for fraud. It is therefore no argument to
say that the act of registration is equivalent to notice of repudiation,
assuming there was one, notwithstanding the long-standing rule that
registration operates as a universal notice of title.
Inasmuch as petitioners registered the properties in their names in fraud of their co-
heirs prescription can only be deemed to have commenced from the time private
respondents discovered the petitioners' act of defraudation (Adille vs. Court of
Appeals, supra). Hence, prescription definitely may not be invoked by petitioners
because private respondents commenced the instant action barely two months after
learning that petitioners had registered in their names the lots involved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
dated December 24, 1980 is Affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.