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BRAHMA-SUTRAS
Wi t h T e x t , E n g l i s h R e n d e r i n g , C o m m e n t s
A c c o r d i n g t o Srl-bhasya o f Sr i R a ma n u j a ,
a n d i n d e x
ADVAITA ASHRAMA
Cal cut t a 700014
Badarayana's Brahma-Sutras are the
aphorisms which systematize the
teachings of the Upanisads. Sri Ramanuja,
taking these Sutras to be 544 in number,
elucidated them in his famous commen-
tary, Sri-Bhasya, from a theistic
standpoint. The present compendium
in English of the Sri-Bhasya, is similar
to an earlier one of Sri Sankara's
commentary on the Brahma-Sutras by
Swami Vireswarananda. The foreword
presents a scholarly resume of the
Sri-Bhasya. The Introduction contains
an illuminating comparative study
of the commentaries by Sarikara,
Ramanuja, Vallabha, Nimbarka, and
Madhva. It concludes with a section
drawing attention to the harmony
underlying these different commentaries.
Cloth Bound Rs 25
Limp Edition Rs 19
BRAHMA-SOTRAS
SRt-BHASYA
BRAHMA-SUTRAS
SRi-BHISYA
WI TH TEX T A N D ENG L I SH RENDERI NG OF T H E
SUTRA S, COMMENTS , A N D ESTDEX
PART I
Chapters I, H, and HI (Sections 1 & 2)
BY SWAMI VIRESWARANANDA
PART II
Chapter III (Sections 3 & 4) and Chapter IV
BY SWAMI ADIDEVANANDA
ADVAITA ASHRAMA
5 DBHI ENTALDY ROAD
CALCUTTA 700014
PUBLISHED BY
SwAMi TADRUPANANDA
PRESIDENT, ADVAITA ASHRAMA
MAYAVATI, PrraoRAGARH, HIMALAYAS
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED
FIRST EDITION, MARCH 1978
3M8C
PRINTED IN INDIA
IN 10 PT. ON 12 PT. TIMES ROMAN TYPE
BY H. K. GHOSH AT SREEBHUMI MUDRANIKA
77 LENIN SARANI, CALCOTTA 700013
PREFACE
In 1936 was published my earlier work on the Brahma-
Sutras according to Sankara's commentary, containing text,
word-for-word literal rendering, running translation of the
text made as literal as possible consistent with easy reading,
and notes based on the main Bhasya of Sankara, and also
on the Tikas on his Bhasya by his followers. The present
volume is a similar edition of the Brahma-Sutras according
to the Srl-Bhdsya of Ramanuja, with the exception that it
does not contain the word-for-word translation of the Sutras
as in the earlier volimie based on Sankara's commentary.
The notes are based on the main Bhasya of Ramanuja,
namely Srl-Bhdsya, and also on his other two short com-
mentariesVeddnta-Sdra and Vedanta-Dlpa. The notes
are also based on the various Tikas on Srl-Bhdsya by later
scholiasts of the Sri Ramanuja school. Upanisadic text
occurring in the Sri-Bhdsya quoted in the notes are rendered
into English according to Dr. Thibaut's edition of the Srl-
Bhdsya (Sacred Books of the East Series) with slight
adaptations.
Chapter I, II, and Sections 1 and 2 of Chapter III
appeared in Prabuddha Bharata in serial form earlier
during the years 1938, 1954, and 1957 to 1960. Owing to
pressure of work and later because of weakening of my eye-
sight it was not possible for me to complete the remaining
portion of the Srl-Bhdsya, namely, Sections 3 and 4 of
Chapter III, and Chapter IV, which has been completed by
Swami Adidevananda. I am happy he could complete it.
I have included in this volume a comparative study of the
vi
Preface
various commentaries on the Brahma-Sutras, pointing out
the differences in the interpretation of some of the main
Sutras by difierent commentators. This also appeared serially
in Prabuddha Bharata, 1953, from January to July.
I am thankful to Prof. S. S. Raghavachar for his learned
Foreword and for having gone through the manuscript.
It is hoped that the present volume will be a fitting
companion to my earlier work on the Brahma-Sutras based
on Sankara's commentary, as also other Sanskrit works
published by the Ramakrishna Order.
Belur Math
Dt. Howrah
1 August 1977
S. V.
CONTENTS
Page
FOREWORD . . . . . . xi
INTRODUCTION . . . . xxvii
CHAPTER I
Section i . . . . . . 1
Section n . . . . . . 119
Section ra . . . . . 148
Section iv . . . . . 180
CHAPTER II
Section i
Section n
Section m
Section iv
. . 208
. . 241
. . 272
. . 303
CHAPTER III
Section i
Section n
Section in
Section iv
. . 314
. . 330
. . 357
. . 405
Contents
CHAPTER IV
Section i
Section ii
Section in
Section iv
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INDEX
. . 436
. . 450
. . 465
. . 478
. . 497
. . 499
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
Ai.
Aitareya Upanisad
Ai. AT.
Aitareya Aranyaka
Ai. Bra.
Aitareya Brahmana
B.S.
Brahma-Sutras
Br.
Brhadaranyaka Upanisad
Br. Ma.
Brhadaranyaka Madhyandina
Cha.
Chandogya Upanisad
Gau.
Gautama Dharma-Siitras
Gita
Bhagavad-Gita
isa.
isavasya Upanisad
Ka.
Katha Upanisad
Kau.
Kausitaki Upanisad
Ke.
Kena Upanisad
Ma.
Mahanarayana Upanisad
Ma. Br.
Maitreyi Brahmana
Manu.
Manu Smrti
Mu.
Mundaka Upanisad
Mud.
Mudgala Upanisad
Pra.
Prasna Upanisad
Pu. Mi. Su.
Piirva-Mimamsa-Sutra
R. V.
Rg Veda
ga. Satapatha Brahmana
Su. Subala Upanisad
Sve. Svetasvatara Upanisad
Tai. Taittiriya Upanisad
Tai. AI. Taittiriya Aranyaka
Tai. Bra. Taittiriya Brahmana
Tai. Sam. Taittiriya Saiiihita
Vi. Visnu Purana
KEY TO TRANSLITERATION AND
PRONUNCIATION
Sounds like
^ a o in son
srr a a in master
^ i i in if
I 1 ee in feel
3 u u in fwll
g; u 00 in boot
^ r somewhat between
r and ri
1 e a in evade
^ ai y in my
sfr o oh
au ow in now
kk
'a
kh ckh in bloc/cftead
n
g g (hard)
H
gh gb in Xog-hvA
^ nng
c ch (not k)
ch chh in oatc/z Mm
J J
jh dgeh in hedgehog
n n (somewhat)
t t
5
th th in an/-/iill
Sounds like
? d d
5 dh dh in got/Aood
01 n n in under
g t French t
SI th th in thnmh
? d th in then
q dh theh in hxeathe Aere
^ an
q pp
K ph ph in loop-^ole
^ bb
^ bh bh in aMor
JT mm
T y
T rr
s 11
^ v in avert
^ s sh
^ s sh in s/!0w
^ s s
f hh
m ng
: hhalfh
FOREWORD
I am glad to be associated with this significant publica-
tion by way of this Foreword. Its value lies in the fact that
it satisfies a genuine and long-felt need for a substantial
compendium of the Sn-Bhdsya. ri Ramanuja himself wrote
Vedanta-Sara and Veddnta-Dlpa to help the comprehension
of Sn-Bhdsya. This work, I may put it, comes in between
Veddnta-Dipa and Sri-Bhasya in point of bulk and the
measure of elaboration of detaUs. The medimn of presenta-
tion invests it with value from the stand-point of the modern-
ization of Vedanta.
1. Brahma-Sutra
The text attributed to Badarayana designated Brahma-
Sutra or Sdruaka-Sutra occupies the foremost position of
authority in the system of Vedanta. That there were com-
mentaries on it even before Sri Sankara we learn explicitly
from Sri Sankara himself, whose commentary is the earliest
available now. Its central status in Vedanta is thus very
well established. This is understandable as it explicitly
endeavours to formulate, elaborate, and defend the philos-
ophy of the Upanisads in the full-fledged darsana style. The
Bhagavad-Gitd seems to accord to it this pivotal status in the
one significant reference we have in it.^ All the commenta-
tors seem to identify the author Badarayana with Veda-
Vyasa. The Advaitic tradition handed down both by Vacas-
1. ^|I?J,^qiq^^|3qf^^i^r^^: (XIII. 4)
xii
Srl-Bhdsya
pati and Prakasatman is unanimous on the point. The Sutras
fall into a magnificent pattern. The first chapter brings out
the coherent import of the Upanisads by elucidating the
apparently doubtful import of certain pronouncements. The
second chapter works out a philosophical defence of the
Vedantic standpoint in the context of adverse systems of
thought. The third chapter outlines the spiritual pathway to
the supreme Goal of life, while the fourth chapter discusses
the nature of that goal itself.
2. Pre-Rdmdnuja Position
In spite of the greatness of the design, the Sutras offer
insuperable difiiculties. Except a few, the Sutras in general
do not indicate the theme of discussion or the particular line
of thought adopted. They definitely require an interpretative
tradition to convey their import. Hence authoritative com-
mentaries utihzing such tradition or traditions were supplied
from time to time. ri Sankara refers to a vrttikdra in the
context and Sri Ramanuja refers to an extensive vrtti by
Bodhayana. Sri Sankara's commentary is the earliest and
a very substantial work of elucidation. He propounds a
specific school of philosophy as sponsored by the Sutras.
Its distinctive features are that it asserts the sole reality of
the Absolute Spirit, named Brahman in the Upanisads,
regards the external world as only phenomenally real, and
identifies the essential Self in man with Brahman. Man's
supreme perfection hes in apprehension of this identity
through the realization of the import of the fundamental
propositions of the Upanisads. It appears, as is evident in
the next significant commentary of Bhaskara, that this for-
mulation of the philosophy of the Sutras was found to be-
Foreword xiii
unacceptable to a considerable section of Vedantic philos-
ophers. They seem to have felt that the Brahma-Sutra, while
affirming Brahman, does not negate the reality of the world,
nor identify the individual spirit with the absolute so wholly,
and the way to blessedness is knowledge that springs from
Karma-yoga and matures into updsand or devotional medita-
tion. There was a strong current of the mysticism of love or
bhakti, standardized by the greater Puranas, the Bhagavad-
Gltd, the Agamas, and the experience of high-ranking and
God-intoxicated saints. Sri Yamunacarya seems to have
yearned for a competent and adequate commentary on the
Sutras integrating all these doctrinal and spiritual points of
view. He was convinced that the truth promulgated by
Badarayana lay in this direction but could not himself pro-
duce the much needed work of interpretation.
3. SrT-Bhdsya
The prayers of the saintly Yamuna were to be fulfilled
by his grand-disciple, Sri Ramanuja. Providence destuied
Sri Ramanuja to accomplish the great task of elucidating
the Sutras in a theistic style, asserting the metaphysical
eminence of Brahman, without the supplementary thesis of
world-denial and the denial of the individuality of the finite
selves, and promulgating knowledge of Brahman as arising
from Karma-yoga and maturing in bhakti. Sri Ramanuja
has bequeathed three works on the Brahma-Sutra : the
Veddnta-Sdra, Vedanta-Dlpa, and the Sri-Bhdsya. The first
work merely enunciates the meaning of the Sutras. The
second goes beyond this summary of conclusions and indi-
cates the dialectical framework. The third is the fullest and
all-sufficient commentary. Pious tradition records that the
xiv
Sri-Bhasya
Goddess Sarasvati was so charmed by it that she blessed it
with the prefix 'Sri'. Sri Ramanuja lived a long and full life.
He seems to have spent nearly half of it in equippmg him-
seK for the creation of this masterpiece. He did advance his
special philosophical point of view in his early work, the
Vedartha-samgraha in a brilliant and spkited manner. But
he acquired devoutly all that Sri Yamuna's tradition could
give him on the Sutras, studied ancient doctmients on the
Sutras such as the works of Bodhayana, Tanka, and Dra-
mida, mastered the current schools of philosophy to perfec-
tion, soaked himself in the Vedic literature, particularly the
Upanisads, acquned an authentic understanding of the com-
mentaries of Sri Sarikara, Bhaskara, and Yadava-prakasa,
got the core of the Advaitic classics, of the masters such as
Mandana, Padmapada, Suresvara, Vacaspati-misra, Vimuk-
tatman, Prakasatman and shaped his own vision of Vedanta
and an appropriate style before he addressed himself to the
literary mission of his life. No wonder the Sri-Bhasya is a
stupendous and masterly work, its style matching its sub-
stance. Sri Ramanuja chooses the hard way on every issue,
that of thoroughness, and he is massive in the statement of
prima facie views and also in his vindication of his own
findings. The language of exposition is lucid as well as grand,
Vedanta-desika, himseK a great master of style, acknowledges
that his own style acquked grace through a devout applica-
tion to the writings of Sri Ramanuja. In the compass of
vision, fullness of execution, and splendour of style the Srl-
Bhdsya reaches heights of excellence.
4. The Sequel
The great commentary evoked a great many sub-com-
mentaries in its turn. It is a pity that Vedanta-desika's
Foreword XV
Tattva-tlkd is available only in its introductory portion. His
verse condensation of the Sri-Bkasya, the Adhikarana-
sdrdvali, is happily available completely. But Vedanta-
desika's greatest service to the Srl-Bhdsya is his preserva-
tion, under hard circmnstances, of the Srutaprakdsika of
Sudarsana-svxri, and elder contemporary of his, and his pro-
pagation of it. This work is a momunent of devotion,
thorough elucidation and brilliant amplification. As a sub-
commentary it set standards xmsurpassed in Vedantic litera-
ture.
The Ramanuja tradition of Vedanta thus consolidated
has influenced all subsequent writmgs on the Brahma-Sutra,
not excluding the commentaries adverse to Sri Ramanuja's
school of Vedanta.^ The Vaisnava schools of Vedanta in
general have utilized kindred elements profusely. It is in the
fitness of things that Jiva Gosvamin, the celebrated Vedantin
of the Caitanya school says of Sri Ramanuja, 'Pramita-
mahimndm',^ 'as one whose glory is established'. The great
Appayya-diksita used the Srl-Bhdsya considerably in his
Sivdrka-Mani-dipikd and also wrote a condensation of it
called Naya-mayukha-mdlikd.
2. See Candrikd which is a commentary of Vydsa-tirtha
on Tattvaprakdsikd of Jayatirtha on Sri Madhva's
Sutra-Bhdsya wherein the Srl-Bhdsya is criticised.
And also see Siddhdntasiddhanjana of Krsnananda-yati
on Sri Sankara's Sutra-bhdsya wherein the Srl-Bhdsya
is criticised. In the same Sivdrka-manidipikd also con-
tains considerable criticism of the Srl-Bhdsya.
3. Tativa-sandarhha : Sffqaqf^g-f ssftsigfcRT:
( 3T^3aq?si*iT5rr-^T?rfejT:, Page 74-75)'
xvi
Srl-Bhdsya
Thus the Srl-Bhdsya is a major work in the history of
Vedanta, propounding a powerful theistic version of it, and
is also great in its subsequent influence.
5. Architectonics oj the Work
The Srl-Bhdsya expounds the philosophy of Sri Rama-
nuja in aU its essentials. The structure of tiie work followmg
the structure of the Sutras is laid down weU. The first four
Sutras concern themselves with four considerations of an
introductory character. The rest of the first chapter elucidates
the crucial passages of the Upanisads that appear to be
ambiguous, and the result is a formulation of the philosophy
of the Upanisads in a coherent and decisive manner. The
second chapter deals with the possible exegetical and philos-
ophical objections to the standpoint. It incidentally exam-
ines rival philosophical systems. These two chapters
present the metaphysics of Vedanta. The third chapter pro-
pounds the sddhand or the pathway to the attainment of the
supreme Goal of life. The fourth chapter dehneates that goal
with all its implications. The last two chapters, thus relate
to the ideals to be achieved. In traditional language the first
two chapters formulate the Tattva or the nature of Reahty
and the third deals with the Hita or sddhand, and the fourth
brings out the Purusditha or the supreme ideal of life.
6. Introductory Matter
The first aphorism of the Brahma-Sutra is very important
as it initiates the inquiry into Brahman. It lays down the
precondition into the inquiry and also the reason for it. The
precondition is the inquiry into the nature, limitations, and
value of karma as elucidated in the Karma-Mimamsa. of
Foreword xvii
jaimini. Inquiry into karma and Bralunan constitutes one
organic unity of Vedic philosophy. In the earlier inquu^
into karma, the purport of the earlier portion of the Vedas
centred in rehgious activity is discussed. Being dissatisfied
with the objectives of karma, the inquky into Brahman is
undertaken as the knowledge of Brahman is said to bring
about the eternal and infinite good of man in the later por-
tion of the Vedas, namely, the Upanisads. In this context
the Srl-Bhdsya discusses elaborately the role of karma, as
it leads to minor objectives when performed in an ego-
centric way and also as it conduces to the understanding of
Brahman when performed in a disinterested spkit of worship
and dedication. Such a discrimination is the antecedent to
the inquiry into Brahman.
The reason for the inquiry is the unsatisfactory character
of the ends procured by religious life devoid of knowledge.
The inquiry is for piurposes of gaining knowledge of Brah-
man ; which knowledge is said to bring about the summum
honum. The knowledge that could accomplish such a supreme
consummation is no mere intellectual and mediate under-
standing, but a devout and intense meditation on Brahman.
It is, in short, bhakti. In this context the Srl-Bhdsya under-
takes a complete examination of Advaita in its longest
discussion, opposing the concept of nirguna Brahman and
the supplementary postulate of Avidya or Maya. Brahman
is significantly described : 'The term "Brahman" signifies the
supreme Person (Purusottama) who transcends all imper-
fections and abounds m infinite classes of auspicious qualities
of unsurpassed excellence.'* The Purva-Mimairisa writers
ii-l
xviii
Sn-Bhdsya
attempted to interpret the whole of the Vedas as just in-
culcating imperatives and denounced the metaphysical pur-
port of Brahman. That position is rejected after considerable-
discussion.
The second aphorism offers a definition of Brahman to
focus further elucidation and Sri Ramanuja defends the
definition as perfectly legitimate. The definition according
to him means :
'That supreme Person who is the ruler of all; whose
nature is antagonistic to aU evil; whose purposes come
true ; who possesses infinite auspicious quaUties such:
as knowledge, bhss and so on; who is omniscient,
omnipotent, supremely merciful; from whom the crea-
tion, subsistence, and re-absorption of this worlds
with its manifold wonderful arrangements, not to be
comprehended by thought, and comprismg within itself
the aggregate of souls from Brahma down to blades of
grass, all of which experience the fruits (of theu: pre-
vious deeds) m definite pomts of space and time
proceed is Brahman: Such is the meaning of the
Sutra:^
The thkd aphorism concerns itself with the somrce of
our knowledge of Brahman. It declares the 'Sastra' is our
only source of knowledge. This involves the entire episte-
mology of Visistadvaita. The school recognizes the vaUdity
of perception and inference in then: respective spheres. It
Foreword xix
does not subscribe to the thesis that they are infected with
an error or nescience at their very root. In the matter of
proving the existence of the supreme Being, it does not
accept the efficacy of mference, as was done in the Nyaya-
Vaisesika system. It discovers flaws m that theistic argument
somewhat on the lines of Purva-Mimariisa writers. But it
does not agree with the latter in interpreting the Vedic
scriptures as bereft of metaphysical import. Nor does it
question the veridical character of the Sastra which is our
only source of knowledge concerning the transcendent ulti-
mate, Brahman. The supreme Sastra in the context is the
concluding portion of the Vedas, the Upanisads. ri Rama-
nuja describes Brahman as 'Sruti-sirasi vidipte\ meaning that,
that supreme Reality is specifically and pre-eminently re-
vealed in the Upanisads.
In the interpretation of these texts and in the defence of
their philosophy, reason is to be fully utilized. Hence Vedanta
is no mere cult based on mere faith, but a philosophical
inquiry employing methods of logical investigation. Reason
is also of value in the examination of schools of thought
opposed to the philosophy of the Upanisads. The primary
scripture of Vedanta is to be supplemented and augmented
by the secondary scriptures such as the Rdmayana and the
Mahdhhdrata, the Puranas such as the Visnupurdna, the
Agamas such as the Panca-rdtra, and Smrti texts such as that
of Manu. The principle of this supplementation is stated by
Sri Ramanuja clearly :
'By this "supplementation" we have to understand the
elucidation of the sense of the Vedic texts studied
by.us through the words of men who had mastered the
entke Veda and its contents, and by the strength of
then: devotion had gained full realization of Vedic
XX
Sn-Bhdsya
truth. This needs to be done, smce the import of the
entire Veda with all its sdkhds cannot be fathomed by
one who has studied a small part only, and smce with-
out knowing that purport we cannot arrive at certitude.'^
It is to be understood that Sri Ramanuja included in the
category of secondary scriptures, the body of inspired mysti-
cal poetry, collectively named 'Divya-prabandha\ composed
and sung by the Alvars, but he does not use this soiurce in
the Sn-Bhdsya by direct statement for the understandable
reason that it was not acknowledged as authoritative by the
other schools of Vedanta. This was a case of personal in-
spiration and not probative evidence.
The fomth aphorism attempts to demonstrate the supreme
value of the knowledge of Brahman. The ignorance of
Brahman is the very essence of human bondage and to know
Brahman even mediately is a source of joy. Impelled by this
joy, the seeker pursues further knowledge by way of direct
apprehension through the comprehensive discipline of bhakti.
In the end his effort is crowned through the grace of God
with the joyous triumph of the full attamment.
Thus the four Sutras establish the necessity and possi-
bility of the inquiry into Brahman, the definition of It, the
sources of knowledge concerning It, and the supreme value
of the pursuit of the knowledge in question. An old verse
sums up the work of the four Sutras :
'The four Sutras eliminate any objection to the com-
mencement of the inquiry into Brahman on four prima
6. gqi^' ^]^ fr^^5s%^?i^#rt 5^1-iq1i:igT8sncii?i-
^^JTrat^ra gq#T ft 5i4^r ll (I Adhikarana)
Foreword xxi
jacie suppositions : (a) the Vedic words cannot signify
Brahman (an accomplished reality), {b) the Brahman
cannot be defined, (c) It is revealed by other means
of knowledge, and (d) the inquky is of no value.'''
7. Tattva
Brahman is the supreme Tattva or Reality. The function
of Vedanta is the discernment of its nature. It does it in
hundreds of ways but there is a fundamental concord run-
ning through aU of them. The Sutras review almost all the
central Upanisads and discuss thek import. The one per-
sistent misunderstanding they succeed in removing is, that
the Upanisads, in thek major metaphysical dialogues, raise
to ultimacy either the category of Prakrti (nature) or the
individual self. They all affirm the transcendent Brahman,
of the nature of absoluteness of Being, Consciousness, and
Bliss, and that nature and the finite self come in as its
vehicles of seK-manifestation. The Srl-Bhdsya regards the
Sutras as a single dociunent with no internal stratffication
in terms of authenticity. There is no lower and higher Brah-
man, and there is no lower and higher knowledge. It is the
same logic of indivisible truth that is discerned in the Upani-
sads. When Brahman is spoken of as attributeless, the motive
is to deny of It imperfections characteristic of the finite
existents. When attributes like omniscience are ascribed,
they are to be taken in metaphysical seriousness. When
Brahman is exhibited as other than matter and finite spkits,
7. sgc^^msr: sffeqfe^^w 3T?^jrf^f^ sraiTtB^q. i
(Tattva-tlkd, Kaiichi Edition, p. 9)
xxii
Sri-Bhdsya
the truth of transcendence is bemg proclauned. When Brah-
man is spoken of as one without a second, the significance
is that Brahman is the central substantive reality to which
the finite realities belong in the relation of predicates or
subsidiary associates. The fuU truth is conveyed without any
chance of misconception when Brahman is described as the
Atman, and the world of matter and mdividual selves are
said to constitute its 'Body'. This is a monism that does not
involve any ifiusionism. Sri Ramanuja opposes illusionistic
monism, the grosser forms of Bhedabheda and also dualism.
He says :
'Apart from the consideration of Brahman as the Soul
of all, the meditation of Brahman as the Jiva or the
Jiva as Brahman cannot be true. On the theory of
difference-cum-identity, as the limiting adjuncts con-
dition Brahman itself, all the consequent flaws will
contaminate It itself. On the theory of absolute differ-
ence between Brahman and the Jiva, the teaching of
Brahman as the Atman of all would be impossible
and thus the entire Vedanta gets rejected.'^
The external world of msentient existence and the finite
selves is real, however much they may be subject to muta-
tion. They have existence in all then: states as permeated
(Sri-Bhdsya III. iii. 37)
^^V-mft^Wl: (Sn-Bhdsya : Maha-Siddhdntd)
Foreword
xxiii
and sustained by the supreme Spirit. In this concept of the
lotaHty of existences as constituted of Bralunan and the
realm of finites, we have the justification of the designation
of Visistadvaita that has come to be applied to Sri Rama-
nuja's school of Vedanta. He himself does not use the term
l)ut his authoritative commentators, Sudarsana-suri and
Vedanta-desika employ it. (Vide Tdtparya-dipikd, p. 48,
Tirupati edition ; and Pancardtra-raksd, p. 121, Kaiichi
edition). It signifies that Reality is one, in so far as there
the one central substantive principle. Brahman, and the
totality of finites characterizes It as inseparable qualifications.
8. Hita or Means
The question of sddhana naturally pertains to the indi-
vidual soul or Jiva. The Srl-Bhdsya expounds the nature of
the Jiva in the course of the second chapter. It is uncreated,
is of the nature of a conscious principle, and enjoys powers
of free volition conferred by God. The plurality of the
individuals is real and eternal. Uniqueness and self-con-
sciousness are fundamental in its nature. The Jiva is neither
separate from God nor wholly identical with Him. It is an
'Arnsa' or part in the sense of forming an adjectival mode.
The third chapter reviews the life of the Jiva and comes to
the conclusion that in all its mundane states it is infected
with evU of the nature of suffering brought about by igno-
rance and evil-doing. Hence a spirit of renunciation is called
for. When it looks to its inward Soul, the Paramatman, it
sees in Him infinite perfections in spite of His unmanence.
Seeking Hun is the road to its own perfection. He is its final
goal and also the power that could effectuate its final blessed-
ness. The thurd quarter of the thurd chapter determmes the
xxiv
Sn-Bhdsya
exact nature of tlie various types of 'Vidyd' or meditation
to be practised in order to win the grace of the supreme
Being. The fourth quarter elucidates the supremacy of know-
ledge and the pathway to perfection and determmes the
accessories of this knowledge. This knowledge is of the
nature of bhakti or loving meditation, cultivated in ever-
increasing intensity.
9. Purusdrtha
The fourth chapter is devoted to workmg out the notion,
of Moksa. The Sn-Bhdsya states the nature of Moksa in
the first chapter itself and the final chapter is an elaboration
thereof :
'But those who are established in the Vedanta^hold-
ing (as they do) that the supreme Brahman is the sole
cause of the entke universe, and of the nature of in-
finite bliss antagonistic to all evU, an ocean of count-
less auspicious qualities of natmal and unsurpassed
excellence, transcending all else and constituting the
Self of all; and also that the Jiva, of the nature of
boundless knowledge, is of the nature of a mode of
Brahman, bemg It's body, and of such a nature that
it can get joy in the experience of Brahman, this natiure,.
however, being concealed by beginningless ignorance
of the nature of karma,affirm that Moksa is the
dkect experience of Brahman, in accordance with its.
fundamental nature after the destruction of its igno-
rance.'^
9. ^?:jr;cjftDirai55 f5i%^5riiS[^^oi5if aRt^rlJisfcq^^raJct-
Foreword XXV
The three implications of Moksa are that it is a release from*
all the binding karma of the past, it is a release of the soul
into the abundance of its iimate nature, and the fulfilment
of this natiu-e in the blissfid experience of Brahman, its own
inmost soul. This unimpeded joy of existence is the eternal,
destiny of the Jiva.
10. Conclusion
The substance of the Srl-Bhdsya may be stated in four
synoptic propositions.
(1) It is a reasoned and critical reconstruction of the
philosophy of the Upanisads with due appropriation of other
sources of knowledge such as perception and inference and
the supplementary scriptures.
(2) The reconstruction presents ultimate Reality, Brah-
man, the supreme Spurit, as the transcendent repository of
all perfections and as holding as it's own embodiment the
totality of finite existence, sentient and insentient.
(3) The pathway to the final good of life is the blissful
communion with Brahman by way of devout and loving
contemplation named bhakti, facilitated by a life of virtue
and founded on assured philosophical understandmg.
(4) The end attained through that means is the eternal
experience of Brahman, with all the plenitude and eternity
which only that experience can bring to the individual per-
sonality. It is the supreme ecstasy of life in God.
irre^nSfl^^ qt^r-^^^ l (Sn-Bhusya, I. ii. 12)
xxvi Sri-Bhasya
The importance of the Sri-Bhdsya lies in the amplitude
of its substantiation of these fundamentals.
The work executed with meticulous and reverential care
constitutes a landmark in the presentation to the modern
world of the greatest work in Visistadvaita. I am glad to
have read the whole of it and derived pleasure and instruc-
tion from it.
Mysore
14 July 1977
S. S. RAGHAVACHAR
INTRODUCTION
A Comparative Study of the Commentaries on the
Brahma-Sutras
All philosophical ideas in India 'can be traced to their
source in the Vedas. These ideas were there even in the
Samhitas, and were later on developed in the Aranyakas
and the Upanisads. Yet the Upanisadic thought did not
constitute any consistent system but was merely a record of
the spiritual experiences of the Aryan race, which developed
later on into various systems of philosophy. These different
systems grew side by side in the various centres of learning
in the country, till they became very unwieldy and required
regular systematization. Thus systematic treatises were written
which were in the form of short aphorisms called Sutras or
clues to long discussions on particular topics. The maxunum
of thought was compressed into as few words as possible,
and this desire for brevity was carried to such extremes that
the Sutra literature now is unintelligible, and the Veddnta-
Sutras, too, are no exception to this.
Badarayana, to whom the authorship of the Brahma-
Sutras is ascribed, was not the oidy one who had tried to
systematize the philosophy of the Upanisads. In the Brahma-
Sutras itself we find the names of Audulomi, Kasakrsna,
Badari, and others, whose views have been either accepted
or rejected by the author. This shows that there were other
schools of Vedanta besides Badarayana's, though probably
his was the latest and best, and so has siurvived tune. All
the Vedantic sects in India today hold his work to be the
great authority and the various Acaryas who have founded
xxviii
Sri-Bhasya
a sect have commented on these Sutras. The oldest extant
commentary on it is by Sankara, the exponent of Monism.
Sankara was followed by a host of commentators, all of
whom have raised thek voice against the monistic explana-
tion of Sarikara and his doctrme of Maya, and have given
a theistic interpretation of these Sutras, but there are various
shades of difference amongst themselves. Madhva refers to
twenty-one commentaries on these Sutras extant in his day
Each of these commentators tries to mamtain that his system
is the one that Badarayana propounded through the Sutras.
It has akeady been stated that the Sutra literature, owmg
to its extreme brevity of thought, is unmtelligible. This,
difficulty becomes greatly enhanced in the absence of an
unbroken tradition. While there is an accepted tradition as
regards the division into Chapters (Adhyayas) and Sections
(Padas), there is no such tradition as regards the division
into topics (Adhikaranas), nor as regards the texts of the
Scriptures (Sruti) that are discussed therein. Agaui, the
same Sutra sometimes yields just the opposite meanmg by
a mere shifting of the stops, e.g., Sankara's and Ramanuja's
commentaries on III. ii. 11. The total number of Sutras, too,
differs in the various commentaries, and sometimes a single
Sutra is split kito two, or two Sutras axe combined into one,
or a Sutra is dropped, or a new one added. The readkigs
ol: the Sutras also differ in the various commentaries and
the addition of a single letter like g (but), =^iand), or
3T (the negative) makes the meaning completely different.
Some of the words, too, used in the Sutras are very ambig-
uous, for m the Upanisads themselves they convey different
meanings in different places. All this gives the commentators
freedom to interpret the Sutras according to thek predilec-
tions.
Introduction
xxix
It is not possible to do justice to a vast subject like this,
viz. a comparative study of the various Bhasyas m so short
an introduction as this. So we shall consider only a few of
the Bhasyas, viz. those of Sankara, Bhaskara, Ramanuja,
Nimbarka, Madhva, and Vallabha, and that too on a few
salient topics, taking some significant Sutras only into con-
sideration.'^
Preliminaries to an Inquiry into Brahman
Sutra I. i. 1 says : 'Now, therefore, an inquiry into
Brahman'. The words 'now' and 'therefore' in this Sutra
are mterpreted differently by different commentators, which
from the very beginning indicates to a great extent the lines
<m which thek metaphysical thought would evolve.
Sankara takes 'now' ki the sense of 'immediate consecu-
tion', the antecedent fact referred to being the four Sadha-
nas or spiritual requisites. The root cause of bondage is the
superknposition of the Self and not-Self on each other owing
to ignorance (Adhyasa Bhasya). Release is attamed by the
destruction of ignorance through the intuitive knowledge
of the unity of the Self taught by texts like 'That thou art'.
Such intuitive knowledge only destroys ignorance, and Brah-
man which is an eternally existing self-luminous entity,
reveals Itself, even as when the illusion of the snake is de-
stroyed, the rope reveals itself and is not in any way created.
As knowledge alone effects release without any further act
to be performed, it has no connection with any action nor
1 The numbering of the Sutras in the different commentaries
varies. But in this study the references are according to Sankara as
that would facilitate comparison.
XXX
Srl-Bhdsya
Upasana. Hence a knowledge of the Purva-Mimamsa or
the performance of work is useless to an aspkant after Brah-
man, and therefore cannot be taken as antecedent to aa
inquiry mto Brahman (I. i. 1). Nevertheless all works pre-
scribed by the Scriptures {Br. IV. iv. 22) may serve as an
indirect means to knowledge by way of the purification of
the mind, but they have no part m producing the result of
knowledge, viz. release (III. iv. 26).
The word 'therefore', according to Sarikara expresses
a reason and is interpreted by him to mean, 'As the results
obtained by sacrifices etc. are ephemeral, whereas the result
of the knowledge of Brahman is eternal,' the inquiry mto
Brahman should be taken up.
Bhaskara, Ramanuja, and Nimbarka also take the word,
'now' in the sense of 'immediate sequence', but the ante-
cedent referred to is the knowledge of the Purva-Mimaiiisa.
Bhaskara prescribes the combination of works with know-
ledge (Jnana-Karma Samuccaya). The works prescribed
for all the Asramas are to be performed throughout life for
the Scripture (Br. IV. iv. 22) enjoins them as auxiliary to
knowledge for attaimng release (III. iv. 26). Mere know-
ledge caimot effect release. So works are not to be given
up even by an aspkant after knowledge. Combmed with
knowledge, they yield eternal results, viz. final release. There-
fore a knowledge of the Piirva-Mimaihsa is a necessary
pre-requisite for an inquky into Brahman (I. i. 1 and IV.
i. 16).
Rdmdnuja also prescribes a combination of works and
knowledge, for Scriptures prescribe it (Isa. 11). Though he
holds that the knowledge of Brahman alone leads to release
he understands by knowledge Upasana or devout medita-
tion. Meditation, again, is constant remembrance of the object
Introduction
xxxL
of meditation for which another name is Bhakti or devotion.
Scriptures in texts like, 'Whomsoever the Self chooses, unto
Mm It reveals Itself' (Mu. III. ii. 3 ; Ka. II. 23) show that
mere hearmg etc. lead nowhere, but it is only devotion alone
to the Lord that leads to release, since he who is devoted tx>
the Self is dear to the Self, and is therefore chosen. For the
practice of this devotion all works as are prescribed by
Scriptures (Br. IV. iv. 22) are necessary, for the Lord
pleased with the performance of such works vouchsafes such
devout meditation to the devotee out of grace (III. iv. 26).
They are thus helpful to the origination of knowledge and
since knowledge is to be practised all through life to attain
release (IV. i. 12), works also have to be performed all
through life. Works performed without desures, as worship
of the Lord, and combmed with knowledge yield eternal
result, viz. final release. Hence a knowledge of the Piirva-
Mimaiiisa is necessary (I. i. 1 and IV. i. 16).
Nimbarka also holds that aU works prescribed by the
Scriptures (Br. IV. iv. 22) are not to be renounced by an
aspuant after knowledge, but should be performed all through
life, for these are not antagonistic to knowledge but helpful
in its origination (III. iv. 26 and IV. i. 16). Hence a know-
ledge of the Purva-Mimariisa is essential.
Madhva coimects the word 'now' with the qualification
of the aspkant whom he classifies as ordinary, middling, and
the best. One who is devoted to and has taken refuge in the
Lord, has studied the Vedas, is dispassionate, and has re-
nounced aU work, is the best aspirant and fit for the know-
ledge of Brahman (I. i. 1). Knowledge does not stand in
need of works for securing release, but prescribed works are
helpful in the origination of knowledge. After knowledge,,
however, works are to be given up (III. iv. 26).
xxxii
Sn-Bhasya
Vallabha takes the word 'now' as introducmg a new
subject, and does not think a knowledge of the Purva-
Mimariisa or the spiritual requisites of Sankara as necessary
pre-requisites for an inquiry into Brahman. Yet he also pre-
scribes a combination of works and knowledge. Sutra III.
iv. 26 he does not interpret as, 'All works are necessary', or
as, 'In all Asramas works are necessary', but as 'All, viz. work,
knowledge, and devotion, are necessary', for the origination
of knowledge, and cites Brhadaranyaka IV. iv. 5 as authority.
This text refers to a person who performs work with deske
and says that he transmigrates. But one who performs work
without desire, and who thus bemg free from all deskes,
attains the Lord and has all his desires fulfilled in Him, does
not transmigrate (Br. IV. iv. 6). So works are necessary.
This, however, appUes to one who wants release and not to
the extremely devoted viz. the followers of Pusti Marga (the
path of divine grace), for whom there is no need of any-
thing.
The word 'therefore', is interpreted by all the above
commentators more or less like Safikara, though some of
them, as Ramanuja and Bhaskara, would add the word
'mere' and say, 'As the result of mere works, i.e. works not
combined with knowledge, is transitory', etc. Accordkig to
Madhva, the word 'therefore' expresses a reason for the
inquky mto Brahman. Without the knowledge of Brahman
there is no grace of the Lord, and without it there is no
release. Therefore an mquiry mto Brahman should be made
for attaining this knowledge.
BrahmanIts Nature and Causality
Sankara holds that Brahman is the ultimate reality, and
Introduction xxxui
as such It is not an effect but eternal, being birthless (Br.
IV. iv. 25). It is mere existence (Sat) without any distinc-
tion, existence in general, and as such It cannot be the effect
of any particular thing ; for we see in the world that only
particular things are produced from the general, as, for ex-
ample, pots from clay, and never vice versa (II. iii. 9).
This Brahman, which is the object of the inquuy (I. i. l)i
is defined as the 'origin, etc. of the world' (I. i. 2). The
Sruti text referred to is Taittiriya III. 1. It seems from this
definition that Brahman is differentiated and has attributes
(Saguna). But Sankara says that this definition aims at a
non-differentiated, attributeless Brahman (Nirguna). it
defines Brahman per accidens, even as, when we say that
which is the snake is the rope, the snake indicates the rope
owing to the illusory connection between the two. Sankara
says that the sense of this passage, viz. Taittiriya III. 1, is
to be determined from Taittiriya III. 6, where Bliss is said
to be the origin, etc. of the world (I. i. 2). This Bliss, which
admits of no difference is the Infinite (CM. VII. xxiii. 1
and VII. xxiv. 1), the Brahman defined m Its pure essence
as 'Existence, Knowledge, Infinity is Brahman' (Tai. II. 1),
and it is from this Brahman that the world is produced, so
understood Varuni. These three words. Existence, etc. though
they have different meanings in ordinary parlance, yet refer
to one indivisible Brahman, even as the words, father, son,
husband, etc. refer to one and the same person according to
his relationship with different individuals,
r But the Scriptures describe Brahnian as being both qual-
ified and unqualified, differentiated and non-differentiated
(Saguna and Nirguna). So both must be true according
as It is or is not connected with Upadhis (adjuncts). San-
kara refutes this and says that such contradictory descrip-.
iii-1
xxxiv
Srl-Bhdsya
tions of one and the same entity cannot be true, nor cm
Its nature be changed by connection with another ; for such
a change would mean its destruction. Brahman is without
attributes, for the Scriptures throughout describe It as such,
to the exclusion of Its other aspects (III. ii. 11). They do
not inculcate the connection of Brahman with forms, for
wherever they describe a form of Brahman, the Scriptures
explain at every instance that the form is not true and that
behind the Upadhis there is one formless principle (Br.
II. V. 1) (12). Scriptures condemn those who see a difference
in Katha II. iv. 11 (13). Brahman is only formless ; forms
are due to Upadhis and are meant for Upasana (medita-
tion), and are not intended to establish It (14-15). Brah-
man is pure intelUgence, homogeneous, and formless ; the
various forms are like reflections of the one sim in water,
and as such are not real (III. ii. 11-18). In Brhadaranyaka
II. iii. 6 the words 'Not this, not this' deny the two forms of
Brahman given in Br. II. iii. 1. Brahman can be described
only as 'Not this, not this', i.e. It is something different from
all this manifested world that we experience.. It is 'the Truth
of truth', the only reality that exists behmd this world, whicb
is illusory. But this negation does not launch us mto a non-
entity (gunya), denying even Brahman Itself, for without
It we could not comprehend even this nonentity. Though
unmanifest. It exists, for It is realized m perfect meditation
(Samadhi) when the self attains identity with It, the Infinity
(III. ii. 22-24, 26).
Brahman is the origin and also the place of dissolution
o[ the world (I. i. 2), and so It is both the efacient and the
material cause of the world. It is the eflicient cause because
besides It there was nothing else at the beginning of the
creation {Chd. VI. ii. 1). It is also the material cause, for
Introduction XXXV
in that case only can the enunciation that by the knowledge
of the One (Brahman) ever5^hing else is known hold true,
even as by the knowledge of one lump of clay all things
made of clay are known {ibid. VI. i. 3-4). Moreover, the
Scriptures, in texts like Taittiriya II. 7, say that It created
Itself by undergoing modifications (I. iv. 23, 26). Though
Brahman and the world are of different natures, yet they
can be related as cause and effect; for, to establish such
a relation, they need not be sunilar in all respects, in which
case they would be identical and not subjects of different
designations. What is necessary is that some of the qualities
of the cause must be found in the effect also, and we do find
two qualities of Brahman, viz. existence and intelligence in
the world also, for everything exists and is lighted by mtel-
ligence (II. i. 4-6). At the time of cosmic absorption or
dissolution Brahman is not affected by the defects of the
world ; for absorption means that all the qualities of the
effect do not continue to exist, even as when a pot is absorbed
in its cause, the clay, its shape does not continue to exist.
It is the effect that is of the nature of the cause and not vice
versa (II. i. 9). This non-difference of the cause and the
effect, of Brahman and the world, does not obliterate the
difference between the experiencer and thmgs experienced ;
for such difference in non-different things is possible owing
to name and form. For example, though waves and foam
are non-different as sea-water, yet, as waves and foam they
are different from each other (13). Thus far Sankara
thinks the author of the Sutras accepts the Parinamavada
(the doctrine of actual modification) of the Samkhyas as a
workable basis, but refutes their theory of Pradhana, an in-
dependent entity, as the cause of the world, and establishes
Brahman as the First Cause. But in II. i. 14 the author
xxxvi
Sri-Bhasya
establishes the true nature of this causahty according to his
own view.
The difference due to name and form referred to in
Siltra 13 is not possible in a non-dual Brahman. Difference
and non-difference, being contradictory, cannot exist in one
and the same thing. The ultimate reality is only non-duality,
and Sutras 14-20 declare the true significance of this non-
difference of cause and effect. Non-difference does not mean
identity, for that is not possible between Brahman and the
world. It only means that there is no essential difference
between them, i.e. the effect, the world, has no existence
apart from Brahman, the cause; in other words, it is not
real. The denial of identity does not establish difference
between the two but establishes the apparent identity or the
illusory nature of the world. The modification, pot, is only
a name arising out of speech but the truth is : all is clay
{Cha. VI. i. 4). The pot, etc. are not different from clay,
but are mere modifications or different conditions of the clay
(14). They are not experienced without clay and so are
unreal (15). But clay is realized even apart from name and
form and is therefore real. Hence Brahman is non-dual.
Brahman together with Maya is the cause of this world ;
the former through Vivarta (apparent modification), the
latter through Parinama (actual modification), and the qual-
ities of both are found in the world. There are five elements
in the make-up of everything in this world, viz. asti (exist-
ence), bhdti (intelligence), priya (bliss), nama (name), and
rupa (form): the first three have Brahman for then: material
cause corresponding to Its three factors. Existence, Know-
ledge, and Bliss, and the last two are due to Maya and are
unreal. The effect exists in the cause as one with it and is
only manifested at creation. Otherwise everything could have
Introduction xxxvii
been produced from all things (18). It is like a piece of
cloth folded and spread out (19). The five Pranas (vital
forces) when controlled get merged in the chief vital force
in the mouth, and are manifested agam when the control
is released which shows the effect is non-different from the
cause. Hence the world is non-different from Brahman and
the above-mentioned enunciation holds good (20). Brahman
though without extraneous aids yet creates this world, even
as milk turns into cind (24). Through Its infinite inherent
power It produces the world even as gods create through
mere volition (25). Thus Brahman, though immutable, yet
undergoes change and produces this diverse universe, for
the Scriptures say this and therefore it has to be accepted,
since they are the only authority with respect to It. Nor is
this against reason, for ui the dream state we do find in the
soul diverse creation, which exists without marring its indi-
visibility. So also the world springs from Brahman which
yet remains unchanged, and therefore like the dream world
this world is also umeal from the transcendental standpoint
(26-28).
Bhaskara interprets Sutra II. iii. 9 differently from San-
kara. Brahman is eternal and never created, for the Scrip-
tures declare it in texts like Svetasvatara VI. 9. Therefore
a doubt as to whether Brahman is created or not cannot
arise. So he finds a different topic in this Sutra, viz. whether
the qualities of the elements which are created are also
created or not and concludes that when it is declared that
the elements are created, it is taken for granted that their
qualities are also created. In Sutras III. ii. 11-21 Bhaskara
does not deal with the question whether Brahman is differ-
entiated or non-differentiated ; for Brahman is both, as is
known from the Scriptures, though the latter aspect is Its
xxxviii
Sn-Bhdsya
true nature and the former is only a manifestation and there-
fore adventitious which is again absorbed in Its true essence.
The question therefore is which aspect is to be meditated
upon and he says that it is only the non-differentiated, form-
less Brahman in the causal state which is mere Existence
and pure Consciousness that is to be meditated upon. Thus
though he interprets these Sutras like Sankara, it is with
reference to the above topic and not to show that Brahman
is attributeless only, and that Its other aspect is unreal or
illusory (11-14). Brahman is mere Existence and pure Con-
sciousness. Even as a piece of salt is salty through and
through, so is Brahman nothing but consciousness (16). This
Brahman, which is one, appears different in different bodies
owing to Upadhis, as the one stm reflected in different sheets
of water appears to be many (18).
Sutras 22-30, accordmg to him, do not deny the world
of forms as unreal and establish that Brahman alone is real.
According to him the first 'Not this' of Brhadaranyaka II.
iii. 6 denies the gross and subtle forms of Brahman declared
in II. iii. 1, and the second 'Not this' denies the subtle body
of the soul consistmg of the impressions (Vasanas) of
objects. Thus by the double denial the self is cleansed of
aU material form, the non-self, and its pure nature as identi-
cal with Brahman is taught by the Scriptures. Sutra 22,
therefore, teaches the pure nature of Brahman, which is
Existence, Knowledge, and Infinity. These are qualities of
Brahman and so do not refer to different entities, for a
thing does not become different on account of its qualities.
Being quaUties they are non-different from Brahman, and
neither can exist without the other (22). The rest of the
Sutras he interprets like Sankara, but as connected with the
above topic.
Introduction xxxix
Bhaskara agrees with Sankara in so far as he says that
Brahman is both the efiBcient and the material cause of the
world and the effect, the world, is non-different from its
cause. Brahman; but he differs from Sankara when he says
tliat the world for that reason is unreal. He interprets Chan-
dogya VI. i. 4 differently as follows : Speech is based on
two things, the object (form) and name, which serve our
practical purposes, as when we say 'Bring water in the pot'.
But if the effect is meant to serve a practical purpose, then
the cause and effect, the clay and the pot, would be different.
That is why the Sruti says, 'The clay alone is real.' The
cause alone exists as the effect, the pot, which is also seen
to be made of clay. At all tunes the effect is dependent on
the cause and is never experienced as different from it. It is
only a state of the cause^both different and non-different
from it, and as it comes and goes, it is said to be transient
and not true, while the cause is permanent and remains the
same, the basis of all modifications ; therefore it is said, 'The
clay alone is real.' When the effect is seen from the stand-
point of the cause, it is not experienced as anything different,
for it gets merged in it. But effects, for this reason, are not
unreal (Mithya) or illusory, for the Sruti afiBrms theur
reality in Br. II. iii. 6. 'There is no difference whatsoever
here (m Brahman)' (Ka. II. iv. 11) denies difference
in the cause, and not that the effects are umeal (Mithya).
The world is a state or mode of Brahman and is also real
(II. i. 14). Brahman, which is omniscient and omnipotent,
of Its own wni transforms Itself into this world of diversity
through Its powers (Sakti) which are nmnerous, just as
milk turns into curd. The fact of having parts is not an
essential cause of the modifications ; for in that case water,
too, could be tiurned into curd, but this is not possible. So
xl
Sri-Bhdsya
the modification of the milk into curd depends on its inherent
power and not on its having parts. So also Brahman, which
is without parts, transforms Itself at will into the world
through Its various inherent powers (Sve. VI. 8), and at the
same time remains unchanged in Its essence (II. i. 24 and
I, iv. 26J, By one of these powers It becomes the world of
enjoyables and by another It becomes the enjoyer. As the
sun sends out its rays and again withdraws them, so also
Brahman through Its powers manifests this world of diversity
and again absorbs it (II. i. 27). It is nothing to be wondered
at that a thing without parts should be modified uito effects
without losing its essential nature : for in the dream state
there appears diversity in the indivisible soul (II. i. 28).
Ramanuja refutes Sankara's view of an attributeless,
non-differentiated Brahman. Brahman, according to hkn,
cannot be non-differentiated for want of proof, as all omr
experiences are only of qualified objects. It is the invariable
characteristic found in an object but nowhere else that dist-
inguishes it from others. So when Brahman is defined as
'Existence, Knowledge, and Infinity' {Tai. II. 1), it means,
that these three are qualities of Brahman which distinguish
It from others. The words 'one only without a second' in.
Chdndogya VI. ii. 1 do not mean that Brahman has no
second even by way of quality, but from the context we find
they mean that besides Brahman there was nothing else
which could be the efficient cause of the world. That Brah-
man has auspicious qualities is known from the texts like Cha.
VI. ii. 2-3. Texts dehneating the attributeless Brahman deny
only evil qualities m It. Brahman has not only knowledge
as Its essential nature, but is a knower also : 'By what should
the knower be known ?' (Br. II. iv. 14). It possesses other
auspicious qualities also. Texts like Br. II. iv. 14 and IV.
Introduction xii
iv. 19 do not negate the diversity established by Chandogya
V I. i i . 3 and other similar texts. They only deny plurality
in so far as it contradicts the unity of the world which is an
effect of Brahman and has It for its self (I. i. 1).
Brahman is eternal and so uncreated. If it is also aa
effect, then the enunciation that by the knowledge of Brah-
man everything is known would not hold true (II. iii. 9).
In Sutras III. i i . 11-26, which according to him form
one topic, the question discussed is whether Brahman is
polluted by imperfections due to Its having for Its body
the sentient and insentient world, even as the soul is subject
to the unperfections stated in Sutras 1-10, owing to its being-
embodied. Ramanuja says that Brahman is not polluted, not
even from places such as earth, by being inside them, for
the Scriptures everjT^'here describe It as being free from
imperfections and possessing aU blessed qualities (11). At
every step the Scripture denies imperfections in It by saying:
that It is immortal and therefore free from imperfections
(Br. III. vii. 3 et seqq.). The imperfections of the soul,,
which also has these tM'o characteristics, are due not to its
having a body, but to its Karma (past work), and so Brah-
man, which is not subject to Karma, is free from such-
imperfections (12). Brahman, though connected with forms,
is in Its tree nature formless, and as such is not subject to
any Karma (14). The differentiated form of Brahman is not
umeal, for texts which describe It as such are as authorita-
tive as texts like 'Existence, ICnowIedge, Infinitjr is Brahman'
(15). This text only teaches that Brahman has knowledge
for Its essential nature, but does not deny other attributes
like omniscience in It (16). This twofold characteristic is
ever there and Brahman is not polluted by being inside this
diverse world, just as the sun reflected in different sheets of
xiii
Sn-Bhdsya
dirty water is not poUuted thereby (18). The 'Not this, not
this' in Brhadaranyaka II. iii. 6 does not deny the two forms
mentioned in II. iii. 1, but denies that Its nature is confined
only to these two forms. They do not exhaust Its qualities,
for the text mentions further quahties after that (22). Though
Brahman is unmanifest, yet this differentiated form is reahzed,
just as Its bemg of the nature of intelligence is reahzed in
perfect meditation (Samadhi) (23-25). For aU these reasons
Brahman is regarded as Infinite, i.e. as possessing uifinite
attributes, for thus holds good the twofold characteristic
referred to in Sutra 22 (III. ii. 26).
Brahman is not only the efiBcient cause but also the
material cause of the world, for otherwise the enunciation
that by the knowledge of one thing the knowledge of every-
thing is gained will not hold good. The text 'AU this has its
seff in That' (Cha. VI. viii. 7) shows that Brahman has
for Its body this world of sentient and insentient beings
in all Its condition, i.e. both in the causal and effected
states. When the souls and matter are in a subtle con-
dition, and therefore designated as one with Brahman,
then It is said to be in the causal state. Brahman in
this state desires to be many and It evolves names and
forms ; so the worldthe effected statecomes into exist-
ence. When Brahman undergoes this change from the causal
to the effected state, imperfections and sufferings are limited
to the souls, and aU change to matter, i.e. Its body under-
goes a change, while Brahman continues to be the Self and
inner Ruler and as such is not affected by the imperfections,
etc. even as childhood, youth, etc. do not affect a person
but are restricted to his body (I. iv. 23-27). Brahman and
the world, though of different natures, can yet be related
as the cause and effect, for it is not absolutely necessary that
Introduction xliii
the qualities of the cause which distinguish it from others
should be found in the effect. Though we do find it in such
cases as the clay and its effect, the pot, etc. yet we do not
find it when worms are produced from honey. But then, the
effect is not altogether different from the cause ; for though
there is difference in character, there is oneness of substance
(II. i. 4, 6-7). The effect is non-different from the cause ;
for the cause is recognized in the effect also. Chdndogya
VI. i. 4 means that clay takes a new condition and a name,
and thereby serves a practical purpose. The new mode of
the substance clay gives rise to a new idea and name while
it remains clay. Similarly, when Brahman takes a new con-
dition as the world. It remains the same in substance and
there is only a difference of state and therefore the world
and Brahman are non-different (14-15). Threads, when they
are arranged in a new set-up, produce a cloth and serve a
purpose. The same vital breath functionmg differently gives
rise to different names. Thus the effect is seen to be non-
different from the cause (19-20). Scriptrures say that Brah-
man is without parts and yet creates this world of diversity
and as Scriptures alone are authority with respect to Brah-
man we have to accept it. Ordinary experience is useless
here (27). The difference in the essential nature of things
gives rise to different quahties, so Brahman which is unique
can have quahties beyond our experience (28).
Nimbarka too holds that Brahman is not created; for
such a view would contradict Scriptures which say that It
is eternal and birthless. Moreover, it would lead to a regressus
ad infinitum regarding the Fust Cause (II. iii. 9). It is the
origin, etc. of the world (I. i. 2). Though Brahman resides
in the same body as the soul and rules it in all its conditions,
viz. waking, dream, and sleep, yet It is not soiled by its
xliv
Sri-Bhasya
imperfections ; for the Scriptures declare that in all condi-
tions It is free from unperfections and possesses auspicious
quahties (11-12). Moreover, texts dkectly say so, viz. the soul
suffers while Brahman is at peace as a mere witness, though
both reside in the same body ( MM. III. i. 1) ( 13). Brahman
is formless, for It is beyond name and form, being thek
revealer, and bemg formless It is free from all unperfections
due to such lunitations (14). It manifests the world and
yet is beyond darkness, i.e. is not affected by its knperfec-
tions even as light reveals objects covered by darkness and
yet is not affected by this darkness ( 15). The Scriptures
teach only that which is the subject-matter of any text and
notliing more, and so no Sruti text is purportless ( 16 ). And
as the Sruti and Smrti sayas in Chandogya VIII. i. 3 and
5, and Gltd XV. 18 respectivelythat Brahman has the
above two fold character, it must be accepted. Hence the
comparison (of Brahman and soul) to the sun and its reflec-
tion in sheets of water is appropriate : Brahman is not
polluted by the imperfections of the world, though It is
biside it, even as the sun is not polluted by being reflected
in sheets of dkty water (III. ii. 18). In Sutras 22-24 Nim-
barka foUows Ramanuja and says that Brhadaranyaka H.
iii. 6 does not deny the world ; it only states that the two
forms described in Brhadaranyaka II. iii. 1 are not the only
attributes of Brahman, for the Sruti gives more of Its attri-
butes later on.
Brahman is both the efficient and the material cause of
the world, as otherwise the enunciation about the knowledge
of aU from that of one thing will not hold true. The Scrip-
tures directly declare It as such, and also that It created Itself
by undergoing modifications (I. iv. 23-26 ). Brahman and
the world, though of different natures, can yet be related
Introduction xlv
as cause and effect, for we do have such examples m the
world, as when scorpions are produced from cow-drmg, or
hair and nails from a person. It is not necessary that the
cause and the effect should be similar in all respects (II. i.
6-7). At cosmic absorption. Brahman is not poUuted by the
quahties of the insentient world, for we see in the world
that the cause in not affected by the qualities of the effect
at absorption, e.g. when a pot is absorbed in clay, the clay
does not become the pot, but it is in just the other way that
absorption takes place (8-9). Though Brahman, being the
cause, exists as the soul and is thus non-different from it, yet
the former is the ruler and the other the ruled, for they are
also different like the sea and its waves ; and so the relation
of the ruler and the ruled can exist between them (13). The
effect, the world, is non-different from the cause. Brahman,
i.e. it is not absolutely different from Brahman. In Sutras
4-7 it has been shown that the world is of a different natine
from Brahman, and Sutra 13 says that between the soul
and Brahman there is difference ; this Sutra also says that
the soul and the world are both non-different from Brahman,
i.e. they cannot exist apart from Brahman. From this it
follows that the relation between Brahman and the sentient
and insentient world is one of difference and non-difference,
and consequently the world is not unreal or illusory. The
effect, the world, exists in Brahman, the cause, even before
creation and is manifested at creation^like a cloth in a
folded and unfolded condition, or as the various Pranas
(vital forces) are absorbed in the chief Prana when
they are controlled, and when the control is relaxed,
the various Pranas agam manifest themselves ; so is the
world manifested from Brahman, in which it exists even
before creation. Thus the world is non-different from It
xlvi
Sri-Bhasya
(14-20). Brahman manifests Itself as this world by Its in-
herent powers, even as milk turns into curd without external
aids. It creates fliis world by Its mere will, Uke the gods
creating by their mere vohtion. Though Brahman undergoes-
modification and produces this world, yet It remains unmu-
table, since It possesses extraordmary powers. The Sruti says-
thus, and we have to accept it, for the Sruti is the sole
authority with regard to Brahman. Smce even the soul,
whether endowed with supernatural powers or not, and the
gods owmg to their powers are seen to create without any
change in themselves, where is the objection to Brahman's
havmg such extraordinary powers (24-28)?
Madhva also holds that Brahman (i.e. Visnu) has no
origin, for It is eternally existent. It is omniscient, Its powers
are mfinite, and they are not distmct from Its being, though
they are spoken of as distmct for the sake of understanding
(II. iii. 9). All contrary attributes like being neither big nor
small, having qualities and being attributeless, are possible
in Brahman owmg to Its extraordinary powers (I. iii. 12).
It is the origm, etc. of this universe. It is the supporter of
matter and soul, both of which depend on It. It is incom-
prehensible and therefore said to be indefinable (I. i. 5). It
is without an equal and superexcellent, and hence It is said
to be 'one without a second', i.e. there is no one else equal
to Brahman. Its various manifestations, ui spite of difference
of place and position, are not different as between them-
selves, or from Brahman, for It is of identical essence in all of
them and the Sruti at each step declares the identity (III. ii.
11-13). Brahman is formless, for It rules Prakrti and is
therefore beyond Prakrti, which evolves colour and form.
Though It has no material colour and form, yet It has such
colomr and form as consist of Its spiritual essence, viz;
Introduction xlvii
Knowledge and Bliss. The Sruti and Smrti declare it (14-17).
Though souls are simUar to the Lord, yet they are not
identical with Him. They are mere reflections of the Lord,
just as we have reflections of the one sun in different sheets
of water. They are therefore separate from Him, dependent
on Him and of His likeness (18).
Brahman is not merely the creator and destroyer of the
universe but also its preserver, for the Sruti denies the limita-
tion of Its powers to creation and destruction only {Rg-Veda,.
X. xxxi. 8). It is unmanifest and is not made manifest even
by intense devotion, but direct vision results through Its grace
and not from the soul's efforts (22-26). Brahman is not
merely bhss but also bhssful, for the Sruti declares It as
such, even as the serpent is coils and has coUs, or as the
gem is lustre and lustrous. These attributes of bhss, etc. are
not of the same kind as we find in this world, though the
same terms are used for them (27-28).
In I. iv. Madhva shows how the various words referring,
to the gods, ritualistic acts, etc. ultimately refer to the Lord,
thereby showing the excellence of the Lord. In keeping with
this trend he interprets Sutras 23-27. Unlike other com-
mentators he does not find the topic of the material causahty
of the Lord discussed m them. He does not regard the Lord
as the material cause also of the world; He is only its effir
cient cause.
In Sutras II. i. 4-6 Madhva discusses the authoritative*
ness of the Sruti, and of Smrti which do not contradict it,
as distmguished from Smrtis rejected in Sutras 1-3. Thus
he finds m them quite a different topic from what others
find, viz. the possibihty of the relation of cause and effect
in spite of difference m characteristics between the two; for
xlviii
Sn-Bhdsya.
such a possibility does not concern him, inasmuch as his
Brahman is not the material cause of the world.
Some texts like Chdndogya VI. ii. 1 declare that Asat
or non-existence alone was there at the beginning, which
shows that non-existence and not Brahman is the First Cause.
Madhva says that this view is wrong, for it is mere negation.
If that were the cause, then after cosmic absorption nothing
would be left, which, however, is not a fact, for there are
instances of thmgs existmg even then, and it is also corrob-
orated by our experience in this world, when we find that
a thing comes out of somethmg, and when it is destroyed,
something is left behind (7-9). Though the texts say that
on realization the soul becomes one with Brahman, i.e. non-
different from It, it cannot mean absolute identity, for there
exist attributes in Brahman like independence and wisdom
which distinguish It from the soul even in that state ; there-
fore Brahman is the creator (13). The cause is none else
but Brahman, i.e. It does not stand in need of anything
independent of It for It possesses powers to create mdepen-
dently. It there were such means, the Vedas would have
mentioned them. No means independent of Brahman existed,
but means dependent on and owing their existence to It
existed (14-16). Non-existence before creation does not
mean that there was nothing whatsoever but that there was
hothmg that was manifest and independent (17). The
acceptance of dependent means adds to the glory of the
Lord. He creates with other things as means of which He is
the master. In the world also we see that an agent creates
something with means other than himself, e.g. a cloth from
threads. But they are not independent of the Lord. The
material with which He creates is unbued with His presence
as the ruler, even as the body, vital forces, etc. are so im-
Introduction xlix
bued and guided by Him (18-20). In Sutras 21-26 Madhva
refutes the view that the soul is the creator. He thus finds
an altogether different topic in these Sutras from other com-
mentators. In Sutras 27-28 he says that the objections men-
tioned in Sutra 26 against the view that the soul is the creator
do not apply in the case of Brahman, for the Scriptures
declare that contradictions are possible in It because in It
alone exist such powers, as make things unpossible for the
soul possible for Him.
Vallabha also holds that Brahman has no origin, for It
is eternal (II. iii. 9). It is the origin, etc. of the world (I. i.
2), and the Scriptines are the only authority with respect
to It. In Sutra III. ii. 11-21 the topic discussed is whether
the attributes of the soul and the world that are sometimes
affirmed of Brahman (Cha. III. xiv. 2) and sometimes denied
of It (Br. III. viii. 8) really belong to It or not. Sutras 16-18
give a prima facie view saying that Brahman is pure intel-
ligence alone and nothing more, and that the attributes of
the soul and the world are metaphorically apphed to It and
not really found in It for the Sruti denies such attributes in
It by saying 'Not this, not this'. Sutras 19-21 refute this view
and say that both views are true, i.e. It has and has not the
attributes of the soul and the world, for all contradictions
are resolved in It. It is only thus that all scriptural state-
ments can have a meaning. The negation of attributes in
Brahman refers only to the material attributes, and not to
supernatural attributes. Chdndogya VIII. i. 5, which denies
such attributes, later mentions attributes of Brahman. Brah-
man has all auspicious qualities and is of a different cate-
gory from the world (22). ,
Brahman is essentially unmanifest but through worship
and service it is possible to see It. The Sruti and Smrti also
iv-1
1
Srl-Bhdsya
declare It as having a form and possessmg all auspicious
quaUties. The &uti alone is authority with respect to Brah-
man, and from it we learn that through Its extraordmary
powers Brahman, which is formless, also takes infinite forms-
at the deshe of Its devotees. Both aspects are true. Brah-
man has and has not attributes, as a serpent has coils and is
without them. The relation between Brahman and its attri-
butes is like that between the orb and its lustre, i.e. they
are both difierent and non-difierent (23, 24, 27, 28).
Brahman is both the efQcient and the material cause of
the world (I. iv. 23-27). Brahman and the world, though
difierent m natture, can be related as cause and effect, for
we see scorpions generated from cow-dung. The objection
to an insentient world bemg produced from a sentient Brah-
man holds good only in respect of sentiency and not in
respect of existence, which is common to both. While San-
kara holds that Existence, Knowledge, and BUss are found
in the world as Asti, Bhati, and Priya, Vallabha holds that
only existence is found, for accordmg to him the other two
quaUties are not manifest or are withdrawn (II. i. 4-6). The-
mention of Asat as the cause is intended only to refute it,
as Chdndogya VI. ii. 1 declares (7). Brahman is not polluted
by the imperfections of the world m Pralaya (dissolution)
even as the characteristics of a pot do not affect clay when
the former is merged in the latter (8-9). Sutra 13 he mter-
prets like Sankara, i.e. in the effects there can be difference as^
between enjoyers and enjoyables, though both are non-
different from the causeBrahman (13). From Chandogya
VI. i. 4 it appears that the modification is due merely to
speech and not m reality. In that case, of what is Brahman
the cause? Therefore, we have to understand this text as
showing only the non-difference of the effect,, the world',.
Introduction
li
from the cause, Brahman, and not its unreality (Mithyatva),
for such a conclusion would contradict the enunciation
(regarding the knowledge of everythmg through that of one
thing) as also the subject-matter of the Scriptures (1). The
effect, the pot etc. is experienced only if it exists and is real,
and not otherwise. The world exists and at all tunes, and
hence its Brahman-ness or Brahmatva (15-16). The non-
existence of the effect before creation refers only to its un-
manifest condition, meaning that it exists in a subtle con-
dition, and not that it did not exist at all. It is like a cloth
folded and unfolded, or like the Pranas controlled and un-
controlled. In the former case they exist absorbed in the
chief Prana and in the latter case the different Pranas are
manifested and function differently (17, 19, 20). Brahman
cf Itself becomes this world, just as milk turns into curd
without any extraneous agency. Even as gods create by mere
vohtion, so does Brahman create this world (24-25). If
Brahman were its material cause, then either It would get
exhausted in creation or we have to accept parts in It,
which would contradict the Scriptures. Vallabha says that
both are true since the Sruti says so, and it alone is authority
with respect to Brahman and Its causality. In Brahman which
has extraordinary powers to accomplish everything, aU con-
tradictions get resolved (26-28).
The SoulIts Nature
Sankara says that the individual soul is eternal and un-
created. It is the one Brahman without a second that enters
the intellect and appears as the soul (Jiva) but in reality
they are identical, and so Ai. I. 1 is not contradicted. The
creation of souls, spoken of in texts like Brhadaranyaka II.
Iii
Sn-Bhdsya
i. 20, is only in a secondary sense, for texts like Katha
I. ii. 18 and Brhaddranyaka IV. iv. 25 deny such birth to
the soul (11. iii. 17). Birth, death, etc. are spoken of the
body and not of the soul (16). What origmates is its con-
nection with its adjuncts, gross and subtle^which is umeal.
The soul is pure intelUgence, which is never lost under any
condition (18). Sutras 19-32 deal with the size of the soul.
Sutras 19-28 give the prima jade view that the soul is
atomic. This view is refuted hi Sutras 29-32, where it is
stated that this atomicity is due to its connection with the
adjuncts (Upadhis)^intellect, etc. and that this connection
lasts so long as the soul exists in its relative aspect {sain-
sdrin). Even in deep sleep (susupti) this connection exists
in a potential form and it is manifested on awakerung, as
virility does in youth. It is an agent, for the Scriptures
declare it; but this agency lasts so long as its connection
with the Upadhis lasts. In its real nature it is active, even
as a carpenter is active with his tools in hand and mactive
without them (33-40). This agency is ultimately dependent
on the Lord, who makes the soul act according to its own
past works (41-42). It is a part of Brahman and also other-
wise, i.e. identical with It. It is a part of Brahman, for the
Scriptures declare a difference between them m texts like
Brhadaranyaka II. iv. 5 and IV. iv. 22. But this difference
is only from the emphical standpomt: from the absolute
standpoint they are identical (43). The soul is a mere reflec-
tion of Brahman m the Upadhi, the mner organ {antdh-
karana), and Brahman is not affected by the sufferings of
the soul, just as the sun is not affected by the tremblings of
its images m ruffled water. Nor do the experiences of one soul
affect another even as the tremblmg of one unage of the sun
does not affect other unages m different sheets of water
Introduction liii
y (50). The soul realizes its identity with Brahnian in perfect
meditation. So the relation is one of identity and not one of
difference and non-difference, which is supported by the
fact that the Sruti denies everything else besides Brahman
(HI. ii. 26-30).
Sutra 2 deffnes Brahman as the origin, etc. of this world
of sentient and insentient bemgs, referring to Taittiriya III.
1. From this we have apparently to understand that souls
are created, but in II. in. 17 the author denies such origin
of souls. Thereby he contradicts his definition and also the
enunciation that 'by the knowledge of one thing everything
else is known'. So we have to reconcile this contradiction
which drives us to the conclusion that the soul as such (i.e.
as samsdrin), is an effect, atomic, an agent, and a part of
Brahman, but in its real nature it is eternal and identical
\vith Brahman. Sarikara has taken this standpomt and mter-
preted consistently aU the Sutras from II. in. 16 to 50. The
enunciation also is not contradicted thereby.
Bhaskara, too, holds that the soul is eternal and birthless
and so is imcreated. Birth, death, etc. are spoken of the body
and not of the soul. So Brhaddranyaka II. i. 20 (Madhyan-
* dina), which describes souls as springing from Brahman
like sparks from fire, means only differentiation due to
Upadhis. The soul is a knower, because it is so seen from
the Scriptures, and also because it is a part of Brahman. In
its natural condition it is identical with Brahman, its other
l:orm is due to Upadhis (II. iu. 16-18). It is atomic in size,
Cor the Scriptmes declare it to be such (19, 22). It pervades
the body by consciousness (25). Thus in the state of bond-
age it is atomic, but this is not its true nature; for it is
I declared as identical with Brahman in texts like, 'That thou
art'. Its atomicity is due to its identification with Upadhis,
liv
Sri-Bhdsya
wliich are limited, and this connection lasts so long as the
soul sees diversity and transmigrates. Even in susupti it
exists m a latent condition and is manifest on awakenmg,
like virility ui youth (29-31). The soul is an agent, though
this is due to its Upadhis, for if agency were its real nature,
then there would always be activity resulting in happiness
and misery, and there would be no release for it. Moreover,
hi deep sleep the soul is mactive, and such a change of
nature is not possible. Therefore, its agency is due to Upa-
dhis but it is not for that reason tmreal. So long as the soul
is connected with its Upadhis this agency also is real in all
aspects, even as a carpenter is an agent when busy with his
instruments and not so without them (33, 40). Even this
agency ultunately is from the Lord (41-42). The soul is a
part of Brahman, not in the physical sense as threads are
parts of the cloth, but as sparks are parts of fire, or the
Akasa (space) m a vessel is a part of the aU-pervading
Akasa, or the different Pranas are parts of the chief Prana,
or the various mental states are parts of the mind. Thus it
is non-different yet different from Brahman, the former
bemg its true nature and the latter dtie to Upadhis. Differ-
ence is declared between them by the Scriptures in texts like
Brhadaranyaka IV. iv. 22, and also non-difference is taught
m texts like Svetdsvatara IV. 3, and m texts like, 'Brahman
is fishermen. Brahman is slaves', etc. (43). The soul bemg
atomic its activity is limited to its body, and so there is no
confusion of results. This holds true m its state of bondage ;
and in the state of release, when it is one with Brahman, the
question of confusion of results does not arise at aU (49).
The view that souls are many and aU-pervadmg is falla-
cious (50).
Ramanuja also holds that souls are not created. They are
Introduction Iv
birthless and eternal. But this will not contradict the above-
mentioned enunciation, for souls are effects of Brahman, and
have existed in It from ah eternity as a mode (prakdra) of
Brahman. So also have the elements. At the time of creation
the elements imdergo a change in their essential nature, and
therefore they are said to be originated, but the souls undergo
no such change. There is only an expansion of their inteUi-
gence, making them fit to enjoy the fruit of thek Karma, and
so they are said to be uncreated. Hence texts which speak of
thek creation mean only the expansion of thek intelUgence,
Uke sparks emanatmg from a fire (II. in. 17). The soul is a
knower both in bondage and release, for it is so declared in
texts like Chdndogya VIII. xii. 4-5 (18). It is atomic in
size. It pervades the body with its quahty, mteUigence. It
is not knowledge, but has this for its quality ; for knowledge
is different from the knower, the soul, like earth from its
quahty, smeU. Texts like Brhaddranyaka IV. in. 30 declare
the dijfference between them. It is caUed knowledge, because
it has that for its essential quahty, and as this quahty is
always present, the designation is not objectionable. It exists
even in deep sleep in a potential condition and is manifested
on awakening, like virUity in youth. It has this quality even
in the state of release. Brhaddranyaka II. iv. 12 does not
deny its presence but only means that it has no knowledge
of suffering, etc. which it experiences in the state of bondage
(19-31). The soul is an agent as otherwise Scriptural m-
junctions wUl be meaningless. Scriptures also declare it in
texts like Taittiriya II. 5. If Prakrti were the agent, it bemg
common to aU souls, there would be confusion of results,
and Samadhi or realization of the kmd T am different from
Prakrti' would be impossible. Therefore the soul is the agent
and it acts at wiU, as a carpenter possessing instruments acts
Ivi
Sri-Bhasya
or is inactive at his will (33-40). This agency also is ulti-
mately from the Lord who directs it according to its previous
efforts (41-42).
The soul is a part of Brahman, for the Scriptures declare
both difference and non-difference between them. Though
it is a part of Brahman, yet the latter is not of the same
nature as the soul, but is always free from imperfections and
possessed of auspicious qualities. The soul is a part in the
sense that hght is a part of the orb, or the body that of an:
embodied bemg. Though an attribute is a part of the sub-
stance and inheres in it, yet a difference in theh natures is
not impossible. Brahman is of a different nature from the
soul. Texts which declare non-difference are based on the
fact that attributes are not experienced apart from the sub-
stance and have no separate existence. Though souls are of
a similar nature, being part of Brahman, yet, being atomic
and residing in separate bodies they are different, and hence
injunctions which imply a difference have a meaning. For
this very reason there is no confusion of results. This expla^
nation would be impossible if the soul were Brahman under
ignorance or limited by the Upadhis. The arguments put
forward by the Advaitins are fallacious (43-50).
Nimbarka accepts the view that the soul is eternal,
atomic in size and a knower, and interprets Sutras 18-28.
like Ramanuja. But Sutras 29-32 he interprets differently..
The soul, though atomic, is called all-pervading because of
its all-pervading quality, knowledge, which is its essence,,
and thus quaUty is always present, though sometimes latent
and sometunes manifest, as virility latent in childhood be-
comes manifest in youth. If the soul itself were all-pervadingv
its bondage and release would be either unpossible or eternal
(29-32). The soul is an agent, for thus only can Scriptural
Introduction Ivii
injunctions liave meaning. Tlie subsequent Sutras up to 42
he interprets more or less like Ramanuja.
The soul is a part of Brahman, for the Scriptures declare
diSerence between them in texts like Svetdsvatara I. 9 and
also non-diiference ui texts like, 'That thou art' (CM. VI.
viii. 7), and 'This Self is Brahman' (Br. II. v. 19). But for
this reason Brahman is not affected by the imperfections of
souls even as the sun is not affected by its parts, the rays,
EaUing on filthy things. On account of their connection with
different kinds of bodies, souls are different and injunctions
regarding them have a meanuig. Souls being atomic and
limited to their respective bodies there is no confusion of
resuhs of thek works. The view that the soul is ah-pervading
is faUacious (43-50).
Madhva interprets Sutras II. in. 11-50 in a very different
way though in conclusion he too holds the view that the soul
is atomic, an agent, etc. Sutras II. iii. 14-16 discuss the order
in which the elements are withdrawn at absorption (Pralaya).
Sutra 17 raises the question whether Brahman also is with-
drawn, and declares that It is not withdrawn for Scriptines
declare that It is eternal, etc (17). The soul is eternal and
the texts which refer to its bkth, etc. are with respect to its
Upadhis, the body, etc. (18-19). The soul is atomic and it
pervades the body with its quality, inteUigence (21-25). It
is different from Brahman (28) but on account of similar
quahties like knowledge, bliss, etc. in the soul and Brahman,,
the soul is said to be one wkh Brahman in texts like, 'That
thou art' and 'I am Brahman', even as the world is said to
be identical with Brahman in texts like, 'AU this is Brahman'
{Chd. III. xiv. 1) inasmuch as It possesses the quahties of
the world (29). AU the quahties of the soul are latent in
it, and are manifested through the Lord's grace on its attain-
Iviii
Sri-Bhasya
ing release, like virility in youth ; otherwise some (the gods)
would experience bliss eternally, others (the Asuras) misery,
and still others (men) both (31-32). The soul is an agent.
The Scriptures describe its attributes, and it is also seen to
adopt means to attain its ends. The Scriptures prescribe for
it meditation. But its activity is controlled by God, and so
it is not a free agent like God, who is all-powerful. The soul
also feels it is not a free agent. As a carpenter is an agent
by hunself, but controlled by his master, even so is the soul
an agent under the Lord's control, who directs it in accord-
ance with its past actions and efforts (33-42). The soul is
a part of the Lord, for the Scriptures declare it to be vari-
ously related to the Lord, as son, father, friend, etc. It is
also declared to be otherwise, i.e. umelated and quite differ-
ent from the Lord. As it is thus declared to be different and
non-different from the Lord, it is said to be a part of Him.
Its being separate and non-separate from the Lord should
be taken in a secondary sense and not literally (43). Though
the souls and the manifestations (Incarnations) of the Lord
are both His parts, yet the latter are essential parts, while
the souls are distinct parts, and so the Incarnations are ot
the same nature as the Lord and are all-powerful, while
the souls are limited in power, though they resemble the
Lord in an extremely smaU degree. The soul's activity and
release, being connected with a body, depend on the Lord,
but this is not the case with the manifestations of the Lord,
Between ordinary souls and the Lord's manifestations there
is a distinction, for souls are limited in power, etc. while
the latter are not so. The ordinary souls (Jivas) are merely
reflections of the Lord, while the others are manifestations
of the Lord, and as such resemble Him in ah aspects (46-50),
Though souls are reflections of the Lord, yet among them-
Introduction
lix
selves they are different, because of the difference in their
adrsta or the unseen result of their virtuous and sinful con-
duct'(51).
Vallabha also holds that the soul is eternal and that bhth,
etc. refer to the body and not to the soul (II. in. 16-17).
The view that the soul is merely inteUigence and therefore
Brahman Itself, VaUabha takes as a prima facie view and
refutes it. According to him also, the soxd is a knower and
has knowledge for its essential attribute. The soul cannot
change its nature and become one with Brahman. They may
say that the soul as such is iUusory and therefore the ques-
tion of losing its nature cannot arise. But this would
contradict texts Uke Chdndogya VI. in. 2. The difference
between the soul and Brahman is not iUusory, for there is
no proof to establish it. Nor can it be said that there is no
Brahman different from the Jiva, since that would con-
tradict texts like Chdndogya VIII. i. 5 and Sutra II. i. 22
The Advaitin's view is therefore xmtenable (18). The soul
is atomic. VaUabha interprets Sutras 19-28 lUce Sankara,
not as a prima facie view, however, but as a final view
(Siddhanta). In texts like 'That thou art', the soul is said
to be Brahman, because the soul has the qualities of Brah-
man for its essence. The statement holds good in the state
of release, when the bliss aspect of the soul is manifest. It
exists potentially, and is manifest in the state of release, like
virility in youth. If this aspect also were manifest, it would
he experienced by the soul, and there would be no bondage ;
and if it were never experienced as a quahty, then there
would be no release. The bliss aspect cannot be denied, for
it would contradict texts like Brhaddranyaka IV. iv. 6
(19-32). The soul is an agent. Texts like Brhaddranyaka
II. i. 17 clearly show that this agency belongs to the soul,
Sn-Bhdsya
and the senses are its instruments. The view that this agency
is due to its connection with the inteUect should be rejected
(33-35). Though generaUy the agent and the enjoyer
are different, they need not necessarily be so even as a
carpenter may be an agent and construct a chariot to enjoy
by riding on it (40). The soul is a part of Brahman. One
might say Brahman has no parts and so how could the soul
be a part of Brahman. But the Scriptures declare it, and it
has to be accepted, siuce there is no other means of know-
ing this. The Sruti and Smrti declare that the soul is a part
of Brahman. Though it is a part of Brahman, the latter is
not affected by the soul's sufferings, just as fire heats other
things but not itself. Though the soul is a part of Brahman,
yet injunctions and prohibitions are applicable to it on
account of its connection with bodies. The soul is a mere
reflection or resemblance of Brahman inasmuch as its bliss
aspect is not manifest (43-50).
The State of Release and the Means to It
All the commentators agree that meditation on the
supreme Brahman is the means to release, and that this
meditation is to be repeated till the rise of knowledge (IV.
i. 1). Bhaskara, Ramanuja, and Nimbarka further state that
the meditation is to be continued till death (12). Sankara,
however, takes this Sutra as referrmg to meditations which
are practised for attaining certain results by way of pros-
perity. 'With whatever thought he passes away from this
world', etc. says Satapatha Brahmana (X. 6.3.1). Such a
thought, which fixes the course of life hereafter cannot be
had at the moment of death without lifelong practice. Hence
such meditations should be practised tiU death. But Bhas-
Introduction
Ixi
kara, Ramanuja and Nimbarka connect the Sutra with the
meditation on Brahman ; for according to them even after
the rise of knowledge one has to go after death by the path
of the gods, at the end of which path one gets disembodied
completely and attains Brahman, while Sankara holds that
on death he becomes one with Brahman. Madhva says
that meditation is to be practised tUl the close of life, i.e.
tiU release. In this meditation on Brahman, according to
Sankara, one is to identify oneself with Brahman. Bhaskara
also prescribes the same process ; for identity between the
two is the real fact, and the difEerence is only due to Upa-
dhis. This diflference is destroyed by the meditation on
identity, just as dross is removed from gold by contact with
heat. According to Ramanuja one has to regard the supreme
Brahman as the Self of the soul even as the soul is the self
of the body ; for aU souls constitute the body of the Lord.
There is non-difference between them in so far as the T is
of the nature of Brahman, and there is difference between
them even as there is difference between the soul and body.
Nunbarka prescribes meditation on Brahman as the Self of
the meditatmg person, i.e. as non-different from hun ; for
the difference is experienced, while the non-difference is not
experienced at present by ah, and that is the cause of bond-
age. By such meditation the soul reahzes its non-difference
from Brahman and gets released. Madhva prescribes that
Brahman is to be meditated upon as the Lord, while VaUabha
says that those who foUow the path of knowledge (Maryada
Marga) meditate on It as their Self and become one with It.
AU the commentators agree that on reahzation or rise
of knowledge aU works except those that have begun to
lake effect in that life (Prarabdha Karma) are destroyed.
The Prarabdha Karmas are exhausted by bemg worked out.
Ixii
Sn-Bhdsya
when this body faUs off and one attains perfection, becommg
one with Brahnian, as declared by Chdndogya VI. xiv. 2
(IV. i. 15, 19). Ramanuja and Nunbarka, however, thmk
that the Prarabdha Karma may not get exhausted m the life
m which knowledge has been gamed, and that the man ot
reahzation may have to go through several more lives to
exhaust them.
Sankara makes a twofold distinction among those who
have attamed knowledge, viz. those who have attamed know-
ledge of the nurguna (Supreme) Brahman and those who
have attamed knowledge of the saguna (Conditioned) Brah--
man. The organs of a knower of the supreme or nirguna
Brahman do not depart, but get merged in It at death.
Though the Madhyandina recension of Brhaddranyaka IV.
iv. 6 reads, 'From him the Pranas do not depart', yet it is
made clear by the KSnva recension of Brhaddranyaka III.
ii. 11 that the Pranas do not depart from the body, but get
merged ui him only. In other words, there is no gomg by
the path of the gods for such a knower. He becomes one
with Brahman at death. His organs also get merged in Brah-
man and attain absolute non-distinction, according to the
Prasna VI. 5, without any chance of cropping up again.
Mundaka III. u. 7 describes the end from a relative stand-
pomt, according to which the body dismtegrates and goes
back to the cause, the elements (IV. u. 12-16). On release
the soul does not attain anythmg new, but manifests its true
nature (Chd. VIII. in. 4 and xu. 3), which was covered by
ignorance (IV. iv. 1). The relation of the released soul with
Brahman is that of identity as it is given by texts like Chdn-
dogya VI. viu. 7 and Brhaddranyaka I. iv. 10 and IV. iv.
6 (4). In the state of release the soul exists, according to
Jaunini, as possessed of the attributes of Brahman, while
Introduction Ixiii
Audulomi thinks it exists as pure Intelligence. According,
to Badarayana, however, both are true; the former from
the relative aspect and the latter from the transcendental
aspect, even as Brahman is so viewed from these two stand-
points as Saguna and Nhguna (5-7).
The soul of a knower of saguna Brahman goes by the
path of the gods to Brahmaloka (the region of Brahma),
i.e. it attains the conditioned Brahman^which is the view
of Badari and is also endorsed by Badarayana. On the dis-
solution of Brahmaloka the soul along with the ruler of that
world attains the supreme Brahman (IV. iu. 7-11). The
view upheld by Jaunini, viz. that the soul attains the supreme
Brahman cannot be supported, for with respect to It there
can be no gomg or attammg, since the realization of the
supreme Brahman consists in nothing but the destruction
of ignorance (12-14). Those alone who have worshipped
the saguna Brahman without a symbol attam Brahmaloka
(15). The soul which has attained Brahmaloka effects its
desires by mere volition (IV. iv. 8). It can exist with or
without a body accordmg to its Ukmg (10-14). It attams
aU the lordly powers except the power of creation, etc. (17).
There is no return to this mundane existence from Brahma-
loka (22).
Rdmdnuja does not make a twofold distmction among
the knowers of Brahman as Sankara does. According to him
the Pranas (organs) of a knower of Brahman do not depart
from hun (the soul) at dteath while his soul does depart
from the body. This is made clear in the Madhyandina
recension of Brhaddranyaka IV. iv. 6, which reads, 'From
him the Pranas do not depart' while the Kanva text reads,
'His Pranas do not depart'. So the soul of the knower of:
Brahman departs from the body and goes by the path of
kiv
Sri-Bhasya
the gods. Brhaddranyaka IV. iv. 7 refers not to absolute
immortality by the destruction of the embodied state, but to
the destruction of past sms and the non-cluiging of those
committed after the rise of knowledge, and the reaching of
Brahman m the text means only intuitive knowledge of
Brahman, and not actual attamment of Brahman. The em-
bodied state (Saihsara) lasts tiU the end of the path of the
gods, when it completely casts off its embodunent and attains
Brahman (IV. u. 7, 12, 13). The worshippers of the con-
ditioned Brahman (Hiranyagarbha) and the supreme Brah-
man go by the path of the gods, but not those who worship
Brahman in symbols (IV. iu. 15).
The soul on release manifests its own nature (Chdn-
dogya VIII. xii. 3) and does not attain anything new. This
true nature which is freedom from sin is obscured in the
state of bondage by Karma (past works) (IV. u. 1). In the
released state the soul experiences that it is non-different
from the supreme Brahman which is its Self and that it is
the body, and hence a mode, of that Brahman (4). The
released soul is not only mere mteUigence but also has
quahties like freedom from sin, etc. for they are not con-
tradictory ; and since the Sruti mentions both, they are
equally true of the soul (7). The released soul effects its
deshe by mere will (8). It can exist with or without a body
accordmg to its sweet wiU (12). The released soul acquhes
equahty with Brahman as regards its qualities but it does
not obtain the power of creating, etc. (17). There is no
return for the released soul to this mundane world (22).
Bhaskara, who preceded Ramanuja, also mterprets the
Sutras referred to above from IV. ii. 12 more or less lUce
him except the Sutra IV. iv. 4 which he interprets as foUows:
The released soul attains identity with Brahman as is con-
Introduction Ixv
veyed by texts like 'I am Brahman'. Just as when a pot is
broken the space inside becomes one with the infinite spa.ce,
so also the soul becomes.'one with Brahman. Bynatiure
they are identical and it is the Upadhis that create the differ-
ence. So the Upadhis being destroyed the difference is de-
stroyed and the soul becomes one with.Brahman.
Nimbarka^ who came after Ramanujal^foUows him closely
in these Sutras except in IV. iv. 4 where he states that the
released soul experiences itself as both different and non-
different from Brahman. >
In Sutras IV. u. 7-14 Madhva does not find: anything
connected with the knower of Brahman, but finds quite a
different topic, viz. whether Laksmi (Prakrti) is also merged
like the organs at death, and says that she is not merged in
Visnu, but ever reinains separate. In Sutras IV. ui. 7-14-he:
first gives the views of Badari and Jaiinini, and says finally
in Sutra 15 that of those who go by the path of the gods,
only those who worship the supreme Brahmanlas all-pervad-
ing attain It while those who see It in,the symbol, i.e. in
one's own body go to the conditioned Brahman. In the last
Section of the work Madhva discusses the enjoyment of the
released soul. Those who have entered into the Lord (Sa-
yujya Mukti) enjoy the same pleasures as the Lord, though
not in the same degree and experience nothing but bliss (IV.
iv. 1-4). Jaimini thinks the released souls enjoy bliss through
the Lord's body, as they themselves have no body, either
gross or subtle (5). Audulomi thinks that the released have
a body of their own consisting of pure inteUigence through
which they enjoy pleasures. The casting of aU material bodies
and existing as pure intelligence is what is caUed the; state of
release (6). Badarayana says it is both ways, for.the Scrip-
tures say that qrs release souls give up their;material bodies.
v-1
Jxvi
Sri-Bhdsya
and possess a form of the essence of mteUigence, with which
they enter mto the Lord and enjoy aU bhss m and through
Hun (7). The released soul issues forth from the Lord and
takes up eidier a form of inteUigence or a material body
accordmg to its Uking (12), and it then experiences only
bhss and pleasure (15). The released attam aU deshes but
they do not have the power of creation, etc. which belongs
only to the Lord. They have no control over the world order
(17-20). They do not return any more to this mundane
world (22).
In Sutras IV. u. 7-16 Vallabha describes the nature of
souls that have attained release through the Pusti Marga
or the path of divine grace, as contrasted with the Maryada
Marga or the path of knowledge and meditation. The mani-
festation of the Lord as love and the experience of the highest
bhss by attaming the Lord as the Purusottama (the supreme
Being) are possible only m Gokula. Souls that have reached
this world and have become united with the Purusottama
are never again separated from Him. The knower who goes
by the path of the gods attains not the conditioned Brah-
man but the supreme Brahman. Those who understand aU
thmgs to be nothing but Brahman go to the supreme Brah-
man, while those who worship through symbols do not attain
It (7-14). But the devotees of the Purusottama attam Hun
direct as soon as they have a deshe for Hun (15). There is
a difference between the two asphants, and each goes to his
object of worship (16).
The soul on attaming Brahman, gets a special kmd
(Aprakrta) of body, through which it enjoys pleasures
(IV. i. 1). Through this body the released enjoy pleasures
with Brahman, says Jahnmi, whUe Audulomi holds that they
enjoy pleasures as pure inteUigence ; for to enjoy with Brah-
Introduction Ixvii
man, whicii is pure Intelligence, they must also be of the
same kmd. FmaUy, however, Badarayana decides that the
released have Aprakrta bodies which enable them all the
same to enjoy with Brahman, which is pure InteUigence
(5-7). Only those whom the Lord elects attain Hun (8).
The enjoyment in the company of the Lord is free from
the functions of the body, speech, etc. (jagad-vydpara
varjam). This meaning is quite different from what the other
commentators attach to these terms. Those who attain re-
lease, whether through the Pusti Marga, or through the
Maryada Marga, do not return to this mundane world any
more (22).
A Brief Review of the Various Commentaries
From the previous sections we find that aU the Vedantic
Schools more or less agree on certain points, especiaUy in
their attacks against the non-Vedantic Schools. AU agree
that Brahman, the ultunate reaUty, is the cause of the world ;
that a knowledge of It leads to release, which is the sum-
mum bonum of life; that Brahman can be known only
through the Scriptures and not through mere reasoning or
other means of knowledge, the Scriptures being the sole
authority with respect to It. But they differ among themselves
as to the nature of Brahman, Its causahty in respect of the
world, the nature of the soul and its relation to Brahman,
and the condition of the soul on release.
According to Sankara the ultimate reality is the one non-
dual Brahman. It is Existence, Knowledge, Infinity. It is
mere existence and pure Consciousness, i.e. It is homoge-
neous, without attributes. Existence etc. are not Its attributes
hut Its very essence, and they are convertible terms. It is
Ixviii
Srl-Bhdsya
immutable and eternal. The one unmutable Brahman appears
as this diverse universe through Maya (ignorance), which
is indefinable (anirvacanlya). It is formless ; the various
forms are but Its refiections, Uke the reflections of the one
sun in sheets of water and are therefore unreal. Even isvara
(the conditioned Brahman) is in a way the product of this
Maya, beuig the highest reading of the attributeless Brahman
by the individuaUzed soulwhich serves the purpose of
devotion and worship (Upasana) for man. Brahman is both
the efficient and the material cause of the world. The world
is a Vivarta, an apparent^not real^modification of Brah-
man through Maya, even as a snake is seen in a rope, and
tiierefore it is non-different from Brahman. Brahman, though
immutable, yet produces this diverse universe. The Sruti
declares it and it is not um-easonable either, for the soul in
its dream state conjmres up diverse creation without marring
its individuality. The soul is in reality eternal, uncreated,
all-pervading, and identical with Brahman, though as individ-
ualized by its Upadhi, the mner organ (antahkarania), it
is an effect, atomic, an agent and part of Brahman. The soul
on release attains identity with Brahman and exists as pure
Consciousness, though from the relative standpoint attributes
like omniscience are spoken of it. A knower of nhguna
Brahman attains It dkect at death without having to go by
the 'path of the gods', whUe a knower of the saguna Brah-
man goes by that path and attams Brahmaloka, whence he
does not return to this mundane world, but attains the
supreme Brahman at the end of the cycle, along with
Brahma, the ruler of Brahmaloka.
To Bhaskara and the other commentators Brahman is
not attributeless, but an essentiaUy personal God possessmg
qualities. Accordmg to them personality need not necessarily
Introduction kix
be limited so as to contradict infinity. They do not accept
the Maya doctrine, for to them the universe of sentient and
insentient beings is real and an effect of Brahman through
Parinama or actual modification and not through Vivarta,
as Sankara holds. Brahman manifests the world through Its
powers (Sakti) and yet remains unchanged in Its true
essence. The effect, the world, is non-different from
the cause. Brahman, which is both the efficient and the
material cause of the world. Madhva alone holds that it is
only the efficient cause, while Prakrti, which is dependent
on the Lord, is the material cause. The soul according to
them is really atomic, an agent and a part of Brahman. On
release it attains its true nature which was obscured in the
state of Samsara (bondage) by Avidya (ignorance) and
Karma. The knower of Brahman goes by 'the path of the
gods', at the end of which he gets completely disembodied,
attains Brahman and does no more return to the mortal
world. They do not make any distinction of higher and lower
knowledge like Sarikara. Accordmg to them devotion (Bhakti)
and divine grace are the chief means to release, and not
knowledge (Jiiana). Though these are some of the common
features of theh philosophies, yet there are subtle differences
amongst them as we shall presently see.
According to Bhaskara, Brahman is differentiated and
also non-differentiated. The non-differentiated, formless
aspect, which is merely existence and consciousness, is the
causal state, and Brahman manifested as the world is the
differentiated state. The former aspect is Its true nature,
while the latter is adventitious. Brahman, which is one,
appears as many owing to Upadhis, like the reflections of
the one sun in different sheets of water. Brahman and the
world are both different and non-different, but for that reason
Ixx
Sri-Bhasya
the world is not unreal (Mithya). From the standpomt of
the cause. Brahman, the reality is one, and the world is not
experienced as anythmg different, whUe from another stand-
point it is experienced as distinct from It. Unity is the natural
state ; the distinctions are adventitious. Brahman of Its own
wUl actuahy transforms Itself and at the same tune remams
unchanged in Its essence, even as in the dream state there
appears diversity in the indivisible soul. The soul in its true
nature is identical with Brahman, but in the state of bondage,
when it is hmited by the Upadhis, it appears to be different.
It is matter, which is also a power of Brahman, that brings
about this difference between Brahman and souls. So the
soul is non-different and different from Brahman. The
Upadhi is not umeal (Mithya), but real so long as it lasts.
In the state of release, when the Upadhi is destroyed the
soul attains its true nature, which is identity with Brahman.
Thus Brahman actuahy experiences the sufferings and im-
perfections of the soul. It is Brahman which appears as the
soul and finally attains release.
Rdmdnuja refutes Bhaskara's view of unity and variety,
for the two, being contradictory, cannot exist in the same
thing. Moreover, the difference is not experienced by itself.
Agam if Brahman exists as the world, then It would be
affected by its unperfections ; so Ramanuja does not accept
this view of Bhaskara. He also denies Bhaskara's formless,
non-differentiated Brahman, which is mere existence and
consciousness ; for according to hun Brahman has always
auspicious qualities and is free at all tunes from aU kmds of
imperfections. He postulates a Brahman which is qualified
by the world of sentient and insentient beings as Its body
under aU conditions, viz. in both the causal and effected
states. At creation all the changes and unperfections are
Introduction kxi
therefore limited to Its body alone, while It remains un-
changed in Its true essence. At the time of creation It only
takes on a new condition as the manifest world, but remains
the same in substance ; hence the world is non-different from
its cause. Souls are really effects of Brahman and form Its
body, but they are said to be not created because at creation
there is no essential change m them as in the elements. The
soul is a knower, atomic, an agent and a part of Brahman
in the sense that the body is a part of an embodied bemg,
or a quahty a part of the substance qualified. As quahties
are not different from the substance, so also souls are not
different from Brahman. The soul on release manifests its
true nature, which consists in freedom from sin etc. which
was obscured in the state of bondage by ignorance and
Karma. It attams aU the auspicious qualities of Brahman,
but not identity with It, for It continues to have a separate
existence. In the released state it experiences itself as non-
different from Brahman, being but Its modethat Brahman
is its self, and that it is the body of Brahman.
Unlike Ramanuja, Nimbarka sees no need to regard
matter and soul as the body of God and therefore as Its
qualities. For qualities generaUy help us to distinguish a thing
from others of its kind. But in this case, besides Brahman
there is nothing else from which It requhes to be distin-
guished. He does not also agree with Bhaskara when he says
that the differences are due to Upadhis^that the souls are
Brahman Ihnited by Upadhisas that would mean that the
perfect Brahman actuaUy gets limited which is inconceivable.
Again souls' identity with Brahman on release would mean
theh destruction which is as good as accepting Maya-vada.
On this view the world process would have no meaning for
it is started by God in the interest of the souls, so that they
Ixxii
Srl-Bhdsya
may attain perfection. If souls are Brahman Itself, the world
process would lose .all significance. For all these reasons he
differs from Bhaskara's Bhedabheda-vada or unity and differ-
ence, accordmg to which the unity aspect is natural and the
difference adventitious. Though Ramanuja also recognizes
difference and non-difference, yet he stresses non-difference.
Bralmian accordmg to him is non-dual, but qualified by
matter and souls, which are Its body. Nunbarka, however,
proclaims that both unity and difference are natural and
equaUy real and eternal. Matter and soul are different from
Brahman, for they have different characteristics ; and they
are non-different as they are not experienced apart from
Brahman. The relation is as between the snake and its coils
or an orb and its lustre. Both are equally real. In the state
of release the soul realizes its non-difference from Brahman,
which was not patent in the state of bondage, being obscured
by ignorance and Karma, and so it had to suffer.
Vallabha holds that Brahman is attributeless and yet
possesses aU auspicious qualities which are non-material
{aprdkrta) for It is of a different category from this world.
In It ah contradictions are resolved. It is essentiaUy Exist-
ence, Knowledge, and Bliss and has no cotmection with
Maya. At creation it becomes an effect and is perceived and
at dissolution it ceases to be such an object of perception
and is absorbed. The world is therefore neither illusory
nor different from It. It is real and hence its Brahmatva.
The relation between the two, the world and Brahman,
one of identity and the text, 'AU this is Brahman',
is hteraUy true. Both sentient and msentient beings are
in essence Brahman but in the former the bhss aspect
is witheld, and m the latter the knowledge and bliss aspects
are witheld. The soul is identical with Brahman, as a part
Introduction Ixxiii
^ is with the whole. In the state of bondage the soul is under
ignorance and is but a semblance of Brahman, but when it
attains release it recovers its true nature, i.e. the bliss aspect
also is manifested, and it becomes one with Brahman,
Though the world is real and is Brahman in truth, yet through
ignorance we see diversity, which is the cause of our bondage.
A man of reahzation sees the world as but Brahman; one
who has mere scriptural knowledge understands both Its
aspects, i.e. as Brahman and Maya or as reality and un-
reahty, and the ignorant mix up the two. Brahman and
Maya, and regard both aspects as true. The world is not
unreal, but what is umreal in it is our viewpoint of it, which
is removed when one attains reahzation and is released..
Madhva is a thorough-going dualist. He declares three
eternaUy distinct and enthely separate entities, viz. Brahman,,
matter (Prakrti), and souls, though the last two are depen^
dent on Brahman, who is their ruler. Brahman is the only
absolute mdependent existence and everything else is finite,
being conditioned by Brahman. It is essentially Knowledge
and Bhss. When Brahman is said to be imknowable and
mdescribable, it only means that It cannot be known com-
i pletely nor described fuUy, for otherwise It is known and
also described by the Scriptines. Though Its infinite person-
ality is beyond our conception, yet out of grace for the de-
votee It takes on limited forms, which, however, are neither
material nor finite. Matter (Prakrti) is also eternal, but
dependent on Brahman and capable of undergoing modi-
fication. At creation it undergoes modification at the
wiU of the Lord in accordance with the Karma of partic-
ular soul. Thus the Lord is only the efficient cause.
I It does not appeal to Madhva that an insentient world should
be produced from the sentient Brahman. Souls, though eter-
Ixxiv
Srl-Bhdsya
nal, are limited in intelligence, etc. and dependent on Brah-
man, which guides them to thek goal. On release they are
not only free from this bondage and suffering but also enjoy
positive bliss. Release is not a mere negation of sufEermg,
but a positive blissful state. In release the soul does not
attam identity or even equahty with Brahman, nor are the
released souls all equal among themselves.
Sankara's Vivartavdda
There is a view current amongst scholars today that the
Veddnta-Sutras propound a Theistic philosophy, whatever
be the exact nature of it, and never Sankara's rigid monism.
Such a view we should think is not justified in the fact of
very many Sutras in the work which clearly point to Vivarta
as against Parinama.
From the first Sutra of the work we find that Brahman
is to be inquked into, for a knowledge of this Brahman that
is aspked after, leads to non-return to this mundane exist-
ence as is declared by the last Sutra. So it is the knowledge
of Brahman that leads to release, and Upasana, Bhakti,
grace, or Karma has no place in this except as an indkect
means, by way of purification of the mind, to reahzation of
knowledge. By knowledge is not meant mere mtellectual
grasp, for Sarikara nowhere says that mere inteUectual know-
ledge of Brahman leads to release, but it is mtuitive know-
ledge attained through hearkig (sravana), reasoning (manana)
andmedkation (nididhydsana) that leads to such knowledge
as destroys ignorance about Brahman, resultmg m release.
So the unportance given to Bhakti (devotion) and grace by
the theistic commentators does not seem to be justified
accordmg to the author's views.
Introduction Ixxv
Sutras I. iv. 23, II. i. 14-20, 28, II. iii. 50, and III. u. 18,
specially the last three, give us the framework, as it were,
of the whole work. These Sutras, coupled with the fact that
their author uses the word 'Sat' only with respect to Brah-
man and nowhere with respect to the world or the soul show
tliat he must have had Vivarta (apparent modification) and
not Parinama (actual modification) in view. Though Sutras
I. iv. 26 and II. i. 13 lean towards Parinama, yet ih& Sutras
referred to above leave no room for doubt that this view is
finaUy discarded by the author in favour of Vivarta. Pari-
nama is accepted by him only as a workable basis to refute
the Sariikhya's and others from theh own standpomt. Sutras
II. i. 14-20 give the author's view which is Vivartavada and
this is confirmed by Sutras II. i. 28, II. hi. 50, and HI. u. 18.
These three Sutras occur at significant places in the work,
viz. in the sections dealing with the causality of Brahman,
the nature of the soul, and the nature of Brahman, and all
point towards the unreahty of the world of sentient and in-
sentient beings.
Sutra III. ii. 18 gives an example as to how the formless
Brahman appears to have forms. It says that these forms of
Brahman are like the reflections of the one sun in different
sheets of water, meaning thereby that they are unreal, bemg
due only to the Ihniting conditions (Upadhis), even as the
reflected images of the sun are unreal.
Again, Sutra II. i. 28 explains the declaration of the
Sruti that Brahman is changeless and yet produces the diverse
universe. It shows that it is like the dream world created
by the indivisible soulwhich clearly points out that this
creation from Brahman is also unreal from the standpoint
of the transcendental reality, even as the dream world is
umeal as compared with our waking state.
Ixxvi
Sri-Bhasya
Sutra II. iii. 50 (abhdsa eva cd), according to Sankara,.
says that the soul as such is but a reflection of Brahman m
the Antahkaranas and so the reflections m different Antah-
karanas are different, even as reflections of the one sun in.
different sheets of water are different. So the suffermgs of
the soul do not affect Brahman, nor do the suffermgs of one
soul affect another, for they are different and as such there
is no confusion of the results of action done m the gross,
body. It is only in the state of release that the soul becomes
aU-pervadmg and identical with Brahman, and at that time
the question of the results of action does not arise at aU. But
Sankara's interpretations are also forced at places, as for
example, his commentary on the 'Anandamaya Adhikarana''
where he is very halting.
Conclusion
Brahman is eternal, immutable, without a begmning or
end. It is beyond the senses, mind, and speech, and so it
caimot be described in words : 'There the eyes cannot reach,
nor speech nor mind' {Ke. I. 3); 'Whence speech returns
with the mmd without reaching It' {Tai. II. 9). Therefore
nothmg positive can be predicated of Brahman. Even the
Scriptures give but an indhect hint at It. The utmost that
can be said of It is that It is Existence, Knowledge, Bliss
Infinite. Even this is only by way of a concession. The best
description, however, of It is, 'Not this, not this', that is,
rejecting from It everythmg which is lunited by the senses:
and the mind, and then what is left is Brahman. As long as
the mind functions and reasons, one is within the sphere of
relativity, but when it stops functionmg and is annihilated,
then one attains Samadhi and reahzes Brahman. When one-
Introduction Ixxvii
tries to describe this Absolute, to express It in terms of
thought and speech, It ceases to be the Absolute and becomes
phenomenal. As such the descriptions given by different
persons are likely to differ according to the standpoint or
plane of consciousness from which they.describe the Reahty.
AU these descriptions are real so fair- as.they go, for they
are descriptions of the one Reality though they may differ
among themselves even as the photographs of the sun taken
from different distances by one who approaches it are real,
bemg photographs of the same sun and yet they would vary
from one another.. When a person describes the Absolute
from the material plane,^when he is conscious ot the body,
God, soul, and Nature appear as three different entities,
God being the ruler of the other two. When he sees It from
the mental planewhen one is conscious of hunself as a-
Jiva^he sees the three entities as one organic unity, and
realizes, himself as a part of God. But when one rises to the
sphitual plane and is conscious of himself as pure sphit, then
he reahzes that he and the Absolute are one. To start with,
God appears as an extra-cosmic Being; then he is seen as
the God immanent in the universe as its inner ruler; and
finaUy one ends by identifymg the soul with God. From
duahsm we go to qualified monism and finaUy end in
monism. The views expressed by the various commentators
are beautifully harmonized by Sri Ramakrishna, the great
prophet of the modem age on the basis of his reaslization as
foUows :
'That which is Brahman is Sakti and That again is the
Mother. . . .After attaming perfect Knowledge one reahzes
that they are not different. They are. the same, like the gem
and its briUiance. . . .But you caimot realize this non-duality
before the attahunent of perfect Knowledge. Attaining perfect
Ixxviii
Srl-Bhdsya
Knowledge, one goes into Samadhi, beyond the twenty-four
cosmic principles. Therefore the principle of "I" does not
exist in that stage. A man cannot describe in words what he
feels m Samadhi. Coming down, he can give just a hint
about it. I come down a hundred cubits as it were, when
I say "Om" after Samadhi. Brahman is beyond the mjunc-
tions of the Vedas and cannot be described. There neither
"I" nor "you" exists.^
'Agam, when God changes the state of my mind, when
He brmgs my mmd down to the plane of the Relative, I
perceive that it is He who has become aU thesethe Creator,
Maya, the hving beings, and the universe.
'Agam, sometimes He shows me that He has created
the universe and aU hving bemgs. He is the Master and the
universe His garden.^
'As long as a man is conscious of "I" and "you" and as
long as he feels that it is he who prays or meditates, so long
whl he feel that God is listening to his prayers and that God
is a Person. Then he must say, "O God, Thou art the Master
and I am Thy servant. Thou art the Whole and I am a part
of Thee. Thou are the Mother and I am Thy child". At that
time there exists a feelmg of difference : "I am one and Thou
art another". It is God Hunself who makes us feel this
difference ; . . .As long as one is aware of this difference,.
one must accept Sakti, the Personal God.
'Therefore as long as a man is conscious of "I" and of
differentiation he cannot speak of the attributeless Brahman
1 'M', The Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna, trans. Swami Nikhil-
ananda, Madras : Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1947, Second Edn. (Indian),,
p. 602.
2 Ibid., p. 250.
Introduction Ixxix
and must accept Brahman with attributes. This Brahman
with attributes has been declared.. .to be the primal Energy
(Sakti).
'As long as a man must see the sun in the water of his
"I-consciousness" and has no other means of seemg It, as
long as he has no means of seeing the real Sun except through.
Its reflection, so long the reflected sun alone is one hundred
per cent real to him. As long as the "I" is real, so long is
the reflected sun realone hundred per cent real. That
reflected sun is nothing but the primal Energy. . . .That
which is Brahman with attributes is verily Brahman without
attributes ; that which is Brahman is verily Sakti. One
realizes this non-duahty after the attainment of perfect Know-
ledge'.*
The Upanisads, as aheady stated at the very beginning,
do not teach any particular doctrine. They teach various-
doctrines suited to different people at different stages of sphit-
ual evolution. They are not contradictory, but based on the
principle of individual fitness for receiving a truth (Adhikari-
bheda). The aspirants are taken step by step to the ultunate
truth, from dualism to qualified monism and finaUy to
monism. 'That thou Art' is the last word of the Upanisads
in religion. The Brahma-Sutras also are as comprehensive
as the Upanisads and contain reference to these various
stages. Hence commentators, when they claim that their
commentary alone is correct, do not reflect Badarayana's.
view truly.
3 Ibid., pp. 603-4.
lx.xx Sn-Bhdsya
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. The various commentaries on the Brahma-Sutras.
2. George Thibauts, The Vedanta-Sutras, with the Commentary
cf Ramanuja (English Translation).
3. Subba Rao, S., The Vedanta-Sutras, with the Commentary
-of Madhva (English translation).
4. Ghate, V. S., The Vedanta.
5. Das Gupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. HI.
6. Dr. Radliakrishnan S.,^ Indian Philosophy, Vol. XL
BRAHMA-SOTRAS
SRI-BHASYA
PART I
Chapters I, II, and III (Sections 1 & 2)
By Swami Vireswarananda
vi1
CHAPTER I
SECTION I
1. Then (after a knowledge of the work-portion of ttie
Vedas and the ephemeral nature of the results o mere
ivork has been gained by the study of the Purva
Mimaihsa) therefore (as the results obtained by mere worit,
i.e. sacrifices etc., are ephemeral and limited, whereas the
results of the knowledge of Brahman is eternal and infinite)
the inquiry (into the real nature) of Brahman (should be
taken up).
The word 'Brahman' is derived from the root 'brh' which
denotes greatness, and is therefore apphcable to ah objects
which have the quahty of greatness, but more aptly to tl^t
object which by nature and by qualities possesses this great-
ness to an infinite degree; hence the word 'Brahman' pri-
marily denotes that supreme Person who is the abode of all
auspicious quahties to an infinite degree and is free frofti affl
worldly taint. This supreme Person is the only Being the
knowledge of whose real nature results in liberation.
The word 'then' denotes hnmediate sequence and there-
fore' signifies that the antecedent fact necessarily leads to
an inquiry into Brahman. This antecedent fact is the know-
ledge of the work-portion of the Vedas. As the -desired
knowledge of Brahman depends on the interpretatidh of
Vedic texts and as one who has studied the Vedas
(svadhydyd): naturally takes to the stuidy of the exposition
2
Sn-Bhdsya
of work first, therefore an inquiry into work must first be
taken up. Wheii from such an mquury a person learns that f
the result of all work is ephemeral"^ and limited, while he
finds that another part of the Vedas says that the knowledge
of Brahman yields eternal and unlimited results, viz libera-
tion,^ a deshe to know Brahman arises in hun. Therefore,
on account of that very reason, an inquiry into Brahman
should be .taken up after an inquky into work. Scriptures
also support this view : "Having exammed the worlds attain-
able through work, a Brahmana should get dispassionate
towards them. The uncaused cannot be attained by the
caused. To know that he. . .must approach a guru"etc. (Mu. .
I.U.12). A Brahmana, i.e. one who is devoted to the stiidy
ot the Vedas, having examined, scrutinized, with the help of
the Purva-Mlmaihsa, the true natme of work, and coming
to know that the results of work are ephemeral and there-
fore work carmot help hun to attain the eternal supreme
Person, gets dispassionate, and to know that supreme Person,
he approaches a guru in all humility. It is the knowledge of
the ephemeral nature of the results of work that necessitates
an,inquky into Brahman.
An objection may, however, be raised that, since the
study of the Vedas {svddhydya) itself gives one the know- *
ledge that the result of work is ephemeral and lunited, why
should not one straightaway take to the study of the Uttara
Mimamsa ? This is not possible. Even as the knowledge of
Brahman gained from the mere study of the Vedas does not
help one desirous of liberation, but necesskates on his part
an mquky into Brahman, in order to make his knowledge
i-Vide Cha. VIII. i. 6; Br. III. viii. 10; Ka. I. ii. 10 ; Mu.
1. ii. 7; and so on.
? Vide Tai. II. 1; Cha. VII. xxvi. 2; Sve. III. 8; and so on.
1.1.1. ] Sn-Bhdsya 3
'
precise and beyond doubt and also to preclude all wrong
notions, so also a study of the Purva-Mimaiiisa is necessary
to realize definitely and beyond doubt that the results of all
work is ephemeral and lunited. It is only after such a definite
knowledge is gained that the necessity of an inquiry into
Brahman results as an inunediate sequence.
Objection by Advaitin : Here the word 'then' refers to
the fourfold sphitual requisites, which existmg an inquky
into Brahman is possible and without which it would be
impossible, and not to an inquky into work, for it in no
way helps one who aspkes after knowledge or liberation.
The cause of this bondage is the wrong perception of mani-
foldness due to begiimingless Nescience {avidya) which
covers, as k were, the non-dual and non-differentiated
Brahman, the pure Consciousness, which is the only reahty.
Vedanta texts try to estabUsh the knowledge of this Brah-
man, for such knowledge alone destroys Nescience and its
product, the manffoldness, which destruction is the same
thing as hberation. To this end, work is not only not helpful,
but is detrimental, since work is based on the assumption
of plurahty, like caste, age, stage of life, object to be accom^
plished, ks means and method, and so on. Scriptures also
uphold the above view. Vide texts referred to in the footnote
on page 2.
The Uttara-Mimaihsa discusses meditations {upasands),
though connected with work, because they are of the nature
of knowledge ; yet they are not dkectly connected with the
subject-matter, viz. Brahman. The reference to the necessity
of all works as scriptures prescribe {B. S. III. iv. 26) is only
in so far as they create a desire for knowledge. 'Brahmanas
seek to know It through the study of the Vedas, sacrifices,
charity,' etc. (Br. TV. iv. 22). They do not produce know-
4
Sn-Bnssyd
ledgfe, for which purpose scfiptltfes pffesciribe eahiihesss
self-ebnti-oi, etc. aS direct meahs. Vide ibid. IV. iv. 23. So
Work without desiire purifies the iiiiild and creates a desite
for knowledge. Then knowledge produced through the hear^
ing, reasohhig, and meditation on texts like "Existence,
Knowledge, Infinite is Brahman" (Tai. II. 1), "This Self is
Brahman" (Br- H. v. 19), "That thou art" (Chd. VI. x. 7)
etc. puts an end to Nescience. Therefore the antecedent to
the inquiry of Brahman cannot be an inquiry into work,
but the fourfold requisites.^
Answer : Granted that the destruction of Nescience is
hberation and that knowledge of Brahman alone leads to it,
yet the nature of this knowledge remains to be explained.
Does 'knowledge' prescribed by scriptures as means to libera-
tion mean merely the sense of Vedic texts as conveyed by
the sentences or does it mean "of the nature of meditation
(updsana)" 7 It cannot be the first, for experience shows
that such knowledge does not destroy Nescience and its
product, the manifoldness. It cannot be said here that the
texts do not produce true knowledge which destroys Ne-
science, so long as the notion of manifoldness lasts, for it is
against experience and reason to say that all the necessary
means of time knowledge are there and yet it is not produced.
Nor can it be said that a littie of the beginningless Nescience
is stiU left behind even after knowledge origmates from the
sense of the text, due to which the wrong notion of mani-
foldness persists; for this wrong notion also is false and is
automatically destroyed when knowledge dawns. Moreover,
1 (1) Discrimination between things permanent and transcient;
(2) renunciation of the enjoyment of the results of work in this
world and in the next; (3) the six treasures, viz. ,?ama, dama,
uparati, titiksa, samadhdna, and sraddhd ; 'and (4) an intense fesite
for IrberaWbh. - .
$rl-Bkqsya 5
such a ppsitipn woul4 mean tfeat the wrong r^ption would
continue to exist indefinitely, since knowledge dogs riot
destroy it, and there is nothing elsp but knowledge th^t can
do it. In other words, there wiU be no liberation. It is equally
meaningless to say that knpwlgdge is produce^ by the sense
of the texts, which destroys Nescience, but the niapifolid^^ess
cpntipues tp exist, thpugb it has no Ipnger t|ie efffpt of
binding the soul; for to say that Nesciencp, the ropt pf
manifoldness. is destrpyed and ypt the nianifoldppss cpi^~
tinues to be experienced is ridiculoxis. It is tipt also ppssihle
that knowledge originates after ^estfpying NesiJienqe, fpr-
tlip latter is bghmipglpss and tberefpfp ppwerful, an4 <?m'
not ppssibly be destroyed by an antagonistic, notipri of ^iiity
which has been qomparatively of less duration and js, therie?
fore, weaker.
In wjiatspver way we may argue, if knowledge me^ps
the sense of Vedic tgxts as eonyeyed by the sentences, we
find that such Icnowledge dpps npj; le.^d us to liber^tipn,
and hence we haye tp cpnclix^e that knpwlec|ge prespribeij
as a mef^ns to hberation is npt thP were sense pf the te^ts
as conveyed by the sentences, but something different, viz
knowledge as conveyed by the term 'nieditatipn' (upasana).
That 'knowledge' means 'meditation' is inferred frpm texts
like "Knowmg about It, one should meditate on It" (Br. IV.
iv. 2'1); "One should meditate on the Self alone" (ibid. I.
iv. 15); "The Self is to be seen.. .and meditated upon"
(ibid., II. iv. 5); "Having searched out the Self, he knows
It" (Chd. VII. vu. 1), where the word 'knows' of the
Chdndogya text also is to be taken in the sense of medita-
tion prescribed by the other texts, since the purport of the
different Sakhas of the Vedas is one. Scriptures also dhectly,
uphold this view in the following texts, where we find
6
Srl-Bhdsya
the two words 'knowing' and 'meditation' interchanged in ^
the introductory and concludmg portions :^ "One should
meditate on mind as Brahman" {ibid., III. xviii. 1), which
topic ends thus, "He who knows this" etc. {ibid.. III. xviii.
2). See also Br. I. iv. 7 and the topic in Chd. IV. i. 4-5,
which ends in IV. ii. 2.
Meditation, again, is a constant remembrance of the
object meditated upon, like a contmuous stream of oil.
Texts like "When constant remembrance has been attained,
all knots (bondages) are rent asunder" {ibid., VII. xxvi.
2) prescribe this constant remembrance as a means to
liberation. This form of remembering is as good as seeing. \
"When that supreme Person is seen, aU the knots of the
heart are rent asunder" (MM. II. u. 8). The text "The Self
should be seen^to be heard of, reflected on, and medi-
tated upon" {Br. II. iv. 5) also shows that meditation
is as good as seeing. Remembrance when exalted assumes
the same form as seeing or direct perception. About such
constant remembrance or dhect perception, which is pres-
cribed as a means to liberation, scriptures further say :
"This Self is not realized by the study of the Vedas, nor by
the inteUect, nor by much hearing of scriptures ; whomso- \
ever this Self deshes, by hun is this Self realized, unto hun
this Self reveals ItseU" {Mu. III. u. 3). So hearing, reason- .;
ing, etc. do not lead to the realization of the Self, but it is
realized by him alone who is deshed by the Self. The
1 In the treatment of a subject the topic introduced should be
referred to again in the concluding portion, otherwise the treatment
becomes defective. Since we find these words interchanged in these
portions in scriptures, which are free from all defects, we have to
conclude that the two words 'knowing' and 'meditation' mean the ;
same thing.
I.I.I. ] . Sri-Bhasya s 7
^ extremely beloved is desired. He who extremely loves itbis
Self is loved by the Self. So that this beloved may reaUze
the Self, the Lord Hhnself helps him : "Those who are Con-
stantly attached to Me and worship Me with devotion.-^!
give that dhection to theh mind by which they come to Me"
{Gita, X. 10). See also VII. 17. Therefore, we conclude
that he to whom this constant remembrance which is exalted
to the height of dhect perception is dear, because the object
of that remembrance is dear, he is loved by the Self and by
him the Self is realized. This kind of constant remembrance
is called bhakti, for bhakti means devout worship. That is
why Sruti and Smrti texts say thus : "Knowhig him alone
one goes beyond death" {Sve. III. 8); "There is no'other
way out" {ibid., VI. 15); "Neither by the Vedas nor by
austerity, nor by gifts, nor by sacrifice can I be seen as thou
hast seen Me. But by single-minded devotion I may in this
lorm be known", etc. {Gita XI. 53-54). See also VIII.
22. For such constant remembrance, sacrifices etc. are
means. Vide Sutra HI. iv. 26. This constant remembrance,
which is the same as knowing, practised throughout life, is
the only means to the realization of Brahman, and aU duties
prescribed for the various stages of life {asramas) have to
be observed only for the origmation of knowledge. The
Sutra-kara also refers to this in Sutras IV. i. 12, 16 and
III. iv. 13. Scriptures also say, "He who knows both vidya
(knowledge) and avidya (non-knowledge), he having con-
quered death by avidya attains immortality through vidya"
(r.sa. 11). By avidya here is meant that which is different
from vidyd, i.e. duties pescribed for the various stages of life.
By this all previous sins (death) which obstruct the origina-
tion of knowledge are destroyed. "By the performance of
duty sins are destroyed." Thus the knowledge which is the
Srl-Bhdsya
[ I.I.I.
taearis to the attainment of Brahman depends on the due
peiformance of the works prescribed for the various stages
of life. Hence an inquiry into work forms an essential pre-
requisite of the inquury into Brahman, and the position of
the Advaitin is not tenable.
The Great Purvapaksa
ADVAITIN' S POSITION REV IEWED
1. BRAHMAN IS NON-DIFFERENTIATED AND THE ONLY
REALITY
Brahman, the non-differentiated pure Consciousness, is
the'only reality, and all this manifoldness is imagined in
It alone and is false. "The Universe, my dear, was but the
i&tl (Sat) in the beginningonly one without a second."
{Chd. VI. u. 2) ; "That which is imperceptible, ungrasp-
able" etc. (Mu. 1. 1. 6) ; "It is unknown to those who do
ROt know" etc., (Ke. II. 3) ; "Existence, Knowledge, Infinite
is Brahnian." (Tai. II. 1). These texts show that Brahman
Is bereft of aU differences arising from unlike and like objects
and attributes, that It is not an object of perception, that
It cannot be known, but that Its nature is essentiaUy oppo-
site to what we generaUy experience in this world. Again,
"There is no difference whatsoever in it. He goes from death
to death, who sees difference, as it were, in It." (Br. IV.
iv. 19) ; "When one makes the least differentiation in It
tlien for hun there is fear." (Tai. III. 7). Such texts deny
all manifoldness in It and show that It alone is real and that
everything else is false. Falsehood means that kmd of
knowledge about a thmg, which is Uable to be sublated later
Srl-Bhdsya
9
by true knowledge of things as they are in reality, the earlier
one being due to certain defects m the means of knowledge
adopted.
2. MANIFOLDNESS DUE TO NESCIENCE
Due to the effect of begmnmgless Nescience which is
unspeakable (anirvacanlya) this manifoldness is wrongly
imagined m the one non-dual Brahman which is pure
Consciousness. This Nescience covers the real nature of
Brahman (dvarana-sakti) and makes it appear as manifold
(viksepa-sakti). "By falsehood are these covered; of these
which are real, falsehood is the covering." {Cha. VIII. ui.
1-2); "Know Maya to be Prakrti and the Lord as the
Mayin" {Sve. IV. 10) ; "The Lord on account of His Maya
is perceived manifold." {Br. II. v. 19) and so on.
3. NESCIENCE DESTROYED BY THE KNOWLEDGE OF
IDENTITY
This Nescience disappears when the identity of the indi-
vidual soul and Brahman is realized. "He who sees that
One, is no longer subject to death" {Chd. VII. xxvi. 2);
"The knower of Brahman becomes Brahman" {Mu. III. u.
6) ; "Knowing It alone one goes beyond death," {Sve. III.
8) ;here 'death' stands for Nescience. That the nature of
Brahman is non-differentiated is known through the full
comprehension of the texts like : "Truth, Knowledge,
Infinite is Brahman" {Tai. 2. 1) ; "Knowledge, Bliss is
Brahman" {Br. III. ix. 28), which describe Its real nature.
That the individual soul is identical with Brahman is dec-
lared by the foUowing texts : "He who worships another
10 Sn-Bhdsya
God thinking, 'He is one and I am another', he knows not"
etc. (Br. 1. iv. 10); "That thou art" (Chd. vi. 2) and so
on. The Sutra-kara also says m IV. i. 3 : "But (texts)
acknowledge (Brahman) as the self (of the meditator) and
also teach others (to realize It as such)."
4. SCRIPTURES OF GREATER FORCE AS AGAINST DIRECT
PERCEPTION
Jt maybe said that as direct perception which is the
best of aU proofs affirm this world of manifoldness, so it
tannot be sublated by scriptural knowledge of unity, i.e.
dhect perception being a dhect proof, knowledge derived
from it cannot be set aside by a contradictory knowledge
derived through a comparatively weak means of knowledge
hke scriptures. Scriptures as a means of knowledge are
weaker than direct perception because they depend on it to
show what they actuaUy mean. For example when they say,
"The sacrificial post is the sun" we understand that the post
is shining like the sun because it is besmeared with ghee
and not that it is actuaUy the sun, which fact direct per-
ception contradicts. But the question here is not one of
stronger or weaker means of knowledge but whether the
means of knowledge, though a better one, is contaminated
by any defect. If so, knowledge derived through its help
can be sublated by knowledge derived through comparatively
v/eaker means provided it is free from such defects. Direct
perception gives us the hnpression that the flame of a lamp
is identical throughout, but inference tells us that it cannot
be the same one but different flames produced by different
particles of oil and wick which come in such a rapid succes-
sion that the eye is not able to distinguish them and thus
I.I.I. ] Sri-Bhasya 11
give rise to tlie idea of an identical flame. Here direct per-
ception, though a stronger proof, is set aside by inference,
for the former was contaminated by some defect (viz. the
incapacity of the eyes) and was capable of being otherwise
explained while the latter was free from such defects. There-
fore, wherever there is a conflict between experience derived
through different means of knowledge the one that is defec-
tive (savakdsam) and can be explamed otherwise (anya-
thdsiddham) and cannot be explained otherwise (ananya-
thasiddham) is the sublating one. The question of stronger
or weaker means of knowledge does not count in this.
Therefore, scriptural knowledge of unity can sublate the
knowledge of manifoldness based on dhect perception, as
scriptures which are beginningless and of divine origin are
free from all defects while the direct perception of mani-
foldness has an innate defect in it, viz beginningless Ne-
science.
5. NIRGUNA TEXTS ARE OF GREATER FORCE THAN
SAGUNA TEXTS
A doubt may arise : if scriptures are free from all
defects, how can texts which prescribe works that are based
on the assumption of plurality be set aside by texts deahng
with liberation ? The former can be sublated by the latter
according to the principle of avaccheda, i.e., between two
contradictory expiatory injunctions a later one is of greater
force and sublates the earlier one (Purva-Mimdmsa, VI.
V. 54). These texts about work are sublated not because
they are defective, for such a thing cannot be expected in
the Vedas, but because they can be explained away other-
wise (anyathdsiddham), as leading to lesser results, whUe
12
Sri-Bhasya
[U. I.
thp te?ts about liberation cannot be so explained away and
since these texts occur later than the texts prescribing work,
they are of greater force. The same principle applies also
in the case of Saguna and Nkgu^a texts about Brahman.
Since the former occur earlier and cari be e;;fpla.ined as
leadtag to lesser results they are sublated by the latter which
occur later and cannot be so explained away. The Saguna
te?;ts, however, are not useless for they serve a purpose;
they attribute quahties to Brahman but for which the
Nhguna texts would have conveyed no sense, fpf denial
presupposes the quahties that are to be denied. B^t if the
Saguna texts were of prune importance, the subsieqyent
Nhguna texts would serve no purpose, which wpviW inake
the scriptures defective, for they contain nothing that is use-
less. Therefore, the Nhguna texts are of greater force than
the Saguna texts.
Therefore, Brahman in Its reality is non-differentiated.
6. EXISTENCE, KNOV / LEDGE AND INFINITE (IN TAI. n. 1)
ARE NOT ATTRIBUTES OF BRAHMAN BUT ARE CO-ORDI-
NATED AND HAV E ONENESS OF MEANING AND REFER
TO ANON-DIFFERENTIATED HOMOGENEOUS ENTITY
In the text "Existence, Knowledge, Infinite is Brahman",
'Knowledge and Infinite' are not attributes of Brahman, for
these terms stand in co-ordination and have oneness of mean-
ing, i.e. they convey the idea of one thmg only, viz Brahman,
as the different words have same case-ending. In a sentence
where the words have the same case-ending one of them is
the thing defined and the rest are what define it, and the
latter words, though, in ordinary parlance, have different
meanings, yet in such a sentence, "a beautiful, red, sweet-
Sri-Bhasya 13
snieilings ros6," the Words 'beautiful', 'ted', and 'sweet-SBtleU-
ihg', though have differetit Ineaaitigs, yet all Met to
the one thing, Viz the rose, and So are said to have drieiiess
of ineanmgs. Similarly in the Tai. text, 'Existehee', 'Kflow-
ledge', and 'Infinite', refer to one Brahmah and do not
convey aiiy mdependent meahiiigs. They are co-ordinated
and have oneness of meaning. If these were quaUties
of Brahman then this unity of purport would be lost, for
the difference in the attributes would necessarUy lead to
difference in theh meaning and this would make the objects
denoted different, and consequently they would faU to refer
to one thmg. This oneness of meaning, however, does not
mean that the terms are synonymous, for they refer to one
thing, viz Brahman, and describe Its nature as contrary to
that which is contrary to the ideas expressed by these words.
Thus the terms 'Existence, Knowledge and Infinite' des-
cribe Brahman's nature as opposite to aU things that are
unreal (being subject to change), inert and hmited resj)ec-
tively. This differentiation of Brahman from the rest is
neither a positive nor a negative attribute of Brahman but
Its very nature, even as whiteness as distmguished frbin black-
ness is its very nature and not an attribute. Therefore,
Brahman is a homogeneous self-luminous Entity. This inter-
pretation of the text is justified since thus only it conforffis
with creation-texts lUce : "The universe, my dear, was but
the real (Sat) in the beginningonly One without a second."
(Cha. vi. ii. 2), which describe It as homogeneous. This
conformity is essential since the texts of the different Salkhas
have one purport, an accepted principle of the Purya-
Miinaihsa. No dbubt this leads to the abandoning of die
dhect meaning of these words and resorting to implied
meaning, but this is no defect, for the putpbrt of a jsentfente
N
14 Sri-Bhasya 11.1.1.
is of greater force than the direct meanings of the words,
which conflict with it. Here the purport of such co-ordination
is oneness and therefore the dhect meanings cannot possibly
be talcen. For keeping the purport of the sentence intact,
even more than one word can be taken in an implied sense,
even as it is seen in scriptmral injunctions or in imperative
sentences in ordinary parlance.
7. PERCEPTION REV EALS ONLY EXISTENCE (SAT)
NON-REALITY OF DIFFERENCE
. It has been shown aheady that, when there is a conflict
between direct perception or other means of knowledge and
the. scriptures, that latter ones are of greater force. But
actuaUy no such contradiction exists between dhect percep-
tion and scriptures, for it is only the non-differentiated
Brahman, which is Existence Itself, that is dhectly perceived
in aU objects of perception and not their difference. Hence
there is no contradiction between scriptures and our dhect
perception. It is the unity that is experienced and not the
difference. It may be objected that, if Existence alone is
experienced by us hi aU objects and not the difference, then
all our cognitions wiU have one object only, and the resulting
experience wUl be one only, i.e. there wiU be no difference
in our knowledge like 'this is a pot', 'this is a cloth', even as
1 According to some Mimamsakas, in scriptural injunctions the
primary meaning of the imperative sense is the apurva (unseen
fruit) that results from the act itself. Therefore, when it denotes
the action there is the secondary sense. All other words in such a
sentence when they refer to the apurva, have their secondary mean-
ings. In imperative sentences in ordinary parlance, there being no
apurva, they are necessarily connected with action and so have a
secondary meaning only..
1
Sn-Bhdsya 15
there is no difference in our continuous knowledge of one
object, like a pot. The objection is not valid, for the nature
of an object and its difference from othersthese two can-
not result from the same perception, either simultaneously
or in successive moments. They cannot be perceived snnul-
taneously, for, while the nature of the object is perceived
at once, its difference from other objects cannot be so per-
ceived, as it depends on our remembrance of other things
from which this object differs. These two, bemg contradictory
one depending on other objects and the other not so
dependingcannot be sunultaneously experienced. Nor can
they be perceived in successive moments, as perception lasts
only for one moment. So we have to settle which of the two
is the object of our perception : It cannot be the 'difference',
for it presupposes a knowledge of the real nature of the
thing and the remembrance of objects opposhe to it. Hence
'difference' cannot be the object of direct perception, and
our knowledge of it is due to a wrong notionit is
illusory or unreal. Moreover, this 'difference' caimot be
defined, for it is neither the nature of the thing nor
its attribute. If it were its nature, then cognition of the
thing would also lead to the cognition of the difference, and
further the object and 'difference' would become synony-
mous. It cannot be an attribute, for in that case this difference
wiU have a difference from the essential nature of the thmg,
and this latter difference would be an attribute of the first,
which would lead to a thud difference as the attribute of
the second, and so on ad infinitum. Again, it would mean
that this 'difference' which is an attribute would be experi-
enced only when the object is experienced as qualified by
attributes such as a generic character (jdti), and the object
as possessing a generic character is experienced only on the
16
Sn-Bhdsya
apprehension of the differencewhich is an untenable posi-
tion. Therefore, 'difference' cannot be defined ; and so it is.
only Existence (Sat) that is the object of perception, and
all difference or manffoldness is unreal.
Again', in all experiences like 'a pot is existing', 'a piece
of cloth is existing', we find that what persists in all is
Existence (Sat) and not the forms, pot, cloth, etc. which
disappear one after another. Therefore Existence alone is
real and not the forms^^pot, cloth, etc. even as in the case
of a rope successively mistaken for a snake, a crack in the
ground, and a stream of water, it is the rope which persists
as the substratum of the wrong notions that is real, and the
wrong notions which disappear one after another are known
to be unreal. Individual difference like pot, cloth, etc. means
the negation through sublation of other objects ; for the
experience 'this is a jar' negates a cloth, i.e. sublates the
cloth and this proves the non-reahty for the non-continuous
objects like cloth etc. But what persists like the rope in the
example and is not sublated is Existence (Sat), and there-
fore it is the only reality and everything else is umreal.
8. PURE CONSCIOUSNESS IS EXISTENCE (SAT) ITSELF
Similarly, Consciousness which persists in all our cog-
nitions is real and therefore identical with Existence (Sat).
An objection may be raised that since 'Existence' is an object
of consciousness it is different from it, which fact establishes
plurality. But it has clearly been shown that 'difference' does
not exist, for it is neither an object of perception nor can
it be defined. Hence Existence cannot be proved to be an
objedt of consciousness, i.e. it is not experienced through
any iheans of knowledge. Hence Existence is Consciousness
itself. ^
Sri-Bhasya 17
9. CONSCIOUSNESS IS SELF-PROV ED AND SELF-LUMINOUS
And because it is consciousness, it is self-proved. It does
not depend on any proof ; if it did so depend, it would cease
to be consciousness and would be an object like any other
thing like a pot etc. Nor can any other act of consciousness
manifest consciousness since it is seh-luminous, inasmuch
as it is never seen to be non-manifest while it exists, like
ordinary objects. While manifesting everything, it reveals its
own existence. A thing through which other things are mani-
fested and rendered fit to be spoken about does not itself
depend for these on anything else. Colour, for example,
makes objects visible, but it does not depend on anything
else to make itself visible. Hence consciousness, which
reveals other objects, is itself self-luminous, and does not
depend on some other means of knowledge for its mani"
festation.
10. CONSCIOUSNESS IS ETERNAL AND ONE
Now, this consciousness is eternal, for it cannot have a
beginning or end. A beginning means that it was not exist-
ing before that. Consciousness of such previous non-existence
of consciousness presupposes the existence of consciousness.
Hence non-existence of consciousness cannot be proved
through consciousness. Nor can anything else prove it, for
that something can prove it only by making consciousness
its object, and this is not possible, for consciousness has been
shown to be self-proved, and cannot become such an object.
Therefore its previous non-existence cannot be proved,
hence it is beginningless, i.e. not origmated, and so it has
none of the other changes, too, like growth, modification,
2
18
Sri-Bhasya [I.I.I.
decay, destruction, etc., since these are true only of objects
that have an origm. As consciousness has no beginnmg,
there can be no manifoldness m it, for we find that wherever
there is manifoldness it has a beginnmg, for the latter is an
invariable concomitant of the former. Nor can difference,
origmation, etc., which are objects of consciousness be attri-
butes of consciousness, for objects of consciousness are
different from consciousness itself. Colour, for example, is
an object of consciousness, and it is not an attribute of con-
sciousness. Nor can Existence, Knowledge, and Bliss be its
attributes, for consciousness is essentially consciousness itself.
11. PURE CONSCIOUSNESS IS THE SELF
Therefore consciousness is devoid of all plurality, and,
as a result, it cannot have any 'knower' (self) at its back
different from itseff. Self-luminous consciousness itseff is the
Self, for consciousness is intelligent and so is bereft of
inertness, which inertness is a quality of everything that is
non-Self. Non-Seff bemg thus precluded from conscious-
ness, it is nothing but the Self. Neither can it be said that
the quaUty of being a 'knower' is an attribute of conscious-
ness as expressions like 'I know' seem to suggest, for this
knower is an object of consciousness, and therefore cannot
be its attribute. The same thing cannot be both the subject
and the object of its activity at the same time. An object
is that on which is concentrated the activity of the agent,
and hence it must be different from the agent; and as this
'knower' is an object of consciousness, it is different from
consciousness. Moreover, this 'knower', which means the
agent in the act of knowing, is changing, since agency beghis
and ends with that act of knowing, and for this reason also
Sn-Bhdsya 19
>, it cannot be an attribute of consciousness which is eternal
and changeless. This attribution is due to a misnomer.
It is superunposed upon it even as the notion of being a
man, being lame or blind, is superimposed on the self in
expressions like T am a man', '1 am lame', T am blmd', and
is a product of the ego, which itself is umeal and ever-
changing. The ego or 'I' is not the Self, because it does not
exist in deep sleep and in the state of liberation, when the
Self alone persists as consciousness. But this ego, neverthe-
less, serves to objectify the Self, or Consciousness abidmg
in it, even as a mkror reflects an object which thus looks
as if abiding in it, and this leads to erroneous notions like
T know'. Therefore the 'knower' or 'I' in 'I know' is no
attribute of the Self, which is pure Consciousness.
Thus there exists, in reality, oifly eternal, non-changing
Consciousness, which is bereft of all plurahty and whose
natture is pure non-differentiated Intelligence, which, how-
ever, due to error appears as manifold. The object of an
inquiry into Vedanta texts is to set right this error through
the knowledge of Brahman, which is non-dual, eternal, and
pure Consciousness.
The Great Siddhanta
ADVAITIN' S POSITION REFUTED
1. B RAHMAN CANNOT BE NON-DIFFERENTIATED, FOR
THE EXISTENCE OF NON-DIFFERENTIATED
OBJECTS CANNOT BE PROVED
Brahman cannot be, as the Advaitins say, non-differ-
entiated pure Consciousness, for no proof can be adduced
to establish non-differentiated objects. AU sources of know-
20
Sri-Bhasya
ledge prove the existence only of objects qualified by
difference. Non-differentiated objects cannot be estabhshed
by one's experience, for such experience is only of objects
qualified by some characteristic difference, as is shown
by statements like 'I saw this', where 'I' and 'this' are both
differentiated objects. In spite of this fact, if we mtend
proving a non-differentiated object, we have to do so only
by having recourse to some special characteristic of it, that
is, a characteristic which is invariably found in it alone,
besides its pure being, which would distinguish it from other
objects. Pure substance, as in the case of Brahman, which,
accordmg to Advaitins, though experienced is mistaken for
the world, does not help us to so distmguish it. This pecuhar
characteristic by which it is distinguished from others would
itseff make the object qualified by it. It is some qualities of
the object that keep out other attributes from it and thus
help us to distmguish it from other objects, and so a hon-
differentiated thing cannot be estabhshed. Consciousness or
knowledge is by nature such that it reveals an object to a
knower. It is connected with the Seff and the objects distinct
from it, and on this depends the existence of knowledge and
its self-lumhious character. Therefore, consciousness always
involves the cognition of difference. Moreover, when con-
sciousness is said to be eternal, seff-lmnmous, etc., what is
meant is that these are hs qualities, for h is not possible to
prove that these form its substance or being. The existence
of a bemg or substance is recognized by all philosophers,
but they differ only with respect to the views they hold about
it. So, if 'eternal', 'seff-luminous', etc. mean the substance
itself, no proof is requhed for it, and all the Advaitins'^
argument is useless. But if they are not so and are different
from it, then they become its attributes. When the Advaitins
T.I.I. ] Srl-Bhdsya 21
i refute the views of others and estabhsh thek view of the
Bemg by saying that Brahman is eternal, is Knowledge,
Bhss, etc., they differentiate thek view of the Being (Brah-
man) from others' by these characteristics of Brahman,
which, therefore, are nothing but Its attributes.
Scriptures, too, cannot prove a non-differentiated entity.
A word consists of a root and a termination which differ,
and so aU words denote only difference. Different words,
agam, have different meanings. A sentence, therefore, which
connects the meanings of words in it, can denote only objects
quahfied by difference. Scriptures, therefore, which consist
of words and sentences, cannot denote a non-differentiated
entity.
Dkect perception, too, cannot denote non-differentiated
thmgs in both its determinate (savikalpa) and non-deter-
minate (nirvikalpa) aspects. There is no difference of opi-
nion with respect to determinate perceptions, for all agree
that, in such perceptions, we experience objects qualified by
attributes like generic character etc., as for example, when
we see a cow, we see the object as qualified by the generic
character of a cow. With respect to non-determmate per-
ceptions, there is difference of opinion, for some hold that,
in such perceptions, the determiiung attributes are not ex-
perienced and the subject and object are merged into each
' other. Such knowledge, they say, is beyond sense-perception.
Others, again, hold that, in such perceptions, we have the
experience of qualified objects and thek attributes unrelated
to each other, as for example, merely the cow or the generic
character of a cow and not the two as related to each other.
Both the views are denied by experience and are impos-
sible, too. AU om experience is of the kind'This is
, such and such', that is, as qualified by difference.
22
Srl-Bhdsya
So non-determinate perception is not the apprehension of
an object as devoid of all attributes, but the experience of
an object as devoid of some attributes. It is the experience
of the first object of a class. When we see a cow for the first
time, we see the object as also its generic character, for both
are objects of perception, but the fact that the generic
character exists in aU cows is not apprehended at the time,
and it is only when a second and a thhd cow is seen that
we get this knowledge. In determinate perception, this quality
experienced in the non-determinate perception is remem-
bered and recognized. Due to the absence of this experience
in the first one, it is called non-determinate perception. So
dhect perception of non-diSerentiated thhigs is impossible.
The above argument refutes also the bheddbheda (differ-
ence and non-difference) view held by some as between
objects and theh attributes. They say that, when we expe-
rience an object, we do not experience the attribute ; and
when we experience the attribute, we do not experience the
object, and therefore they are not identical; yet each is not
experienced in the absence of the other, and so they are not
also absolutely different. They are different and non-different..
This view is not sound, for our cognhions are of the kmd
'This is such and such' which has two elements, viz 'this' and
'such and such', and the view stated above denies this latter
element in perception. When we apprehend an object, we
experience also its difference from others, which is made
known by the 'such and such' element in our perception,
its generic form; and what differentiates must be different
from what is differentiated, and can never be identical. The
two, the object and its generic character or attributes, are
quite separate. When we say 'a man with a stick', the stick
distmguishes him from other men, but is also different from
I.I.I. ]
Sri-Bhasya
23
the person holding it. Similar is the relation between an
individual of a class and its generic character, or an object
and its qualities, though between the two examples there is
a difference; for while the stick and exist independent of
the man, the generic character or qualities cannot exist or be
experienced independently of the object in which they in-
here ; otherwise, the relation of the thing qualified and that
which qualifies is the same in both cases. They are quite
different from each other.
Inference also denotes only objects qualified by differ-
ence, for iifference depends upon the mvariable relation
between two things which are objects of perception, and
perception deals only with objects qualified by difference.
Similarly, other sources of knowledge also have objects
qualified by difference.
Therefore, no proofscriptures, duect perception, in-
ference, etc.can be adduced to establish a non-differen-
tiated object, and so it does not exist.
2. PERCEPTION DOES NOT REVEAL MERELY EXISTENCE
(SAT)
It is not true, as the Advaitins say, that Being (Sat)
alone is experienced through perception, for, as shown
already, perception has for its objects only things qualified
by difference, like generic character and so on. This generic
character is nothing but the particular form or configuration
that is experienced as conunon to all things of a class, for
we do not see anything else that can be called jati (genus).
Now this common feature or generic character Udti) sepa-
rates things possessing it and itself also from other objects.
This generic character itseff is 'difference', smce, by know-
24
Sri-Bhasya
[ I.I.I.
ing genus, we know that things of that genus differ from
others and there is no other entity besides this genus wliich
can be called 'difference'. And when we experience genus
and talk of, say, cows as possessing a genus, the 'difference'
also becomes an object of thought and speech, for the idea
that cows form a class by themselves means that aU talk of
theh non-difference from buffaloes etc. ceases, and this non-
difference does not cease till we experience difference. Since
genus is experienced, 'difference' also is experienced simul-
taneously, and becomes also an object of thought and speech
as shown. So when we experience an object as possessing
genus, we experience 'difference' also, and hence even if
perception should last for one moment only, it does not
matter, for there is nothmg to be perceived the next moment,
and so the arguments put forward by the Advaitms to show
that 'difference' is not perceived falls to the ground.
Again, since 'genus' and 'difference' are one, there can
be no objection to 'difference' being an attribute of the
substance of the object of perception, and there can be no
argument in a chcle as pointed out by the Advaitins, viz
to know difference we must know the object as qualified by
genus, and to know the object as qualified by the genus we
must know the 'difference'an argument based on the view
that 'genus' and 'difference' are two different thhigs. So also
there is no argument ad infinitum, for 'difference', which is
genus, differentiates objects possessmg it and hself from
ether objects, even as the consciousness of the Advaitms
manffests objects and itseff.
So it is not correct to say that Existence alone is expe-
rienced and that difference is not perceived and cannot be
defined.
Further, ff we experience only Existence (Sat) m all
1.1.1. ]
Sn-Bhdsya
25
perceptions and difference is not perceived, tlie statements
like 'a pot is', 'a cloth is' wUl be meamngless. Moreover,
why does one who goes' to buy a horse return seeing a
buffalo ? Agam, ff we do not experience difference, why do
we do not use the word 'elephant' or 'cow' when we see a
horse, since all words have the same object, viz Existence,
and therefore these words are synonymous, masmuch as
they refer to the same object ? Moreover, when we see in
sequence a horse and an elephant, the latter knowledge (i.e.
about the elephant) would only be a remembrance, for,
v/hen we see the elephant, there wiU be no difference in this
knowledge from the previous one, inasmuch as the same
Existence (Sat) is experienced. If, however, an element of
difference is accepted m each knowledge, it would mean
that perception has for its objects only differentiated objects.
And, finaUy, ff Existence alone is perceived in aU perceptions
then blindness, deafness etc. wUl not be handicaps, for a
single perception by anyone sense alone wUl help to expe-
rience everythmg, since there is no difference among objects.
The fact, however, is that the different senses perceive objects
as possessmg different attributes Uke colour, smeU, touch,
taste, and sound. Therefore, perception does not reveal
only Existence (Sat). If perception should reveal only Sat,
then the scriptures would be useless, for they wUl be teachmg
a thing aheady known through perception, and Brahman
would also be an object of perception and consequently be
subject to aU defects like other objects.
Therefore, perception has for its objects thmgs possess-
ing difference like genus {jdti), which is nothmg but a
particular form or configuration, and never imdifferentiated
objects. The argtunent of the Advaitms that what persists,
i.e. Existence, is real and that those which have no continu-
26
Srl-Bhdsya [ I.I.I.
ous existence, such as pot, cloth, etc., are unreal, because
they are sublated by each other, shows only confusion of
thought with respect to the nature of sublation. The snake
is sublated by the knowledge of the rope, because the snake
did not exist at the time and place ; we imagined it and so
it is unreal. There is conflict between the two experiences.
Such conflict does not exist between the experience of a jar
seen at a particular place and time and Us absence at some
other place and time, where and when the cloth is. The
former is not therefore sublated, and cannot therefore be
said to be unreal. To be sublated, non-continuity of the object
must be proved at the time and place. Its non-continuity at
another place and time does not by itself make the object
unreal.
Moreover, if Existence (Sat) is mere substance fit to
be cognized, then it is already proved by such means of
knowledge, and inference of the kind 'Existence is real
because it persists'is not necessary to establish it. If, however,
particular substances like pot, cloth, etc. are meant, it is not
true that Sat alone is experienced, for that which appears
as cloth is not what appears as pot. So Existence (Sat) is
not the only reality that is experienced.
3. CONSCIOUSNESS AND EXISTENCE (SAT) CANNOT
BE ONE
Again, consciousness cannot be Existence (Sat), for the
latter is an object of consciousness, and as such the difference
between the two is quite palpable ; this experience of the
difference between the two is not sublated at any time, and
so they cannot be one.
Srl-Bhdsya 27
4. CONSCIOUSNESS IS NOT ALWAYS SELF-LUMINOUS
AND THEREFORE IS NOT SELF-PROV ED
Consciousness is not self-luminous always and to every-
body, but it is self-luminous only when it reveals objects
and not at other times, and it is so only to a particular
knower and not to every one ; for we remember past states
of our consciousness and also infer the states of conscious-
ness in others from their conduct, as, for example, whether
they are well disposed or ill disposed towards us. In both
these cases, consciousness is an object of perception. This
shows that it is not self-luminous always, and consequently
it cannot be self-proved. If we could not have inferred the
states of consciousness in others, then speech would have
ceased to be of any value in human intercourse. For the
connection between words and theh objects depends on such
inference. When A asks B to get a horse and B gets an
anhnal with which A is satisfied, we infer that a horse means
that particular animal and that B was conscious of this fact.
Agam, inasmuch as we remember our past perceptions and
infer those of others, consciousness caimot be said to cease
to be so, if it becomes an object of knowledge. The nature
of consciousness is to manifest itself by hs own being,^ at
the present moment,^ to its own substrate,* the Self, or prove
1 This excludes other attributes of the Self like atomicity, eter-
nity, etc., which are manifested not through themselves, but by acts
of knowledge different from them.
2 This excludes past states of consciousness. It means the con-
nection of consciousness with the object at the present moment.
3 This excludes objects like pot etc., which are not revealed to
themselves, but to the knower. It also shows that the' state of con-
sciousness is manifest to the knower alone and not to others.
28
Srl-Bhdsya [I.I.I.
its own^ objects, at the present moment, by its own being,^
to the substrate, the Self. These characteristics are known r'
from one's own experience, and do not cease to exist when
consciousness becomes an object of another act of know-
ledge. But objects like pot etc. do not manifest themselves
or other things, and so they are material Uada), and not
because they are objects of consciousness. It is not true that
everythmg known must necessarily be a non-conscious object.
Nor is it true that consciousness is such because it cannot
be known, for ha that case everything that cannot be known,
like the sky-flower, would have been consciousness. It may
be urged that sky-flower is not consciousness, because it is
a non-existent thing and therefore unreal. In that case, pot
etc., bemg products of mdya, are also unreal according to
the Advaitms, and that is why they are not consciousness,
and not because they are objects of consciousness. In other
words, non-existent things like sky-flower are not contra-
dictory by nature to ignorance. As they are not real, they
can co-exist with ignorance, and so they are not conscious-
ness. But then, according to the Advaitins, aU the objects
in the world exist in ignorance and so are not contradictory
to it, and that very fact shows why they are not conscious-
ness, and not because they are objects of consciousness. So
to be an object of consciousness is not necessarily to be a
non-conscious thing.
5. CONSCIOUSNESS IS NOT ETERNAL AND ONE
Again, h is not correct to say that consciousness is
eternal, because its previous non-existence cannot be proved ;
1 Knowledge derived through the eyes does not reveal objects
of hearing. These words avoid such a generalization.
2 This excludes the senses which also reveal objects, but not by
their own being.
Sri-Bhasya
29
for such non-existence of consciousness is experienced by
consciousness. It may be asked : How can consciousness
experience its own non-existence ? It is not necessary that,
to be experienced by consciousness, it must be contempor-
aneous with it. If this condition were a necessary factor, then
we could not have had perception of past and future thmgs,
that is, of objects not existmg at the present moment. Such
a rule is true only with respect to dhect perception through
the senses and not with regard to aU perceptions, nor with
respect to other means of knowledge ; for we do have know-
ledge of thmgs existing at other tunes through memory, in-
ference, and scriptures. The inseparable connection between
means of knowledge and theh objects does not mean that
the means should always be connected with objects existmg
at the tune of knowledge, but the relation between the two
v/hich represents objects exactly as they were perceived with
respect to tune, place, and form. This refutes also the view
that memory has no external objects, for we do find that
memory is related to objects that have ceased to exist.
Nor can it be said that there is no proof to estabhsh the
non-existence of consciousness, inasmuch as it is not an
object of direct perception, and inference in the absence of
any characteristic mark (linga) cannot help us to know it,
and scriptures do not say anything about it; for non-percep-
tion {anupalabdhi) proves it. According to this means of
knowledge which is accepted as vahd by the Advaitins, if
an object capable of being apprehended is not so appre-
hended when all the conditions necessary for such a cog-
nition are present, it is a proof that it does not exist. Now,
if consciousness were eternal, it being always self-luminous
as the Advaitins say, it would have been apprehended as
such, and the fact that it is not shows that it is not eternal.
30
Srl-Bhdsya
but is limited by time. Moreover, direct perception of a pot
etc. gives knowledge of the pot etc. at the moment, i.e.
when the perception exists and not before and after, i.e. not
as long as the object exists, which shows that consciousness
is limited by time. If consciousness were unlunited by tune,
then all its objects, too, would be so ; for objects conform
to their respective states of consciousness. This fact of eter-
nity about the objects is not, however, certified by our
experience. This holds true also of experience through ia-
ference. Hence consciousness is limited by time and is not
eternal.
The Advaitms may say that, when they say that con-
sciousness is eternal, they do not refer to consciousness as
limited by objects like pot etc. but to pure Consciousness
unlunited by objects. Such pure Consciousness devoid of
all objects does not exist, for it is not experienced. Moreover,
the Advaitins accept that the nature of consciousness is to
manifest objects and on this depends its self-luminosity. So
m the absence of objects, consciousness would turn out to
be a pture myth or unagination, for consciousness, according
to the Advaitins, is not an object of any other act of know-
ledge and, there being no objects revealing which it can
manifest itself also, there will be no proof of its existence
as pure Consciousness. It is not a fact that pure Conscious-
ness is experienced in deep sleep. If it were experienced
in that state, then we would have remembered about it on
wakmg up, but we do not. A person waking up from deep
sleep says, 'All the time I knew nothmg'. It cannot be said
that the experience of consciousness is not remembered,
because the 'T and the objects did not exist and were not
perceived, for the absence of an object, a pot, or its non-
perception cannot prevent our remembering another object,
Srl-Bhdsya 31
a cloth, experienced ; for there is no connection between the
two. If, however, the T and objects are connected with con-
sciousness and are necessary for remembering the conscious-
ness experienced, it cannot be experienced also without them,
and since the T' and objects do not exist in deep sleep,
accordmg to the Advaitins, consciousness also cannot exist
in deep sleep. But that the T' does persist in deep sleep and
that consciousness is its attribute will be shown later on.
Therefore, it is not correct to say that the antecedent
non-existence of consciousness cannot be proved, and since
consciousness is shown to be an object of perception, it is
equally untrue that its non-existence cannot be proved by
other means of knowledge. So consciousness is not eternal.
Since antecedent non-existence of consciousness can be
proved, it cannot be said to have no origin ; and since it has
origin, the absence of other changes in it also refuted. More-
over, beginninglessness does not establish that it is eternal,
for it may have an end. Anything which is beginningless is
not necessarily endless, for antecedent non-existence which
is beginningless is seen to have an end. This statement does
not hold true even in the case of positive entities, for Ne-
science which, according to the Advaitins, is a beginningless
positive entity, undergoes changes, and has an end when
Icnowledge dawns. To say that aU these changes are unreal
and that the statement is true only of real changes is no way
out, for such an argument can have no sense, since the
Advaitins do not accept any change as real. For these reasons
also, consciousness is not eternal.
Further, it is not true that consciousness is one and
Ron-difierentiated because it is beginningless, for the Self
which is beginningless exists as different from the body.
Brahman also exists with Nescience, both of which are
32
Srl-Bhdsya
beginningless. It will be no escape to say that this dijfferentia-
tion of Brahman by Nescience is not real, for that would
mean that Brahman and Nescience are identical. The Advai-
tins gay that whatever is created is qualified by real difference,,
and therefore that which is originless can have no real
difference. But no example is cited by them to establish this,
statement. Pot etc. cannot be such examples, for if pot etc.
had real difference, i.e. real objects dhlerent from it, then,
such real objects wiU conflict with the Advaitin's conclusion
that Brahman alone is real.
Again, the view that consciousness being essentiaUy
consciousness can have no attributes which are objects of
consciousnessconsciousness and its objects are quite
different and can never be oneand consequently eternity,
self-lummosity, manffesting other objects etc. cannot be hs
attributes as they are objects of consciousness, is not sound.
For the Advaitins themselves accept that eternity etc. are
foimd in consciousness, and they can also be proved to exist
in consciousness, and so it is not true that it cannot have
attributes that are objects of consciousness. These cannot
be its very nature, because they essentially differ from con-
sciousness and from each other. 'Eternal' means existing in
aU tunes ; 'seff-lummous' means revealing its own existence
while existing, to its substrate, the knower ; to 'manffest
objects' is to manffest objects to the substrate, the knower.
'Shinhig itseff' and 'manffestmg objects' mean the capacity
to become hseff or make a thing an object of thought and
speech and so on. These are positive attributes of conscious-
ness. Even ff they are interpreted to mean absence of change,
inertness, etc., yet they are negative attributes and not its-
substance, smce they are stUl different from consciousness
and from each other. They must be connected with con-
Srl-Bhdsya 33
sciousness either as positive or negative attributes ; other-
wise, nothmg is proved by these termsit would be im-
meaning to deny such attributes as inertness etc. in con-
sciousness.
6. THE SELF IS NOT PURE CONSCIOUSNESS BUT THE
KNOVv'ER : IT IS ESSENTIAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND
HAS IT ALSO AS AN ATTRIBUTE
FinaUy, is consciousness proved or not ? If it is proved,
it must have attributes ; if it is not proved, it is a myth like
the sky-flower.
If it is said to be proof itself, then it must be shown to
whom and with respect to what it is a proof. If it is a proof
to the Self, then what is this Self ? The Self cannot be con-
sciousness itself, for it is not possible that consciousness can
be a proof to itself. Consciousness manifests to its substrate,
the Self, an object by its very existence and makes the object
fit to be an object of thought and speech. It is related to an
object and is an attribute of the knowing Self. This is proved
by our experience like T know the pot' etc. Thus conscious-
ness, being connected with an object and a 'knower', cannot
be its own object, or itself be the 'knower'. It is an attribute
of the knowing Self, and therefore cannot be one with it.
This 'knower', moreover, is permanent as is proved by our
recognition at the present moment of an object seen before.
This recognition would not be possible unless the same
'knower' exists on both occasions. But consciousness is not
permanent as is proved by statements like 'I know', 'I knew',
'1 have forgotten'. So the 'knower' who is permanent cannot
be consciousness, which is transitory. Even if consciousness
be accepted as permanent, yet it wiU not be possible to
3
34.
Srl-Bhdsya
explain recognition, for it means the same knowing person
existing on the two occasions and not mere consciousness
(.knowledge), and the Advaitms do not accept that con-
sciousness is a 'knower', for it is essentiaUy consciousness.
That pure Consciousness does not exist has aheady been
shown, for it is never experienced. Nor can consciousness,
accepted by both parties, be the Self, for it contradicts
experience, which shows that the Seh and consciousness are
different, being related to each other as the subject and its
attribute. AU these arguments show that what the Advaitins
say that pine Consciousness alone is real is unsound.
Again, the Advaitins say that the 'I' is an object of con-
sciousness, and as such it belongs to the world of the non-
Seff. This is not true, for, in the statement 'I know', the
'I' is the subject qualified and knowledge is its attribute
it is experienced hke this, and to say that the T is an object
is to deny this experience. If this T were not the Seff, the
latter would not have been experienced as inward, for it is
this T that separates the inner from the outer world of
objects. It is because this 'I' feels itseff miserable that one
wants to attain Freedom, and ff Freedom meant the destruc-
tion of this T, nobody would try for such Liberation. Neither
is it any consolation to say that, though the 'I' is destroyed,
consciousness exists; for nobody would try to bring about
this state destroying himseff. Moreover, consciousness can-
not exist without this 'I', for the nature of consciousness is
to manffest objects to this 'T, and when the 'I' and the
objects do not exist, consciousness also cannot exist, even
as the act of cutting cannot exist when the wood-cutter and
the axe are absent. That the Seff is not pmre Knowledge,
but a knower is also known from scriptures. "By what can
the knower be known" (Br. IV. iv. 14); "He who is con-
Sri-Bhdsya
35
icious of this body is the Ksetrajiia" {Gitd, XIII. 1). So does
the Sutra-kara also say : "The Self is not born" (II. iu. 17);
"Therefore he is an (eternal) knower" (II. hi. 18). To con-
sider this T', the knowing subject, experienced to be such
through states of consciousness like 'I know', to belong to
the sphere of the objective world is self-contradictory, like
the statement 'my mother is barren'.
Moreover, this 'T is self-luminous, and does not depend
for its manifestation on anythmg else. 'SeK-lummous' means
'to have consciousness' for its essential nature, and the 'T
which has it for its essential nature cannot depend for its
manifestation on something else, i.e. its attributes. A flame
of the lamp is itself lummous, manifests itseh and with its
attribute, hght, manifests objects. Light is an attribute of
the flame, but not an attribute like the white colour of an
object. White coloiu does not exist, and cannot be seen
without the object, but light spreads round its base and has
form (colomr). It has the power to manifest, for it manifests
itself and other objects. It is made of the same substance
as its base, viz the flame, but yet it is caUed an attribute of
the flame, because it is always found in the flame and
depends on it. Simflarly, the Self is essentially consciousness,
and has consciousness for its attribute with which it hghts
up objects. Being essentially consciousness, it is seh-ltunin-
ous. Scriptures also uphold this view : "He who thinks, 'I
smeU this', is the Self" {Chd. VHI. xii. 4), which estabhshes
the T as the Self; "As a lump of sah is without interior or
exterior, is entire, and is purely salt in taste, even so is the
Self without interior or exterior, is entire, and is pure Con-
sciousness" (Br. IV. v. 13), which shows that the Self is
essentially consciousness ; "In this state, he hhnself is the
light" {ibid., IV. hi. 9),which shows that the Self is self-
36
Srl-Bhdsya
luminous ; "Tlie knowledge of the knower is never lost"
(ibid., IV. hi. 30), which shows that consciousness is its.
permanent attributeeven hi the state of release. The Sutra-
kara also says, "Therefore he is a knower" (II. in. 18)..
All this proves that the self-lumhious Self is ever a knower
and not mere consciousness, and also has consciousness for
its attribute alv/ays.
To say that consciousness, because it is 'not non-inteUi-
gent' (ajada), is therefore the Self is not a sound view.
What is this 'absence of non-inteUigence' (ajadatd) ? It can-
not mean luminosity due to the substance of the thing itself,,
for such lummosity is found in the flame of a lamp also.
Moreover, the Advaitms do not accept any attribute like
light besides consciousness. They say that the two are one ;
what is light is consciousness itself. But according to them,,
consciousness is the means and Ulumination is the result. So
these two, the means and the result, must be different, and.
this contradicts theh statement that the two are one.
If 'absence of non-intelligence' (ajadatd) means 'to be
always manifest', then mental feelings like happiness, misery,,
etc. win be included in the deflnition. It may, however, be
objected that they do not manifest to themselves, but tO'
some one else (the self), and so they are non-inteUigent.
But so is knowledge, for there is no difference between the
two statements 'I know' and 'I am happy'. Knowledge, too,
does not manifest to itself, but to some one else, the knower,
the substrate. Knowledge is dependent on the 'T, the knower,
and that is why the knowledge of one person, like his feel-
ings, is not manffest to others. So consciousness is not non-
intelligent as to mean 'to be manifest to itseff'. Therefore, the
seff is not mere knowledge, but the knower, the T, which
alone is manffest to itseff by its very being.
Sri-Bhdsya
37
6. THE ' KNOWER' IS NOT APRODUCT OF IGNORANCE
It is not quite sensible to say that this T, the knower, is
a product of ignorance due to superimposition, even as
mother-of-pearl is taken for silver. For, in this case of super-
imposition, our experience would have been, 'I am con-
sciousness', even as mother-of-pearl and sUver are experi-
enced as non-different, and not as 'I am conscious', which is
actuaUy what we experience. The experience 'I am conscious',
however, shows that consciousness is an attribute of the 'I'
and different from it, even as the statement 'the man with
a stick' shows that the stick is an attribute of the man and
different from him ; and as our experience in this latter case
is not merely of the stick, but of 'the man with a stick', so
also in 'I am conscious' our perception cannot be merely of
consciousness, but of a knower with consciousness as his
attribute.
As to what the Advahins say that the 'knower' means
the agent in the act of knowing and for this reason it cannot
be an attribute of the changeless Self ; that the 'knower' or
'agency' is something changing and jada and abides in
ahankdra which is itseff unreal and ever-changing, etc.aU
this is untenable. The 'knower' cannot be ahankdra.
Ahankdra, like the body, is something known, external, and
a product of Prakrti and therefore material, and so lUce the
body, it also cannot be the 'knower', which is something
inward, and which knows this ahankdra, even as it knows
the body. Just as the ahankdra, according to the Advaitins,
-cannot be consciousness because it is an object of conscious-
ness, for that very reason h cannot be the 'knower', inas-
much as It is known by this 'knower'. Nor is it true that to be
a 'knower' is to be changeful, for 'knower' means the sub-
3.8 Sri-Bhasya i I.U..
strate of the attribute, knowledge, even as gems are the
substrate of their lustre, and as the knowhig Self is eter^ial,.
its attribute, knowledge, also is eternal. (Vide Sutras II. 3.
18-19).
Though knowledge is eternal and unlimited, yet it is-
capable of contraction and expansion, and it is contracted
in the embodied state of the Self due to its past karma and
is determined by the senses, and this is why it appears to-
rise and disappear along with the activities of the senses and
the Self possesses the quahty of an agent. A change like this,
is admitted, but what is denied is that the Self undergoes
modifications like matter. In this sense, it is said to be-
changeless. This agency is not an essential nature of the
Self, as it is created by action and therefore the Self is im-
changmg. This knowership subject to this particular kind of
change, viz expansion and contraction, belongs to the Self,,
which is of the nature of knowledge and cannot belong to-
ahankdra.
It may be argued that this ahankdra, though material,,
due to reflection and its nearness to consciousness, appears
to be a 'knower'. This argument cannot hold, for, by such
reflection, a quality which is found in one is reflected in the-,
other, as the red colour of a flower is reflected in a prism.
But here the 'knower' is not, accordmg to the Advaitins, a
quahty of consciousness, and it has been shown above that
it cannot be an attribute of the ahankdra, and so whether
the reflection is of consciousness in ahankdra or of ahankdra
in consciousness, the appearance of a 'knower' is inexpli-
cable. Such reflection, moreover, is possible in the case of
visible objects and not where both are invisible objects, as
here. Nor can the 'knower' be the result of contact of the-
one with the other, even as an hon rod gets heated when in
Sri-Bhasya 39
contact with fire, for here also the 'knower' must be an
attribute of either of them, as heat is of fire, but it is not an
attribute of either consciousness or ahankdra.
Again, it is absurd to say that the ahankdra manifests
consciousness as abiding in it, for consciousness is self-
proved and self-luminous accordmg to the Advaitins, and
so it cannot be manifested and that by ahankdra, which is
non-inteUigent, and if it is manifested, it would cease to be
consciousness according to the Advaitins. Moreover, of what
nature is this manifesting ? It cannot be origination, as con-
sciousness is self-existent; nor can it be revealing, for con-
sciousness is not an object of perception ; nor can it be an
indirect help to the means of manifesting it by bringing
about the connection of the senses with the objects, as jdti
is brought in connection with the senses when an individual
of that class is brought, or by removmg some disabihty in
the person, even as self-control etc. help hun by purifying
his mind to comprehend the meaning of Vedic texts ; for
neither kind of service can be rendered by ahankdra in mani-
festing consciousness. The former is not possible, since con-
sciousness is not an object of the senses like jdti; nor is the
latter possible, for ahankdra, which, according to the Advai-
tins, is the 'knower', cannot remove hs own disability.
Even if consciousness were an object of another act of
perception^which, of course, the Advaitins do not accept,
but which is accepted for argument's sakestiU ahankdra
cannot help to manifest it, for it would mean the removal
of somethmg which obstructs such knowledge, and we do
not see any such obstruction. To say that ignorance obstructs
it, and this ignorance is removed by ahankdra cannot be
accepted, inasmuch as knowledge alone can, according to
the Advaitins, remove ignorance and nothing else can.
40 Srl-Bhdsya
Further, ignorance cannot reside in consciousness, for igno-
rance and knowledge have the same seat and the same
object. Ignorance and knowledge abide in the same person
and with respect to the same thing. Just as a pot cannot be
the seat of ignorance because knowledge does not reside in
it, so also pure Consciousness or knowledge, because it is
not the seat of knowledge, cannot also be the seat of ignor-
ance. In other words, knowledge abides in a 'knower', and
so also ignorance abides in a 'knower' and not in pure Know-
ledge. Even if ignorance should somehow rest hi knowledge
or consciousness, then it cannot be removed, for knowledge
of the object alone and not of others destroys ignorance with
respect to it, and since consciousness is not an object of
knowledge, the ignorance abiding in it can never be removed
by knowledge. Again, that ignorance as defined by the
Advaitins is not a fact shall be shown later on. If ignorance,
however, means absence or antecedent non-existence of
knowledge, then it is no obstacle to the rise of knowledge
and so its removal by ahankdra will not be serviceable in
any way.
From ah this, we find that ahankdra cannot in any way
help in the manifestation of consciousness.
Again, manifesting agents do not manifest objects as
abidmg in them, and so what the Advaitins say that consci-
ousness is manifested by ahankdra, as abiding in it, is not
correct. A flame, for example, does not manifest objects as
abiding in it. The nature of such manifesting agents is such
that they always promote the knowledge of things in their
reality. Even when a face is reflected in a mirror, the mani-
fester is light and not the mhror. The latter only reflects the
light, and so the face appears in the mhror and laterally
inverted. Ahankdra not being a reflecting surface like the
Srl-Bhdsya 41
r mirror, such a distorted reflection of consciousness cannot
take place in it; moreover, consciousness being self-proved
cannot be an object of perception, and is not perceived by
tlie eyes. Jdti also is not'^manifested by the individual, but
has the individual as its substrate. Therefore, no reason can
be shown how consciousness can be manifested by ahankdra
as abiding in it, whether in reality or due to any misnomer.
Hence, ahankdra is not the 'knower', nor does it appear to
be such.
Ah this goes to show that the T, which appears by itself
I as the 'knower' and as inward, is the Self and not pure
Consciousness, for it has already been shown that, in the
absence of the 'I', consciousness cannot be pratyak, i.e.
inward and therefore cannot be the Self.
7. THE T , THE KNOWER, PERSISTS IN DEEP SLEEP
AND RELEASE
It is not true that the T does not exist in deep sleep
and that only pure Consciousness exists in that state. One
who gets up from deep sleep does not say, "I was pure
Consciousness free from the notion of T ", but rather says
'1 slept happily', which shows that the T persisted in deep
sleep as a 'knower' and experienced happiness. No doubt
he also says, "I did not know anything at the tune", but this
does not deny the existence of everything including the T,
but shows only that there were no objects of knowledge.
The T existed along with knowledge, which, of course,
could not function for want of objects to be made known to
the 'knower', the T. If the statement denies everything
including the 'T, then it would deny pure Consciousness also.
But then, one after deep sleep also says, 'I did not know
42
Sri-Bhasya
myself then'. True, but here 'myself' cannot refer to the T,
who is the experiencer of 'do not know', but refers to such
of the forms of the T with which h was associated m the
waking condition, such as due to caste etc. It means the
sleeping person was not conscious of himself as so and so etc.
But the T, which is a uniform flow of self-consciousness,
persists in deep sleep also, though not very vividly. The
Advaitins also accept that the T persists when they say
that pme Consciousness exists in deep sleep as the Witness
of Nescience. For to be a witness is to be a 'knower'. Pure
Consciousness cannot be a witness. If the 'I' did not exist,
we could not have remembered that we slept happily.
The 'I' exists also m the state of release, otherwise
release would mean the destruction of the Self, for the 'I'
is not an attribute of the Self, but the very nature of the Self.
'I know' etc. show that knowledge is its attribute, and the
T is the very nature of the Self. That the T exists in release
is also inferred, for it shines to hself. Whatever shines to
itself shines as T, as, for example, the soul in the state of
bondage, which is accepted also by the Advaitins. Whatever
does not shine as the T does not shine to itself, as, for
example, a pot. The Self in release shines to itself and there-
fore shines as the T. It may be said that, m this case, even
in the state of release, it wiU be ignorant and bound like
the embodied Self, which also shines to hseh. Scriptures
deny such a possibihty and, moreover, the mference is
faulty, for what causes ignorance hi the embodied state is
not 'shining to itself' or consciousness of the T, but karma.
Ignorance means want of knowledge or wrong knowledge
about a thing. The 'I' is the very nature of the Self; so how
can the 'I', which is the knowledge of its real nature, possibly
brmg about ignorance or bondage ? Sages like Vamadeva
Sn-Bhdsya 43
also experienced the Self as the T in the state of release :
"Seeing this, Rsi Vamadeva said, 'I was Manu and the
sun'" etc. (Br. I. iv. 10). The supreme Brahman is also
spoken of by the scriptures as having the consciousness of
the T' : "May I be many, may 1 grow forth" (Chd. VI, ii.
3); "As I transcend the perishable, and am above even the
imperishable, I am celebrated as the supreme Being among
people and m the Vedas (Gltd, XV, 18), and so on. This
T', however, as aheady shown, is different from ahankdra,
which causes us to take the body, the non-Seh, as the Seh.
That which makes the not-T' appear as the T is ahankdra
this is ignorance. But such knowledge of the T' as is not
rmllified by anything else has the Self for its object, whUe
that knowledge of the T' which has body for its object is
sublated, and therefore is Nescience.
The conclusion therefore is that the T, the knower, is
the Self, as it is estabhshed by oiur own experience, reason-
ing which has estabhshed the permanency of the T, scrip-
tural authority, and from the wrong notion pointed out. This
Self is difiEerent from the body, senses, etc. and even diflEerent
from knowledge, its attribute; it is self-proved, eternal,
minute, diflEerent in each body, and by nature bhssful.
8. SCRIPTURES CANNOT CARRY GREATER WEIGHT
AS AGAINST DIRECT P ERCEP TION, WHEN THERE
IS CONFLICT B ETWEEN THEM
The view held by the Advaitins that dhect perception is
aflEected by an inherent defect and is capable of bemg ex-
plained otherwise and therefore is sublated by scriptural
knowledge is not quite a sound one. What is this defect with
which dhect perception is contaminated ? If it is the inherent
44
Sri-Bhasya [ I.I.I.
defect (Nescience) that makes us see manifoldness, how do
we know that this perception of manifoldness is an error ?
If it be said that this manifoldness is an error because it
conflicts with scriptures which teach unity, then this would
lead to a logical seesaw. For it would mean that direct per-
ception is defective, because we know for certain that scrip-
tures teach unity. How do we know that scriptures teach
unity? Because we are sure that the manifoldness experienced
through dhect perception is an error. Moreover, if direct
perception is contaminated by this error of manifoldness,
so are also scriptures which are based on this manifoldness.
It carmot be said that, though scriptures are defective, yet,
as the knowledge of unity taught by them dispels the mani-
foldness experienced through direct perception, they are
later and are capable of sublating direct perception, for what
is defective cannot sublate another knowledge merely be-
cause it is later. When a person mistakes a rope for a snake,
his fear is not removed by another person who is known to
be under a delusion only by saying that it is not a snake but
a rope. The very fact that one has to practise reasoning and
meditation on Vedic texts after hearing them shows that a
person, who hears these texts, is aware of their inherent
defect that they, too, have a tendency to show differences,
for they are made of words and sentences which are differ-
entiated. Moreover, there is no proof to show that scriptures
are free from all defects, while dhect perception is so con-
taminated. Consciousness, which is self-proved and unrelated
to any object, cannot establish that scriptures are free from
defects. For consciousness to prove this, it must be connected
with them, and it is not. Nor can direct perception prove it,
since it is defective and gives wrong knowledge ; nor can
any other means of knowledge prove h, since they are all
Sri-Bhasya 45
based on direct perception. So the view that scriptures are
free from defects cannot be proved. Emphical means cannot
establish it, for empiricism means that which is accepted as
correct on a first view, but which is refuted by reasoning.
But then it might be argued that, though both sense per-
ception and scriptures are defective, yet the unity taught by
scriptures nullifies the knowledge of manifoldness through
sense perception, while the unity taught by scriptures is not
so sublated by anything else, and therefore non-dual Brah-
man alone is the reahty. This argument is not sound, for
what is defective, though not sublated by anything else, does
not for that reason become real. In a country where aU are
suffering from cataract, the fact that theh knowledge through
defective vision (as, for example, experiencmg the moon as
double) is not sublated, does not vouch for the reality of
their knowledge or its object, a double moon. Both their
knowledge and its object, the double moon, are umeal. So
the knowledge of Brahman based on ignorance and its object.
Brahman, are unreal, though it is not sublated by any other
knowledge. Brahman is false, because It is the object of
knowledge of persons affected by ignorance, even as the
phenomenal world is false for the same reason. Brahman is
false, because It is the object of knowledge, even as the
world is.
Again, Brahman is false, because Its knowledge results
from an unreal cause, even as this world is false for a similar
reason. Its knowledge is derived from scriptures, which are
based on Nescience and therefore unreal. It may be said
that scriptures are not absolutely unreal, like sky-flower,
but have a relative reality. They are real for the man under
Nescience, and cease to be real only for the man of realiza-
tion, when they have created the knowledge of unity and
46 Sri-Bhasya [ I.I.I.
not before that. But, then, the idea of reality about what is
unreal in truth cannot but be false, and so the reality of
scriptmres being false, the knowledge produced by them is
false, and so is Brahman, the object of that vmreal know-
ledge. If one infers fire at a place mistakuig a cloud for
smoke, then, since the smoke is unreal, the fire also, the
object of the knowledge inferred through the unreal smoke,
is unreal. It is also not true that Brahman cannot have any
subsequent sublatmg knowledge, for It may be sublated by
tlie 'Void' of the Buddhists. If such a knowledge of a 'Void'
be said to be based on an error, so is the knowledge of
Brahman based on the unreal scriptures. Between Brahman
and the Void, it is the latter alone that has nothing which
can sublate it, and so if reality depends on the absence of
anythmg else that can sublate it, then the Void is the reality
and not Brahman.
It may be argued that scriptures, though they are unreal,
can yet give, rise to real knowledge of a real Brahman, even
as dreams which are unreal forecast events which are real.
But, then, here also reality does not result from unreality,
for though thmgs seen in a dream are umeal, yet theh
knowledge is not unreal, and it is this knowledge which is
real that forecasts events which are real. Nobody on waking
up thinks that the perceptions he had in dreams are unreal,
but realizes only that the objects of those perceptions are
unreal. The objects are sublated and not theh perception
on wakmg up. So also, when one experiences objects in a
magical performance, or sees a snake in a rope, the per-
ceptions are real, though hs objects are unreal, and it is
the perceptions that produce fear. Simharly, a person who
thinks that he is bitten by a snake when pricked by some-
thing in the dark, the experience is real, and may even lead
U. I . ]
Sri-Bhdsya 47
to death. All these states of consciousness are real, for they
Isave an origin, and produce real results, while the objects
ol those states of consciousness are not real, because they
do not origuiate, and are not capable of use like real objects.
It may be objected here that, if the objects are unreal,
how can the perceptions be real ? They are real, because
what is required for such perceptions is only the appearance
of the objects and not their reality. When we have experi-
ence of past and future objects, we have only the appear-
ance of those objects and not their real existence. So to have
a knowledge of an object, it is enough if there is a mere
appearance of the object at the time ; its actual presence is
not necessary. So in aU these cases cited, it was real per-
ceptions that produced real results.
Even where the sound of a letter is apprehended through
a line or symbolic representation, it is not a case of the
unreal giving efiEect to something real, for the symbohc
representation of the letter is real. It may be argued that
the symbohc representation is not actually the letter, but by
convention it indicates the letter and so it is untrue, and this
unreal thmg is seen to produce a real thing, the knowledge
of the letter. This is not correct, for if the representation
were unreal, then we could not have had the knowledge of
the letter. Nothmg unreal is seen to produce any real result,
nor is it possible. If it be said that the idea of the letter hi
the symbol results in the knowledge of the letter, then this
idea being real, it is a case of something real producing
somethmg real, and not a case of the real originating from
the unreal. Moreover, this argument would mean that the
means and the object are identical, since there is no differ-
ence between the letter and the idea of the letter, as both
are perceptions of the letter. If the symbol were not real.
48
Sn-Bhdsya [1.1.1,
that is, not the letter, then one symbol would have repre-
sented all the letters that do not actually exist in it, and thus
give rise to the perception of all sounds. It will be no way
out to say that even as the word 'Devadatta' represents a
particular person by convention, so also a certain symbol,
perceived through the eyes represents a particular letter
(sound) heard, and so particular lines or letters produce
the knowledge of particular sounds, for in this case it is only
a real thing that produces a real thing, since both the
symbol and the convention are real. So also, when the
knowledge of a real cow results from its pictiure, it is the
likeness between the two that causes this knowledge, and
this likeness is a reality.
FinaUy, even where we have knowledge of certain things
from certain sounds heard, it is not a case of something
tmreal giving rise to something real, even if Sphotavada is
accepted. The Sphotavadins say : There is one eternal in-
expressible sound, Sphota, which manifests as different
particularized sounds (letters) due to difference in the
intonation. This Sphota is the material of aU sounds, and
yet it is not any definite sound in its fuUy formed state. That
is to say, ff aU the pecuharities which distinguish one letter
from the other be removed, then what remains wiU be the
Sphota. Every sound symbol intended to express this in-
expressible Sphota wiU so particularize it that it would be
no longer the Sphota. This Sphota alone is capable of
conveying ideas and not the particularized sounds, and this
Sphota conveys different ideas on account of the differences
in the particularized sounds (letters), which are super-
imposed on the Sphota. So from these superimposed differ-
ences, which are unreal, real difference in ideas is conveyed.
This view, however, is not true, for, even as the difference
,1.1.1] Sri-Bhdsya 49
in tlie intonation causes real differences ia the sounds
(letters), so also the different manifestations of the Sphota
by these sounds (letters) are also real. Moreover, this
theory of Sphota is unnecessary, smce we find that parti-
cular sounds heard denote particular objects.
Therefore, it is impossible to establish that, from the
umeal scriptures, real knowledge of Brahman can arise.
9. SCRIPTURES DO NOT TEACH A NON-DIFFERENTIATED
BRAHMAN
The Advaitms say that the scriptures teach a Brahman
which is non-differentiated, immutable, seff-proved, eternal,
and pure consciousness, and quote as authority texts like,
"Existence alone, my dear, was this in the begmning. One
only without a second" (Chd. VI. i. 1), which they inter-
pret to mean that Brahman has no second, not even by way
of attributes. This is not correct. This text occurs m that
section where it is taught how the knowledge of one thing,
the Brahman, leads to the knowledge of everything in this
world. That section teaches that Brahman is both the mate-
rial and efficient cause of the world, that It has infinite
attributes of great excellence, such as omniscience and om-
nipotence, that Its thoughts are true and eternal, that It is
the support and ruler of the world, and so on ; and lastly,
that It is the Seff of this world of sentient and insentient
beings ; finaUy it instructs Svetaketu that this Brahman is
also his Seff. The Mundaka text, "That which is not per-
ceived, not grasped, without origin, colourless, without eyes
or ears, or hands and feet,that which is eternal yet of mani-
fold expressions, all-pervading, extremely subtle and undecay-
ing, the source of all creation^the wise behold everywhere"
4
50
Sri-Bhasya
(Mu. I. i. 6), denies in the first half all evil quaUties of
Prakrti in Brahman and m the latter half ascribes to It aU
auspicious quaUties. AU material objects are perceivable
and graspable and have colour and name and form ; but
Brahman is quite the opposite of material things. It has neither
eyes nor ears nor hands and feet, that is, unlike the indivi-
dual souls It does not depend on these organs for knowledge
and action.
"Existence, Khowledge, Bhss is Brahman" (Tai. III. 1) ,
does not define Brahman as free from aU attributes. The
three terms are in co-ordination and denote the one Brah-
man. Co-ordination means the existence of several attributes
in the same substratum, there being a reason or motive for
using each of the different terms in it. Therefore the three
terms denote three attributes. It cannot be said that the
terms have oneness of meaning and therefore are the very
nature of Brahman and not attributes, for, in that case, only
one term would have been quite sufficient to apprehend the
nature of Brahman and, moreover, such an interpretation
would conflict with co-ordmation, for in co-ordination there
must be different reasons or motives for using these different
terms. It may, however, be objected that ff these terms de-
note attributes, and since they are different, it would lead
to a differentiation of theh object and so there wiU not be
oneness of the object. In other words, due to difference in
these attributes, we will have a plurality of Brahmans. This
argument, however, has no force in it, for grammarians de-
fine that in a co-ordination terms connoting different qualities
are placed in apposition to refer to one objectthe very
ahn of co-ordination is to show that one object is qualified
by different attributes.
The words, "One only without a second" in the
Srl-Bhdsya 51
text (Chd. VI. i. 1), the Advaitias say, deny all attributes
of Brahman and establish It as homogeneous ; they argue
that, on the principle that texts of different Sakhas have the
same purport, aU the texts dealing with the causality of
Brahman should be taken as teaching a non-dual Brahman.
This Brahman which is indirectly described or defined by
the causality texts is directly defined by the Taittiriya text
as 'Existence, Knowledge, Bliss is Brahman' and so this
text also defines It as non-dual, especiaUy as otherwise these
would be in conflict with those texts which describe It as
without attributes. AU this is not a sound view. The words
'One without a second' establish that besides Brahman there
is no other efficient cause, and thereby prove that Brahman
is unique without the lUce of It in possessing excellent aus-
picious qualities. That It has such attributes is known from
texts hke, 'It thought, "May I be many, may I grow forth"
and It projected fire' (Chd. VI. h. 2-3). The principle that
aU Sakhas have the same purport is wrongly applied by the
Advaitms, for it in reahty means that the attributes 'aU-
knowmg' etc. mentioned in other causality texts have to be
taken in this Chdndogya text also. Consequently the
text (Tai. III. 1) also teaches Brahman as possessing
attributes and not as non-dual. This wiU not conflict with
texts which describe Brahman as without attributes, for those
texts deny attributes of Prakrti in Brahman. The texts that
teach that Brahman is knowledge teach that Brahman is by
nature essentially knowledge, but not that the idtimate reality
is pure knowledge, for Brahman is a knowing subject and
has knowledge for its essential nature. That Brahman is a
knowing subject is learnt from texts lUce : "It thought"
(Chd. VI. iu. 2) ; "It wUled, 'Let me project the worlds'"
{Ai. I. i. 1) ; "His high power is revealed as manffold,
52 Srl-Bhdsya
forming His essential nature which is knowledge, strength
and action" (Sve. VI. 8) ; "This Self is free from evU, old
age, death and sorrow, without hunger, and thhst, with true
desires and true volitions" (Chd. VIII. i. 5) and so on.
These texts show that Brahman, which is essentiaUy know-
ledge, is also a knower and possesses other infiiute auspi-
cious qualities like aU-knowing, with true desires, true voli-
tions, and is free from evU quahties like sinfuhiess, aging,,
death, grief, etc. The Nirguna texts deny only evU qualities
in Brahman, and so there is no conflict between the Saguna
and the Nhguna texts, and therefore there is no need to
take any set as being nuUified by the other set of texts.
The text, "He who knows the Bhss of Brahman
from where aU speech with mind turns away without
reaching it" (Tai. II. 9), describes with emphasis the m-
finite nature of its auspicious quaUties. That Brahman has
attributes is also known from texts like, "He who knows
that supreme Akasa. . .he realizes aU his deshes along with
the omniscient Brahman" (Tai. II. 1), where 'deshes'
means objects of deshe, that is, the attributes of Brahman
which are desired by the aspirant. The words 'along with"
are used to show that the attributes are of primary unport-
ance, and consequently one has to meditate on these
attributes of Brahman according to the principle, 'as is the
meditation so is the result'.
The text, "It is unknown to those who know and
known to those who do not know" (Ke. II. 3), does not
mean that Brahman is not an object of knowledge, for that
would contradict texts like, "The knower of Brahman attains
the Highest"' (Tai. II. 1) ; "He who know Brahman be-
comes Brahman" (Mu. III. ii. 9), where Brahman is realized
to be an object of knowledge. The Taittiriya texts, 'Whence
U. I. ] Srl-Bhdsya 53
speech returns' etc. describes Brahnian as possessing an
infinite number of auspicious qualities, which cannot be
grasped by the mind or described by speech both of which
are limited, and in accordance with this the Kena text means
that Brahman is not known by those who view It as this
.much.
The text, "You cannot know the knower of knowledge,
you cannot think the thinker of thought" (Br. III. iv. 2) ,
does not deny a knowing and thinking subject as the Advai-
tins say, but only refutes the view of the Vaisesikas who say
the Self, though a knower, is not of the nature of knowledge
but that knowledge is an adventitious attribute of the Self.
The text asks not to think like that, but to consider this
knowing and thinking to be also the essential nature of the
Self, the knower. Otherwise the Advaitin's interpretation
would conflict with the text, 'By what should the knower be
known', which clearly says that It is a knower.
The Taittiriya text which says, 'Brahrnan is Bliss', does
not mean that Brahman is purely Bliss even as It is not pure
Knowledge, but a knowing subject as well. 'Consciousness,
Bliss is Brahman' (Br. III. ix. 28) shows that Knowledge
is of the nature of Bliss. Bliss is a congenial state of con-
sciousness. That the two are one is accepted by the Advaitins,
too, who say that Brahman is homogeneous. That Bhss is
different from Brahman, (i.e. Brahman has it as an attri-
bute), that Brahman is a blissful being is known from texts
like, "A hundredfold bliss of Prajapati is a unit measure
of the bhss of Brahman" (Tai. II. 8) ; "The knower of
that bliss of Brahman" (Tai. II. 9).
Again, texts like, "When there is duality, as. it were"
(Br. II. iv. 14) ; "There is no difference whatsoever in it.
He goes from death to death who sees difference, as it were,
54 Srl-Bhdsya [ I.I.U
in It" (Br. IV. iv. 19) ; "Wlien to the knower of Brahman
everything has become the Self" (Br. II. iv. 14), do not
altogether negate the manifoldness estabhshed by texts like,.
"It wiUed, 'May I be many'" (Chd. VI. u. 2), but negate
plurality hi so far as it contradicts the unity of the world,
which is an effect of Brahman and has It as its Self and
inner Ruler. We cannot possibly imagine that plurality
estabhshed by scriptures in earlier texts is denied by it in
later texts.
Finahy, the text, "When one makes the least differen-
tiation in It, then for hhn there is fear" (Tai. II. 7), does-
not mean that for one who sees differentiation in Brahman
there results fear, for that would contradict the Chdndogya
text, "All this is Brahman ; one ought to meditate calmly
on aU this as beginning, ending, and existing in It" (Chd,
III. xiv. 1), where meditation on the manffoldness is pre-
scribed as a means to attaining calmness of mind, i.e. by
knowing Brahman as the Seff of this manffoldness one
attains peace. Thus prescribing to see the manffoldness as
Brahman, it cannot possibly deny this manffoldness later
on. What the Taittiriya text, therefore, means is that when
one rests in Brahman, there is fearlessness and that fear
comes to hhn when there is a break in this resting in
Brahman.
Smrtis also say that Brahman has attributes. Vide Gltd,.
VII. 6-7 ; IX. 4r5 ; X. 3, 42, and XV. 17-18. Vi. Pu., I. h.
10-14 ; I. xxu. 53 ; I. xxvi. 53-55 ; VI. v. 82-87 ; VI. vh.
69-71.
From all this, it follows that Brahman is not non-dual
pure Consciousness, but possesses infinite auspicious attri-
butes, and is bereft of ah evU attributes that are common
in Prakrti and its effects. It is the creator, preserver, and
Srl-Bhdsya 55
destroyer of this universe, which It pervades and of which
It is the inner Ruler. The enthe world, sentient and insen-
tient, forms its body. The individual souls have a real exis-
tence, and are essentially of the nature of knowledge, which
in the embodied state is obscured or contracted due to theh
past Karma, as a result of which they regard themselves as
material. In short, Brahman is a differentiated entity, and
this world of sentient and insentient beings is also a reahty
and forms the body of Brahman and of which It is the Seff.
10. NESCIENCE CANNOT B E PROVED
The Advaitins say : "The non-dual Brahman alone is
the reality and this manffoldness brought about by Nescience
which covers the true nature of Brahman and makes It see
this manffoldness in Itseff is unreal. Scriptures too uphold
this view. 'By the unreal is aU this covered' (Chd. VIII.
in. 2). This Nescience is removed by the fuH comprehension
of Vedic texts like, 'That thou art.' Though a positive entity.
Nescience is neither real nor unreal but unspeakable (anir-
vcicanlyd)."All this is untenable. What is the seat or sub-
strate of this Nescience or ignorance ? Does it inhere in the
individual soul or Brahman ? It cannot be the former for
the individual soul (jiva) comes into existence only after
Brahman is covered by ignorance. Neither can it be Brah-
man, for It is self-proved and of the nature of knowledge
and so opposed to ignorance. Since Nescience is destroyed
by Knowledge the two cannot co-exist. It cannot be said
that what is opposed to Nescience is not the knowledge
which is Brahman's nature but the knowledge that Brahman
is pure Knowledge, for there is no dhlerence between the
two, viz. the knowledge which is Brahman's nature and the
56 Srl-Bhdsya
knowledge about Brahman's true nature, both being self-
liuninous and so the latter cannot be said to be particularly
opposed to Nescience and the other not. The nature of
Brahman, proved by this second knowledge, itseh shmes
forth since It is seh-luminous and so we cannot differentiate
between the two kinds of knowledge. Moreover, knowledge
about Brahman's true nature is not possible, for that would
make Brahman an object of knowledge and the Advaitins
deny it. So ff knowledge is opposed to Nescience, then the
true nature of Brahman which is knowledge itseff is also
opposed to Nescience and so it cannot exist hi Brahman.
Brahman's nature being self-luminous and seff-proved It
appears to Itseff as It is and so is opposed to Nescience or
ignorance and therefore it cannot exist m Brahman. But the
case of the rope and the snake is different, for there the
rope is not seff-luminous and therefore is not contradictory
to ignorance of itseff and therefore such ignorance is re-
moved by some other knowledge. Brahman being seff-lumin-
ous is opposed to ignorance of Itseff and therefore does not
depend on another knowledge for the destruction of that
ignorance.
If it be said that what destroys Nescience is the know-
ledge of the unreality of manifoldness, then such knowledge
cannot destroy the ignorance about the true nature of
Brahman, for this knowledge and Nescience do not refer
to the same object. The knowledge of the unreality about
one object cannot destroy the ignorance with respect to the
nature of another object. To be nullified knowledge and
ignorance must refer to the same substrate. Knowledge of
the unreality of the manffoldness can only destroy the notion
of the reality of the manffoldness and not the ignorance
about Brahman's nature. It may, however, be argued that
^.1.1. ]
Sn-Bhdsya 57
ignorance about Brahman's nature is nothing but regarding
that there are other real things besides Brahman and there-
fore this ignorance is destroyed when other objects are
shown to be unreal. But this is not correct, for the non-dual
nature of Brahman being seff-proved no notion contradictory
in nature to it, viz. the reality of the.manffoldness, can arise.
Moreover, this non-duality must be either Brahman's nature
or Its attribute. It cannot be Its nature, for in that case it
cannot be the object of knowledge. Nor can non-duality be
an attribute of Brahman, for the Advaitms say that Brahman
which is pure Consciousness is free from attributes which
are objects of consciousness, and this non-duality is perceived
and so cannot be Its attribute.
So, Brahman which is pure Knowledge cannot be the
substrate of Nescience.
Again, when the Advaitins say that Brahman which is
seff-luminous pure Consciousness is covered by Nescience,
they only establish that Brahman is destroyed ; for this
covering means either an obstruction to the origination of
consciousness or the destruction of what exists. It is not the
former, for the Advaitins do not accept the origination of
consciousness and therefore it means the destruction of
consciousness which exists, and this consciousness is the
very nature of Brahman and therefore hs destruction means
the destruction of Brahman. Further, is this Nescience which
makes the non-dual Brahman appear as manffold real or
unreal ? It is not real since the Advaitins do not accept it.
Nor can it be unreal, for in that case h must be either the
knower, the object known or perception or pure Knowledge.
It cannot be knowledge, for in that case it must be either
identical with or different from it. It cannot be identical,
for in that case it would be identical with Brahman which
58 Sri-Bhasya
is pure Knowledge and as a result, since Nescience is un-
real. Brahman too would be unreal. It cannot also be non-
identical, for knowledge according to the Advaitins is non-
differentiated. If Nescience is of the nature of consciousness
and at the same time unreal, it would mean we have two
kinds of consciousness and this would contradict the Advaita
doctrine of oneness. The unreal Nescience cannot be the
knower, the object known or the perception connecting the
two, for in that case there must be some other Nescience
which is the cause of this unreal Nescience even as this first
Nescience is the cause of the unreal world. That second Ne-
science must have a third Nescience which gives rise to
the second and so on ad infinitum. To get over this regressus
if it be said that Brahman Itseff is the defect, viz. Nescience,
then Brahman Itself can be the cause of this universe and
there is no need to imagine a Nescience for this. Again, if
Brahman is this irnperfection (avidya), then since Brahman
is eternal this Nescience will also be eternal and so can
never be destroyed and consequently liberation would be
impossible. So unless some real defect besides Brahman is
accepted, erroneous perception of this world cannot be
accounted for.
Again, the Advaitins say that Nescience (avidya) is
anirvacanlya, i.e. it is neither real nor unrealit is un-
speakable. Now our perception which characterizes the
nature of objects in this world classifies them as either
existing or non-existing. So ff we should have to accept
that perception has for hs objects things which are neither
real nor unreal it would lead to the fact that every perception
will be capable of cognizing all things.
The Advaitins' view with respect to Nescience
can be smnmed up as follows : Nescience is an entity
I.I.I.] Srl-Bhdsya
59
tliat is experienced by direct perception and whose
existence can also be inferred. It is perceived directly
as can be known from expressions like, 'I am ignor-
ant' (non-knowing) which is an expression like, 'I am
happy' where happiness is directly experienced. This Ne-
science has a twofold function or capacity. It covers the
object Brahman and thus prevents It from appearing as It
is, and creates the manifold world of internal and external
objects, by its dvarana and viksepa powers respectively. It
is neither real nor unreal but anirvacanlya. It is antagonistic
to knowledge and therefore is removed by the knowledge
of Brahman. 'Antogonistic to knowledge', however, does
not mean non-knowledge or previous non-existence of know-
ledge (Prdgabhdva), for it is not a negative entity but a
positive one. It cannot mean non-existence for such non-
existence of knowledge is experienced through anupalabdhi
(one of the means to knowledge accepted by the Advaha
Vedantins) and not by direct perception as is Nescience.
Even if we regard non-existence as an object of perception
still Nescience and non-knowledge cannot be identical. To
have a knowledge of the non-existence of a pot for example,
we must have a knowledge of the pot and of the place where
its absence is experienced. So in the experience, T am ignor-
ant ; I do not know myself or anything else', if ignorance
mea"ns mere non-knowledge then it would mean, 'there is
non-knowledge in me.' To know this non-knowledge I must
have knowledge about myself and of knowledge, i.e. the
counter entity of non-knowledge, even as in the case of
non-existence of the pot I must have a knowledge of the
pot and the ground where it is non-existent. Now if I have
knowledge of myself and of knowledge, the counter entity
of non-knowledge, then a statement like, 'I am ignorant
0 Sri-Bhasya
of myself', cannot possibly be made. If there is no knowledge
of myseh: and of the counter entity, knowledge, then since
these are necessary for the perception of non-knowledge
there cannot be perception of non-knowledge and so the
statement, 'I am ignorant (non-knowing) ; I do not know
myseh: or anythmg else', cannot be made. In the first case
knowledge and non-knowledge of myseh: cannot exist in me
at the same time, and in the second, the conditions necessary
for the perception of the non-knowledge do not exist and
so we cannot have perception of this non-knowledge. The
same dhficulty exists even if non-existence of knowledge be
an object of inference or anupalabdhi, for even here though
the object to be experienced need not exist at the tune, yet
this non-knowledge is expressed as a present object. But if
we regard Nescience as a positive entity and not mere non-
knowledge, a negative entity, then we can get over this
difficulty, for there wiU be no conflict between the Nescience
and the knowledge of myself and knowledge. The perception,
T am ignorant etc' has this ignorance or Nescience for its
object while the object of knowledge would be myself some-
thing different from it. It may be objected that the positive
entity. Nescience, conflicts with Consciousness (Brahman)
whose nature is to manffest the true nature of things. This
is not correct. The witnessing Consciousness is what mani-
fests objects and produces knowledge in us. No mental
function can illumine an object unless it has the Self at its
back. Every object is known in and through the Self. It is
the Witness of all our knowledge and without it we cannot
have knowledge. It manffests ah objects which the inteUect
presents before it whether real or unreal. But since there is
no reality except the Seff and this Seff is seff-luminous and
therefore never an object, aU objects of this witnessing Con-
Srl-Bhdsya
61
sciousness are false things. So this Witness has not the true
nature of things for objects but only Nescience. Otherwise
it would be difficult to explam unreal things like the world.
Knowledge which has for its object Nescience does not put
an end to Nescience. Hence there is no conflict between
Consciousness and Nescience.
A fresh objection may be raised : Nescience becomes
an object of perception only as limited by an object which
is known through some means of knowledge {pramdnas).
Therefore, in the perception, T do not know myself,' as
Nescience is limited by the Self, the Self also becomes an
object of perception. But since this is not accepted by the
Advaitins, how can such a perception separate merely Ne-
science as its object from the Self ? This objection is not
valid. AU things are objects of knowledge, some as known
and some as not known, and in them again those which are
material and are perceived only through some means of
Icnowledge, depend on some means of knowledge. That which
is not material, viz. the Self, is self-luminous and does not
depend on those means and, therefore, can always shine as
different from Nescience. Therefore consciousness of Ne-
science is always possible even in the perception T do not
know myself, since the Witness is always capable of Ihnit-
ing the Nescience. Hence Nescience is perceived through
perception as a positive entity.
Inference also leads to the same conclusion. The inference
is as follows : In a dark room where there are many objects,
when a bright light is ht, the darkness is destroyed and aU
objects are revealed as well as the lamp. Here darkness
which had its seat in the lamp before it was lighted covered
all objects in the room which were revealed later by the
lamp. This darkness which covers all objects is not mere
62 Sri-Bhasya
absence of light but something positive as is known from
statements like 'pitch dark' and 'darkness visible' which show
different states of this darkness as dense or light. It has form
and therefore is something positive. From this it follows that
in aU cases where things come into existence, and on coming
into existence manffest objects which were not known before,
there was before the origination of such things a certain some-
thing at these particular places, which was capable of being
destroyed by the thing which came into existence later and
which something covered ah objects that were later revealed
by that which was originated later. This something is not the
mere previous non-existence of the thing that is orighiated but
a positive entity. Taking the analogy in the case of Nescience
we can also irffer it as a positive entity. When objects are
brought into contact with our senses we perceive them and
have knowledge of those things. This knowledge when it
originates manffests objects which were not known before.
So before the origination of this knowledge there was some-
thing which was capable of bemg destroyed by this know-
ledge and which kept aU objects covered. It was inherent
m the Seff where also true knowledge is produced and this
something is not mere non-existence of knowledge but a
positive entity. This entity is what is perceived in a percep-
tion like, 'I am ignorant; I do not know myseff or anythmg
else.'
(Refutation): AU this is untenable. In the perception,
'I am ignorant; I do not know myself. Nescience is not
perceived as a positive entity. The defects shown with res-
pect to Nescience being non-knowledge equaUy apply to
Nescience taken as a positive entity and not a mere negation
of knowledge. In this perception ched above, is there know-
ledge of the Seff or not? If there is, then ignorance and
Srl-Bhdsya 63
knowledge cannot exist in the Self at the same time smce
they are antagonistic. If there is no knowledge of the Self
then we camiot predicate where this Nescience exists and
with respect to what and so ignorance cannot be perceived
at aU. Even i it be said that what is antagonistic to ignor-
ance is the knowledge of the real Self, and not of the Self
which is the seat and object of Nescience and which is an
obscured vision of the Self due to the presence of ignorance
(i.e. being contaminated by ignorance), and so there is no
contradiction between the Nescience of this obscure Self and
Nescience perceived, yet this does not prove ignorance as
a positive entity, for even where Nescience is taken as the
previous non-existence of knowledge (prdgabhava) it relates
to the real Self and the knowledge of the seat and the object
of non-knowledge is only the obscure Self and not the real
Self, and hence the difficulties pomted out by the Advaitins
do not exist. Whether Nescience is taken as a positive entity
or the negation of knowledge, it means nothing but non-
knowledge and so there is the need of the counter entity,
knowledge, for its perception. It means either non-know-
ledge, something different from knowledge, or antogonistic
to knowledgein aU these cases its perception depends on
the knowledge of the counter entity, knowledge. Though
darkness is capable of being known independently, yet to
know it, as antagonistic to light the knowledge of light is
essential. The ignorance of the Advaitins is not known in-
dependently but merely as antagonistic to knowledge and
therefore depends on the counter entity, knowledge, like the
non-knowledge which is the negation of knowledge. Previous
non-existence of knowledge or the negation of knowledge is
recognised by the Advaitins, for knowledge which removes
Nescience was absent previously. If it were not so, knowledge
64 Srl-Bhdsya [ U. I.
would be permanent and consequently there would be no
Nescience. Hence it is more reasonable to accept that this
non-knowledge or negation of knowledge alone is what is
perceived and not any positive entity called Nescience in
perception like, 'I-am non-knowing'.
Moreover, Brahman which is self-luminous Conscious-
ness cannot experience Nescience, for 'self-luminous' means
It is conscious of Itself always. If it be said that Brahman
which has consciousness of Itself, yet Its nature being covered
by Nescience, experiences this Nescience and that this cover-
ing takes place by something else than Itself, it would mean
nothing but destruction of Brahman for if It's nature
which is self-effulgence is ever covered by something
then It ceases to exist. Moreover, this view is defec-
tive, for according to this view Brahman cannot expe-
rience Nescience till It is covered by it and Nescience can-
not cover Brahman tiU It experiences this Nescience. Again,
does this Nescience first become known and then cover
Brahman or does it first cover Brahman and then is experi-
enced ? In the former case, since Brahman without Its
natture being covered is able to cognize Nescience, It can
also cognize this manifold world, the product of this Nes-
cience, and therefore there is no need to regard It as covered
by Nescience nor even to imagine an ignorance of this kind.
Again, does Brahman experience Nescience by Itself or
through some other agency ? If by Itself, then such con-
sciousness results from Its nature and therefore can never
be destroyed and there would be no release. If still it should
be maintained that it is destroyed, then it would mean that
Brahman Itself is destroyed. Even as the misconception of
silver in mother-of-pearls along with the false silver is des-
troyed by the knowledge of mother-of-pearls so also know-
Srl-Bhdsya 65
ledge which destroys Nescience wUl destroy Brahman also
y which sees this Nescience by nature. If it experiences Nes-
cience through some other agency, then what is It? It
cannot be another Nescience, for that would lead to a re-
gressus ad infinitum. If it be said that Brahman is first
covered by Nescience and then is experienced by It, then in
that case Nescience by its essential being covers Brahman
and so it is real like the cataract in the eye and caimot be
destroyed by knowledge. Just as cataract in the eye prevents
vision and is not destroyed by knowledge, so also Nescience
which exists in Brahman wiU not be destroyed by knowledge.
If it be said that this Nescience is beginningless and that
it simultaneously covers Brahman and is experienced by It
which would avoid a regressus ad infinitumsuch a thmg
is not possible, for Brahman which is essentially conscious
of Itself cannot possibly be a witness and experience Nes-
cience without Its nature being covered first. Urdess this
nature ceases to shme It cannot see anything else. If it be
said that it is covered by something else and not by Nes-
cience and then experiences Nescience, then Nescience
would cease to be beginningless for it is experienced only
after that something has covered Brahman and not before
and, moreover, this wiU also lead to a regressus ad infinitum.
If, however, it be said that Brahman experiences Nescience
t without Its nature being covered, then it wiU not be true that
Brahman is conscious of Itself.
Again, when Brahman is covered by ignorance, does It
not shine at aU or does It shine somewhat ? In the former
case since Brahman is mere light (Prakdsa) It will cease to
exist. The latter case is not possible in Brahman which has
no parts or attributes but is homogeneous. It is only an
object which has parts and attributes that can shine to some
5
66
Sri-Bhasya
extent, as some of the parts or attributes are covered while
the rest shine. But such a thing is not possible in a homo-
geneous Brahman which cannot have two forms. Therefore
shiiung and not shining cannot co-exist in It. Even if it be
5aid that Brahman's nature is covered by Nescience and
therefore It shines dimly, it is not quite conceivable. When
all attributes or parts shine in a thing it is said to shme
vividly and when some parts or attributes alone shine it is
said to shine dimly and in this case in those parts or attri-
butes which do not shine, the hght is altogether absent and
those which shine, shine vividly and there can be no dimness
when there is hght. In an object which is cognizable, dun-
nessmay take place with respect to certain parts or attributes
which are not experienced. So m Brahman which is pure
light and without attributes and not an object of sense per-
ception such a dhnness is not possible and so cannot be an
effect of Nescience.
Moreover, does this dimness disappear or not when
knowledge dawns ? If it does not, release is not possible. If
it does, then what is Brahman's nature ? Does Its essentially
vivid nature exist before the destruction of the dimness by
kjiowledge or not ? If it does, then It cannot be dimmed by
Nescience nor would it be necessary to remove it by know-
ledge. If it does not exist, then the vivid shining is some-
thing newly brought about and therefore something originat-
ing and consequently it would be perishable and not eternal,
which would mean that Liberation {Moksa) is non-perma-
nent. Nescience cannot be proved as its substrate cannot
be determined. Moreover, ff wrong perception results
from a defect (Nescience) which is umeal it will be
difficult to show that it cannot take place without
a real substrate. Even as it is possible to have wrong per-
U. I . ] Srl-Bhdsya 67
ception due to an unreal defect, it is possible to have it even
when there is no real base which would make Brahman as
a reahty doubtful thus leading to the theory of a universal
void of the Buddhists.
Again, in the hiference that was made it was proved,
rather it was attempted to prove, that the Nescience which
is a positive entity rests in Brahman and covers It and is
later destroyed by true knowledge. But this Nescience can-
not have Brahman for its substratum, for ignorance has as
its substrate a knower and not that which is pure Knowledge,
as it is antagonistic to knowledge. Where silver is seen in a
sheU the ignorance with respect to the sheU exists in the
person who experiences the silver and not m knowledge.
Since Brahman is pure Knowledge according to the Advaitins
and not a 'knower'. Nescience cannot have its seat in
Brahman. Secondly, Nescience cannot cover Brahman, for
ignorance covers the object which is cognizable and with
respect to which there is ignorance and does not cover
knowledge. When shell is taken for shver, ignorance covers
the object, sheU which is cognizable and not knowledge.
Inasmuch as Brahman is never an object of knowledge,
Nescience cannot cover It. To admit that It is so covered
is to accept that It is an object of knowledge. Again, the
positive Nescience cannot be destroyed by knowledge, for
ignorance which covers an object of knowledge alone is
destroyed by knowledge. Ignorance which is so destroyed
by knowledge is only with respect to objects of perception.
But Brahman is not an object of knowledge and therefore
the ignorance with respect to It cannot be destroyed by
knowledge. Fourthly, all knowledge which proceeds from
valid proof is not preceded by a non-knowledge which is a
positive entity, i.e. something different from the mere nega-
68 Srl-Bhdsya [I. I. I.
tion of knowledge, for in that case it would not be valid
proof. Proof which gives a knowledge as to the positive
nature of your non-knowledge would be preceded by such
positive non-knowledge, and proof which precedes non-
knowledge cannot be a vahd proof. Therefore, Nescience
as a positive entity cannot be established by such proof.
Non-knowledge which is mere negation of knowledge (prd-
gabhdva) alone exists before knowledge and is destroyed
when knowledge dawns. Fifthly, knowledge cannot destroy
anything because it is mere knowledge and destruction can
be accomplished only by some other agency. No positive
entity is destroyed by knowledge, as for example, the know-
ledge of a pot does not destroy it. So knowledge cannot
destroy Nescience if it is a positive enthy. It may, however,
be said here that positive things like fear generated by see-
ing a snake in a rope is destroyed by the knowledge of the
rope. This explanation however is not correct, for fear
meets destruction by its own nature because it is momentary
and not by the knowledge of the rope. When knowledge
dawns the snake disappears and the cause of the fear being
removed no more fear is generated, and the fear that was
generated before, being momentary, meets destruction by
itself and the person is free from fear, and not because
knowledge has destroyed fear. That fear like perception is
momentary is known from the fact that it exists so long
as its cause exists and not after. Moreover, if it were not
momentary then the stream of perceptions which causes it
would produce a fear for each perception and as a result we
would be experiencing difierent kinds of fear. The fact,
however, is that we do not experience a number of fears
and consequently it is momentary. So avidyd is not proved
even by inference.
1.1.1.] Sn-Bhdsya 69
Again, merely from the fact that a thing is perceived
which is later sublated by new knowledge which shows that
the first perception was erroneous we cannot conclude that
an anirvacanlya thing exists. What is perceived is alone the
object of perception, error and sublation, and the object is
not perceived as anirvacanlya and so we cannot imagine
5uch an object which is not perceived by these states of
consciousness or any other. Whatever becomes an object of
perception, error or sublation is capable of being described
as such and such, and if the Nescience is capable of being
<iescribed like this it cannot be anirvacanfyd and if it is not
capable of being defined like this it cannot be an object of
perception.
The Advaitins may say that in the case of the rope and
the snake, the rope is experienced as a snake and there is
fear, but later knowledge shows that the snake did not exist
fit the tune and place and it is not possible for the rope to
hecome a snake and so we are forced to the conclusion that
for the time being there came into existence a snake which is
licither real nor unreal. That is why the person perceiving
it became afraid and later got rid of this wrong perception
by the knowledge of the rope. All this could not take place
without a snake and therefore we have to accept an anir-
vacanlya snake as the object of wrong perception. This,
however, is untenable. In a wrong or erroneous perception
one thing appears as another and this element in wrong
perceptions has to be admhted by the Advaitins also. This
element by itself is sufficient to explain wrong perception
and consequent fear and its final sublation, and therefore
there is no need to accept any inexplicability which is neither
experienced nor can be proved by any means of knowledge.
The perception is not that the snake is inexphcable but is
70 Sri-Bhasya [ I. LI.
real. In the former case there would be no wrong percep-
tion or fear of sublation by later knowledge. So we have to
conclude that the rope appeared as the snake, for otherwise
the perception, the fear generated and subsequent sublation,.
caimot be explained. Whatever be the explanation given by
the various schools of philosophy with respect to wrong
perception this element, viz. the one thmg appearing as.
another is common to aU of them. They have to accept
finahy this anyathdkhyati and therefore there is no use
putting forward any other explanation (khydti).
Moreover, before we accept the creation of an inexplic-
able snake we must show the cause from which it originated.
Perception cannot be the cause of this unique snake, for it
cannot come into existence before the snake is per-
ceived and therefore the snake must exist aheady before
perception takes place. Nor can the organs create it, for
they generate only knowledge and not its objects. Nor can
the snake be created by defects in the sense organs, the
eyes, etc. of the perceiver, for such defects affect only the
knowledge for the perceiver and do not create any object
and the Advaitins hold that an anirvacanlya object is created
where a wrong perception takes place. That beginningless
ignorance cannot be its cause has already been shown.
Assuming that a unique silver is created, why is it expe-
rienced and spoken of as real silver and not as any other
object ? It cannot be due to the simharity or likeness between
it and the real silver, for in that case the perception would
have been, 'It is like real silver.' If it is perceived as real
silver then it would be a case of one thing appearing as.
another (anyathdkhyati) and not inexplainable (anirvaca-
niyd khydti). Neither can it be said that it is the genua
(jdti) which is in both the unique and the real sHver, for m-
Srl-Bhdsya
71
that case, is this genus (jdti) real or unreal ? K it is real,
then it cannot exist in the unreal silver. If it is unreal, then
it cannot exist in the actual real sUver existing elsewhere.
So this theory of anirvacanlya khydti is untenable from
aU standpoints.
11. AL L KNOWLEDGE IS OF THE REAL
Those who are learned in the Vedas declare that ah
knowledge is of real things, of things as they are and that
there is nothing like wrong or erroneous knowledge, for
every object contains every other object. Even as the gross
elements contain all the three or five subtle elements in their
composition and are called earth, water, etc. oiJy according
to the predominance of the earth and water element in them,
shnilarly aU objects contam aU other objects of them, and
speciaUy substances which are similar contain portions of
each other in theh composition. Thus silver exists actually
in the composition of the shell and the terms 'silver' and
'sheU' are used according to the predominance of the one
or the other element in any object. So when shell is taken
for silver what happens is this : Due to some defect in the
eye or due to some other cause the sUver element in the
object is seen and not the sheU element in it and the per-
ceiver desires to possess it. Later when the defect is removed,
the sheU element is seen and he no longer desires it. Thus
the perception of silver in the sheU is real. The perception
in which the sheU is predominant sublates the perception
in which it is not predominant and there is no sublation ot
an unreal perception by a real one.
Brahman alone, is the creator of everything in this world,
be it in the waking or in the dream state. The waking state
72 Srl-Bhdsya [I.I.I.
is experienced by all souls but the dream world is experi-
enced by the dreaming individual alone as it is meant for
him alone and is created by the Lord as a frmt of that
particular individual's merh or demerit (Vide 111. h. 1-2).
SimOarly in the waking state also certain things are created
by the Lord as are experienced by aU, while certain other
things are created in such a way as to be perceived only by
particular persons and to last for a limited tune only, and
it is this difference between objects of general perception
and objects of perception of particular beings, which makes
the difference between things sublating and things sublated.
Thus aU perceptions are real and aU knowledge is real and
there is nothing like urjeal object or wrong knowledge.
12. SCRIPTURES DO NOT TEACH NESCIENCE
The Nescience of the Advahins which is neither real
nor unreal is not based on scriptural authority. In the text,
"These which are true are covered by what is tmtrue (anrtd)"
(Chd. VIII. iu. 2), quoted by the Advaitins, the word
'untrue' (anrtd) does not mean unreal or indefinable but
is the opposite of what is meant by the word rta (true) and
rta means such actions as do not result in any worldly
enjoyment but are helpful only to attain the Lord, viz.
"Those enjoying the results of good actions (rta)" (Ka.
I. ih. 1). Therefore 'untrue' (anrta) means actions which
lead to worldly enjoyment and not helpful in attaining the
Lord and consequently due to such actions the world of
Brahman is hidden to such peoplethat is what the Chdn-
dogya text says. Again, "Though they daily go to the world
of Brahman they do not attain Brahman, being carried away
by untruth."
Srl-Bhdsya 73
The word Maya does not mean unreal or false but that
power which is capable of producing wonderful effects. This
latter meaning is also accepted. Prakrti also is capable of
creating wonderful effects and is therefore caUed Maya. In
ihe text, "The Lord, the Mayin, creates through Maya this
world and the souls are bound in it by this Maya" (Sve.
IV. 9), the word Maya refers to Prakrti which is the cause
of this wonderful creation and the Lord is called Mayin
because He possesses the power and not because of Ne-
science on His part. It is the jiva that is bound by this Maya
as the text itseff says. Again m "The Lord became many by
His Maya" (Br.) the reference is to the Lord's manffold
powers. "My Maya is hard to cross" (Gltd VII. 14)^here
Maya is said to consist of three gunas and therefore refers
to Prakrti. So it is clear that scriptures (Sruti and Smrti)
do not teach a Nescience which is neither real nor uiureal.
Nor is such an entity taught by the Puranas.
13. THE TEXT, ' THAT THOU ART' DOES NOT PRODUCE THE
KNOWLEDGE OF ANON-DIFFERENTIATED B RAHMAN
It is not true that final release resuhs from the know-
ledge of a non-differentiated Brahman. Scriptural texts like,
"I have known the great Being resplendent like the sun and
who is beyond this darkness of ignorance ; knowing Him
alone one attams immortahty herethere is no other way
to go by" (Sve. III. 8), show that Brahman is differentiated
and that the knowledge of such a Brahman alone leads to
liberation. It has already been shown that even purifying
texts like, "Existence, Knowledge, Infinhe is Brahman" refer
to a differentiated Brahman. Even the co-ordination in the
text, "That thou art" (Chd. VI. xih. 3) does not prove a
74 Sri-Bhdsya
a non-differentiated Brahman. The word 'That' in this text
refers to the omniscient Brahman whose deshes are true,
the first Cause, and That which has been spoken of in the
earlier passages : "He thought, 'I shah be many' " etc. (CM.
VI. i. 3) ; the 'thou' refers to the jiva with the gross matter
with which it is connected as the body of the Lord, for the
Chdndogya text says that He is the Seff of everythhig in the
world, both sentient and insentient: "In that aU this has its
Seff" (Chd. VI. i. 3), and thus the 'thou' is co-ordinated
with 'That' and refers to Brahman. Therefore the text shows
that Brahman exists in two modes as the cause of the world
and as the jiva and this existence of one object m two
different conditions is what a co-ordmation aims at. If this
twofold condhion is not accepted then co-ordination would
be meaningless, for no idea of difference will be conveyed
by the terms and we shah also have to give up the primary
meanings of the terms and resort to secondary mearungs or
implications.
The Advaitms say that just as the sentence, 'This is
tliat Devadatta,' on account of the contradiction involved
in one part of hs hnport, viz. Devadatta as existing in the
past and at another place and in the present and here,
implies, by abandoning the conflicting portion which has
reference to time and place, only the non-conflicting portion,
viz. the man Devadatta, similarly 'That thou art,' on
account of the contradiction involved in one part of its im-
port, viz. consciousness characterised remoteness and im-
mediacy, imphes, by abandoning the conflicting portion
which has relation to remoteness, immediacy, etc. only
absolute pure Consciousness which is common to both 'That'
and 'thou'. But the fact is here there is no contradiction
at aU in the sentence, 'This is that Devadatta', for the same
I. U. ] Srl-Bhdsya 75
person can exist at different times and there is no contra-
diction in such a perception. Even the perception as exist-
ing in different places involves no contradiction smce
it is connected with different times and does not refer
to one moment, for he does not exist at different
places at the same moment but at different moments. On
the other hand ff 'That' refers to non-differentiated pture
Consciousness then it wiU conflict with the earlier texts,
"He thought, T shaU be many'." Moreover the inhial pro-
mise "By the knowledge of one everything wiU be known"
v/iU also not be fulfiUed, for according to the Advaitins the
knowledge of Brahman leads to the knowledge of the uni-
verse as unreal and these words are imwarranted when it is
possible to fulfil the promise without them', that is, by
showing that by knowing Brahman aU its products are also
known and this is possible ff we regard Brahman as the
Cause and Itseff as the Effect, i.e. as having for Its body
the jlvas and matter in their subtle condition and also as
liavhig these two in theh gross state for Its body in the
effected state. As the cause and the effect are the same
substance, by knowing the cause the effect is also known.
Lastly, according to the Advaitm's view, to Brahman which
is knowledge itseff and is pure whl be attributed Nescience
and It will be the seat of all the objectionable qualities which,
are the effects of this Nescience.
Even ff the co-ordinated statement 'That thou art' were
meant to show that the Jivahood denoted by 'thou' does
not exist in Brahman denoted by the word 'That', still we
have to give up the direct meanings of the terms 'That' and
'thou' and take to implied meanings, 'That' denoting a
universal substrate Brahman and 'thou' denoting that the
Jivahood has withdrawn from it; while the other objections
76 Srl-Bhdsya
shown aheady remain. In addition, two more defects would
be added if this interpretation is accepted. Where sheU is
taken for sUver and we have the wrong perception, viz.
'this is silver,' the shver is sublated by an independent evi-
dence got through a later perception 'this is sheh and not
:sUver' but in the case of 'That thou art' there is no inde-
pendent evidence which sublates the Jivahood, and we have
only to assmne it through otu: helplessness. Further,
where sheU is taken for silver the possession of an
attribute by sheU which is the substrate of the wrong
perception and which attribute is later perceived con-
tradicts the perception of sUver which is therefore sub-
Consciousness_ and no attribute besides that, and as such
the impression of the Jivahood whl not be nuUified, for the
perception of Brahman without any attribute is not incon-
sistent with wrong perception. It may, however, be said
that Consciousness which is the substrate remains concealed
and the function of the word 'That' is to reveal it. But in
this case such a concealed substrate cannot be an object
of error or the subsequent sublation. Nor can it be said that
the substrate is not concealed in so far as it is an object of
wrong perception, for m its non-concealed state it is opposed
to aU wrong perception. Hence unless we accept an attri-
bute of the substrate besides its substance we cannot explain
wrong perception and sublation. It is only when such an
attribute exists and is concealed that wrong perception is
possible and when the attribute is revealed the wrong per-
ception is nullified. If, however, the text is interpreted as
referring to Brahman having the jlvas for its body, then the
the words 'That' and 'thou', wiU convey theh primary
meanings and the principle of co-ordination also wiU be
justified, as the text refers to a single substance. Brahman,
Sri-Bhasya
77
existmg in two modes and a ftirther attribute of Brahman
will thereby be enunciated, viz. Its being the inner ruler of
the individual souls. Moreover, it would be in keeping with
the uitroductory portion of the section and also with the
promissory statement that by the knowledge of one thing
every thing is known, as Brahman having for its body the
jivas and the matter in then gross state is the effect and the
same Brahman having these for Its body in the subtle state
is the cause.
On this interpretation it may be questioned which of
the two is the original statement. This objection is not valid,
for the text "Thatthou art" does not make any such state-
ment as it is already made at the beginning of the section
in the text, "All this has That for ffs Seff" where it is clearly
stated that Brahman is the Self of 'all this', i.e. of the world
ol matter and the individual souls which form Its body. This
is justified by a previous text, "All these creatures are born
of Brahman, in It they live and in It they are merged again."
Other texts also declare this identity of Brahman with the
individual souls and matter m so far as they form Its body,
for in the Br. III. vii. 3, and the Tai. II. 6, Brahman is said
to be the Self of this sentient and insentient world which is
Its body. Moreover, the Chd. text, "Having entered into
them let me evolve name and form," shows that aU things
attain substantiality due to the individual soul which has
Brahman for its Self entering into them. This text along with
Tai. II. 6 shows that the individual soul also has Brahman
for its Seff, Brahman having entered into it. Thus the whole
ol the sentient and insentient world has its Self in Brahman
in so far as it constitutes Its body, and as the whole world
derives its substantiality from Brahman aU terms whatsoever
denotmg different things ultimately refer to Brahman in so
78 Sri-Bhasya
far as It is distinguished by these different things. The text
''That thou art" is therefore only a special statement of the
universal truth, 'Tn That aU this has its Self."
On the other hand the Advaitins, the Bhedabhedavadins
and Bhedavadins whl find it difficult to explam texts stating
the doctrine of universal identity. If, according to the Advai-
tins, there is only one non-differentiated substance, then with
respect to what is this identity taught? It cannot be said
with respect to Itself, for that is already known from texts,
like, "Brahman is Truth, Knowledge, Iiffinity," and there is
nothing fiuther to be known from texts depicting this identity.
It may be said that this teaching of identity is necessary
to remove the imagined differences in Brahman. It has
already been shown that such hnagined differences cannot
be removed by texts teaching identity by way of co-
ordination. For, co-ordination catmot be used at aU
except to show that the substance exist in two modes,
which win go against the conclusions of the Advaitins,
the absolute oneness. According to the Bhedabheda-
vadins also, hi either case, i.e. whether the difference
is due to limiting adjuncts or it belongs to Brahman due to
Its very nature. Brahman which is the Self of everything
and which is free from all taint would be contaminated by
unperfections. Lastly, the Bhedavadins will have to entirely
ignore these texts teaching universal identity inasmuch as it
is meaningless to say that things which are entirely different
are identical also.
To sum up : Texts declare a threefold classification :
matter, individual souls and Brahmanmatter being the
object of enjoyment, souls, the enjoyers and Brahman, the
ruhng principle. Matter and souls which other texts declare
to be connected with Brahman as Its body are controlled
M. I. ] Sri-Bhasya 79
by It. It is therefore the Seh of everythingthe inner ruler.
"He who inhabits the earth but is whhin it" etc. (Br. Ill,
vu. 3-23). Other texts again teach that Brahman wluch has
matter and souls for Its body exist as this world both in the
causal and effected states, and hence speak of this world in
both these aspects as that which is the real (Sat). "Sat alone
was this in the beginning, One only without a second" etc.
(Cha. VI. h. 8) ; "He wished, 'May I be many'" etc. (Tai.
II. 6) and so on. These texts also uphold the threefold en-
tities essentiaUy distinct in nature from one anothera view
which is supported by texts hJce, "Let me enter these three
divine beings with this hving seff and then evolve names and
forms" where the three divine beings or primordial elements
stand for the whole material world and the hving seff refers
to the individual soul. Brahman is hi Its causal or effected
condition, according as It has for Its body matter and souls
either in theh subtle or gross state. The effect being thus
non-different from the cause, it is known through the know-
ledge of the cause, and the initial promissory statement of
the scriptures that by the knowledge of one thing everything
ts known holds good. As Brahman which has for Its body
matter and souls in theh gross and subtle states constitutes
the effect and the cause we can weU say that It is the material
(upadana) cause of this world.
Texts which teach that Brahman is without quahties
teach that It is free from aU evU qualities. Similarly texts
like, "True, infinite, knowledge is Brahman," which declare
knowledge as Its essential nature declare that the essential
nature of Brahman which is all-knowing can be defined as
knowledge, while texts like, "He who is aU-knowing" etc.
show that It is essentially a knowing subject. Again texts
Uke, "He deshed, 'May I be many' " (Tai. II. 6), teach that
so
Srl-Bhdsya
Brahman exists as this manifold world, thereby denying the
leahty of ah things diflerent from It, which is the true import
of texts like, "From death to death he goes who sees any
plurality here" (Br. IV. iv. 19). Thus we find that texts
which declare matter, souls and.Brahman to be essentiaUy
different in nature, which declare Brahman to be the cause
and the world the effect, and finaUy the cause and effect to
be non-different, do not in the least contradict the texts
v/hich declare matter and souls as the body of the Lord
matter and soul in causal condition existmg hi a subtle state,
not having assumed as yet names and forms, whUe in the
gross or effected state they are designated by such names
and forms. Thus some texts declare that matter, souls and
Brahman are three different entities, whUe others teach that
matter and souls in aU thek states form the body of God
who 4s thek Self, while stUl other texts teach that It in Its
causal and effected stales comprises within It these three
enthies. "AU this is Brahman".
Bondage is real and is the result of ignorance which is
of the nature of Karma without a beginning. This bondage
can be destroyed only through Knowledge, i.e. through the
Knowledge that Brahman is the inner ruler different from
souls and matter. Such Knowledge alone leads to final release
or Moksa. This Knowledge is attained through the Grace of
the Lord pleased by the due performance of the daily duties
prescribed for different castes and stages of life, duties per-
formed not with the idea of attaining any results but with
the idea of propitiating the Lord. Works done with a desire
for results lead to knpermanent results while those per-
formed with the idea of pleasing the Lord result in the
Knowledge of the nature of devout medkation which in turn
leads to the intuition of Brahman as the inner Seff different
Sn-Bhdsya 81
from souls and matter. The leads to Moksa. As the due
performance of the duties prescribed requhes the knowledge
of the work portion of the Vedas, an inquiry into Brahman
must be preceded by an inquiry into the works.
Topic 1 : The Inquiry into Brahman and Its
Pre-requisites
After an inquiry into the ritualistic portion of the Vedas
one comes to know that results acquhed by mere sacrifices
etc. are ephemeral; on the contrary the result of the know-
ledge of Brahman is eternal. As such an inquiry into Brah-
man should be takenup.
The necessity of such an inquiry is questioned, to start
with, by the Mimamsakas. '
Objection : There is no need to know Brahman, the
knowledge of which is attained after great effort; for the
result such knowledge is the attainment of immortahty,
which can also be had by rituals, as is declared by texts
like, 'Drinking Soma (juice) we have become hnmortal.'
Answer : The results of work are ephemeral and can
never give permanent results, and so it cannot help us to
attain immortality. Texts like, 'Having examined the worlds
attainable through works, a Brahmana should get dispas-
sionate towards them. The uncaused cannot be had through
the caused' etc. (Mu. I. u. 12), declare it. Vide Chd. VIII.
i. 6 also. On the other hand, the scriptures declare that hn-
mortality can be attained only through the knowledge of
Brahman, in texts like, -The knower of Brahman attains the
Highest' (Tai. II. 1) ; 'Knowing Hhn alone one transcends
death' etc. (^ve. III. 8). What is stated by 'Drinking Soma
we have become immortal' should not be taken hteraUy, but
in a relative sense only. So Brahman should be known.
6
82 Sri-Bhasya [ i.i.i.
A further objection is raised by the Prabhakara Mimam-
sakas.
Objection : The power of a word to signify a thing is
known only from the use it is put to by experienced people,
and as such use always hnphes the idea of something to be
accomphshed, the true purport of a word is to denote an
action; it cannot produce knowledge of a mere existing
thmg. Therefore the hnport of the Vedas is only action, and
as such the Vedanta texts cannot be authority with respect
to Brahman, which, being an aheady existing self established
thing, has no connection with action. Hence an inquiry
mto Brahman need not be taken up, smce it cannot produce
the result expected of it.
Answer : People who are guided by the accepted criteria
of truth cannot respect an opinion which sets aside the uni-
versahy known method of estabhshing the relation between
words and the thhigs signified by them, and which wants to
establish that words signify only actions that are not com-
monly known and which are inculcated by the Vedas.
Parents pomt out to theh chUd the things that are signified
by the words they use, and thus the child comes to know
that these words mean those things. It finds in time that
these words of themselves give rise to certain ideas in its
mind, and as it finds no other relation between these words
and the objects signified by them, it comes to understand -<
that the relation between them is based on the denotative
power of the words. Therefore, the rule that words denote
only actions is not binding, and we find that it is possible
for words to convey knowledge of a seh-estabhshed existing
thing. So the Vedanta texts are authority with respect to
Brahman, though It is a seh-estabhshed existing thmg, and
as such an inquhy into Brahman should be taken up.
1.1.2.]
Srl-Bhdsya 83
Even if the Vedanta texts relate only to thhigs to be
accomplished, stUl an inquiry into Brahman should be taken
up. The scriptures prescribe meditation on Brahman ia texts
like, 'Verhy, my dear, the Self has to be seen, to be heard,
reflected on and meditated on' (Br. II. iv. 5); It has to
be sought after, we must try to understand It' {Chd. VIII.
vu. 1) ; also Br. IV. iv. 21, Chd. VIII. i. 1, etc. An action
hke meditation, which is enjoined, should have a result of a
particular nature and quahty, and we have to find this from
other laudatory statements, just as in the case of other Vedic
injunctions. In texts hke, 'He who deshes heaven must per-
form the Asvamedha sacrifice', we do not have any descrip-
tion of the nature of heaven; we have to gather it from
other statements like, 'where there is neither heat nor cold
nor suffering' etc. Again, in texts like, 'He shah perform the
nocturnal sacrifices', no mention is made of the result of
such sacrifices, but later the texts say, 'Those who perform
these sacrifices attain eminence'. Simharly, that the result of
meditation on Brahman, which is prescribed by the scrip-
tmres, is the attaimnent of Brahman has to be known from
texts like, 'He who knows Brahman attains the Highest'
{Tai. II. 1). The nature and attributes of Brahman also
have to be gathered from simUar other texts. So the know-
ledge of the true nature of Brahman and Its attributes are
helpful to actions prescribed, and therefore an inquiry into
Brahman should be taken up.
Topic 2 : Definition of Brahman
2. (Brahman is that Omniscient, Ommipotent, all-
merciful Being) from whom proceed the origin etc. (i.e. ori-
84 Srl-Bhdsya
[ 1.1.2.
gin, sustenance and dissolution) o this (varied and wonder-
fully fashioned world).
What is the nature of that Brahman which is to be ia-
quhed into? 'That from which these beings are born, by
which they hve after birth and into which they enter at death
try to know That. That is Brahman' (Tai. III. 1). This
text gives a definition of that Brahman, i.e. it gives those
pecuhar characteristics by which Brahman is distinguished
from other things.
Objection : These characteristics, viz. the origin etc. of
the universe, cannot define Brahman, for the attributes being
more than one, there arises the possibhity of theh denoting
more than one Brahman, even as when we say, 'The ox is
that which is broken-horned, hornless, or fuUy-horned',
more oxen than one are meant. Again, these attributes, 'the
origin' etc. cannot be accidental characteristics of Brahman,
for such characteristics denote in a different form a thing
aheady known from a certain source, as, for example, 'The
house where there is that crane, belongs to Devadatta'. But
we do not have any idea of Brahman from any source other
than this text; so 'the origin' etc. cannot be accidental cha-
racteristics of Brahman. Therefore Brahman cannot be de-
fined at ah, and consequently an inquiry into It is useless.
Answer : 'The origin' etc. can be indicative of Brahman
as being Its accidental characteristics, inasmuch as Brah-
man is already known in another form or aspect from the
etymological meaning of the wordas possessing 'supreme
greatness' and 'power of growth'. Moreover, the Taittiriya
text refers to some Being already weU known, whose great-
ness is due to Its being both the material and the efficient
cause of the universe. Vide Chd. VI. u. 1 and 3. This Brah-
man, which is known to be aU this, can weh be indicated
1.1.3.]
Sn-Bhdsya 85
by 'the origm' etc. of the muverse as Its accidental traits,
and therefore a knowledge of Bralunan through these cha-
racteristics is possible.
Agam, 'the origin' etc. can define Brahman. The objec-
tion that more than one attribute would give rise to the idea
of more than one Brahman is not correct, for it is only when
the attributes are contradictory to each other that they give
rise to such an idea, as in the example cited by the objector,
but not when they do not contradict each other, as e.g. 'The
taU, fah-looking youth is Devadatta'. Here we do not get
the idea of more than one person. Simharly, as 'the origin'
etc. of the universe are attributes that are not contradictory,
having reference to difierent times, they denote only one
Brahman and It can be known through them.
So the objection that Brahman cannot be defined, and
consequently that no inquiry into Brahman is possible, is
not correct.
Topic 3 : Brahman Cognizable only Through the Scriptures
^TTF^nfrffTr^ U ^ U
3. The scriptures (alone) being the source of right
knowledge (with respect to Brahman), (the scriptural text,
Tai. III. 1., is proof of Brahman).
Objection : The scriptures give us knowledge only of
those thmgs that cannot be known otherwise. If Brahman
could be known only from the scriptures and not from other
sources, then the scriptures would be proof of Brahman and
the text, Tai. III. 1, cited in the last Sutra could be taken
as a definition of Brahman. But the scriptures are not the
only source of knowing Brahman, as It could be known
through other proofs such as inference. This world, being
made up of parts, is an effect, and one can easUy infer that
86
Srl-Bhdsya
[ 1.1.3.
an eflEect like this, which is so varied and wonderful, must
have a creator who is omniscient and aU-knowing, unlike
ordinary souls which are of limited power and knowledge.
So, the scriptures not being the only means of knowing
Brahman, they cannot be proof of Brahman, and therefore
Tai. III. 1, caimot be accepted as defining Brahman.
Answer : This objection caimot be accepted. Though
one can infer a creator, yet it is not known that the enthe
world was created at one time and by one being. It is quite
possible that different parts were created at different times,
and as such it might have been created by many individual
souls, which are known to acquhe extraordinary powers by
sphitual merits. Therefore, the existence of a single tran-
scendental Being cannot be inferred. Nor can one infer that
the same Bemg, having for Its body the world of matter
and sphit, is both the efficient and the material cause of
the world. Hence other means of proof have no place with
respect to Brahman. In the scriptures also we find, T ask
you of that Being who is to be known only from the Upani-
sads {Aupanisadamy (Br. III. ix. 26), where the word
only shows that It cannot be known by any other means
of knowledge except the Upanisads. Therefore, the scrip-
tures alone are authority with respect to Brahman, and we
have to admit that Tai. III. 1 does define Brahman.
Topic 4 : Brahman the Main Purport of all
Veddnta Texts
^ ?m'^qT?T U >f U
4. But that (the scriptures alone are authority with
respect to Brahman is established), because it is the main
purport (of all texts as constituting the highest aim of man).
Objection : Granted that Brahman cannot be known by
1.1.4.]
Srl-Bhdsya 87
other means than the scriptures, yet they cannot be authority
or proof with respect to Brahman which is self-estab-
hshed. The scriptures must aim at some practical purpose,
and they can have a purpose in so far as they lay down
injunctions for man which either mduce hhn to or prohibh
him from some action conducive to his weU-being. The very
meaning of the word 'sastra' in this. Texts, therefore, which
do not contain any such injunctions, but are mere descrip-
tions of things existing, are purposeless. It is only a non-
existing thmg that induces or prohibits activity. So, though
there are texts about Brahman in the scriptures, depicting
It as a seh-estabhshed existing thing, and also as one's own
self, these texts do not induce or prohibit any action on the
part of a person, and so they are purposeless.
It may be said that texts describing Brahman are con-
nected with injunctions prescribing meditation on It. But
though such descriptions are necessary to the act of medi-
tation, yet they do not vouchsafe the reality of the object of
meditation, for meditation of an umeal object is also possible,
as for example, 'Let him medhate on name as Brahman'
(Chd. VII. i. 5).
Even where a reference to an accomplished thmg serves
some purpose of man, as, for instance, the joy expressed on
hearing, 'a son is born to you' or the removal of fear when
one says, 'this is a rope and not a snake', it is not the thing
or fact that serves man's purpose, but the knowledge of the
thing or fact. So it is quite possible that man's purpose may
be attained by the mere knowledge of a thmg or fact, even
where the thing or fact is not a reality. Fairy-tales give great
joy to children. So, though the scriptures may serve some
purpose, yet they may not be proof of the existence of a thmg
since it relates merely to the knowledge of a thmg, and not
88 Srl-Bhdsya [ 1.1.4.
to the thmg hself. So the Vedanta texts do not establish
Brahman.
Answer : The word but refutes what has been stated
above. It is not correct to say that inducement to or prohi-
bition from some action alone makes the scriptures purpose-
ful. Those that estabhsh something which serves man's
pm^iose or aim are authoritative. Since the Vedanta texts
teach Brahman as the highest object to be attained, as It is
infinite bhss and free from ah evil etc. it is childish to say
that these texts are devoid of a purpose simply because they
have no relation to an action. Whatever is attained through
rituals (Karma-Kanda) though it serves some purpose of
man, yet it carmot be his ultunate goal, inasmuch as it is
not eternal. Brahman alone can be that idtimate goal or
aim. Therefore, Vedanta texts which have Brahman as their
main purport, as constituting the highest aun of man, and
which describe Its nature, which is obscured due to igno-
rance arismg our of beginnings Karma (past actions),
cannot be purposeless. Rather, these scriptural texts alone
are purposeful, because they establish Brahman which is the
essence of all that man can asphe after.
Again, the proposition that a description of a thing
gratifies people through a mere knowledge of a thing, though
the object may not be a realityis not correct, for the
moment one knows that the object described is not real the
gratification wUl cease. Fairy-tales give joy to children,
because they think they are all real; but if they once grasp
that the tales are false, they wih not be gratified by them.
So also Vedanta texts if they do not describe the existence
of a real Brahman to us, the mere idea conveyed by them
whl not satisfy us. Therefore Vedanta texts do estabhsh
Brahman.
1.1.5.]
Srl-Bhdsya 89
Topic 5 : The First Cause an Intelligent Principle
fea^JH??^ u ic u
5. On account of thinking, that which is not based on
the Scriptures (viz. the Pradhana) is not (the Sat mentioned
in the scriptural text relating to the first Cause).
It has been stated earher that Brahman which is taught
as the cause of the world m texts like Tai. III. 1, is to be
enquhed iato. Now hi this and the foUowiag Sutras it is
declared that these texts do not refer to the inert Pradhana
and such other entities which rest on inference alone.
It is taught in the Chdndogya Upanisad, 'Existence (Sat)
alone, my dear, was this at the beginnmg, one only without a
second. It thought, "May I become many and be born". It
created fire' (VI. u. 1, 3). A doubt arises whether the word
Existence (Sat) refers to Brahman or the Pradhana of the
Samkhyas, as the first Cause. The Sariikhyas say that it
refers to theh Pradhana, for it is but natural that the inert
Pradhana which consists of Sattva, Rajas and Tamas in a
state of equhibrium can alone be the cause of the material
world made up of these three Gunas, and not Brahman
which is an inteUigent principle. The cause and the effect
must be of like nature, for the effect is nothmg but the cause
in another condition. Moreover, it is thus alone can the
initial statement, 'by the knowledge of the one thing, the
knowledge of everythhig is gained' hold true. Otherwise,
what is taught by way of example in the text, 'Just as by
the knowledge of a lump of clay aU things made of clay are
known' etc. (Chd. VI. ii. 5) wiU not be an apt example in
the case of the first Cause and its product, this world. So
Pradhana is the Sat which is taught as the first Cause m the
Chdndogya text VI. ii. 1.
90 Srl-Bhdsya
[ 1.1.5.
Answer : The Sutra refutes this view and declares that
the word 'Existence' (Sat) in the Chdndogya text refers to
Brahnian as the first Cause and not to the Pradhana, for
the text says later, 'It (Sat) thought' etc. Now the 'thhikmg'
can be predicated only of a conscious subject and not of the
inert Pradhana. In ah texts which refer to creation, the act
of creation is preceded by thought. 'He thought, "May I
create these worlds". He created these worlds' {Ai. Bra. U.
iv. 2); 'He thought He created the Prana' {Pra. VI.
iu. 4).
It is true that the cause and effect must be of like nature.
Brahman which has matter and souls for Its body exists as
this world both in its causal and effected states. It is in the
causal or effected condition according as It has for Its body
matter and souls either m theh subtle or gross state. The
effect is thus non-different from the cause and is therefore
known from the knowledge of the cause. This wih be estab-
hshed later in II. i. 4.
It may be said the 'thinking' attributed to the Sat is not
used in the primary sense which is possible only in the case
of inteUigent beings but is used hi a figurative sense, even
as it is used later m the foUowing passages : 'That fire
thought', 'The water thought', where 'thmking' is attributed
to fire and water. Such figurative use is very common as
we find in phrases like, 'the rains delight the seeds'. The
next Sutra refutes this view.
T>r4i-^v(lrH5I5?I^ U ^ W
6. K it be said (that'thinking') is used m a secondary ^
sense (with regard to the Sat); (we say) not so, because of
1.1.7.]
Sn-Bhdsya 91
the word 'Self' (by which tlie first Cause is referred to in
these texts).
Objection : In the Chdndogya text ched above, it is said
later, 'That fire thought', 'Water thought' etc. where the
'thinking' is certainly used in a figurative sense, as fire and
water are material things. Similarly, the 'thinking' attributed
to the Sat is also used in a figurative sense and therefore the
Pradhana though insentient can be the first Cause denoted
by the word 'Sat'.
Answer : This contention cannot be accepted for fiurther
on the same section it is said, 'AU this has that for its self ;
it is the true, it is the Self, and that thou art, O Svetaketu'
(Chd. VI. viu. 7), where this Sat is designated as the Self
of Svetaketu. The insentient Pradhana caimot be said to be
the Self of Svetaketu, an inteUigent being. So the word
'thinking' is used in the prhnary sense and not figiuratively
and refers to the highest Self and not to the Pradhana. On
the other hand as the text says, 'AU this has that for its self',
the highest Self (the Sat) is also the self of fire, water, etc.
and as such the 'thinking' attributed to them is ultimately
predicated of this highest Self, and so even there, the think-
ing is used in the primary sense and not figuratively.
7. Because Liberation is declared to one who is devo-
ted to the Sat (the first Cause) (it cannot be the insentient
Pradhana).
The Sat cannot be the Pradhana but something different
from it viz. the highest Seff. Having taught Svetaketu who
is deshous of Liberation to meditate on the Sat as his self
92 Sn-Bhdsya
[ 1.1.7.
in 'Tliat thou are, O Svetaketu', the Scripture later on says,
'For hun there is only delay so long as he is not dehvered
from the body ; then he becomes perfect'' (Chd. VI. xiv.
2). Now Liberation cannot result from meditation on the
hisentient Pradhana. Even the Samkhyas do not accept it.
So the Sat is not the Pradhana but the highest Seh.
Inc^i^^rsg u ^ w
8. And because it is not stated (by the Scriptures)
that It (the Sat) has to be abandoned (the Pradhana is not
the Sat).
If the Pradhana were denoted here as the first Cause
by the word 'Sat', then the text would have taught Svetaketu
to set it aside, as meditation on it could not lead to Libera-
tion. On the other hand meditation on the Sat is clearly
taught as the means to Liberation. Therefore, the Pradhana
cannot be the Sat, the first Cause.
SlfrmTr^^tsncT., U . H
9. And because it would contradict the initial state-
ment.
If the Pradhana were the first Cause then the initial
statement, that 'by the knowledge of the one thmg every-
thing is known', would be contradicted. According to this
initial statement, by the knowledge of the Sat, the first
Cause, Its products, the sentient and the insentient worlds
would be know. If the Pradhana be the first Cause then
this whl be contradicted for the sentient world, the souls,
1.1.11.]
Srl-Bhdsya 93
which camiot be products of the hisentient Pradhana, can-
not be known by its knowledge. But if Brahman be the cause
of the world^Brahman having for Its body the sentient and
insentient worlds in theh subtle and gross forms in Its causal
and effected states, then by the knowledge of Brahman
everything would be known. Therefore Brahman is the first
Cause and not the Pradhana.
10. On account of (the mdividual soul) merging in its
own SeU (the Sat, in deep sleep, the Pradhana cannot be
denoted by the word 'Self').
'When a man is said to be thus asleep, he is united with
the Sat, my child^he merges in his own Self' (Chd. VI.
viu. 1). Reabsorption means mergmg an effect in its cause.
As the inert Pradhana cannot be the cause of the intelligent
soul, this text would be contradicted ff the Sat were the
Pradhana. Therefore the Pradhana is not the Sat, the first
Cause, but Brahman.
H . On account of the uniformity of view (of all scrip-
tural texts relating to the origin o the world).
As aU Vedanta texts unfformly point out to an inteUigent
principle as the first Cause, in this Chdndogya Upanisad
also, the Pradhana is not taught as the first Cause, 'VerUy
in the beginnmg aU this was the Seff.. .He thought, I shaU
send forth the worlds' etc. (Ai. Brd. II. iv. 1-2); 'From that
Seff was created ether' etc. (Tai. II. 1)aU these texts
94
Sri-Bhdsya
[1.1.11.
teach that the highest Self or Brahman is the first Cause,
aud so the Sat m Chd. VI. h. 1 also refers to this highest
Self as the first Cause.
12. And because it is directly stated in the Scriptures.
In the Chdndogya Upanisad itself later on it is stated,
'From the Self sprang forth the Prana, from the Self sprang
forth ether...AU this springs from the Self' (VII. xxvi.
1), where it is clearly stated that the Self is the cause of
everything, thereby showhig that the Sat referred to in Chdn-
dogya VI. u. 1 is this highest Self or Brahman, and not die
Pradhana.
Topic 6 : Concerning 'The Self Consisting of Bliss'
13. The self consisting of bliss (is Brahnian and not
the individual soul) on account of the repetition (of bliss).
In the last topic it has been shown that Brahman which
is to be mquhed into is different from the inert Pradhana
consisting of the three Gunas, which is the object of enjoy-
ment for the individual soul (Jiva). In the present topic it
is shown that this Brahman is also different from the indi-
vidual soul (Jiva), whether in its bound or its freed state,
and is fuU of bhss.
In the beginning of the Ananda VaUi of the Taittiriya
Upanisad we find, 'From that Seff sprang ether' etc. (II.
1), and later the text says, 'Different from this seff which
i.i.14. ]
Srl-Bhdsya 95
consists of understanding (Vijiianamaya) is the inner Self
that consists of bliss' (II. 5). A doubt arises as to whether
'the Seh consisting of bhss' refers to the individual soul
(Jiva) or the supreme Seh (Brahman).
Objection : 'The Self consistmg of bhss' is the individual
soul because the text later says, 'The self embodied hi that
one i.e. the self consisting of understandhig, is this Seh con-
sisting of bliss' etc. (II. 6), which declares its relation to
a body, and this can indicate die individual soul and not
Brahman, and as the individual soul is an intelhgent being,
creation preceded by thought is possible for it. So 'the Seh
consistmg of bliss' is the individual soul (Jiva).
Answer : 'The Seh consisting of bliss' here, refers to
Brahman on account of the repetition of the word 'bhss'.
The text begms with, 'Now this is an examination of bliss',
and finaUy says, 'From where speech (the senses) together
with the mind turns away unable to reach It. Knowing the
bhss of that Brahman he fears nothing' (Tai. II. 8), and
this indicates supreme Bhss, which cannot be surpassed by
any other bliss like the earher ones described in the section.
Such infinite bhss can be true only of the supreme Self,
which is opposed to aU evU and is of an unmixed bhssful
nature and not of the individual self, which enjoys a particle
of that bliss mixed with endless pain and grief. Therefore,
'the Self consisting of bliss' is the supreme Self.
14. If it foe said (Bralmian is not referred to in the
passage) on account of (the suflSx 'mayat') denotmg modi-
fication, (we reply) not so, because it (the suffix 'mayat')
denotes abunudance (of bliss).
96 Sri-Bhdsya
[ 1.1.14.
Objection : The suflBx 'mayat' is indicative of a modi-
fiction, and so Anandamaya cannot refer to Brahman,
which is not an effect. Earher in the section this suflSx
'mayat' has been used to indicate an effect, an in 'the seff
consistmg of food', 'the seff consisting of Prana' etc. and
so here, in the expression 'the Seff consisting of bhss', it
also denotes a modification and so refers to the individual
soul and not Brahman; for the soul, which is of the nature
of bhss, can, in the condition of bondage in Samsara, be
said to be a modification of bhss.
Answer : Though the suffix 'mayat' has been used earher
to indicate modification yet in the expression 'the Seff con-
sisting of bhss' it cannot refer to the individual soul, for
even with regard to that aU changes are denied in many
texts like, 'It is neither born nor does it die' etc. (Ka. I.
u. 18). So the 'mayat' indicates abundance of bhss, in which
sense also this suffix is often used. This abundance of bliss
is possible in Brahman alone and not in the individual soul.
Therefore 'the Seff consisting of bliss' is Brahman and not
the individual soul.
Again it is also not possible for the individual soul to
become a modification in the sense a lump of clay becomes
a pot, for it is agamst ah scriptural teaching and logic. In
the state of Samsara its knowledge and bliss are only in
contracted condition due to Karma.
15. And because It is declared to be the cause of the
bliss of the individual soul (even).
The supreme Self is said to be the cause of the bhss of
others in the text, 'Who could move, who could live, ff that
1.1.17.]
Sn-Bhasya
97
bliss did not exist in ether (Brahman)? For It alone causes
bliss' (Tai. II. 7). That which causes bliss to others cannot
but have bliss in abundance, and so 'the Self consistmg of
bhss' can refer only to Brahman and not to the individual
soul. Further, that which imparts bliss to others, the indi-
vidual souls, is different from them, and so can only be the
supreme Self. That 'the Self consistmg of bliss' is referred
to by 'bhss' in the passage, wih be stated in Sutra 20.
16. Moreover, that very (Brahman) which has been
referred to in the Mantra portion is sung (m this passage as
'the Self consisting of bhss').
The second chapter of the Taittiriya Upanisad begins,
'He who knows Brahman attains the Highest. . .Brahman is
Truth, Knowledge, and Infinity'. This very Brahman is
finally declared in Taittiriya Upanisad (II. 5) as 'the Self
consisting of bliss'. This Brahman, however, is different
from the individual soul, masmuch as It is declared to be
the object to be attained by the soul'The knower of
Brahman attains the Highest'and is therefore necessarily
different from it. The same is made clear in aU the subse-
quent passages, 'From that Seff sprang ether' etc. Therefore
'the Seff consisting of bliss' is different from the individual
soul and refers to Brahman.
17. (Bralunan and) not the other (the individual soul),
(is meant here) on account of the impossibihty (of that
^assumption).
7
98 Sri-Bhdsya
[ 1.1.17.
Objection : No doubt That which is to be attamed is
different from the Jiva that attains It, yet it must be said
that the Brahman declared here is not ahogether different
from the soxxl (Jiva), for It is the essential nature of the
worshipper (the soul), which is non-differentiated iatelh-
gence devoid of aU attributes, and free from ah ignorance.
This non differentiated nature of the soul is declared by the
text, 'Truth, Knowledge, Infinity is Brahman', and the text
'From where speech (the organs), together with the mind
returns, unable to reach It' (II. 9) also refers to this soul
as devoid of attributes in its essential nature. It is this to
which the Mantra refers, therefore 'the Seff consistmg of
bhss' is identical with this essential nature of the mdividual
soul.
Answer : What is referred to m the Mantra cannot be
the individual soul either m its bound or its freed state, for
this is impossible, inasmuch as the soul cannot possess un-
conditioned oniniscience as is mentioned in texts hke, 'It
thought, "may I grow forth"' etc. Unconditioned omnis-
cience means the power to reaUze aU one's purposes. Though
a realized soul may be onmiscient, yet it cannot be imcon-
ditioned omniscience, for in the state of Samsara it is lunited
in power. Sutra IV. iv. 17 denies the power of creation to
the freed souls. Agam, ff the soul in its freed state be pure,
non-differentiated inteUigence, it cannot see different things,
and so cannot possess unconditioned omniscience. Hence
the hnpossibUity referred to in the Sutra. It has aheady been
proved that there can be no non-differentiated or attribute-
less thing. If the text, 'From where speech (the organs)
together with the mind turns away, unable to reach It' (Tai.
II. 8), means that mind and speech (the organs) return from
Brahman, it cannot thereby prove that Brahman is non-differ-
1.1.18.]
Srl-Bhdsya 99
entiated or attributeless. Rather it would meau that speech
and mind are no means to prove Brahman, and that would
make It a mere nothing. But in the Scriptures beginning
with, 'He who knows Brahman attains the Highest', it is
mentioned that Brahman is omniscient, the creator of the
world, the abode of bhss and knowledge, infinite bliss, etc.
and so after having said aU this, it is idle to say that there
are no means of knowing Brahman because speech and
mind are no means to it. In the text, 'From where speech
together with the mind turns away' etc. the words 'From
where'^ refer to the bliss of Brahman referred to in the text,
'He who knows the bliss of Brahman' (Tai. II. 9). Again
the words 'Bliss of Brahman' show clearly that the bliss
belongs to Brahman. After having thus qualified Brahman
as possessing bhss etc. if it is sought to prove that Brahman
is attributeless, bemg beyond speech and mind, it would be
meaningless prattle. So we have to understand that the bliss
of Brahman being infinite and measureless, it cannot be
fathomed by speech and mind. That is what the text 'From
where' etc. tries to teach. A person who knows this infinite
measxureless bhss of Brahman becomes fearless. Moreover,
that the omniscient Being declared in this Mantra is different
from the individual soul is made clear by texts declaring
that It created the world through Its mere vohtion, that it is
the inner Seff of everj^thing, and so on.
18. And on account of the declaration of difference
(between 'the Self consisting of bliss' and the individual
soul), (the latter cannot be the one referred to in the
passage).
100
Sn-Bhdsya
[ 1.1.18.
Beginning with the words, 'From that Self sprang ether*^
etc. (Tai. II. 1), which give the nature of Brahman referred
to in the Mantra, the text declares Its nature as different
from that of the Jiva in 'Different from this self consisthig
of understanding (the soul) is the inner Self consisting of
bliss'. Therefore 'the Self consisting of bhss' is not the soul
but Brahman, which is different from it.
19. And on account of (Its) desire (being the sole cause
of creation), there is no need of that which is inferred (i.e.
the Pradhana).
The text, 'It deshed, "may I be many, may I be born" ^
. . . .'It sent forth all this^whatever there is', (Tai. II. 6)
shows that everything was carried by this 'Seh consistmg of
bliss' without the aid of non-sentient matter or Pradhana
(which is inferred). But the individual soul, which is sub-
ject to Nescience, caimot create anything without the aid of
a material thing. Hence 'the Seh consisting of bhss' is other
than the individual soul.
20. And the Scriptures declare the union of this (the
individual soul) with that (bliss) in that (Self consisting of
bliss).
'It (the Self consisting of bliss) is indeed the essence
(of existence); only by attaining this essence does the soul
become blissful' (Tai. II. 7), where it is clearly stated that
the individual soul becomes bhssful after attaining 'the Self
consisting of bliss'. Therefore this 'Seh consisting of bhss'^
1,1.21.] Srl-Bhdsya
101
which is attamed by the soul is different from it and is the
supreme Seff or Brahman.
Hence it is estabhshed that the supreme Seff or Brahman,
which is different from the Pradhana as declared in the last
topic, is also different from the mdividual soul.
Topic 7 : The Person in the sun and the eye is. Brahman
In the last topic it was objected that 'the Seff consisthig
of bhss' was the individual soul, for the text declared its
relation to a body. This argument was refuted, and it was
established that 'the Seff consisthig of bhss' was the supreme
Seff, on account of its unmixed bhssful nature, which can
be true only of the supreme Seff and not of the individual
seff. A further objection is raised against this conclusion as
follows : We have in Chdndogya Upanisad, 'He who is in
this body and he who is in the sun, are the same.' Now the
person in the sun is its presiding deity and since the individ-
ual soul animates that, 'the Seff consisting of bhss' cannot
be the supreme Seff. This argument is refuted by saying that
even the person in the sun is the supreme Self and not the
individual soul.
21. (The one) within (the sun and the eye is Brahman),
because the characteristics of That are mentioned (therein).
'Now that golden (radiant) person who is seen within
the sun, with a golden beard and golden hah. . .is named
Ut, for he has risen (Udita) above all evils...Rk and
Saman are his joints... He is the lord of aU worlds beyond
the sun and of aU objects deshed by the gods' (Chd. I. vi.
102 Srl-Bhdsya
[ 1.1.21.
6-8). 'Now the person who is m the eye is iElk; he is
Saman, Uktha, Yajus, Brahman. The form of that person
in the eye is the same as that of the other (the person in
the sun), the joints of the one are the joints of the other,
the name of the one is also the name of the other... He
is the lord of the world beneath the body and of aU objects
deshed by men' (Chd. I. vu. 5-8). The question is whether
the person m the sun is the individual soul, the presidmg
diety in the sun, or the supreme Seh other than this sovd.
Prima facie view : The person in the sun and the eye
is the individual soul, the presiding deity in the sun, on
account of his relation to a body, which relation exists only
for souls to enable them to enjoy the merits and demerits of
theh previous actions. Such a cotmection with a body is not
possible in the case of Brahman, who is not subject to any
Karma. That is why the state of Liberation (moksa), in which
one is not affected by good and evU, is said to be a state
of disembodiedness. Moreover, though for ordinary souls
whose merit is very htde, it may not be possible to create
the world, yet for a soul that has gained extraordinary merit
and therefore has very great knowledge and power, it may
be possible to create this world. Hence the texts which refer
to the cause of the world and to the inner ruler refer to
such a soul, as for example, the person in the sun, who has
become aU-knowing and aU-powerful owing to acquhed great
merit. Therefore, there is no supreme Seff other than such
an individual soul, and texts like, 'It is neither gross nor
subtle', etc. describe the real nature of the individual soul,
while those texts that declare Liberation are meant to teach
the true nature of the soul and the way to realize that natture.
Answer: The person in the sun and the eye is other
than the individual soul, viz. the supreme Seff, for the text
1.1.21.]
Srl-Bhdsya 103
declares the qualities of that supreme Self as follows : 'He
Ims risen above all evU', i.e. is free from all evU. This can be
true only of the supreme Sel and not the soul. Such other
qualities as the mastery over ah worlds and aU objects of
deshe, the power to realize ah one's deskes, being the inner
ruler of aU, etc. which presuppose freedom from ah evh,
can belong to the supreme Self alone. 'It is the Self, free
from aU evh, free from old age, death and grief, from
hunger and thhst, whose deskes and whose resolves come
true' etc. (Chd. VIII. i. 5). Agaki, quahties like being the
creator of the universe and possessing infinite bliss, which
are unattainable by Karma (action) cannot be the natural
quahties of the soul, but can apply only to the supreme
Self.
Moreover, the connection with a special body of the
person in the sun as described is not due to any great merit
acquhed by that individual soul ; for the text, 'He has risen
above all evh', quoted above, reminds us of another scrip-
tural text, 'It has neither merit nor demerit, is free from
ah evil; this Brahman is beyond ah evil.' So this
person is beyond all good and evh actions, and
as such this body of his cannot be the result of any great
merit acquired by hkn. Nor is it a fact that connection with
a body necessarily makes one subject to Karma. The
supreme Self, whose deskes come true, can take a body at
pleasure. The form of the person m the sun is one which
the supreme Seh takes of Its own accord, without being
subject to Karma. It is immaterial (aprdkrta) and not a
product of the Prakrti and its three Gunas. The Scripture
also describes Its form as 'resplendent like the sun, beyond
all darkness'. Just as the supreme Self possesses an infinite
number of excellent qualities, so also It has a beautiful
104
Srl-Bhdsya
[1.1.21.
divine form befitting Its nature, and to gratify Its devotees
It takes various forms according to their desures. Therefore,
the person m the sun and the eye is the supreme Self, which
is different from the soul that animates the sun etc.
22. Also on account of a distinction being made, (the
supreme Self) is different (from the individual soul animat-
ing the sun).
The passage, 'He who dweUs in the sun and is whhin
the sun, whom the sun does not know, whose body the sun
is and who rules the sim from withm, is thy Seff, the ruler
within, the hnmortal' etc. (Br. III. vu. 9), shows that the
supreme Seff is within the sun and yet different from the
individual soul anhnating the sun. This confirms the view
expressed in the last Sutra. This and the foUowing texts in
that section of the Brhaddranyaka Upanisad declare It as
having aU souls for Its body and being the inner ruler of
aU. Therefore the supreme Seff is different from all individ-
ual souls, such as the Hhanyagarbha etc.
Topic 8 : The word Akdsa (ether) refers to Brahman
^ The text, 'That from which these beings are born. . .
That is Brahman' etc. (Tai. III. 1), teaches that Brah-
man is the cause of the world. What is the nature of this
first Cause, the Brahman? 'Existence (Sat) alone, my
dear, was this at the beginning. . .It thought. . .It brought
forth fire' (Chd. VI. u. 1, 3); 'VerUy in the beginning all
this was the Seff. . . . He thought', etc. (Ai. Brd. II. iv. 1,
1-2); 'From that Seff was created ether', etc. (Tai. II. 1)
1.1.23. ]
Srl-Bhdsya 105
texts like these, after describing Its nature by words that
have a general import and not any special meaning have
shown through words which connote such special charac-
teristics as 'thinking', 'infinite bliss' and 'special form', that
Brahman is different from the Pradhana and the individual'
soul. In the rest of this Section (Pada) it is established that
even words that have a special meaningsuch as Akasa
when they occur in texts relatmg to creation, refer to Brah-
man and not the thmg they usually denote.
23. (The word) Akasa (ether) (is Brahman), on
account of Its characteristic marks (being mentioned).
' "What is the goal of this world ?" "Akasa", he replied.
"For aU beings take theh rise from Akasa only and dissolve
in it. Akasa is greater than these. It is theh ultunate resort" '
etc. (Cha. I. ix. 1-2). Here a doubt arises as to whether the
word 'Akasa' (ether) refers to the weU-known elemental
ether or to Brahman.
Prima facie view : Here the word 'Akasa' (ether) refers
to the elemental ether, for everywhere we have to find out
the connotation of words from theh etymology. Therefore,
the word Akasa (ether) here denotes the elemental ether,
and the Brahman referred to m the Scriptures is nothing but
that. For after knowing Brahman as 'That from which these
beings are born' etc. (Tai. III. 1), one is curious to know
what is that from which these beings are born, and this is
conveyed by the text, 'For aU these beings take their rise
from Akasa only' (Chd. I. is. 1), which teUs us that
Akasa (ether) is the first Cause. Therefore, the words 'Sat'
(existence) hi Chdndogya VI. u. 1 and 'Seh' in Aitareya
106 Sri-Bhasya
[ 1.1.23.
Brahmana I. i. 1. 1-2 also refer to this Akasa (ether). It
may be objected that in the text, 'From that Self was created
Akasa (ether)' {Tai. II. 1), Akasa itself is shown to be
something created. But the objection does not hold, for the
word 'Self' denotes that subtle state of Akasa (ether) from
which the gross element Akasa is manifested. Therefore the
elemetal ether alone is referred to in this Chdndogya text,
and it is declared to be the origin of the entire world. Hence
texts that attribute 'thinkuig' etc. to the first Cause, have
to be interpreted in a secondary sense.
Answer : The word Akasa (ether) denotes Brahman
and not the elemental ether, because the text mentions
qualities, such as beuig the origin of all these beings, being
greater than everything else, and being the ultimate resort
of all beings including sentient souls. Now the elemental
ether cannot be the cause of sentient souls or the final goal
or resort to be attained by all souls, nor can an insentient
thmg possess all excellent qualities so as to make it greater
than everything else. But with respect to the supreme SeK,
and these qualities are befitting.
Again, the Chdndogya text quoted at the beginnmg
mentions Akasa (ether) as something well-known; and
this knowledge is obtained from texts like, 'Existence alone,
my dear, was there at the beguining, one only without a
second' etc. {Chd. VI. u. 1), which establish Brahman as
the first Cause. Therefore in Chdndogya I. h.. 1-2 the word
Akasa (ether) denotes Brahman, something already weU-
known. Though the word Akasa in common parlance de-
notes the weU-known element Akasa (ether), yet as that
cannot be the origin or cause of sentient bemgs, we caimot
rely on this smgle argument and interpret aU texts that
declare an independent entity possessing exceUent quahties
1.1.24. ] Srl-Bhdsya
107
like omniscience etc. by this etymological meaning of the
word Akasa. Therefore, the word 'Akasa' (ether) m this
text denotes Brahman and not the individual soul.
Topic 9 : The word Prana refers to Brahman
In the previous topic, the causahty of Akasa was refuted.
In this, the causahty of Prana (the vital force) is being
denied.
24. For the same reason (the word) 'Prana' also refers
to Brahman.
' "Which is that deity ?" "Prana", he said. For aU these
beings merge in Prana alone, and from Prana they rise" '
(Cha. I. h. 4-5). The question is whether Prana refers to
the vital force or Brahman. The prima facie view is that it
refers to the vital force, for the existence, activity, etc. of
the entire sentient world depend on this vital force, and so
it can be caUed the cause of the world. This view is refuted
by this Sutra, which holds that the word 'Prana' refers to
Brahman, and not to the vital force, for the text declares
that the whole world merges in Prana alone also rises from
it. This is a characteristic of Brahman, and is referred to as
something weh known, as in the case of Akasa in the last
topic. Moreover, one does not find the activity of the vital
force in insentient things like stocks and stones, nor even
m inteUigence, and so it is not proper to say that 'aU these
beings merge in Prana'. Therefore Brahman, as the best-
ower of life to aU beings, is referred to in this text as Prana.
So the word 'Prana' refers to some entity other than the
108 Sri-Bhasya
[ 1.1.24.
vital force, which is the cause of this world, which is free i
from evh, whose resolves come true, which is aU-knowmg,
and so on, i.e. Brahman.
Topic 10 : The word 'lighf is to be understood as
Brahman
25. (The word) light (means Brahman), on account of
the mention of feet or quarters (in a complementary passage).
'Now the hght which shines above this heaven, beyond
ah^higher than everythmgin the highest world, beyond ^
which there are no other worlds, that is the same hght which
is within man' (Chd. III. xiu. 7). Here the question is
whether the word 'hght' refers to the well known light of the
sun, which is here described as the cause of the world, or to
the supreme Seh different from the sentient and insentient
world, of mfinhe splendour, etc. The prima facie view is
that it refers to the Hght of the sun, for though the word
'light' is referred to as something weU known, yet there are
no characteristics, as in the two previous topics, that can
denote only the supreme Seff ; and so there is nothing in
the text to show that the supreme Seff is referred to here. v
Moreover, this light is identified with the light in the
person, or intestinal heat. So the world 'light' refers
to the light of the sun. As against this view, the present
Sutra estabhshes that the word 'light' refers to Brahman.
In a previous text it has been said : 'This much, is Its
glory; greater than this is the Purusa. One foot (quarter)
of It is aU beings, while Its (remaining) three feet are hn-
mortal in heaven' (Chd. III. xii. 6), where aU beings are
1.1.26.]
Srl-Bhdsya 109
said to constitute a foot of this Person, and this is none
other than Brahman, for That alone is weh known as having
four feet. See the description of the supreme Person given
in the Purusa Sukta (R. V. X. 90). The 'hght'm Chandogya
III. xih. 7, quoted at the beginning, is identified with this
Person, since like the latter, the 'light' is also connected
with heaven, and the pronoun 'that' signifies something
already stated. Therefore the word 'light' refers to Brahman.
Its identification with intestmal heat is for meditation alone
to attain certain results. The Lord also says in the Gltd,
'I abide in the body of living beings as the fire (Vaisvanara)',
etc. (XV. 14) ; where He identifies Himself with intestinal
heat.
fi, mi ^^^^'M^^^, miT^
26. If it be said (that Brahnian is) not (referred to), on
account of a metre (the Gayatri) being mentioned, (we reply)
no, because in that way (i.e. by means of the metre), the
application of the mind (on Bralunan) has been taught;
for so it is seen (in other texts).
An objection may be raised that in Chdndogya III. xii.
6, Brahman is not referred to, but the metre Gayatri, for an
earlier text says, 'The Gayatri is everything whatever exists
in the universe' (ibid. III. xu. 1). So the feet referred to
in ibid. III. xu. 6, cited in the last Sutra, mean this metre
and not Brahman. In reply it is said : Not so ; for the word
Gayatri here does not merely refer to the metre but also
inculcates medhation on Brahman as the Gayatri for the
attainment of certain results. Otherwise, a mere metre
cannot be the cause of everything. Moreover, there
110 Sri-Bhasya
[ 1.1.26.
is a similarity between the two; for in ibid. III. xu. 6
Brahman is said to have foxir feet, and the metre Gayatri
too sometimes has four feet (though usuaUy it has only
three). Elsewhere also we find that words denoting metres
are used in other senses through some simharity. Vide ibid.
IV. hi. 8 where the metre Viraj havmg ten syUables denotes
ten deities.
27. This also malces possible the representation of
beings etc. as the feet (of the Gayatri).
Beings, earth, body and heart can be the feet of Brahman >
only and not of the metre Gayatri, a mere coUection of
syUables. So the 'Gayatri' Brahman alone is referred to.
28, K it be said (that Brahman referred to in the
Gayatri passage cannot be recognized in the passage dealing
with light'), on account of difference in specification, (we
reply) no, for there is no contradiction in either (descrip-
tion to such recognition).
In the Gayatri passage heaven is specified as the abode ^
of Brahman, whUe in Chandogya III. xui. 7 flie 'hght' is
said to shine above heaven. How, then, can it be said that
the same Brahman is referred to in both the passages ? The
Sutra says that there is no contradiction here, just as there
is none when we say, with reference to a bhd perching on
the top of a tree, that it is perching on the tree, or that it is
above the tree. Therefore the word 'hght' refers to Brah-
man. It is appropriately caUed 'hght' for Brahman is also ^
1.1.29.] Sri-Bhasya
111
described as having extraordmary splendour. 'I know that
Person of sun-like splendour', etc. {Sve. III. 8).
Topic 11 : Indra's Instruction to Pratardana
^M^mHiwy^xx XX
29. Prana is Bralunan, it being so understood (from
the purport of the texts).
In the last topic the casuahty attributed to the sun and
other luminary objects indicated by the word 'hght' has been
refuted. This topic decides that Indra, the leader of the
gods, is also not the first Cause.
In the Kausitaki Upanisad we find the foUowing con-
versation between Indra and Pratardana. The latter says to
Indra, ' "You choose for me the boon that you deem most
beneficial to man." Indra said, "ICnow me only ; that is what
I consider most beneficial to man I am Prana, the
inteUigent self (Prajhatman), meditate on me as life, as
mimortality. . . And that Prana is indeed the inteUigent
seh, blessed, undecaymg, hnmortal"' {Kau. III. 1-8). The
question is whether the individual self is referred to here, or
the supreme Self. The prima facie view is that the individual
self is referred to, for Indra is the weU known god, an
individual seh, and Prana, which is equated with him, must
represent that. Therefore Indra, the individual soul, is held
out here as the object of meditation for man to attam the
supreme good or immortality, and man's supreme good
is attained by meditation on the first Cause, according to
the texts, 'The first Cause is to be medhated upon' {Atharva
Siras), and 'For him there is delay only so long as he is
not freed from the body ; then he becomes perfect.' (Cha.
112 ' Sri-Bhasya
[ 1.1.29.
\l. xiv. 3). This the Sutra refutes by saying that it is the
supreme Seh that is referred to in these passages as the
object of medhation, inasmuch as Its special quahties such
as being 'blessed', 'undecaymg', and 'hnmortal' are men-
tioned.
30. If it be said that (Brahman is) not (referred to in
these passages), on account of the speaker's instruction
about Iiimself; (we reply, not so), because there is abun-
dance of reference to the inner or supreme Self in this
(chapter).
An objection is raised that the word 'Prana' cannot
refer to Brahman, as stated in the last Sutra, for the speaker
Indra clearly refers to himself by this word, saymg,"T am,
Prana' etc. The begmning of this chapter also clearly refers
to an individual being, the god Indra, the slayer of the son
of Tvastr and so words like 'blessed', 'undecaying', etc.
found in the concluding portion of the chapter must be so
interpreted as to harmonise with the begiiming. So the word
'Prana' here refers to the individual soul that is Indra, the
wellknown god. This the Sittra refutes by saying that in
these passages there are profuse references to attributes that
are special to the inner Self. First, Indra, who is Prana, is
prescribed as the object of meditation for attaining the
highest good of man, i.e. Liberation, and this object can only
be the supreme Seh. Again, the text says, 'He makes hhn
whom He wishes to raise from these worlds do good deeds ;
; and He again makes hun whom He wishes to degrade from
these worlds do bad deeds' (Kau. III. 8), and this bemg
the prompter of good and bad actions in nian is a quality of
1.1.31.]
Srl-Bhdsya
113
the supreme Self alone. The same holds true of the quality
of being the abode of everything, sentient and insentient,
and the epithets 'blessed', 'undecaying' and 'unmortal' men-
tioned in the text: 'For as m a car the run of a wheel is
placed on the spokes, and the spokes on the nave, so are
these objects placed in the subjects, and the subjects m the
Prana and the Prana is indeed the self that is Prajna (mtel-
ligence), blessed, undecaying, hnmortal', etc. (Kau. III.
8). The words, 'He is the guardian of the world, the kmg
of the world and the Lord of the universe', can be true only
of the supreme Seh. Therefore, the supreme Seh is referred
to in these texts by the word Indra that is Prana.
31. But (Indra's) instruction (to Pratardana is justified)
hy his realization of the Truth inculcated by the scriptures
(viz. 'I am Brabman'), as was the case with (the sage)
Vamadeva.
Though Indra is an individual being yet his mstruction
about himself as the object of medhation is based on reah-
zation of the scriptural Truth that he is Brahman. Witness
the texts : 'In it aU that exists has its seh. It is the true. It
is the Seh, and thou art That.' (Chd. VI. viu. 7); 'He who
dweUing in the self is dhferent from the seh' etc. (Br. III.
vii. 22). From texts like these Indra had reahzed that the
supreme Seh has the individual souls for hs body, and
hence words like 'I' and 'thou', which connote the individual
seh, iiltimately refer to the supreme Self only ; for terms
apphcable to the body extend also to the principle embo^ed.
So in the passage under discussion, where Indra refers to
himseh, he actually refers to the supreme Self, which is his
8
114 Srl-Bhdsya
[ 1.1.31.
own Self and which has his soul for Its body. The sage
Vamadeva, realizing himself as the body of the supreme
Self, referred to It as T where he said, T was Manu, and
the sun', etc.
32. If it be said that (Brahman) is not referred to, on
account of the characteristics of the individual soul and
chief vital force (being mentioned), (we say) nobecause
of the threefoldness of meditation, and because (such
threefold meditation is found in other places), and is appro-
priate here (also).
It may be said that in Kausitaki III. 8, we find at the
beghming that the characteristics of the individual soul, the
god Indra and the chief vital force are mentioned. The
sentences, T slew the three-headed son of Tvastr', and
T dehvered the Arunmukhas, the devotees, to the wolves,'
etc. refer to Indra. Again the sentences, 'As long as Prana
lives in the body, so long there is life, and Prana alone is
the conscious seh, and taking hold of this body, it raises h up',
refer to the vital force. The second hah of the Sutra refutes
this objection and says that the supreme Seh is designated
by these terms in order to inculcate a threefold meditation,
viz. meditation of It per se as the cause of the universe ; on
Brahman having for Its body the totality of mdividual souls,
and on Brahman having for its body the aggregate of objects
and means of enjoyment. This threefold meditation we find
in other texts. For example, the passage, 'Truth, Knowledge,
Infinity is Brahman', and 'Bhss is Brahman', mculcate
Brahman in Its true nature. In the passage, 'After creatmg
1.1.32. ]
Srl-Bhdsya 115
it, He entered into it. Having entered into it, He created the
Sat and Tyat, (defined and undefined)' (Tai. II. 6); Brahman
is defined as having for Its body sentient individual souls
and insentient nature. In this chapter also this threefold
meditation is prescribed. Wherever qualities of the supreme
Self are attributed to or equated with any individual bemg
or thing, the purpose is to refer to the supreme Self as the
inner Seh of aU persons and thmgs. Hence the being Indra
who is Prana refers to the supreme Seh that is other than
the individual souls.
A Brief Summary of the First Pdda
It has been shown in Section (Pada) I, that a person
who has studied the Purva Mlmdmsa and has thus scru-
tinized and exammed the true nature of work and has come
to know that the results of work are ephemeral and there-
fore cannot help him to attain the highest aun of man viz.
Liberation (moksa), while he finds in another part of the
Vedas, viz. the Vedanta part of them, that the knowledge of
Brahman leads to this Liberation, and who being convmced
that words are capable of conveying knowledge about thhigs
existing and need not necessarily have any relation to things
to be done, and so thinks the Vedantic texts are author-
itative so far as they convey knowledge of Brahman, which
is the highest aim of man, should inquhe into Brahman by
a study of the Uttara Mlmdmsa or Sdriraka Mlmdmsa.
Scriptural texts declare a threefold classification ; matter,
individual souls and Brahmanmatter being the object of en-
joyment, souls, the enjoyers and Brahman, the ruling principle.
Matter and souls which other texts declare to be cormected
with Brahman as Its body are controUed by It. It is therefore
116
Srl-Bhdsya [ 1.1.32.
the Self of everythingthe inner Ruler. 'He who inhabits the
earth but is within it' etc. (Br. III. vii. 3-23). Other texts
again teach that Brahman which has matter and souls for
Its body exists as this world both in the causal and effected
states, and hence speak of this world in both these aspects
as that which is the real (Sat). 'Sat alone was this in the
begmning. One only without a second' etc. (Chd. VI. u. 8);
'He wished, "May I be many" ' etc. (Tai. II. 6), and so on.
These texts also uphold the threefold entities essentiahy
distinct in nature from one anothera view which is sup-
ported by texts like, 'Let me enter these three divine beings
with this hving seh and then evolve names and forms',
where the three divine beings or prhnordial elements stand
for the whole material world and the livmg self refers to the
individual soul. Brahman is in Its causal or effected condi-
tion, according as It has for Its body matter and souls either
in theh subtle or gross state. The effect being thus non-
different from the cause, it is known through the knowledge
of the cause, and the initial promissory statement of the
scriptures that by the knowledge of one thing everything is
known holds good. As Brahman which has for Its body
matter and souls hi their gross and subtle states constitutes
the effect and the cause, we can weU say that It is the
material (upddana) cause of this world.
Texts which teach that Brahman is without qualities
teach that It is free from all evU quahties. Shnilarly texts
like, 'True, infinite, knowledge is Brahman', which declare
that knowledge as Its essential nature declare that the essen-
tial nature of Brahman which is all-knowing can be defined
as knowledge, while texts like, 'He who ah-knowing' etc.
show that It is essentially a knowing subject. Again texts
hke 'He deshed, "May I be many" ' (Tai. II. 6), teach that
1.1.32. ]
Srl-Bhdsya 117
Brahman exists as this manifold world, thereby denying the
reality of ah things different from It, which is the true hnport
of texts hke, 'From death to death he goes who sees any
plurality here' (Sr. IV. iv. 19). Thus we find that texts
which declare matter, souls and Brahman to be essentiaUy
different in natiure, which declare Brahman to be the cause
and the world the effect, and finally the cause and effect to
be non-different, do not in the least contradict the texts
which declare matter and soul in causal condition existmg
in a subtle state, not having assumed as yet names and
forms, whUe in the gross or effected state they are designated
by such names and forms. Thus some texts declare that
matter, souls and Brahman are three different entities, whUe
others teach that matter and souls in aU theh states form
the body of God who is their Self, whUe stiff other texts
teach that It in Its causal and effected states comprises
within It these three entities. 'AU this is Brahman'.
Bondage is real and is the result of ignorance which is
of the nature of Karma without a beginning. This bondage
can be destroyed only through knowledge, i.e. through the
knowledge that Brahman is the inner Ruler different from
souls and matter. Such knowledge alone leads to final release
or moksa. This knowledge is attained through the Grace
, of the Lord pleased by the due performance of the daily
duties prescribed for different castes and stages of Iffe, duties
performed not with the idea of attaining any results but
with the idea of propitiating the Lord. Works done with a
desire of results lead to hnpermanent results whUe those
performed with the idea of pleasmg the Lord result in the
knowledge of the nature of devout meditation which in turn
leads to the intuhion of Brahman as the inner Seff different
' from souls and matter. This leads to moksa.
118 Sri-Bhasya
[ 1.1.32.
It has also been shown that the Taittiriya text 'That
from which these beiags are born', etc. (III. 1) defines
Brahman and that this Brahman can be known only through
the Scriptures and not through any other means of know-
ledge. 'I ask you of that Being who is to be known only
from the Upanisads (aupanisdam), (Br. III. ix. 26),
where the word only shows that it can be known only
through the Upanisads which alone are authority with res-
pect to It. As aU these texts refer to Brahman and have
Brahman as theh mam purport which is the highest ahn of
man, these texts though not related to actions are author-
itative and purposeful. That this Brahman, which is the first
Cause is an inteUigent principle, different from the insentient ^
Pradhana inasmuch as thinking is attributed to It, has been
proved. It has also been proved that this fust Cause is different
from the individual soul be it either in the state of bondage or
release, as It is said to be aU-knowmg, infinite bliss, the inner
Ruler of all beings, sentient and insentient, etc. That this Brah-
man has a form which is immaterial (aprdkrta) and which
form is not a result of Karma. That terms lilce Akasa (ether)
Prana (breath) though ordinarily refer to the well known
material things yet in the texts where they occur they refer
to Brahman because Its characteristics are mentioned. Simi-
larly the word 'light' has been shown as referring to Brah- ^
man on account of its connection with heaven. That due
to the characteristics of Brahman, viz. the attahunent of
Liberation through Its knowledge, the word 'Indra' refers
to Brahman as it is in keeping with scriptural teaching.
The result therefore arrived at was that the Scriptural
texts have for theh purport only Brahman which possesses
an infinite number of good qualities and that It cannot be
known through other sources.
CHAPTER I
SECTION U
In the first Section it has been shown that a person who.
has read the Vedic texts and studied the rituahstic portion
of the Vedas {Purva-Mimamsa) reaUze that the fruit of
ritualistic action is ephemeral; while from other Vedanta
texts he finds that the frmt of the knowledge of Brahman
is eternal and infinite. Therefore a deshe for release through
the knowledge of Brahman arises in him. 'Knowing further
that words have the power of conveying knowledge about
existing things and need not be connected with things to be
done, and being convinced that Vedanta texts describing"
the nature of Brahman are authoritative means of convey-
ing the knowledge of Brahman, which is the highest aim
of man, he begins the study of the Sdriraka Mimdmsd
(Veddnta-Sutras).
It has also been shown that with respect to the supreme
Brahman, which is the first Cause as defined by the Taitti-
riya text, 'That from which these beings are born' etc. (III.
1), Scriptures alone are the means of knowledge as It is
not an object of any other means of knowledge. This point
is further proved by the following facts : That aU Vedanta
texts refer to this Brahman alone which, though not related
to actions, is yet the highest goal of man; That this Brah-
man which is the first Cause is different from the insentient
Pradhana inasmuch as 'thinking' is attributed to the first
Cause (vide Chd. VI. u. 2-3); That It is also different from
the sentient individual soul, be it in the state to release or
bondage, as It is said to be infinite bhss, aU-pervading and
the inner Self of all beings, sentient and insentient; That
120 Srl-Bhdsya
[ 1.2.1.
this Brahman has a divme form which is not material
{aprdkrta) and not a result of karma ; That this first Cause
though referred to by such terms as Akdsa and Prana (vide
Chd. I. ix. 1-2, and I. ii. 4-5) which are weU known material
things, is yet the same supreme Being, Brahman ; so also
is the same Being referred to by the word 'hght' in Chd. III.
xiu. 7, on account of hs connection with heaven and hs
supreme splendour; that due to the characterization of
Brahman, viz. the attainment of Liberation through Its
knowledge, the words Indra and Prana (vide Kau. III. i.
S) refer to Brahman as it is in keeping with scriptural
teaching. The result therefore arrived at was that the supreme
Person, Brahman, which, on account of Its infinite number
of excellent qualities, is so very different from aU other
thmgs, is beyond aU means of knowledge except the Scrip-
tures whose texts have for theh purport only Brahman.
Though the Vedanta texts have Brahman alone for their
purport, yet certain texts seem to estabhsh some particular
beings comprised within Pradhana or the individual souls.
In this and the next two Sections such texts are taken for
discussion, the doubt is answered, and the qualities men-
tioned in such texts are shown to establish certain exceUent
qualities of Brahman. In this Section texts which contam
obscure references to the individual soul are discussed. In \
the thhd Section texts which contain clear references to the
individual soul are taken up, whUe in the last Section the
texts selected for discussion are those which seem to refer
to the individual soul but in fact refer to Brahman.
Topic 1 : The Being consisting of mind is Brahman
1. (That which consists of the mind [ Manomaya 1 is
1.2.1.]
Srl-Bhdsya 121
Brahman) because (the text) states (qualities) well known
(to denote Brahman only) throughout (the Scriptures).
In the Chdndogya Upanisad we have : 'Man is a creature
of thought. Even as is his thought is this world, so wUl be
his hereafter. Therefore he should thmk (meditate thus):
He who consists of the mind, whose body is Prana, whose
form is light' etc. (III. xiv. 1-2). Here the object of the medi-
tation prescribed by the words, 'He should thmk (medhate)'
is 'He who consists of the mind,' etc. A doubt arises whether
the 'being consisthig of the mind' etc. prescribed as the
object of meditation is the individual soul or Brahman. The
opponent holds that it is the individual soul, for the mind
and Prana are instruments of the individual soul, and as
such, the quahties of 'consisting of the mind', etc. are apt
in it and not in Brahman which is described as 'without
Prana and without mind' (Mu. II. i. 2). Nor is it possible
to assume that Brahman which is mentioned in the previous
t:xt, 'All this is verily Brahman' (Chd. III. xiv. 1), is pres-
cribed here as the object of meditation; for we get in this
text itself the object of medhation prescribed, viz. 'He who
consists of the mind' etc. Hence there is no doubt about
the object of medhation, and consequently there is no justi-
fication for us to infer it from a previous text. The word
'Brahman' which occurs in the concluding text, 'This my
inner Self is Brahman' (Chd. III. xiv. 4), is used with
respect to the mdividual soul to glorify it. So it is the
individual soul that is referred to in the text under discus-
sion as the object of medhation.
The Sutra refutes this view and says that Brahman is
the object of the medhation prescribed, for qualities like
'consisting of the mind' etc. which denote only the Brahman
in Vedanta texts are found m this text. Vide also : 'He who
122 Sri-Bhasya [1.2.1.
consists of the mind, the ruler of the subtle body (prana-
sarlra)' etc. {Mu. II. ii. 7); 'There is the ether withm
the heart and hi it there is the Person consisting of the mmd,
immortal, golden' {Tai. I. vi. 1); 'It is not perceived by the
eyes, nor by the speech.. .but by the pure mind', etc. {Mu.
JII. i. 8); 'It is the Prana of the Prana' {Ke. I. 2)-,
'Prana alone is the conscious Seh, and havmg laid hold of
the body it makes it rise up' {Kau. III. 3); 'For ah these
bemgs merge into Prana alone, and from Prana they arise*
{Chd. I. xi. 5). 'Consisting of the rnind' means 'capable of
being perceived by the pure mmd' and 'having Prana for
the body' means 'the support or iniler of Prana'. Thus the
word 'Brahman'm. the concluding portion of the text under r
discussion, 'This my inner Seh is Brahman' is used in hs
primary sense and refers to Brahman. The text, 'without
Prana and without mmd' means that Brahman does not
depend on mind for thought, nor does Its life depend on
Prana.
Another mterpretation of the Sutra foUowed by many
commentators, including the Vrttikara, is as foUows : The
text, 'AU this indeed is Brahman. . .one ought to meditate
on It cahnly' etc. prescribes that, being calm, one should
meditate on Brahman as the Seh of aU. The text, 'There-
fore he should think' is an additional statement with respect ^
to this instruction, stating certain qualities of Brahman for
medhation, such as 'consisting of the mind', etc. The mean-
ing, therefore, is that one should meditate on Brahman
which has attributes like 'consisting of the mmd', etc. as the
Self of aU. A doubt arises whether the individual soul or the
supreme Seh is denoted by the word 'Brahman'. The op-
ponent holds that it is the individual soul, for that alone
admhs of being co-ordinated with the word 'aU'. The word- k
1.2.1. ]
Srl-Bhdsya
123
'aU' denotes the enthe world from Brahma down to a
blade of grass. The state of Brahma is an appendage of the
individual soul, due to nescience and the soul's karma ;
and this is not possible in the case of Brahman which is
ah-wise, omnipotent, free from sin, and hi which not even
a trace of nescience can be foimd. It cannot be this 'ah*
which is fuU of evh. The word 'Brahman' is also used some-
times to denote the individual soul and in the state of release
it is also said to be infinite. 'It is fit for infinity' {Sve. V. 9).
As the nescience of the individual soul is due to karma, the
individual soul can very weh be said to be the cause etc. of
the world. The text means : 'The individual soul, which by
nature is infinhe and therefore of the nature of Brahman,
attams, due to nescience, the state of a god, or a man, or
an anhnal, or a plant.'
This view the Sutra refutes because the text, 'AU this is
Brahman. Let one meditate on this world as originating,
ending, and existing in Brahman' refers to Brahman as
something well known. AU this is Brahman, because the
enthe world originates, ends, and exists in It {tajjaldn);
and so, that which is well-known in Vedanta texts as the
first Cause is also stated here. This well-known Being is
Brahman alone. Vide Tai. 111. vi. 1 and Sve. VI. 9. As the
world has its Seh in Brahman because it originates, ends,
and exists in It, this world can be identified with Brahman.,
Brahman is the Self of the world both in Its causal and
effected states, for in the former state It has for Its body
aU sentient and insentient bemgs in theh subtle state, and
in the latter in theh groiss condition. This kind of identity
with the world is not incompatible with Brahman's possessr
mg exceUent qualities ; for imperfections of the world, which
forms Its body, cannot affect Brahman. What has been
124 Sn-Bhdsya
[ 1.2.1.
stated by the opponent, that the mdividual soul also can be
said to be identical with the world, is not correct; for there
can be no such identity as individual souls are different in
different bodies. Agam, the released soul, though it is not
hmited, yet has not the power of creation etc. Vide Brahma-
Sutras IV. iv. 17. Therefore in this text under discussion the
supreme Seff is denoted by the word 'Brahman'.
f^%?nT3it'N#r u ^ u
2. Moreover the qualities desired to be expressed are
befitting (only in the case of Brahman and so the passage
refers to Brahman). '
'He who consists of the mind, whose body is Prana,
whose form is light, whose resolve is true, whose nature is
like that of ether, from whom aU works, aU deshes, ah
sweet odours and tastes proceed^He who embraces aU this,
who never speaks, and is never surprised' etc. (Chd. III.
xiv. 2). The qualities mentioned in this text are possible
only in Brahman.
3i^^q#?g, T n ^ u
3. On the other hand (they) are not appropriate (in \
the case of the individual soul) and so the individual soul
IS not (referred to in the text).
AU the qualities mentioned in Chd. III. xiv. 2 cannot
belong to the mdividual soul whether in the bound or
released state, for it is very insignificant, subject to great
suffering and to karma, and is ignorant. So it is not the
individual soul but the supreme Brahman that is referred ^
to in this text.
1.2.5. ]
Sn-Bhdsya 125
4. And on account of the mention of the attainer and
the object attained (the reference is to Bralunan and to the
individual soul).
In the same chapter of the Chdndogya there occurs the
passage : 'When / shaU have departed from hence, / shall
attain Hhn (III. xiv. 4)', where 'Him' refers to 'who consists
of the mind', the object of meditation, the thing to be
attained, and the / refers to the individual soul, the attainer.
Therefore the reference in the text is to Brahman, who is
different from the individual soul.
5is?r^(!n?T^ u vc n
5. Because of the difference (indicated by the case
endings) of the words.
In the text, 'This my Seff withm the heart' etc. (Chd.
III. xiv. 4) the mdividual soul is denoted by the genitive
case, while the object of meditation, 'who consists of the
mind', is in the nominative case. So it is clear that the object
of meditation is different from the individual soul. Vide
Satapatha Brahmana X. vi. 3.2, where they are stUl more
clearly differentiated : 'As is a grain of rice, or a grain of
barley. . .so is that golden Being in the seff', where the
individual soul and 'the seff consisting of the mmd' are
clearly described as two different enthies, for 'the seff con-
sisting of the mind', which is in the nominative case, is
described as being in the individual self, the word denoting
it being in the locative case. Therefore the reference m the
text is to Brahman, and not to the individual soul.
126 Sn-Bhdsya [ 1.2.6.
?^r u %, w
6. From the Smrti also (we learn that the individual
soul is different from the one referred to in this text under
discussion).
The Smrti referred to is : '1 am centred in the hearts
of ah' etc. (Gltd XV. 15); 'He who, free from delusion,
thus knows me' (Gltd XV. 19); 'The Lord, O Arjuna, is
seated in the hearts of ah beings.... Take refuge in Him'
etc. (Gltd XVIII. 61). Here the texts clearly describe the
individual soul as the worshipper and the supreme Seh as
the object of worship.
7. If it be said that (the passage does) not (refer to
Brahman) because of the smallness of the abode (referred
to, viz. the heart) and also on account of its being desig-
nated as such (i.e. as minute), (we say) not so, (because
Brahman has been so characterized) for the sake of con-
templation aud because (in the same passage) It is said to
be like ether.
The text, 'He is my self within the heart', declares hhn
to be small in size, as he dwells within the smaU space of
the heart. The minuteness is declared also in the text,
'SmaUer than a grain of rice' etc. (Chd. III. xiv. 3) vide
also (Mu. I. i. 6 and Sve. V. 8). So that being cannot be the
supreme Seh; it can be only the individual soul. The Sutra
refutes this and says that Brahman is characterized as such
for the sake of contemplation, and that minuteness is not
Its true nature. For further on the same text says that It
1.2.8. ]
Sn-Bhdsya 127
is infinite like ether, 'greater than the earth, greater than
the sky' etc. (Chd. III. xiv. 3). Its omnipresence is not
marred by regarding It as Ihnited by the space in the heart,
or as minute in size. The case is analogous to that of the
ether in the eye of the needle, which is spoken of as Ihnited
and smaU, whereas in fact it is all-pervading. Therefore the
limitation of the abode and minuteness in size are meant
only for the sake of meditation.
8. If it is said that (if Brahman dwells within all
* bodies, It would also, like the individual soul) experience
{pleasure and pain), (we say) not so, because of the differ-
ence in the nature (of the two).
The mere fact that Brahman dweUs within bodies, like
the individual souls, does not subject It to pleasure and pam,
lor what results in pleasure and pain is not mere connection
with a body but being subject to the influence on good and
evU deeds. That does not exist in the case of Brahman which
is free from ah sin. The scriptures also say, 'One of them
cats the sweet fruh, whUe the other looks on without eating'
(Mu. III. i. 1).
Topic 2 : The Eater is Brahman
If the supreme Self is not an enjoyer, then wherever
there is reference to enjoyment we have to take that the
mdividual soul is meant. This topic explains that it need
not necessarily refer to the individual soul, and that in
every case we have to decide from the context as to who
' is referred to.
128
Srl-Bhdsya
[ 1.2.9,
3MT ^ ^ ^ ^ I r T \l . U
9. The eater (is Bralunan), because both the movable
and the immovable (i.e. the entire universe) is taken (as his
food).
'Who thus knows where He is, to whom the Brahmanas
and Ksatriyas are (as it were) but food and Death itseh a
condiment ?' (Ka. I. u. 25). The question is : Who is this
'He' the eater, that is suggested by the words 'food' and
'condiment' ? Is it the individual soul or the supreme Seh ?
The opponent says it is the individual soul; for enjoy-
ment, which is the result of karma, is possible only in the
case of the individual soul, and not in the case of the supreme i
Seh which is not subject to karma. The Sutra refutes this
view and says that it is the supreme Seh. For here eating
means reabsorbmg of the whole universe, and not enjoymg
as a result of karma ; and this is possible for Brahman alone.
Here Brahmanas and Ksatriyas are mentioned as mere ex-
amples, meaning the entire universe, as they are the fore-
most of created beings. As death itself is taken as a condi-
ment, it shows that ah things consumed by death, i.e. the
entire universe, is referred to as His food. This kind of
eating is only the reabsorption of the entire universe, and
therefore the eater is only Brahman and not the individual
soul.
10. And because (Brahman) is the subject of the
discussion.
The subject of discussion in the section in which Katha
I. ii. 25 occurs is Brahman. 'The wise one who knows the - k
1.2.11.]
Sn-Bhdsya 129
Self. . .as great and aU-pervading does not grieve' {Ka.
I. ii. 22); 'Tliat SeK cannot be gained by the Veda, nor by
the inteUect, nor by deep scriptural learning. He whom the
Self chooses, by him the Self can be attained. To him the
Seh reveals Itself' {Ka. I. ii. 23). This Self is recognized
in the subsequent text, 'Who thus knows where He is' {Ka.
I. u. 25),of which it has been said that it is hard to know
It without Its grace.
An objection is raised here that the Person to whom the
Brahmanas and Ksatriyas are (as it were) food is not the
supreme Self, free from aU imperfections. For, later we have
in Katha Upanisad the text, 'Having entered the cavity of
the heart, the two enjoy in the body the rewards of their
good works' etc. (I. in. 1). Now this text clearly refers
to the individual soul enjoying the fruhs of hs action
in association with another, which can be either the Prana
or Buddhi (the inteUect). This kind of enjoyment of the
fruits of action is not possible for Brahman. But the Prana
and Buddhi are instruments of the soul and so can some-
liow be associated with it in this enjoyment, but not Brah-
man. So it is only the hidividual soul that is referred to in
these texts ; and as the 'eater' also occurs in the same
section, it is the individual soul, and not Brahman.
To this the next Sutra says as foUows :
11. The two that have entered mto the cavity (of the
heart) are indeed the two Selves (the individual and the Su-
preme), because it is so seen.
The two that are referred to in Katha I. in. 1 are not
the individual soul and Prana or Buddhi, but the individual
9
130 Sn-Bhdsya
[ 1.2.11.
soul and the supreme Self ; for it is seen that these two are
referred to in that section. The supreme Seh is indicated by
the text, 'The wise who, by meditation on the Seh, has real-
ized the Ancient One who is difficult to be seen, who has
entered into everything, who is seated hi the heart, and who
dwehs in the abyss^^he indeed transcends joy and sorrow'
(Ka. I. ii. 12). The individual soul is indicated in the
text, 'He who knows Aditi also, who is one with the deities,
who is born with the Prana, who entering into the heart
abides therein' etc. (Ka. I. iv. 7). 'Aditi' in this text means
the hidividual soul which enjoys the fruit of hs karma, which
is associated with Prana and is one with aU the deities, that
is, with the senses with which it enjoys the fruits, and is born ^
in various forms. The fact that both are said to enjoy the
fruits of actions, which cannot apply to the supreme Self,
is accordmg to the popular custom where characteristics of
one in a group are indhectly apphed to the whole group^
as when we say 'the men with the umbreUa', where only one
has an umbreUa and not the whole group. So here also,
though it is one that is enjoying the fruits of actions, both
are so spoken of. Or it may be because the supreme Self
causes the individual soul to enjoy the fruits of its actions,
both are agents in this enjoyment.
12. And from the (distinctive) qualities (of the two
mentioned in subsequent texts).
In this section of the Katha Valll the individual soul
and the supreme Self are depicted everywhere. In texts like
'It is never born, nor does it die' (Ka. I. u. 28) the in-
dividual soul is depicted. In texts like 'It is smaUer than the ^
1.2.12. ]
Srl-Bhdsya 131
small, greater than the great' (Ka. I. u. 20) and 'The
Seh cannot be attained by the Veda' (Ka. I. u. 23) the
supreme SeK is depicted.
Again, in this section of the Katha Valll, from the
beguining to the end, the individual soul and the supreme
Seh are depicted as the worshipper and the object wor-
shipped, the attainer and the thing attamed respectively :
'The wise one who knows the Seh as great and aU-pervading
never grieves' {Ka. I. u. 22); 'He who has hiteUect as his
charioteer, and who holds the reins of the mind, he reaches
the end of the jomrney, and that is the highest world of
Visnu' {Ka. I. in. 9). Vide also {Chd. III. xui. 6). So the
eater is the supreme SeK.
An objection, however, may be raised against this view
as foUows : This section begins with a question as to the
true nature of the individual soul: 'There is a doubt when
a man has departed from hence; some say he is, whUe
others say he is not' {Ka. I. i. 20). So it is but proper to
tike that this whole section is with respect to the mdivid-
ual soul. This view is not tenable ; for the question is not
with respect to the existence or otherwise of the individual
soul after death. For the second boon prayed for by Naciketas
clearly shows that he had no doubt about its existence after
death. Therefore, when NacUcetas chooses for the thhd boon
the solution of the doubt as to the existence or otherwise
of the individual soul when it departs from hence, he ques-
tions this with respect to the individual soul which, being
fit for hberation, departs from hence. So the words, 'departs
from hence', do not refer merely to the separation from the
body but to liberation, which is freedom from aU bondage.
Therefore the question refers to the knowledge of the true
nature of the supreme SeK, and thereby to the true nature
132 Sn-Bhdsya
[ 1.2.12.
of liberation. 'When he has departed there is no more
knowledge' (Br. II. iv. 12) deals with the same question.
This doubt about the nature of liberation arises because
different sages hold different views regardmg it.
Those who are well versed m Vedanta know that Brah-
man is the sole cause of the universe, free from all imper-
fections, whose essential nature is infinite knowledge and
bhss, who has innumerable auspicious quahties, and who is
different from aU other things. Of the Brahman the individ-
ual souls, whose nature is infinite knowledge and whose
essential attribute is the intuition of Brahman, are modes
and form of Its body. Theh true nature, however, is covered
by Nescience. Liberation consists in the destruction of this ^
nescience and the intuition of Brahman by the individual
soul, which thereby gains its true nature. Yama, who is
satisfied as to the fitness of Naciketas for this knowledge
of Brahman, teaches it to hhn and also the nature of libera-
tion which consists in reaching the abode of the supreme
Seff or Brahman, from Katha I. ii. 12 to I. hi. 9. Therefore
the 'eater' is Brahman.
Topic 3 : The Person within the Eye is Brahman
13. (The person) inside (the eye is Bralunan) on ^
account of (the attributes mentioned therein) being appro-
priate (only to Bralunan).
'This person that is seen inside the eye is the Seff. This
is immortal and fearless ; this is Brahman' (Chd. IV. xv. 1).
The question is whether this person referred to here is
the reflection of a person in the eye, or the individual soul,
or the deity which presides over the function of the eye, or.
1.2.15. ]
Sn-Bhdsya
133
Brahman. As the 'person' is referred to as something well
known, by the words 'is seen', which shows that it is dhectly
seen, it^ can be the reflection of a person, or the individual
soul. Or it may also be the presidmg deity of the eye,
accordmg to the text, 'The former (i.e. the person seen
inside the sun) rests on the latter (i.e. the person mside the
eye) through the rays' (Br. V. v. 2). This view the Sutra
refutes, and says that the person inside the eye is Brahman.
For the text says that He is 'immortal' and 'fearless', which
can be true only of Brahman. It further says, 'They caU him
Samyadvama, for aU blessings go towards hhn. He is also
Vamani, for he leads ah blessings... He is also Bhamani,
tor he shmes in all worlds' (Chd. IV. xv. 2-4). These
qualities also enumerated here can be true of Brahman only.
14. And because abode etc. (i.e. niUng the eye) are
attributed to It (by other scriptural texts also).
He who abides in the eye and rules it is the supreme
Self. 'He who inhabits the eye,. . . and who controls the eye
from withm. He is your Seh, the internal Ruler, the im-
mortal' (Br. III. vu. 18). That supreme Self is recognized
in the Chdndogya text also. That the reference is to some-
thing weh known is true of the supreme Self also, and the
words 'is seen' which hint at dhect perception are equaUy
true of the supreme Seh as It is so perceived by Yogis in
their meditation. Therefore the person in the eye in Chd.
IV. XV. 1 is the supreme Seh.
15. And on account of the reference (by the text) only
134 Srl-Bhdsya [ 1.2.15.
(to Brahman) characterized by bliss (mentioned at the
beginning of the Section).
The subject matter of the Section is only Brahman
characterized by bhss. 'The vital energy is Brahman, bhss
is Brahman, the ether is Brahman' (Chd. IV. x. 5); so
taught the Fhes to Upakosala Kamalayana about Brahman,
and the same Brahman is further elucidated by his Teacher
as the person in the eye, where the abode in the eye is
prescribed for the purpose of meditation as also some qua-
lities for the same pmpose.
An objection is raised here that between the Chdndogya
text IV. X. 5 and IV. xv. 1 the Fhes taught Upakosala
meditation on themselves, which yields certain results like
long life. Therefore this mstruction cannot be said to be a
part of the teaching on Brahman. So, on account of the
break in the continuity of the subject, the person m the eye
cannot reasonably be connected with Brahman in the text
at the beginning. This objection is not tenable as the word
'Brahman' occurs in both the Chdndogya texts, IV. x. 5 and
IV. XV. 1. So the mtervening topic, viz. the knowledge of the
Fires, is subordinate to the same subject matter, viz. Brah-
man, particularly as the Fhes also say, 'The Teacher shaU
teU you the way,' which shows that the instruction in the
knowledge of Brahman is not complete without the instruc-
tion in the knowledge of the way. Moreover, Upakosala is a
fit asphant after knowledge, for he is disgusted with the
world and deshes freedom from all bondage. So the final
words of the Fhes, 'Upakosala, this, friend, is our knowledge
and the knowledge of the Self ; but the Teacher wUl declare
to you the way' (Chd. IV. xiv. 1) shows clearly that the
knowledge of the Fhes is subordinate to the knowledge of
the Self which leads to liberation. Therefore the other results
1.2.17. ]
Sn-Bhdsya 135
enumerated of this knowledge of the Fhes are only by way
of praise (arthavdda). Thus, the knowledge of the Fhes
being a member of the knowledge of Brahman, there
is no reason why the Brahman referred to in the Chd,
text IV. X . 5 cannot be connected with Brahman in IV. xv.
1, the object of which is only to mention an abode for
meditation on Brahman and certaia quahties of Brahman
to be included in this meditation. Therefore the person in
the eye in Chd IV. xv. 1 refers to Brahman mentioned
earher in IV. x. 5.
16. Therefore verily is that (ether) Bralunan.
An objection is raised here : In the text, 'Bliss is Brah-
man, the ether is Brahman', how can one be sure that it
refers to Brahman, on the basis of which you can say that
the person in the eye is Brahman? It looks more like a
Pratika Updsana, or meditation on a symbol as Brahman,
as for example, hi 'Name is Brahman, Mind is Brahman'
etc. This objection the Sutra refutes by saying that the Chd.
text further says, 'What is bliss is ether, and what is ether
is bliss.' Though worldly pleasure is ephemeral and the
element ether is insentient, yet these two words Ka and Kha
determine each other and give one idea, viz. infinite bhss,
which is true only of Brahman. Therefore the supreme Self
alone is taught in that text, and consequently the 'person
in the eye' also is Brahman.
17. Also on account of the statement of the way
(after death) of those who have known the Truth of the
136
Sn-Bhdsya [1.2.17.
Upanisads (i.e. Imowers of Bralunan) (with reference to
the knower of the person in the eye).
In the Chd. text IV. xv. 5 it is said that the knower of
the person in the eye goes by the Devaydna. 'Now (if one
.who knows thus dies). . .he goes by hght, from light to day'
etc. It is weh known from other scriptural texts, like Prasna
[. 10, that only the knowers of Brahman go by this path
after death. Therefore the person in the eye here must be
Brahman only.
18. (The person in the eye is the supreme Self) and
not any other (i.e. reflection in the eye etc.) as these do not
exist always; and on account of the impossibihty (of the
qualities of the person in the eye being attributed to any
of these).
As the reflection in the eye, etc. do not exist always, or
as a rule in the eye, and also because qualities like immor-
tality, etc. cannot be appropriately attributed to them, none
of these besides Brahman can be this person in the eye.
The reflection in the eye is there so long as the eye is near
to the person reflected. The individual soul which dhects
ah the senses can have its seat only "in the heart from where
ah the organs can be directed. The presiding deity, as the
text says, 'rests with the rays on the person inside the eye'
(Br. V. V. 2), and so need not necessarhy reside in the eye.
Moreover, qualities like immortahty etc. cannot be predi-
cated of them. So the person in the eye is Brahman only.
Topic 4 : The Ruler within is Brahman
in the last topic it was taken for granted that the
1.2.19..]
Sn-Bhdsya 137
^internal Ruler' in Br. HI. vii. 18 is Brahman and on that
basis it was estabhshed that the person in the eye in Cha.
IV. XV. 1 is Brahman. Now this section proves that the
internal Ruler is Brahman.
19. The Ruler within of the gods, the worlds and so
on (is Bralunan) on account of the qualities of that (Brah*
man) being mentioned.
Both the Kanva and Madhyandina recensions of the
Brhaddranyaka Upanisad read as foUows : 'He who inhabits
the earth but is within it, whom the earth does not know,
whose body is the earth and who controls the earth from
withua, he is your self, the internal Ruler, the immortal'
(III. vu. 3). The text further says of the existence of
this Ruler withm water, fire, the sky, ah, heaven, the sun,
quarters, the moon and the stars, ether, darkness, hght,
aU beings, aU the senses, the mind, the inteUect etc. con-
cluding each section by saying : 'He is your seh, the internal
Ruler, the hnmortal.' The Madhyandina text mentions, m
addition, all the worlds, the Vedas and the sacrifices ; and
mstead of the readmg 'he who dweUs in knowledge' they
have, 'he who dweUs in the self.' As the Madhyandinas have
these three extra sections, the word 'world' in the Sutra is
meant to include both the recensions. The internal Ruler
spoken of here is Brahman and not the hidividual soul, for
the characteristics of Brahman are mentioned. Bemg one,
and ruler of everything,aU the worlds, beings, gods etc.
^is a characteristic of Brahman. In answer to Uddalaka's
question, 'Now describe the internal Ruler' (Br. III. vh. 2)
Yajiiavalkya delineates the internal Ruler beginning with the
138 Sn-Bhdsya
[ 1.2.19.
text, 'He who inhabits the earth but is withm it' etc. This
quahty of entering everything, the worlds, bemgs, gods, the
Vedas, the sacrifices etc. controUing them from withm, havmg
everythmg for Its body, and being Self of everything can be
true only of Brahman who is aU-knowing and whose ah
deshes are fulfilled, and not of any other. Scriptural texts
like : 'He wished, may I be many, may I grow forth. Having
sent forth, he entered into it. Having entered into it he
became sat and tyat' (Tai. II. 6) estabhshed that the quali-
ties of ruling everything and being the Seh of everything
belong to Brahman alone. Subdla Upanisad which begms
with, 'There was nothmg at the beginning' and ends by
saying, 'the inner Self of everything, free from ah unper-
fections is the one god, Narayana', shows that Brahman
rules aU, is the Self of aU, and has for Its body everythhig.
Moreover, the quality of immortality is true only of Brah-
man. Nor does Its 'seeing' etc. depend on the senses as
in the case of the individual soul but results from Its
very nature, Its onmiscience etc. 'He sees without eyes,
hears without ears' etc. (Sve. III. 19) 'Whom the earth
does not know,' 'whom the self does not know' show that
He rules from within without theh knowing It, and as
is confirmed by 'unseen but seeing' etc. (Br. III. vii. 23).
And the following text, 'There is no seer but He' denies ^
any seer of the internal Ruler referred to in the text. The
expression, 'He is your seh' also distmguishes the individual
soul from the internal Ruler who is hs Self.
Therefore the internal Ruler is the supreme Seh.
20. And neither is (the Ruler vritliin) tliat wliich is
talked of in (Samkhya) Smrti (i.e. the Pradhana), because ^
1.2.22. ]
Sn-Bhdsya 139
attributes contrary to its nattoe are mentioned (here); nor
is it the individual soul (for the same reason).
That which is taUced of in the Smrti, i.e. the Pradhana,
or the hidividual soul is not the Ruler within, for quahties
contrary to theh nature, i.e. quahties impossible to be attri-
buted to them, are mentioned in the texts under discussion.
Qualities like being the seer of everything, ruler of every-
thing, being the Seh of everything, and immortality, by theh
very nature, can never be true of the Pradhana or the indi-
vidual soul.
21. For both (the recensions) read tliis (i.e. the indi-
vidual soul) as different (from the internal Ruler).
Again both the Madhyandina and Kanva recensions
which read, 'He who dweUs hi the seh' and 'He who dweUs
in knowledge' respectively, show that the individual self on
account of its being ruled by supreme Self is difEerent from
It. Therefore it is estabhshed that the inner Ruler who is
different from the individual soul and free from aU imper-
fections is the supreme Self, Narayana.
Topic 5 : That which cannot be seen is Brahman
22. The possessor of qualities like invisibility etc. (is
Brahman) on account of (Its) characteristics being men-
tioned.
In the Mundaka Upanisad we have the foUowmg texts :
'The higher knowledge is that by which the Imperishable
is known' (I. i. 5); 'That which cannot be seen or seized,
which is without origin or quahties, eternal, aU-pervading,
140 Srl-Bhdsya
[ 1.2.22,
omnipresent, extremely subtle. Imperishable; that which
the wise behold as the source of all beings' (I. i. 6); 'Higher
than the high, Imperishable' (II. i. 2), The question is
Whether in these texts the Imperishable which cannot be
seen and the one which is higher than the high Imperishable
refer to Pradhana and the individual soul respectively of the
Samkhyas or whether both refer to Brahman.
The view held by the opponent is : In the text discussed
in the last topic, quahties like 'seeing', 'hearing' which are
contrary to the nature of the insentient Pradhana were
present, and so the Ruler withht was interpreted to be the
supreme Self. In the Mundaka texts cited we do not find any
such quahties stated which would exclude the Pradhana,
and in Mu. II. i. 2 the reference is clearly to the individual
which is higher than the Pradhana. So the texts refer to the
individual soul and the Pradhana, and not to the supreme
Soul.
The Sutra refutes this view and says that it is the supreme
Self that is referred to by both the texts, for quahties Uke,
'He is aU-knowmg, aU-pervading' etc. ( MM. I. i. 9) are
predicated of It, and these quahties are not applicable to
the Pradhana or the mdividual soul.
Mu. I. i. 5-6 declare that there is an Imperishable some-
thing possessing the qualities of invisibhity etc. from which
all this is born, 'the source of ah beings'. Further in Mu.
I. i. 9 the Sruti says that this Imperishable which is the
soturce of ah beings is 'aU-knowing, all-perceiving'. For aU
these reasons it is clear that the supreme Self is referred to
m these texts, and not the other two.
23. The other two (viz. the individual soul and the
1.2.25. ]
Srl-Bhasya 141
Pradhana) are not (referred to m the passage), because the
characteristics of Brahman and the difference (of the Being
wliich is the source of all beings from these two) are men.^
tionedo
The Pradhana is not referred to in the text, because the
Sruti wants to prove in this section the proposition that 'by
the knowledge of One everything is known.' This is not
true in the case of Pradhana, for the individual souls are
not its products and so the knowledge of the Pradhana wUl
not give a knowledge of the individual soul. This 'One' is
also distinguished from the individual soul by the text,
'Higher than the high Imperishable', where It is stated to
be higher than the soul which is higher than the hisentient
Pradhana, thus distinguishing It from the mdividual soul
also. |i :
24. And because (its) form is mentioned (the passage
under discussion refers to Bralunan).
'Fhe is its head, its eyes the sun and the moon, the
quarters its ears' etc. (Mu. II. i. 4) Thus it is said to have
the three worlds for Its body. Hence that which is the source
of aU beings is none other than the supreme Self.
Topic 6 : Vaisvanara is Brahman
In the last topic it was shown that the Aksara in Mu.
II. i. 2 is Brahman as it has the three worlds for hs body.
Vide Mu. II. i. 4. In order to remove the doubt that other
things besides Brahman may have the three worlds for Its
body this section is begun. i
142
Srl-Bhdsya
[ 1.2.25.
25. Vaisvanara (is Bralunan) because of the qualify-
ing adjuncts to the common word (Vaisvanara).
In the Chdndogya we find that five Rsis came together
and discussed, 'What is our Seh, and what is Brahman?'
iChd. V. xi. 1). Being unable to come to any conclusion
they approached Uddalaka Aruni who, they thought, knew
about 'the Seh caUed Vaisvanara'. Uddalaka also was not
quhe conversant about this Vaisvanara Seh and so they
aU went to Kmg Asvapati Kaikeya who knew about this
'Vaisvanara Seh'. They approached him and said, 'You
know at present that Vaisvanara Seh, teh us that' {Chd.
V. xi. 6). Further on it is said, 'But he who worships this
Vaisvanara Seh extending from heaven to the earth as
identical with his own seh, eats food in aU worlds, in all
bemgs, in ah selves' (Chd. V. xviu. 1). Now what is this
Vaisvanara Seh? Vaisvanara generaUy means the gastric
fire, ordinary fire, and the presidmg deity of fire, Agni.
Sometimes in the Scriptures it refers to the supreme Brah-
man also. 'Thus he rises as the Vaisvanara' etc. (Pra. I. 7).
In what sense is it used in the Chdndogya text ? NormaUy
one of these ordinary meanmgs of the word should be taken.
But the Sutra refutes this view and says that here Vaisva-
nara is used to denote Brahman on account of the qualifying
adjuncts to the word Vaisvanara which can be true of
Brahman alone.
The Rsis were deshous of knowing that Brahman which
is the Self of aU the individual souls'What is om: Seh, and
what is Brahman?' With this object in view they went to
the king and so the Vaisvanara Self about which they ques-
tioned can only be the supreme Brahman. Moreover, the
1.2.26. ]
Sn-Bhasya 143
words used in the earher texts of the Chandogya are 'Seh'
and 'Brahman' and m the later texts, 'Seh' and 'Vaisvanara',
which also shows that Vaisvanara denotes Brahman only.
The result attained by the worship of the Vaisvanara Seh
can be true only if the supreme Brahman is meant. The
text says, 'He eats food in all worlds, in aU bemgs, in all
selves.' Here the eating of food, does not mean material food,
but intuition of the ever-bhssful Brahman which exists in
aU these worlds, beings, etc. 'Food means that which is
eaten, i.e. experienced. Vide Tai. II. 7. Again in Chd. V.
xxiv. 3 we find, 'As the soft fibres of the Isika reed, when
thrown into fire, are burnt, thus aU his sins are burnt,' which
shows that the result of the worship of the Vaisvanara is
freedom from ah sins. Moreover, the Vaisvanara is said to
have the three worlds for its body. Due to aU these quahties,
viz. being the Self of aU, being the object of meditation for
the realization of Brahman, the object of worship which
results in the freedom from all sins, and having the three
worlds for Its body, the Vaisvanara Self denotes Brahman
alone.
26. (That form of the Lord described in other texts
and) remembered (in the descriptions given in the Ciia.
text) is thus an indicatory mark (showing that the supreme
Self is referred to in this Cha. text also.)
The Chd. text. V. xviu. 2 describes the Vaisvanara Seh
thus, 'Of the Vaisvanara Self the heaven is the head, the
sun the eye' etc. wherein one recognizes the Brahman de-
scribed hi other Sruti and Smrti texts m simhar terrns. Vide
Mu. II. i. 4. Such a form as is described can belong to the
144
Sn-Bhdsya
[ 1.2.26.
supreme Brahman only and so the Vaisvanara Self is Brah-
man and not anything else.
27. If it be said that (Vaisvanara) is not (Bralunan)
because of the word (Vaisvanara which has a definite mean-
ing, viz. the gastric fire) and other reasons, and on account
of its abiding inside (which is true of gastric fire), (we say)
not so, because there is the instruction to conceive (Brah-
man) as such (as the gastric fibre), because it is impos-
sible (for the gastric fire to have the form described) and
also because (Vajasaneyins) describe him (Vaisvanara) as
a person (which the gastric fire is not).
Objection: Vaisvanara cannot be definitely said to be
Brahman because in Scriptural texts we find that it is used
to denote the as for example in, 'This one is in the fire
(Agni) Vaisvanara.' Again as the Vaisvanara is said to
abide within, it may also refer to the gastric fire which abides,
inside a person, 'He who knows this Agni Vaisvanara. . .
abiding within man' etc. (Sa. X. vi. 1-11). In the text, 'the
heart is the Garhapatya fire' etc. (Chd. V. xviu. 2), Vais-
vanara abidmg m the heart etc. is represented as the three
fires. Further the text says, 'The first food which a man:
takes is an object of libation. And he who offers that first
oblation should offer it to Prana saying Svaha' (Chd. V.
X. 1), where Vaisvanara is the abode of the offerhag to
Prana. For aU these reasons given above Vaisvanara means
fire and not Brahman.
This the Sutra refutes firstly because the Scripture here
teaches the worship of Brahman having the gastric fire for,
1.2.29. ] Sri-Bhdsya 145
its body. So the word 'fire' denotes not only the gastric fire
but also Brahman in so far as qualified by the gastric fire.
Secondly, the gastric fire cannot have the three worlds for
hs body as described in the text, as it is unpossible, Lasfly,
the Vajasaneyins describe the Vaisvanara as a person. 'This
Agni (fire) Vaisvanara is a person' (Sa. X. vi. i.2)
and this Person (Pinusa) is the supreme Brahman, for vm-
conditioned personahty belongs to Brahman alone, 'All this
is the Person (Purusa)' (.Sve. I. ih. 15); 'there is nothmg
higher than the Person' (Ka. III. 2), Gastric fire cannot be
a person.
28. For the same reason (Vaisvanara) is not the deity
(fire) or the element (fire).
For the same reason, viz. having the three worlds for
hs body and an unconditioned personahty, neither the deity
fire, nor the element fire, is referred to in the text imder
discussion, as these quahties are impossible in their case.
29. Even (if the word Agni is talcen) as directly
^ (meaning Brahman) there is no contradiction: (so says)
Jaimini.
Till now Agni co-ordinated with Vaisvanara was said
to represent Brahman in so far as It has the gastric fire for
Its body. Therefore, it was held that the text enjoins medi-
tation on Brahman. Jaunini, however, thinks that these two
terms can be taken to refer to Brahman dhectly without
/ any contradiction. Even as the word 'Vaisvanara' can dhectly
10
146 Sri-Bhasya
[ 1.2.29.
refer to Brahman as possessmg the quahty of rulmg ah men
in the world, so also the word 'fire' can directly refer to
Brahman as meaning the foremost of all beings.
30. On account of manifestation(so says) Asmara-
thya.
'But he who worships this Vaisvanara Self extending
from heaven to the earth' etc. iChd. V. xviu. 1). In this
text the aU-pervading Brahman is described as bemg limited
by heaven, etc. Asmarathya thinks that as the Lord mani-
fests Himseh like that to His devotees He is described thus.
31. For the sake of constant remembrance(so says)
Badari.
Why should the Lord be regarded as a person having
limbs like the head etc. ? Vide Chd. V. xviu. 2. Badari
thinks that the Lord is so imagined in human form for the
sake of Updsand (meditation). 'He who in this way medi-
tates' (Chd. V. xvui. 1) enjoins devout meditation for the
piurpose of realizing Brahman. 'In this way' in the text
means, 'as having a hmnan form'. The eating of food means
intuitional knowledge of Brahman who abides everywhere
and is of the nature of supreme bliss. Enjoyment of worldly
objects is not meant here, for that would obstruct final
release.
A further doubt arises : The text says that the altar is
its chest and the Kusa grass on the altar its hahs etc. which
shows that the gastric fire is meant.
1.2.33. ]
Sn-Bhdsya 147
32. Because of imaginary identification (witli Agni-
Iiotra, so says) Jaimini; for so (tbe sruti) declares.
'The chest the altar, the haurs the (Kusa) grass on the
altar, the heart the Garhapatya fire' etc. (Chd. V. xviu. 2).
This altar etc. is said to be the chest etc. of the Vaisvanara
in order to identify the offering to Prana which is performed
by the Upasakas (worshippers) with the AgnUiotra sacrifice:
so says Jaimmi. The text, 'But he who offers this Agnihotra
whh the fuU knowledge of its purport, he offers it in all
worlds, in aU beings, in aU selves. As the fibres of the Isika
reed, when thrown into the fire, are burnt, thus ah his sins
are burnt' (Chd. V. xxiv. 1-3), also declares the same
identification of the offering to Prana with the Agnihotra.
33. Moreover, they (the Vajasaneyins) teach liim (viz.
tlie Vaisvanara) as witiiin that (viz. the body of the .
Upasaka).
In the text, 'Of this Vaisvanara Seff' etc. (Chd. V. xvui.
2), the supreme Seff Vaisvanara having the three worlds
^ for Its body is taught as present ui the body of the wor- -
shipper for the sake of worship by the Prana-Agnihotra.
That is, at the time of performing the Prana-Agnihotra
sacrifice, the various limbs from head to foot of the wor-
shipper should be identified with heaven etc. which are the
head etc. of the supreme Seff.
The final conclusion, therefore, is that the Vaisvanara
Seff is no other than the supreme Brahman.
CHAPTER I
SECTION ni
Topic 1 : The resting place of heaven, earth, etq.
is Brahman
1. The resting place of heaven, earth, etc. (is Brah-
man) on account of the word 'SeK' (or on account of the
actual words of the Sniti) (designating this resting place).
Tn Him heaven, the earth, and the slcy are woven, as
aiso the mind with ah the senses. Know that Seh alone and
leave off other talk! He is the bridge of Immortality'
{Mu. II. h. 5).
Who is this abode in whom heaven, the earth, etc. are
woven ? Is it Brahman or the individual self ? The opponent
holds that it is the individual seh because the bemg is
described as the abode of the mind and the senses. Again
in the next verse it is said, 'Where aU the arteries meet like
spokes fastened to the nave of a wheel,there within the
heart He moves, becoming manifold' ( MM. II. u. 6). In this
text that being is said to be the basis of the arteries, and
the words 'becoming manifold' describes the being to be
born in many ways as god, man, etc. AU these are charac-
teristics of the individual self and so the text refers to it
and we have to interpret Mu. II. u. 5 consistent with this.
It may be said that in B.S. I. ii. 21 (topic 6) it has been
shown that the Mu. I. i. 6 refers to Brahman and so here
1.3.2. ]
Srl-Bhdsya 149
also it ought to xefer to Brahman as It is the subject-matter
of the discussion m the Mundaka texts. This argmnent is
untenable as the characteristics of the individual self are
clearly mentioned, as against which other argiunents cannot
prevah.
This view the Sutra refutes because of the words, 'He is
the bridge of Immortality' which is true of Brahman alone.
Nothing else can be the bridge or means to immortahty for
He alone is described as the means to immortality in all
Upanisadic texts. 'Knowing Him alone one passes beyond
death. There is no other way out from this chcle of bhths
and deaths' (Sve. III. 8). Agahi the word 'Seh' unqualified
by any term always represents Brahman and m Mu. II. u. 7
we have terms like 'aU-knowing', 'aU-cognizing', etc. which
are qualities of Brahman only. Brahman may also be de-
scribed as the abode of arteries. Vide Mahdnardyana Upani-
sad XIII. viu. 12. He can also be said to be born in many
ways ; 'Not born, He is born in many ways ; the wise know
the place of His bhth' (Purusa Sukta 21), where the text
says that the supreme Seh without giving up His nature
takes the shape, make, qualities and works of different
classes of beings like gods, men, etc. m order to become
theh abode. He being the abode of everything ultunately.
He is also the abode of the mind, the senses, etc.
2. Also because of tbe statement (in the Scripture)
that that is to be attained by the liberated.
A ftuther reason is given to show that Brahman is
referred to in the passage under discussion. This abode of
Iieaven, the earth, etc. is the goal of the liberated. 'When
150 Srl-Bhdsya
[ 1.3.2.
the seer reahzes the seh-effulgent Bemg.. .then the wise
one, shaking off merit and demerit, becomes stainless and
attains supreme unity' (Mu. HI. i. 3). 'As the flowing rivers
disappear in the ocean losing name and form, thus a wise
man freed from name and form, goes to the supreme Person
who is greater than the great' (Mu. III. u. 8). Therefore It
can be Brahman alone.
3. (The abode of heaven etc.) is not what is inferred
(i.e. Pradhana) owing to want of any term indicating it,
(nor) also the individual self.
Pradhana is not the subject-matter of this section in the
Mundaka as there are no terms indicating it. Nor is it the
individual seff for the same reason.
4. On account of difference being mentioned (between
the individual self and the abode of heaven etc.).
'The individual seff abiding on the same tree, viz. the
body, being bewfldered by Prakrti (Nature) is immersed
in. grief; but when it sees the other one, the Lord, con-
tented, and His glory, then his grief passes away' (Mu. HI.
i. 2). In texts like this, the abode of heaven etc. is described
as different from the hidividual seff. Being bewfldered by
Prakrti, the object of enjoyment, the mdividual seff grieves.
But when it sees the greatness of the one different from it,
viz. the Lord, who is the beloved, and His glory which con-
sists in ruling everythmg, then it becomes free from grief.
1.3.6. ]
Sri-Bhasya 151
S R J ^ ^ ^ W St U
5. On account of the subject-matter.
As the supreme Seh is the subject-matter of the section,
the abode of heaven etc. cannot be anythmg else but Brah-
man. That the supreme Seh is the subject-matter of the
Mundaka texts under discussions has aheady been shown
it) B.S. I. ii. 21. The same subject-matter is continued in
the subsequent texts of the Muridaka and there is no break
in the continuity of the subject-matter. To show that, this
topic is begun. The topic about Vaisvanara was introduced
in between as it also refers to Brahman since Vaisvanara
has the three worlds for Its body.
fF^?^^3?T^^^^ n % w
6. Also on account of (the mention of two conditions)
remaining unattached and eating (which are the charac-
teristics of tbe supreme Self and the individual self
respectively).
'Two birds, inseparable friends, cling to the same tree.
One of them eats the sweet fruh, the other looks on without
eating' (MM. III. i. 1). Here one is described as enjoymg
the fruits of its actions and the other as residing in the body
in Its own splendour without enjoying the fruits of Its
actions. The latter, the omniscient, the bridge of Inunortahty,
the Seh of all, can alone be the abode of heaven etc. and
not the individual self which is subject to Karma and grieves.
Topic 2 : The Bhuman is Brahman
In the last topic the abode of heaven etc. was interpreted
as referring to Brahman because of the continuity of the
152 Sn-Bhasya
[ 1.3.6.
topic whose subject-matter was Brahman. So the opponent
foUowing the same argument now says that the Bhuman m
Chd. VII. xxiii. and VIII. xxiv, is the individual self and
not Brahman, inasmuch as the individual seU is taught in
Chd. I. i-xv. To remove this doubt this topic is begun.
7. The Bhhman (is Bralunan) because the instruction
about It is in addition to that about the individual self.
' In the seventh chapter of the Chdndogya Upanisad
Narada approaches Sanatkumara and says, T have heard
from persons like your revered seh that a knower of the
Atman goes beyond grief. I am in a state of grief. May your
revered seh take me across it' (Chd. VII. i. 3). Sanatkumara
teaches Narada several truths. He begins with Name and
goes, higher and higher tUl he reaches Prana. After Sanat-
kumara jBnishes teaching each truth from Name upwards,
Narada every tune asks hhn, 'Is there anything higher than
this?'-to which Sanatkumara answers, 'Yes, there is', and
takes up the next higher truth. But after being taught about
Prana, Narada does not ask whether there is anything
higher than Prana, nor is anything taught by Sanatkumara,
which shows that the instruction about the individual self
ends with Prana which is therefore the individual self. As
no -further truth is taught, we have to conclude that there is
no break in the subject-matter and that what is taught in
the subsequent Sections of the Chdndogya tUl the mention
of Bhuman-in Section xv, refers only to the individual self.
That Prana here means the mdividual self is known from
the fact that unlike mere breath it is referred to as an
inteUigent principle in Chd. VII. xv. 2-3 Where it is described
1.3.7. ]
Srl-Bhusya 153
as capable of saying harsh thmgs to others and therefore
deserving of condemnation for such conduct. The final con-
clusion of the teaching therefore is that the true natme of
the individual self bereft of all ignorance is abundant bliss
on account of which the knower of the mdividual self goes
beyond grief. Therefore Bhuman refers to the individual
self and not Brahman.
This view the Sutra refutes. The knower of Prana,
the individual self, is caUed in the texts an Ativadin or one
who makes a statement surpassmg previous statements, as
the object of his worship is superior to other such objects
mentioned earlier in the texts. Vide Chd. VII. xv. 15. In
the next Section, however, the texts says, 'But he reaUy is
an Ativadin who is such through the reahzation of the
Truth.' Thereby this latter Ativadin is distinguished from
the earher one and is said to be reaUy an Ativadm evidently
as the Truth which is his object of worship is. superior and
different from the individual seff which was the object of
worship of the earher one. Now it is weU known that the
Truth is Brahman. 'Truth, Knowledge and Infinity is Brah-
man' (Tai. II. 1). Narada then says in Chd. VII. xvi. 1
that he desires to understand the Truth and become an
Ativadin of the latter class. Thus Brahman which is caffed
here the Truth is introduced as a fresh topic. After saying,
'But one must desire to understand the Truth', the texts
says that Brahman should be known as bliss. 'But one must
desire to understand bhss' (Chd. VII. xxii. 22). Subsequently
it is said, 'The infinite alone is bhss. But one must desire to
understand the infinhe.' (Chd. VII. xxiu. 1), whereby the
Truth is said to be mfinite bliss. As the text appUes
Bhuman to this Truth which is different from the
Prana or individual self, as already explained above.
154 Sn-Bhdsya
[ 1.3.7.
the Bhuman is nothing but Brahman. Moreover, as
the Truth is said to be infinite bhss, we recognize in these
texts the Brahman described as bliss in Tai. II. 7. There-
fore, as there is a break from the topic dealing with the
individual self, the word Bhuman, occurring m the later
Sections, viz. Chd. VII. xxiu. and xxiv. 1, dealing with
Brahman, cannot refer to the individual seh but to Brahman
alone.
^ffqwr u n
8. And because the qualities (mentioned in the texts)
are appropriate (only in the case of Bralunan).
The qualities referred to are : Immortahty, restmg on
its own greatness, being the Seh of aU and being the cause
of everything. These qualities attributed to Bhuman hold
good only in the case of Brahman and not in the case of
tlie hidividual seh. Therefore the Bhuman is Brahman.
Topic 3 : Aksara is Brahman
In the last topic it was shown that on account of the
Bhuman resting in its own glory it is Brahman. It may be
said that beings other than Brahman are also seen to rest
m their own glory. To remove such a doubt this topic is
begun.
3?^<*<M<l'-d^^: U 5. W
9. The Aksara (the Imperishable) (is Brahman) be-
cause it supports that wliich is beyond Akasa.
In the dialouge between Gargi and Yajnavalkya in Br.
we have 'O Gargi, the Brahmanas describe It as the Imper-
J.3.9.]
Sn-Bhasya 155
ishable (Aksara). It is neitlier coarse nor fine, neither short
nor long' etc (Br. III. viu. 8). Here the question is whether
Aksara means the Pradhana, or the individual seh, or
Brahman, as the characteristics more or less of aU the three
are seen. The opponent holds that it is either the Pradhana
or the individual seh and not Brahman. It is the Pradhana,
because Scriptures also refer to Pradhana as Aksara. 'He
transcends even the unmanhest causal state of the world'
(Mu. II. i. 2). Moreover, the text says, 'This very Imper-
ishable, O Gargi, pervades the ether (Akasa)' (Br. III.
viii. 11). This is true of the Pradhana which is the cause
of Akasa. The quahties neither coarse nor fine etc. are also
characteristics of the Pradhana. Therefore Aksara is the
Pradhana.
It may be said that h caimot be the Pradhana but the
individual self for the text says, 'It is neither redness nor
darkness,' which shows that it is not the -Pradhana consist-
ing of the three gunas. Therefore it is the mdividual seh
which is bereft of Rajas and Tamas and it is also designated
as the Aksara in texts like, 'AH beings are perishable
and the unchangmg self is caUed the Imperishable' (Gltd
XV. 16). Again in texts like, 'The unmanifest is merged in
the Aksara' the individual seh is said to be the support of
Prakrti. Therefore h can be said that the Aksara pervades
the Akasa, a product of Prakrti.
These prima facie views are refuted by this Sutra. The
Akasa which is said to be the support of everything of the
past, present and futmre is the unmanifest Pradhana and
not mere ether. The question is asked, 'In what is this Akasa
woven like warp and woof?' and the answer given is 'In
that Aksara'. So the Aksara cannot be the Pradhana for
Pradhana cannot be its own support. Though the individual
156
Sn-Bhasya
[ 1.3.9.
self also can be said to be the support of the Pradhana yet
it is not referred to here for the foUowing reason :
10. Because of the command this supporting (springs).
This supportmg of the cause of ether etc. results from
the command which is inviolable. 'Under the mighty rule
of this very Imperishable, O Gargi, the sun and the moon
are held in theh own courses' (Br. III. viu. 9). This kmd ot
conmiand, which cannot be transgressed, cannot be true of
the individual seh. Therefore the Aksara is not the indi-
vidual self but Brahman.
3F!Ti^5m|#r \\%\\\
11. And because of the negation of a different nature
(from that of Bralunan) (in tbe Aksara).
Another nature lUce that of the Pradhana or the individ-
ual seh is negated in Aksara. The text, 'Verily this Imper-
ishable, O Gargi, is never seen, but is the seer' etc. (Br,
III. viii. 11) excludes both these. The insentient Pradhana
is excluded because the text says that the Aksara is an
inteUigent principle inasmuch as it is a seer, hearer etc. The
individual self is excluded as the Aksara is aU-seemg but
never seen etc. Therefore this exclusion in Aksara, of what
has a nature other than that of Brahman, confirms the view
that It is Brahman
Topic 4 : The supreme Person to be meditated upon is
the supreme Brahman
In the last topic h was shown that Brahman is not an
1.3.12. ]
Sn-Bhdsya
157
object of sight: 'Verily this Imperishable, O Gargi, is never
seen, but is the seer' etc. (Br. III. viii. 11). Therefore the
Person who is described as the object of the act of seemg
m Pra. V. 5 cannot be the supreme Brahman. To remove
such a doubt this topic is begun.
12, Because of his beiug mentioned as an object of
(the act of) seeing, he (the supreme Brabman, is that
object).
'He again who meditates upon the supreme Person with
the syUable Om consisting of three Matras, he comes to the
hght and to the stm. He is freed from aU sins, even as a snake
is freed from its slough. He is taken up to the world of
Brahma (Brahmaloka) by the Saman hymns ; He sees the
Person dwelling in the heart who is supreme, higher than
the individual souls' (Pra. V. 5). The question here is
whether the object of meditation and seeing is Hiranya-
garbha (Brahma), the presidhig deity of Brahmaloka, or
the supreme Brahman. The opponent holds it is Hhanya-
garbha. In the precedmg verse it has been stated that he
who meditates upon one Matra, returns to the world of men
where he enjoys ; that he who meditates on two Matras
attains the world of the moon in the heavens. After that the
text says, 'He, again, who medhates on the supreme Person
with the syUable Om consisting of three Matras' etc. The
Brahmaloka mentioned in the text can be oiily the world of
Hhanyagarbha as that is situated above the world of
heavens. So the Person seen as a result of this medhation
on the three Matras and who is said to be in the Brahma-
loka can be only Hiranyagarbha (Brahma), its presidmg
deity. , ;
158 Sn-Bhdsya
[ 1.3.12.
This view the Sutra refutes and says that the supreme
Person is the supreme Bralunan. For in the text we find that
one bereft of aU sins sees the supreme Person. The place
reached by such a person cannot be merely the world of
Hiranyagarbha, and so the object of seeing cannot be this
Hiranyagarbha. With respect to this Person the text says
later, 'By the Samans is attained that which is known only
to the wise. What is peaceful, immortal, free from aU fear
and supreme, the sage also attains by means of this Om'
later, 'By the Samans is attained that which is known only
to the wise', one recognizes the world of Visnu, the supreme
Brahman, mentioned in the text, 'The wise behold always
that supreme abode of Visnu' (SH. 6). The qualities men-
tioned in the text, viz. peaceful, immortal etc. are apt only
m the case of the supreme Brahman and not in the case of
Hhanyagarbha. Moreover, in Pra. V. 5 we have, 'He sees
the supreme Person', m which one recognizes the supreme
Person mentioned in, 'So the wise man, freed from name
and form, goes to the supreme Person' (MM. III. ii. 8).
That this Mundaka text refers to the supreme Brahman has
been shown while discussing B.S. I. ii. 22. So the object of
seemg is the supreme Brahman and none else, as its quah-
ties are mentioned.
Topic 5 : The small Akdsa is Brahman
In the last topic it was shown that the Person in the
heart (Pra. V. 5) is Brahman. But as this Person in the
heart is designated by the word Akasa (Chd. VIII. i. 1)
which commonly denotes the material ether, a doubt may
arise about the Person in the heart being the supreme
Brahman. To remove this doubt this topic is begun.
i.3.13. ]
Sn-Bhdsya
159
^^"q: W l\
13. The smaU (Akasa) (is Brahman) because of the
subsequent texts (which mention the quaUties of Brahman).
'Now there is in this city of Brahnian (the body) a
smaU lotus-hke palace (the heart), and in h is a smaU
Akasa. What exists within that smaU Akasa is to be sought,
that is to be understood' (Chd. VIII. i. 1). Now the ques-
tion is : What is this smaU Akasa ? Is it the material ether
which is the ordmary meaning of the word Akasa, or is it
the individual soul or Brahman ? The opponent holds that
as the ordinary meaning of the word Akasa is material
ether, and as it is also designated as small, it can only be
either the ether or the individual soul and not Brahman.
The Sutra refutes this view and says that the smaU Akasa
is Brahman, as the texts later on say that it is the support
of the whole world (CM. VIII. i. 3) and free from ah sins,
old age, death etc. and that its desires are aU fulfiiUed and
resolves turn out true (CAa. VIII. i. 5).
A further objection is raised that as the text says that
what is within this small Akasa is to be sought, the small
Akasa is only the abode of something else which is the
object that is deshed, and that the smaU Akasa is not itself
this object. This objection cannot stand for the foUowmg
reasons : The smaU Akasa is said to be the real city of
Brahman, the Self in Chd. VIII. i. 5, and the rest, the
desires contained in it, are its qualities. So Chd. VIIL i. 1
should be understood as saying that the small Akasa
together with the desires contamed in it, i.e. the qualities
that abide in it, should be sought. This is made aU the more
clear by Chd. VIII. i. 6 where it is said, 'But those who
depart from here, having understood the SeK and these true
160 Sri-Bhdsya [ 1.3.13.
desires (i.e. the quahties mentioned in Chd. VIII. i. 5),
for them there is freedom to act as they wish in aU the
worlds' and not those who depart without the knowledge
of these two, viz. Akasa and its quahties.
14. (The small Akasa is Brahman) on account of the
going (into Brahman) and of the word (Brahmaloka); (the
indiviudal soul's going into Brahman) is likewise seen (from
other sruti texts); and (there is) an indicatory sign.
'Thus do ah creatures day after day go into this Brah-
maloka' etc. (Chd. VIII. iu. 2). The word this in the text
connects the place where these creatmes go into day by day
with the subject-matter of the chapter, viz. the smah Akasa.
Again the word this is co-ordinated with Brahmaloka, there-
by showing that the smaU Akasa is the supreme Brahman.
In other Sruti texts also we find that this going of the mdi-
vidual souls dahy into Brahman in the state of deep sleep
is mentioned. 'AU these creatures having become united
with the Real (Sat), do not know that they are united with
the Real' (Chd. VI. ix. 2). The word Brahmaloka is also
used to designate the supreme Brahman in other texts also.
'This is the world that is Brahman' (Br. IV. iii. 32). More-
over, it is not necessary to get the support of other texts to
show that the creattures go daily into Brahman. The text
itself says that as at the time of Pralaya (dissolution) so
also in deep sleep state the mdividual souls get merged ht
the smaU Akasa and are free from aU suffermgs. This is a
sufficient indicatory sign to show that the small Akasa is
the supreme Brahman. Again the word 'Brahmaloka' which
refers to the smaU Akasa establishes that the latter is the
13.16.]
Sn-Bhdsya 161
supreme Brahman if we interpret 'Brahmalolca' as the world
which is Brahman itself and not as the world of Brahma.
There is therefore no need of support from other scriptural
texts.
15. Moreover, on account of the supporting (of the
world by the small Akasa, it is Brahman) for this greatness
is seen in that (i.e. Brahman) (only).
'That Seh is a bank, a limiting support, so that the
worlds may not get confounded' (Chd. VIII. iv. 1)in this
text we find, in the smaU Akasa, that greatness of the
supreme Brahman by way of holding the worlds asunder.
Therefore it is the supreme Brahman. That this greatness
belongs to Brahman alone is seen from other Sruti texts.
'Under the mighty rule of that Imperishable, O Gargi, the
sun and the moon are held in their positions' (Br. III. viii.
9); 'It is the demarcating bank for keeping these worlds
distinct from one another' (Br. IV. iv. 22).
16. Also because of the well-known meaning (of
Akasa as Brahman, the smaU Akasa is Bralunan).
In scriptural texts the word 'Akasa' is used to denote
Brahman also. 'Who indeed, would breathe, who would
remain alive, if this Bhss was not in the ether (Akasa)?'
(Tai. II. 7). 'All these beings take theh rise from Akasa
(ether) alone' (Chd. I. ix. 1). As the qualities like bemg
free from sin etc. are predicated of this (smaU) Akasa, hs
meaning as Brahman is stronger than the other meaning
which signifies merely the material ether.
11
162
Srt-Bhdsya
[ 1.3.17.
17. Because of the reference to the other (i.e. the
individual soul in a complementary passage) if it be said
that it (is meant by the small Akasa) (we say) no, on
account of the impossibility (of such an assumption).
The other i.e. the individual soul. 'Now that being, the
individual soul in deep sleep, which having risen above this
earthly body' (Chd. VIII. iu. 4)^in this passage the indi-
vidual soul is referred to and so the opponent holds that the
smaU Akasa is this individual soul. This, however, cannot
be, for the quahties mentioned m Chd. VIII. i. 5 are im-
possible in its case.
18. If (it be said) that from subsequent texts (which
refer to the individual soul, the small Akasa means it) (we
say) but (that reference to it is in so far as its) real nature
is made manifest.
An objection is raised that in Chd. VIII. vu. 1 the indi-
vidual soul is described as free from sin etc. and therefore it
is quite possible to interpret smah Akasa as referring to it.
Moreover, as the three states, waking, sleeping, and deep
sleep are predicated of it, the reference is only to the indi-
vidual soul and not Brahman, as these three states do not
apply in the case of Brahman. So the individual soul is the
topic of the teachuig and hence smah Akasa means the
individual soul and not the supreme Brahman.
The second half of this Sutra refutes this and says that
the reference to the individual soul as free from sin etc. is
m so far as it has realized its real nature. In the state of
L3.20. ]
Srl-Bhdsya
163
bondage (Samsara) its real nature is hidden from it, due
to Karma, and it suffers pain and pleasure. But when it
frees itseff from Karma and rises above the body, i.e. gets
disembodied and approaches the supreme hght i.e. Brahman,
its real natiue which is freedom from sin etc. is manffested.
But the earher sections deal with the smah Akasa whose
nature is never hidden and is always free from sin etc.
Moreover, the texts ascribe other quahties to the smaU
Akasa which are not true of the individual soul even in the
state of releasequahties like being a bank or support of
the worlds. The smah Akasa, therefore, is none other than
the supreme Brahman.
19. And the reference (to the individual soul) is for
a different purpose.
'Now that being, having risen out of this body and
reachmg the highest hght, appears in its own true from'
{Chd. VIII. hi. 4). Here the individual soul is brought hi to
show that by meditation on the smah Akasa it attams its
true nature, and not to show that it is the same Akasa.
20. If it be said that because the Sruti declares the
limitedness (of this Akasa, it cannot be the supreme Brah-
man) ; (we say) that has already been explained.
The text declares that the Akasa withm the heart is
smah ; and so it can be only the hmited hidividual soul that
is referred to and not the supreme Brahman. This objection
has aheady been answered in B.S. I. u. 7 where it has been
164
Srl-Bhdsya
[ 1.3.20.
shown that for the sake of medhation Brahman may be
viewed as of smaU size.
Therefore it is clear from the foregoing Sutras that the
smaU Akasa is the supreme Brahman which is ever perfect
and has an infinite number of exalted quaUties. On the other
hand the being taught by Prajapati as being under bondage,
and attaming its true nature later when it approaches the
highest light, is the individual soul and not the smah Akasa.
21. And on account of the attaining of the lilceness of
that.
As the individual soul is said to attain the likeness of
the supreme light, the smah Akasa, by meditating on it, the
individual soul cannot be this small Akasa.
The attainment of the likeness of the supreme Brahman
by the individual soul in a state of freedom consists in its
being free from sin etc. So the one which attains this lUce-
ness, (viz. the individual soul) and the one whose likeness
is attamed (the small Akasa, the supreme Brahman) are
different. This attainment of likeness by the individual soul
is also taught in other scriptural texts. 'When the seer sees
the self-effulgent Being^ruler, maker, and source of the
creator (Brahma)then that wise one, shaking off merits
and demerits, attains supreme likeness, being free from all
passions' ( MM. III. i. 3).
3TPI U W
22. The Smrti also states this (attainment of likeness
by the individual soul).
1.3.23. ] Sn-Bhdsya 16 5
Smrti {Gltd) also says that the individual soul, by
meditation on it, attains its likeness in attributes. Vide
Gltd XIV. 2.
Topic 6 : The Person of the size of a thumb is Brahman
In Sutra 20 it was shown that the smallness of Brahman
referred to in Daharavidya is for the sake of meditation.
But we find that in scriptural texts the individual self alone
is referred to as of limited size. So why should it not be the
individual self? To remove this doubt this topic is begun.
An alternative connection is this : In the previous topic the
smallness of Brahman was established for the sake of medi-
tation. To estabKsh again its size as the size of a thumb
this topic is begun.
5!S?it^ srfim: U U
23. From the very word ('Lord' mentioned in the
text) (the being) measured (by the size of a thumb is Brah-
man).
'The being of the size of a thumb resides in the middle
of the seh, as the Lord of the past and future ; (knowmg
Vide II. iv. 13 and II. vi. 17 also. Who is this being of the
size of a thumb ? Is it Brahman or the individual self ? The
opponent holds that it is the latter, for it is referred to as
of the size of a thumb in Sve. V. 8 where it is clear that
the reference is to the individual self as it is said to have
desires and egoism. Again, nowhere else is Brahman said to
be of the size of a thumb even for the sake of Updsana
(devout meditation). The individual soul can also be said
166
Srl-Bhdsya
[ 1.3.23.
to be the 'Lord' as the text says, for it is the ruler of the
body, the sense-organs etc.
This the Sutra refutes and says that the 'being of the
size of a thumb' is the supreme Brahman, for it is apparent
from the words, 'The Lord of the past and future.' This
rulership over everythmg of the past and future cannot
belong to the individual self which is subject to Karma.
24. But with reference to (the space in) the heart (is
tliis declaration of size), as man alone is qualified (for
meditation on Brahman).
As the Lord abides in the heart of men who meditate
on Him, and the heart is of the size of a thumb. He is said
to be of the size of a thumb. As man alone is capable of
meditation on Brahman, scriptural teachings are meant for
him. Therefore it is with reference to him that the thumb
is used as the standard of measurement.
Topic 7 : The right of the gods to Brahma-vidyd
In the previous topic it was said that men alone are
capable of meditation on Brahman. So a doubt might arise
that the gods are not entitled to such meditations. To remove
such a doubt this topic is begun. In Sutras 25-37 there is
therefore a digression from the main topic of the Section.
25. Badarayana thinks (that) beings above men (i.e.
the gods) also (are capable of meditation on the supreme
1.3.27. ]
Srl-Bhdsya
167
Bralunan), because (it is) possible (for them also).
The gods also are entitled to meditation on Brahman
according to Badarayana, for they are also corporeal bemgs
like men and so capable of such meditations and it is pos-
sible for them also to have a desire for final iUumination.
That they are corporeal beings we know from the hymns
addressed to them as having a body. We also find in the
Upanisads gods like Indra and others gomg to teachers for
the attainment of the knowledge of the Brahman. So, as the
gods are corporeal beings they are also entitled to medita-
tion on Brahman.
26. If it be said (that the corporeality of gods would
involve) a contradiction to sacrifices; (we say) no, because
we find (in the scriptures) (that gods) assume many forms
(at one and the same time).
An objection is raised that if the gods are corporeal
beings then it would not be possible for one and the same
god to be present when invoked at sacrifices performed
simuhaneously at different places. This the latter part of the
Sutra refutes, for it is seen from scriptural texts that gods
are capable of assuming several forms simultaneously.
f% ^ , ?I, STCT: S I T^ ^ SI?q?TnTRI*mi^ U U
27. If it be said (that the corporeality of the gods
would involve a contradiction) with re^rd to (Vedic)
words, (we say) no, since beings originate from them (as
is known) from perception (Sruti) and inference (Smrti).
AU the words in the Vedas are eternal. Every word has
as its counterpart a form, an object which it denotes. The
168
Srt-Bhasya [ 1.3.27.
word, the object, and the relation between the word and the
object are eternal verities. This is accepted by all orthodox
Hiiidu philosophers. Now we have in the Vedas words like
Tndra,' 'Varuna' etc. and so the relation between these
words and the gods they refer to should be eternal; but if
the gods are corporeal beings they cannot be eternal. So the
word Tndra' etc. will be meaningless before the creation ot
Indra and after his demise, and consequently the eternity
of the Vedas and thek authoritativeness on that ground
would be a myth.
The Sutra refutes this objection thus. The Creator creates
god Indra uttering the Vedic word Tndra'. The words Tndra'
etc. do not mean particular individuals but a type; So each
Vedic word has a counterpart, an object which is a type,
class or species, that have the same form and as such is
eternal and does not depend on the birth and death of
individuals belonging to that type, as e.g. the word 'cow'.
So when one Indra dies the Creator remembers the partic-
ular form of Indra and creates another Indra of the same
form etc. even as a potter creates a new pot when an earlier
one is destroyed. Hence there is no contradiction with Vedic
words if the gods are corporeal beings. How is this known ?
Both from Sruti and Smrti or direct perception and infer-
ence. In the Vedas it is said that the Creator uttered different
words before creatmg different types of beings. 'He said
Bhuh and then created the earth' (Tai. Brd. II. ii. 4). 'The
several names, actions and conditions of all things He shaped
m the beginning from the words of the Vedas' (Manu I. 21).
28. From this very reason also (results) the eternity
(of the Vedas).
1.3.29. ]
Srl-Bhdsya
169
The Creator recollects the meanmg of the words m the
Vedas and then creates the world of bemgs. He remembers
the shape of different things m the world by uttermg the
Vedic words and creates those things. Though many of the
Mantras in the Vedas are attributed to certain Rsis yet they
are not the authors but only discoverers or revealers. At the
time of creation after a partial dissolution, Brahma remem-
bers with the help of the words of the Vedas the former
Rsis, Viswamitra and others, and He creates these Rsis
agam having the same name and ability, who could there-
fore recite the same Mantras assigned to them, correctly
and without any difficulty, thus revealmg the very Mantras.
So the eternity of the Vedas is established though these
Rsis are their revealers.
29. And because of the sameness of names and forms
(in every fresh cycle) there is no contradiction (to the eter-
nity of these Vedic words) even in the revolving of world
cycles, as is seen from the sruti and tlie Smrti.
An objection is raised. Since at the end of a cycle when
there is complete dissolution including the Creator Brahma
and the Vedas, and creation begins afresh at the beginning of
the next cycle, there is a break in the continuity of existence.
So how could the eternity of the Vedas be established ? This
Sutra refutes it. At the beginning of a new cycle the world
will have the same name and form as it had in the previous
cycles and so there is no contradiction to the eternity of the
Vedas. The Sruti and the Smrti declare the creation of a
v/orld of the same name and form. 'He who first creates
Brahma and delivers the Vedas to him' (Sve. VI. 18). 'As
170 Srl-Bhdsya
[ 1.3.29.
in the rotation of the seasons, the very same signs of the
different seasons are seen repeated, so also at the beginning
of a cycle the various things are created as in the previous
cycle' (Fj. I. V. 65).
Topic 8 : The rights of the gods to practise certain
Updsanas
30. Jaimini (is of the opinion) that the gods (Yasu and
others) are not entiled for Madhu Vidya etc. on account of
the impossibility.
It has been shown that the gods are quahfied for the
m.editation on Brahman. Now the question is raised whether
they are qualified for certain other updsanas. In many ot
the meditations {updsanas) one has to meditate on the self
of some god or other. For example, in Madhu Vidya one
has to meditate on the sun-god. Such a meditation would
be unpossible for the sun-god. So the gods cannot practise
these meditations for the same person cannot be both the
object of meditation and the meditator. Moreover, the result
of such meditations is the attaimnent of the position of such
gods which they are already and there is no question of their
attaining it. So Jaunini thinks the gods are not qualified for
Madhu Vidya etc.
31. And on account of (the meditation of the gods)
being on the Light (of lights i.e. Brahman).
'The gods meditate on that Light of lights as Iffe and
1.3.33. ]
Srl-Bhdsya
171
immortality' (Br. IV. iv. 16). Though this meditation
is common to both men and the gods, yet the special men-
tion of the gods shows that they have a right only for this-
meditation and not for other medhations like Madhu Vidya
etc.
32. But Badarayana (maintams) the existence (of
these qualifications) for it is possible.
Badarayana maintains that the gods have necessary
qualifications for Madhu Vidya etc. for it is possible for
them to medhate upon Brahman in theh own form and
attain also its results, viz. the position of Vasu (the sun-god)
etc. in the next cycle also.
Topic 9 : The right of the Sudras for Brahmavidya
discussed
33. Grief arose in him (Janasruti) on hearing the con-
temptuous words (of the Rsi in the form of the flamingo) ;
owing to his approaching him (Raikva with) that (grief)
(Raikva called him a Sudra); because it (the grief) is:
referred to (by Raikva).
In the last topic h has been shown that the gods are
entitled to Brahmavidya. This topic discusses whether
the Sudras are entitled to it. Since like the gods, the Sudras
also are possessed of a body, capacity and deshe for final
liberation, it nattnaUy foUows that they too are entided to
Brahmavidya. Maybe they are debarred from the Vedic
172 Sn-Bhdsya
[ 1.3.33.
studies yet as Updsanas consist only of mental activity the
Sudras have the necessary qualifications for that and they
can get the necessary knowledge about the nature of Brah-
man and the methods of meditation from Puranas and
Itihasas for which they have a right though not for Vedic
studies. We also hear of Sudras like Vidura who were
estabhshed in the knowledge of Brahman. In the Upanisads
we have instances where Brahmavidya has been imparted
to Sudras. In the Samvargavidya (Chd. IV) we find that
there was a great king caUed Janasruti who was famous for
his good works. In order to create a deshe in hhn for the
knowledge of Brahman two Rsis took the form of swans and
approached the place where Janasruti was sitting. One of
them praised the king while the other spoke contemptuously
of hhn as he did not have the knowledge of Brahman like
Raikva whom he praised. The king on hearing this was
smitten with grief for not having this knowledge of Brah-
man and so approached Raikva with present for getting
this knowledge from him. This sage Raikva addressed hhn
twice as 'Siidra'. Raikva said, 'O Siidra, you have brought
all these presents ! Even by this means you will make me
talk' (Chd. IV. ii. 5). After addressing the king thus, Raikva
taught him Brahman.
This Sutra refutes this view and denies to Sudras by
caste, the right to Brahmavidya. Though meditation is only
a mental activity yet the intellectual knowledge required
as a means to the Updsana is not possible without the
study of the Vedas, as in the case of ritualistic action,
As Sudras are barred from Vedic studies they can-
not therefore have the necessary qualifications for such
Upasands. Itihasas and Puranas only reiterate the know-
ledge derived from the Vedic studies and so, there is no
3.3.35.]
Sri-Bhasya
173
chance of the Sudra getting this knowledge from them, with-
out the necessary background from the study of the Vedas.
Vidura and others had this knowledge on account of saihs-
karas of a previous life. Moreover, that Janasruti was
addressed by Raikva as 'gudra' is not because he belonged
to that caste by bhth ; it refers to his grief for not having
the knowledge of Brahman, for 'gudra' etymologicahy means
'one who grieves'. So Sudras by caste are not entitled to
Brahmavidya.
^r?iq5^T W \ W
34. And because his (Janasruti's) Ksatriyahood is
luiown (from tbe texts).
The Chandogya texts at the beginning of Chapter IV
ten us that Janasruti had given gifts liberaUy and plenty of
food too in charity. He also gave many villages to the sage
Raikva as teacher's fee. AU this shows that he was a man
of position, a Ksatriya, and not a low-born udra.
^3xm =l5r^ fe^^ w \x u
35. On account of the indicatory sign later on (of his
being mentioned) along with a descendant of Citraratha (a
Ksatriya) (Janasruti's Ksatriyahood is known).
In connection with the same Vidya later on, Janasruti
is mentioned with Caitraratha Abhipratarm who was a
Ksatriya. So the inference is that Janasruti is also a
Ksatriya as equals alone are mentioned together. Regardmg
this Vidya h is said later that h should be resorted to by
Brahmanas and Ksatriyas only.
174 Srl-Bhdsya
[ 1.3.36.
36. Because purificatory ceremonies are mentioned
(before the study of the Vedas) and their absence declared
(in the case of the Siidras).
In the scriptures we find purificatory ceremonies like
Upanayana etc. prescribed as prerequisites to the study of
the Vedas and the vidyas. Vide Chd. IV. iv. 5. These cere-
monies are for the three higher castes and not for the
Sudra. Thek absence in the case of the Sudra is repeatedly
declared in the scriptures. 'Sudras do not mcur sin, nor
have they any purificatory rites' (Manu XIII. 126); 'The
fourth caste is once bom and not fit for any ceremony'
(Manu X. 4). So they are not entitled to the study of the
Vedas or to the vidyas.
37. And because the inclination (on the part of
Gautama to impart knowledge is seen only) on the ascertain-
ment of the absence of that (Sudrahood) (in Jabala Satya-
kama).
In Chdndogya IV. iv. 5 we have, 'The teacher said to
him : No one who is not a Brahmana can speak thus. Dear
boy, bring the sacrificial fuel, I shaU initiate you as a Brah-
macarm, for you have not deviated from truth.' It was only
after Gautama was convmced that Satyakama, though the
son of a maid servant, yet was not a Sudra but a Brahmana
that he proceeded to impart knowledge to Satyakama. Hence
Siidras do not have the necessary qualification for Brahma-
vidya and so are not entitled to it.
1.3.39. ]
Sri-Bhdsya
175
38. (And) because o the prohibition of hearing and
studying (the Vedas) and knowing their meaning (and per-
forming Vedic rites) (to Sudras, they are not entitled to
Upasanas).
Sudras are debarred from hearing and studying the
Vedas. 'Therefore the Vedas must not be studied in the
presence of Sudras'. When they are not entitled even to hear
the Vedas the question of theh studymg them and perform-
ing rites prescribed by them does not arise at ah.
39. And on account of Smrti texts (which prohibit
hearing and studying of the Vedas by Sudras).
Smrtis also prohibh hnpartmg Vedic knowledge to
Sudras. 'He is not to teach hun (a Sudra) sacred duties or
vows' (Manu IV. 80).
*The Prdna in which everything trembles is Brahman
Havmg concluded the mtervening topics about the right
of the gods and the Sudras for Brahmavidya, the mam
subject is agam taken up and a further reason is given to
show that the Person of the size of a thumb is the supreme
Brahman.
* These two Sutras, 40 and 41, form a part of topic 6 and hence
no separate number is given.
176 Sri-Bhasya
[ 1.3.40.
40. On account of trembling (of the whole world in
His breath, He is Bralunan).
In between Katha II. iv. 12 and II. vi. 17 dealing with
the Person of the size of a thumb we have the followmg
text, 'Whatever there is in the whole world, when it comes
out of Hhn, trembles hi His breath. He is a great terror like
the raised thunderbolt. Those who know this become im-
mortal. For fear of Hhn the fire burns ; for fear of Him the
sun shines' etc. {Ka. II. vi. 2-3). This text tells us that the
whole world includmg fire, sun, Indra and others trembles
from great fear of Him who is of the size of a thumb and
who is referred to in the above text as Prana. Here we have
an attribute of Brahman, for such power before which every-
thhig trembles belongs to Brahman only, as could be
gathered from other texts also. 'From fear of It the wind
blows, from fear the sun rises' etc. {Tai. II. viii. 1). Vide
also Br. III. viu. 9.
41. On account of brilliance declared in the text.
A further reason is given hi this Sutra to show that the
Person of the size of a thumb is Brahman. 'The sun does
not shine, nor the moon and the stars, nor these lightnings
and much less this fire. He shining, everything shines after
Hhn. By His light ah this is lighted' {Ka. II. v. 15). This
supreme brilliance is a quality of Brahman as we find from
Mu. II. ii. IG where this very text is read. Moreover, other
Sruti texts also declare the supreme Person as light. 'The
1.3.42. ] Sm<-Bhasyq 177
gods meditate on tliat Light pf lights as longevity' etc. {Br-,
IV. iv. 16); 'Now that Light which shines above this heaven,'
{Chd. III. xiii. 7). Therefore the Person of the size of a
thumb is Brahman.
Topic 10 : The Akdsa which reveals names and forms
is Brahman
42. Akasa (is Bralimaii) because it is declared to be
something different etc. (from names and forms and yet their
revealer).
'That which is caUed Akasa is the revealer of the names
and forms. That within which these names and forms are,
is Brahman, the immortal, the Seh' {Chd. VIII. xiv. 1).
A doubt arises whether the Akasa is the released individual
soul spoken of in Chd. VIII. xiii. 1 or Brahman. It may bf
asked : As the small Akasa has been shown to be Brahman,
how can such a doubt arise as to the meaning of the word
Akasa in this text ? The doubt arises because between the
section deahng with smaU Akasa and this text there inter-
venes the teaching of Prajapati which deals with the indi-
vidual soul m ah its conditions. The hnmediately previous
text deals with the individual soul in the state of release.
'Shakmg off evil as a horse his hahs, shakmg off the body
as the moon frees hself from the mouth of Rahu, I, having
fuIfiUed: aU ends obtam the eternal Brahman-world' (CM
VIII. xiu. 1). So the opponent holds that it is the liberated
individual sotil that is referred to as Akasa. In its conditioned
state the individual soul can be said to be the revealer of
iiarnes and forms, for it supports in its unreleased conditic^
12
178 Srl-Bhdsya
[ 1.3.42.
the shape of gods etc. and their names, and in the released
state it is beyond all names and forms.
' This Sutra refutes this view and says that it is the
supreme Brahman that is referred to by the word ' Akasa' .
The evolver of names and forms does not mean one who
takes those forms, the individual soul, but one who evolves
these names and forms for it. This is possible only for the
supreme Brahman. Even the released soul does not possess
this quality. Vide B.S. IV. iv. 17. On the other hand we
find from the scriptures that Brahman alone reveals these
names and forms. 'Entering within these three deities with
this hving seh, let Me evolve names and forms' (Chd VI. iii.
2). Vide also Mu. I. i. 9. So this Akasa is different from
the individual soul hi both hs states viz. the state of bondage
and the state of release. In the state of bondage it is subject
to name and form and so cannot be theh revealer, and in
its state of release it has no connection with the world
(B.S. IV. iv. 17). 'Etc' hicludes hnmortahty and other
qualities mentioned in the text. So Akasa is Brahman which
in the previous text, Chd. VIII. xiu. 1 is referred to as the
Brahman-world to be attained, and the attainer, the released
soul, is obviously different from it.
43. On account of difference being shown in deep
sleep and death (between the individual soul and Brahman).
A further objection is raised by the opponent. Scriptural
texts hke, 'That thou art' (tat tvam asi) 'There is no
difference whatsoever here' (neha ndnasti kimcana) declare
the unity of ah selves and deny duality. Hence the individual
soul is non-different from Brahman. Texts like, 'the highest
1.3.44. ]
Sn-Bhdsya
179
Brahman' etc. refer only to the individual soul m release;
and the attainer, the soul, and the attained, the Brahman-
world, are not different. Therefore, the word 'Akasa' refers
to the individual soul in release.
This Sittra refutes this objection. This person (individual
seff) 'embraced by the supremely mteUigent Seff knows
nothmg that is without or within' etc. (Br. IV. iii. 21). This
shows that in deep sleep state the individual soul is different
from the supremely intelligent Seff, viz. Brahman. So also
at the time of death. 'The seff that is in the body presided
over by the supremely inteUigent Seff departs' etc. (Br. IV.
iii. 35). Thus in deep sleep state and at the time of death,
the individual soul bereft of the knowledge of the external
and internal things is shown to be different from the supreme-
ly inteUigent Seff which is aU-knowmg. This clearly shows
that the supreme Seff is different from the mdividual soul.
44. On account of the words like 'Lord' etc. (it is the
supreme Self).
Epithets like Lord, Ruler etc. are appUed to this em-
bracing Seff. Vide Br. IV. iv. 22. Again, 'This mfinite,
birthless seff is the eater of aU foods, and the bestower of
the results of workundecaymg, immortal, fearless' etc.
(Br. IV. iv. 24-25). AU these qualities mentioned in these
texts caimot be true of the Jiva even in the state of release.
So the Akasa which is the revealer of names and forms is
difierent frona the released individual soul. The declaration
of unity means only that aU sentient and insentient thmgs
being effects of Brahman, have It for then: inner Seff. 'All
this is Brahman' means this. This wiU be explained further
in B. S. I. iv. 22.
CHAPTER I
SECTION IV
In the first Section Brahman, the object of inquhy by
those longmg for Liberation, was defined as the first Cause.
It was then shown that this definition refers only to Brah-
nian which is different from the sentient and insentient world
and thereby the rest like Pradhana etc. were excluded from
the category of being the first Cause. After that in the three
Sections, the possibility of anything else than Brahman
being the first Cause was taken up for discussion. In Section
two. Causal texts of doubtful import referring to animate
and inanhnate beings rather indistinctly, and in Section three
such Causal texts more or less clearly referring to sentient
and insentient things as the first Cause, were taken up for
discussion, and it was shown that aU these texts refer to
Brahman only and not to other things. In the present Section
very clear references in Causal texts to other things as the
first Cause is being taken up for discussion and refutation.
In certain scriptural texts the Pradhana of the Sariikhyas
seems to be mentioned as the first Cause. This Section
refutes such a view and confirms that Brahman is the ulti-
mate Cause of everything.
In the last topic of the previous Section it was shown
that Brahman is different from the individual soul whether
iri the state of bondage or freedom. The objection that there
is nothing 'like Brahman different from the individual soul
was refuted. The present topic is begun to refute a simhar
1.4.1. ]
Srl-Bhdsya 181
objection raised from a different standpoint. It also refutes
the view that the Pradhana is the first Cause.
Topic 1 : The Mahat and the Avyakta of the Katha
Upanisad do not refer to Sdmkhyan categories
1. If it be said that in some (versions of the Vedas)
that which is inferred (i.e. the Pradhana) (is) also (men-
tioned as the first Cause), (we say) no, because (the word
*Unevolved'Avyaktain the Katha text) is mentioned lift
a simile referring to the body (and means the body itself);
(the text) too explains (it).
In the Katha Upanisad we have, 'Beyond the Great
(Mahat) there is the Unevolved (Avyakta), beyond the
Unevolved is the Being (Purusa). Beyond the Being there
is nothing, that is the end, that is the supreme goal' (I. in.
11). Does the word 'Unevolved' (Avyakta) here refer to the
Samkhyan Pradhana or notthis is the doubt that arises
here. The opponent holds that h refers to the Pradhana ; for
the principles, the Great (Mahat), the Unevolved (Avyakta)
and Purusa are identified to be the Samkhyan categories
inasmuch as they are mentioned in the text in the order
enumerated hi the Samkhyan Philosophy. This is further
confirmed by the text when it says that beyond the Being
(Purusa) there is nothing, thereby denying the existence of
anything beyond the Purusa, the twenty-fifth category of
the Samkhyas. So the 'Unevolved', the Sarhkhyan Pra-
dhana, is the first Cause.
The second half of the Sutra refutes this view and says
182 Sn-Bhdsya
[ 1.4.1.
that by the word 'Unevolved' (Avyakta) the Pradhana
independent of Brahman is not referred to but the body
represented as the chariot in the simile of the body in a
previous text. 'Know that the soul is the rider of the chariot
and the body as the chariot' etc. (Ka. I. iu. 3). This text
mentions in the form of a shnile the various means of medi-
tation as the chariot-rider, chariot etc. in order to teach
theh control. From the standpoint of control which one is
superior to which is described in, 'The objects are superior
to the senses' etc. (Ka. I. iu. 10-11). Now aU the things men-
tioned in Ka. I. ih. 3-4 are found in Ka. I. iu. 10-11, being
designated by theh proper names. Only the word 'chariot' in
the earher text and Avyakta m the later text remain. So we
have to understand that what is described as the chariot,
viz. the body in the earlier text, is denoted here in the later
text, by the word 'Unevolved' (Avyakta). Hence there is
not the least trace of any reference to the Sarhkhyan prin-
ciple m these texts. The text under discussion refers only to
those entities mentioned previously in the shnhe. In 'Higher
than the Unevolved is the Being (Purusa)', the word
Purusa (Being) does not refer to the twenty-fifth category
of the Samkhyas but to the supreme Brahman that is to be
attained by meditation and seh-control prescribed in these
texts.
2. But the subtle (cause of the body is meant by the
Unevolved' Avyakta) on account of its capacity (to attain
the end of man).
As the body is gross how can it be described as
'Unevolved' (Avyakta) ? In reply it is said that the fine
1.4.4. ]
Srl-Bhdsya 183
uneompounded elements under particular conditions become
the body. These elements in thek fine state are what is
called the 'Unevolved' and these later on evolve into the
gross body. It is the 'Unevolved' as the body that is called
the Unevolved (Avyakta). The 'Unevolved' insentient matter,
when it assumes gross states and forms, serves the ends
of man. It may be said that if the 'Unevolved' is taken
here as subtle matter why not accept the Samkhyan Pra-
dhana, as k also means the same thing? The next Sutra
answers it.
cR^>5TcgrRfq?T^ U ^ U
3. (Matter in the subtle state) serves an end (of man),
on account of its dependence on Him (tlie Lord).
The Lord is the cause of everything and the subtle
matter subserves an end in so far as it is dependent on Him,
Subtle matter is not denied by the scriptures but its existence
as independent of the Lord is denied. It constitutes His
body and He is its Self. It is only on account of this relation
between the two that the Pradhana is capable of accom-
plishing ends. The Samkhyas do not accept this dependence
and that is why their view is refuted in this topic. Every-
where in the scriptures where the creation of the world or
the greatness of the Lord is described, the Pradhana and
individual souls are declared to be His body and to have
their Self in the Lord. Vide Su. II. & III. ; Gltd III. 3-7.
l:qr^Tq^r3^ U V u
4. And because it is not mentioned (that the 'Un-
evolved') is to be known (it cannot be the Pradhana of the
Samkhyas).
184 Sn-Bhdsya
[ 1.4.4.
if tlie Pradhana was meant, then the text would have
declared it as a thing to be known, for according to Sariikh-
yas fihial Liberation results when the difference between the
Pnirusa and the Unevolved (Prakrti) is known. So the 'Un-
evolved' with them is to be known. But the text does not
dfeblare that the 'Unevolved' is to be known and so it cannot
be the Pradhana.
5. If it be said (that the Sniti) does state (that the 'Un-
evolved' has to be luiown and therefore it is the Pradhana);
(we say) no, for (it is) tbe intelligent (supreme) Self (which
is meant), since this is the topic.
'He who has perceived that which is without sound,
without touch. . .beyond the Great (mahat) and unchange-
able, is freed from the jaws of death' (Ka. I. hi. 15). The
Sariikhyas hold that in this text the Sruti says that the
Pradhana has to be known to attain Liberation. This Sutra
refutes this view and says that what the text declares as the
object of meditation is not the 'Unevolved' (avyakta) but
the intehigent (supreme) Seff as that is the subject-matter
of that Section, which is hfferred from the two previous
texts'He who has inteUigence for his charioteer' etc. (Ka.
I. iii. 9); 'That Seff hidden in aU bemgs' etc. (Ka. I. hi. 12).
For the same reason, 'Higher than the Purusa there is
nothing' does not refer to the Sariikhyan Purusa but to the
supreme Lord, That the supreme Lord is without sound etc.
is declared by Mu. I. i. 6. 'And beyond the Great' (Ka. I.
iii. 11) declares the Lord as beyond the individual soul
caUed the 'Great' in the previous text (Ka. I. iu, 10),
1.4.7. ]
Srl-Bhdsya
185
6. And of the three only there is this mention and
question.
In the text under discussion there is the mention of three
things only as objects knowledge viz. the object of the medi-
tation, the nature of the meditation and the person medi-
tatmg, and questions are only with reference to those three.
There is no mention of, or question relating to, the Pradhana.
In the third boon Naciketa inquires about the final Liberation
and this inquky includes the nature of the goal or object
to be realized, the means to it and the nature of the person
wishing for it. Yama replies, 'They know the ancient efful-
gent One through knowledge of the Self obtained by con-
centration'this is the elucidation of the question, 'When
a man departs from here there is this doubt: Some say "He
exists". Some again, "He does not" etc' (Ka. I. i. 20). So
there are references and questions only with regard to these
three and therefore the 'Unevolved' cannot be the Pradhana.
T|^5^ U \9 U
7. And like the Great (Mahat) (the word 'Unevolved'
Avyaktadoes not refer to the Samkhyan category).
In the text, 'Higher than the inteUigent is the great Seh',
as the word great is co-ordinated with the word Seh, it was
shown that it does not refer to the Sarhkhyan category, the
'Great' (Mahat). So the word 'Unevolved' which is said
to be higher than the great Self cannot mean Pradhana but
the supreme Lord.
186 Sn-Bhasya I 1.4..8
Topic 2 : The Tri-coloured Ajd of the Svetdsvatara
Upanisad is not the Sdmkhyan Pradhana
8. (The word 'Aja' caimot be asserted to mean the
Samkhyan Pradhana) in the absence of special characteris-
tics, as in the case of the bowl.
This Sutra refutes the Samlchyan view which declares
a Prakrti, Mahat, Ego etc. independent of Brahman. It does
not, however, refute these categories themselves as depend-
ent on the supreme Brahman, and having Brahman for their
Self. For this latter view, as having their Seh in Brahman,
is taught by Sruti and Smrti.
In the Svetdsvatara Upanisad we have the foUowing
text : 'There is one Aja (female unborn), red, whhe and
black, producing manifold offsprmg of the same hue' (IV. 5).
The question is whether this 'Aja' refers to the Sarhkhyan
Prakrti or to a Prakrti dependent on Brahman, and having
its Seh in Brahman. The Saihkhyas hold that this word
'Aja' refers to the Pradhana, and the red, white and black
colours refer to its three constituents, the Gunas, Rajas,
Sattva and Tamas respectively. Moreover, it is described
as 'unborn' and is spoken of as the independent cause of
many products. This Sutra refutes this view and says that
the word 'Aja' cannot refer to the Sarhkhyan Pradhana in
the absence of special characteristics to support such an
assertion. Merely saying 'unborn' is not enough to. identify
it with the Samkhyan category, the Pradhana. The text may
be interpreted otherwise also as referring to a Prakrti
dependent on Brahman. It can also be the cause of many
offspring even though dependent on Brahman. The text
1.4.9. ]
Sn-Bhdsya
187
says only that it is the cause and not that it is the inde-
pendent cause. It is impossible to fix the meaning of the
word 'Aja' from the text alone. Mere derivative meaning of
a word cannot fix the nature of a word in scriptural texts.
We have to look to complementary passages to arrive at
the correct meanmg. 'There is a bowl that has its opening
below and bulgmg at the top' (Br. II. u. 3). Here also it
is unpossible to decide from the text itself what kmd of a
bowl is meant. Later the text fixes what is meant by the
'bowl'. 'The "bowl with its opening below and biilgmg
above" is the head (of ours), for it is a bowl with hs
opening below and bulgmg above.' So here also hi the text
under discussion we have to refer to complementary scrip-
tural texts to know the exact meaning of the word 'Aja'.
Moreover, another recension of the text declares that
it is dependent on Brahman.
9. (Prakrti) has Light for its origin, so read some
(recensions).
The 'Aja' (unborn) mentioned in the text has Brahman
for its origin. So read some, viz. the Taitthiyas. Even as
this text declares the 'Aja', so also the Taitthiyas declare hi
a simUar text that this 'Aja' is dependent on Brahman and
has Brahman for hs Seh. Having taught the Brahman as
the object of medhation in the text, 'Smaller than the
smaU, geater than the great' etc. (Ma. XII. 1), the Sruti
declares finally that aU other things are produced from
Brahman and have Brahman for theh Self. 'From Hhn
188 Sn-Bhdsya [ 1.4.9.
originate the seven Pranas.... From Him arise all the seas
and mountains' (Ma. XII. 2-3). In this context, the text
(Ma. XII. 5) reads also the above verse of the Svetdsvatara
Upanisad, 'There is one Aja (unborn)' etc. So from the
Taittiriya text it is clear that the 'Aja' also is produced from
Brahman and ha!s Brahman for its Seh. So the Svetdsvatara
text has to be interpreted in the light of the above Taittiriya
text as explamed by the complementary passage. S6 the
*Aja' in the Svetdsvatara text also has Brahman for its Self,
It is not an independent entity and therefore cannot rhean
the Samkhyan Pradhana.
It may be questioned : How can the same thihg be
declared as 'imborn' and also as originating front Bfahinah ?
The next Sutra answers this doubt.
10. And on account of the teaching of creation
(Kalpana) there is no contradiction as in the case of the
Madhuvidya.
The word 'And' disposes of a doubt that is raised.
'Kalpana' means creation for this is the meaning we get
from Ma. where it is said, 'The Lord created (akalpayat)
the sun and the moon as of yore.' The creation of Prakrti
is taught in the text, 'The Lord of Maya creates the whole
world out of this' (Sve. IV. 9), where the word 'this' refers
to Prakrti. At the time of pralaya or dissolution, this Prakrti
in the causal state exists in a fine condhion as the power of
the Lord and dependent on Him. Referring to that state,
Prakrti is caUed 'Aja' (unborn). But at the time of creation
it takes a gross form and is said to be caused by Brahman.
1.4.11-] Sri-Bhasya 189
Topip 3 : The fivefold five people of Brhadaranyaka IV.
iv, 17 are not the twenty-five Sdmkhyan categories
In the last topic the interpretation of the word 'Aja' as
n mdependent entity, not having its Seh m Brahman, was
set aside as there were no special characteristics to interpret
it as such, and it was shown that Prakrti is dependent on
Brahman. Now another text is taken up for discussiou
where the special characteristic is mentioned unlike in the
previous topic.
11. Even from the statement of the number (fivefold
! five, i.e. twenty-five categories by the Sruti, it is) not (to be
presumed that the Sruti refers to the Pradhana) on account
of the difference and the excess (over the number of the
Samkhyan categories).
'That in which the five groups of five and the Akasa
i are placed, that very Self I hold is the immortal Brahman.
Knowmg It I am inunortal' (Br. IV. iv. 17). The question
is raised whether the 'fivefold five' mentioned in the text
^ refers to Samkhyan twenty-five categories or not. The
Samkhyan hold that this text refers to theh twenty-five
^ categories. The Sutra refutes this view. These fivefold
: five objects referred to in the text are different from
the Samkhyan categories. The word 'even' in the Sutra
denotes that the munber twenty-five is not meant here. The
Sarhkhyan twenty-five categories cannot be grouped into five
groups for each one is different from the other, and no five
j can be grouped in one for want of a common property, The
^kxt 'That in which...are placed' distinguishes the 'that'
190 Srl-Bhdsya
[ 1.4.11.
which is the receptacle from the twenty-five categories
placed in It, and which is therefore theh Self. There is
therefore no reference to Samkhyan categories independent
of Brahman in the text. The words 'That' and 'Akasa' refer
to objects different from the twenty-five categories and there-
fore are over and above them. This does not fit m with the
Sarhkhyan categories. 'Pancajana' therefore denotes a class
of things known by that word. This is similar to the state-
ment 'seven, seven sages'.
12. (The five people referred to are) the breath etc.
because of the complementary passage.
'They who know the breath of the breath, the eye of
the eye, the ear of the ear, the food of the food, the mmd
of the mind' etc. (Br. Madhyandina IV. iv. 21). 'The five
people' refer to the breath etc. which are cited to describe
Brahman and have theh SeK in It.
13. (In the text) of some (i.e. the Kanvas), food not
bemg mentioned (tbe number is made up) by Light (men-
tioned in the previous verse).
In the Kdnva recension we do not have 'the food of the
food', but aU the same the munber five is made up by the
word 'hghts' mentioned in 'The Light of the lights' (Br. IV.
iv. 16). Here the word 'hghts' refers to the sense organs.
'Light of hghts' means Brahman who is the lUuminator of
illuminators or the sense organs. Hence the word 'Panca-
jana' refers to the five sense organs.
1.4.14. ]
Sn-Bhdsya
191
Therefore 'the fivefold five' in the text under discussion
does not refer to the Sariikhyan categories.
Topic 4 : There is no contradiction in the scriptures as
regards the fact that Brahman is the first Cause
In the last section it was shown that the sense organs,
Akasa etc. are dependent on Brahman and have theh Self
in Brahman, and thereby it was shown that the Pradhana
independent of Brahman cannot be the Cause of the world
spoken of in the Sruti texts. Now it whl be shown that aU the
Vedanta texts describmg the Cause refer to Brahman alone
and not to the Pradhana at ah, as that Cause.
14. And on account of (Bralunan) as described being
declared to be the cause of ether (Akasa) etc.
The Sariikhyas agam try to show that the causal texts
do not refer to one particular single cause. In the Sruti
texts no particular single agent is declared to be the Cause
of this world and therefore Brahman cannot be the sole
first Cause. 'In the beginnmg, dear boy, this was Being
alone, one only without a second' {Chd. VI. u. 1) here
Being is said to be the first Cause. In another place the text
says, 'In the beginning this was mdeed Non-bemg' {Tai.
II. vh. 1); 'Before creation, this was Non-being. Then it
became Being' (Chd. III. xix. 1). Since the texts mention
different agents as the first Cause, it is not possible to say
that they declare that Brahman alone is that first Cause.
But on the other hand it is possible to infer that the Pra-
dhana is the first Cause. 'This then was Unmanffest' {Br.
I, iv. 7), shows that before creation the universe existed in
192 Sn-Bhdsya
[ 1.4.14.
the Pradhana in its unevolved condition and then Tt mani-
fested itseh as names and forms' (Br. I. iv. 7), which shows
rhat the creation proceeds from the 'Unmanifest', i.e. that
which is not distinguished by name and form. The 'Unmani-
fest' is none other than the Pradhana. As this is eternal in
its essential nature and the basis of aU change, it produces
the world of name and form. It can therefore be said to be
both Being and Non-being. But Brahman cannot be said
to be both without contradiction. So the texts like, 'It
thought, may I be many' etc. have also to be appropriately
interpreted to refer to the Pradhana, as meaning the state
immediate before the evolution sets in. The terms, 'Seh' and
'Brahman' are also to be interpreted as referring to the
Pradhana which is aU-pervading and eminently great. There-
fore the Pradhana alone is the first Cause.
This Sutra refutes this view. The word 'and' is used in
the sense of 'but'. It is possible to declare from the Sruti
texts that Brahman who is aU-knowing, Lord of aU etc.
alone is the sole Cause of this world. Brahman as described
is said to be the Cause of ether etc. As described means :
'(Brahman is that omnipotent, omniscient Cause) from which
proceed the origin etc. (i.e. sustenance and dissolution) of
this (world)' (B.S. I. i. 2). Brahman is introduced as the
subject matter in the text, 'Brahman is Existence, IntelU-
gence, Infinitude' (Tai. II. 1) and then the text says,
'From that very Self ether sprang' where 'from that' refers
to the Brahman mentioned earlier. Similarly in the text,
'It sent forth fire' (Chd. VI. ii. 3) the word Tt' refers to
Brahrnan mentioned earlier in that text, 'It thought, niay
I be many' (Chd. VI. ii. 3). All accounts of creation there-
fore confirm the view that Brahman is the sole Cause of
this world.
1.4.15.]
Sri-Bhasya 193
If that be so, how can the texts describe It as Non-being.?
The next Sutra explams it.
15. On account of the connection (with the passages
referring to Brahman, Non-being does not mean absolute
Non-being).
Tn the beginning this was indeed Non-being', here also
the Non-being refers to Brahman alone. The section pre-
vious to this text says, 'Different from this Self consisting
of Understanding is the Self consisting of Bliss' (Tai. II.
5); 'He, the Self desired. May I become many. . .He pro-
jected all this, whatever there is here. Having brought it
forth, verily. He entered into it' etc. (Tai. II. 6). This latter
text refers clearly to the Brahman consistmg of Bliss referred
to in the previous text. Further Tai. II. 6 says 'On this
there is this verse' and declares in Tai. II. 7, 'In the begm-
ning this was indeed Non-being' etc. It is clear that Tai.
II. 7 explains what is said in the previous section. Moreover,
we have the text, 'Out of fear of Him the wind blows' etc.
(Tai. II. 8) which refers to Brahman.
In the state of dissolution when there is no distinction
of name and form. Brahman not being connected with them
is said to be Non-being. The text, 'This then was Unmani-
fest' (Br. I. iv. 7) does not refer to the Pradhana but to
Brahman whose body is not yet evolved into gross form.
'That same Being has penetrated into all these bodies up
to the nail ends' (Br. I. iv. 7), here the words, 'That same
Being' refer to the 'Unmanifest' mentioned earher and It is
said to enter all beings and that It thereby becomes their
ruler. Cha. VI. iii. 2 also says that Brahman enters into
13
194
Sn-Bhdsya [ 1.4.15.
creation. It enters into creation and becomes its ruler which
is not possible for the insentient Pradhana. The 'Unmanifest'
therefore is Brahman when Its body is not developed into
gross form but exists in a fine state. 'It developed Itseh as
names and forms' (Br. I. iv. 7), i.e. It evolved Its body
into the gross form with the distinction of names and forms.
In this interpretation the words 'It thought' etc. can be
interpreted hi their primary meaning. Therefore Brahman
is the sole Cause.
Topic 5 : He who is the maker of this world is Brahman
and not Prana (vital force) or the individual soul
So far in the previous topics it has been shown that some
sentient Being is the cause of this world. The Sariikhyas
again raise the objection : Granted this conclusion of the
previous topics, yet that sentient Being can be only the
individual seh and the insentient Pradhana presided over
by the individual seh is only what is taught as the first
Cause and no other entity besides this is taught by the
scriptures.
16; (He whose work this is, is Brahman) because (the
work) denotes tbe world.
'He, O Balaki, who is the maker of these persons (whom
you mentioned), and whose work this is^is alone to be
known' (Kau. IV. 19). In this section Balaki first describes
the several individual souls residing in the sun, moon, ether,
etc. as Brahman. Ajatasatru says that these are not Brah-
man and proceeding to teach the real Brahman, says, 'He
who is the maker of these persons is alone to be known and
.1.4.16. ]
Sri-Bhasya 195
J not these persons'. Here who is the maker of the sun, moon,
etc. is the question. The Sariikhyas say that it is the hidi-
vidual soul for the clause 'whose work this is' connects this
Bemg to be known with work and as the individual soul
alone is connected with work, its merits and demerits, the
Brahman spoken of is none other than the individual soul.
Neither can it be said that 'work' here stands for the world
which is perceived by the senses, for in that case the two
separate clauses, 'who is the maker of these persons' and
' 'whose work this is' would be redundant as the latter state-
ment includes the former one. Moreover, the meaning of
the word 'work' both hi scriptures and in ordinary parlance
is meritorious and demeritorious actions. So the Being to
be known is the mdividual soul as separated from Prakrti.
This view is refuted by the Sutra which says that the
word 'work' here denotes the world and so the Being to be
known is not the individual soul subject to good and evU
works and which through ignorance gets mixed up with
Prakrti and thmks is the cause of the effects of Prakrti, but
the supreme Brahman. The word 'work' here denotes, as
can be gathered from the context, the enthe universe made
of sentient and hisentient beings. If it were the hidividual
soul then Balaki aheady knew these souls residmg in the
> sun, moon, etc. and so nothmg new is taught by Ajatasatru.
So the word 'work' must be interpreted to mean some Bemg
not known to Balaki. Therefore the text means : He who
is the maker of these persons whom you wrongly thought to
be Brahman, of which Being these persons are creatures,
of whom this enthe world of sentient and hisentient beings
is the effect, is to be known. This Bemg can be only the
> supreme Brahman which is the first Cause accordmg to all
Vedanta texts.
196
Srl-Bhdsya
[ 1.4.17.
17. If it be said that on account of tlie characteristics
of the individual soul and the chief Prana (found in the
text) (Brahman) is not (referred to), (we reply) that has
already been explained.
'Then he becomes one whh this Prana alone' and 'Thus
does the conscious seh feed with the other selves' {Kau. IV.
20)in these texts the vital breath and the individual soul
are clearly mentioned. So the opponent holds that h must c
be one of these two that is referred to as the Being to be
known.
This Sutra refutes this view and says that it has aheady
been explamed in B.S. I. i. 29-32. There it was shown that
if a topic clearly refers at the beginning and at the end to
Brahman then the intervenmg texts have to be interpreted
as referring to Brahman and consequently characteristics
of the individual soul and Prana mentioned there were ex-
plained as coimected with a threefold meditation on Brah-
man. Here also the topic begins with the words, 'Shall I tell
you Brahman' {Kau. IV. 1), in the middle we have the
text, 'whose work this is' which refers to Brahman, and the
topic ends by saying, 'Havmg overcome all evil he obtains
pre-eminence among ah beings, sovereignty and supremacy'
{;Kau. IV. 20), and this fruit is possible only if it is the
knowledge of the supreme Brahman. So m the beginning,
the middle and the end, the topic refers to Brahman. It is
the main subject-matter of the topic and so all references
to Prana and the individual soul should be so interpreted
as to be connected with Brahman ultimately. 'Then he
becomes one with this Prana alone'in this text 'this' and
'Prana' are co-ordinated and so Prana is used,here to refer
J.4.18.]
Sn-Bhdsya 197
to Brahman. We have to mterpret that the Brahman which
has the Prana for Its body is prescribed here for meditation.
Similarly the reference to the individual soul should be con-
nected with Brahman the main topic. This is explained in
the next Siitra.
18. But Jaunini (thinlcs that the reference to the
individual soul in the text) has another purpose because of
the question and answer; moreover thus some (the
Vajasaneyins) (read in their recension).
'And the two together came to a person who was asleep'
etc. (Kau. IV. 19), here by striking the sleeping man with
a stick which woke him up Ajatasatru taught Balaki that
the individual soul is different from the body, breath, etc.
So it is the individual soul that is taught here. This objection
is refuted by the word 'but'm the Sutra. Jaunini thinks that
the reference to the individual soul is to teach the Brahman
which is different from it. This is borne out by the questions
and answers that foUow in the text. After establishing the
individual soul Ajatasatru asks, 'Where did this person sleep,
where was he and whence has he come back?' (Kau. IV.
19). These questions are asked to propound the Brahman
in which the soul in deep sleep abides. The answer also,
'Then he becomes one with this Prana alone', refers to
Brahman. The Prana in which the soul abides in deep sleep
refers to Brahman as something different from the individual
seff. The same idea is expressed in, 'Then he becomes united
with the True' (Chd. VI. viu. 1).
Moreover, the Brhaddranyaka Upanisad, in which also
this question and answer occurs,'clearly points out the mdi-
198
Sn-Bhdsya
[ 1.4.18.
vidual soul by die term vijndnamaya, the person consisthig
of cognition, and distmguishes it from the supreme Seh. K
Vide Br. II. i. 16-17.
So the object of knowledge mentioned m the Kausitaki
texts is something different from the individual soul viz. the
first Cause and not the individual soul or the Pradhana
presided over by it.
Topic 6 : The Self to be seen through hearing etc. is
Brahman
In the last topic the clause, 'Whose work this is', was
interpreted to refer to the world and not to action. Thereby
it was shown that the text does not refer to the individual
soul but to Brahman, as the latter was the subject matter
referred to at the beginning, in the middle, and at the end
of the passage under discussion.
Now is taken up for discussion the Maitreyi Brdhmana
passage where the individual soul is clearly referred to at
the beginnmg, m the middle and at the end of the passage.
Therefore the opponent holds that the individual soul ought
to be the subject matter of the passage according to the
argument given m the previous topic. This topic is begun *
to show that it refers to Brahman and not to the individual
soul.
19. (The Self to be seen, to be heard, etc. is Brahman)
on account of the connected meaning of the passages.
In the Maitreyi Brdhmaria ot the Brhaddranyaka Upani-
1.4.19.]
Srl-Bhdsya 199
sad, Yajnavalkya, in reply to Maitreyi's question as to
the way to hnmortahty, says 'Verily the husband is dear
not for the sake of the husband but for the sake of the Self
a husband is dear' etc. (II. iv. 5) and then concludes by
saying, 'The SeK is to be seenshould be heard, reflected
on, and meditated upon. By the realization of the SeK alone,
my dear, through hearing, reflection and meditation, all
this is known.' The question is : Who is referred to by the
word 'SeK' in this passage^is it the Purusa of the Samkhyas
or the supreme Brahman ? The Saihkhyas hold that it is
the Purusa. For it is the individual soul that is referred to
at the beginning, in the middle and at the end. At the
begiiming the 'Self is said to be attached to the husband,
wKe, son etc. which shows it is the individual soul. In the
middle of the passage it is said that the 'Self is connected
with orighiation and destruction ; Vide II. iv. 12, and ends
by saymg, 'Through what, my dear, should one know the
knower ?' (II. iv. 14). Therefore the 'SeK' is the individual
soul, the Purusa of the Samkhyas. The knowledge of this
'Self, as disdnguished from Prakrd, is what leads to hn-
mortahty, according to the Samkhyas. So the 'Self to be
seen' is the individual soul as differentiated from Prakrti.
The knowledge of the 'Self w^h result m the knowledge
of aU souls ; for the souls as distmguished from Prakrti, are
not differentiated as gods, men etc. but are ahke.
This view is refuted by this Sutra. Because from the
connection of the various passages, it is clear that the
supreme Brahman is taught and not the individual soul. The
passage begins by saying that wealth does not conduce to
hnmortahty. In reply to this statement of YajiiavaUcya,
Maitreyi who was deshous of immortality says, 'What shall
I do with that through which I cannot attain hnmortahty ?
200 Srl-Bhdsya
[ 1.4.19.
Tell me, venerable sir, of that alone which you know (to be
the means to hnmortahty)' (II. iv. 3). Therefore the 'Seh'
that is taught to be seen cannot be the individual soul but
Brahman. For scriptures say that hnmortahty is attained
only through the knowledge of Brahman. 'Knowing Hhn
only does one go beyond death', 'Knowing Him thus one
becomes immortal here, there is no other means to this'
(Sve. III. 8). So the supreme Brahman is taught in the text
under discussion : 'The Self is to be seen' etc. Again, bemg
the cause of the entire world, as mentioned in : 'From that
great Being emanated the Rg Veda etc' can be true only
of Brahman and not of the individual soul which, in the
state of bondage is under the influence of Karma, and in
the state of release, has nothing to do with the world. So
also the enunciation that by the knowledge of the Self every-
thing is known shows that it is the supreme Brahman which
is the Seh of aU. The knowledge of the soul according to
the Samkhyas, as differentiated from Prakrti, does not give
a knowledge of the insentient world ; and so the knowledge
of the soul does not result in the knowledge of everything.
'This Brahmana, this Ksatriya, these worlds, these gods,
these beings, and aU this are only the Self (Br. III. ii. 63)
^in this text the sentient and insentient world of perception
is described as 'this' and identified with the Self and this is
possible only ff it is Brahman, and not the individual soul,
whether in the state of bondage as identified with Prakrti
or in the state of release as differentiated from Prakrti.
Moreover, the epithets used with reference to it in 'This
great, endless, infinite Reality' etc. can be true only of the
supreme Brahman. The passage proclaiming that husband,
wffe, wealth, etc. and in fact aU things dear to man are so,
not for - their own sake but for the sake of the Atman,
1.4.20.]
Sn-Bhasya 201
signifies that Brahman is the sole object of pursuit. The
reason adduced is that whatever is dear to man is so not
because of its own intrinsic volition to that effect but because
of the gracious wiU of Brahman. As such the ultimate object
of man's love must be this supreme Source of the value of
all that he values in his life. There is no pomt, the argument
urges, in seeking thmgs of derivative value and also in seek-
ing the individual soul, which is itself unpoverished and
deficient, without the objects through which it seeks self-
fulfilment.
In Br. II. iv. 12 and also in many other texts, the words
denoting the individual self mean the highest Seff, and are
used in grammatical equation with the word denoting Hun.
The Sutra-kara supports this according to the views of other
Acaryas in the following Sutras.
20. (The fact that the individual soul is taught as the
object of realization is an) indicatory mark (which is) prooi
of the proposition, so Asmarathya thinks.
The word denoting the individual soul is used to indicate
the supreme Brahman, to show that the former is an effect
of the latter and therefore not different from It, thus esta-
'r blishmg the promissory statement that by the knowledge of
one thing the knowledge of everything is gainedso argues
Asmarathya. Vide Mu. II. i. 1 where it is said that the
individual souls are brought forth from the Imperishable
like sparks from a fhe and return to It also. So they are
one with Brahman in so far as they are Its effects. On this
ground the word denoting the individual soul denotes the
n- supreme Self also.
202 Srt-Bhdsya
[ 1.4.21.
21. Because of this nature (viz. possessing the
characteristics of Bralunan) of the individual soul which
rises from the body (at the time of release), thus (thinks)
Audulomi.
'Now that serene and happy bemg, rismg out of this
body and reaching the highest hght, appears in its own true
form' (Chd. VIII. iu. 4)this text shows that the released
soul possesses the characteristics of the supreme Brahman,
therefore the word referrmg to the individual soul is used
to denote the supreme Brahmanso thmks Audulomi.
22. On account of Brahman abiding in the individual
soulso thinks Kasakrtsna.
'He who resides in the seh' etc. (Br. III. vii. 22) shows
that the supreme Brahman is the mner Seh of the individual
soul which forms Its body. On this identity of the two selves
related to each other as the soul and the body, the word
denoting the individual soul is used to denote the supreme
Brahman. This is the view of Kasakrtsna.
The three views expressed above are contradictory, and
after the last one no other view is expressed by the Siitra-
kara nor is the last one refuted by him. So the last one viz.
the view of Kasakrtsna seems to be the view of the Sutra-
kara also.
Topic 7 : Brahman is the material cause also
23. (Brahman is) the material cause also, (on account
1.4.23. ] Srt-Bhdsya
203
of this view alone) not being contradictory to the proposi-
tion and illustrations (cited in the Sruti).
In the previous topic it was shown that the Self to be
seen was the supreme Brahman. The argmnent was based
oa the proposition, 'By the knowledge of one thmg every-
thing is known'. This is possible only if the 'Seh' to be seen
is the cause of the whole universe, sentient and insentient.
The mdividual seh cannot be such a cause of the whole
universe of sentient and insentient beings. So it was estab-
hshed that the supreme Seh is the object of knowledge
prescribed in the text. This shows that Brahman is also the
material cause of the universe.
An objection is raised that Brahman cannot be both the
efficient and material cause of the world, as it is contrary
to common experience. In the world we see the potter and
the claythe efficient and material causes respectively of
the potare different from each other. Similarly Brahman
cannot be both these causes. That Brahman is the efficient
cause of the world is known from texts like, Tt thought. . .
It created Prana' (Pra. VI. 3-4).
That the efficient and material causes of the world are
dhferent is known from texts like, 'From that, the Lord of
Maya sends forth all this'; 'Know Maya is Prakrti, and
the great Lord is the Mayin' (Sve. TV. 9-10). Moreover,
scriptures declare that Brahman is unchangeable. Therefore
Brahman can only be the efficient cause and not also the
material cause. So we have to infer the existence of a
Pradhana which serves as the material cause, though not
clearly declared in the scriptures. 'Animating My Prakrti I
project again and again this whole multitude of beings' etc.
(Gltd IX. 8)^this text clearly declares the existence of a
Prakrti different from Brahman.
204 Srt-Bhdsya
[ 1.4.23.
This view is refuted by this Sutra which declares that
Brahman is both the efficient and material cause of the
universe. For otherwise, texts like, 'By which what is not
heard becomes heard' etc. (Chd. VI. i. 3), which declare
tliat by the knowledge of Brahman everything is known,
would be meaningless. If Brahman is the material cause of
the universe, then as effects are not different from the cause,
the proposition wiU hold true. The illustration given to
explain this, viz. 'My dear, as by the knowledge of one lump
of clay, all that is made of clay is known' etc. (Chd. VI. i.
4), also estabhshes that Brahman is the material cause. As
Brahman has for Its body the whole world of sentient and
insentient beings in the causal and effected states as modes,
there can be no contradiction in Its being both the causes.
The change at creation is only in the insentient part of Its
body which was in a fine condition before creation and which
manffests in a gross form assuming names and forms in the
effected state. There is no change in Brahman as such in
this modffication, even as in a chhd, when it grows up to be
a youth, there is no change in the person but only in the
body. So Brahman is changeless, as texts describe It. Even
though Brahman, having for Its body the sentient and in-
sentient beings, is the material cause, texts like, 'From that
the Lord of Maya sends forth all this (universe) . . . In this
the other is bound up through Maya' (Sve. IV. 9) show
that It is not in any way affected by the imperfections or
changes in the world. Therefore, on account of the proposi-
tion and iUustrations given in the Sruti texts. Brahman is
both the efficient and the material cause of the world.
3Tr V7 f t q t 5 n ^ U R ^ U
24. Also on account of the statement of will (to create
1,4.26. ]
Sri-Bhdsya
205
OH the part of Brahnian, It is the material cause).
'It wished : May I be many, may I grow forth' etc.
(Chd. VI. ii. 3)^this text shows that Brahman wished, to
become many, as the world of multiphcity. This shows that.
It is both the efficient and material cause.
25. And because the Sruti texts directly declare (that
It is) both (the efficient and material cause of the world).
Scriptures dhectly declare that Brahman is both the
causes. 'What was the wood, what was the tree, from which
they have buUt this earth and heaven ?. . . Whereon it stood
supporting the worlds ?'in this text a question is asked
as to the efficient and material cause of the world. The
reply given in the text is, 'Brahman was the wood. Brahman
the tree from which they bmlt heaven and earth. . .it stood
on Brahman supporting the worlds' (Tai. Brd. II. 8-9).
Therefore Brahman is both the causes.
26. (Brahman is the material cause of the world) be^
cause (Sruti says that) It created Itself.
'That Itseh manifested Itself' (Tai. II. 7)this text
shows that Brahman, the creator, manifested Itseh as the
world. Therefore Brahman is both the causes. It is possible
for the same thing to be both the agent and the object of
activity as not having and having names and forms, i.e. as
existing in a fine state without names and forms, and mani-
festing itseh in a gross form with names and forms.
An objection is raised : If Brahman manifests Itself as.
206 Sn-Bhdsya
[ 1.4.26.
the world which is fuh of unperfections, ignorance, misery,
change etc. then Brahman would cease to be free from evil,
ah-knowing, infinitely blissful, etc. This objection is answered
by the next Sutra.
Tr^iTmT?r \ \ R } d \ \
27. On account of modification (it is possible).
The modification taught by the Vedanta texts is as
foUows : Brahman has for Its body the universe of sentient
and insentient beings in an extremely subtle form before
creation. At the tune of creation Brahman wUls to create
the world in its gross form : and Its body undergoes a
modification and develops names and forms. 'This universe
was then unmanifested. It manifested itself only as name
and form' etc. (Br. I. iv. 7). In both conditions Brahman
is Its iimer Self. AU imperfections, ignorance etc. belong to
the sentient world which forms one part of Its body, and
aU change is in the insentient world which forms the other
part of Its body. But Brahman, the inner Seh, remains ever
blissful, free from all imperfections, aU-knowing, unchanged
etc.
That the whole universe of sentient and insentient-beings
is Brahman's body and that It is its inner Self, is declared
by the text, 'He who is inside the earth. . .whose body is
the earth' etc. (Br. IH. vu. 3) up to the end of the section.
Many more texts can be quoted in support of this declara-
tion.
qtfjTr W R^ W
28. And because (Brahman) is called tbe origin.
That which the wise regard as the origm of aU thmgs'
1.4.29. ]
Srl-Bhdsya 207
(Mu. I. i. 6). Vide also Mu. III. i. 3. These texts show that
Brahman is the material cause of the universe.
Topic 8 : All Veddnta texts refer to Brahman alone as
the first cause
29. By this all (texts relating to the cause of the world)
are explained (as referring to Brahman alone).
In these four Padas of tills chapter, it has been shown
by various arguments that Vedanta texts which relate to the
origin of the world declare only an ah-knowing, aU-powerful
Brahman which is different from the sentient and insentient
world. By this, i.e. by the arguments hitherto given, aU texts
which refer to the cause of the world, other than those
aheady explained in these Padas, are also explained as
referrmg to Brahman alone.
The repetition of the verb m the aphorism shows that
the chapter ends here.
CHAPTER n
SECTION I
In the last chapter it was shown that the Vedanta texts-
teach only Brahman which is different from the insentient
world of matter experienced by direct perception, as also
from the sentient world of intelligent souls, whether in the
state of bondage connected with matter or in the state of
freedom dissociated from matter,^Brahman which is the
repository of infinite good qualities, free from ah imperfec-
tions, the one cause of this sentient and insentient world,
and the inner Seff of everything. The second chapter is begun
to strengthen this view by refuting aU possible arguments
that may be brought against it. To start with, the author
takes up the objection that this view would contradict the
Samkhya Smrti of sage Kapha who is recognized on all
hands as a trustworthy authority on matters supra-sensuous.
Topic 1 : Refutation of Smrtis that are not based on
the Srutis
1. If it be said that (from the doctrine of Bralmian
being the cause of the world) there would result the defect
of leaving no scope for certain Smrtis (we say) no; (be-
cause by the rejection of that doctrine) there would result
the defect of leaving no scope for some other Smrtis.
2.1.1.]
Sn-Bhdsya
209
The question is whether the view expressed in the last
i! chapter, viz. that Brahman is the cause of the world, can
be rejected as it contradicts the Kapila Smrti, or not. The
opponent holds that it should be set aside. Smrtis only
elucidate what is taught in the Srutis, and one has to take
their help to understand the true purport of Sruti texts. No
doubt it is an accepted maxim that Smrtis which contradict
Srutis are not to be accepted as authoritative. But this
maxim applies only with respect to matters where the mean-
ing of the Sruti texts is quite obvious and requires no
reasoning to arrive at their meaning. But with respect to the
ultunate truth, which is difficult for the dull-witted to grasp,
the true purport of the texts has to be elucidated by Smrtis
written by great sages whose testimony is trustworthy. So
one cannot set aside Smrtis so very easily because they
contradict a superficial view of the Vedanta texts. Sage
Kapila, the promulgator of the Samkhya Smrti, is a seer of
truth ; and as his Smrti deals only with the ultunate truth,
one has to take its help for a true understanding of the
Vedanta texts. Otherwise the Smrti becomes absolutely
meaningless. We have to conclude, therefore, that the doc-
trine taught by the Vedanta texts cannot be different from
that taught by sage Kapila and that the Vedanta texts are
to be interpreted consistent with the Sariikhya Smrti.
> This view is refuted by the second half of the Sutra.lt \
says that if the doctrine of Brahman bemg the cause of the
world be rejected to accommodate the Saihkhya Smrti, then
many other Smrtis like that of Manu and others which uphold
this doctrine and are based on Srutis will have no scope.
If help is to be taken to understand the Sruti texts, one
should resort to Smrtis which do not contradict the Srutis.
*' It may, however, be said : Samkhya Smrti deals only
210 Sn-Bhasya
[2.1.1.
with the ultunate truth, and so if, on this point, it be
rejected it wUl mean its total rejection. But this is not the
case with respect to Manu and other Smrtis which also deal
with ritualistic worship. So if they are rejected with respect
to the ultimate truth, yet with respect to ritualistic worship,
they whl retain theh authority. So it wiU not be their total
rejection, as in the case of the Saihkhya Smrti.
This view is not correct. For ritualistic worship is meant
to propitiate Brahman, the ultimate truth. If there be in-
defimteness with respect to this ultunate reality, ritualistic
worship meant to propitiate it wih be meaningless. So it is
not correct to say that Manu and other Smrtis wUl be at
least partly authoritative if theh view of the ultunate truth
'is rejected. Between the two, therefore, we have to accept
those Smrtis only which are based on the Srutis and teach
the doctrine of Brahman, an inteUigent principle, being the
cause of the world and reject Smrtis like the Sariikhya
^Smrti which go counter to the Srutis.
2. And on account of the non-perception (of the
truth as (aught by Kapila) by others.
An objection is raised that KapUa who had the power,
through deep medhation, to realize the truth which is be-
yond sense-perception, did not experience that the Vedanta
texts refer to Brahman, and so we have to accept that they
refer to the Pradhana as taught by KapUa. This Siitra refutes
this argument as it equally applies the other way also. Manu
and others who were foremost amongst the knowers of the
Vedas and who also were able to realize the truth beyond
the ken of the senses, did not perceive that the Vedanta
2,1.3.]
Sn-Bhdsya
211
texts referred to the Pradhana but to Brahman. Therefore
we have to accept theh view and conclude that the realiza-
tion of Kapha which goes counter to the teachings of the
Vedas is based on error.
Topic 2 : Refutation of the Yoga philosophy
3. By this the Yoga philosophy is (also) rejected.
A fresh objection is raised. Grantmg that the Sairikhya
Smrti is not authorhative, the Yoga Smrti at least is so, for
it recognizes an Isvara who dhects the Pradhana and also
because it is propounded by Brahma or Hhanyagarbha
who is the promulgator of the Vedas. There cannot be any
sage superior or equal to him, whose Smrti could be more
authoritative as against the Yoga Smrti. Therefore we have
to mterpret the Vedanta texts accordmg to this Smrti and
accept that isvara is the efficient cause and the Pradhana
the material cause of the world.
This view is refuted by this Sutra. Even Hhanyagarbha
is an embodied being and as such hable to error. This Smrti
also, like the Sariikhya Smrti, is based on error. If isvara
is merely the efficient cause, then by the knowledge of one
everything whl not be known. For the knowledge of the
Pradhana wih not give us the knowledge of the sentient
souls which are not its products. Nor can the knowledge of
isvara result in the knowledge of the souls as they are not
products of isvara who, accordmg to the Yoga phUosophy,
is merely the efficient cause and not the material cause also.
So we have to conclude that Brahman alone is both the
efficient and material cause of the world and its knowledge
will result in the knowledge of everythhig. Therefore, only
212 Srl-Bhdsya
[2.1.3.
those Smrtis are authoritative which teach Brahman as the
cause of the world. It may be said that the Yoga Smrti
teaches many things which are also taught by the Vedas. It
is true, and to that extent only is it acceptable, and its other
teachings have to be rejected.
Topic 3 : Brahman, though of a different nature from the
world, can yet be Its cause
A further objection is raised by the Samkhyas who say
that the Smrtis of Manu and others are hrational and so
their conclusions are defective ; but the Kapha Smrti is
rational and so, in interpreting the Vedanta texts, one should
take help from it and not from Manu and others. This topic
deals with this objection and refutes it.
4. (Brahman is) not (the cause of the world) because
this (world) is of a contrary nature (to Brahman); and its
being so (i.e. different from Brahman) (is knovm) from the
scriptures.
Objection (continued in the next Sutra also) : The cause
and the effect must be of siimlar nature, i.e. non-different
in character, as we find in the case of clay and its products,
pots etc. or gold and its products, bracelets etc. But this
world of sentient and insentient beings is not of a similar
natiue with Brahman. The sentient world is made up of
souls with Ihnited knowledge, full of unperfections, and
subject to suffering. The insentient world is non-inteUigent
and subject to change. As distinct from these two worlds.
Brahman is omniscient, aU-knowing and free from all im-
perfections. It enjoys unbroken blessedness. It is of the
2 1.5. ] Sri-Bhdsya 213
nature of intelligence, changeless etc. An effect cannot be of
a dissimhar nature or different in character from the cause.
That Brahman and the world are of contrary natxure is
further known from the scriptures also. 'Brahman became
inteUigence as also the non-mtelligent' (Tai. II. 6) ; 'Brah-
man is existence, inteUigence, infinitude' (Tai. II. 1); 'Seated
on the seff-same tree, one of them^the individual soul
sunken in ignorance and deluded, grieves for its impotence'
etc. (Mu. III. i. 2). Vide Sve. I. 8 and IV. 7 also. The two,
viz. Brahman and the world, being of contrary nature, the
relation of cause and effect cannot exist between them, as
an effect cannot be of a different nature or character from
the cause. On the other hand the Pradhana and this world
of insentient matter are of simUar character and so it must
be assumed to be the cause of the world. KapUa Smrti,
therefore, is more authoritative than Manu and others which
are hrational.
It may, however, be said that the world of matter also
has inteUigence, as can be gathered from texts like, 'The
earth said to hhn' (Tai. Sam. V. v. 2). The next Sutra
answers this plausible objection.
fqftBiT^rcFq TR U K U
5. But the reference is to the presiding deities, on
account of the special characterization (as deities) and
entering.
The word 'but' refutes the objection raised. The refer-
ence in these texts cited is to the presiding deities, as is
known from the special characterization as deities in the
scriptures. 'That diety wiUed : WeU, let me, entermg into
these three deities' etc. (Chd. VI. hi. 2); here fire, water.
214
Srl-Bhdsya [ 2.1.5.
and earth are characterized as deities, Vide Kau. II. 14
also. 'Entermg' in the Sutra refers to the text, 'Agni, having
become speech, entered mto the mouth' etc. (Ai. II. 4),
where Agni and other deities are described as having entered
into the sense-organs as theh presiding deities.
So one camiot refute the fact that Brahman and the
world are of different character, which shows that the world
cannot be an effect of Brahman. Therefore in agreement
with the Samkhyan Smrti confirmed by reasoning, the
Vedanta texts must be assumed to teach that the Pradhana
is the material cause of the world.
6. But it is seen.
The word 'but' refutes the view expressed in the previous
two Sutras.
The argument that Brahman and the world being ot
different character, the relation of cause and effect cannot
be established between them contradicts experience. For we
do see that things of contrary nature are related as cause
and effect, as for example worms which are produced from
honey, scorpions from cowdung etc. It may be said here ^
that the relation of cause and effect exists only with respect
to the material part in both. This argument cannot hold.
For equahty of character necessary to estabhsh the relation
of cause and effect means, according to the opponent, that
those quahties which distmguish the cause from other things
must persist in the effect also. This rule does not hold good
in the case of worms born from honey, for the special
quahties which distmguish the cause, viz. the honey, from
other things are not seen in the effect, the worms. So it is
2.1.8, ] Sri-Bhdsya
215
not unreasonable to hold that the world which is of a
different nature from Brahman can yet be Its effect.
7. If it be said that (in that case) (the effect is) non-
existent (in the cause); (we say) no, there being a denial only
(of similar characteristics between cause and effect and not
of oneness of substance.)
It may be objected : If Brahman and the world are
of different nature and yet related as cause and effect it
would mean that the world, the effect, was not existent
in the cause, the Brahman, the two being quite different.
We reply that it is not so. For what is denied is merely
the rule that there should be shnharity of characteristics
between the cause and the effect. But we do accept theh
oneness of substance, as we find in clay and pots, or gold
and bracelets. The world is not altogether different and
separate from the cause, the Brahman. Therefore what
we say is that the same substance, the cause, becomes
modified into the effect but may or may not have similar
characteristics.
8. On account of the fact that at the time of dissolu
tion (the cause becomes) like that (i.e. like the effect) (the
doctrine of Brahman being the cause of the world) is
absurd. ' i '-^^jHp
Objection : If reaUy the Brahman,which is aU-know-
ing, whose every deshe is fulfilled, who enjoys unbroken
bliss and who is free from all unperfections^be the cause
216 Sn-Bhdsya
[2.1.8.
of this world of a contrary nature, and both be made of one
substance, then the unperfections of the world, like ignor-
ance, being subject to Karma etc. will surely be connected
with Brahman. The result would be that contradictory qual-
ities as given by the Vedanta texts would be attributed to
the same substance, thereby reducing their teaching to an
absurdity. A few Vedanta texts are cited here. 'He who is
all-knowning' (Mu. I. i. 9); 'Free from sin, old age and
death' (CM.* VI. i. 5) ; 'Of these two, one eats the sweet
fruits' etc. (Sve. IV. 6) ; 'On account of its impotence it
laments bewildered' (Sve. TV. 7). The Vedantui may say
that as Brahman has in both the causal and effected states
the world of sentient and insentient beuigs for Its body, the
imperfections of the world found in Its body do not affect
It. But the relation of soul and body cannot exist between
Brahman and the world, for in that case the imperfections
due to embodunent will affect It. Moreover, embodiment is
meant for the enjoyment of the fruit of Karma and this is
made possible through the senses which abide in the body
made of elements and sustained by Prana. But Brahman
is not subject to Karma, nor has It sense-organs to experi-
ence enjoyment dependent on the senses, nor does It depend
on Prana for life. Vide Sve. III. 19 ; Mu. II. i. 2. Moreover,
Vedanta texts clearly declare that Brahman has no body :
'Without hands and feet It grasps and hastens' etc. (Sve.
m. 19).
9. But not (so) on account of the existence of illustra-
tions.
The word 'buf refutes the view expressed in the last
2.1.9.] Srt-Bhdsya 217
Sutra. Imperfections do not affect Brahman and' so the
teachings of the Vedanta texts are not an absurdity. One
substance can exist in two different states having good and
bad qualities separately in the two states. Brahman has for
Its body the world of sentient and msentient beings and
Brahman is its Seff in both the causal and effected states.
The unperfections of the world, the body, do not affect
Brahman, the indweUing Seff, nor do the good quahties of
the Seff, the Brahman, affect Its body, the world. In the
human being the changes and imperfections of the body like
bhth, childhood, youth, old age etc. do not affect the soul,
nor do the qualities of the soul like intelligence, pleasure
etc. extend to its body. That Brahman has for Its body the
world of sentient and insentient beings in both their subtle
and gross conditions and that It is its inner Seff is clearly
declared by the scriptures. 'To whom the individual self
is the body' (Br. Mddhyandina 111. vu. 22) ; 'To whom the
Avyakta is the body' (Sub. 7). So in both the causal and
effected states Brahman is not affected by the change,
ignorance, being subject to Karma etc. which belong to the
world, nor do the quahties of Brahman like aU-knowingness,
being free from aU imperfections etc. extend to the world.
Moreover, the definition of a body as given by the oppo-
nent is defective. A body is not necessarily a means for
enjoying the fruh of Karma. For the Lord takes forms at
His pleasure without being subject to Karma. So do released
souls. Vide Chd. VII. xxvi. 2. Nor are these bodies made
of the elements. 'The body of the highest Seff is not made
from a combination of elements' (Mahdbharata). So we
define 'body' thus : 'Any substance which a sentient soul
controls and supports completely for its own purpose and
is in a subordinate relation to the soul, is the body of that
218
Sri-Bhdsya
[2.1.9;
soul.' In this sense all the sentient and non-sentient bemgs-
constitute the body of Brahman as they are subordinate tQ It
and controlled and supported by It for Its own purpose.
Texts which say that Brahman has no body mean only that
It has no body due to Karma.
10. And because of objections (against) lus owu
(Samldiyan) view.
The defect of absurdity in reasoning apphes to the
Samkhyan view also. According to the Sariikhyas, creation
begins due to the nearness of the Prakrti to the Purusa and
the consequent superhnposition of the quahties of Prakrti
on the Purusa (soul) which is pure inteUigence and free
from aU change. If nearness of the Prakrti means the mere
existence of the Prakrti, then even in the case of the released
souls this superimposition of its qualities on the released
souls wiU be there and consequently there wiU be no release
at all. If nearness means some change in the Prakrti which
causes this superimposition, then it would lead us into a
contradiction, the change in the Prakrti being the cause of
the superimposition and again superimposition being the
cause of the change in the Prakrti which results in the evo-
lution of the world process. While the Vedanta view has
been explained satisfactorUy, the Sariikhyas cannot get out
of this absurdity and so their view is based on error and has
to be discarded.
11. Also because reasoning has no sure basis (it can-
not upset the conclusions of the Vedanta.)
2.1.13.]
Srl-Bhdsya
219
As the Sarhkhyan view is refuted by the Bauddhas and
others through reasoning, there is no sure basis for reason
on which one can depend. The arguments of one can be
refuted by another more inteUigent. So Reasonmg without
the help of the scriptures is not dependable. So the Sam-
khyan view, based merely on reasoning, cannot upset the
Vedanta view based on the scriptures.
12. If it be said that it should be reasoned otherwise
(so as to get over the defects) ; (we say) even so there will
result the contingency of non-release (for tbe defect cited).
It may be said that the conclusion of the Saihkhyas can
be arrived at through a different process of reasoning which
would elimmate the defects shown by the Bauddhas and
others. We reply it is of no use, for arguments given by any
one are capable of being stiUed by another more inteUigent
and expert hi faUacious arguments. So mere reasoning can-
not lead us to any sure concli^sion. Therefore in matters
supersensuous scriptures alone are authority. Reasonmg
which goes agamst them is no proof of knowledge and can-
not contradict scriptural texts.
Topic 4 : The line of reasoning against the Sdmkhyas is
valid against others like the Atomists
13. By this (i.e. by the arguments against the
Samkhyas) the remaining systems (like that of the Atomists
and others) not accepted by the Vedas, are explained.
220 Sn-Bhdsya
[2.1.13.
By this argument against the Samkhyas, viz. that mere
reasoning has no sure basis, aU other systems like that of
the Atomists, Bauddhas, Jainas and others, not based on
the scriptures, are also refuted. It may be said that aU of
them agree on the point that atoms are the ultimate cause
of the world and so they do not contradict each other; and
there is therefore no room for the argument given against
the Sariikhyas in their case. We reply that though they are
ah agreed about the uhhnate cause being atoms, yet they
aU differ from each other as to the nature of these atoms
and so there is no sure basis. Hence they are also refuted
by this argument against the Sariikhyas.
Topic 5 : Though Brahman has for its body the entire
universe of sentient and insentient beings, yet it does
not experience pleasure and pain like the
individual soul
In Topic 3 it was shown that just as the individual soul
is not affected by the qualities of the body, like being stout
or lean, so also Brahman is not affected by the suffering
or change in the universe, which forms Its body. By this
hody-relation between Brahman and the world, it was shown
that the world is dependent on Brahman and is controlled
by It, even as the body is dependent on and controUed by
the individual soul. The Sariikhyan objection is now
answered in this topic from another standpoint, viz. the
dependence of the world on Brahman which controls it.
14. If it be said that from (Brahman) being an enjoyer
2.1.14.]
Sn-Bhasya 221
(being embodied) tbere will be non-distinction (between
Brahman and the individual soul), (we say, such distinc>
tion) may exist (all the same), as is experienced commonly
in the world.
Brahman which is the Self of everything and which has.
for Its body the individual souls is distinguished from the
latter because of Its unbroken bhssfulness, while the latter
is subject to suffering and unperfections. Is this distmction
a reality or even possible ? The opponent holds that it is
not, for the mere fact that Brahman has a body which is
made up of the souls and matter will subject It to suffering
like the individual souls. Scriptures also declare the same
thhig. 'Surely there is no cessation of pleasure and pain for
one who is embodied' (Chd. VIII. xu. I). In what way then
can Brahman be superior to the individual soul ? There can
be no difference between the two. So the Pradhana is the
material cause of the world while Brahman is only the
efficient cause.
Reply : Such a differentiation is possible. For, being
subject to pleasure and pain does not depend on possessing
a body, but it depends on the good and evh deeds performed
by the embodied being. Moreover, your view also wiU be
defective in that case. For you say that the inteUect is the
agent because of hs connection with the body. In that case
the Purusa also, being connected with the body, wiU become
an agent. But you do not accept it. Not being connected with
Karma (work) which is the cause of suffering. Brahman does
not experience pleasure and pam. The Sruti text quoted
above refers to bodies which result from good and evU
works. Brahman is the ruler and the individual soul is
controUed by It and rewarded or punished for its good and
evil deeds. This dependence of the individual soul on It and
222 Sri-Bhdsya
[2.1.14.
Its being independent of everything, makes ail the difference
between the two. We see even in the world the same differ-
ence between the king and his subjects. Though the king and
the subjects are both embodied beings, yet the experience
of pain due to the punishment meted out for transgressing
the kmg's orders is suffered by the subjects only and not
by the king. Similarly here also Brahman, the Lord, is ever
bhssful whUe the souls are subject to pleasure and pain due
to theh good and evil deeds. Hence the difference between
Brahman and the individual souls^the former being free
from all pain and ever blissful and the latter being subject
to pleasure and painis estabhshed. Sruti also say : 'Two
birds, bound by close friendship, perch on the seff-same
tree. One of them eats the fruits of the tree with relish,
whUe the other looks on without eating' ( MM. III. i. 1).
Therefore Brahman has for Its body the world of sentient
and insentient beings and yet does not experience pleasure
and pain like the soul.
Topic 6 : The non-difference of the effect, the world, from
Brahman, the cause
In Topic 3 Brahman was shown to be the cause of the
world, taking for granted the non-difference of the effect, the
world, from Brahman, the cause. Now this Topic is begun
to refute the view of the Atomists (Vaisesikas) and to
estabhsh the non-difference of the cause and the effect.
15. The non-difference (of the world) from that (viz.
2.1.15.]
Sn-Bhdsya 223
Brahman) is luiown (from texts) beginning with the word
'Arambhanam'.
The opponent, the atomist (Vaisesika) raises an objec-
tion and says that the cause, the Brahman, and the effect,
the world, cannot be non-different, for there are various
differences between the two. Fkstly, there is the difference
m time, the cause existing in a previous moment and the
effect in a subsequent moment. Then there is the difference
in shape, as we see, for example in a lump of clay and a
pot. There is also the difference in number as between the
threads and a cloth, or a pot and its two shreds. There is a
difference again as regards thek utilitya pot serves the
purpose of getting water but not a liunp of clay. There is
also a difference in the idea conveyed by the two. Finally,
there is the difference in nomenclature, as when we say a
lump of clay and a pot. If the two were non-different, then
when one says, 'get me a pot', it would be complied with
by getting a lump of clay, but it is not. There is, therefore,
much difference between the cause and the effect. Those
things which differ in the idea conveyed and in names can-
not be non-different. Moreover, ff the two are non-different
then the activity of the agent would be meaningless. There
fore Brahman and world are different and texts which
declare that the two are non-different have to be explained
otherwise.
All this the Siitra refutes and says that the non-difference
between Brahman and the world is declared by hundreds
of texts which cannot be explained away. 'A lump of clay
undergoes changes assmning different names through verbal
references, but clay alone is real' (Chd. VI. i. 4); 'Being
alone was this at the beginning, one only without a second ;
It thought, "May I become many, may I grow forth." It
224 Srl-Bhdsya [2.1.15.
sent forth Fire' (Chd. VI. ii. 2-3) ; 'AU this world has That
for the Self, That is the true. That is the SehThat thou
art, O Svetaketu' (Chd. VI. viii. 7); 'Verily aU this universe
is Bralunan. From It do aU thmgs originate, into It do they
dissolve and by It are they sustained' (Chd. III. xiv. 1) ;
'AU this was unmanifest before creation and became mani-
fest as names and forms' (Br. I. iv. 7). There is not the
least trace or sign in these texts of any difference in sub-
stance. The causal substance, the lump of clay, takes a new
mode or condition, the pot with a belly-like shape, and
hence its representing a different idea and name is also apt.
The activity of the agent also becomes meaningful. As the
causal substance is recognized in the effected state also as
having attained a new mode or condition there is no need
to assume a different substance which is not perceived.
Therefore the world which is the effect of Brahman is non-
different from It.
16. And because (the cause) is recognized in the
effected sf^te.
In the existence of the effect, the pot, one recognizes
the cause, the clay, as 'this pot is clay'. Hence the non-
difference of the cause and the effect. It is just like Deva-
datta who is the same person in both the stages of Iffe, viz.
childhood and youth. The effect is nothing but the causal
substance which has passed over into a different condition.
Since the same substance is perceived in both the cause and
the effect, the difference in idea and words is dependent on
this difference in state or condition only. The effect, there-
fore, is non-different from the cause.
2.1.18.]
Sri-Bhdsya 225
17. And on account of the existence of the other
(viz. the effect, as the cause).
As the other, yiz. the effect, exists in the cause, the two
are non-different. The effect is spoken of m terms of the
cause both in common parlance and in the scriptures.. All
these effects, viz. the pots, plates, etc. were mere clay, in
the morning. Thus the effect is recognized in the cause. The
clay which is found in the pots, plates etc. was forinerly
perceived as a lump. 'Being alone was this at the beginning'
(CM VI. u. 1).
18. If it be said that on account of (the effect) being
described as non-existent (before creation) (the conclusion
of the previous Sutra is) not (true); (we say) not so, (.such
designation being due to) another attribute (as is seen)
from the latter part of the text, reasoning, and another
Sruti text.
An objection is raised : 'In the beguining there was non-
existence' (CM. VI. ii. 1) ; 'Non-existence indeed was this
hi the beginnmg' (Tai. II. vi. 1) ; Tn the beghmmg there
was nothmg whatsoever' (Tai. Brd. II. u. 8)texts like
these declare the non-existence of the effect. In common
parlance also we say, 'These pots, plates etc. were not in the.
morning.' So it is not correct to say that the effect.exists
in the cause. ; - ; " ' :
15
226 Srl-Bhdsya [2.1.18.
To all this we reply : It is not so. It is caUed non-
existence as the effect had earlier a different quality, not
because of hs bemg absolutely non-existent. The quahty
different from the quality of existence is non-existence . Non-
existence here means the subtle state before creation, as
opposed to the gross manffested state having names and
forms. In common parlance, gross manffested state with
names and forms is said to be existence. As opposed to this,
the subtle state without names and forms is caUed non-
existence. Before creation the world was not nianffested as
names and forms but was in a subtle condition. Hence it is
said to be non-existent. How is this known? 'From the
latter part of the text, reasoning, and another Sruti text.'
The latter part of the text referred to is this : 'That non-
existent one formed the resolve, "May I be"' (Tai. Brd.
11. u. 8). Such a resolve can be made only by that which
exists. Therefore, in the other texts also quoted above, we
have to conclude that non-existence means existence in a
subtle form as opposed to the gross manffested state with
names and forms. Reasoning spoken of is thus : Ordinarily
people caU things which are gross and serving some purpose
as 'existing' and subtle things which are not usable, though
existing, are said to be 'non-existing'. When the clay pos-
sesses a certam shape we say 'the pot exists'; but when the
clay exists in a different condition as opposed to that of a
pot, as when the pot is broken, we say the pot does not
exist. Thus we do not perceive and non-existence apart from
this which explams ah ordinary ideas and expressions. There
is therefore no need to imagine a non-existence apart from
this. The text referred to m the Sutra is, 'AU this was un-
manffest before creation, and became manffest as names and
forms' (Br. I. iv. 7).
2.1.21.]
Sn-Bhdsya
227
19. And like a piece of clotli.
Threads when arranged in a particular way are called
"a cloth', thus acquirmg a new nomenclature and utility.
TTie same is the case with Brahman also.
W ^ ^ m f k : U R o u
20. And as in the case of the different Pranas.
The same Prana undergoes different modifications in the
body and assumes different names like Prana, Apana, etc.
new characteristics and functions. So also the one Brahman
becomes the world of sentient and insentient beings.
Therefore it is established that this world is non-different
from Brahman, the Cause.
Topic 7 : Refutation of the objection that if Brahman
were the cause of the world, then It and the Jiva
being non-different. Brahman would be re-
sponsible for creating evil
Tiff now the objections of the Saihkhyas and the Vai-
sesikas to Brahman being the material cause of the world
have been answered through reasoning. Now an objection
to Brahman's bemg the efficient cause is taken up for refu-
tation.
21. On account of the other (the individual soul) being
stated (as non-different from Bralunan) there would arise
228
Srl-Bhdsya
12.1.21.
(in Bralunan) the defects of not doing what is beneficial
and the like/
A fresh objection is raised to Braliman's being the cause
cf the world. Since Brahman and the world are non-different,
the individual souls which form the sentient part of the
world are also non-different from Brahman. Sruti texts also
cieclare thus : 'That thou art' (Chd. VI. viii. 7) ; 'This seff
is Brahman' (Md. 2). But the world is full of suffermg for
the soul; and ff Brahman is non-different from the soul,
then Brahman who is omniscient etc. would be held respon-
sible for creating a world which is fuU of suffering for Itseff.
No reasonable person does harm to hhnself. Therefore
Brahman cannot be the cause of the world. Texts which
differentiate between Brahman and the individual soul have
been rejected by the Vedantin. On the other hand ff they
are accepted, then the principle of non-difference cannot
stand. It may be said that the difference declared by the
texts is due to Ihniting adjuncts. In that case, does Brahman
which is tmconditioned and aU-knowing know the soul which
h non-different from It ? If it does not know it, then Brah-
man cannot be all-knowing. If it does know the soul which
is non-different from It, then Brahman is conscious of the
pam of the soul as Its own, and so Brahman cannot escape
the defect of creating a world which is non-beneficial to
Itseff. It may, however, be said that the difference between
the two, the soul and Brahman, is due to Nescience. In that
case also, ff the soul is subject to Nescience, then we have
the same defect as stated above. If Brahman is subject to
Nescience, then Brahman which is seff-luminous cannot
possibly be conscious of Nescience and the creation of the
world by it. If it be said that the self-lummous nature of
Brahman is obscured by Nescience, it would be the destnlc-
2.1.23.]
Sn-Bhasya
229
tion of Brahman's very nature or in other words of Brahman
Itseh.
The view that Brahman is the cause of the world is thus
imtenable.
^ f m g ^r?r?5n?i^ w R R W
22. But ou account of the statement (in the Sruti) ot
difference (between the individual soul and Brahman)
(Bralunan the creator is) something more (than the indivi-
dual soul).
'But' refutes the objection of the last Sutra. Brahman
is something different from, and superior to, the individual
soul. Scriptures declare dhlerence between the two. 'He is
the cause of aU, and the ruler of the individual soul. He has
no parent, nor is there anyone who is His lord' (Sve. VI.
9) ; 'He is the repository of ah good quahties, and the
master of aU sciences. He is the controUer of matter and
spirit, and the Lord of the gunas' (Sve. VI. 16) ; 'He who
dwells in the self but is within it, whom the seff does not
know, whose body is the self and who controls the seff from
within' etc. (Br. Madhyandina III. vii. 22).
31^lf?g' g d4HM4rTT: n R ^ W
23. And as in the case of stones etc. it is an impossi-
bility.
Just as it is unpossible for stones, wood, herbs, etc. to be
of the same nature as Brahman, so also h is impossible for
the individual soul which is subject to imperfections to be
one with Brahman. This has been explamed in I. iv. 22.
The texts which declare non-difference between them only
230 Srl-Bhdsya
[ 2.1.23.
declare the fact that Brahman has the hidividual soul for
Its mode in so far as It has the individual soul for Its body
and It is its inner Seh. Vide Br. Mddhyandina III. vh. 22.
Brahman having for Its body the sentient and msentient
world in its subtle condition is the causal state and Brahman
having for Its body the same world m its gross form is the
effected state; the cause and effect are non-different. The
imperfections of Its body do not affect It and It is always,
as the scriptmes declare, the repository of aU good qualities.
Therefore it is estabhshed that Brahman's bemg the
cause of the world is not untenable.
Topic 8 : Brahman though destitute of materials and
instruments is yet the cause of the world
This topic is begun to refute the objection that without
extraneous aids Brahman cannot be the cause through mere
volition.
24. If it be said (that Brahman without extraneous
aids) cannot (be the cause of the world) because (an agent)
is seen to collect materials (for any construction), (we say)
no, since (it is) like milk (turning into curd).
A fresh objection is raised against Brahman bemg the
cause of the world. Sruti texts declare, 'Being alone was
this before creation, one only without a second' (Chd. VI.
ii. 1). So besides Brahman there was nothing extraneous.
It is ordmarUy seen that even agents who are capable of
creating something have to take the help of extraneous
materials, instruments, etc. as for example, the potter who
2.1.25. ]
Sn-Bhasya 231
has to take the help of the elay and the wheel to create a
pot. So Brahman, being one without a second, has not the
accessories and so cannot be the creator of this variegated
world.
The Sutra refutes this objection by showing that such
a thing is possible, even as milk turns into curd without the
help of extraneous things. So it is not always necessary to
have the aid of accessories in creating a thing. Therefore
Brahman also without accessories can be the cause of the
world.
25. (The case of Brahman creating the world is) even
lke the gods and others (creating) in their own worlds.
Even as gods are seen to create thmgs in their own
spheres without accessories but by mere volition, so also the
Lord creates the entire world through mere vohtion. The
objection given by the opponent might have had some justi-
fication if Brahman, like the potter, was merely the efficient
cause. But It is also the material cause of the world, as the
example of milk given shows.
Therefore Brahman's being the cause of the world is
tenable.
Topic 9 : Brahman though without parts is yet the
material cause of the world
In the last Topic, by the example of milk turning into
curd, it was shown that Brahman without the aid of acces-
sories can yet be the cause of the world. This Topic is begun
to remove a doubt that would naturally arise from the
example of milk ched in the last Topic.
232 Sri-Bhasya
[2.1.26.
26, (Brahman's being the cause of the world involves)
either the possibility of the entire (Brahman being modified)
or the violation of the scriptural statement that Brahman
is without parts.
If Brahman is without parts and yet the material
cause of the world, then we have to admit that the enthe
Brahman evolves into this multiform universe. So there wih
be no Brahman left and consequently no ruler of the world
either. If, on the other hand, it is said that the whole of It
does not undergo modification but only a part, and that
therein a portion gets evolved as the sentient world of souls
and a portion as the world of matter, then we have to accept
that Brahman is made up of parts in Its causal state which
is denied by scriptural texts : 'In the beginning, my boy.
Being alone was aU this, one only without a second' {Cha.
VI. ii. 1) ; 'In the beginning, verily, all this was Atman
alone' etc. {Ai. I. i. 1). So, in either case, it leads to a
dilemma and so Brahman cannot be the cause of the world.
isi^, 515?*T^r^ W R^ W
O ^ N
27. But (it cannot be like that) on account of
scriptural texts (supporting both the apparently contra-
dictory views) and on account of (Brahman's possessing
various powers) being based on the scripture only.
'But' refutes the view of the former Sutra.
There is no dilemma whatsoever for scriptures declare
that Brahman is without parts and yet the material cause
of the world of multiform. It may be said that even scrip-
tures cannot say what is absurd as for example, 'water with
.2.1.27.]
Sn-Bhdsya 233
fire'. But in matters supersensuous scriptures alone are
authority and ordinary standards of reasoning do not apply
there. Whatever thing is established by the proper means
oi knowledge with respect to it must be taken to be of a
tiature as declared by that particular source of knowledge.
Brahman is unique and beyond ordinary comprehension. It
is quite unlike everything we experience in this world and
possesses infinite powers. You cannot apply here the reason-
ing which holds good in our ordinary experience and with
respect to things of fimte poAver. The rule of invariable
concomhance of two quahties or things (vydpti) which
holds true in the worldly experience cannot be applicable
in the case of Brahman. In the world we know that those
who have eyes and ears see things and hear sounds and vice
versa those who do not have eyes or ears do not see things
or hear sounds. So we conclude that those who see and hear
have eyes and ears. To conclude from this that because
Brahman sees and hears It must be having eyes and ears
wiU not be correct, for texts like, 'without eyes It sees,
without ears It hears' etc. clearly declare that Brahman has
no eyes, ears etc. though It sees, hears etc.
So also the principle that causal things which produce
effects have parts is not apphcable hi the case of Brahman ;
for texts declare It to be without parts and yet the material
cause of the world. So we have to accept this view expressed
by texts and there is no room for any doubt as to how
Brahman without parts could become many. This has
already been explained in Sat Vidya. If, however, from
ordinary experience we attribute quahties to Brahman, then
the quality of inertness found in pots is likely to be attrib-
uted to the soul also. Such a possibhity does not arise as
the nature of the soul which is sentient is quite different
234 Sri-Bhdsya
[ 2.1.27.
from that of the pot which is insentient. So also in the case
of Brahman which is different from all things experienced
in the world and which has infinite powers, the question of
attributmg qualities from ordinary experience cannot arise.
So Brahman, though It has no parts, can yet exist as a
whole both in the causal and effected states, as established
by texts. It is also not tmtenable to say that It is hke the
lati (class) of the opponents (Naiyayikas) who say that
It exists in fuh in aU species, as for example the class (Jati)
'cow' which exists in fuh in ah cows whether with horns or ^
hornless.
M f ^^r u R ^ U
28. And thus in the Self; for (there are) manifold
powers.
That the quahties or attributes of insentient matter are
not hnposed on the Seff is because the Self is of a different
category altogether from matter. Simharly, even among
thmgs material like fire, water etc. different qualities are
fotmd which are not found in the others. So it is not unten-
able to say that Brahman which is so different from the
sentient and insentient world has supernatural powers. . \
29. And on account of the opponent's own view being
subject to these very objections.
If, as the Samkhyas say, the Pradhana is the cause, then
it being according to them not different in nature from ordi-
nary things, the defects seen in those things would also
attach to the Pradhana. So we cannot but come to the
2.1.31.]
Sn-Bhasya
235
conclusion that Brahman alone which is so very difEerent
from aU other things can be the Cause. Moreover, as Pra-
dhana also is without parts and yet produces the effects
Mahat etc. the objection is applicable in its case. It is not
possible for Pradhana without parts to produce effects in-
asmuch as it is of a simhar nature with other things which
we ordinarUy experience. But Brahman, on the other hand,
is quite different from other thmgs and so the rule that
without parts a cause caimot produce effects is not appli-
cable in Its case. The only source of knowledge about Brah-
man is scripture and it clearly declares that Brahman, though
without parts, is yet the material cause of the world as It
possesses infinite powers.
30. And (Brahnian is) endowed with all (powers),
because it is seen (from the scriptures).
Brahman is endowed with all powers and this fact is not
to be understood merely from the text, Tt wUled, "May I
be many" ' etc. {Chd. VI. u. 7) but from various other texts
like, 'His great power alone is described by Sruti texts to be
of various kinds, and His knowledge, strength, and action
are described as inherent in Hhn' {Sve. VI. 8). Shnilarly
Cha. VIII. i. 5, after describing It as different in nature
from aU other thmgs, attributes aU powers to It. 'Free from
sin, old age, from death and grief, from hunger and thhst,
realizing aU Its wishes and intentions' etc.
31. If it be said that because (Brahman) is devoid of
236
Sn-Bhasya
[2.1.31.
organs (It is) not (able to create, (bough endowed with
powers), (we say) this has (ah-eady) been explained.
An objection is raised that though Brahman is endowed
with ah powers yet as It is destitute of mstruments It cannot
produce an effect. This Sutra refutes it by saymg that this
objection has been answered aheady in II. i. 27-28^that
Erahman for which the scriptures alone are the somce of
Icnowledge and which is different from other thmgs is cap-
able, through mere volition, of producing these effects even
though without accessories. 'He sees without eyes. He hears
without ears, without hands and feet He hastens and grasps'
etc. (Sve. III. 19).
Topic 11 : Brahman's creation has no motive behind
except a sportive impulse
In the previous topic it has been shown that as Brahman
is endowed with aU powers It is capable of creating the world
through mere volition. A fresh objection is raised that It
cannot be the cause of the world as It has no need to create
a world, being self-sufficient.
32. (Brahman is) not (the creator of the world) because
(creation appears to have) a motive (behind).
There is some motive or purpose at the back of this
creation and the Lord has no purpose to gain by such
creation. Nobody engages himseff in any action without a
motive or purpose. This purpose can be twofold. It can be
either to satisfy one's own deshe or for the sake of others.
Brahman being seff-sufficient. It has nothing to gain for Itseff
2.1.34.]
Srl-Bhdsya 237
by the creation of this world. Neither can it be for the sake
of the individual souls, for m that case It would have created
a world fuh of happiness, out of pity for the souls, and not
tills world fuh of suffering for them. Therefore, as Brahman
-has no purpose whatsoever to achieve by this creation. It
cannot be the cause of the world.
33. But (Brahman's creative activity) is mere pastime,,
as is seen in tlie world.
Even as kmgs engage themselves m activity, like playing
with a bah, without any motive but for mere amusement, or
even jis children play out of fun, so also Brahman, without
any purpose to gain, engages Itseff in creating this world
of diversity as a mere pasthne.
An objection is raised against the view expressed in this
Sutra. The creation of a world in which there is so much
suffermg would subject Brahman to the charge of partiahty
and cruelty. So Brahman who is fuh of pity cannot be the
cause of this diabolical world even out of mere sport.
34. Partiality and cruelty cannot (be attributed to
Brahman) on account of Its taking into consideration (other
reasons in that matter), because (the scripture) declares (it
to be) so.
Some are born as men whhe others are born as gods ;
so the Lord is partial to some. He is cruel masmuch as He
creates a world fuU of sufferhig for the souls. The latter part'
of the Sutra refutes these objections and says that on account
238
Sn-Bhdsya
[ 2.1.34.
of the Lord's takmg mto consideration the past Karrna of
the various beings before creating them as gods, man, or
lower animals, partiahty cannot be attributed to Hhn. Souls
are born according to theh past Karma in different species.
So theh Karma accoimts for the difference in theh condhion
and not the Lord's partiality. Sruti also declares the same
thing : 'A man becomes good by good work, bad by bad
work' (Br. III. u. 13). The Lord is only the operative cause
in the creation of beings ; the main cause is the past Karma
of the beings. Just as rain helps different seeds to sprout,
each according to hs nature, so the Lord is the general
efficient cause in bringing the latent tendencies of each in-
dividual to fruition. Hence He is neither partial nor cruel.
35. If it be said (that is) not (possible) for want of
any distinction in work (before creation), (we say) no, be-
cause (tbe world) is beginningless; this is reasonable and is
also seen (from the scriptures).
Before creation there was Brahman alone and nothing
else existed ; there were no individual souls and so there
was no Karma to justify the inequality in creation. That
there were no souls before creation is declared by the
scriptmres : Tn the beginning, dear boy, there was this Being
alone, one only' etc. (Chd. VI. u. 1). The Siitra refutes
this and says, 'No'; for the souls and their Karma form
an eternal stream which is beginningless. Individual souls
axe not created but existed even before creation m a
very subtle condition almost non-distinguishable from
Brahman, and hence the scriptural texts which declare the
2.1.36. ]
Sn-Bhasya 239
non-existence of everything but Brahman before creation.
Wtmt the texts deny is the existence of beings in a gross
slate with name and form. But the souls did exist in a subtle
condition even before creation. This is reasonable also, for
otherwise souls would be punished for acts they did not
commit and go without punishment for wrong acts com-
mitted by them. That the souls are eternal is also declared
by the scriptures : 'All this was then unmanifest. It became
manifest only as name and form' (Br. I. iv. 7). As the text
talks of mere manifestation in gross form, the souls are
eternal and existed before creation also. 'He is the eternal
among the eternal' (Sve. VI. 13); 'This unborn, eternal,
everlastmg ancient One' etc. (Ka. I. ii. 18); 'The conscious
subject and the unconscious object, the master and the
dependent, are both unborn' (Sve. I. 9). Smrti also declares
the same : 'Know that Prakrti and Purusa are both begin-
ningless' (Gltd XIII. 19). Moreover, creation also is begin-
ningless, and when the scriptures talk of the begmning of
creation they mean only the beginning of a new cycle. This
is borne out by texts like, 'The Lord devised the sun and
the moon as before' (R.V. X. cxc. 3).
So partiality and cruelty cannot be attributed to the
Lord.
36. And because all attributes (requhed for the crea-
tion of the world) are possible (only in Brahman, It is the
cause of the world).
As ah attributes necessary for the creation of the world
which were denied in the Pradhana and atoms in Sutra II.
i. 29 are possible in Brahman, It is alone the cause of the
240
Sn-Bhdsya
[ 2.1.36.
world. As die powers of the Pradhana and atoms are limited
and as they are of the same nature as things seen in the
world, there are any number of objections against the pos-
sibility of their being the cause of the world. But as scrip-
tures alone are the source of knowledge with respect to
Brahman, It being quite different in nature from all things
experienced, and as scriptures declare that It possesses in-
finite powers and that It has no other motive than sport in
creation and arranges the diversity of creation in accordance
with the Karma of the souls. It alone can be the cause of
the world.
CHAPTER H
SECTION II
In the previous section, ah the objections that were raised
by others with regard to Brahman, which is different from
the world of matter and spmt, being the first Cause were
refuted. It was also estabhshed beyond doubt that Brahmarc
is the first Cause. Now in this section, views held by others;
with respect to the first Cause are refuted by raismg objec-
tions against them, and thereby the Vedantic view that
Brahman is the first Cause is stUl more firmly established.
In the first Topic, objections are raised agamst the
Samkhyan view, and it is shown that it is untenable.
Samkhya philosophy in brief
According to the Samkhyas, nothing can be produced
from nothing. In other words, all effects are latent in their
cause and are only manifested. So if infinhe regress is to be
- avoided, there must be an uncaused cause of aU things.
Moreover, certain characteristics seem to pervade the world
of matter, which shows that there must be an ultunate single
cause from which it is produced. This first Cause cannot be
the Brahman of the Vedantins, for It is free from all imper-
fections, while the world is characterized by pleasure, pain,
and delusion. The cause and effect must be of like nature.
A clay pot is produced from clay and not from gold, for
gold is of a different nature from the clay pot. So Brahman,
an intelhgent principle, cannot be the cause of the inanhnate
16
242 Srl-Bhdsya
[2.2.1.
world, for the shnple reason that spmt cannot produce
matter. Pleasure, pam, and delusion have for theh cause -
thhigs of hke nature, and they are the three GunasSattva,
Rajas, and Tamas. When the three Gunas are in a state of
equihbrium, that state is caUed Prakrti or Pradhana or
Avyakta. This Pradhana is the first Cause. The world of
diversity evolves from it when the equihbrium of the Gunas
is upset, and then gets involved in it again. It is eternal,
and has the potentiality to produce the effects through evo-
lution. When the equhibrium of the Gunas is upset, then ^
through various combmations of the Gunas the Pradhana
evolves mto Mahat, Ahariikara, Antahkarana, the five subtle
eleinents, the five gross elements, the five organs of percep-
tion, the five organs of actionaltogether twenty-four cate-
gories includmg the Pradhana or Prakrti. It niay, however,
be objected : How can this inert Pradhana evolve of its
own accord into this world order without the agency of an
inteUigent principle ? This objection cannot stand, for we
see in the world that milk produces curd of its own accord,
and likewise rain water turns mto various khids of saps and
fruit juices accordmg to the trees and climate without such
agency. So it is reasonable to say that the Pradhana also
evolves mto this world order of its own accord without the \
guidance or agency of an intelligent prmciple.
The Pradhana evolves into this world order for the
fulfilment of the ends of the soul, viz. Experience and
Liberation. The Purusa or the soul, the twenty-fifth cate-
gory of the Saihkhyas, is pure-conscioushess, eternal, in-
active, changeless, aU-pervading, and different in different
bodies. Due to the nearness of the Prakrti and the Punisa,
theh difference is not perceived by the soul, and the qual-
ities of the one are superunposed ori^ the other and vice
2.2.1,]
Srl-Bhdsya
243
versa ; and as a result, we have the hlusory experience, 'I
. am doing, eating, etc' This is the bondage of the soul, to
get mixed up with the Prakrti and to attribute to itseh the
activity of the latter. When the soul realizes the difference
between itseff and the Prakrti, it attains Liberation.
Topic 1 : Refutation of the Sdmkhyan theory of the
Pradhdna as the first Cause
^'tC'iHMMri^r HH*4W*^, 51|^r U ? U
1. And that which is inferred (viz. the Pradhana of
the Saihkhyas can) not (be the first Cause), because (it is)
not possible (for inert Pradhana) to create ; also on account
of (the impossibiUty of such) a tendency (to create).
In the world, we see that inert things like wood etc. are
not capable of producing chariots, palaces, etc. of theh own
accord, but only under the guidance of an inteUigent agent.
So also the inert Pradhana by itseff, without the guidance
of an inteUigent agent, cannot be the cause of this world of
manifoldness so weU designed. So the Pradhana cannot be
the first Cause. Moreover, the three Gunas, Sattva etc are
qualities of the substances, and they cannot be the cause of
effects, even as qualities like whiteness do not produce any
effects. They belong to the substances lUce the earth etc.
as thek attributes, and are not present m the effects as
substances, even as clay, gold, etc. are found in their effects.
Again, the tendency to create, i.e. the initial disturbance of
the equUibrium of the Gunas, which causes them to com-
bine in various ways, is not possible without the guidance
of an intelligent principle or agent. Therefore the Pradhana
cannot be the first Cause.
244 Srl-Bhdsya [ 2.2.2.
2. If it be said (tbat the Pradhana spontaneously
undergoes modification) like milk and water, (we say that)
even there (it is due to intelligence).
Tlie Samkhyas say that even as milk tiurns into curds
and rain water into various kmds of juices of their own
accord, without the agency of an intelligent principle, so
also can the Pradhana whose essential nature is to change
undergo modification of its own accord. The Sutra refutes
this view. Even there, i.e. in the cases cited above, namely,
the cases of milk and water, it is dhected by an inteUigent
being. Vide II. i. 24. Agam, texts lUce, 'He who inhabits
water, but is within it,. . .who controls water from within'
(Br. III. vh. 4) show that the Lord is behind everything,
directhig the material world.
3. And because (the Pradhana) is not dependent (on
anything), there would foUow the non-existence of what is
different (from creation, i.e. Pralaya).
As the Pradhana is not dependent on anything else,
creation wiU always go on, and there would be no state of
dissolution (Pralaya). So the Pradhana alone is not the
first Cause.
3Tai5rnTi^ JT g<iiTr?^?T^ \\ ^ n
4. And not like grass etc. because of its absence
elsewhere.
Even as the grass eaten by cows is spontaneously con-
2.2.5. ]
Srl-Bhdsya 245
verted into milk, so the Pradhana also undergoes sponta-
neous modification as the world order. This analogy itself of
the Sariikhyas is defective, for grass is changed into mhk
only when eaten by cows and not otherwise. It is not con-
verted into milk independent of them. So the conversion of
grass into mhk depends on the agency of an inteUigent
principle.
5. K it be said (tbat the Purusa can dhect the
Pradhana) even as a (crippled) person (can direct a blind
man, or a magnet (the iron filings), even then (the difficulty
cannot be surmounted).
It may be said that the Pradhana which is inert evolves
aud creates the world due to the mere nearness of the
Purusa, though it is inactive and pure-consciousness, even
ar. a blind man is led by a lame man near him, or as iron
filings are moved by a magnet. The second half of the Siitra
refutes this view. Even then the spontaneous activity of the
inert Pradhana cannot be accepted. The blind man, though
he is not able to see, is yet an mteUigent being and is able
to grasp the direction of the lame man who is able to see
and direct. But the Purusa, being ahogether inactive and
indifferent, cannot dkect the Pradhana ; nor is the latter,
being inert, able to grasp the dkection. So the analogy of
the blind and the lame does not hold good here. Agam, the
magnet has the property of attracting iron filings. But the
Purusa being inactive and indifferent, no change whatso-
ever is possible in it. So the mere nearness of the Purusa
does not explain the evolution of the Pradhana. Moreover,
the Purusa being always near the Pradhana, and as both
246 Sn-Bhdsya
[ 2.2.5.
are all-pervading, creation would be eternal and Liberation
would be impossible. If, on the other hand, the soul is
eternally free, then there can be no bondage and release
for it.
3T%T^f ^ r u ^ u
6. And because tbe relation of principal (and subordi-
nate) is impossible (among the Gunas, the Pradhana can-
not be active).
Creation results from a certam relation of the Gunas
as prmcipal and subordinate, which means the relative super-
iority of one or other of the Gunas over the other two.
Before creation, however, the three Gunas are in a state
of equilibrium, none being superior to the rest. Hence crea-
tion would be impossible. If it be asserted that even in
Pralaya there is inequality, it would mean that creation is
eternal.
STPJFTRfilrft fRI%r^#TTrT^ W \3 W
7. Even if it (the Pradhana) be inferred otherwise,
owing to tbe absence of the power of intelligence (the
objections mentioned would remain).
Even if the Pradhana be inferred by some other reason-
ing, different from what has been refuted, yet the result
would be the same ; for the Pradhana being inert, our
objection would remain. Therefore the Pradhana cannot be
established by any kind of inference.
8. Even if it be admitted (that the Pradhana can be
established through inference) (yet the Samkhyan theory
2.2.9. ]
Sn-Bhdsya 247
cannot be accepted), because of tbe absence of any pur-
pose.
Even admitting that the Pradhana can be established
through inference, yet because of the absence of any purpose
to be served by it, it (Pradhana) should not be inferred.
According to the Samkhyas, Prakrti serves the ends of the
soul, viz. Experience and Liberation. But the Purusa which
is pure consciousness, alone, inactive, eternal, and change-
less is aheady free. Its bondage due to superhnposition of
their qualities on each other is not possible, nor, therefore.
Liberation through discrhnmation between the two. If it be
said that its enjoyment of pleasme and pain, the modifica-
tions of Prakrti, results from the mere nearness of Prakrti
then, as both the soul and Prakrti are eternal and all-
pervading, they will eternally be near each other and there
would be no Liberation.
9. And on account of contradictions (the Samkhyan
theory) is untenable.
The Sariikhyan theory is fuh of contradictions and so
is untenable. They say that Prakrti is for the enjoyment of
another, and the Purusa is the seer, the enjoyer, and the
agent. As Prakrti serves the ends of the soul, it has a pur-
pose. Nature evolves, and the soul undergoes experience
and is released. Again, they say the soul is only pure con-
sciousness, eternal, and changeless, not a seer, enjoyer, or
agent. Therefore the soul is neither bound nor exerts for
release, nor is released. Due to the proximity of the soul,
Prakrti which is inert superimposes the quality of con-
sciousness on itself and hs agency on the soul and gets
24 Srl-Bhdsya
[ 2.2.9.
bound, exerts for freedom, and is released. These two
views are quite contradictory. There are also many more '
contradictions, and therefore the Samkhyan view which
declares the Pradhana as the first Cause is quite untenable.
Topic 2 : Refutation of the atomic theory of the
Vaisesikas
According to the Vaisesikas, the ultimate condition
of the world is atomic and ah things are but aggregates of
the different kinds of atoms. The atom is invisible and
incapable of division into parts. If it is endlessly divisible
into parts, then aU things would be products of an equaUy
endless number of parts and the difference between a
mustard and a mountain would remain unexplained. The
atoms are spherical and infinitesimal. Two such atoms
produce a dyad which is minute and short. This is also
invisible. Three dyads form a triad and four dyads form
a tetrad. The triads and tetrads are visible and have dhnen-
sions and are great and long. In the state of dissolution
(pralaya), the world exists in the atomic state. At the
beginning of creation, the atoms are set in motion by adrsta,
the unseen principle, and the atoms combine to form dyads,
and dyads combine to form triads, tetrads, etc. ; and in this
way, the gross elements are created from different kinds of
atoms and the world order is evolved. This view is refuted .
in this topic.
10. And (even as the view of the Vaisesilcas that) the
big and long (are produced) from the short and the atomic
,2.2,11.]
Sn-Bhdsya 249
(is untenable) (so are all their views quite untenable).
If the atoms are infinitesunal, that is, without parts,
they fin no space, and so any number combining together
wih not differ in extension from a single atom. So the
production of dyads, triads, tetrads, etc, is unpossible. If,
on the other hand, it be admitted that atoms have parts,
then these parts wiU be divisible into parts and so on ad
infinitum. Therefore the Vaisesika theory that creation
takes place through the combination of atoms is untenable.
So are ah other views held by them, as wUl be explained
in the foUowing Sutras.
11. In either case (viz. adrsta, the unseen principle,
inhering either in the atoms or the soul) the activity (of the
atoms) is not (possible); therefore (there would be) the
negation of that (viz. the creation of the world).
Accordmg to the Vaisesikas, creation begins when the
atoms are set in motion by the adrsta, the unseen principle,
i.e. the result of the good and evil deeds of the souls. Where-
in does the adrsta reside ? Does it inhere in the atoms or
the souls ? In either case, adrsta of the souls being a con-
tinuous stream, the atoms would constantly produce the
world ; and theh occasional activity and rest at the tune of
creation and pralaya cannot be explained. Therefore the
combination of atoms through activity is impossible. Again,
it is not possible to explain how the adrsta of the manifold
actions performed at different times by the muhitude of souls
could aU mature at one particular time to give rise to a new
creation. Nor can you say that the activity of the atoms is
due to the wiU of the Lord, for through inference yoii can-
250
Sn-Bhasya
[ 2.2.11.
not establish the existence of a Lord. Hence there can be no
combination of atoms. So their theory that the woirld is
created by the combination atoms is untenable.
12. And because (the Vaisesikas) accept samayaya
(as one of the categories), there results regressus. ad
infinitum on account of equahty.
The Vaisesikas recognize samavdya or the inseparable
inherence as one of the categories. It is requhed to establish
the inseparable relation between qualities and substance or
jdti (class) and individuals. But the samavdya also, being
like jati or quahties, requhes something else to prove the
fact of its being inseparably connected with the things it
connects ; and that thing, again, requhes another thing to
explam it, and so on ad infinitum. Nor can it be said that
the inseparable connection is the essential nature of sama-
vdya, so that no further reason is necessary for its insepar-
able cotmection. For in that case, on similar reasoning, it
could as weU be said that jdti and quahties etc. are also of
like nature, and that would make samavdya unnecessary.
13. And because (the world also) would be eternal
(on account of samavaya being eternal).
According to the Vaisesikas, samavdya is eternal. So
the parts and the whole which it connects would also be
eternal. For it a relation be eternal, that to which the
relation belongs would also be eternal. That would mean
that the world is eternal, which is not acceptable to any.
2.2.1^.]
Sri-Bhdsya 251
14. And on account of the (the atoms) possessing
colour etc. the opposite (of what the Vaisesikas hold-would
be true), because it is seen.
The atoms are said to have colour etc. by the Vaisesikas.
fp. that case, the atoms would cease to be atomic and eternal.
For whatever possesses colour etc. is found to be gross and
impermanent, as compared with its cause. So the atoms
which have colour etc. would.be gross and impermanent,
and this would contradict their view that the atoms are
minute and permanent.
15. And as there are objections in either case (the
atomic theory is untenable).
If, on the other hand, it be assumed that the atoms have
no colour and other sensible qualities, then you cannot
account for the colour etc. of the effects, viz. the earth etc.
In either case, therefore, whether they have colour etc. or
not, the atomic theory is untenable.
16. And because (tbe atomic theory) is not accepted
(even in part by the followers of the Vedas), it is to be
completely rejected.
Though the Kapha doctrine is in conflict with Sruti and
reason, yet the foUowers of the Vedas accept some parts of
252 Sn-Bhdsya
[ 2.2.16.
it like the Satkaryavada. But of the Vaisesikas no part is
acceptable to them, and hence h is to be completely rejected
by those who aspire after hberation.
Topic 3 : Refutation of the Buddhist realists
There are four principal schools of Buddhism : (1) The
Vaibhasikas who accept the reahty of both the outside and
inside worlds, consisting respectively of the elements and
theh products and mind and things mental. They hold that
aU these are directly perceived and also inferred. (2) The
Sautrantikas who hold that, though the outside world and
inside world are real, yet they can be merely inferred from
ideas, and are not directly perceived. (3) The idealists,
Vijhanavadms, or Yogacaras who maintahi that thought
alone is real and there is no corresponding real object out-
sidethat the outside objects are mere shadows, like objects
seen in a dream. AU the three schools hold that everything
is only momentary, and they do not accept any further entity
like ether or soul. (4) Finally, there are the nihUists, &\xa-
yavadins, or Madhyamikas who maintain that everything
is void and unreal.
This topic refutes the view of the realists, viz. the hrst
two schools mentioned above, who hold that the external
world is real. According to them, the atoms of earth, water,
fire, and air combine to form the aggregates, the elements,
viz. earth, fire, etc. Out of the elements, the aggregates, viz.
the body, the sense-organs, and other objects, are produced.
The series of ideas which give rise to the notion of 'V
residmg inside the body is what is called the self. On these,
according to them, depends the entire empiric world.
2.2.17.J
Srl-Bhdsya
253
17. Even if tlie aggregate (the world) proceeds from
its two causes (viz. the atoms and the elements), there would
result the non-formation of that (aggregate).
Neither of the aggregates mentioned above, viz. the aggre-
gate of elements and the aggregate consisting of bodies etc..
with their twofold causes can produce the aggregate of the
world, for, according to the Bauddhas, everythmg is moment-
ary ; so the atoms and the elements are ah momentary. These
causes, which have a momentary existence, carmot produce
the world. Fhst, there is the activity of the atoms, then the
connection of the atoms with others, and then the formation
of the aggregates. But, then, as the atoms are momentary,
when their activity begins, and before they get connected
with other atoms, they cease to exist. So how could the}'
combine ? SimUar is the case of the elements also. They
cannot combine to produce material things. Such aggregation,
is possible orUy i things last for more than a moment. Again,
as the objects are momentary, they cease to exist when they
come in contact with the sense-organs, and do not exist
when the cognition originates. So cognition itseh is impos-
sible. Further, as the self also is momentary, it ceases to exist
by the tune the sense-organs come in contact with the objects,
and so it cannot cognize objects. If what is contacted by
one self produces cognkion in another, then what comes
in touch with the senses of A could be cognized by B. But
that is not seen in the world. Moreover, since the objects
cognized have a momentary existence, they cease to exist
by the time they are cognized, and so no deske or aversion
can arise with respect to them.
Due to aU these absurdities, the view of the Bauddhas;
is untenable.
254. Srl-Bhdsya
[2.2.18.
18. If it be said (that the formation of the aggregates
is possible) because of tbe successive causality (of nescience
etc. in tbe Bauddha series), we say, no, on account of their
not being the cause of tbe aggregation.
The Bauddhas may say that through the successive
causality of the members of fhe series, nescience (avidyd)
etc. aU this can be explained. The series is as foUows : Ne-
science (avidya) is that knowledge which is difEerent from
the real one, in other words, iUusory knowledge. It creates
the notion of permanency in impermanent thmgs ; this gives
rise to desire and aversion which is grouped as samskdra ;
from this is produced viindna (seh-consciousness), the kmdl-
ing of the mind ; from that, name, i.e. the mind and things
mental, and the earth etc. having colour etc. ; from that, the
abode of the six or the six sense-organs ; from that, the body
caUed touch (sparsa); from that, vedand or sensation and
so on ; from these, agam avidyd and the whole series. These
constitute an uninterrupted chahi of cause and efEect, re-
volving unceasingly, and this cannot take place without those
aggregates of elements and elemental things caUed earth
and so on. So the formation of the aggregates is proved.
The second half of the Sutra refutes this view and says
that the formation of the aggregates is not possible. Nescience
etc. cannot be the cause of the aggregation of the moment-
ary atoms. Though nescience produces the notion of per-
manency in momentary things, yet they do not reaUy become
permanent because of it. It does not, in reality, produce
permanent thmgs. Otherwise, the Ulusory knowledge of sUver
m sheU could produce real sUver. Therefore aggregation is
22.20.]
Srl-Bhdsya 255
not possible. Moreover, as the cognizer, in whom the idea
ol permanency in momentary things is produced, ceases to
exist the very next moment, in whom can desire, aversion,
etc-, drise ? Therefore the series itself is not possible. With-
out a permanent entity, the contmuance of the samskdras
cannot be explamed.
19. And on account of the cessation of the previous
one at the time of the origination of the subsequent one
(the former cannot be tbe cause of tbe subsequent tiling).
When, for example, the pot of the subsequent moment
comes into existence, the pot of the previous moment has
ceased to exist, and so cannot be the cause of the subse-
quent pot. If we, then, accept that non-existence is the cause,
it being the same with respect to aU things, then anythmg
might originate at any tune and place. Hence aggregation
is not possible on the view of the momentary existence of
aU things. Further, as the thing which comes m contact
with the sense-organs ceases to exist when the idea origi-
nates, cogmtion of any object would be impossible.
m'k arrRThdsft aftwrtpw u R O W
20. If non-existence (of cause) be assumed, (there win
result) contradiction of their (Bauddhas') proposition.
Otherwise (there would result) sunultaneity.
If h be said that an effect may be produced even with-
out a cause, then, apart from the difficulty aheady shown,
viz. that anything might origmate at any tune anywhere, the
Bauddhas would contradict theh own proposition. They
256 Sn-Bhdsya
[ 2.2.20.
recognize four causes which bring about the origination of
a cognition, viz. the adhipati cause, viz. sense-organs ; the
sahakdri cause, like light etc. ; the dlambana cause, viz. the
object; and finaUy, the samanantara cause, or the knowledge
of the immediate preceding moment. If, to avoid this diffi-
culty, they say that the previous jar exists when the next
jar is produced, then the two jars would be perceived sunul-
taneously, but such a thmg is not experienced. Moreover,,
it wotUd falsify the momentariness of the pots. If moment-
ariness is stiU adhered to, then it would mean that the
contact of the sense-organs with the object and cognhion
are shntUtaneous.
The next Sutra shows that it is not possible to establish
what the Bauddhas hold, viz. the absolute destruction of a
thing which is (sat).
21. Both gross (pratisaihkhya) and subtle (apratisarii-
kbya) destruction would be impossible, owing to non-
interruption.
The Bauddhas mamtain that destruction is of two kinds,
viz. the gross (pratisamkhyd) destruction which is perceived
by the senses, as when a pot is broken by a stick ; and subtle
(apratisamkhyd) destruction, not perceived by the senses,
occurring in a series of similar momentary existences at
every moment. These two cannot be possible. It has been
shown in II. i. 15 that absolute destruction of any substance
that exists is impossible ; that origination and destruction
only mean a change of state of the substance which con-
tinues to exist in the new condition, and that the effect is
uon-different from the cause. The clay taking the shape of
2.2.23. ]
Sn-Bhdsya 257
the pot is the origmation of the pot, and the clay's attaining
' the state of shreds is what is caUed the destruction of the
pot. The substance is never destroyed absolutely. As origi-
nation and destruction are by the change of states, there is
no need to imagine absolute destruction. The case of a
flame blown out may be cited as a case of absolute destruc-
tion. There, too, reason would teh that it exists in a subtle
form, not perceived by the senses.
22. And m either case (viz. origination from nonentity
or a thing becoming nonentity on destruction) because of
the objections (that arise, the Bauddha position is
untenable).
If a thing that has originated suffers absolute destruc-
tion, i.e. passes into nothingness on destruction, or if a
thing originates from nothingness, in either case, there arise
objections, and so they are not acceptable. If an originated
thing becomes a nonentity on destruction, then, according
to the view of momentariness, the world would be destroyed
after a moment and become a nonentity. The subsequent
world that has come out of nothingness would be a non-
entity also. But the Bauddhas do not accept that the world
is a nonentity or umeal. So origination from nothingness or
passing away into nothingness on destruction, both are
equally untenable.
23. The case of akasa also not being diiferent (from
earth etc. it also cannot be a non-entity).
17
258 Sn-Bhdsya [ 2.2.23.
Akdsa cannot be a mere nonentity, for like earth etc.
which are proved to be positive things, it also is proved to be
likewise by knowledge which is not sublated later. That
akdsa is experienced is proved by statements like, 'There a
bird flies'.
24. And on account of recognition.
The momentariness of objects as declared by the Baud-
dhas is also not tenable. We have the experience of the
kind, 'This is that jar'. The identity of a thing seen before
and a thing experienced at the present moment by the same
person, existing at the time of the first experience and the
present one, is caUed recognition. Unless there is the identity
of the thmg perceived and the identity of the perceiver,
such a recognition is not possible. This contradicts the doc-
trine of momentariness, which therefore is untenable. It
cannot be said that recognition is due to the shnharity of
the successive momentary jars, as m the case of a flame.
In the case of a flarne, there is valid means of knowledge
through inference that there is a real succession of shnflar
flames, but not in the case of the jar. Moreover, who is to
realize the shnharity of the two jars existing at different
times ? For the Bauddhas do not admit the existence of the
same knower, as he, too, has a momentary existence.
25. Not from non-existence, because this is not seen.
The Sutra refutes an objection raised by the Sautranti-
kas, who hold that, though outside objects are real, they are
2.2.26.]
Sn-Bhasya 259
not known through dhect perception, but through inferential
knowledge. It was shown earlier that the cognition of objects
is not possible on the theory of momentariness, for the
object which comes in contact with the senses ceases to
exist when the cogmtion origmates. The Sautrantikas say
that the existence of the object up to the time of the cogni-
tion is not necessary, for before it perishes, a thing imparts
its forms etc. to the cognition, and from that the object is
inferred. The Sutra refutes this argument and says that it is
never experienced that an object, when it perishes, passes
over hs attributes to another. So the Sautrantikas' position
that, when the object perishes, it imprints its form etc. on
the cognition cannot be accepted. Cognition is possible only
if the thing persists at the tune of the cognition.
26. And thus (there would result) the attamment ol
the goal by the effortless.
This Sutra refutes both the Vaibhasikas and Sautranti-
kas. If everythmg is momentary, the effortless would attain
all their ends here and hereafter, for the person who puts
forth effort perishes that very moment, and the benefits are
reaped by another who comes after him.
For aU these reasons shown above, the doctrines held
by these two schools of Bauddhas are untenable.
Topic 4-. Refutation of the Bauddha idealists
According to the Bauddha idealists, the Vijiianavadins
or Yogacaras as they are cahed, the external world is non-
existent. They argue as foUows : Granting that external
260 Srl-Bhdsya
[ 2.2.26.
objects are real, they are illumined only by the light of
knowledge. Without the light of knowledge, there is no
proof of their existence. Again, knowledge by itself does not
sjjine forth, but only in the form of some object. Hence we
use the terms like, 'I know the pot', 'I know the cloth', etc.
Therefore knowledge or an idea has a form similar to that
of the object illumined, viz. the pot, the cloth, etc. As we
are always conscious of the object and the idea together,
they are identical. If they were different, we would have
cognized them as such. But we are conscious of only one
such form, viz. that of the idea or cognition. The reality
therefore is only the idea, which due to error appears as
something external. The variety of ideas or notions is not
due to the variety of external objects, but is accounted for
by the preceding vdsanas or mental impressions left by pre-
vious experience, even as the impressions of the waking
state give rise to the variety of experience in the dream
state. All this is sufficient for rendering possible practical
thought and intercourse, and therefore to assume the exist-
ence of external objects would be superfluous and unjustified.
So ideas alone are real and external things do not exist.
27. Non-existence (of things external) is not (trae),
on account of their being experienced.
This Sutra refutes their idea. In the experience T know
the pot', we are conscious of the object, the knowledge, and
the knower. The knowledge of the object and the knower is
not sublated later. So the view which denies the reality of
the two viz. the object and the knower, and upholds the
reality of the knowledge only cannot be accepted. If direct
2,2.28.]
Srl-Bhdsya 261
perception is proof of the existence of the idea, then the
* reahty of the other twothe object and the knowerwhich
also are perceived through dhect perception, has perforce
to be accepted. Again, the knowledge 'I know the pot' arises
only after the contact of the object with the sense-organs
and not otherwise. Therefore first there is the contact of
the object with the senses, and then we have the cognition
of the object, say, the pot. So, how can the pot, which exists
before the cognition, be a mere projection of the knowledge
that arises later ? Hence the pot is not a mere idea, but
somethmg different from it. Agam, the Bauddhas say that
the idea and the object always appear together and as such
they are identical, and therefore the idea alone is real and
not the object. It is only two real things that can appear
together. A real and an umeal thing cannot appear together.
Therefore theh appearing together only estabhshes theh
difference and not identity. So theh appearing together
shows that the external object is real, which goes counter
to the Bauddhas' view. The special character of a cognition
is that it produces the idea in persons with respect to certain
objects. The relation between the cognition and the object
is of the nature of samyoga or connection, as knowledge
- also is an object. The Bauddhas' view that the variety of
notions is due to vasanas cannot stand. How can vasanas
be handed down by cognitions which are momentary ? How
can the earher cognition which is destroyed absolutely that
moment effect the later one which has not yet arisen?
Therefore we have to conclude that the variety of notions
is due to the variety of real external things.
^sTPCff^ ?T i^gsnT^gfcT^ WR ^ w
28. And owing to the difference of nature (in con-
262
Srl-Bhdsya
[ 2.2.28.
sciousness between the waking state and the dream state,
the experience of the waking state) is not like dreams etc.
There is a difference in the contents of the cognitions
of the dream state and the waking state. Cognitions in the
dream state are due to impaired organs, and they are sub-
lated when the person awakes. But the knowledge of objects
in the waking state is not sublated. It is not of the same
nature as of the dream state, and so cannot be said to have
no real objects. If, however, the Bauddhas insist on holding
this view, then their inferential cognition also will be with-
out any real content. If it has, then they have to accept that
all cognitions have a real content, for aU of them are alike
cognitions.
29. The existence (of mere knowledge) is not (possi-
ble), because (it is) not experienced.
Mere cognition devoid of objects is not possible, because
it is not experienced anywhere. Cognitions are always in-
herent in a person, and refer to particular objects. That
even the cognition of the dream state have real objects for
the time being will be shown later on. If the object of a
cognition which is not sublated be held as unreal, then the
inevitable conclusion would be that the mere knowledge also
is unreal.
For all these reasons, the view of the Bauddha ideaUsts
is untenable.
Topic 5 : Refutation of the Bauddha nihilists
The Madhyamikas or the Bauddha nihilists argue like
this : It is only when origination is proved that there is
2.2.30. ]
Srl-Bhdsya 263
room for discussing whether the cause is the Pradhana or
the atoms or the Brahman. But origination itseh cannot be
proved. If there is origination, is it from existence or non-
existence ? It cannot be from existence, for a pot originates
only after the clay limip is destroyed. So also aU effects
come into existence only on the destruction of the cause.
Destruction means ceasmg to exist, and that is non-existence.
Therefore it is not correct to say that origination is from exist-
ence. Nor can it be said that it is from non-existence, as exist-
ence cannot originate from non-existence. Therefore it is diffi-
cult to establish origination itseff, and, consequently, all the
changes that foKow origination are also not real, and the
behaviour of men is ah due to error. Therefore the Void
alone is the ultunate Reality, and final release means passmg
into non-being. The next Sutra refutes this and says that
the Void declared by the Bauddhas cannot be proved.
30, And (as nihilism) is illogical in everyway (h
cannot be accepted).
The terms existence (sat) and non-existence (asat) and
the ideas expressed by them are used with respect to the
state of actually existing things. If by 'everything is a Void'
is meant theh non-existence, then it would indhectly be
estabhshing theh existence in a different state, for non-
existence of a thing that is means only its existence in a
different state, as for example, when a lump of clay is said
to be non-existing, it only means that the clay exists in the
form of the pot. This has been fully explained in II. i. 14.
Moreover, those who uphold the Void must have come to
know it through some means of knowledge, and they have
264
Srl-Bhdsya
[ 2.2.30.
to acknowledge the reality of that; and this would go counter
to their idea of the Void. If the means of knowledge is un-
real, then they cannot for want of proof establish the Void.
Consequently, the view of the nihilists cannot stand.
Topic 6 : Refutation of the Jainas
The Jainas acknowledge six categories, which can be
divided into two groups, the soul and the non-soul. They
do not accept a God. The six categories are : jlvas (souls);
dharma (merit), which causes the motion of all things mov-
ing ; adharma (demerit), which causes stationarmess ; pud-
gala (body), which possesses colour, smell, etc. namely,
the atoms, the elements, and things elemental; kola {time),
which is atomic and gives rise to the ideas of past, present,
and future; and finally akdsa (space), which is one and
infinite in extension. Soul is that which has knowledge,
sight, pleasure, etc. Non-soul is the aggregate of thmgs en-
joyed by the soul. They further hold that all things are real
and unreal, permanent and non-permanent, separate and
non-separate.
^ %T?l 5Fn:*raicl^ \ \ \ \ \ \
31. On account of the impossibility (of contrary
attributes) in one and the same thing (the Jaina doctrine
is) not (tenable).
The view of the Jainas cannot be accepted, as it is
absurd to think of the same thing as endowed with contra-
dictory attributes. A thing cannot be both existing and non-
existing at the same time. Similarly, it cannot be both per-
manent and non-permanent and so on.
2.2.34. ]
Srl-Bhdsya 265
32. And in the same way (there would arise) the non-
universality of the soul.
The Jainas say that the soul is of the size of the body.
If so, when a soul abiding in the body of an elephant is
reborn in the next life as an ant, the soul will not have
sufficient space in an ant body. Vice versa, a soul of an ant
born as an elephant will not be able to fill up the body. It
may be said that the soul is capable of contraction and ex-
pansion, according to the size of its body. This view is
refuted in the next Siitra.
33. Nor (can) consistency (be gained) even (if the
soul is assumed to dilate and contract) in turn (to suit the
size of different bodies), on account of the change etc. (of
the soul in that case).
Even if we say that the soul assumes a different condi-
tion through expansion and contraction, yet we wiU not get
ever the inconsistency. For the soul would then be subject
to change with all its concomitant imperfections like im-
permanence etc. and hence will not be in anyway superior
to material things Hke pots etc.
34. And because of the permanency (of the size of
the soul) at the end (i.e. on release), and as the two (the
soul and its size on release) are eternal, tbere is' no
difference (as to the size of the soul before, i.e. in the state
of bondage).
266 Srl-Bhdsya
[2.2.34.
The size of the soul in the state of release is permanent,
as it has not to take another body, and because the soul and
its size on release are both eternal, its size on release is its
natural size, and so it cannot be different in the state of
bondage also. Hence the view of the Jainas that the soul is
of the size of the body is untenable.
Topic 7 : Refutation of the Pdsupatas
The Pasupatas accept an isvara, whose existence they
establish through inference. They do not depend on the
authority of the Vedas for it. Again, from ordinary experi-
ence, we find that the efficient cause and the material cause
are different. The potter uses the clay to produce a pot.
Basing thek arguments on this experience, the Pasupatas
hold that the isvara is only the efficient cause of the world
and that the material cause is the Pradhana. He, like the
potter, uses the Pradhana to create the world.
35. The system of the Pasupatas (should be discarded)
ou account of the inconsistency (of their doctrine).
The view held by the Pasupatas, the followers of Pasu-
pati, is contrary to the teachings of the Vedas. The Upani-
sads declare clearly that the ultimate Reality, the supreme
Person, can be known only through the^Vedanta texts and
not through any other means of knowledge. T ask you of
^ that supreme Person taught by the Upanisads' etc. (Br. III.
ix. 26). Again, the Vedanta texts declare that this supreme
Person is both the efficient and the material cause of the
world, 'He desired, "Let me be many, let me be born"....
2.2.36. ]
Srl-Bhasya 267
He created all this that exists' etc. (Tai. II. 6); 'That Being
wiUed, "May I become many, may I grow forth", It created
fire' etc. (Chd. VI. h. 3). They also declare that the reah-
zation of this supreme Person alone is the way to final
release. 'I have realized that great Being. On realizing Hhn
alone, one passes beyond death. There is no other way out
from this cycle of birth and death' (Sve. III. 8). The view
held by the Pasupatas goes against these teachings of the
Vedas. Moreover, they prescribe various rituals, meditations,
and rules of conduct which are at variance with the Vedic
teachings. Therefore theh system has to be discarded by
those who aspire after liberation.
36. And on account of the rulership (of the Lord)
being impossible.
The Pasupatas infer the existence of the Lord and say
that He directs the Pradhana and creates the world, even
as the potter directs the clay to produce the pot. The potter,
however, is able to direct the clay, because he has a body
with Ihnbs. It is only such an agent that can direct external
material. But as the Lord has no body with limbs. He can-
not direct the Pradhana. If, to avoid this difficulty, we
assiune He has a body with Ihnbs, we wih be landed in diffi-
culties, whether we regard that body as eternal or non-eternal.
If the body is eternal, it would mean that something with parts
is eternal. Again, if it be non-eternal, then there will be no
cause of the body, for the Lord without a body could not
have created it. Nor can we say that the Lord gets embodied
by means of some other body, for that would lead to a
regressus ad infinitum.
268 Srl-Bhdsya
[2.2.37.
37. K it be said (that the Lord rules the Pradhana
etc. even as the jiva rules) the body and the senses (the
instruments of enjoyment), (we say) no, because of the
enjoyment etc.
It may be said that the Lord rules the Pradhana even
as the jlva, though without a body, rules the body and the
senses through which it enjoys. This view cannot stand, for
the rulership of the jlva is due to adrsta, the result of the
good and bad deeds performed by it, and is for the sake of
enjoyment of pleasure and pain, the fruition of those works.
So if the Lord rules the Pradhana, He too will be subject to
adrsta, and as a result enjoy pleasure and pain. Such a Lord
cannot be the ruler. The Pasupatas also do not accept this
position.
38. (If the Lord be subject to adrsta) He will be sub-
ject to (creation and) dissolution and will not be omniscient.
The Pasupata view is therefore inconsistent, and so
should be discarded by all who aspire after liberation.
Topic 8 : The Authoritativeness of the Pdncardtra system
In the last section, it was shown that the Pasupata
system was not in accordance with the Vedic teaching, and
so it was to be rejected. Lest a doubt should arise that, for
the same reasons, the Paficaratra system also is unaccept-
able, this section is begun to remove such a doubt and to
2.2.40. ]
Sn-Bhasya 269
establish the authoritativeness of this system. In the first
two Sutras, the view of the opponent is given, and in the
next two Sutras, that viev/ is refuted.
39. The origination (of the individual soul from the
Lord) being impossible (the Paiicaratra system is un-
tenable).
Though the Pancaratra system, like the Vedanta recog-
nizes that the Lord is both the efiicient and the material
cause of the world, yet it propounds certain other views
v/hich are objectionable. According to it, Vasudeva is the
supreme Person. From Vasudeva is born Samkarsana, the
jiva ; from jiva, Pradyumna, the mind ; from mind, Anirud-
dha, the ego. These are the foiufold forms (vyuhas) of
Lord Vasudeva. The origination of the jiva is against Vedic
teachings. So the system is untenable. Again, Sandilya is
said to have promulgated the Paiicaratra system, as he
found that the teachings of the Vedas could not help man
to attain the goal. This disparaging statement about the
Vedas shows that this system is opposed to the Vedas.
40. Nor (is it seen that) the instrument (is produced)
from the agent.
As an instrument, like the axe, is not seen to be produced
from the agent, the woodcutter, the Bhagavata doctrine that
from the jiva is produced the mind cannot be accepted.
Moreover, it is against the teachings of the Sruti, which
clearly declares that the mind and everything else originate
270 Srl-Bhasya [ 2.2.40.
from Brahman. 'From Him originates the vital force as well
as the mind, all these senses' etc. ( MM. II. i. 3).
41. Or if they (the four vyuhas) are of the nature of
that which is intelligence etc. there is no contradication to
that.
The 'or' refutes the view expressed by the previous two
Sutras.
Saihkarsana and others are also of the nature of intel-
ligence, i.e. Brahman. According to the text 'Though un-
born, yet He is born in various forms' (Purusa-sukta), He
assumes of His own accord these four vyzl/ia-forms for the
good of the devotees. So there is no ground to declare that
tliis system is unauthoritative. Samkarsana and others are
called jlva etc. because they are the presiding deities over
the jlvas, the mind, and the ego, and hence the nomencla-
tures are appropriate, even as Brahman is declared as Akasa,
Prana, etc.
42. And on account of denial (of the birth of the
jiva).
This system, moreover, clearly denies the origination of
the jlva. 'The connection between Prakrti and the self is of
an inseparable nature ; that self is known to be without
beginning or end.' So it cannot be said to be unauthoritative.
As regards Sandilya's statement quoted in Siitra 39, it is a
statement like Narada's in Chd. VII. i. 2-3, where he says
tliat though he had gone through all the Vedas, Itihasa-
2.2A2. ]
Srl-Bhdsya 271
Puranas, etc. yet he is in a state of grief. Such a statement
is not meant to disparage the Vedas, but meant only to
praise the bhumdvidya that Sanatlcumara teaches later.
Similarly, SandUya's statement is not meant to say that the
Paiicaratra system is opposed to the Vedas, but is meant to
praise the system which gives in a clear and succinct manner
the teachings of the Vedas, and which can be easily grasped
by even the dull-witted. Moreover, Vyasa in the Mahdbha-
rata praises this system and says that it is consistent with
the Vedas and beneficial to man. 'Fully agreeing with the
Rk, the Yajus, the Sdman, and the Atharvan, the doctrme
will be truly authoritative.' So the same Vyasa could not
have maintained in the Brahma-Sutras the non-authorita-
tiveness of this system. The reference to the origination of
the mind from the jiva is like the Vedic statement, 'That
fire willed... . It created water' {Chd. VI. ii. 3), which
means that the Lord Himseh, so far as embodied in fire,
creates water {Vide B.S. II. hi. 14). Similarly, the Paiica-
ratra doctrine also has to be understood when it says that
the mind originates from Vasudeva.
CHAPTER II
SECTION in
In the first chapter, it was shown that aU the Vedantic
texts dealing with creation refer to Brahman as the first
Cause. In the first section of this second chapter, it was
shown that this view, viz. that Brahman is the first Cause,
is free from all defects, and aU objections raised against it
were refuted. In the last section, it was shown that Saiiikh-
yan and other non-Vedantic systems, which uphold Pradhana
etc. as the first Cause, are untenable, because they are based
on fallacious arguments and are self-contradictory. Thereby,
the fact that Brahman is the first Cause was firmly esta-
blished.
An objection may be raised that, as there are contra-
dictions among Sruti texts dealing with creation, the doctrine
tliat upholds Brahman as the first Cause is also untenable. To
clear that objection by harmonizing the apparent contradic-
tions in the scriptural texts, the next two sections are begun.
In every topic, the opponent's view is given first and then
refuted.
Topic 1 : Ether is not eternal, but created
1. Akasa (is) not (created), (as it is) not so stated by
the gruti.
In the Chdndogya Upanisad, where the order of creation
is given, the text says, 'It thought, "May I be many, may
2.3.3. ]
Srl-Bhdsya
273
I grow forth". It sent forth fire' (VI. ii. 3). Here akdsa is
not mentioned, but fire is mentioned as the first product of
Brahman. Moreover, hke the Self, akdsa also, which is
without parts and all-pervading cannot be created. The
Sruti cannot declare what is impossible. So the texts deal-
ing with the creation of akasa have to be interpreted in a
secondary sense.
3T%C g W R W
2. But there is (a Sruti text which states that akasa
is created).
The objection raised in the last Siitra is refuted in this.
In the Taittiriya Upanisad, we have a text which declares
that akdsa is created, 'From that Self (Brahman) sprang
akdsa' etc. (II. 1). In matters dealing with supersensuous
things, the authority of the Sruti is absolute, and arguments
based on inference etc. cannot be put forward to refute it.
So the argument that dkSsa cannot be created, because it
has no parts, has no force as agamst the Sruti text which
declares that it is created. Nor is its creation an impossibUity
like the statement 'Sprinkle it with fire'. In the case of the
Self also, it is not created, not because it has no parts, but
because the scriptures categorically declare that it is not
created, 'It is not bom, nor does it die', etc. (Ka. I. u. 18).
3. (The Sruti text dealing with the origin of aka^a)
is to be taken in a secondary sense, on account of the im-
possibility (cf akasa being created). Also from the Sruti
texts (we find that akasa is eternal).
18
274 Srl-Bhdsya [ 2.3.3.
The opponent raises a further objection in Sutras 3
and 4.
The creation of akasa in between would contradict the
text, 'It sent forth fire' (Chd. VI. ii. 3), which declares fire
as the first product of Brahman. Moreover, the Sruti texts
declare clearly that dkasa is eternal, '(And the formless are)
vayu and dkdsathese are immortal' (Br. II. iii. 3). The
text, 'From the Self (Brahman) sprang dkdsa' (Tai. II. 1),
therefore has to be taken in a secondary sense.
4. It is possible that the same word ('sprang' be used
in a primary and a secondary sense) like the word 'Brah
man'.
In this Sutra, the opponent answers a plausible objec-
tion against the view expressed m the previous Sutra. In the
text, 'From that Self (Brahman) sprang dkdsa ; from dkasa
sprang vdyu (air); from vayu sprang fire' etc. (Tai. II. 1),
how can the word 'sprang' be used in a secondary sense
with respect to dkasa and in a primary sense with respect
to vdyu, fire, etc. ? It can be used in both the senses, even
as the word 'Brahman' is used in both these senses in the
following texts : 'Through knowledge Brahman increases in
size. From that is bom (the unmanifested) food' (Mu. I.
i. 8), where 'Brahman' is used in a primary sense. Then we
have the next verse, 'From Hun.. .evolves this (derivative)
Brahman' (Mu. I. i. 9), where 'Brahman' is used in a
secondary sense. Therefore the use of the same word 'sprang'
in both the senses cannot be an objection against the view
expressed in the previous Sutra.
2.3.7. ]
Srl-Bhdsya 275
S(fd5l||i>^irH<oH(d^+Id^ U S( ((
5. The non-abandonment of the proposition (viz. by
the knowledge of one, everything else becomes known, can
result only) from the non-distinction (of the entire world
from Brahman).
This Sutra refutes the view put forth in the previous
two Sutras. In Chdndogya VI. i. 3, the Sruti declares that
by the knowledge of Brahman, everything else is known.
This can be true only if dkdsa is also an efifect of Brahman
and therefore non-different from It. Then the cause being
known, the effect also will be known.
5I5|: w ^ u
6. From (other) Sruti texts also (this is established).
'Existence alone was this at the beginning' etc. (Chd.
VI. ii. 1); 'AU this has It for its Self' (Chd. VI. viii. 7). As
texts like these show that, before creation, there was one-
ness and also that Brahman is the Self of all this, we have
to conclude that dkasa is an effect and non-different from
Brahman and hence it is also created. The text 'It sent
forth fire' (Chd. VI. ii. 3) cannot negate the creation of
dkdsa declared by the Sruti elsewhere.
7. But the origination extends over all effects as (is
seen) in the world.
'All this has It for its Self' etc. (Chd. VI. viii. 7). In
texts like this, where dkdsa is spoken of as an effect of
Brahman, its origination from Brahman is also declared
276 Sn-Bhdsya [2.3.7.
thereby. In the world, when after saying, 'All these are
Devadatta's sons', we say, 'He is born of Devadatta' with
respect to a particular son, it would include all the rest also
as born of Devadatta. Air and akdsa are said to be eternal
in a relative sense only, even as the gods are said to be
immortal.
'FTRfTJm' 5in'9m?f: u ^ u
8. By this (i.e. the foregoing explanation about
akasa, the fact of) air (also being an effect) is explained.
The origination of air is treated in a separate Sutra, as
air is again referred to in Sutra 10 in the words, 'from
hence', i.e. from aur.
9. But there can be no origin of Sat (That which is,
i.e. Brahman) (only) as it does not stand to reason.
Only Brahman is not produced, but objects other than
It are created, as declared by the text, 'Existence alone' etc.
(Chd. VI. h. 1). That the rest are Its products is proved
by the text declaring that everything is known through the
knowledge of one thing, viz. Brahman.
Topic 2 : Brahman, as embodied in the preceding element,
is the cause of the subsequent element in the order of
creation
10. Fire (is produced) from this (i.e. air); so verily
says (the Sruti).
2.3.13.]
Sn-Bhasya
It has been shown that everything different from Brah-
man is an effect of Bralmian. The question is whether the
effects originate from their immediate antecedent substance
or from Brahman in that form. The opponent holds that the
origination takes place from the immediately preceding
substance only.
The text 'From ak (is produced) fire' (Tai. II. 1)
shows that fire originates from air.
3TN: U \ \ W
11. Water (is produced from fire).
'From fire is produced water' (Tai. II. 1); 'That created
water' (Chd. VI. ii. 3). These texts show that water is
created from fire.
^r# w w
12. Earth (is produced from water).
'From water earth' (Tai. II. 1); 'It (water) sent forth
food' (Chd. VI. ii. 4), where food stands for earth. These
two texts show that earth is created from water. It may be
questioned : How does 'food' mean 'earth' in the Chdndogya
text quoted ? The next Sutra answers it.
3Tf WT^ 5I 5?FTf ^ : \ \ \ \ \ \
13. (Earth is meant by 'food') because of the subject-
matter, the colour, and other Sruti texts.
In the Chdndogya text, the word 'food' denotes earth,
because the section treats of the creation of elements, and
hence 'food' also refers to some element. As everything
eatable is a product of earth, the effect is mentioned to
278 Srl-Bhdsya
[2.3.13.
denote the cause. In a complementary text, which mentions
the colour of the elements, we have, 'The red colour of a
flame is the colour of fire ; the white one that of water ; and
the black one that of food' (Chd. VI. iv. 1). This text
clearly shows that 'food' means the element earth. Other
Sruti texts also, like 'From water earth' (Tai. II. 1), clearly
show that from water earth is produced. Therefore the
word 'food' in the Chdndogya text means earth.
Fhe and other elements are given as mere instances,
indicating that aU enthies like mahat etc. in the order of
creation are origmated from the immediately preceding
substance. Texts like 'From It is born breath, mmd', etc.
(Mu. II. i. 3); 'It sent forth fire' (Chd. VI. u. 3) are to be
understood in the sense that Brahman is the mediate cause
and not the dhect cause.
14. But He (is the direct cause of everytliing) (as i.s
luiown) from the indicatory mark, viz. reflection.
The word 'but' refutes the view expressed in the pre-
vious Sutras and says, that Brahman, as embodied m the
inunediately preceding substance, is the dhect cause of all
effects like mahat etc. How is this known ? From the in-
dicatory mark, viz. reflection on the part of these substances.
The text 'That fire thought. . .that water thought' (Chd.
VI. ii. 3-4) shows that after refiection these elements pro-
duced the effects. This reflection is impossible for the inert
elements, and so we are to understand that the Lord, as
embodied m these elements, produced the effects. That the
Lord is embodied in aU beings is known from texts like 'He
Who inhabits the earth' etc. (Br. III. vii. 3 ff.).
2.3.16. ]
Srl-Bhdsya 279
15. But the order o creation (which is stated) in the
reverse order (of the true one) is possible (only if the effects
are produced) from It (i.e. Brahman).
In Sutra 13, it was stated that texts like Mu. II. i. 3 and
Cha. VI. ii. 3 are to be understood in the sense that Brah-
man is the mediate cause and not the direct cause. The
word 'but' in this S'ixtra refutes that view, and the Sutra
establishes that Brahman is the direct cause, in so far as
It is embodied in the immediately preceding causal substance.
The order of succession in the creation of the elements
etc. is given in the text 'From air fire ; from fire water' etc.
{Tai. II. 1). But the text 'From It is born the vital breath,
mmd, aU the sense-organs, ether, air, fire, water, earth'
{Mu. II. i. 3) declares quite the reverse of what is stated
in the previous text, i.e. while the previous text says that
the preceding element is the cause of the next element in the
order of succession, the Mundaka text says that they are
created dkectly from Brahman. To say that the causality of
Brahman is only mediate would contradict texts like the
Mundaka one. So we have'to understand that Brahman,
in so far as It has assumed the form of the special causal
substance, viz. the immediately preceding element in the
order of creation, is the cause of the next one in the order.
Therefore everything originates directly from Brahman.
16. If it be said that knowledge and mind (mentioned)
in between (breath and the elements) (show) then- order of
280 Sn-Bhdsya [ 2.3.16.
succession (in creation) owing to the indication (in the text)
to that effect, (we say) not so, on account of the non- '
difference.
Knowledge in this Sutra stands for the means of know-
ledge, viz. the sense-organs. The opponent raises an objec-
tion against the conclusion arrived at in the previous Sutra,
viz. that everything originates directly from Brahman. He
says that the Mundaka text only gives the order of creation
of the vital breath, mind, and the sense-organs, which is
easily inferred from the second half of the text, wherein the ^
elements are narrated in the order of theh origination known
from other Sruti texts. So the purport of this text is only to
give the order of creation, and it cannot be interpreted to
mean that everythmg originates from Brahman dhectly. This
view the Sutra refutes. The first words of the text 'From It
is born' connect themselves equaUy, without any difference,
with aU, viz. breath, mind, senses, ether, etc. The text there-
fore teaches that aU are direct products of Brahman, and
does not teach the order of creation of these entities. More-
over, it carmot refer to the order of creation, as the creation
of the breath, which is a function of air, is not possible
before the creation of the elements. Therefore we assert that
aU things originate from Brahman only, as embodied in the
immediately previous entity, and that the terms 'fire' and so
on refer to Brahman, the Seff of aU these entities.
W U
17. But that which abides in the moving and
stationary beings, i.e. tbe words denoting them are n o t
secondary (with regard to Bralunan), on account of (those
2.3.18. ]
Sn-Bhdsya
281
terms) depending (for their denotative power) on the
existence of That (i.e. Brahman).
, An objection is raised that the words 'fire' etc. in the
texts quoted in the previous Sutra can refer to Braliman in
a secondary sense only, the prunary meaning being those
things or entities. The word 'but' in the Sutra refutes this
view, and the Sutra says that with respect to Brahman also
the denotative power of these words is primary and not
secondary, as this power depends on Brahman. Vide Chdn-
dogya VI. iii. 2, which declares that names and forms were
evolved by Brahman. Moreover, all beings like fire,etc. exist,
because Brahman exists. Therefore 'fire' etc. which are so
dependent on It, are not different from It, and so these
terms 'fire' etc. are not used in a secondary sense with res-
pect to Brahman also.
Topic 3 : The soul is not produced, but is eternal
18. The individual self is not (produced), (for it is
so) mentioned in the scriptures, also (on account of its)
being eternal, (for so it is known) from them (the Sruti
texts).
The question is raised whether the individual self also
is produced from Brahman, like the elements. The opponent
holds that it is produced, for there are texts which say so :
'He from whom this world is produced ; He who has created
these beings on this earth.' Reasonmg also shows that the
individual self is produced from Brahman, as otherwise the
promissory statement that from the knowledge of one thing
everything is known would be contradicted. Moreover, texts
282 Sn-Bhasya [2.3.18.
liJce 'From whence these bemgs are produced' {Tai. III. i.
1) declare m a general way the orighiation of the world,
and no distinction is made between the sentient and hi-
sentient beings.
The Sutra refutes this and says that the hidividual self
is not produced, for the Sruti texts deny it: 'The inteUigent
self is neither born, nor does it die' {Ka. I. ii. 18). Vide
also Sve. I. 9 and Ka. II. u. 13. In that case, how does the
knov/ledge of one thing lead to the knowledge of everything?
Yes, it is possible, for the individual self also is an effect of
Brahman. By effect is meant that the substance has attamed
a new condition, and from this point of view, it is an effect
as is clearly seen from the soul's taking a gross body at the
tune of creation. There is, however, a difference between
the sentient seff and the insentient beings in this attain-
ment of a new condition. In the case of the seff, it is a mere
contraction and expansion of inteUigence, whUe in the case
of the insentient beings, the elements etc. it is a change in
their essential nature. It is this latter kind of change that
is denied for the seff by the Sruti texts. They do not deny
even the attainment of a new condition by the seff. Brahman
has for Its body the sentient and insentient beings both in
the causal and effected states. In the causal state, they are
so subtle that they cannot be designated otherwise than as
Brahman Itseff, and hence texts hke 'Sat alone was this at
the beginning' etc. {Cha. VI. u. 8). But when these sentient
and insentient beings attam a gross state with names and
forms. Brahman is said to be in the effected state. At the
time of this change, the insentient beings undergo change
in theh essential nature and produce objects of enjoyment,
whUe the souls attain expansion of inteUigence as a result
of their taking to a gross body, which makes them fit for
2.3.19.] Sn-Bhdsya
283
the enjoyment of these objects as a result of the fruit of
then- karma. So the soul also is an effect of Brahman. The
texts which declare the origination of the soul only refer
to its taking a gross body and thereby having expanded
intelligence, while those that deny origination declare that
there is no change in its essential nature. Brahman is in Its
causal or effected state according as It has for Its body
matter and souls either in their subtle or gross state. The
effect being thus non-different from the cause, the initial
promissory statement holds good.
Topic 4 : The nature of the soul and its size
19. For this very reason (viz. scriptural statements)^
(the individual soul) is a knower.
Now the question of the nature and the size of the soul
is taken up for discussion. First, as regards the nature of
the soul. Is it purely consciousness, or is it an inert sub-
stance having intelligence occasionally under certain circum-
stances as an adventitious quality, or is it a knower ? Some,
like the Advaitins, hold that it is mere knowledge, for the
Sruti texts declare like that : 'Knowledge performs sacrifice'
etc. {Tai. II. v. 1); 'He who abides in intelligence' {Br.
III. vii. 22), where 'intelligence' stands for the 'self men-
tioned in the Kanva recension.
The Vaisesikas refute this view and say that the self is
neither mere knowledge nor is it a knower having knowledge
for its quality. The self, according to them, is an inert thing.
284 Srl-Bhasya
[2.3.19.
and its knowledge is an adventitious or occasional quality,
as it results when the sense-organs come in contact with
external objects. If it were mere knowledge or a knower,
there would have been no use of the sense-organs to cog-
nize objects. Moreover, in deep sleep, there is no knowledge,
which shows that it is neither mere knowledge nor a knower,
for if ehher were its nature, it could not have been des-
troyed in deep sleep. Destruction of one's nature would
mean destruction of the thuig itself. The Sruti texts declare
that in the state of freedom also there is no knowledge :
'When he has departed, there is no consciousness' {Br. II.
iv. 12). So it has to be said that the seh is an inert thing
like the pot, and that its knowledge is an adventitious
quality.
These two views the Sutra refutes and says that the soul
is essentiaUy a knower, and is neither mere knowledge nor
inert, for the scriptures declare it to be a knower both in
the state of bondage and freedom : 'And he who knows
'1 smeU this" is the self. . . .Through the mind, he verily
sees these deshed objects and rejoices' {Chd. VIII. xii.
4-5); 'He who sees this does not see death nor iUness nor
any sorrow. He who sees this sees aU things and obtains
all thmgs in aU ways' {Chd. VII. xxvi. 2); 'And this one
is the seer, feeler,' etc. {Pr. IV. 9). Texts which declare it to
be mere knowledge only show that knowledge is its chief
characteristic, by which its nature is known or defined. In
deep sleep and swoon, knowledge exists, though in a dor-
mant condition, and on waking, it expands and manifests
itself. 'When he has departed, there is no consciousness' {Br.
II. iv. 12) does not mean that there is no consciousness in
the state of release, but that the self does not remember
the body it had in the state of bondage.
2.3.22.]
Sn-Bhdsya
285
20. (As the sruti texts declare the soul's) passing out,
going (to other spheres), and returning (thence) the soul is
atomic in size.
It was shown' that the soul is a knower. The opponent
says that, if it is a Icnower, it being infinite and all-pervading,
there will be cognition at all places and at all tunes. Refut-
ing this view, this Sutra and the following establish that the
soul is atomic in size. There are Sruti texts mentioning the
soul's passing out of the body, going to heaven etc. and
returning from there. Vide Br. IV. iv. 2 and 6. This is
possible only if the soul is atomic and not infinite or aU-
pervadLng, for to an infinite soul, there can be no going
and coming.
21. And the latter two (the going and coming) (being
effected) directly by the seU (it is of atomic size).
Even if the soul is infinite, stiU it can be spoken of as
passing out of the body, if it be taken to mean separation
from the body. But for the going and coming, they cannot
be explained away like that, and must be understood as
being accomplished by the self itself; and that is not possible
for an entity that is all-pervadmg. So the soul is atomic
in size.
22. If it be said (that the soul is) not atomic, as the
scriptures state it to be otherwise (i.e. aU-prevading) (we
say) not so, for (the One) other than the individual soul
286
Srl-Bhdsya
[ 2.3.22.
(i.e. supreme Brahman) is the subject-matter (in those
texts).
A fresh objection is raised that the soul is not atomic,
as the scriptures declare it to be otherwise. "Which is the
self? This entity consisting of knowledge withm the heart sur-
rounded by the organs' etc. (Br. III. iv. 7)m this text, the
individual seh is introduced as the subject-matter, and later
on, the Sruti declares, 'That infinhe, birthless self' etc. (Br.
IV. iv. 22), where the seh is said to be mfinite. Therefore
the soul is not atomic. This Sutra refutes it and says that
the soul is atomic, as the self referred to in Br. IV. iv. 22
is not the soul, but the supreme Self or Brahman, which
was introduced in the discussion 'He who has known the
Self of mteUigence' (Br. IV. iv. 13). It is this latter Self
that is caUed infinite by the Sruti text.
^5I5?>?TTfnVTTi ^ U R ^ u
23. And on account of the very word (atomic) (used
by the Sruti texts to denote its size) and infinitesimal mea-
sure (the soul is atomic).
'This atomic seh' etc. (Mu. III. i. 9)this text dhectly
states that the soul is atomic. Agam, we have 'That self is
to be known as a part of the hundredth part of the tip of a
hah divided a hundred tunes' (Sve. V. 9), which shows
that the soul is of infimtesimal measure.
24. There is no contradiction, like sandal-paste.
Just as sandal-paste applied to any particular part of
the body gives a pleasant sensation aU over the body, the
soul, though of atomic size and therefore occupying oiily
2.3.27. ]
Sn-Bhdsya 287
one part of the body, may yet experience sensations extend-
ing over the entire body.
25. If it be said that on account of the particular
position (of the sandal-paste in the body the analogy is not
correct), (we say) not so, on account of the acceptance (by
the scriptures of a special seat for the soul, viz.) in the heart
alone.
An objection is raised against the view expressed in the
previous Sutra. The sandal-paste produces the sensation, as
it is in contact with a definite part of the body. But in the
case of the soul, we do not know that it occupies a partic-
ular part of the body. This view the Sutra refutes and says
that the scriptures do declare that the soul has a particular
abode in the body, viz. the heart. 'The self-eifulgent one in
the heart' (fir. IV. iii. 7).
26. Or owing to its quality (viz. intelligence) as light.
In this Sutra, the Sutra-kara gives his view as to how
the atomic soul experiences sensations throughout the body.
As a light placed in one corner of the room lights the whole
room, so the consciousness of the soul, though atomic and
seated in the heart, yet pervades the whole body and thus
experiences pleasure and pain throughout the body.
27. There is distinction as in the case of smell; scrip-
tares too declare so.
288 Sri-Bhasya
[ 2.3.27.
An objection is raised that, as the soul is mere intelli-
gence, how can intelligence be said to be a quality of the soul
with which it can pervade the entire body. This view is
refuted. Just as smell experienced as a quality of the earth
is distinct from it, so also the knowledge of which we are
conscious in statements like T know' is different from the
knowing subject, the T. Scriptures also declare it so. 'This
person knows'.
^^T^t^ncT^ U R ^ w
28. On account of the separate teaching (by the
Sruti texts).
Knowledge is not only perceived as separate from the
soul in experiences like T know', but it is also declared by
the scriptures as separate from the soul. 'For there is no
absence of knowmg on the part of the knower' (Br. TV,
iii. 30).
How then is the soul said to be mere knowledge in texts
like 'Knowledge performs sacrifice' (Tai. II. 5)? This is
explained in the next Sutra.
29. But that declaration (as to the soul's being mere
knowledge) is on account of its having that (viz. knowledge)
as its essential quality, even as the intelligent Lord (Brah-
man who, though omniscient, is said to be mere know-
ledge).
The word 'but' refutes the objection. The self is said to be
mere knowledge, because it has knowledge for its essential
quahty. Similarly, the inteUigent Brahman, described
2.3.31. ]
Srl-Bhdsya
289
hy texts as 'By the inteUigent supreme Self (Br. IV.
iii. 21); 'He who is omniscient, all-knowing, etc' (Mu. I. i.
9), is described by Sruti texts as 'truth, knowledge, infinite
is Brahman' (Tai. II. i. 1), because of Its essential quality
of omniscience.
30. And there is no defect (in what has been said in
the previous Sutra), (as the quality of knowledge exists in
the soul) so long as the soul exists; because it is so seen
(in the scriptures).
As knowledge exists throughout as its essential quality,
there is no harm in designating it as knowledge. It is seen
that a cow with broken horns is still called a cow, because
the generic character is still found in it as its essential nature.
Moreover, like knowledge, the self also is self-manifested ;
and for that reason also, it is weU designated as knowledge.
An objection is raised that the knowledge is not an in-
variable quality of the self, for it is not found in deep sleep.
The next Sutra answers this objection.
31. On account of the manifestation (of knowledge in
the waking state) being possible only on its existing
(potentially in deep-sleep state), like virility etc.
Knowledge exists even in deep-sleep state, though it is
not manifest, and it manifests itself in the waking state etc.
it is like virility which exists potentially in a child, but
manifests only when the child attains youth. Unless it exists
potentially in childhood, it cannot manifest itself in youth'.
19
290
Srl-Bhdsya [ 2.3.31.
Similarly, unless knowledge exists in deep sleep, it cannot
manifest itself on awakening. Therefore the soul is a knower
and atomic in size. Br. II. iv. 12 does not declare that the
released soul has no knowledge or consciousness whatso-
ever, but that it has no knowledge of bhth, death, pain, etc.
experienced in the state of bondage. This is explicitly stated
by other texts which describe the state of the released soul.
'The seeing one does not see death nor iUness nor pain'
{Chd. VII xxvi. 2); 'Not remembermg that body hi which
he was bornseeing these pleasures with the mind, he
rejoices' (Chd. VIII. xu. 3, 5).
32. Otherwise, there would result either perpetual
perception and non-perception, or else the limitation of
either of the two.
The Sutra refutes the view of the Saihkhyas who hold
that the seh is mere knowledge and omnipresent, and also
of the Vaisesikas who say that the self is omnipresent and
that knowledge is its adventitious quality. If the self is
mere knowledge and at the same time omnipresent, then it
would result in perpetual simuhaneous perception and non-
perception or perpetual experience of either of the two only
to the exclusion of the other. But our experience is otherwise,
for we sometunes perceive objects and sometunes do not.
To explain, if the soul is the cause of perception and non-
perception, then it is either the cause of both, in which case
there wih be perception and non-perception of an object
simultaneously, which is contrary to experience ; or else, if
it is the cause of one of the two only, then m that case we
will %e -having only perpetual perception or perpetual nn-
2.3.33. ]
Srl-Bhdsya 291
perception to the exclusion of the other, which is also against
our common experience. Moreover, if the soul were omni-
present, then there would have been ego-consciousness every-
where and not be confined to the body only. If for any reason
the ego-consciousness elsewhere were restricted, then for
the very same reason, there would be no ego-consciousness
in the body also. All these difficulties are averted if the self
is atomic, and has knowledge for its quafity. The view of
the Vaisesikas also is defective for these very reasons.
According to them, knowledge results as a quality in the
inert soul when it is connected with the organs. If, as they
say, the souls were omnipresent, they would be always con-
nected with all organs, and there would be perpetual know-
ledge, but this is not so experienced in life.
Topic 5 : The individual Soul is an Agent
^ f , 5IH' ^^I cr^ \ \ \ \ \ \
33. (The soul is) an agent, on account of scriptural
(injunctions) having a meaning on that ground only.
The question is taken up whether the soul is an agent
or not. The opponent holds that it is not an agent, but a
mere enjoyer, and that Prakrti alone is the agent, for the
scriptures so declare. 'The soul neither slays nor is it slain'
{Ka. I. ii. 19); 'The gunas of Prakrti perform all actions.
With the understandmg deluded by egoism, man thinks,
"I am the doer" ' {Glta III. 27); 'When the seer beholds no
agent other than the gunas' {Glta XIV. 19); 'Prakrti is the
cause in the production of the body and the senses, while
the soul is the cause in the experience of pleasure and pain'
{Glta XIII. 20). So it is clear from these texts that the
soul is not an agent.
292
Sn-Bhdsya
[ 2.3.33.
The Sutra refutes this and says that the soul is an agent,
for only on that basis do the scriptural injunctions like 'he
who deskes heaven should sacrifice', 'one who desires libera-
tion should meditate on Brahman', etc. have a sense. The
scriptures prompt a person who desires certain things to
perform certain acts, as a result of which he would realize
what he desires. An intelligent self alone can have desires
and not inert Prakrti, and the scriptural injunctions can
influence only a sentient being to action and not inert Prakrti.
So the individual self is an agent. Katha Upanisad, I. ii. 19
means only that the soul is eternal, and it is not meant to
teach anything about the agency of the soul. Gitd III. 27
means that the activity of the self in the state of bondage
(samsdra) is not due to its own nature, but due to its^
contact with the gunas.
34. And on account of (the Sruti) teaching its taking
(the organs) and wandering about.
'It taking the organs, moves about as it pleases m its
own body' (Br. II. i. 18). This text, which describes that
the soul takes the organs and wanders about in the dream
state, clearly shows that it is an agent.
35. Also on account of (the scriptures) mentioning
(the soul as an agent) with respect to action. If it were not
so, the reference (would have been) of a different kind.
'Intelligence performs sacrifices, and it also performs
all acts' (Tai. II. 5). Here 'intelligence' refers to the soul.
2.3.37. ] Sri-Bhdsya
293
thereby showing that the soul is an agent. It may be objected
that the word 'intelligence' refers not to the soul, but to the
mternal organ (buddhi). In that case, the scriptures would
have used the word not m the nominative case, but in the
instrumental case, as 'by inteUigence'.
36. (There would be) no definite rule, as in the case
of consciousness.
If the seh were not an agent, but only an enjoyer, then
the same difficulty that was shown m Sutra 32 with respect
to consciousness would arise here also. If the soul were
merely an enjoyer and not an agent, and Prakrti alone were
the agent, then, as all souls are equally connected with
Prakrti, aU actions wotUd result hi the enjoyment of aU
soids or of none. Even if the internal organs be different in
different souls, stUl as aU the souls are infinite and aU-
pervadhig, they wiU be equaUy connected with aU internal
organs, and so there would be no distribution of results of
actions.
37. On account of the inversion of the power (of
enjoyment).
An agent alone enjoys the results of his actions. If the
soul be a non-agent, and Prakrti be the agent, then the
results of actions would be enjoyed by Prakrti and not by
the soul. So there wjU be an inversion of the power *of
enjoyment. Further, if the soul be not an enjoyer, there
would be no proof of its existence.
294 Srl-Bhdsya [ 2.3.38.
38. And on account of the unpossibility of samadhi.
If the mternal organ were the agent, then samadhi would
be unpossible. For in samadhi the meditating person realizes
his difference from Prakrti. This experience would be im-
possible for the mternal organ, inasmuch as it is a product
of Prakrti. So we have to accept that the soul is an agent.
39. And even as a carpenter is both.
An objection is raised that ff the soul is an agent, and
as the instruments of action are always present, there would
result eternal activity on the part of the soul. This Sutra
refutes it and says that, just as a carpenter, though posses-
ing the instnunents, may or may not be active according to
his desire, the intelligent seff also is sometimes active and
sometimes not, as jt pleases it. On the other hand, ff the
internal organ were the agent, it would be constantly acting,
as, unlike a sentient soul, it cannot perform or refrain from
action according to its deshe, smce it is incapable of such
a deshe, being insentient.
Topic 6 : The soul in its activity is dependent on the Lord
40. But (that agency of the soul) is from the highest
Lord, that being declared by the scriptures.
The question is raised whether this agency of the soul
is independent or dependent on something else. The oppo-
2.3.41.] Srji-Bhasya
295
nent holds that the agency of the soul is independent, for
otherwise, if the soul were not a free agent, the scriptural
injunctions wiU have no meaning. One who is free to do or
not to do can alone be impelled by the injunctions and be
liable for punishment and reward.
The word 'but'" refutes this prima facie view, and the
Sutra declares that the agency of the soul is dependent on
the highest Lord, for the Sruti declares this. 'The supreme
Lord, the Self of all, residing withm all souls controls them
as their inner Self ; 'He who dweUs withm the self, but is
within it,. . . and who controls the seK from within' etc.
(Br. III. vii. 22). The Smrti also says the same thing : Vide
Glta. XVIII. 61.
41. But accorduig to the efforts made (by the soul)
(the Lord makes it act); (thus only would) injunctions and
prohibitions etc. be relevant.
An objection is raised that, if the agency of the soul is
dependent on the Lord, scriptural injunctions and prohibi-
tions will he meaningless. This Sutra explains the position
by refuting this objection. The Lord makes the soul act by
granting it permission, taking into consideration the efforts
put forth by it; but action is not possible for the soul with-
out this permission of the Lord. Though the Lord's per-
mission is essential, yet the responsibility for the initial
volition is the soul's ; hence injunctions and prohibitions
etc. have a scope. The text 'He makes those whom He will
raise do good deeds' etc. (Kau. III. 8) does not mean that
the Lord Himself makes man do good and evil actions, but
it means that the Lord favours or rewards those who are
resolved to be virtuous by aiding them in this resolve.
296 Srl-Bhdsya
[ 2.3.41.
aad vice versa. He makes those who are resolved
on evil actions take greater delight in such actions which
take them downwards. 'To them, ever steadfast and serving
Me with affection, I give that buddhi-yoga by which they
come unto Me' {Glta. X. 10); 'Those malicious and cruel
evil-doer.'!, most degraded of men, I hurl perpetually into
the wombs of asuras only in these worlds' {Gitd. XVI. 19).
Topic 7 : The individual soul is a part of Brahman
42. (The soul is) a part (of the Lord), on account of
difference (between the two) being declared and otherwise
also (i.e. as non-different from Brahman); in some
(sakhas or recensions of the Vedic texts) (Brahman) is
spoken of as being fisherman, knave, etc.
The question of the relation of the soul to Brahman is
now taken up for discussion. Is the soul quite different from
Brahman, or is it Brahman under ignorance, or is it Brah-
man determmed by a limiting adjunct {upadhi), or is it a
part of Brahman ? Different schools of thought hold different
views. One group holds that the soul is quite different from
Brahman, and their relation is like that between the master
and the servant, for the scriptural texts declare then differ-
ence : 'Knowing that the individual self and the Lord, the
moving Force, to be different' {Sve. I. 6) ; 'Two birds of
beautfful plumage... of these, one eats the fruits of the
tree with relish, while the other looks on without eating'
{Sve. IV. 6); 'There are two, one the knowing (the Lord)
and the other ignorant (the soul), the master and the servant.
2.3.42. ]
Sn-Bhdsya 297
both unborn' (Sve. I. 9). In these texts, the difEerence
between the two is declared by the scriptures, showing that
the relation between the two is like that between the master
and the servant, the ruler and the ruled. The Lord is not
subject to karma, whhe the soul is subject to karma, and
enjoys and suffers the result of it. The texts which declare
the non-difference between the two are to be taken in a
secondary sense, or as mere eulogy.
Another group holds that the soul is Brahman under
ignorance and that the two are non-different, for this is
declared by texts like, 'That thou art' (Cha. VI. viu. ff.);
'This soul (Atman) is Brahman' (Br. IV. iv. 5). The texts
which declare difference between the two are but repetitions
of what we commonly experience through other means of
knowledge and, as such, carry no weight, while the texts
which declare non-difference give us a knowledge which is
not known through other soiurces. Hence these texts, which
declare non-difference, are more authoritative, for the scrip-
tures are to give us knowledge which is not had through
other sources of knowledge. They hold that the soul cannot
be a part of Brahman, for a part is possible only in a thing
which is divisible, but Brahman is indivisible and one and,
as such, cannot have a part.
A third group holds that the soul is nothmg but Brahman
as determined by a Ihniting adjunct (upadhi). They quote
for authority the same texts as the second group and say
that the dualistic texts only declare the apparent difference
between the two due to the limhing adjunct.
As against aU these views, the Sutra says that the soul is
a part of Brahman, since there is declaration of difference
and also of unity in the scriptures. The view that the two
are absolutely different cannot stand in the face of texts
298 Sn-Bhdsya [ 2.3.42.
which declare non-difference. Some recensions (sakhas)
read that Brahman is the fisherman, the Icnave, etc. which
teach the general non-difference of the self. Both sets of
texts have to be taken in their primary sense. Again, Brah-
man which is ever all-knowing etc. can never come under
the influence of ignorance : 'From Hun, who is omniscient
in general and all-knowing in detail, and whose austerity
is characterized by knowledge' etc. (Mu. I. i. 9). Nor can
the soul be Brahman under a limiting adjunct, for, in that
case, Brahman will have to experience all the happiness and
misery experienced by the soul in this world, which would
contradict all scriptural texts which declare the nature of
Brahman.
Therefore, the only alternative left is that the soul is a
part of Brahman, in which case alone both these sets of
texts can be taken in their primary sense. By part, however,
is meant that which constitutes one aspect (desa) of a
substance. Hence a distinguishing quality of a substance is a
part of that substance. The lustre of gems, the generic charac-
ter of a cow in cows, or the body of an embodied being, is a
part of the gem, the cow, or the embodied being respectively.
In this sense, the soul-which is the body of Brahman, as
declared by the scriptural texts, is a part of It. These qualities
which distinguish the substance are experienced as different
from the substance ; hence the texts which declare the differ-
ence. On the other hand, inasmuch as these qualities cannot
exist without the substance, they are non-different from it;
hence the texts which declare non-difference.
43. And also from the words of the mantra (it Is
known that the soul is a part of the Lord).
2.3.46. ]
Sn-Bhdsya 299
A further reason is given to show that the soul is a part
of Brahman. 'One foot of It are all beings' (Cha. III. xii. 6),
where the souls are said to be parts of the Lord. The text
uses the plural 'all bemgs', as there are many souls. 'He who
is eternal and intelligent dispenses the desired objects to
many' (Ka. II.- ii. 13). AU these souls are diSerent due to
different characteristics, though they are aU alike as having
intelligence for thek essential nature.
44. And it is also so stated in the Smrti : 'An eternal
portion of myself having become a living soul' (Gita.^
XV. 7).
An objection is raised that, if the soul is a part of
Brahman, then It would be affected by the defects of the
soul. The foUowing Sutra answers this objection.
o
45. But as in the case of light and so on, the supreme
Lord is not like this (i.e. like the soul).
Though a distinguishing quality of a substance is a part
of it, yet we observe differences between the two. Though
light is a part of the object of which it is a quality, yet the
object is different in nature from its quality, the hght. So
also, though the soul is a part of Brahman as Its body, still
the essential nature and characteristics of the two are not
one. Hence the Lord is not affected by the pleasure and
pam experienced by the soul.
46. The Smrtis also state that.
300
Sn-Bhdsya
[ 2.3.46.
Parasara and others declare that the world of sentient
and insentient beings is a part of Brahman, like light. 'Just
as the Ught of fire placed m a place spreads all round,
so is this world the power {sakti) of the Lord' (Fi. L xxii.
56). So also is the soul declared to be the body of the Lord :
'All these are Hari's body' (Vi. I. xxii. 38); 'All those are
His body' (Vi. I. xxii. 86).
47. Permission and exclusion (result) from the con-
nection (of the soul) with the body ; as in the case of fire
etc.
An objection is raised that, as all souls are equal, being
parts of Brahman, why then are some permitted to study
the Vedas, while others are excluded from it. The Siitra says
that this is because of the soul's connection with a pure or
impure body. Though the fire is one, yet the fire from a
household is acceptable, while that from the funeral pyre
is rejected.
48. On account of the non-extension of each soul
(beyond its body), there is no confusion (of the results of
actions).
The souls being atomic are different in different bodies
and are limited to those bodies. So there is no confusion
of the results of actions done by them, i.e. the results of the
action done by one do not affect another soul. This would
not have been possible if the souls were Brahman in ignor-
ance or limited by upddhis. For the same Brahman being
2.3.50. ]
Sn-Bhdsya 301
in connection with ignorance or the limiting adjuncts, there
would have resulted the corrfusion of the results of actions.
smn^ q^ ^ n V5. u
49. And their arguments are fallacious.
Moreover, the arguments put forward by those who hold
that the soul is Brahman covered by ignorance are ah faUa-
cious. They say that Brahman, which is pure consciousness,
is covered by ignorance, which means that Brahman loses
this essential quality of consciousness. That would mean
destruction of Brahman Itself. The word 'and' in the Sutra
pomts out that this theory contradicts various scriptural texts,
like 'Of these two, one eats the sweet fruits with rehsh,,
whUe the other looks on without eating' (Sve. IV. 6); 'There
are two, the one the Ruler and the other the ruled' (Sve.
I. 9); and so on. Even if this difference is due to limitmg
adjuncts based on ignorance, stUl as Brahman is one which
connects Itseff with aU the different adjuncts, the confusion
of the results of actions is inevitable.
An explanation is sought to be given, so that this
difficulty pointed out above may be got over. If we regard
the upadhis as real and not due to ignorance, then, m that
case, the various spheres of experience of different souls
can be explained as due to beginningless adrstas, which
are the causes of these Ihniting, adjuncts. The next Sutra
refutes this view.
50. There being no fixity about the unseen principles
(adrstas) (there would result confusion of the spheres of
experience).
302
Sn-Bhdsya
[ 2.3.50.
As the unseen principles (adrstas) have Brahman for
their substratum, there can be no rule that a particular
adrsta operates in a particular soul; so the confusion of the
spheres of experience is inevitable. Neither the upddhis not
adrstas can differentiate Brahman, which is one.
51. And even as regards resolve etc. (it would be) like
this.
For the same reason as given in the previous Sutra, there
can be no definite restriction as regards resolves etc. also.
They, too, cannot create differentiation in the one Brahman.
52. If it be said (that this distinction results) from
(the difference of) place, (we say) not so, on account of
(all adjuncts) being within (all places).
A further argument is given to show that, though Brah-
man cannot be differentiated by the upddhis, yet as these
upadhis are connected with distinct places ia Brahman, con-
fusion of the results of actions would be averted. The Sutra
refutes this view. As the upddhis move here and there, all
places get connected with aU upadhis, and so this confusion
cannot be averted. Moreover, the pain or joy connected with
any particular place will affect the whole of Brahman, as
It is one.
This and the previous two Sutras refute the view of those
who hold the absolute unity of Brahman,
CHAPTER n
SECTION IV
Topic 1 : The origination of the organs
In the last section, the origination of the insentient world
as also of the sentient world was described. There it was
clearly shown in what sense the elements are said to be
created, as well as in what particular sense the souls are
said to be created. Now m this section the creation of the
organs is taken up for discussion.
1. Likewise the organs (pranas).
Objection : This Sutra is to be connected with the hn-
mediately previous topic, viz. the eternity of the souls treated
at the end of the last section. So, like the souls, the organs
also are not created. Sruti texts declare that they exist even
at the time of dissolution {pralaya). 'This was, mdeed, non-
existence at the beginning. They say : what was non-exist-
ence at the beginning ? These rsis. . . . Who are those
rsis ? The organs (pranas) are, indeed, the rsis' {Sa. VI.
i. 1. 1). Hence the texts dealing with the origination of the
organs (pranas) should be interpreted like those dealing
with the origination of the souls.
Answer : This Sutra is to be connected with the earlier
topics in the last section, viz. the creation of the elements
etc. Why ? Because before creation everything was one.
304
Srl-Bhdsya
[2.4.L
'Being alone was there before this' {Cha. VI. ii. 1); 'The
Self alone was this at the beginning' {Ai. I. i. 1). Moreover,
there are texts which declare the creation of the organs.
'From that Self are produced the vital force, mind, and all
the organs' etc. {Mu. II. i. 3). On the other hand, we do
not find texts denying the origination of the organs, as in
the case of the souls. AU these reasons show that the organs
are originated like the elements ether etc. In the Satapatha
Brdhmana text quoted above, the word 'pranas' refers to
Brahman, as prana is one of Its designations. Vide Cha. I.
xi. 5. The word 'rsi' which means aU-knowing, is apt as
applied to Brahman and not to the insentient organs.
2. (The plural in the text quoted is) secondary, on
account of the impossibility, and since (Brahman alone) is
declared by scriptures (to exist) before that.
An objection is iraised that as the text quoted in the
last Sutra uses a plural form, 'the rsis are the Pranas', how
can it refer to Brahman ? This Sutra answers it. The plural
form is to be taken in a secondary sense, as there is no
plurality then, for texts say that Brahman alone existed
before creation. One without a second.
dr^jct)HI^M: \ \ \ \ \
3. On account of speech having for its antecedent that
(the creation of the elements).
A further reason is given in this Sutra to show that the
organs are created. The scriptures say : 'This universe was
then unmanifested. It was then differentiated by names and
2.4.5. ] Sri-Bhasya 305
forms' (Br, J. iv. 7). Before creation, ether and other ele-
ments did not exist, and consequently speech (name) and
other organs had no function to perform, as theh objects,
were not in existence. Therefore, as the organs had no func-
tion before creation, and as there are no proofs to imagine
theh existence, we are to take that the organs did not exist
before creation. Hence the word 'pranas' in the Satapatha
Brdhmana text quoted earher does not refer to the organs,
but to Brahman which alone existed before creation.
Topic 2 : The number of organs
4. (The organs are seven m number) on account of
seven (organs) going (with tbe soul at tbe time of death)
and on account of the specification (of these seven).
This Sutra gives the view of the opponent. The organs
are seven, as the soul is said to go forth from the body at
the time of death with only seven organs : 'From him come
forth the seven organs (pranas)^ (Mu. II. i. 8). Again, they
are distinctly enumerated in the foUowing text: 'Wheh the
five senses of knowledge come to rest together with the mmd.
and the intellect, too, does not function, that state they call
the highest' (Ka. II. iu. 10). '
5. But the hands etc. also (are organs); (since they
assist the soul while) abiding (in the body). Therefore it
is not so.
When the soul abides in the body, the haiids etc. are
20
ao6
Srl-Bhasya I 2.4.5.
equally its instruments like ears etc So the organs are not
merely seven in number. The scriptures also declare then
number as eleven : 'The ten organs in man and the mind
is the eleventh' (Br. III. k. 4); vide Gita, XIII. 5. There-
fore it is not that hands etc. are not organs. Their number
is therefore eleventhe five organs of knowledge, the five
organs of action, and the mmd. The text quoted in the
previous Sutra mentions only seven, because the organs of
action come mto existence with the body, are dissolved with
the body, and do not accompany the soul. The mention of
seven m the highest state of yoga is because they are pro-
minent among the group.
Topic 3 : The organs are minute in size
9Prar u % w
6. And (they are) minute.
The opponent holds that the organs are all infinite, for
the scriptures say so : 'They are all alike, all are infinite'
(Br. 1. vi. 13). This Sutra refutes it and says that they are
all minute in size. They pass out of the body, and therefore
they must be finite. 'When the vital force goes out of the
body, aH the organs accompany it' (Sr. IV. iv. 2). As they
are not perceived when they pass out of the body, they
must be minute in size.
UV 9U
7. And the best.
The word 'best' refers to the chief vital force, whose
superiority is established in the colloquy of the pranas in
2.4.8. ]
Srl-Bhasya 307
Br. VI. i. The opponent holds that the chief vital force is
eternal and not created : 'By Its own law It alone was
breathing without wmd' {R.V. X. cxxis. 2). Here the words
'was breathing' evidently refer to the function of the vital
breath, which shows that it must be existing even before
creation, and is therefore not created. So the texts which
say that the vital force is created have to be interpreted hke
the texts which declare the origination of the souls. This
Sutra refutes this view and says that even the vital force is
produced from Brahman, for otherwise it wiU contradict
scriptural statements which declare the oneness of aU before
creation. The Muridaka text, again, declares that the vital
force is created like earth etc. and there are no texts, as in
the case of the soul, which deny the creation of the vital
force. The text 'It alone was breathing without wind' does
not refer to the vital force, but inthnates the existence of
Brahman alone before creation, which is indicated by the
words 'Without wind'.
The vital force, though practically disposed of in the
last Sutra, is speciaUy mentioned is this Sutra with a view
to the question raised in the next Sutra.
Topic 4 : The chief prdria (vital force) is different from
air and its functions
8. (The chief prana) is neither air nor its function,
on aceoant of its being mentioned sepwately.
The Sutra discusses the nature of the chief prana. Is this
prana mere ah or its function, moving in and out as breath.
308 Sn-Bhdsya
[ 2.4.8.
or is it mere air which has assimied a special condition?
The opponent holds that it is mere air according to the text,.
'Prana is aur'; or that it may be the function of ak as in-
halation and exhalation. These views are rejected by the;
Sutra, on account of its being mentioned separately from
ak in the text, 'From Him are produced the vkal force,.
mmd and all the sense-organs, space, ak, fire, water, and
earth that supports everything' (Mu. II. i. 3). It cannot be
a mere function of ak, for the text does not mention the
functions of the other elements as separate things. The text
'Prana is ak' only indicates that prana is ak which has
assumed a special form, but not altogether a separate thing
from ak, like ke. It is not a separate element. The next
Sutra establishes this.
9. Bat vital force (is an instrument of the soul) lilte-
eyes etc. on account of (its) being taught with them and
for other reasons.
The vital force is not a separate element, but an instru-
ment of the soul like eyes etc. This follows from the fact
that it is mentioned in the conversation of the pranas along
with the organs of the soul. In common parlance, only like
things are mentioned or grouped together. So the vital force
is an instrument of the soul. 'And for other reasons' refers
to texts where the organs are called pranas; and the vital
force is said to be the chief prana. Vide Chd. I. ii. 7.
If the vital force is an instrument of the soul, then like
eyes etc. it must have some particular activity or function,
lielpful to the soul. But no such activity is visible. The next
Sutra refutes this objection.
,2.4.12.] Srl-Bhdsya 309
10. On account of its not Iiaving any activity (tliere
is) no objection, because thus (tbe scripture) teaches.
The objection that the prana has no activity helpful to
the soul is hot correct, for the vhal force mamtains the body
v/ith aU the organs. Vide Cha. V. i. 7. So the prana sub-
serves the pinpose of the soul, and is therefore an instrument
of the soul like the eyec etc.
11. It is taught as having a fivefold function like the
juind.
Even as deske etc. are not difEerent from the mind,
though they are difEerent functions of it produchig different
effects, according to the text, 'Deske, purpose, doubt.. .ah
this is mmd' etc. (Br. I. vi. 3), even so according to the
same text, 'PrdTia, apana, vyana, uddna, and samana aU this
is prdria', they are but fivefold functions of the one prana
and not dhferent from it.
Topic 5 : The minuteness of the vital force
3T^r w \R w
12. And it is minute.
Like the sense-organs, the vital force is also minute, for
the scriptural texts declare that it passes out of the body
with the soul, that k moves, and so on : 'When k (soul)
goes out, the vital force accompanies it' <Br. IV. iv. 2). An
objection inay be raised that other texts declare that it is
infinke :''Equal to these three worlds, equal to this universe'
310 Sn-Bhdsya
[ 2.4.12.
{Br. I. iii. 22). Tius is only by way of praise, as tlie life
of aU living beings depends on breath.
Topic 6 : The presiding deities of the organs
13. But the ruling over the senses by Fire and others:
and of the soul (over the organs) is owing to the will of the
highest Self (as is known) from the scriptures.
The rule of the deities Fire etc. over the organs (vide
Sutra II. i. 5) and of the soul also, as is known from com-
mon experience and texts like Br. II. i. 18, ultimately
depends on the will of the highest Self. 'He who, abiding
within Fke, rules Fire from within' etc. (Br. III. vii. 5).
Vide Tai. II. viii. 1 and Br. III. viii. 9 also.
14. And on account of the permanence of this.
This quality, inhering in all things, of beuig ruled by the
highest Self is permanent, as it is connected with His essen-
tial natiure. 'Havmg sent forth this. He entered into it; having
entered into it. He became Sat and Tyat' (Tai. II. 6). This
text shows that He enters mto all thmgs to be theur ruler.
Vide Gita, X. 42 also. So, ultimately, the rule of the gods
and the soul over the organs depends on the will of the
Lord.
Topic 7 : The organs are different from the chief prana
15. Tfcey (tihe other pranas), except the chief (praiia),.
2.4.17. ] Sn-Bhdsya
311
are organs, on accoant of (their) being so designated (by the
scriptures).
Are ah the pranas mentioned in Br. I. v. 21, organs or
is the chief prana to be excluded from this category? The
chief prana is not an organ like the rest, for texts Eke 'The
organs are ten and one (mind)' mention only the senses
and the mind as organs and not the chief prana.
16. On account of differentiating scriptural texts and
characteristic differences.
'From Him is born prana, the mind, and aU organs'
(MM. IT. i. 3): here the chief prana is stated as different
from the organs. No doubt the mind also is separately stated
from the organs, but other texts declare that the mind is an
organ. Vide Gltd, XV. 7. The chief prana, again, differs
in characteristics from the organs, for in susupti, deep sleep,
the chief prana functions, but not the mind and other organs.
The organs including the mind are instruments of the soul
for cognition and action, whhe the chief prana maintams
the body and the organs. It is because of thisNdependence of
the organs on the chief praria that they are called pranas
in Br. I. v. 21. So the chief prana is different from the
organs.
Topic 8 : The evolution of names and forms is the mork
of the Lord and not of the Soul
17. But the creation of names and forms is by Him
312
Srl-Bhdsya [ 2.4.17.
who does the tripartite (creation), for so the scriptures i.,
teach.
A question is raised whether the Hiranyagarbha
(Brahma) or the highest Self, having the Hnanyagarbha for
its body, fashions gross objects of name and form like gods
etc. The Siitra states that this activity belongs to the highest
Self, having Hiranyagarbha for its body, and not to Hiranya-
garbha (Brahma) only, for texts teach that names and
forms were evolved by the same agent that produces the
tripartite combination. 'Let me.. .differentiate name and *>
form,...of these let me make each one threefold' (Chd.
VI. iii. 2-3). Moreover Brahma cannot be the agent of the
tripartite combination, for he comes into existence only
after the tripartite creation is finished and the gross elements
are produced. The mundane egg is produced from the gross
elements, and from this egg is born, the four-faced Brahma
(Hiranyagarbha).
18. Flesh etc. are of earthy nature; so also in the
case of the other two, according to texts.
"An objection is raised against what is said in the last
Sutra. The objection is that, though the agent of both the
tripartite creation and evolving of name and form is the
same, he need not be the highest Self, but can be the indi-
vidual soul Brahma. For texts do refer to a tripartite process
regarding food taken by the individual souls. So it is not a
fact that the tripartite creation takes place before the evolu-
tion of name and form. Moreover, the Chdndogya text
(VI. iii: 2-3) quoted in the last Siitra clearly says that name
afld form'were evolved first and then the tripartite creation
2.4.19. ] Srl-Bhdsya
313
took place : 'Let me. . . dffieretitiate name and form,... of
these let me make each one threefold.'
The Sutra refutes this and says that the tripartite process
referred to in Chd. VI. v. 1 is only a description of the
evolutionary process of food, drink, etc. taken by (human)
beings and not the true tripartite process described in the
earlier Chdndogya text. 'Food when eaten becomes divided
into three parts' etc. (Chd. VI. v. 1). Food undergoes a
threefold change : a portion, the grossest, is rejected by the
organism ; a portion, the nutritive part, is asshnilated for body
building; and the finest or the subtle essence goes to' build
the mind. So the refused matter, flesh etc. and the mmd are
aU earth (food). Shnilarly, the other two elements, water
and fire, also imdergo a threefold change as described in the
next two verses (vide Chd. VI. v. 2-3). What the Chdndogya
text 'Let me.. . differentiate name afid form,... of these let
me make each one threefold' means is that the highest Seff
willed to evolve name and form, and for this pm-pose. He
created as a first step the gross elements from the fine ones
by the tripartite process, and then evolved name and form
with these gross elements. So the highest Seff alone, having
Hhanyagarbha as its body, is the evolver of name and form.
19. But the designation (of the gross elements as earth
etc.) on account of the preponderance (of a particular
element) in them.
Though each gross element is a compound of the three
rudknentary elements, yet due to the preponderance of one
of these three fine elements in the gross element, it is called
after that element as earth, water or fire. The repethion of
the word 'designation' indicates that the chapter ends here.
CHAPTER III
SECTION I
In the last two chapters, it has been shown that the
Vedanta texts establish Brahman, the first Cause, which is
free from all imperfections and endowed with an mfinite
number of good qualities and so different in nature from
all other beings, as the proper object of meditation for
attaining final release. In this connection, aU objections
based on the Smrtis and reasoning against the Vedantic view
have been refuted and shown to be incorrect, and it was
also shown that the so-called scriptural contradictions do not
exist with respect to the Vedantic view. The remaining two
chapters prescribe the means and mode of attaining Brahman.
This chapter particularly deals with meditation which is the
means of attaining Brahman. But without a spirit of dispas-
sion for the world and a desire for Brahman, no one would
be inclined to meditate on Him. In the first two sections of
this chapter, the imperfections of the soul and the character-
istics of Brahman, which is beyond .all imperfections, are
shown in contrast in order to create this dispassion for the
world and the desire for Brahman.
Topic 1 : The soul, when passing out of the body at death,
is enveloped with fine particles of the gross elements
1. (The soul) goes (out of the body) enveloped (with
subtle parts of the gross elements) with a view to obtaining
3.1.2. ]
Sri-Bhdsya 315
another of that (viz. a fresh body); (so it is known) front
the question and answer (in the scripture).
The Sutra discusses whether in transmigration the soul
takes with it subtle parts of the gross elements as the seed,
as it were, for the future body or not. The opponent holds
that it does not take them, for it is useless, because the
elements are easily available everywhere. This Sutra refutes
it. The words 'another of that' in the Siitra refer to the form
or body mentioned in 11. iv. 17. The soad, when it goes out
of one body and takes another, goes out with the subtle parts
of the gross elements ; that this is a fact is known from the
question and answer that occurs in the scriptture in the
pancdgni vidydthe knowledge of the five fires. 'Do you
know why in the fifth oblation water is caUed man ?' (Chd.
V. in. 3). This is the question, and the answer is given in
the subsequent texts which, after explaining how the five
oblations. in the forms of sraddhd, soma, rain, food, and
seed are offered in the five fires (i.e. objects imagined to be
fires for the sake of upasand) the heavens, parjanya, earth,
man, and womanend thus : 'For this reason is water in
the fifth oblation caUed man', i.e. comes to be designated
as man. From this, we understand that the soul goes out
enveloped with water (same as sraddhd).
2. But on account of (water) consisting of thiee ele-
ments (all these elements are present and not merely
water); (water alone is, however, mentioned) on account
of its preponderance.
An objection is raised that the text mentions only water
and not the other elements as accompanying the soul. The
316
Srl-Bhasya
[ 3.1.2.
Sutra says that, as the gross element of water contams the
other two elements also according to the tripartite creation,
all the three elements accompany the soul. As the watery
portion in the body, however, preponderates, it alone is
mentioned.
5nwi^r n ^ u
3. And because of the going of the organs (pranas)
(with the soul, the elements also accompany the soul).
'When it departs the vital force follows. When the vital
force departs, all the organs foUow' (Br. IV. iv. 2). Since
the organs follow the soul, they must have a material base ;
hence also it is inferred that the elements follow the soul,
thus forming a basis for the organs.
4. If it be said (that the organs do not follow the
soul), for the scriptures declare their entering into iire etc.,
(we say) not so, on account of its being so said in a secon-
dary sense.
'When the vocal organ of a man who dies is merged in
the fire' etc. (Br. III. ii. 13)-this text shows that the organs
are resolved ui their presiding deities, and hence it cannot
be said that they accompany the soul. This Sutra says that
these statements are to be taken in a secondary sense and
not literally, for the same text later says, 'The hairs of the
body enter the herbs, the hairs of the head enter the trees',
and this is obviously not true in the literal sense. Hence the
text must be taken in a secondary sense.
3.1.6. ]
Srl-Bhasya 317
5. If it be objected on account of (water) not being
mentioned in the first of the oblations, (we say) not so, be-
cause tbat (viz. water) only (is meant by the word
'sraddha'), on account of the appropriateness (of such an
interpretation).
An objection is raised that, as there is no mention of
v/ater in the first oblation, it is not correct to say that the
soul goes out enveloped in subtle parts of water. The text
mentions only sraddhd and not water as oblation, and
sraddhd is a mental attitude. 'On that altar the gods ofEer
sraddhd as oblation' (Cha. V. iv. 2). The Sutra refutes this
and says that by sraddhd in the text water is meant, for in
that case alone, there would be consistency between the
question and the answer. The question asked is, 'Do you
know why m the fifth oblation water is called man ?' and
the answer at the very beginnmg is that sraddhd is mentioned
as the oblation m the fire of heavenly world. So sraddhd
denotes water, otherwise there will be no syntactical unity
of the whole passage. The word 'sraddhd' is also used for
water in the scriptmres : 'Sraddhd indeed is water' (Tai. Sa.
1. vi. 8.1).
6. If it be said that on account of (the soul) not being
mentioned in the text (the soul does hot depart enveloped
in water etc.), (we say) not so, for the jivas who perform
sacrifices etc. (are understood).
An objection is raised that, in the Chdndogya text cited
(V. iii. 3); there is mention of water only, but there is no-
Srl-Bhdsya [ 3.1.6.
reference to the soul. So how can it be said that the soul
departs enveloped in water, and is born again as man ? The
Sutra refutes this view, for there is reference to the mode
of departure of the souls who perform sacrifices etc. Later
in the same chapter, it is said that those who have per-
formed sacrifices attain the world of gods and become
Somardja (King Soma) and, on the exhaustion of thek meri-
torious deeds, are reborn again as men. 'But they who,
being in the village, practise sacrifices and works of pubUc
utility, and give alms, go to the smoke, from smoke to night,
. . .from dkasa to the moon. This (i.e. this moon) is King
Soma. This is the food of the gods. This the gods eat' (Chd.
V. X. 3-4). Eearlier, we have the text, 'Out of that oblation
King Soma arises' (Chd. V. iv. 2). This King Soma is
recognized in Chd. V. x. 4, which also mentions King Soma
as quoted above. By the word 'water', therefore, the indi-
vidual soul enveloped in water, and having the water for
its body, is understood.
7. But (the souls' being the food of the gods in
heaven is used) in a secondary sense, on account of their
not knowing the Self; because (the Sruti) declares like
that.
In the text cited in the previous Sutra, it is said that
that which goes by the path of smoke etc. becomes the food
of the gods ; and as the soul is not a material edible thing,
how can those texts be taken as referrmg to the soul ? 'This
is King Soma. This is the food of the gods. This the gods
eat' (Cha. V. x, 4).
The word 'but' is used to remove this doubt. In the text
3.1-8. ] Srlr-Bh&Sya 319
quoted, the word 'food' is not used in the primary sense,
but metaphoricaUy, meanhig objects of enjoyment; and the
souls, in turn, enjoy in theh company. That the souls become
objects of enjoyment to the gods is known from texts hke,
'He is like a beast to the gods' (Br. I. iv. 10).
Therefore the soul goes out of the body at death envel-
oped in the subtle parts of the elements.
Topic 2 : The souls descending from heaven have a re-
sidual karma, which determines their birth
8i On the exhaustion of (good) work, (the soul) Mith
the residual karma (descends to this earth), as is known
from Sruti and Smrti, along the path (it) went by (from
here) and differently too.
The question is raised whether the soul that went to
heaven from here by the path of smoke etc. when it descends,
returns with any residual karma or not. The opponent holds
that there is no residual karma, for residual karma means
karma left over after what has been enjoyed. Sruti says,
'Havmg dwelt there tiU theh work is consumed, they return
again the same way as they went by' etc. (Chd. V. x. 5).
Vide Br. IV. iv. 6 also. These texts say that aU the karma is
exhausted and there is nothmg left. So the soul returns with-
out any residual karma.
The Siitra refutes this and says that the soul returns
with residual good and bad karma, for Sruti says, 'Among
these, those who have good residual karma quickly reach a
good womb, that of a Brahmana, Ksattriya, or Vaisya. But
320 Srl-Bhdsya
[3.1.8.
those who have bad residual karma reach an evil womb,,
that of a dog, or a hog, or a Candala' (Cha. V. x. 7). What
is exhausted in heaven is only that karma which gave the
soul a birth as god in heaven. So the enjoyment in heaven
exhausts the results of good work like sacrifices etc. but
there is other karma in store, according to which a man is
born again in good or bad environment. The Smrti also says^
'With the remainder of their karma, they are born ia a
noteworthy place, caste, and family, with good appearance,
longevity, knowledge, wealth, happiness, and intellect' (Gau.
II. xi. 12, 13). So the soul is born with residual karma. By
what way does it descend ? Following the same way that
it went by, but with some difference. That it returns by the
same way as it went is known from Chd. V. x. 5, which
mentions ether m the path, and that there is some difference
is known from the fact that the world of the fathers etc. are
omitted (vide Chd. V. x. 3), but wind, mist, etc. are men-
tioned (vide Chd. V. x. 6).
9. H it be said that on account of conduct (the
assumption of residual karma is unnecessary), (we say>
not so, (for the word 'conduct' is used) to denote indirectly
(karma). Thus (thinks) Karsnajini.
The text (Chd. V. x. 7) cited in the last Sutra says that
persons of 'good conduct' get a good birth. 'Good conduct*^
and karma are two different things, and as Sruti says that
'good conduct' leads to good birth, the assumption of residual
karma is unnecessary. The Sutra refutes this and says that
the sage Karsnajmi thinks that .'good conduct' indicates
good karma. - , . ^. ,
S.1.11.] Sri-Bhasya 321
10 If it be said (tbat in tliat case good conduct
would become) purposeless, (we say) not so, on account of
(karma) being dependent on tbat (good conduct).
An objection is raised that if good conduct be interpreted
as karma, that would make good conduct purposeless in our
lives, as it has no results. The Sutra refutes this on the
ground that only people of good conduct are entitled to
perform sacrifices etc. 'Hhn who is devoid of good conduct
the Vedas do not purify.' Thus karma is dependent on goqd
conduct, and hence the latter has a purpose. So Karsnajmi
thinks that it is karma and not mere good conduct that is
the cause of the new bhth.
11. But (conduct) is'merely good and evil works;
thus (the sage) Badari (thinks).
In the text 'By good conduct. . .by bad conduct' (Chd.
V. X. 7), by conduct is meant good and evh works, for the
word 'conduct' is used in the general sense of action as,
lor instance, when we say, 'That man practises righteousness'.
Thus men of good conduct means those whose actions are
praiseworthy. So Badari thinks that nothmg else but good
and evh works are denoted by the word 'conduct'. This
opinion of Badari is accepted by the Sutra-kara, for the
word 'but' in the Sutra refutes the view of Karsnajini given
in the previous Siitra. But Karsnajini's view is partiaUy
accepted by the Sutra-kara, in so far as he says that 'good
conduct' entitles one to perform sacrifices etc. The conclu-
sion therefore is that the soul descends with residual karma.
21
322
Sn-Bhdsya
[3.1.12.
Topic 3 : The fate of souls who are not entitled by their
actions to go to the lunar sphere after death
12. The Sruti declares (the going to the lunar sphere
etc.) of those also who do not perform sacrifices etc.
The question of those who do not perform sacrifices etc.
is taken up for discussion. The opponent's view is given in
Sutras 12-16. He holds that all, even the evil-doers, that is,
those who faU to perform what is enjoined and perform
what is forbidden by the scriptures, also go to heaven. The
scriptures say so : 'All who depart from here go to the moon'
{Kau. I. 2). Then, is there no difference between those who
perform sacrifices and the evil-doers ? The next Sutra
answers this point.
13. But of others (i.e. the evil-doers), after having
enjoyed (the results of their evil works) in the abode of
Yama, there is ascent and descent (from the lunar world);
for such a course is declared (for the evil-doers) by the
Sruti.
For the evil-doers also, there is ascent and descent from
the lunar world, but with this difference, that is, they first
go to the abode of Yama, where they suffer punishment
for their evil works. 'The hereafter never rises before an
ignorant person,. . .thus he falls again and again under my
sway' {Ka. I. ii. 6).
^H^frT ^ W \^ W
14. The Smrtis also declare thus.
3.1.17.]
Sn-Bhdsya
323
That all these beings are under the sway of Yama is
declared by Smrti writers also.
15. Moreover, there are seven hells.
Seven hells like Raurava etc. are mentioned by Smrtis,
to which evil-doers go to expiate their sins through suffering.
16. And on account of his (Yama's) control even
there (in those heUs), there is no contradiction.
As the evil-doers are sent to the seven hells by the
command of Yama, there is no contradiction. So the evil-
doers, after undergoing punishment for their evU actions,
ascend to the moon and again descend from there.
The view expressed in the foregoing Sutras is refuted by
the next Sutra,
17. But (the two paths, viz. of the gods and of the
fathers are the results) of knowledge and work (respec-
tively), on account of their being the subject under
discussion.
The evil-doers do not go to the lunar world, for the text
declares the path of the gods and that of the fathers only
for those who have knowledge and (good) works. Know-
ledge and work are the two topics under discussion, and the
two paths are declared as the results of these two : 'Among
them, those who know thus (the knowledge of the five fires)
324
Sri-Bhdsya
[ 3.1.17.
aad those who are devoted to faith and austerity in the
forest go to light' {Cha. V. x. 1); 'But those who living in
viUages practise sacrifices and works of public utility and
gift go to the smoke' {Cha. V. x. 3). The evil-doers there-
fore cannot go by the path of the gods, as they have no
knowledge ; nor can they go to the lunar world by the path
of the fathers, for they have not performed sacrifices etc.
But, then, the text 'in the fifth oblation, water is caUed
man' shows that this fifth oblation is the cause of a new
body, and as this presupposes going to the sphere of the
moon, it must be admitted that, for the attainment of a
new body, the evil-doers also have to go to the moon. This
view is refuted in the next Sutra.
18. Not in the case of the third (place), for so it is
seen (from the scriptures).
The term 'third place' refers to mere evil-doers. These
evil-doers do not depend on a fifth oblation for the origina-
tion of a body. This is known from the scriptures. To
the question, 'Do you know why the world (of heaven)
is not fiUed up ?' the text says, 'On neither of these two
ways are those small creatures continually returning. Of
them, it may be said : Be born and die. This is the thhd
place. Therefore that world (of heaven) never becomes full'
{Chd. V. X. 8). It is because the evil-doers do not ascend
or descend from the world of the moon that that world does
not get fiUed up. It follows therefore that the third place
or evil-doers do not depend upon the fifth oblation for the
origination of a body. They are born hrespective of this
oblation.
3,1.21. ]
Sn-Bhasya 325
19. And, moreover, (cases vcithout the fifth oblation)
are recorded in the world.
I Cases like Drona, who had no mother, and Draupadi
and Dhrstadyumna, who had neither father nor mother,
are recorded in the Smrtis.
} 20. Also on account of observation.
6ruti texts also declare that, ia some cases, the bodies
originate without the fifth oblation, i.e. mating : 'Of the
aforesaid beings, there are only three originsthose born
from eggs, those born from living beings, and those which
germinate (or plant life)' (Chd. VI. iii. 1). Those which
germinate require no fifth oblation for their birth.
21. The tWrd term (i.e. plant life) includes that which
;V springs from moisture.
The Chdndogya text enumerates the origination of only
three kinds of life, i.e. viviparous, oviparous, and plant life,
but does not refer to life spriaguig from moisture (svedaja).
The Siitra says that it makes no difference, as that which
germinates from moisture is included in plant life, since
both germinate, one from the earth and the other from
moisture.
Hence it is a settled fact that the evil-doers do not go
to heaven, but only those who perform sacrifices.
326 Sn-Bhasya
[3.1.22.
Topic 4 : The soul in its descent from the moon does not
get embodied in ether etc. but attains similarity oj
nature
dc^mMm%;, WT^: U R R W
22. (The soul, when descending from the world of
the moon) attains similarity of nature with them (i.e. with
ether, air, etc.), (that alone) being reasonable.
The path of the descent of souls from candraloka is given
by Sruti as foUows : 'They return again the same way as
they come by ; they come to the ether, from the ether to the
air; the sacrificer, having become ah, becomes smoke' etc.
(Chd.V.x. 5). The question is : Does the soul become ether,
ah, etc. in the same sense that it becomes a man on earth,
that is, has it ether etc. for its body, or does it attain shni-
larity of nature with ether etc. ? The opponent holds that it
takes ether etc. for its body. Just as the soul in the sraddhd
state becomes the moon, in the same sense it also becomes
ether etc. i.e. it becomes embodied in ether etc. as there is
no reason to differentiate between the two cases. This Sutra
refutes this view and says that it only attauis shnharity of
nature, and does not get embodied. There is a reason for this
view. In the case of becoming a man or the moon, the soul
gets embodied for the enjoyment of its karma, but there is
no such enjoyment of karma in the intermediate stages of its
descent, and so there is no need of a body. Hence it only
attains simharity of nature.
Topic 5 : The entire descent of the soul takes only a
short time
23. ^ (The soul's descent from the moon through the
3.1.24. ]
Sn-Bhasya
various stages up to tiie eartli talies) not very long time,
on account of special declaration (of the Srutis with respect
to the stages after that as taldng time).
The question is raised whether the soul in its descent,
while passing through the various stages, remains m those
stages for long or attams the subsequent stages quickly. The
Sutra says that the soul passes through the various stages
up to the earth quickly, as the Sruti text says explicitly
about the later stages as hard to escape from, thereby hmting
that the earlier stages are attained quickly. 'Thence he is
born as rice and corn, herbs and trees, sesame and beans.
From there the escape is beset with many more difficulties'
(Chd. V. X. 6).
Topic 6 : When the souls enter into plants etc. they only
get connected with them and do not participate
in their life
24. (The descending soul enters) into what is ruled
by another (soul) ; for the Sruti statement (here also) is as
in the previous cases.
'Then he is born as rice' etc. (Cha. V. x. 6)the ques-
tion is whether the word 'born' is to be taken in its primary
sense, meaning that the soul actually gets embodied as plants,
herbs etc. or whether the soul is merely connected with the
plants etc. The Sutra says that it is merely connected with
the plants etc. for the same reason as given in Sutra 22,
i.e. there is no enjoyment of karma in these stages also, and
so there is no need of a body. Whenever birth m the
primary sense takes place, and there is experience of fruits
328 Srt-Bhdsya [ 3.1.24.
of action, it is made clear by the Sruti by a reference to
karma which brings about that birth, as in 'Those whose
conduct has been good will quickly attain a good burth' etc.
(Chd.V. X. 7). The actions which resulted in the enjoyment
of heaven are exhausted before the soul begins to descend,
and the other karmas which have not yet begun to produce
then results lead to embodiment as mentioned in Chd. V.
X. 7. In the interval between these two stages, no new karma
originates for the enjoyment of whose results a body is
necessary. So the souls are only connected with plants etc.
and they are not born as such in the primary sense.
25. If it be said (that the sacrifices in which animals
are killed) are unholy^ (we say) not so, on account of
scriptural authority.
A further objection is raised against the view expressed
in the last Suira. During the sacrhices, which entitled the
soul to go to heaven and enjoy, there was some bad karma
also diie to the kiUhig of animals. And this bad karma can
lead to the soul's getting actuaUy embodied as plants etc.
during its descent from the moon. The Sutra refutes this view
and says that no bad karma accrues by kiUing animals in
sacrifices, as it is sanctioned by the scriptures.
26. Then (the soul gets) connected with him who per-
forms the act of generation.
That the descending soul is not hteraUy born as rice etc.
is further established by the verse which says that the soul
3.1.27. ] Sn-Bhdsya 329
becomes the person who performs the act of generation.
Tor whoever eats food and performs the act of generation
(the soul) becomes that bemg' (Chd. V. x. 6). This means
that the soul only gets connected with that person. So we
have to understand that, in the precedmg stages also, the
soul only gets connected with plants, herbs, etc. and is not
actually born as such.
27. From the womb a (new) body is born.
It is only when the soul reaches the womb that it gets,
according to its residual karma, a body for the enjoyment
of pleasure and pain. In the previous stages, it only gets
connected with ether, air, etc.
CHAPTER i n
SECTION II
In the previous section, the waking state of the soul, its
transmigration to different spheres and return to this world,
and its consequent sufferings in the state of bondage were
described in order to engender a spirit of renunciation. Now,
in order to create a desire to realize the Lord, the present
section deals with the infinite auspicious qualities of the
Lord, who is free from aU imperfections.
In order to show the soul's unperfections further from
its suffering in the dream state also, as weU as to show the
Lord's wonderful power in creatmg the dream world for the
enjoyment of the particular soul, the first topic is begun.
Though the dream state of the soul, which shows its unper-
fections like its waking state, ought to have reasonably been
uicluded in the previous section dealing with the wakmg
state, yet, as the topic discusses the wonderful power of the
Lord, it is quite in the fitness of things to include this dream
state in this section, which deals with the Lord's auspicious
quahties.
Topic, 1 : The soul in the dream state
1. In the mermediate state (i.e. the dream state)
creation (is by the soul), because (the Sruti) says so.
The Sruti says, 'There are no chariots, nor horses to be
3.2.3. ]
Srl-Bhasya
331
yoked to them, nor roads there, but he himself creates the
chariots, horses, roads, etc. . . . For he is the agent' (Br.
IV. iii. 10). The question is whether this creation is by the
individual soul or by the supreme Lord. The intermediate
state refers to the state of dream, for the Sruti says, 'The
dream state, which is the thnd, is at the junction of the two'
(Br. IV. iii. 9). In this state, the creation is by the soul,
for the Sruti says, 'He is the agent', by which the soul is
referred to.
2. And some (recensions state the individual self to
be) the creator and (the objects of desires there stand for)
sons etc.
Some sakhas or Vedic recensions clearly say that the
soul is the creator of dream objects. 'He who is awake in
us shaping objects of desne (kdmas) whUe we are asleep'
(Ka. II. ii. 8). 'Kdmas' does not mean mere desires, but
objects of desires like sons etc. as can be gathered from the
previous texts : 'Ask for aU kdmas according to your wish'
(Ka. I. i. 25); 'Ask for sons and grandsons that will be
r centenarians' (Ka. I. i. 23).
3. But it is mere Maya, on account of its (soul's)
true nature not being manifest fully.
'But' refutes the view of the previous two Sutras.
The creation in dreams is by the Lord, and it is His
iVIaya only. As the dream world is experienced only by a
particular soul, and lasts for some time only, this creation
u ^ n
332 Srl-Bhdsya
is wonderful; in this sense, it is cahed Maya, but it is
not illusion. True wih etc. the natmral traits of the soul, are
manifest only in the state of perfection and not m the state
of bondage or samsara. Therefore it is not possible for the
soul in bondage to create objects in dreams. The person
mentioned in Br. IV. hi. 10 and Ka. II. u. 8 is not the soul,
but the supreme Self, as His characteristics are referred to
both at the beginnmg and at the end of the text, 'He who is
awake in us, and goes on creating deshable things even when
the senses fah asleep, is pmre. He is Brahman... .AU the
worlds are fixed in Him ; none can transcend Him. This is
that' (Ka. II. u. 8). So, we have to take, in conformity with
this text, that Br. IV. hi. 10 also refers to the supreme
Person.
If in hs real nature the individual seh is free from aU
imperfections, then why does it not manhest itseh ? The next
Sutra answers this.
4. But according to the wish of the supreme Lord, it
is covered, for from Him (the Lord) are its (the soul's)
bondage and freedom.
The word 'but' refutes the objection. It is according to
the wish of the supreme Person that the true nature of the
soul is hidden. Due to the sinful karma of the soul, hs
essential nature is hidden by the Lord. That is why the
scriptures say that the bondage and release of the soul come
from the Lord : 'Whenever he finds freedom from fear and
rests in that invisible, bodiless, inexpressible, unsupported
Brahinan, he reaches the state of fearlessness' (Tai. II. 7),
'This one indeed enlivens (people)'; 'Out of His fear the
wind blows' (Tai. II. 7, 8).
3.2.7.1 Sn-Bhdsya 333
5. And that (covering of the soul's true nature results)
also from its connection with the body.
The covermg of the soul's true nature results from its
connection with the body made of gross elements or fine
elements in the state of creation and dissolution respectively.
As its true nature is covered and not manifest, it is not able
to create the dream objects. They are created by the Lord
^ for the retribution of the soul and are experienced only by
that particular soul. Ka. II. ii. 8 therefore can apply only to
the supreme Lord.
6. But yet it serves as an omen according to the
sruti; (and) expert dream-readers also say (thus).
A further reason is given to show that the dream world
is not created by the soul. Dreams often forecast coming
events, good or ill fortune (vide Chd. V. ii. 8). The expert
dream-readers also say that dreams forecast good and evU
fortune. If the dream world were the creation of the soul,
then it would fashion such dreams only as would forecast
f good fortune and not ni fortune. Hence, the creation of the
dream world proceeds from the Lord only.
Topic 2 : The soul in dreamless sleep
Now the state of deep sleep or susupti is taken up for
discussion.
7. The absence of that (dreaming, i.e. dreamless sleep
334 Srt-Bhasya
[3.2.7.
takes place) in tlie nerves and in tiie self, as it is known
from the sruti.
In different texts, susupti (deep sleep) is said to take
place under different conditions. 'And when a man is asleep
. . . so that he sees no dreams, then he has entered into those
nerves (nddis)' (Cha. VIII. vi. 3); 'Through them, he moves
forth and rests in the pericardium, i.e. ui the region of the
heart' (Br. II. i. 19); 'When a man sleeps here, he becomes
united with the True' (Chd. VI. viii. 1). The question is
whether each of them alternatively or all of them together
are the seat of deep sleep. The opponent holds that, as the
various places mentioned are in the same case ending, the
locative case, they are alternatives ; and moreover, the sleep-
ing soul being atomic cannot be at all the places. The Siitra
refutes this and says that there can be no alternative in such
cases, for aU the Vedic texts are equally authoritative, and
to accept one.alternative would mean the sublation of the
authority of the other texts for the tune being. The same
case ending, moreover, is used where things serve different
purposes and have to be combined, as, for example, when
we say, 'He sleeps in the palace, he sleeps on a couch',
where we have to combine the two into one as 'He sleeps
cn a couch in the palace'. Similarly, here also we have to
combine all the texts, meaning that the soul goes through
the nerves to the region of the heart and there rests in
Brahman. Thus Brahman alone is the knmediate resting
place of the soul in deep sleep.
mi sRtsf^s?^^ u u
8. Hence the awakening from this (i.e. Brahman).
Since Brahman is the immediate resting place of the
3,2.9. ] Sn-Bhdsya 335
soul, the Sruti declares that the souls awake from that, i.e.
Brahman, 'AU these creatures, when they have come back
from the True, know not that they have come back from the
True' (Chd. VI. x. 2).
Topic 3 : The selfsame soul returns from susupti
9. But the selfsame soul (returns from Brahman after
susupti) on account of work, memory, scriptural authority,
and precept.
Does the same soul arise after susupti or a different one ?
The opponent holds that, since the soul in deep sleep rests
in Brahman, freed from aU its limhations, it is as good as a
released soul, and can no more have any connection with
samsdra ; so the soul rising from deep sleep is a different
one.
This view the Siitra refutes and says that the seffsame
soul returns after deep sleep, for the following reasons :
(1) The soul has to undergo retribution for the good and
evU acts done by it before it attains knowledge. If a different
soul arises, then the retribution would be experienced by
one who has not done that karma. So one wiU be punished
for the actions of another, whUe the latter goes scotfree.
(2) There is the experience of identity of personality before
and after deep sleep. (3) There is the scriptural authority
in texts like, 'Whatever these creatures are here, whether
a tiger, or a lion, or a woff, or a boar,.. .that they become
again' (Chd. VI. ix. 3). From this, we find that the seffsame
soul returns after deep sleep. (4) If the person who rises
from sleep is a different one, then scriptural injunctions with
336, Srt-Bhdsya
respect to release would be useless. For, if a person attains
release by merely going to sleep, the scriptural instruction
would be unnecessary for attaining hberation. Nor can it
be said that the soul in deep sleep is free from aU limhations,
and manhests itseh in its true nature like the released soul,
for the description of the two states in scriptural texts is
quite different. Of the former state, the Sruti says, 'It seems
as if he has gone to annihilation. I see no good in this' (Chd.
VIII. xi. 1). Of the released soul, it says, 'There he moves
. . .rejoicing' (Chd. VIII. xii. 3); 'He becomes sovereign. He
becomes free to act as he wishes' (Chd. VII. xxv. 2 ; see
also Chd. VII. xxvi. 2). While the sleepmg soul is ignorant,
the released soul is aU-knowing etc. The sleeping soul is
still whhin the sphere of samsdra, but having discarded
temporarUy the instruments of action and knowledge, and
thus being incapable of knowledge and enjoyment, it rests
completely in Brahman and rises again refreshed for new
enjoyment and action. So deep sleep is not liberation ; hence
the selfsame soul returns after deep sleep.
Topic 4 : The nature of a swoon
10. In a swoon, there is partial death, as that is the
only alternative left.
The question of swoon is taken up for discussion now.
Is swoon mcluded in the three states already stated above
and the fourth state, death, or is it a fifth state different
from them ? The Sutra states that it is pardal death. It is
not waking or dream state, as the soul has no consciousness
in a swoon ; nor can it be deep sleep, for that gives rest and
3.2.10.]
Srl-Bhdsya 337
happiness, which a swoon does not. On the other hand, it
gives only pain and suffermg. The causes that lead the soul
to the two states also are different. Nor can it be death,
because a person in a swoon returns to life. So the only
alternative left is to regard it as partial death.
Topic 5 : The nature of the supreme Brahman
In the preceding topics, the experience of pleasure and
pain by the soul, in the various states (described above)
which are brought about by its connection with the body,
has been described. In this topic, the nature of the supreme
Brahman, as being free from all imperfections and as pos-
sessing infinite blessed qualities, is declared. It is shown that
the supreme Brahman, though as the inner ruler is connected
with the body presided over by the soul, yet is not, because
of this connection with the body, affected by pleasure and
pain like the soul. The imperfections of the soul and its
suffering would lead men to dispassion ; and the nature of
Brahman, as free from imperfections and as having blessed
qualities, would create in men a desire to attain Him.
No doubt it was shown in the Brahma-Sutras, I. ii. 8,
y I. ii. 22, and II. i. 14 that Brahman, not being subject to
karma, was free from all imperfections of the soul, though
embodied like it. But then karma does not directly brmg
about the imperfections of the soul, but it brings about the
soul's connection with a body ; and it is this connection of
the soul with the body that causes suffering etc. to the soul
(vide B.S. III. ii. 5). So it is immaterial whether this con-
nection is brought about by karma or voluntarily. So long
as this connection with the body is there, the being abiding
in it will be affected by imperfections. A person who of his
22
338
Srl-Bhdsya
[3,2.10.
own accord walks into a filthy place will nevertheless be
contaminated by the filth. So, though Brahman's connection
with the bodies as their inner ruler is a voluntary one, yet
It cannot escape the imperfections which result from this
connection.
This view is refuted by the next Sutra.
11. Not even on account of place (is there any imper-
fection) in Brahman, because throughout (the scripture It
is described) as having a twofold characteristic.
The supreme Brahman is not contaminated by imper-
fections like the soul, though It abides in the earth, the soul,
etc. as theh inner ruler. Why ? Because throughout the scrip-
ture. Brahman is described as having a twofold nature, viz.
being free from all imperfections and as possessing aU blessed
qualities. 'This is the Atman, free from evh, free from old age,
free from death, free from sorrow. . .whose deshe is True,
whose resolve is True' (Chd. VIII. i. 5); 'Who is omnis-
cient in general and aU-knowing in detail' (Mu. I. i. 9);
'Without any stam etc' (Sve. VI. 19); 'His nature is full of
ail the blessed qualities. . . where all evhs, sufferings, etc. do
not exist' (Vi. VI. v. 84-85).
12. If it be said on account of different states (the
supreme Brahman as the inner ruler is affected by imper-
fections), (we reply) not so, because with respect to each
of the states, the Sruti says the opposite of that (i.e. imper-
fections).
A further objection is made. The soul is by nature free
from all imperfections (vide Chd. VIII. vu.^Prajapati's
5.2.14.]
Srl-Bhdsya 339
instructions), but due to its connection with diSerent bodies
like divine, human, etc. it is affected by imperfections.
Similarly, Brahman, though possessing the twofold charac-
teristic, yet due to Its connection with different bodies as the
inner ruler, cannot escape imperfections. The latter haff of
the Sutra refutes this view and says, 'It is not so' ; for every
text in which the Lord is described as abidmg as the inner
ruler also says that He is immortal, thereby denying ail
imperfections in Him. The true nature of the soul, however,
is obscured as long as it is connected with the body (vide
B.S. 111. ii. 4 and 5). Therefore the supreme Brahman,
though connected with bodies, is not affected by imperfec-
tions.
srfq u w
13. Moreover, some (teach) thus.
Some recensions of the Vedas {sakhas) directly teach
that, though the soul and Brahman are connected with the
seffsame body, yet the soul alone experiences pleasure and
pain, while Brahman is not affected like that. 'Two birds of
beautfful plumage, inseparable friends, cling to the same
tree. One of them eats the sweet fruit, while the other looks
'r on without eatmg' (MM. III. i. 1).
It is the soul's embodiment in human, divine, and other
bodies that causes its subjection to karma. Similarly, Brah-
man would also be so subjected by embodiment. How can
It be free from karma and not be enjoying its fruit ?
14. Verily (Brahman is) merely formless, since It is
the principal agent with respect to that (revealing of names
and forms).
340 Sn-Bhdsya [ 3.2.14.
Though Brahman by entering into bodies human, divine,
etc. is connected with those forms, yet by Itself It is al-
together formless and therefore not subject to karma, as the
soul is due to its embodied condition. Why ? Because It is
the chief agent in the revealing of names and forms suited
for bringkig about the soul's enjoyment of the fruit of its
karma. It abides in all bodies for the fulfilment of the soul's
enjoyment and not for Its own enjoyment. 'Verily, what is
called dkdsa is the revealer of name and form. That within
which they are is Brahman' etc. (Chd. VIII. xiv. 1). Being
the chief agent in the differentiation of name and form. It
is different from them.
Therefore Brahman has a twofold characteristic.
15. Even as Brahman is of the nature of consciousness
(so also It has these characteristics); (the texts) not being
devoid of meaning.
Texts like 'Brahman is existence, knowledge, infinite'
declare that Brahman is undifferentiated consciousness. How
can it have a twofold characteristic ? This objection is refuted
by this Sutra. Even as Brahman is regarded as essentially
of the nature of consciousness and seff-limiinous to preserve
the authority of the text quoted above, so also to keep mtact
the authority of texts like, 'Who is onmiscient in general and
aU-knowing in detaU' etc. (Mu. I. i. 9), also vide Sve. VI.
8, we have to take that Brahman has a twofold character-
istic. For they, too, are not without meanmg.
16. And (the text quoted) says so much only.
3.2.18.] Srl-Bhasya 341
' ' '~n j r
The text 'Existence, knowledge, infinite is Brahman'
declares that Brahman has consciousness for its essential
nature, but does not negate the other attributes of Brahman
declared by other texts.
17. (The scripture) also shows (this, and) thus also
(is it) stated by the Smrtis.
The Sruti declares that Brahman is free from aU imper-
fections and endowed with numerous blessed qualities. 'Who
is the supreme Lord over aU lords' etc. {Sve. VI. 8); 'His
great power is described to be of various kinds' etc. {Sve.
VI. 9); 'Who is partless, free from actions, tranquil, fault-
less, tamtless' etc. {Sve. VI. 19); vide also Mu. I. i. 9. The
Smrti also says so : 'He who knows Me, bhthless and begin-
ningless' {Gltd, X. 3); 'I am the origin and dissolution of
the whole world' {Gltd, VII. 6); 'Beyond Me there is naught'
{Gltd, VII. 7); and so on.
Thus, under aU conditions Brahman is declared to pos-
sess the twofold characteristic, and He is not affected by
the imperfections of the various condhions.
18. Therefore also (with respect to Brahman we have)
comparisons like the images of the sun etc.
Though Brahman abides in various places like the earth
etc. yet It always has the twofold characteristics, and is not
in the least affected by the imperfections attached to the
places. Therefore the scripture uses the shnile of the reflected
sun in a sheet of water or in a mhror with respect to
Brahman. Just as the sun is not in anyway contaminated by
342
Sri-Bhdsya
[3.2.18.
the imperfections in the water, so is Brahman not affected
by the imperfections of the various places like earth etc.
19. But (there is) no similarity, for It is not appre-
hended (there) like (the sun in the) water.
An objection is raised in this Sutra against what was
said in the previous one. The existence of the sun in the
water is not real, but the existence of Brahman in the earth
etc. is real. So the two cases are not similar, and therefore
it cannot be said, on the basis of this analogy, that It is not
affected by the imperfections of the places in which It
abides.
20. Brahman's participation in the increase and
decrease (of the earth etc.) due to Its abiding within (is
denied by the example cited before) ; for both (the exam-
ples) are appropriate. It is also so seen in the world.
The example given in Sutra 18 is meant only to deny
Brahman's participation in the imperfections of the earth
and other beings within which It abides. It is only on this
supposition that the two examples in the following text are
appropriate : 'As the one ether is rendered manifold by jars
etc. or as the one sun becomes manffold in several sheets
of water, thus the one Self is rendered manifold by abiding
in many places.' Ether actually exists in the jars etc. while
the sun does not actually exist in the water. The only com-
mon factor in these two examples is the fact of not being
contaminated by the imperfections. So, since both the ex-
amples are appropriate, they are meant to teach this particular
3.2.21. ]
Srl-Bhdsya 343
fact only with respect to Brahnian, viz. Its not being
contaminated by the imperfections of the places wherein It
abides. The comparison is restricted to this fact only. In
common parlance also, comparisons are often made with
respect to a particular quality in two things, as, for example,
when we say, 'This boy is a lion', only the quality of courage
is common to both the boy and the lion. So the example
cited m SUtra 18 of the reflected images of the sun is apt.
The conclusion therefore is that Brahman is not suUied in
the least by the imperfections of the sentient and non-
sentient beings in which It abides.
In Br. II. ui. 6, we have, 'Now therefore the description
(of Brahman): "Not this, not this" ' etc. Since this text
denies the gross and subtle forms of Brahman taught imme-
diately before, it shows that Brahman is only pure Being
bereft of all quahties. So how can It have the twofold char-
acteristics described earlier, viz. being free from aU imper-
fections and being endowed with infinite auspicious quahties?
This doubt is removed in the next Siitra.
S l f ^ c I I ^ 51%^ % cleft 'ET Wr: U ^ ? U
21. The text denies that-muchness of Brahman (des-
cribed earlier) and says more than that.
Since the gross and subtle worlds are not known by
other means of knowledge than through the scriptures as
modes of Brahman, one cannot think of the scriptures deny-
ing what they had expressly taught first. So what the text
denies is only that-muchness of Brahman's qualities. These
two forms do not exhaust Its qualities, for the text speaks
of further quahties of Brahman after that : 'For there is
nothing higher than this (Brahman) that has been described'.
344 Srl-Bhdsya
[ 3.2.21.
i.e. tliere is notliing superior to Braliman either by nature or
by qualities. 'Then comes the name, the Truth of truth ; for
the pranas are true, and It is the Truth of them.' Pranas here
mean the souls, because they accompany the latter at death.
The souls are true, because they do not imdergo any change
in their essential nature at the time of creation. 'The Lord
is the Truth of these true souls', for the souls contract and
expand with respect to intelligence, while He is unaffected.
Thus the subsequent part of the text connects Brahman with
some more qualities. So the 'Not this, not this' does not
deny the attributes of Brahman already taught earlier, but
denies that Its nature is confined to those two forms or
attributes only. Brahman therefore possesses the twofold
characteristics.
A further objection is raised. Brahman is apprehended
through perception as merely pure Being. All the rest is
illusory. This is what 'Not this, not this' teaches. This is
refuted in the next Sutra.
22. That (Brahman) is not manifest, for (so the scrip-
ture) says.
This Siitra estabhshes that Brahman cannot be appre-
hended by any other proof than the scripture. 'He is not
apprehended by the eye, nor by the other sources, nor by
penance' etc. (Mu. III. i. 8); 'His form does not exist with-
in the range of vision ; nobody sees Him with the eyes'
(Ka. II. vi. 9).
23. And moreover (Brahman is experienced) in per-
fect meditation, according to Sruti and Smrti.
3.2.25. ] Srl-Bhdsya
345
He is experienced in deep meditation only. Other
than by this method of love in the form of deep meditation,
He is not experienced. So declare the Sruti and Smrti : 'This
Self is not attained by learning' {Ka. I. ii. 23); 'Neither by
the Vedas. . .can I be seen' etc. {Gltd, XI. 53). The Sruti
in Br. III. ii. 1, teaches for the sake of meditation that the
gross and the subtle universe are two forms of Brahman.
Having taught so, the Sruti cannot evidently deny this teach-
ing later. So what is denied is only that-muchness to Brah-
man's nature or qualities described in Br. III. ii. 1.
5| ^7RTTf?^^ttKlf 5 1 ^ r U R>i W
24. There is non-difference (in the qualities of Brah-
man with respect to apprehension) as in the case of light
(Imowledge) ; that apprehension (of Brahman) takes place
by constant practice of meditation.
When Brahman is experienced, then, just as one finds
Knowledge and Bhss to be the essential nature of Brahman,
so also one finds that the gross and subtle universes are Its
modes or attributes. Vamadeva and other rsis experienced
like that. 'Seeing this, Rsi Vamadeva understood, "I have
become Manu, the sun" ' etc. {Br. I. iv. 10). This appre-
hension of Brahman is attained through constant medhation.
3icfts?(?^ f| w Rx u
25. Hence Brahman is qualified by endless qualities ;
thus His (twofold) characteristics (hold good).
Thus it is stated by the scriptures that Brahman is dis-
tinguished by infinite number of blessed qualities. Therefore
His twofold characteristic are estabhshed.
346 Sn-Bhdsya
[ 3.2.26.
Topic 6 : The relation between the non-sentient world
and Brahman
26. But on account of both (i.e. difference and non-
difference) being taught (by the Sruti), (the relation between
the non-sentient world.and Brahman is to be taken) like
that between a serpent and its coils.
In the last topic, the non-sentient world was shown to
be a form of Brahman. Now the relation between the two is
defined. 'Brahman has two forms' (Br. II. iii. 1)this text
says that the non-sentient world constitutes the two forms
of Brahman. The question is : What is the relation between
the two, the non-sentient world and Brahman. The Sruti
declares both difference and non-difference between the two.
'This is Brahman ; this is all' (Br. II. v. 1); 'Atman alone
is all this' (Chd. VII. xxv. 2)texts like these declare non-
difference. Again, texts like 'Well, let me, entering into these
three deities' etc. (Chd. VI. iii. 2) declare difference between
the two. So the world is but a special form or arrangement
of Brahman, like the snake and its coils. Just as the coils
are different from the snake in name and form, but non-
different as regards substance, since the same snake exists
as the coils, so also the non-sentient world is different from
Brahman in name and form, but one in substance.
27. Or like (the relation between) light and its sub-
stratum, on account of both being luminous.
The 'or' sets aside the view of the previous Siitra. If
3.2.28.]
Srl-Bhdsya 347
Brahinan Itself exists as the non-sentient world, even as the
snake constitutes the coils, then Brahman would undergo a
change, and the texts which declare changelessness in Brah-
man will be contradicted. So also will the texts, which declare
difference be contradicted. Moreover, Brahman will be con-
taminated by the imperfections of the world. Therefore their
relation is as between light and its substratum. WhUe they
are different, yet, as both are fire, they are non-different.
Even so is the non-sentient world a form of Brahman.
^(OT U R^ W
28. Or (the relation between the two) is as given
before.
The 'or' sets aside both the views given in Sutras 26
and 27. Of these two views, the first.one has already been
refuted. The second view, expressed in the last Sutra, would
mean that just as fire is common to both light and its sub-
stratum, so also a quality like Brahmanhood is common to
both Brahman and the non-sentient world. This would
reduce Brahman to an abstract generic quality, which would
contradict the Sruti texts which declare It as a concrete
entity. Moreover Brahmanhood cannot be true of the ma-
terial world.
Therefore this Siitra says that the relation between the
non-sentient world and Brahman is as described before m
Sutras II. iu. 43 and 45, where the relation of the individual
soul to Brahman has been discussed. Like the soul, the non-
sentient world also is an attribute of Brahman, incapable
of being realized apart from It, and so a part of Brahman.
In this explanation, the texts which declare difference and
non-difference can be interpreted in their primary sense.
348 Sn-Bhasya
[ 3.2.28.
As a part of Brahman, the world is non-different from It;
but the world, as an attribute, and Brahman, as the object
to which it belongs, are different. And Braliman's being free
from all imperfections of the world is also preserved.
. 29. And on account of denial.
Texts like 'This is that great unborn Seff, undecayuig,
indestructible, immortal' etc. (Sr. IV. iv. 25); 'It does not
age with the aging of the body' etc. {Cha. VIII. i. 5) deny
in Brahman the qualities of the material world. Therefore
tlie relation between the two, the non-sentient world and
Brahman, is that of an attribute and the object to which the
attribute belongs ; and in this sense the non-sentient world
is a part of Brahman.
Hence Brahman is free from all imperfections and en-
dowed with infinite blessed qualities. Thus Brahman's twofold
characteristic is established.
Topic 7 : Brahman is the highest reality : There is nothing
beyond or superior to it; and expressions which appar-
ently imply something else as existing are only
metaphorical
30. (There is something) superior to this (Brahman),
on account of terms denoting a bridge, measure, connec-
tion, and difference (used with respect to It).
From Sixtras I. i. 2 to III. ii. 29, Brahman, the first
cause, has been estabfished. Now an objection is raised.
3.2.31.]
Srl-Bhasya 349
based on fallacious reasoning, that there is something beyond
this Brahman too, on account of Its being designated as a
bridge, thereby hinting that it leads to something beyond,
even as a bridge leads to the other bank. This shows that
there is something superior to be attained through It. For
the texts say : 'Now, that Self is a bridge' etc. (Cha. VIIL
iv. 1); that Brahman is crossed over 'Having crossed this
bridge' (Cha. VIII. iv. 2); that Brahman is limited, and as
such there is something else that limits It : 'That Brahman
has four feet' (Chd. III. xvih. 2). That Brahman leads to
immortality shows that there is something beyond Brahman,
the way to which is through Brahman : 'Which constitutes
the supreme bridge to immortality' (Sve. VI. 19). Lastly,
the following texts clearly show that there is something
different from Brahman and beyond It : 'By that Being the
whole universe is filled' (Sve. III. 9); having said thus, the
Sruti teUs in the next verse, 'What is beyond It is formless,
sinless' etc. (Sve. 111. 10). Vide Mu. 111. u. 8 also.
31. But (Bralunan is called a bridge) on account of
similarity.
The word 'but' refutes the position taken in the previous
Siitra. There can exist nothing different from Brahman. It
is caUed a bridge, not because there exists something beyond
It to be reached, but because It binds the sentient and in-
sentient worlds to Itseff avoiding confusion, even as a bridge
keeps things separate. 'Having crossed this bridge' (Chd.
VIII. iv. 2) means having attained Brahman fuUy, even as
we say he has passed Vedanta, meaning thereby that he has
mastered Vedanta.
350
Srl-Bhdsya [ 3.2.32.
32. (Brahman is depicted as having size) for the salce
of easy comprehension (i.e. upasana); just like (four) feet
The statements describmg Brahman as havmg four feet
or skteen digits are meant for the sake of updsand or medi-
tation. Braliman, which is infinite, as declared by texts
like 'Truth, knowledge, infinite is Brahman', cannot be
limited. The texts which declare such lunitation are meant
only for meditation, even as Brahman is imagined to have
the organs of speech, nose, eyes, and ears as Its four feet
{vide Chd. III. xviii. 2) for the sake of upasana.
33. (The statements about limitations with respect to
Brahman) are on account of special places; as in the case
of light etc.
In so far as Brahman is connected with limiting adjuncts
hke ears, eyes, speech, etc. It may be conceived as having
measure ; just as light etc. though spread everywhere, is
viewed as limited, owing to its connection with different
places like wmdows and so on.
34. And it is possible.
'Which constitutes the supreme bridge to immortahty'
{Sve. VI. 19)^from this text, one need not necessarily
conclude that, through Brahman as the means, there is
something else to be attained, for Brahman Itself can be
the means to attam Itself. 'He whom the Self chooses, by
him the Self can be gamed' {Mu. III. ii. 3).
3.2.36. ]
Sri-Bhasya 351
35. Similarly, on account of the express denial of
everything else (there is nothing beyond Brahman).
'The Purusa higher than the higher' (Mu. III. ii. 8); 'He
i? superior to the superior immutable' (Mu. II. i. 2); 'What
is beyond It' (Sve. III. 10)aU these texts seem to indicate
that there is something beyond Brahman. This cannot be
accepted, as the Sruti texts expressly deny the existence of
anything else beyond Brahman. 'There is nothmg else higher
than this "not so" ' (Br. II. iu. 6); 'Of Hhn none is the
Lord' etc. (Ma. 1. 10); 'There is nothmg higher than or
different from Hhn. . . . By that Being the whole universe
is fiUed' (Sve. III. 9)these texts deny anything beyond
Brahman. What Sve. III. 10 says, 'What is beyond It', is
to be interpreted consistent with verses III. 8 and III. 9.
'I know that great Person ; knowing Him alone, one goes
beyond death' (Sve. III. 8)^this verse declares that the
knowledge of Brahman is the only way to hnmortahty ; and
the next verse says about this Person, Brahman, 'Higher
than whom nothing exists'. To be consistent, verse III. 10
can be interpreted only as giving a reason for what has been
said. Because that which is the highest, the supreme Person,
is formless and free from misery, therefore those who know
Him become free. Further, verse III. 10 says, 'They who
know this become immortal' etc. which clearly refers to
what is said in verse III. 8 : 'Knowing Him alone, one goes
beyond death.'
36. By this (Brahman) everything is pervaded, as is
352 Sn-Bhdsya [ 3.2.36.
known from scriptural statements etc. regarding (Brah-
man's) extent.
'By this Person, this whole universe is filled' (Sve. III.
9); 'Whatever is seen or heard in this world is pervaded
inside and outside by Narayana' (Ma. XIII. 5); 'The eter-
nal, all-pervading omnipresent, subtle (one),which the wise
conceive as the source of everything' etc. (Mu. I. i . 6)
these texts declare that Brahman pervades everything. This
all-pervasiveness of Brahman negates the existence of any-
thing higher than Brahman. Hence Brahman, the first cause,
is the supreme Person.
Topic 8 : Brahman, the giver of the fruits of action
It has been shown that the soul is imperfect, while Brah-
man, to be reached by it, is free from all imperfections, is
endowed with all blessed qualities, and is the supreme Person.
In the next section, updsands or meditations, which are the
m.eans to attain Brahman, will be discussed. Meanwhile, in
this topic, the author declares that release and also the fruits
of various Vedic sacrifices are from Brahman.
37. From Him (the Lord) are the fruits of actions ;
for that (alone) is possible.
The Siitra says that the fruits of all actions, whether
Vedic sacrifices or updsands, result from the Lord ; for He
alone is capable of giving these rewards for the pious actions
of the souls. Mere action, which is non-sentient and tem-
porary, cannot give the results at a future tune according to
one's deserts. We do not see any insentient thing bestowing
3.2.39. J Srl-Bhdsya
353
fruits on tliose who worship it. Therefore, it is only from
the Lord, who is worshipped through actions, that the
results proceed.
38. And because the scripture so teaches.
The scripture declares' that the fruits of actions come
from the Lord. 'That great, burthless Self is the eater of
food and the giver of wealth (the fruits of one's actions)'
(Br. IV. iv. 24); 'For He alone causes delight' (Tai. II. 7).
39. Jaimini (thinlts), for the same reasons (viz. scrip-
tural authority and possibility), that religious work (is what
brings about the fruits of actions).
The view expressed in the last Sutra is criticized. Jaimini
thinks that, for the same reasons, viz. possibility and scrip-
tural teaching, religious works, like sacrifices, gifts, updsands,
etc. produce results by themselves, even as ploughing and
the like produce results directly or indirectly without any
intervening agency. It may be argued that, since the deed
is destroyed, it cannot produce a result at a future time.
This is answered by positing an apurva or extraordinary
principle, which is produced by the karma before it is dest-
royed, and through the intervention of which the result is
produced in the distant future. This is known from scrip-
tural injunctions like 'He who is desirous of the heavenly
world is to sacrifice'. Injunctions therefore enjoin sacrifices
as the means to attain certain results. Hence we have to
accept that the sacrifices themselves produce the results
through the intervention of the apurva.
23
354
Sn-Bhdsya
[ 3.2.40.
40. But Badarayana (thinks) the former (i.e. the
Lord as the bestower of the fruits of actions), on account
of His being declared to be the cause (of the fruits of
actions).
The word 'but' refutes the view of the previous Sutra.
Badarayana maintains that the supreme Person is the be-
stower of the fruits of all actions. Scriptural texts like 'Let
him who is deshous of prosperity ofEer a white animal to
Vayu. . . .and Vayu leads him to prosperity (Tai. Sa. II.
i. 1) show that the deities worshipped bestow the results
of the sacrifices through which they are worshipped. But,
ultunately, it is the Lord, abidmg m Vajoi etc. as theh inner
self, who, bemg pleased with the devotion of the sacrificer,
bestows on hun the results : 'Offermgs and pious works,
all these He bears, who is the nave of the universe. He is
Agni and Vayu ; He is the sun and the moon' (Ma. I. 6, 7);
'He who dweUs m Vayu, . . .of whom Vayu is the body' etc.
(Br. III. vu. 7). Smrti also says the same thmg : 'Which-
ever divine form a devotee wishes to worship.. .and obtams
from it the results he deshes, as ordained by Me' (Gita,
VIII. 21-22). Givmg up all this teachmg, where is the need
to imagine an apurva ?
BRAHMA-SUTRAS
SRt-BHASYA
PART II
Chapter III (Sections 3 & 4) and Chapter IV
By Swami Adidevananda
CHAPTER III
SECTION III
It has been shown by the author that release (moksa) and
fruits of various Vedic sacrifices are from supreme Brah-
man. Now the topic is introduced whether the meditations
ividyds) are one or several; afterwards it has to be decided
whether the attributes of Brahman in those meditations are
to be included in one act of meditation or not. First of all,
we have to consider whether the meditations such as the
Vaisvanara-vidya constitute one meditation or manifold.
The meditations are several, the opponent avers ; for the
same matter is repeated in several sakhas without any differ-
ence under a different topic. This view is rejected by the
Sutra.
Topic 1 : The meditations are one and the same in all
Vedanta texts
1. What is understood from all Vedanta texts (is one),
because there is no difference in the injunctions and the
rest.
The meditation, taught m different texts, is one and the
same ; because the injunctions such as 'he should know'
{vidyat), 'he should meditate' (updsita) are common. The
one and the same injunction ('he should meditate on Vais-
vdnara') is illustrated in Chdndogya (V. xii. 2) and Vaja-
358 Sri-Bhdsya [3.3.1.
saneyaka. Here the identity of meditations even in different
Vedanta texts is estabUshed. The forms and names of medi-
tation, and the fruit, viz. attaimnent of Brahman are common.
^ 51^ ^ '^+"?4(r*(pT W R w
2. If it be said that (the meditations are not one) on
account of diSerence, we disagree; since even in one
(meditation there may be difference).
This Sutra refutes the reasons as set forth by the
opponent.
The prima facie view is that the medffations are mani-
fold, because of the repetitions of the same matter without
difference and coming imder different topics ; so the object
of injunction is different.
We reply it is not so, for the same matter is repeated
without any difference in one and same meditation and under
a new topic, there bemg different knowers.
When the knower is one only, repetition pf the same
matter imder a new topic can mean only the difference in
the object of injunction, hence meditations are different.
But when the knowers are different, (in different re-
censions) , the repetition of the same matter subserves cog-
nition of different knowers, hence there is no difference of
matter enjoined.
; m ^ % m H \ \ S m m ^
^ m m w ^ u
3. (The rite of carrying fhe on the head is an attri-
bute) of the study of the Veda (of the Atharvanikas); be-
cause it is so directed in the work called Samacara (book
3.3.4. ]
Sn-Bhdsya 359
on Vedic rites) as being such; and the restriction is analo-
gous to that of libations.
This Sutra rejects the argument founded on a rite
(sirovrata) enjoined ui the Mundaka. According to the
Mundaka Upanisad, the teacher has to impart knowledge
of Brahman to those who have performed sirovrata accord-
ing to rule. This is a restriction ; this restriction does not
indicate difference of meditations. For that sirovrata does
not constitute part of the meditation. The restriction mti-
mates only the exclusiveness of the Vedic study in order to
possess a special impression which the rite generates, but
it does not bring a change m the meditation itself. This is
confirmed in the Mundaka Upanisad itself; 'One who has
not observed that vow should not read the text' (III. ii.
It), which means there is a direct relation between the vow
and the study of the text. Further, in the text of the Athar-
vanikas called Samdcdra, it has been directed thus : 'This
has been explained akeady by the Vedavrata (the vow of
the study of the Vedas)'. This passage refers to a rite related
with the Veda and not with the special meditation enunciated
by the Mundaka. The words 'knowledge of Brahman' refer to
the Veda in general. Sirovrata belongs to Atharvanikas only
just like the restriction of the libations offered m one fire
by Atharvanikas.
4. And (the Upanisads) reveal this.
The Upanisads declare the identity of meditation in
different passages. The Chdndogya (VIII. i. 1) declares
thus : 'What is within that, should be enquired into'. To the
question : 'What is there which should be enquked into',
360 Sn-Bhdsya [ 3.3.4.
the Upanisad itseh gives the reply that it is the supreme Self
possessmg the eight attributes, such a freedom from evh,
etc. vi'hich is to be meditated on withm the heart.
The Taittiriya also confirms this revelation in the Chdn-
dogya : 'Fmrther in this smah area there is the Ether free
from sorrow, that is to be medhated upon.' (Ma. XII. 16).
Thus the Upanisad enjoins the medhation on the supreme
Self possessing the eight attributes. This is possible only if the
attributes mentioned in the Chdndogya are included in the
meditation enjoined in the Taittiriya. Thus the unity of two
meditations is established.
5. (Meditations) thus being the same, tbere is com-
bination (of attributes) ; on account of unity of purport as
in the case of vidhi-sesa (what subserves injunction).
Now the Siitra proceeds to state the resuh of such unity.
Thus meditations in aU Upanisads being equal, the attri-
butes stated in one Upanisad text ought to be combined
with those mentioned in another. The meaning of the vidhi-
sesa is as fohows : The meditation on Vaisvdnara etc. as
stated in a single Vedanta text has some secondary attri-
butes as part of that medhation which subserve that medi-
tation ; hkewise, we have to include in the meditation
attributes stated in other Vedanta texts also so that they may
subserve meditation in the same way.
Topic 2 : Difference of the contexts
3IHrTIr^ 51S?Tr3[% ^5 Jrf^eiT?I U % U
6. If it be said there is difference (in the Udgltha-
3.3.7. ]
Srl-Bhdsya 361
meditation of Brhadara^yaka and Cliandogya) on account
of the texts, no; because of non-difference.
This Sutra represents the refutation of the Siddhantin
by the opponent who tries to establish that the two medita-
tions are one. The texts of the Chandogas as well as of the
Vajasaneyms enjoin meditation on the Udgitha. 'Then this
vital force that is in the mouth : they meditated on the
Udgitha "Om" as that vital force' (Chd. I. ii. 7); 'then they
said to this vital force m the mouth, "Chant the Udgitha
for us". "All right" said the vital force, and chanted for them'
(Br. I. iii. 7). The question is whether the two meditations
are to be viewed as one or not. The advocate of the final
view maintains that they cannot be one, suice the text clearly
shows difference. But to the opponent this difference is im-
acceptable as regards many points such as conquest of the
enemies, object of meditation as Udgitha, a common begin-
ning in the two Upanisads, etc. So there is unity of the two
meditations, says the opponent. This view is refuted by the
Siddhantin in the next Sutra.
7. Rather not, on account of the difference in the
contexts; as in the case of the attributes of being Iiigher
than the high etc.
On account of difference of the contexts, there is no
unity of the two meditations. In the Chdndogya Upanisad,
the Pranava (Om) which is a part of Udgitha, is the object
of meditation. The text says : 'One should meditate on the
syUable "Om" as Udgitha' (I. i. 1). But, in the text of
Vajasaneyins, it is declared : 'Let us overcome the enemies
at the sacrifice with the Udgitha' (Br. I. iii. 1). For the
362
Srl-Bhdsya
[3.3.7.
Chandogas, the object of meditation is Pranava, viewed as
a part of the Udgltha, while for the Vajasaneyms, the entke
Udgltha forms the object of meditation. Since the contexts
differ, subject-matter also differs ; smce the subject-matter
differs, the form of meditation also differs. So there is no
unity in these two meditations, although there may be non-
difference of injunctions.
As regards the medhation on Udgitha m one and the
same sakhd, in the first text (Cha. I. 6) the supreme Self
is viewed as the Person of golden colour, m the second
text (Chd. I. 9) He is also viewed as possessmg the attri-
butes of being higher than the high. So these two meditations
are different owing to the difference of attributes.
8. If it be said on account of (common) term it has
been aheady said. But even that (identity of name) exists.
If identity of the meditations be maintained suice both
have a common name (Udgitha-vidya), we assert that unity
of names is found also where the objects of injunction are
different. For mstance, the term agnihotra which apphes
equaUy to permanent agnihotra as also to the occasional
agnihotra which forms part of the sacrifice Kundapd-
yindm. The term Udgitha appUes equaUy to many medi-
tations set forth in the fhst prapdthaka of Chdndogya.
9. And since (Pranava) extends (over the later medita-
tions) this is appropriate.
Pranava (Om) which is a part of the Udgltha is
introduced as the object of meditation in the first chapter
of the Chdndogya ; it is also extended over the later medi-
3.3.11.]
Sn-Bhdsya 363
tations ; so it is appropriate to claim that, in the middle
also, as mentioned in the text 'the gods practised Udgitha'
{Chd. I. ii. 1); the term udgitha denotes the Pranava. So,
on the above grounds, the meditations are separate.
Topic 3 : Non-difference of everything
\\\o\\
10. On account of non-difference of everything (these
attributes ought to be comprised) in other places also.
In Chdndogya and Brhaddranyaka Upanisads, in the
meditation on vital force, we find attributes of being the
oldest and the best, and also possessing certain other
attributes as bemg the richest etc. {Chd. V. 1 ; Br. VI. 1)
attributed to the vital force; on the other hand, in
Kausitaki Upanisad, in the meditation on vital force, the
attributes of bemg the richest and so on are not to be found.
The prima facie view is that there is a difference between
the two meditations, as the objects of meditation differ. This
view is rejected by the author of the aphorisms. Since the
meditation is common to aU the three Upanisads, the attributes
of bemg the richest and so on must be comprised m the medi-
tation on the vital force. So, m the Kausitaki Upanisad
also, the vital force should be meditated on as possessing the
attributes of being the richest and so on. Hence there is no
difference in meditations.
Topic 4 : Bliss etc. ought to be comprised in all
meditations
3TR?5T?ir: SIn57FI \\x\\\
11. Bliss and other (attributes have to be comprised
364 Sn-Bhdsya
13.3.11.
in all meditations on Bralmian) since (non-diSerence)
of the Chief (object).
Bliss, knowledge, stainlessness, etc. are the essential
attributes of Brahman. The question is whether these essential
attributes of Brahman are to be comprised in ah the medita-
tions or not. As there is no sanction for the combination
of the attributes that are not mentioned in the contexts,
only those attributes which are mentioned must be com-
prised in the meditation. This prima facie view is refuted
by the aphorism, since there is no difference with regard
to Brahman, possessed of the attributes m ah the medhations.
So, the attributes such as bliss etc. ought to be comprised
in ah medhations.
fsFiRii^i^Mirg: "iMTj^m^ift ^ \\\R w
12. Tbe attributes of having joy for His head etc. are
not to be comprised; if they are attributed, there would be
increase and decrease (in Brahman).
Attributes such as having joy for His head etc. men-
tioned in the Taittiriya Upanisad (III. v. 2) are not to be
included, since they are not the attributes of Brahman;
for they are mere anthropomorphic representation of Brah-
man. If Brahman is reaUy possessed of distmctions of head,
wings, etc. then, increase and decrease wUl accrue to Brah-
man ; and this would contradict such texts as 'Brahman is
existence, knowledge, and mfinhe' (Tai. II. i. 1).
13. But the other attributes (like bliss etc. have to be
comprised) as they are common to the entity (Brahman).
3:3.15. ] Srl-Bhdsya 365
The other attributes which are common to the entity
must be included in all meditations ; for these attributes
existence, knowledge, bliss, purity, infinity and so on
determine the nature of Brahman. But those attributes such
as compassion, etc. which remain inseparably associated
with Brahman, but are not necessary to determine the nature
of Brahman, ought to be included in those meditations only
as declared in the scriptures.
14. For the purpose of meditation (these attributes
are inculcated); because there is no other purpose.
On account of the absence of any other purpose, the
teachings figuratively represent Brahman as having joy for
His head and so on for the purpose of constant meditation.
In the Taittirlya passage 'He who knows Brahman attains
the highest' (II. i. 1), as an aid to the attainment of medi-
tation, the scripture divides Brahman^who is made up of
bliss etc.as joy, satisfaction etc. and compares these to the
head, wings, etc. By this means, the Self of bhss, who is the
inmost of all the selves such as Annamaya Pranamaya, etc.
clearly becomes the object of the mtellect of the meditator.
In this way, the attributes of having joy for His head, etc.
are merely secondary characteristics of Brahman, who con-
sists of bliss ; they are not necessarily included in every
meditation relating to the Knowledge of Brahman.
15. Because of the term 'Atman' (in the scriptural
text).
366 Sn-Bhdsya [3.3.15.
The Upanisad text says, 'There is the inner Self (Atman)
who is different and consisting of bhss' {Tai. II. v. 1). Here
the term 'Seff' is pointed out. For, the Atman who is impartite
cannot reaUy have head, wings, taU, etc. ; the continumg
passage of the text, 'Joy is His head', etc. should be taken in a
metaphorical sense for the purpose of easier understanding
of the Atman.
16. The supreme Self is referred, as in other texts;
on account of the later passage in the context.
Previously, the term is used even m the case of non-
selves such as Pranamaya, Manomaya, etc.; how, then, does
the seff of Bhss stand for the supreme Seff ? The author of
the aphorisms replies to this objection : In the text 'There
is the hmer seff who is different and consisting of Bhss'
{Tai. II. 5.1), the term 'Seff' can only denote the supreme
Seff; in the aphorism 'as in other texts' such as 'The Seff
alone was in the begiiming; it thought "may I create the
world"' {Ai. I. i. 1), the term 'Seff' refers to the supreme
'Seff' only. If it is asked, how is this proved ? The reply is :
'On account of the later passage in the context', i.e. 'He
deshed "may I be many, may I be born"' {Tai. II. vi. 2),
vi^hich denotes the Seff made up of Bliss.
17. If it be said, (the term 'Self' is used) in connection
with the other things, tbe reply is 'on account of the
ascertainment'.
Previously, the term 'seff' is used even in the case of
3.3.18. ]
Srl-Bhdsya 367
non-selves such as Pranamaya, Manomaya, etc.; how, then,
can it be determuied that the Self is meant there through
the later passage ? To this objection, it is stated ia reply,
'on account of the ascertainment'. For, in the passage 'from
that Self the ether was originated' (Tai. II. i. 1), the supreme
Self is ascertained by the intellect; and the same idea is
carried forward to the Pranamaya, Manomaya, Vijnana-
maya, ultimately endmg in Anandamaya (Self of Bliss).
From the begmning, the term 'Self' is connected with other
things which are non-selves through the idea that the supreme
Self has entered into them.
Topic 5 : The statement of what is to be done
18. The new (thing is enjoined in the meditation on
the vital force) ; on account of the statement of what is not
otherwise enjoined.
The Prana-vidya (Meditation on vital force) has al-
ready been introduced. Now the aphorism considers the
subsidiaries of Prana-vidya. Both in the Chandogya (V.
ii. 2) and Brhaddranyaka (VI. i. 1), the Prana, which is
the eldest and the best, has been declared as the object of
meditation ; and then water is declared to be the dress of
Prana. One should sip water before and after the meal.
This is called dcamana (sipping of water). By sipping water
in this way, the Prana is free from nakedness.
Here the doubt arises whether the sippmg of water is
enjomed or meditation on Prana as having water for its
368 Sn-Bhdsya [3.3.18.
dress is enjoined. The objector maintains the former view.
The author of the aphorism rejects this view and maintains
the latter. The texts clearly enjoin medhation on the water
used for sippmg as being the dress for Prana, as it is not
enjoined otherwise. On the contrary, sipping of water is
aheady established by Smrti as a good custom. So these
Upanisads enjoin meditation on Prana as having water (used
for sipping) for its dress.
Topic 6 : The sameness of meditations
19. And (attributes) thus being same, on account of
the non-difference.
Meditation on Brahman caUed Sandilya-vidya comes m
two places : in 'Agnhahasya' of Vdjasaneyaka and m the
Brhaddranyaka. In the former text (Sa. X. vi. 3) it is
stated : 'One should meditate on Brahman as satya, etc' and
concludes, 'he should meditate on the Self who consists of
mind, who is in the form of Prana and light, etc' In the
latter text, it is said : 'This person who consists of mind, who
is in the form of light' etc. The opponent's view is that these
two medhations are difEerent. The Sutra says that the object
of meditation is same, as both the texts mention the same
attributes, such as 'consisting of mind' etc.; the additional attri-
butes of Brahman such as 'rulership' as stated in the Brha-
ddrariyaka, are not different from those commonly stated by
both the texts, such as 'Brahman reahzing aU his piuposes'
and so on. Therefore the Sandilya-vidya of the two texts
is one and the same on account of the non-difference in their
characteristics. So there is sameness of the medhations.
3.3.22. ]
Sn-Bhdsya 369
Topic 7 : Connection
20. Ou account of connection, tlius in other cases
also.
The Sutra sets forth the view of the opponent. In the
Brhaddranyaka (V. v. 1-2) the text begins : 'Truth is
Brahman. . .that which is truth is that sunthe Person
who is in that orb and the Person who is in the right eye.'
Further, the text mentions two secret names of Brahman
aham and ahar. Now, on the analogy of the andilya-vidya,
as the object of meditation is the same, both these names
are to be combined in each of these two meditations 'on
account of coimection'. Here the opponent holds that the
meditation is one only ; because Brahman is one although
connected to different places (orb of the sun and the right
eye).
21. Rather not so, on account of difference (of abode).
This Sutra refutes the view of the previous Sutra. The
meditations are different; because it is mentioned that Brah-
man is to be meditated upon in different places, namely, the
orb of the sun and the right eye. On the contrary. Brahman
is to be meditated upon as abidmg in the heart m both the
gandilya-vidyas.
22.
24
53^51% ^ U RR U
(The text) also declares this.
Sri-Bha^ya [3.3.22.
The text (Cha. I. vii. 5) says : 'The form of the one is
the same as the form of that (Person seen in the sun).' So
the attributes of that which abides ui the sun should not be
combined with the attributes of that which abides in the
eye; they must be kept apart. Where the attributes are not
naturaUy established, there the transference of the attribute
is necessary.
Topic 8 : The supporting of all the powers
'jhjf^iastncrirfq U R^ W
23. And for the same reason the supporting (the
powers) and the pervasion of the ether (are not to be
included in other meditations).
In the Taittiriya text and in the supplementary text of
the Rdndyanlyas, there occurs the foUowing passage : 'The
oldest powers were supported by Brahman ; the greatest
Brahman pervaded in the beghming the highest ether' (Tai.
Brd. II. iv. 7, 10). These attributes are not taught with
reference to any special meditation. So these two, namely,
supporting of aU powers and pervasion of the highest ether
are not to be included in aU medhations. In the medhation
on Brahman as abiding in a smaU place like the heart, the
attribute of pervading the ether cannot be included. When
we read in Dahara-vidya 'Brahman is greater than the earth',
'that the ether within the heart is as great as the universal
ether,' these attributes should not be taken in theh literal
sense, but must be taken as meant for the glorification of
the object of medhation.
3.3.25. ]
Sn-Bhdsya 371
Topic 9 : Purusa-vidyd
24. And (since the attributes) as (mentioned) in the
Purusa-Vidya (of the Chandogya) are not stated (in that)
of others (i.e. in the Taittiriya) (the two meditations on
Purusa are not one).
There are two meditations on Purusa in the Taittirlya
and Chdndogya Upanisads. The opponent maintains that the
two meditations are one and the same on account of the
similarity of names, character etc. This view is refuted by
the Sutra.
The meditations are different from each other, although
both are meditations. Why ? Because there is no statement
of other things. The meaning is that the attributes stated in
one text are not stated in the other. While the Taittirlya
mentions three Ubations, the Chdndogya does not mention
them. Further, there is difference in respect of fruits also.
In the Taittirlya, the Purusa-vidya is considered as subor-
dinate to the meditation on Brahman ; here the fruit is'
attainment of the greatness of Brahman. In the Chdndogya,
not only the meditation on Purusa is an independent one but
also the fruit is different i.e. attainment of long Iffe.
Topic 10 : Piercing and the like
25. (Certain mantras relating to) piercing etc. (are not
part of the meditations, though mentioned in close proxi-
mity) because they have a different purpose.
372 Srl-Bhdsya
[ 3.3.25.
The Atharvanikas at the beghmmg of the Upanisad re-
cite some mantras : 'pierce the sukra, pierce the heart'. The
Sdmagds at the beginning of the Rahasya-Brdhmana, read
this : 'O God Savitr, permit me to perform the sacrifice'
(Sdma-mantra Brdhmana, I. i. 1). Similarly, the Kdthakas and.
Taittirlyakas recite other mantras at the beghmmg of their
Upanisads. The question is, whether these mantras and sacri-
fices referred to in the Brahmanas form parts of the medi-
tations prescribed in the Upanisads or not. The opponent
says that the texts form parts of the medhations because they
are mentioned m close proxhnity to the latter. The Sutra
refutes this view. The mantras have different meanings, as
much as they have an application to certain magical rites or
Vedic study etc. and therefore do not have any connection
with the meditations.
Topic 11 : Getting rid of good and evil
26. But where getting rid of (good and evil karmas;
is mentioned), (the acquisition of this good and evil by
others has to be included), on account of the word 'acquir-
ing' being supplementary (to the word 'getting rid of), as in
the case of Kusa, Metre, Praises and recitation.
The Chandogas declare m the text: 'Shakmg off aU evils
just as a horse shakes off his hah, and being freed, like the
moon from the mouth of Rdhu, I attain the eternal world
of Brahman' (CAo. VIII. xui. 1). The Atharvanikas declare
in the scripture : 'Then the knower, shakmg off good and
evil, stainless, attams supreme equality with Brahman.' (MM..
3.3.26. ]
Srl-Bhasya 373
III. i. 3). The Satydyanins also say : 'His sons take his in-
heritance ; his friends take the good ; his enemies take the
evil.' The Kausltakins read in thek text: 'He shakes off
his good and evil karmas ; his dear relations take the good ;
liis enemies take hold of the evil' {Kau. I. 4).
In this way the getting rid of good and evil is declared
in some other places, and' thek reachmg friends and enemies
in some other places, and both getting rid of and reaching
'friends and enemies in some other places.
Although both the incidents are declared severally in
different texts, they have to be considered as an element m
all meditations. For whoever attains Brahman, necessarily
gives up all his good and evil karmas ; and those karmas,
unless thus given up, cannot be acquked by others. There-
fore, consideration on those two matters deserves to be
thought of with regard to all medkations.
Here the doubtful pokit is this : Whether there is any
option between consideration on the abandonment of works,
and on the acquisition of works by others, and on both
these matters ; or whether they ought to be combined m all
meditations. The opponent holds that this is a case of option.
The Sutra sets aside this view. Where a passage says either
the giving up of works or only of these bemg acquked by
others, both these have to be necessarily combined, smce
the acquisition of karmas by others is supplemented to the
abandonment of karmas.
The Sutra illustrates this supplementary character of
these two statements by some parallel passage with respect
to Kusas, metres, praises, and recitations. In some places,
only Kusas are stated, but another text specifies the nature
of the wood. Similarly, with regard to metres, praises, and
leckations. Accordmg to a Purva-Mlmamsd principle (X.
374 Sn-Bhdsya
[ 3.3.26.
.viii. 15), one definitive; statement defines some other general
statement; the former stands to the latter m a supplementary-
relation. Unless we accept this, we cannot avoid any option.
Topic 12 : Discarding of karmas at the time of departure
27. At the tune of death, there being nothing to be
experienced (by the soul); for other texts also declare so.
Here the question is raised as to when the individual
self gets rid of the effects of the good and evil deeds. The
KausUakins declare as follows : 'He comes to the river
Virajd and crosses it by the mind alone, and there he shakes
off good and evil.' (Kau. I. 4). The Tdndins (or Chandogas)
say 'shaking off evil, as a horse shakes off his hair... I shake
off the body.' (CM. VIII. xiii. 1). This intunates that the deeds
are shaken off at the time when the self leaves the body. So
the opponent concludes that a part of the deeds is left behind
at the time of death and remainder of the deeds on the path
to the world of Brahman.
The Sutra refutes this view and says that the man of
realization gets rid of his karma without remainder at the
time when the seff separates from the body; for there is no
experience arising from good and evil apart from the attain-
ment of Brahman, which is the result of knowledge. Thus
others also declare to this, effect: 'Indeed, neither pleasure
nor pain touches him, who remains without a body' (Chd.
VIII. xii. 1); 'that serene being, rising up from the body,,
attams the supreme light and appears in its own form (Chd.
VIII. xii. 3); 'for hkn there is delay only so long as he is not
freed ; then he will be blessed' (Chd. VI. xiv. 2).
3:3.29.1 Srl-Bhasya 375
28. According to the desired meaning, without con-
tradiction of either, (the scriptural texts must be
harmonized).
The time of abandonment of the good and evil deeds
having been determined on the basis of the nature of thmgs
and the declaration of scriptureswithout contradiction of
eitherthe logical connection of the words of the passages
must be construed. Thus in the Kausitaki Upanisad, the later
part 'he shakes off his good and evil deeds' (I. 4) must be
understood as coming before the earlier passage 'having
reached the path of the gods' (L 3).
29. (The Self's) journey will have a meaning (if
abandonment of deeds takes place) at two times; for,
otherwise, there is contradiction.
This Siitra represents the view of the opponent who tries
to maintain that a part of the good and evil deeds wiU be
f left behind at the time of death, and another part wiU be
abandoned on the way ; if, thus, the destruction of the good
and evil deeds takes place on two different occasions the
path of the gods will have a meaning. If it were otherwise,
there would be contradiction ; for, if the destruction of aU the
deeds were to take place at the time of death, the subtle
body also would be destroyed ; if that be so, he would not
be able to proceed by any path. Therefore, at the tune of the
soul's departure front the body, destruction of all the deeds
t without remainder cannot take place.
376 Srl-Bhdsya
[ 3.3.30.
30. (The hypothesis) is reasonable; on account of a
thing (subtle body) having similar characteristics is attained
(later on) ; as (is seen) in the veorld.
To the, above objection tliis Siitra replies : That the
destruction of aU good and evil deeds would certainly take
place at the time of departure from the body is reasonable ;
because the sacred texts declare the connection of the subtle
body with the self whose nature has become manifest after
the destruction of aU deeds. The Chdndogya Upanisad (VIII.
xii. 3 ; VII. xxv. 2; VII. xxvi. 2) declares: 'Haviag attained
the supreme light, he manifests himseK in his true form'; 'He
moves about there laughmg, playing and rejoicmg'; 'He be-
comes a self-ruler, he moves about ui all the worlds according
to his wUl'; and 'He becomes one, he becomes three', etc.
Therefore the self with the subtle body moves through the
path of gods, even after all his deeds have perished. But
how can the subtle body persist? Through the power of
knowledge he is established in the subtle body, although it
itself cannot produce the subtle body. As in the world, a
tank, constructed with the object of irrigation of rice fields
etc. may also be used for the purpose of drawing drinking
water, etc.
31. Those who hold certain offices (like Vasistha etc.)
have to remain as long as their offices last.
It is taken that the absolute annihilation of the karmas
of the wise men, who possess true knowledge of Brahman,
takes place at the time when the self is separated from the
3.3.32. ]
Sn-Bhdsya
377
gross body; in consequence, only the subtle body remains
to enable them to move toward Brahman; and there is no
experience of pam and pleasureaU these cannot be main-
tained, says the opponent. Jt is seen thatm the cases of
Vasistha, Avantaratapas etc. who had reahsed the Supreme
they had other embodiments after death, experiencing
pleasure and pain caused by births and deaths of thek
sons etc.
To this objection, the Sutra-kara replies : We do not
admk that m the case of ah those wise men, the destruction
of good and evU deeds takes place at the tune of death ; on
the other hand, there is destruction of good and evU deeds
of those wise men who inunediately after death travel on the
path of light. There is no movement on the path of light to
Vasistha and others whose particular offices have not come
to an end. Therefore, as long as theh offices last, the karma
which generated that office remams ; there is no movement
on the path of hght for them even after the faU of their
bodies.
Topic 13 : Non-restriction
^rwr: ^wi^ arf^tsr: *i^<iM+HiwnTi^ \\ ^R W
32. In regard to all (devotees), there is no restriction
about attaining Bralunan by the path of light) ; thus there
is non-contradiction of Sruti and Smrti.
In Upakosala-Vidya (Chd. IV. x-xiv), it is declared that
those who meditate on Brahman proceed by the path begm-
ning with hght. The question is whether only the devotees of
this specffic medkation proceed through this path to Brah-
man, or is it the path for ah who are devoted to any of the
378 Srl-Bhasya
[ 3.3.32,
meditations on Brahman ? The first view is refuted by the
Sutra-kara.
There is no restriction that those alone who meditate
on Brahman accordmg to the Upakosala-Vidya attain
Brahman by the path beginning with light. Indeed, aU
devotees engaged in various meditations attain Brahman and
go by the path of light. Thus there is no contradiction of
Sruti and Smrti. For instance, in the Paiicagni-Vidya (medi-
tation on five fires) of Chdndogya (V. x. 1) and Brhaddran-
yaka (VI. ii. 15) Upanisads, it is declared that all those who
practise meditation go on that path begmning with light.
The Smrti also declares : 'Fire, light, day, bright fortnight,
the six months of the sun's northern progresstravelling
by that path, knowers of Brahman reach Brahman (Gitd,
VIII. 24). In this way, the path of light, which is common
to all meditations, is only repeated in the Upakosala-Vidya
and others.
Topic 14 : The conception of the imperishable
33. But the conceptions of the Imperishable have to
be included (in all meditations) ; on account of the same-
ness (of Brahman everywhere) and (those negative con-
ceptions) existing (in the essential nature of Brahman); as
in the case of those mantras 6i the Upasad. This has been
already explained.
It is said in the Brhaddrariyaka (III. iii. 8) : 'O Gargi,
Brahmanas say this Imperishable is that. It is neither gross
3.3.33. ]
Srl-Bhdsya 379
nor minute, neither short nor long' etc. Again, we have m
Mundaka (I. i. 5) 'the supreme knowledge is that by which
the Immutable is attained. That which is not seen, nor
grasped', etc. The question arises here whether aU these
negative attributes whose nature is opposed to the world
ought to be combined in ah meditations on Brahman, or only
in those where the text specially declares them. The oppo-
nent says that the latter view is correct.
The Sutra sets aside this view. The attributes of Brah-
man such as the absence of grossness etc. ought to be com-
bined in all meditations on Brahman; for Brahman is
common to all meditations and these negative attributes are
implied. The individual self, though intrinsicaUy free from
evil, yet is capable of association with evU. Fundamental
opposition to evh imphes having a character of absence of
grossness etc. which belong to the emphical world. Therefore,
one who thinks of Brahman should meditate on Him as
possessing His essential nature, viz. knowledge, bliss etc.
and also absence of grossness etc. ; these negative attributes
are as important as the positive attributes of Brahman.
The case is similar to upasad offerings. Though this cere-
mony is prescribed in the Yajur-Veda, the mantras for
giving these offerings are found in the Sdma-Veda. The
priests for the Yajur-Veda chant these mantras of the Sdma-
Veda not loudly but in undertones as it is subordinate to the
upasad offerings. Jaimini decides this principle in Purva-
Mlmdmsd : 'When there is conflict between the subsidiaries
and the principal matter, subsidiary matters must foUow the
principal matter to which they belong' (III. iu. 9). The
meaning is : attributes like absence of grossness etc. must
invariably follow Brahman who is the principal object of
medhation.
380 Srl-Bhasya
[ 3.3.34.
34. This much only; on account of meditation.
If we accept the Purva-Mimdrhsd principle, i.e. : the
subsidiary attributes must foUow the principal, we have to
include uidiscriminately all attributes such as 'doing all
actions, experiencmg aU smeUs, all tastes' etc. (Chd. Ill,
xiv. 4) in all meditations.
The word 'Amanana' means 'direct thinking of a thmg
(Brahman)'. We have to include only such attributes in all
meditations on Brahman, without which the realization of
Brahman is impossible, i.e. Knowledge, Bliss, etc. combined
with the absence of grossness, etc. Other attributes such as
'doing aU actions' etc. ought to be included in meditation
wherever they are specified.
Topic 15 : Self within
SFcRT ^di< Wc(d ^ ^lrTT?Tts?qgTT ^5TfT^TTW?T
35. If it be said that the enquiry about the self vrithui
all, refers to individual self who is the possessor of aggre-
gate of material things, since, otherwise, the difference in
reply could not be reconciled, the answer is 'no'; as in the
case of the teaching (Sad-Vidya).
In the Brhaddranyaka (III. iv. 1) we find Usasta ques-
tioning Yajiiavalkya thus : 'Teach me the Brahman that is
immediate and directthe Self who is within all' ; and
Yajiiavalkya replies : 'He who through Prana sustains life,
lie is your Self who is within all.' In the same Upanisad,
3.3.36. ]
Sri-Bhdsya 381
(III. V. 1) to the same question put by Kahola, Yajnavalkya
rephes : 'He who transcends hunger and thirst, grief and
delusion, decay and death^knowing him, the Self etc' The
opponent holds that these two are separate medhations, as
the difference in reply shows the distmction between the
two medhations. The former reply, which declares the Seff
mamtaining Iffe through breathing etc. refers to the mdi-
vidual seff; the second reply, which says that the seff i&
beyond hunger etc. refers to the supreme Seff.
The Sutra refutes this view. The meanhig is, there is no-
difference between these two medhations, because the ques-
tion and answer deal with the supreme Seff, and in both the:
cases the words 'hnmediate and direct' are contained. Though
the word 'Brahman' sometunes is used with reference to the
individual seff, the context mdicates the supreme Seff. The
repethion of the question and the answer serves the purpose
of indicating that the supreme Seff, who is the cause of
breathmg, also transcends aU hunger, thirst, etc.
Here the Sutra gives an iUustration : 'as in the case of
Sad-Vidya'. In Sad-Vidya, (vide Chd. VI. i. 3) the questions
and answers refer to Brahman. From this parallel case we
may surmise that Yajiiavalkya's answers to the identical
' questions of Usasta and Kahola refer to Brahman, who is
the inner Seff of aU and transcends aU imperfections. Hence
they constitute one meditation only.
Sirfh^Rt f^fsn^cT ^1?R^^ U W
36. There is reciprocity (of ideas); they, indeed,,
specify (the same Brahman) ; as in other cases.
' The question and answers may, indeed, refer to the.
382
Srl-Bhasya
[ 3.3.36.
supreme Self; nevertheless, there is distinction between the
two meditations. According to one case, Brahman is to be
meditated upon as the cause sustaining life in all beings, and
according to the other. He is to be meditated upon as tran-
scending hunger etc. ; thus owing to the difference with
regard to the objects of meditation, there is difference of
forms between two meditations ; further, there is the distuic-
tion of questioners.
The present Sutra refutes this view and says that there
is no difference of meditations as both questions and answers
have the same subject-matter ; and because the two sections
are connected through a single word expressing injunction.
Indeed, both questions relate to the same Brahman viewed
as the inner Self of all beings. The word 'eva'alone
(Br. III. V. 1) determines the question (of Kahola) as
concerning the seff-same Brahman with the attributes which
Usasta learnt earUer. Again, the idea of injunction is seen
to occur in the second section only, 'therefore, let a Brah-
mana become disgusted with the learning and desire to live
as a child'. The object of meditation being thus determined
to be one, there must be effected a reciprocity of ideas
between Usasta and Kahola ; Usasta's idea of Brahman
being the cause of aU Iffe must be reciprocated with Kahola's
conception of Brahman as beyond hunger, thirst etc. and
vice versa. These meditations are to be practised with the
object of knowing the supreme Seff as distinct from the indi-
vidual Seff. Therefore, Brahman's being the inner Seff of all
is the only attribute that has to be meditated upon.
This is analogus to Sad-Vidya, where repeated ques-
tions and answers only serve to distmguish one and the same
Brahman and not to convey the idea that Brahman is to be
tneditated upon under new attributes.
3.3.38.]
Sn-Bhdsya 383
37. VerUy That itself (is denoted by the word) Satya
etc.
The supreme Deity itself, which is denoted by the term
"Sat' and which is the supreme cause of all thmgs, is in-
troduced as the subect-matter in the passage : 'That Deity
thought' (Chd. VI. iii. 2) and 'Tejas goes to the supreme
Deity' (Chd. VI. viii. 6), and the same thing is intnnated
by the various sections beginning with 'As the bees, my dear,
prepare honey' (Chd. VI. ix. 1). Because the attributes of
being Satya etc. which are mentioned in the first section
thus, Tn that all this has its Self ; that is real. That is the Self'
(Chd. VI. vui. 7) are confirmed in the subsequent ones and
finally concluded.
Topic 16 : True desires and the rest
38. (Attributes such as) (true) desures etc. (ought to
be accepted both) here and there, because the abode etc.
(are common in both tbe places).
In the Chdndogya (VIII. i. 1), we have, 'This is the
city of Brahman and in it is the palace-Uke Lotus and in that
is the smah ether, and that has to be sought after' etc. Again,
in the Brhaddranyaka (IV. iv. 22), 'He, the great unborn
Seh, consists of knowledge. He sleeps in the ether inside
the heart, He is the controher of aU, and the Lord of aU'
etc.
The question is whether the two texts constitute one
medhation or not. The opponent says that these two medita-
384 Srl-Bhasya
[ 3.3.38.
tions are separate; because there is a difference in the
character of the objects of the meditations.
The Sutra-lcara says that the meditations are not separate.
Why ? Because there is no difference in the character of the
objects of meditation. In the Brhaddranyaka and the Chdn-
dogya, Bralmaan who is qualified by true desires (satya-
kdmatva) etc. is the object of meditation. How is this proved?
Because of the attributes of Brahman as having the heart as
the abode etc. which are mentioned 'here and there' (in both
the texts). In both the texts, it is stated that He has the heart,
as His abode, that He is the bridge, that He is the support
etc.; so, it is recognized that there is the very same medita'-
tion in both the texts. Therefore, the character of the two-
meditations does not differ.
Their connection with the fruit also does not differ as it
consists m both the cases the attainment of Brahman :
'Havmg approached the supreme Light, he is manffested
hi his own true form' (CM. VIII. xii. 3); and 'He becomes,,
indeed, the fearless Brahman' (Br. IV. iv. 25). The term,
'dkdsa' denotes the supreme Self m the Chdndogya as well'
as m the Brhaddrariyaka. Hence the two meditations are-
one.
39. On account of ardour, there cannot be omissioir
(of the auspicious attribute of Brahman).
The attributes of being the Controller of aU etc. and*
the existence of the attributes of true desires etc. are not
absolutely real. We should not uiclude the unreal attributes,
on meditation meant for final release. This is the view of:
the opponent.
3.3.39. ]
Srl-Bhasya 385
This Sutra sets aside this objection. The attributes, such
as the existence of true desires etc. are not known by other
means of knowledge. These attributes exist in the two texts
(Chd. VIII. i. 1 ; Br. IV. iv. 22) as weU as in other scrip-
tural contexts. They are taught with great ardour as the
attributes of Brahman who is the sole object of worship in
aU meditations undertaken with a view to final release.
Therefore, they cannot be omhted from those meditations ;
on the contrary they have to be included within them. The
movement in aU those worlds of the liberated selves as said
in the text (Chd. VIII. i. 6) mentions the knowledge of
Brahman as distinguished by the attributes of possessing true
desires etc. In the same way, the repeated declarations of
Brahman's ruler-ship, controUer-ship (Br. IV. iv. 22) are
emphasized with ardour with regard to His auspicious attri-
butes. It cannot be said that the scripture which has more
affection than thousands of parents should, like an imposter,
give instructions about certain attributes with great ardour
^not known through any other means of knowledge
which are unreal and hable to be refuted, and deceive those
who deshe final release and are aheady confused by the
revolution of the wheels of Samsara.
The text, 'There is not any diversity here. ...He shoiild be
seen as one only' (Br. IV. iv. 19) declares that ah things
are the effects of Brahman in so far as they have Brahman
as theh cause, that they have Hun for theh seff, and denies
plurahty of things not having Brahman for theh seff. This
has been already established. Also in the text 'not so, not so'
(Br. IV. iv. 22) the term 'so' refers back to the world as
known through other means of knowledge ; and then it is
declared that Brahrnan who is the Seff of aU, is enthely
> different from the world. The same thing is established in
25
386
'Sn-Bhdsya
[ 3.3.39.
the Chdndogya- (VIII. i. 6) also that Brahman is different
from aU things and that the attributes of possessing true
desire etc. are taught in relation to Him.
40. With regard to liim (i.e. the individual self) who
has attained (Brahman), (there is free movement in the
worlds of fathers etc.) ; on account of the scriptural state-
ment.
Final release is not possible for one who meditates on
Braliman associated with attributes ; because the Chdndogya
(VIII. i. 6) says, 'those who go hence, having known the
Seff and those 'true desires, move about at will in all the
worlds. Thus, he who desires the worlds of fathers, etc.
Thus the fruit is transmigratory existence ; therefore, he who-
desires Brahman should not include 'true desires' etc. in his
meditation. This is the objection raised by the opponent.
To this objection the Sutra-kara gives the foUowing,
reply : The individual seff, released from aU bonds and
manffesting himself in his true nature, attains Brahman ;
because of that only there is free movement in the worlds
of fathers etc. The Upanisad states : 'Having reached the
highest light, he manifests himseff in true form. He is the
supreme person. He moves about eating, playing, etc' (Chd.
VIII. iii. 4). So, free movement in aU the worlds is a fruit
of the final release. Therefore, the attributes of 'true desires'
have to be included in the meditation of hun who desires
final release.
Topic 17 : Non-restriction of the determination
41. There is no restriction of that determination (i.e..
3.3.41. ]
Sn-Bhdsya 387
meditation on the Udgitlia); because that is seen; for,
there is separate fruit wliich is non-obstruction.
We read in the Chdndogya (I. i. 1) 'One should medhate
on the syhable "Om" as Udgitha'. This and other medita-
tions are connected with elements of sacrificial rites. The
question is whether this meditation, which is dependent on
Udgitha, is a necessary element of the sacrifice as in the
case of a ladle made of Parna wood or is not a necessary
element hlce 'godohand (milk pail).
The opponent says that these meditations are necessarhy
to be connected with particular sacrificial rites to which they
are connected.
This view is set aside by the Sutra-kara : 'There is no
restriction of that determination'. What is called 'determi-
nation' is fixing the mind in a particular direction, i.e. medita-
tion. Meditations on the Udgitha etc. are not restricted to
sacrificial rites. Why ? 'Because that is seen'. On the other
hand, the texts themselves say, 'both perform sacrificial rites,
he who knows it, and he who does not know' {Chd. I. i.
10). If they were an auxiliary element to sacrifice, it could
not be appropriate that the meditations are necessary. Thus,
if it is determined that they are not auxihary elements,
a separate fruit must be assigned to the injunction
relating to the medhation. So the texts mention a separate
fruit of the meditation which is apart from the fruit of the
sacrifice itseh. Thus the quality of possessing greater strength
is the fruh, which is different from that of the sacrificial
rites. What is this greater strength ? It is non-obstruction
to the fruit of the sacrifice. The fruit of the sacrifice might
be obstructed by the fruit of some more powerful perform-
ance. Thus the medhations on the Udgitha, though depen-
dent on auxhiaries to sacrifices, have different fruits from
388
Sn-Bhdsya
[ 3.3.41.
those of the sacrifices ; and, therefore, as is the case with
godohana, so also in meditations on Udgitha that are con-
nected to sacrificial rites, there is determination without any
restrictions.
Topic 18 : Oblations
42. (To be repeated) as ui the case of oblations; this
has been stated (by Jaimini in Purva-Mimamsa Sutra).
In the Dahara-Vidya (Chd. VIII. i. 6), we read as
follows : 'Now those who depart from here, after having
found the Self, and those true desires' ; here the meditation
on the supreme Self (dahardkdsa) is first stated ; and then,
by the expression 'true desires', the meditation on the attri-
butes is also separately declared. The doubt is raised here,
whether or not, in the meditation on those attributes, the
meditation on the supreme Self as qualified by those attri-
butes, has to be repeated. The opponent maintains that it
is not to be repeated ; for, the supreme SeK is the possessor
of the attributesfreedom from all evil etc.and because
the supreme Self can be meditated on only once, there is
no need of repeating the meditation for the sake of the
attributes.
The Sutra sets aside this view. The meditation has to
be repeated 'as in the case of oblation'. Indeed, it is only
the supreme Self, free from evil etc. that is to be meditated
upon in the first place. Yet, there is a difference between His
essential nature and His nature viewed as associated with
those attributes ; and further, the passage beginning with
'free from evil, free from old age' etc. enjoins a meditation
3.3.43. ] Srl-Bhasya
389
on the supreme SeK as associated with those attributes.
Therefore, He is to be meditated on in His essential nature
in the first place, and then there is the repetition of the
medhation with a view to reahzing His auspicious attributes.
This case is analogous to that of the sacrificial oblations.
There is the text (Tai. Sam. II. hi. 6.2) : 'He has to offer
"Purodasa" to Indra, the ruler' etc. Though Indra is one
god, the oblations are separately offered to Indra, the ruler,
the supreme ruler, the seff-ruler according to his different
capacities. This principle is established in the Sarhkarsana-
Kanda : 'As the deities are different, the oblations are
different'.
Topic 19 : The abundance of indicatory marks
43. On account of the abundance of indicatory marks
(the Narayana-Anuvaka deals with the object of worship
in all the meditations) ; for, it (indicatory mark) is stronger
(than the context). That also (has been stated by Jaimini).
The Taittiriya text, hnmediately after the Dahara-Vidya,
declares in the foUowing way : 'The thousand-headed God,
whose eyes see everything. . .who is Narayana, the Im-
perishable, supreme Master' etc. (Ma. XI. 1). Here the
doubt is raised whether this medhation, as being identical
with the meditation previously introduced, describes attri-
butes which are inculcated in that vidyd, or whether it
describes those attributes of the supreme Self to be
included in all the meditations as enjoined in all the Upani-
sads. The opponent favours the former, because of the
context; for, in the previous section (Anuvaka 10) the
390 Sn-Bhdsya
[ 3.3.43.
meditation on the small ether is introduced as the subject-
matter .- 'The small space free from all evU, the abode of
the Supreme ; within that is a small space free from sorrow.
What is in that should be meditated upon' (Ma. XI. 7).
The Sutra-kara refutes this view and declares : 'On
account of the abundance of indicatory marks'. This section
of the Mahdndmyana Upanisad has come just to declare
the characteristics of the supreme Self, who is the object
of meditation, in all meditations. The supreme Being is
denoted in all those meditations as Aksara, Siva, Sariibhu,
Para Brahman, Paraiiijyoti etc. Finally, the same entity is
here declared to be Narayana. There is abundance of au-
thoritative marks to prove that Narayana alone is the object
of worship in all meditations. Here the word 'linga' means
symbol, sign or indicatory mark. There are many passages
which contain indicatory marks. Such passages have, accord-
ing to Purva-Mlmdmsd, greater force than the context.
Topic 20 : Alternative to physical fires previously
mentioned
44. (Mental fires are) alternative to (physical fires)
which are mentioned earlier on account of the context;
hence it is an action as in the case of Manasa ritual.
This Sutra and the next represent prima facie view.
In the Agni-Rahasya section of the Vdjasaneyaka, cer-
tain fires built by the mind are declared : 'Built of mind, built
of speech, built of vital air, built of eyes, built of ears, built
of organs of actions and buUt of gastric fire' {Sa. X.). Here
the doubt is raised whether these mental fires which, owmg
,3.3.45. ]
Sn-Bhdsya 391
to their connection with the sacrifice of action, are of the
nature of actions or, on account of their connection with, the
activity of meditation, are of the nature of meditations.
This Sutra represents the former view : 'the mental fires
are alternative to physical fires', which are built of bricks
as mentioned earlier according to the context. The meaning
is that the mental (meditative) fires are equated with the
physical fires as an afiernative. So the conclusion is that the
altars buht by mind etc. are themselves of the nature of
actions, and as such can be used as alternatives for the altar
buht by bricks. It is analogous to the Manasa rite conducted
on the tenth day, known as Avivakya, of Soma sacrifice
'extending over twelve days, in which a vessel for holding
the Soma juice is mentaUy (manasa) offered. Though the
actions connected with the Manasa vessel are of the nature
of thoughts, since they are connected with an actual external
sacrifice, they may be considered here also, as of the natmre
of action.
45. And on account of transfer.
The opponent gives a further reason in support of his
view. The altar built by mind etc. is an alternative to the
altar built by bricks, and hence, is of the natmre of action.
There is the foUowing text : 'Of these (ahar built by mind)
each one is as great as the previous one (fire in the altars
built by bricks)' (Sa. X. iv. 1-3); here the powers of the
previous altar made by bricks is explicitly transferred to the
altar buUt by mind. As all these altars are having equal
effects, there is no choice between them and, therefore, the
fires on the altar of mind etc. are auxiUaries to sacrificial
392
Sn-Bhdsya
[ 3.3.45.
performances ; and hence they themselves possess the char-
acter of action.
46. But (fu-e of thought is a) meditation only; on
account of determination and what is seen (in the text).
The word 'But' refutes the prima facie view given in the
above two aphorisms. Fire-altars built by mind etc. are of
the nature of meditation onlyand not of the nature of
action ; because they are the parts of a sacrifice which is of
the nature of meditation only. The Scripture also says: 'Those
fires are buUt of knowledge only.. . . ; to one who knows
thus, these become built of knowledge' (a. X. iv. 1-12).
Because speech, mind etc. cannot be piled into an altar like
bricks, they are, indeed, constructions of mind only. We
learn from the following passage how these fires are part of
mental sacrifice : 'By mind the mental fires were established,
by mind they were buUt up, by mind the Soma vessels were
taken up ; by mind they chanted and by mind they recited.
Whatever rite was performed at the sacrifice, whatever
sacrificial rite there was, was performed through the mind
only as consisting of mind on those fire-altars consisting
of mind' (Sa. X. iv. 1-3). Therefore, we learn from this
passage that the entire performance is an act of meditation.
About this conclusion, an objection is raised that there
is no specific injunction in the whole section (dealmg with
mental altars) to confirm it. This objection is disposed of
in the next two Sutras.
o
47. And, because of the greater force of scriptures
etc. (than the context) there is no refutation (by the latter).
3.3.48. ] Srl-Bhasya 393.
Because direct scriptural text, inferential mark and
syntactical connection are more powerful than the
context, the sacrifice of meditation which can be compre-
hended by the dhect scriptural text, cannot be contradicted
by the context which is weak. The direct scriptural text is
as foUows : 'Those fire-altars are buUt of knowledge only'
(Sa. X. iv. 1-2). The inferential mark is contamed in the
foUowing sentence : 'For him who knows thus, aU beings
at aU tunes buUd up the fires even while he is asleep.' And
the syntactical connection is contamed in the connection of
the two terms 'evamvide' and 'cinvantf ('for him who knows-
thus' and 'they build up'). The meaning is that this is a
mental sacrifice, and that it cannot be taken as a literal
sacrifice in which a brick-ahar is necessary.
48. On account of the ingredients etc. as in the case
of the separateness of other meditations. It is also seen;
this has been already stated (in Purva-Mimaihsa).
The sacrifice of action is associated with the fire on the
brick-ahar. This sacrifice of action is different from the
performance of the sacrifice of meditation. This is proved
by the ingredients : (1) Soma vessels (2} hymns to be sung:
and (3) text to be recited. For instance, the text says, 'by
mind the Soma vessels were taken up, by mind the hymns
were chanted, by mind the texts were recited' (Sa. X. iv.
1-3). Just as Dahara-Vidya etc. are separate from the
sacrifice of action, this sacrifice of medhation also is separate.
The injunction for this can be construed by means of subsi-
diaries etc. Purva-Mlmdmsd Sutra (III. v. 21) says : 'But
the texts are indeed injunctions as they convey a new meaning.'"
394
Srl-Bhasya
[ 3.3.48.
According to the texts previously mentioned ('Each one is
as great as the previous one', Sa. X. iv. 1.3), the fruits of the
sacrifice of action performed through briclc-altar is transferred
to that of meditation.
49. Not so; it (transfer) is obtained from some simi-
larity also ; as in the case of death ; for (the person in yonder
orb) does not attain his world.
For a transfer (as stated above) it is not- necessary
that intermediate operation should be equal on all occasions.
Indeed, the transfer is obtained by having a common point
of resemblance as in the following text: 'The person in yonder
orb is Death indeed' (Sa. X. iii. 6.3); the common point of
resemblance is the destroying capacity of the two, for that
person who is within the orb does not attain the same world
as in the case of Death. Similarly, the altars made of mind
may be equivalent to the altar made of bricks in some
respects. This sunUarity does not authorise us to connect
mind-made altars with the actual sacrifice. The point is that
the fruit of both the performances is common.
50. And from a subsequent (Brahmana) also, the
'being such' of the text (is known). But the connection (with
the ritualistic portion) is due to the abundance (of the
ingredients of the mental sacrifice).
In a subsequent Brahmana (Sa. X. v. 4.1) we have a
sentence : 'This brick-built fire-altar is that (world) ; the
waters (of the sea) are its enclosing stones. . . . ' ; and it
3.3.51. ] Srl-Bhdsya
395
continues further : 'He who knows that fire a* filhng this
space, all things come to him.' From this we find that a
meditation is enjoined with a separate fruit of its own.
Similarly, in Vaisvanara-Vidya etc. (Sa. X. iv. 6) another
meditation is enjoined. So the Agni-Rahasya (Sa. X.) does
not concern itself with sacrificial action.
Why is this mental sacrifice included in Agni-Rahasya,
whereas it ought to have been included in Brhaddranyaka ?
The reply is that the connection is on account of the abund-
ance of the ingredients. Because of the abundance of the
ingredients which has to be imagined in connection with the
mental sacrifice etc. they are dealt with in the Agni-Rahasya
in proxhnity to the fhe on the brick-altar.
Topic 21 : Existence of a self within a body
51. Some say that on account of the existence of the
self within a body (He is to be meditated upon as knower,
doer and experiencer).
Just as we ascertained the nature of the object of medi-
tation and the mode of meditation in aU meditations on the
supreme Seh, we have also to determine the nature of the
meditating seh. Here it may be asked whether the medhating
self is to be viewed as knower, doer and experiencer,
subject to movement both here and in the next world ; or
as a Self free from all sin etc. as stated in the Chdndogya
Upanisad (VIII. 7) by Prajapati. The opponent advocates
the former view, since the Seh is the doer, experiencer and
knower as long as he dwells in a body. Whatever charac-
teristics a person has at the time of experience of the result
396 Srl-Bhdsya [3.3.5U
over and above the attributes of the imower-ship etc., the
same characteristics are to be meditated upon at the time
of practice ; but he may not attain those attributes as long
as he is not able to attain the fruits of his practice, since the
fruit is attamed by so much of practice of means ; there is
no use ia meditating on what is different from that. Here
also the case is analogous.
But the objection is raised : The text (Chd. III. xiv. 1)
'Just as a person's thought is in this world, so also wiU he be
in the next after death' declares that the individual seff is to
be viewed as free from sin, etc. Not so, the opponent says ;
because that clause refers to the object of meditation and
not the meditating seff as proved by the text: 'Howsoever
they meditate on hun' (Mud. III.).
52. But it is not so. (But rather) the difference, since
it is that form (of the released seff who is free from sin etc.);
as in the case of Brahman-Knowledge.
This aphorism refutes the view expressed in the previous
one. One should not meditate on the form of the bound seff
(i.e. individual self) associated with the knower-ship etc. On
the contrary, one should meditate on the self possessmg the
attributes of freedom from evil etc. which is different from
the transmigratory state. Whatever is the form of the self
in the state of release, the same form should be included
in the theme of meditation also. That is to be meditated
upon. This is proved by the texts : 'Just as a man's thought
is in this world, so also wUl he be in the next after death'
(Chd. III. xiv. 1) and 'Howsoever they meditate on him he
becomes the same thing' (Mud. III). These texts are not
3.3.53. ] Sn-Bhdsya 397
referring to meditation on the supreme Self without having
any relation to the meditating individual self ; the individual
self forms the body of Brahman which is the object of medi-
tation. So one should medhate on the supreme Seh as possess-
ing for its body the individual selves characterised by freedom
from evh etc. which is the teaching of Prajapati. The pure
form of the individual self as an attribute of Brahman has
to be meditated upon.
Just as the essential nature of Brahman forms the object
of medhation on Brahman, so also Atman's ultimate nature
in the state of release should be the object of meditation,
as forming part of the total meditation on Brahman.
Topic 22 : Meditations connected with the limbs of
sacrifice
53. But they (i.e, meditations) connected with limbs
(of sacrificial acts) are not coufined only to (particular)
branches; but, rather (connected with) all branches (of the
Veda).
There are certain meditations mentioned in connection
with sacrificial acts, as for example, the meditation on 'Om';
'One should meditate on Udgitha as the syUable "Om" '
{Chd. II. u. 1); 'Let him meditate on the fivefold Saman
as the five worlds' {Chd. II. u. 1) etc. The question is
ivhether these medhations are enjoined with reference to the
Udgitha etc. as belonging to a certain branch of a Veda or
as belonging to aU its branches. The doubt arises because
the Udgitha etc. are chanted with difierent accents in differ-
ent branches and, as such, they may be considered different.
398 Srl-Bhdsya
[ 3.3.53.
This aphorism refutes this restricted view, because the
texts spealc of this view in general terms and so they are
one in all branches. From the principle that all branches
teach the same doctrine, it naturally follows that the sacrifice
enjoined in different branches is one only. Consequently,
the meditations are not restricted to particular branches.
54. Or there is no contradiction as in the case of
mantras, etc.
The 'or' means 'and'. The term 'etc' denotes generic
characteristics, quaUty, substance, number, similarity, order
of succession, and action. The Mantras etc although they
are mentioned in the text of one branch of the Veda only,
are applied in all the branches of the Veda on the basis of
valid, scriptural texts etc. ; and this is not contradictory,
to reason, as the principal sacrifice is one and the same in
aU branches. Likewise, there is no contradiction in respect
of the meditation under discussion.
Topic 23 : Meditation on the whole
55. (The meditation on) Bhiiman (i.e. whole) is super-
ior ; as in the case of the sacrilice; indeed, the scripture
thus declares.
The Vaisvanara-Vidya (Chd. V. xii. 1) declares the
meditation on the cosmic-form of the supreme Lord who has
the threefold world as his body etc. Here the doubt arises
whether meditations on the parts of the cosmic-form has to
be undertaken, or on the whole as well as its separate parts,
or on the whole cosmic-form only ? According to the oppo-
3.3.56. ]
Sn-Bhdsya 399-
nent, one has to meditate on its separate parts. For separate
meditations are enjoined with special results of their own.
The Sutra refutes these views. The meditation on the
cosmic-form of the Lord as a whole is enjoined here as we
apprehend the unity of the entire section. In the beginning
of the context the five sages wanted to know the self of the
Vaisvanara. The King Asvapati teaches them the Self of
Vaisvanara who has the universe for the body. Here Vaisva-
nara, who is the highest Self, who is the food of the worlds,.
all beings, all selves is the prescription. The meditation on
each lunb of the cosmic-form of the Lord and its special
fruit are of the nature of explanation of the parts of medi-
tation on the whole form.
The above decision is arrived at as in the case of the
sacrifice. The Scripture says : 'As soon as a son is born, let.
one offer a cake on twelve potshreds to Vaisvanara' (Tai.
Sam. II. ii. 5.4). This is reiterated in the following passage :
'in that there is an oblation on eight potshreds' (Tai. Sam.
(I. ii. 5.4). Similarly, here also the meditation has to be
performed on the whole, not in parts. The Scripture more-
over discourages meditation in parts as follows : 'Your head
would have fallen ff you had not come to me'. (Cha. V. xii.
2). Therefore, meditation on the Bhuman is superior and.
fruitful, and not on parts in which case calamities will occur..
Topic 24 : Difference of words etc.
56. (Meditations are) separate. Because there is
difference of words etc.
It was mentioned in the last aphorism that though the:
Scripture enjoins meditations on parts of the cosmic person,.
400 Sri-Bhasya
[ 3.3.66.
the purpose of the Scripture is meditation on the entire
'form'. Now, the scripttures prescribe different meditations
hke Sad-Vidya, Bhuina-Vidya, Upakosala-Vidya, SandUya-
Vidya, Vaisvanara-Vidya etc. which are aU meditations on
Brahman and which have for theh results final release. The
doubt here arises whether these meditations are one or sep-
arate. The opponent says that they are ah one, as they aff
have Brahman as the sole object of meditation. This aphorism
refutes that view and says that these medhations are 'separate,
on account of the difference of words etc' By the term 'etc'
m the aphorism is noted repetition, number, quality, context,
and names (vide Pu. Ml. Su. II. 2, 3). In these meditations,
through separate words, the differences among the subsi-
diaries are seen as the cause of distmction among the princi-
pal rituals enjoined. Indeed, the term 'he knows', 'let him
meditate', etc. denote contmuity of cognitions and these
cognitions relate to Brahman only ; none the less these cog-
nitions are distinct from one another in so far as they have
for theh object Brahman as associated with special attributes
(like, being the sole cause of the world, bemg free from aU
evh and so on). So the conclusion is that aU these medita-
tions are independent and separate, having for the fruit
the attainment of Brahman, and are complete in themselves.
This prhiciple is decided in the Purva-Mlmdmsd Sutra (II.
ii. 1) : 'There is separation of rituals when there are differ-
ences in words'.
Topic 25 : Option
57. There is option; on account of non-difference of
fruits.
3.3.59.]
Srl-Bhasya 401
The next question is whether the vidyds mentioned under
the previous-5tt?ra are to be combined by one and the same
person, or whether there is choice in the practice of any
vidyd. The opponent holds the former view and cites another
practice. As Agnihotra, the new-moon and fuU-moon sacri-
fices etc. have one and the same fruit i.e. reaching the
heaven, and the same sacrificer performs them all with a
view to attaining greater enjoyment. In the same way medi-
tations on Brahman may also be combined. This prima facie
view is refuted by the aphorism. On account of non-differ-
ence of fruit, there is option or freedom of choice. Dkect
experience of Brahman which is of the nature of unsurpass-
able bliss is the fruit of aU meditations on Brahman. The
Scripture says : 'He who Icnows Brahman attains the highest'
{Tai. II. i. 1). If direct experience of Brahman may be
attamed through one meditation, resorting to another is
useless. On the other hand, in the case of those meditations
which aun at fruits other than the attainment of Brahman,
' there may be freedom of choice between different meditations
being combined or pursuit of one among them.
58. But these (meditations) aiming at worldly objects
may be combined or not according to one's desires; on
account of the absence of reasons (mentioned previously).
The meditations aiming at objects of desure other than the
attainment of Brahman grant only limited fruits. The mean-
ing is, that they may therefore be combined to get greater
results.
Topic 26 : Subsidiary meditations
50. (Meditations) V'hich are connected with the parts
26
402 Srt-Bhdsya
[ 3.3.59
(like Udgitha), are as important as the parts themselves.
Sutras 59 to 62 give the view of the opponent. There
are meditations enjoined in the text such as the following
one : 'Let hun medhate on the Udgitha as the syUable "Om" '
(Chd. Li . 1). A doubt arises whether these meditations must
-be adopted at the sacrifice as a part (subsidiary) of it; or
whether they have to be undertaken for the benefit of the
. sacrificer. It has to be performed invariably as accessories
tliis is the conclusion. Many reasons may be adduced to
prove this. As the Udgitha etc. which are the basis of those
meditations ought to be apphed only as subsidiaries of the
sacrifices, so also the meditations connected with those sub- ,
sidiaries are themselves to be adopted as unavoidable acces-
sories to the sacrifices.
60. Because there is an injunction.
The injunction : 'Let hhn meditate on the Udgitha''
(Chd. I. i. 1) enjoins meditation as a subsidiary to the
Udgitha. As in the injunction, 'he should bring water m the
mUk-paU for him who deshes cattle', no other injunctive
sentence is mentioned, in the same way, we have to under-
stand here also that the rule is to be considered as subsidiary
to the injunction on the Udgitha.
61. Because of the rectification (from a text).
A further reason is given by the opponent. The rule in
the text is, 'from the position of Hotr he rectifies the defect
,in the Udgitha', Defective Udgitha means Udgltha without *
3,3.63.]
Sn-Bhdsya 403
meditation. The text shows correction by another passage
when there is absence of meditation. This proves that medi-
tation is an accessory to sacriBcial works.
62. And on account of the scriptural declaration of a
quality (i.e. subject) being common (to all the Vedas).
The text 'by it (syllable "Om") the threefold knowledge
(of the Vedas) proceeds. The Adhvaryu gives orders with
!'Om", the Hotr recites with "Om", the Udgatr sings with
"Om" ' (Chd. I. i. 1) declares that the Pranava, which is
a 'quality' (i.e. subject) of meditation, is common to all the
Srutis (texts); it further shows that the meditation has to be
done in connection with the sacrifice. This view of the
opponent given m these four Sutras is refuted in the next
one.
63. Because the text does not declare their co
existence.
This is not so ; the rule that the meditation on the
Udgitha etc. have to be bound to the sacrifice, like the Udgitha
etc. are, is not correct. Why ? 'Because the text does not dec-
lare their co-existence.' When there is a subsidiary character,
there is always co-existence. In the clause 'let hun meditate
on the Udgitha', no other qualification is mentioned. None
the less, in the subsequent clause'whatever he does with
knowledge, with faith, with Upanisad, that becomes more
vigorous' (Chd. I. i. 10), it is declared that the meditation
wUl become the means of effecting more efficacy in the
404 Srl-Bhdsya [3.3.63.
sacrifice ; from this it foUows that the meditation is taught
aJs a. means of obtaining a frmt other than that of the fruit
of the sacrifice. Consequently, the meditation cannot be
viewed as a subsidiary part of the Udgitha which itseh is a
subsidiary part of the sacrifice.
64. And because (the Scripture) says so.
i The text says : 'The Brahmana (priest) who knows this
protects the sacrifice, the sacrificer and aU other priests' {Chd.
IV. xvii. 10). This shows that aU the priests are protected
through the knowledge of Brahman. This passage becomes
appropriate when we understand that there is no invariable
principle regardmg the knowledge of the Udgatr and such
other priests. The conclusion is that there is no invariable
principle that the medhations are restricted to sacrifice.
CHAPTER III
SECTION IV
Topic 1 : Object of human endeavour
5WffSrT: 515^1^%^ R ^ ' T : U ? U
1. From this (meditation results) the object of human
endeavour, because of the scriptures; thus (says)
Badarayana.
In the last section, we have discussed the oneness or
manifoldness of meditations as related to fruits generated
by combining or non-combining of the attributes of Brah-
man. This section discusses whether the highest object of
human endeavour can be realized by meditation directly or
it accrues from the works whose subsidiaries are medita-
tions. The venerable Badarayana holds the former viewj
because the scriptiures declare thus : (1) 'He who knows
Brahman attains the highest' (Tai. II. i.- 1); (2) 'I know
the great person of sun-like lustre beyond darkness. He who
thus knows Hun becomes unmortal here ; there is no other
path to go.' {Tai. Ar. III. xii. 7); (3) 'As the flowmg rivers
disappear into the sea, loosing their names and forms, so
also the knower, free from name and form, reaches the
divine Person, who is higher than the highest' {Mu. III.
ii. 8). .
2. Because it (i.e. knowledge) is subsidiary (to the
406
Sri-Bhdsya
[ 3.4.2.
sacrificial acts), tlie statement of the object of the human
endeavour is merely laudatory as in other cases; thus says
Jaimini.
The opponent's position is stated in this and the follow-
ing five Sutras. It is not possible to realize the highest object
of human endeavour through meditation. The real purport
of the scriptmal text 'He who knows Brahman attains the
highest' (Tai. II. i. 1) is to teach the knowledge of truth
about the seh who is the agent of sacrificial acts prescribed.
Therefore, by purifying the agent, knowledge becomes sub-
sidiary to the sacrificial acts ; and so the scriptural statement
regarding the fruit of knowledge must be taken as merely
laudatory.
Jaunini thinks that, 'as in other cases (i.e. in the case
of substances, attributes, etc.) the scriptural statement regard-
ing the fruit is merely laudatory. This has been declared
in the aphorism : 'Declaration of results with regard to
substances, piurifying rituals and actions is merely laudatory,
because they subserve the purposes of another' (Pu. Mi.
Su. IV. hi. 1).
No one will undertake any sacrificial action, unless he
is different from the body and of an eternal nature. Thus
knowledge is accessory or subsidiary to sacrificial acts ; and
hence the highest object of human endeavour cannot be
attained through this knowledge.
3. Because we find (from scriptures such) conduct
(of men of realization).
With regard to those who know Brahman, then, conduct
IS primarUy seen in theh sacrificial actions. Asvapati Kaikeya,
U ^ U
3.4.5. ]
Sn-Bhdsya 407
who had a deep knowledge of the Self, told the sages who
.approached hun for receiving the knowledge of the Self :
'Sirs, I am about to perform a sacrifice' {Chd. V. xi. 5).
.'Similarly, we are informed in the Smrti that Janaka and.
others, who were the foremost knowers of the Self, them-
selves performed the sacrificial actions as is seen in the
foUowiag passage : 'Janaka and others attained to perfec-
tion through sacrificial actions only' {Gitd, III. 20). Though
both Janaka and Asvapati were knowers of the Self, they
concerned themselves with sacrificial actions. Thus, medita-
tions, being of the nature of the knowledge of the agent of
actions, subserve sacrificial actions. Consequently, the highest
object of human endeavour cannot be attained through
linowledge.
4. That (i.e. Knowledge being subsidiary to sacrificial
acts) is known from the scriptures.
The scripture, indeed, directly declares that knowledge
stands in a subsidiary relation to sacrificial acts, as in the
. passage 'Whatever one does with knowledge, with faith,
with Upanisad, that is more vigorous' {Chd. I. i. 10). Nor
is it possible to elucidate this as relating to the Udgitha
only ; for, the direct scriptural statement is more powerful
than the subject-matter. And the words of the above passage
refer to knowledge only.
wwRvrnnrT^ una
5. Because the two (i.e. knowledge and works) go
together.
408 Sri-Bhdsya [ 3.4.5/
'He is followed by knowledge and works' (Br. IV. iv. 2).
This text shows that knowledge and work go together with,
the Self. The co-existence of knowledge and work is only
possible, accordmg to the reason given above, when know-
ledge is subsidiary to works.
%rRT?i^ u %, n
6. Because (scriptures) eujoin (work) for sucli a one.
Because works are enjoined on him only who possesses
knowledge, knowledge is subsidiary to works. In the text,.
'He having learnt the Veda from a family of teachers...
setting up a family and in a pure place' etc. (Chd. VIII.
XV. 1), the term 'learning the Veda' enjoins works on hun
who has learnt the meaning of the Veda. Therefore, the
knowledge of Brahman also has its application m the per-
formance of works ; it has no independent fruit of its own.
f^mnm u a u
^
7. On account of the compulsory rule.
'Performmg works here let a man wish to live a hundred
years' (Isa. 2); this text conclusively establishes that the
object of human endeavour cannot be attained by knowledge
only. Accordingly, the entire life of a knower of the Self
must be spent in doing works ; hence works alone. have
fruits, while knowledge is only subsidiary to works;
: ] 8. But, because (the Scripture) teaches about some one
who surpasses (the individual self, who is the-agent)
3.4.9. ] Srl-Bhdsya 409
Badarayana's (view) is correct; for, this is seen (from the
scripture).
Sutras 2-7 give the view of the opponent, which is
refuted in the Sutras 8-10.
Only from knowledge the object of human endeavour
is attained. How ? The Vedanta texts do not teach the indi-
vidual self who is the agent of works ; on the contrary, the
texts teach the supreme Brahman, who is the object of the
knowledge, who is opposite to all that is evil, who is the
mine of innumerable auspicious attributes, unsmrpassed in
excellence. Therefore, the venerable Badarayana holds, that
tlie fruit is attamed through knowledge only. Thus, that the
Vedanta texts teach the supreme Self is clear from such
passages as the following : 'Free from evil, free from old
age, free from death, free from sorrow, free from hunger
and thirst' (Chd. VIII. i. 5), etc.
Thus in the texts which teach the knowledge of Brah-
inan, there is not the slightest trace of the individual self
who is insignificant, who is like a fire-fly, who is caught ia
nescience and all other evils.
cT^* cl ?5ffnT W 5. \l
9. But the declaration of the scriptures equally support
both views.
This Siitra refutes the view expressed in the thnd apho-*
rism. There it was shown that Janaka and others were en-
gaged in works, even after attaining knowledge. This argu-
ment is not right. On the other hand, we also know from
the following text that men of knowledge abandoned aU
activities : 'The seers, the sons of Kavasa, said "For what
purpose should we study the Veda ; for what purpose should'
410 Sri-Bhasya
{ 3.4.9;
we sacrifice?" ' {Ai. III. ii. 6). Thus knowers of Brahman
give up works ; and therefore, knowledge or meditation is
not subsidiary to work.
Sacrificial actions may, however, be performed without
attachment to fruits ; but these actions are subsidiary to
meditations on Brahman, and thus the performance of such
actions on the part of the knowers of Brahman is quite
appropriate.
smi ^f si ^ w \o \\
10. (The deciaration of the scripture) is not universal.
If knowledge is subsidiary to works, abandonment of
works wiU not be possible. To this objection, expressed in
the fourth aphorism, the Sutra-kara rephes : The declara-s
tion of that particular scripture does not refer to all medi-
tations, but only to the meditation on Udgitha. In the passage,
'What is done through knowledge' {Cha. I. i. 10), the 'what'
jndicates the particular Udgitha mentioned in the passage
'let him medhate on the Udgitha' {Cha. I. i. 1); the mean-
ing of the passage must be construed to mean that which is
done through the knowledge of the Udgltha becomes more
powerful.
1^^: 5T?T^^ n \ \ \ \
11. There is division, as in the case of the hundred.
This Sutra refutes the argument expressed in the fifth
aphorism. In the text, 'He is foUowed by knowledge and
works' {Br. TV. iv. 2), both knowledge and works have
different fruhs. The meaning is that knowledge foUows,
him to give its own fruits, and works foUow him to bring
3.4.13. ]
Sn-Bhdsya 411
about their own particular fruits. The example, 'as in the
case of a hundred' means just as a person willing to sell a
piece of land and a gem, receives two hundred coins, it is
understood that a hundred is for the land and a hundred
for the gem. Here also sknilar is the case.
12, Of him, who has made the verbal study of the
Veda.
This Sutra refutes the argument expressed in the sixth
aphorism. It is not right to say that because works are
prescribed for one who is possessed of knowledge, the
knowledge is subsidiary to work. For, in the text 'He having
learnt the Veda' (Chd. VIII. xv. 1) works are enjoined on
him who has merely made the verbal study of the Veda;
here 'verbal study of the Veda' does not mean the know-
ledge of the meaning of the Veda. Verbal study means mere
apprehension of the collections of Vedic syllables, without
any understanding of their meaning. After learning the Veda
verbally, a person who is desirous of work, applies himself
to possess the knowledge of works, while he who is desurous
of release applies himself to acquire the knowledge of Brah-
man ; thus knowledge is not subsidiary to works.
13. No; because there is no restriction.
This Sutra refutes the argument expressed in the seventh
aphorism. It is not right to say that the text 'Performing
works here' (tsa. 2) is meant to separate the knower of
the Self from the attainment of knowledge and restricts hun
412 Sri-Bhdsya
[ 3.4.13.
to performance of work. For there is no particular reason to
hold that the text quoted above refers to any independent
work which is the means of attaining results. It may as well
refer to the works which are subsidiary to knowledge. The
text of the Gitd (III. 20) 'Janaka and others attahied to
perfection through works only' is also simharly proper ; for
in the case of the knower of the Self, knowledge and work
go together as long as he is alive.
14. Or permission is granted for the glorification (of
knowledge).
Now the Siitra-kara gives his own meaning of the text,
'Performing works here' (tsa. 2). The text 'ah this is per-
vaded by the Lord' (Isa. 1) indicates that the context relates
to knowledge ; therefore, permission to perform work at all
times is for the glorification of knowledge. Indeed, one may
work ah his life, stiU he is not tainted by virtue of the great-
ness of knowledge. Therefore, knowledge is not subsidiary
to works.
15. According to wish (the life of house-holder can be
given up)some (thus state) also.
Further, some Sdkhds hold the view that the house-
holder's life may be given up according to one's wish by one
who is devoted to the knowledge of Brahman; the text also
says : 'What shah we do with off-sprmg, we to whom this
world is the Seh?' (Br. IV. iv. 22). This passage shows"
that knowledge is not subsidiary to works ; for, if it were,
3.4.17.]
Srl-Bhasya 413
yoljintary renunciation of the house-holder's life would not
be possible for one who is devoted to the knowledge of
Brahman.
16. And destruction (of all works by the knowledge
of Brahman).
We read in the Upanisads, about the destruction of
karma, good and evil, which is at the root of all the
afflictions of transmigratory existence, as stated in the pas-
sage : 'When He has been seen who is high and low, the
knot of the heart is broken, all doubts are solved and all
his works are destroyed' (MM. II. ii. 9). This would not
be possible if knowledge were subsidiary to works.
17. And (knowledge belongs) to those who are celi-
bates ; indeed (this is so) declared in the scriptures.
The knowledge of Brahman belongs to those who observe
celibacy, and these celibates living in that stage of life,
need not perform Agnihotra, the new-moon and full-moon
sacrifices etc.
If it is said that there is no such stage of life accord-
ing to scriptures, the SUtra-kara asserts that it is so declared
in the scriptures as stated in the passages : 'Three (stages
of life) are the basis of Dhanna' {Chd. II. xxiii. 1), 'Those
who, in the forest, practice penance with faith' {Cha. V.
x. 1), 'Wishing for Brahman only mendicants renounce the
world' (Br. IV. iv. 22) etc. A text relating to fife-long
414 Srl-Bhdsya
[ 3.4.17.
performance of works is valid only for him who has not
renounced.
18. Jaimini (holds that in the texts referred to in the
last Sutra, there is a mere) reference to (renunciation), and
not injunction; because (other texts) condemn (renuncia-
tion).
In the Vedic text 'three (stages of life) are the bases
of Dharma' (Chd. II. xxiu. 1) the celibates possess, as it
were, stages of life ; this is not appropriate, because in that '
passage a mere reference to renunciation is made. It is not
an injunction. The Chdndogya text (II. xxiu. 1) is intro-
duced just to glorify the meditation on Brahman with the
help of Pranava, for the context is concluded with the text,
'He who is devoted to Brahman attains inunortahty' (Chd.
11. xxiii. 1). Simharly, the text, 'And those who, in the
forest, practise penance with faith' (Cha. V. x. 1) refers
to an earher injunction about the path of gods and not a
new injunction. Further, there are other texts which con-
demn renunciation : 'One who removes the sacrificial fire is,
mdeed, the killer of the vhhity of the gods' (Tai. Sam. I. >.
v. ii. 5). Thus Jaimini is of the opinion that there is no
injunction for renunciation for the celibates.
19. They are to be practised, Badarayana thinks; for
fbe scriptural text refers equally to all the stages of life.
But the Siitra-kara, Badarayana, thinks that accord-
ing to the text cited (Chd. II. xxiu. 1), Sannyasar V
3.4.20.]
Srl-Bhdsya 415
and other stages of life ought to be practised like that of
the house-holder. Nor must it be argued that the duties,
mentioned in the text (Chd. II. xxiii. 1) 'sacrifice, study,
gifts, austerity and celibacy' belong to the stage of house-
holder only. While 'sacrifice, study, gifts' denotes the stage
of the house-holder, 'austerity' denotes Vdnaprastha (an-
chorite) and Sannydsa (ascetics). The word 'ceUbacy' also
denotes the duty of the student. The text 'he who is devoted
to Brahman attains immortality' (Cha. IL xxiii. 1) applies
to all the stages of life, because complete devotion to Brah-
man is possible ui aU the stages of life.
f^Isi^? siR'TRcI^ U Ro [\
20. Or it is an injunction, as in the case of bearing
(samit).
In connection with the funeral rites relatmg to Agni-
hotra, the foUowing text occurs : 'Carrying the fig sticks
below the ladle, he runs behind ; for the gods, mdeed, he
bears them above'. Although the passage is having the
character of repetition, yet as the carrymg of fig sticks above
is not estabfished by any other means, it must be accepted
as an injunction. SimUarly, the text (Chd. II. xxiu. 1)
quoted under the previous Siitra must be accepted as an
injunction for aU stages of life, which is not established by
any other means.
In this manner, the text enjoinmg the performance of
AgnUiotra as long as life lasts must be understood as con-
cerning one who is not free from attachment. The conclusion
is that there is an injunction of attainment of knowledge of
Brahman for the ceUbates ; hence the object of human
endeavour is attained through the knowledge of Brahman.
416 Sn-Bhdsya
[3.4.21.
Topic 2 : Mere glorification
21. If it be said (that references to Udgltha as the best
essence) is mere glorification because of their acceptance,
we say 'no', because it is new.
Another question is now taken up. The text mentions :
'That Udgitlia (Om) is the essence of essences, the
supreme, deserving the highest place, the eighth' (Chd. I.
i. 3). The opponent holds that these are mere glorifications,
and that there is no injunction of meditation on Udgitha. ^
These texts are analogous to 'the ladle is the earth, the
dhavanlya fire is the world of heavens', m which the earth
end the heaven are mentioned only to glorify the ladle
and the fire. This view of the opponent is set aside in the
latter half of the Siitra, because it is new. The passages
on Udgitha cannot be mere glorification. Because that
Udgitha is the best of the essences is not arrived at through
any other means of knowledge. There is not any other
mjunction on the Udgitha in proximity. Hence such texts
describing the Udgitha as the essence of the essences
should be accepted as an injunction. The text enjoins a ^
meditation on Udgitha as the best essence of the essences
etc. for the purpose of attaining the fruit of greater vigour
and efi&cacy in sacrifices.
22. And because of the word expressing an injunction.
. 'Let one meditate' (Chd. I. i. 1). In this text, we have a
clear injunction which denotes action of meditation. All the ^,
3.4.24. ]
Srl-Bhasya 417
words which denote action have the force of an injunction.
Therefore, all these texts enjoin meditation.
Topic 3 : Pdriplava
23. If it be said (that the Upanisad stories are) for the
purpose of pariplavas, we say no; because they are speci-
fied.
In the Asvamedha sacrifice, the sacrificer and his family
are expected to hear the recital of certain stories called
pariplavas, as for example: 'They tell stories' (A. S.
Su. X. 6).
In the Upanisads, also, we hear certain stories. 'Pratar-
dana, son of Divodasa, went to the beloved abode of Indra'
(Kau. III. 1) etc. The doubt is whether Upanisadic stories
also serve the above-mentioned purpose of pariplava durkig
Asvamedha or whether they expound any special know-
ledge. The opponent maintains the former view. This
view is set aside by the Sutra, since not all stories are con-
nected with the pdriplava. Rather the texts choose special
stories as suitable for pdriplava performance, such as, 'King
Manu, son of Vivasvat' (Kau. X. 7). The Upanisadic
stories do not constitute pdriplava performance, but are
used with the injunctions about meditations.
24. And so, because they are connected as one
sentence.
'The Self, mdeed, is to be seen' (Br. IV. v. 6); this text
inculcates an injunction. With sxich injunctions the Upani-
27
418 Srl-Bhdsya
[ 3.4.24
sadic stories are logically connected in the same contexts ;
I.e., they subserve mjunctions relating to meditations, just
as the passage 'he wept' (Tai. Sam. I.v.1.1.) is intended
to subserve injunctions of sacrhicial works and not meant
for pdriplava.
Topic 4 : Celibates need not kindle sacrificial fire
25. For this very reason, there is no necessity of
Idndling the sacrificial fire.
It was stated previously (Sutra, III. iv. 15-20) that
meditating celibates have stages of life sanctioned by the
scriptures. Now the opponent holds that, since there are
no sacrifices for celibates, the meditations which have sacri-
fices as theh subsidiaries cannot belong to them. The
Sutra-kara negates this view. As regards the cehbates who*
are connected with medhations, there is scriptural sanction
in texts such as 'desiring this Brahman alone, ascetics
renounce the world' (Br. IV. iv. 22) and 'deshing which
they practise celibacy' (Ka. II. 15) etc. For this very
reason, the meditation among celibates has no necessity for
kindlmg the sacrhicial fhe, i.e. they need not perform Agni-
hotra, New-moon and Full-moon sacrhices etc. for which
sacrificial fire is absolutely necessary. The conclusion is
they have to perform only those works prescribed for their
stages of life.
Topic 5 : Need of all works
26. And there is the need for all (worlds), for the
3.4.26]
Sri-Bhdsya 419
scriptures prescribe sacrifices etc. even as the horse (requires
harness etc.)
From the previous Sutra, we may come to the conclu-
sion that if knowledge (meditation), without any reference
to sacrificial actions etc. leads to immortality, it must do
the same thing in the case of householders also. The text
ordaining sacrifices etc. does not prove that sacrificial
actions are subsidiaries to knowledge, as seen from the
passage : 'Brahmanas desire to know hun by the study of
the Veda, by sacrifice, by gifts' (Br. IV. iv. 22). Of this
view the Sutra-kara gives this opinion : Among the house-
holders who perform Agnihotra etc. knowledge presupposes
sacrificial actions, since we understand from the above
scriptural passage that sacrifices etc. are subsidiary to
knowledge.
What the above passage reaUy means is that sacrifice
is a means by which knowledge is brought about..
Knowledge is something absolutely different from the
knowledge of the textual meaning. It is denoted by words
such as dhydna (meditation), upasana (worship) etc.;
it is of the nature of remembrance, which has attamed
the form of direct and clearest perception ; by practising
day by day, it attains exceUence ; and being continued up
to final departure, it becomes the means of attaming final
release. Such meditation arises by the grace of the supreme
Person, who is pleased by the performance of the daUyand
occasional acts ; thus it is ordained by the scriptures 'they
deske to know hun by the sacrifices' (Br. IV. iv. 22).
Therefore, in the case of the householders, knowledge
stands in need of all daily and occasional works like sacri-
fices etc.
Just as the horse, which is the means of locomotion.
420 Srl-Bhdsya
[ 3.4.26.
stands in need of harness etc. so knowledge or meditation,
which is a means of final release, requhes the help of differ-
ent rituals, daily and occasional; thus the Lord hhnseff
says, 'Sacrifices, gifts, and austerities are not to be given
up; they must be performed always; for sacrifices, gffts
and austerhies piuify the worshipper' (Gitd, XVIII. 5).
Topic 6 : Calmness, self-control etc.
27. But even so one must be possessed of calmness,
self-control etc. since they are enjoined as subsidiaries to
that (i.e. meditation), and therefore, must be necessarily
practised.
The question is whether an householder also should
practise cahnness, seff-control etc. for the purpose of attain-
ing knowledge or medhation. The opponent says that these
need not be practised, since the performance of works
iniplies the activities of external and internal organs of
action, and since calmness etc. imphes a nature contrary to
those activities.
, This view is refuted by the Sutra-kara. Although the
householder is engaged in the performance of worksthe
activities of the organs of actionhe should possess cahn-
ness, seff-control, etc.; for these attributes are enjoined
as, subsidiaries to knowledge, as in the text : 'Therefore, one
who knows this, havmg become calm, subdued, satisfied,
patient, and coUected, should see the Seff in the seff.' (Br.
TV, iv. 23).
3.4.28. ]
Srl-Bhasya All
As calmness etc. by virtue of their being of the nature
: of concentration of the mind, are seen to be subsidiary
materials for the generation of knowledge, they have to be
necessarily practised. >
There is no mutual antagonism between works and calm-
ness, self-control etc. ; for the two relate to two different
spheres. The activities of organs of action operate in the
spheire of works enjoined; cessation of activities operates
virhere works are not enjoined and devoid of any definite
purpose.
For one engaged in works which involve activities of
the' organs of action, it should not be presumed, that Caith-
ness of the mind etc. are not possible, as the mind is
involved by the innate impressions of action. For perform-
mg works enjoined by the scriptures pleases the supreme
Person and hence through His grace it becomes the means
of destroying aU opposite, innate impressions. Therefore,
' the house-holder also should practice calmness, seff-control
and the rest.
Topic 7 : Permission to take all foods '
28. There is permission to take aU foods when life
is endangered; because the scripture declares that.
Both Vajms and Chandogas state thus in connection
with the Prana-Vidya : 'By hun, what is not foo'd
is not eaten, what is not food is not accepted' {Br. VI.
i. 14) and 'Verily, m the case of one who knows this,
there is nothing whatever that is not food.' {Chd. V. ii. 1);
here the knower of Prana is permitted to eat all foods. A
422 Srl-Bhdsya
[ 3.4.28.
doubt arises here whether permission to eat aU foods is
proper for him who is devoted to the Prana-Vidya, or only
when there is danger to life. The Siitra-kara advocates the
latter view. Indeed, elsewhere, the scripture gives permission
to eat ah foods to those who have knowledge of Brahman,
only when there is danger to life. This permission also
applies to those who are the knowers of Prana.
In the Chdndogya Upanisad (I. x. 3) we hear the story
of Usasti, son of Cakra, who was the foremost among the
knowers of Brahman ; when his country was struck by
famine, he ate inferior pulses given to hhn by someone out
of his leavmgsan unlawful food. So we conclude from this
text that prohibited food may be eaten only when life is in
danger.
29. And because (scriptural statements with regard
to food) are not contradicted.
The Chdndogya Upanisad states : 'When the food is
pure, mind becomes pure; when the mind is pure, then
remembrance is firm' (VII. xxvi. 2). This passage clearly
shows the need for purity m food even for knowers of
Brahman. This rule can remam uncontradicted only if we
imderstand that eatmg of aU foods by the knowers of
Brahman, even though endowed with surpassmg powers,
is permissible only when there is danger to Kfe. Likewise,
permission is given to the knowers of;;PrS^a,, also.
3Tfq \\ \o \\
30. The Smrti (also) says so.
3.4.32. ]
Srl-Bhdsya 423
The Smrti also says that both those who have know-
ledge of Brahman and those who have not can take all
foods only when there is danger. 'When there is danger to
bis life, he can take food from anywhere. He is not stained
iy sin like a lotus leaf by water' (Manu, X. x. 4).
31. Therefore the scriptural text prohibits license.
The above conclusion is also confirmed by a scriptural
text which prohibits a person from doing everything as he
-pleases, i.e. eating all foods. The Kdthaka-Samhitd thus
declares : 'Therefore a Brahmana does not drmk liquor,
thinking, "may I not be stained by sin" ' (XII. xii. 4).
Topic 8 : Injunction of duties
32. The duties -of the Asramas (are to be performed)
Ibecause they are enjoined.
It has been stated Shat sacrificial works are subsidiaries
to the knowledge of Braliman. The matter to be considered
"is whether or not tliose sacrificial works have to be per-
formed even by him who is not desirous of his final release
;and who merely wants to fulfil the duties of his Asrama. If
the subsidiaries to the knowledge of Brahman stand in a sub-
orduiate relation to the duties of the Asramas, the conflict
of the combination of permanent and non-permanent works
Will arise ; thus sacrificial works cannot be the duties of
imke Asramas.
The reply is that the sacrificial works sanctioned by tlie
424
Sri-Bhasya
[ 3.4.32.
Asramas are to be performed even by one who merely
Wishes to fulfil the duties of his Asrama, for the text says,,
'One should offer the Agnihotra as long as Iffe lasts' (A. S.
Su. III. xiv. 8). The meaning is that the permanent works
are to be performed since they are a Iffe-long obhgation. Shni-
larly, the same works are to be practised also as subsidiaries
to knowledge, as stated m the text : 'Hhn they seek to
know, by reciting the Vedas' (Br. IV. iv. 22).
33. And also on account of their co-operation (in- *
acquiring knowledge).
The sacrificial works have to be performed also on
account of theh being helpful to knowledge through creating
the deshe for knowledge. A double injunction is enjoined
as regards Agnihotra : to perform sacrifice throughout Iffe,
and to perform sacrifice with a view to attaining heavenly
abode. Just as the combination of these two objections does
not create any contradiction, so also the performance of
sacrificial works as a subsidiary to meditation and as a duty
of the Asrama does not involve any contradiction.
^TTfq cl q^, gr^qfe^^ U ^-if n
34. In all cases the same duties (are to be performed)^
because of the twofold indicatory mark.
There is no fundamental difference of sacrificial works
because, whether they are helpful to knowledge or duties
subserving stages of hfe, these acts are one and the same.
For scripture in enjoining both these (i.e. Asramas and
knowledge) makes use of the same words like 'sacrifice'
3.4.36, ]
Sri-Bhdsya
425
etc. There is no difference with regard to the nature of
rituals to be performed m both the cases.
35. And the scripture also shows (that knowledge) is
not overpowered. '
The scripture declares that there is no overpowermg of
the origination of knowledge by evil works as stated in the
following text: 'By Dharma he destroys evil' (Ma. XXII. 1).
Daily performances of sacrifices etc. purify the mind,
thereby originating knowledge. Therefore sacrifices etc. are
one and the same in both the cases.
Topic 9 : Fitness for knowledge even for outsiders
sFcRT % ?igKS: n w
36. But, (there is competence for knowledge). even
for (those who are) outside (the Asramas), because it is so
seen.
It was said that the members of the four Asramas have
competence to wm the knowledge of Brahman and that
the duties of the Asramas are helpful in producing the know-
ledge. The question is raised whether widowers and others,
who do. not belong to a piarticular Asrama, are entitled for
knowledge or not. The opponent holds that those who are
outside the Asramas are not qualified for knowledge, becaus,e
the duties of the Asrams are means to generating knowledge.
This view is rejected by the Sutra, because the texts
show that even those who do not belong to any Asrama,
undoubtedly, have the qualification for the knowledge of
426 Sn-Bhdsya
i 3.4.36.
Brahman. The texts che the cases of Raikva, Bhisma,
:Samvarta and others who did not belong to any Asrama,
hut were groimded in the knowledge of Brahman. It is not
possible to maintain that only the duties of the Asramas
promote knowledge. The foUowing text says that givmg
pfts etc. which are not connected to any Asrama, can pro-
mote knowledge : 'They deshe to know him by sacrifices,
' % gifts, by penance, by fasting etc' (Br. IV. iv. 22). The
'conclusion is that prayer, fasting, giving gifts, worship of
'the Deity, which are not connected with any of the Asramas,
can promote knowledge.
37. Smrti also records this.
Smrti also declares that those not belongmg to any of
the Asramas are helped by muttering prayers etc for the
promotion of knowledge. For instance, the text says :
'Through muttered prayer (Japa) also he obtains perfection.
He may perform other works or not; he is a Brahmana
who is the friend of aU beings' (Manu. II. 87).
38. There is also special benefit.
The conclusion is not arrived at by reasonmg and
"Smrti. There is also special benefit. The scripture also de-
clares that through particular duties, nbt connected with any
'6f the Asramas, benefit of knowledge is obtamed : 'He
should seek the self by penance, ceUbacy, faith and know-
ledge' (Pm. I. 10).
39. But better than this (i.e. state of beting outside
3.4.40. ]
Sn-Bhdsya
All
the Asrama) is the other (i.e. state of being in some
Asrama) and because of the indicatory marks.
The state of belongmg to an Asrama is better than the
state of being outside the Asrama. The meaning is that one
who is competent must belong to some Asrama; and only
those who are in a state of distress or misfortune alone may
remain outside the Asramas. The Smrti also says 'Let not
a twice-born stay even for a day outside the Asrama' . For
one who has finished the Brahmacarya stage or for one
whose wife is dead, when he is not free from attachrhent,
the unpossibility of getting a wife constitutes the state bf
distress.
Topic 10 : Of him who has become that
40. But of him who has become that (i.e. celibate or
ascetic) there is no reverting; so says Jaimini; because of
the scriptural restraint from the absence of the duties of
that condition (i.e. Asrama).
The doubt here is raised whether or not there is quaU-
fication for the knowledge of Brahman even for those who
have faUen from the Asrama of the ceUbate, the anchorite
or the ascetic ? The prima facie view is that they are also
qualified for the knowledge of Brahman.
This view is set aside by the Sutra. He who has entered
on the state of a ceUbate or other Asramas cannot live m
a non-Asrama state. For those who have entered the state
of cefibacy etc. the Scripture says that they cannot ^ve up
428
Sn-Bhdsya
[ 3.4.40.
i the special duties of that Asrama. Thus there are the
foUowmg texts : 'He should go to the forest and not return
from it'; and 'those who have lapsed from theh dsrama-
dharmas are not qualified for the knowledge of Brahman.'
Jaimini also confhms this view of the Sutra-kara.
41. And (expiation) mentioned in the chapter dealing
with qualification (in Piirva-lVCmamsa) is not for Jiim,
because a lapse is inferred from the Smrti and because it
(i.e. the Smrti) does not prescribe (expiation).
The expiation mentioned in the chapter dealmg with
qualifications (Pu. Mi. Su. VI. viu. 22) cannot apply in the
case of NaisthUcas who have lapsed from that state, on
account of the foUowing Smrti text: 'For hun, who lapses
after taking the vow of Nalisthika Brahmacarin, I see no
expiation by which such a suicide can be cured' (Agneya-
Parana, XVI. v. 23). Therefore, the expiation referred to
in Purva-Mimdmsd appUes to cehbates other than NaisthUcas.
42. But some (consider) it (i.e. expiation) exists, be-
cause (the lapse) is also preceded by the term 'minor', as
in the case of drinking (liquor) ; this has been already
explained.
According to some, the lapse of the NaisthUcas from
chastity is a minor sin, as it is not considered among
the great sins. Expiatory rites exist for the celibates as well
as, the NaisthUcas as in the case of consiuning hquor. Accordv-
mgto Gautama Dharma:Sutra (I. iu. 4), for NaisthUcas and
3.4-.44-..]
Sn-Bhdsya 429
others, the same rules and practices of the student hold good
when they are unopposed to their Asrama. Therefore, as
expiation is possible for one who has lapsed from his vow '
of celibacy, qualification exists for knowledge of Brahman :
for hun also.
43. But in either case (the fallen ones ought to be
kept) outside, because of the Sruti and custom (to that
effect).
Whether the lapses are major or minor sins, those who
have fallen from the vow of celibacy ought to be kept
outside the ranks of those who are qualified for the know-
ledge of Brahman ; because of the Smrti already quoted
(Agneya Purdna, XVI. v. 23). The meanmg of the Smrti
passage is that expiation are powerless to restore purification.
Fmther, virtuous people shun the company of the fallen
Naisthikas etc. even though they have performed the ex-
piatory rites and do not teach them the knowledge of Brah-
man. Therefore, they have no qualifications for Brahma-
Vidya.
Topic 11 : Sacrificer is the chief
44. It (i.e. meditation on Udgitha) belongs to the sacri-
ficer ; because the Scripture declares the fruit. Thiis Atreya
thinks.
This Sutra represents the opponent's view. Now the
question is taken up as to who is to perform the meditations
430
Srl-Bhasya
[ 3.4.44.
on Udgitha etc. which are dependent upon subsidiaries of
the sacrificial acts ; whether it is the sacrificer or the officiat-
ing priest ? The opponent represented by Atreya, holds that
they are to be performed by the sacrificer as the scripture-
text enjoins a special fruit for these meditations. Just as fruit
and meditation on Dahara-Vidya belong to one and the
same person (i.e. sacrificer), sunilarly, in the case of medi-
tations on Udgitha, etc. also the fruit belongs to the sacri-
ficer ; although the Udgitha can be performed by Udgatr
priest the meditation on Udgitha as bemg the essence of the
essences can very well be performed by the sacrificer.
-a ^
45. It is the duty of the priest, thus thinks Audulomi f
because he is paid for that.
The Sutra-kara supports the view of Audulomi.
Since the priest is paid for aU his acts, physical and mental,
and by that means the fruit of aU his acts is piurchased by
the sacrificer, the meditations also have to be performed by
the priest and not the sacrificer. Although meditations on
Udgitha etc. are for the benefit of the man, yet the priest
should perform them as their agent. This case is not of the-
nature of Dahara-Vidya. In Dahara-Vidya, the text says;
nothing as to their bemg performed by the priest; therefore,,
we conclude that, according to the principle 'the fruit of the
Sastra belongs to one who performs' (Pu. Ml. Su. IX. vii.
18), the fruit as such belongs to the sacrificer.
Topic 12 : The injunction of other aid
si^^fpcRf^Fer: gffW risrft f^iHtcjd^ w n
46. There is the injunction of other aid for him wh
3.4.46.]
Srl-Bhasya 431
has tbat (i.e. knowledge) as in the case of (other) injunc-
tions (about aids) and the like; because it (i.e. mauna or-
Meditation) is famous and is a third requisite (in addition;
to learning and child-like state).
"Therefore a seeker of Brahman, having done with
learning should remain hke a chhd, and after having finished,
with this state and With learning, he becomes meditative'
(Br. III. V. 1). The question is whether the meditative
stage is also enjoined like learning and chhd-like state or
merely refers to it as something already mentioned ; the
opponent holds the latter view on the ground that 'medita-
tion {mauna) and 'learning' both connote knowledge. The-
term 'knowledge' enjomed in the phrase 'having done with
learning' is repeated in the text, 'he becomes meditative'..
Here no injunction is laid down.
This Sutra sets aside the view of the opponent and says,
that meditativeness is enjomed in the text as the thhd
requisite besides learning and chUd-hke state. Just as sacri-
fices etc. quietness of the mind and seh-control etc. are
enjoined as an aid in the text hke, 'the Brahmanas seek to.
know hhn through reciting the Veda, through sacrifices, and
gifts, etc' (Br. IV. iv. 22), and 'hearing' and 'reflection' are-
enjoined as aids to knowledge in the text like, 'the seh is to
be heard, to be reflected upon' (Br. II. iv. 5), here also
(Br. III. V. 1) learning, child-like state and meditation are
enjoined as another aid to knowledge. Here 'meditation*
{mauna) does not imply learning ; on the contrary, h is
continued representation in the mind of the object of
meditation, so that the knowledge of the object becomes
more and more vivid. Thus, with regard to a sphitual'
seeker, who is in any Asrama, learning and a chfldUke
state, with meditation as a third requisite, are enjoined as;
432 Sfi-Bhasya- [3.4.46.^
other aids to knowledge, like sacrifices and other duties of
one's own Asrama.
J 47. But, since it (i.e. knowledge) is existent in all
(the Asramas), the scriptural text ends with the house-
holder.
If knowledge, aided by the duties of the respective
Asramas and associated with meditation (i.e. mauna) as
the third requisite, is declared to be the means of attainmg
to Brahman, how then could the declaration of the Chdn-
dogya (VIII. XV. 1) that man has to discharge the duties
off the house-holder throughout his life in order to attain
to Brahman be appropriate?
The Sutra sets aside this objection. Because knowledge
belongs to all the Asramas, the house-holder also has i t ;
and so the scriptural text ends with him. This ending with
the house-holder is only meant to iUustrate the duties of all
the Asramas. Similarly, the text, 'The Brahmana, giving up
the desire for sons, desire for wealth, deske for worlds,
wanders about as an ascetic' (Br. III. v. 1) estabhshes the
duties mvariably associated with the ascetic. Then the
passage, 'Therefore a knower of Brahman, having done
with learnmg' (Br. III. v. 1) sets down the aids with
meditation. as the thu-d requisite to be the duties of the
ascetic. This is merely illustrative of the duties of all
Asramas.
48. Because, like the state of muni, the other stages
of life also are taught.
3.4.49. ]
Sn-Bhdsya 433
Though the instruction of mauna is laid down for one
who is beyond all desues, preceded by mendicancy, it is
meant to illustrate the duties of all the Asramas. Like the
instruction regarding mauna, the duties of other Asramas are
also taught by the scripture in the text beginning with, 'There
are three bases of Dharma' (Chd. II. xxui. 1), and endmg
with 'He who is devoted to Brahman, attains immortahty'
(Chd. II. xxui. 1). The expression 'devoted to Brahman*
is common to ah the Asramas. Therefore, like the duties
of other Asramas, such as sacrifices, learning etc. the text
enjoins learning, child-like state and meditation as the third
requisite, as aids to knowledge on all Asramas.
Topic 13 : Non-manifestation of one's nature
49. (Child-like state means) without manifesting (one's
nature), on account of the context (or propriety).
The child-like state was discussed in connection with
the passage of Brhaddranyaka (III. v. 1) under the Sutra
46. What is meant by child-like state? Bdlya (chUd-like
state) may mean the state of a child or its action. The for-
mer is not relevant; so we have to accept the second
meaning, viz. its action. Here also the doubt arises whether
we have to accept for its meaning aU the actions of the
chhd such as its capricious doing and moving, or only its
freedom from pride etc. The opponent mamtahis the former
view ; for in the absence of any specification we have to
accept aU.
The Sutra disposes of this view ; a chhd does not manir
i fest hs nature, namely pride, arrogance etC; ; so a man
28
434 Sn-Bhdsya
[ 3.4.49.
aiming at true icnowledge must accept this aspect of a child's
nature. Why? Because of the context or propriety. Then
only we can reconcile bdlya with knowledge. In addition
to Brhaddranyaka passage (III. v. 1) other texts also de-
clare as follows : 'One who has not turned away from evil
conduct, who is not tranquil, who is distracted, or whose
mind is not content, can never attain Hun through know-
ledge' (Ka. II. 24), and 'When food is pure, mind becomes
pure' (Chd. VII. xxvi. 2).
Topic 14 : Worldly prosperity
50. Worldly prosperity arises, when there is no ob-
struction at hand; because it is so seen from the scripture.
Knowledge (meditation) is twofold : that which has
worldly prosperity as its fruit and that which has final
Release as its fruit. Here the question is whether the know-
ledge whose fruit is worldly prosperity generates its fruits
immediately or at another tune indefinitely. The opponent
favours the former view. For according to Gitd (VII. 11)
a man attains knowledge through his meritorious deeds ;
v/hen means is completed, there is no reason why fruition
should be delayed.
To this objection the Sutra-kara repUes as follows :
Worldly prosperity springs up when there is no obstruction
at hand. (Worldly prosperity means knowledge which
grants worldly prosperity). If there is no obstruction through
more powerful deeds, the fruit is generated immediately ;
if there is obstruction, it is generated at another tune. Thus
there is no definite rule as to when meditation is fructified ;
3.4.51. ]
Sn-Bhdsya
435
Cor it is so seen from the scripture : 'Whatever one does
with knowledge, with faith, with Upanisad, that is more
vigorous' (Chd. I. i. 10). The meanmg is works that are
associated with the meditation on Udgitha have no obstruc-
tion to dehver theh fruit.
Topic 15 : The fruit of final Release
51. Shnilarly, there is no rule as to the fruit of fmal
Release, because the meditation has that condition (of
granting fruit in the absence of obstruction); has that
condition.
This topic deals with meditation that has for its fruit,
Release. Meritorious deeds are aids for such meditation.
There is no rule that the final Release takes place imme-
diately. When there is no obstruction, the state of Release
may occur immediately, otherwise not. Here also a doubt
may arise : The deeds which are the means of generating
the medhation leadmg to final Release might be stronger
than other deeds, and therefore, there is no obstruction.
Even in that case, offences formerly conunitted against the
knowers of Brahman may exist, and therefore, there is a
chance of obstruction. The repetition of the last words of
the Siitra shows the close of the chapter.
CHAPTER IV
SECTION I
In the thkd chapter, meditation together with its
means was discussed. In this chapter, the fruit of medita-
tion, after investigatmg the nature of meditation, is taken
up for consideration.
Topic 1 : Frequent repetition of meditation
1. Repetition (of meditation is to be practised) again
and again, on account of the teaching.
The texts say in ttiis connection : 'He who knows Brah-
man attains the highest' (Tai. II. i. 1) ; 'Having known him
thus, one transcends death' (Sve. III. 8) ; 'He who knows
Brahman becomes like Brahman' (Mu. III. ii. 9) ; 'When
the seer sees hun who is bright like gold...' (Mu. III. i. 3).
Here the question is raised whether the act of medita-
tion (i.e. knowledge) prescribed in the Vedanta texts is
to be practised only once or to be practised again and
again. The opponent holds that it is to be practised once
only. For, there is no authority for repeatmg the meditation
again and again, as the texts quoted above indicate.
This Sutra refutes this view and says that acts of medita-
tion (i.e. knowledge) must be repeated; this is the purport
of the scripture. The purport of the scripture is that the
term vedana (knowing) is synonymous with the terms
4.1.2.]
Sn-Bhdsya
437
dhydna and updsana (meditation). In the foUowing text,
the verbs vid, upas, and dhai give the same meaning (i.e.
medhation) with reference to one and the same object.
The Chdndogya Upanisad begins, 'One should meditate
(updsita) on the mind as Brahman' (III. xviu. 1), and
concludes by the word.vid in the passage, 'He who knows
{veda) thus shines and glows with fame, greatness and
spiritual splendour' (III. xviu. 6). SimUarly, the same
Upanisad identifies knowledge of Raikva with meditation :
'Whoever knows anything, that RaUcva knows' (IV. i. 4)
and concludes by the word upas in the passage, 'Now,
Fevered Sir, teach me that Deity on which you meditate'
(IV. ii. 2).
Now dhydna is meditation ; it is not mere remembrance
or representation, but is of the nature of continued remem-
brance. And the term upds has also the same meaning,
because it denotes the uninterrupted series of thought of the
mmd that has one pointed concentration. Both these terms
are denoted by the term vedand (knowledge) as in the
foUowing passages : 'He who knows Brahman attains the
highest' (Tai. II. i. 1) and 'By knowing the Lord one is
released from all fetters' (Sve. II. 15).
fe^ra U R W
2. Because of the indicatory marks.
Here linga means smrti. This meaning is made out from
the Smrti also, which says that vedand (knowledge), which
i'o the means of Release, has the nature of continued remem-
brance, as in the foUowmg passage of Visnu-Purdna (VI.
^ vu. 91) : 'The medhation of His form is one continued
stream without attachment to any other object. Meditation
438
Sn-Bhdsya
[4.1.2.
of Him is thus generated by the six limbs of "yoga".' There-
fore the purport of the scripture is that meditation has to
be repeated again and again.
Topic 2 : Meditation on Brahman as the
Atman of the meditator
3. Certainly, the meditators worship (Brahman) as
their Self; and the scriptures make us realize (Him as such).
The question is whether Brahman is to be realized by
the meditator as other than the meditator or the Self of the
meditator. The opponent holds that Brahman is to be
realized as other than the meditator, because Brahman is
different from the individual seff who is the meditator.
This Sutra refutes this view and holds that Brahman is
to be realized as the Seff of the meditator. Just as, the indi-
vidual seff is the seff of his own body, he should meditate
on the supreme Brahman as the Seff of his own seff. Why ?
Because the ancient meditators thus realized hun : 'O Lord,
indeed you are me, I am you.' But it may be asked how the
meditators accept that Brahman is their inner seff who is in
fact a different entity from the meditator. Other scriptural
texts also make meditators understand this meaning as free
from contradiction : 'He who, dweffing within the seff, is
within the seff, whom the seff does not know, whose body is
the self, who controls the seff from within^He is your inner
ruler, the unmortal Seff' (_Br. Md. III. vii. 22). As all notions
are based on Brahman and all words \iltimately denote
Brahman, the texts teach in reciprocal terms thus : 'O Lord,
indeed you are me, I am you.' Thus, ff we understand the
4.1.4. ]
Sri-Bhdsya 439
relation between individual self and Brahman, the contra-
diction between the texts which teach the difference and
non-difference will not arise. In so far as the individual self
has Brahman as its own Self, we deny difference ; in so far
as the supreme Self is different from the individual self
in the same way as the soul is different from oiu body^we
accept difference. Therefore, the worshipper should meditate
on supreme Brahman as his own Seff.
Topic 3 : Symbols
4. (The Self) should not be (meditated on) in the
symbol; for the symbol is notlthat.
The meditation on symbols is given in the foUowmg
text : 'One should meditate on mind as Brahman' etc.
(CM. III. xviii. 1). In such meditations, where the mind is
taken as a symbol of Brahman, the question is whether the
symbols ought to be viewed as being of the nature of the
Self or not. The opponent holds the former view. For
'meditation on mind as Brahman' (Br. III. xvui. 1) is the
same as meditation on Brahman, Brahman being the
Self of the meditator; the conclusion is that the symbol
should be meditated on as the Seff.
This view is set aside by the Sutra. A symbol should
not be meditated on as the Seff; for the Seff of the medi-
tator is not a symbol. In the meditation on symbols what
is to be meditated on is the symbol only and not Brahman;
indeed, a symbolic medhation is that meditation hi which
what is not Brahman is viewed as Brahman. As told earher,
the symbol, the object of medhation, is not the Seff of the
440
Srl-Bhdsya
[ 4.1.4.
meditator. Tiierefore, it should not be meditated upon as
the Self.
3r^c T^ U R U
5. The symbol is to be viewed as Brahman; on
account of the superiority.
The opponent says that the object of meditation is Brah-
man itself. As such, it is inappropriate to hold that the
mind etc. which are non-sentient things of very little power
should be the basis of meditation. Therefore, though viewed
as mind etc. Brahman itself is the object of meditation.
This Siitra refutes this view. The mind etc. may be
appropriately viewed as Brahman, and not vice versa ; be-
cause Brahman is superior to mind etc. while mind ~etc. are
inferior to Brahman. Indeed, to view a king as a servant
produces evil; on the contrary, to view a servant as a king
produces worldly prosperity.
Topic 4 : The views of Aditya etc.
6. And the subsidiary (such as, the Udgitha in the
sacrificial acts) has to be viewed as Aditya etc. because it
is consistent.
'One should meditate upon him who glows (i.e. Aditya)
as the Udgitha' (Chd. I. iii. 1) ; here the doubt is whether
Aditya should be viewed as Udgitha etc. which are the sub-
sidiaries of sacrificial acts or Udgitha etc. should be viewed
as Aditya. The opponent holds the former view. It was
already said that what is inferior should be viewed as super-
4.1.7.]
Sn-Bhasya 441
ior; in this case the Udgltha etc. which are subsidiaries
ot sacrificial acts, and are the means of attaming the desked
fruits, are superior to Aditya etc.
This view is set aside by the Sntra. The Udgitha etc.
which are the subsidiaries of sacrificial acts, should be
viewed as Aditya. Why ? Because it is consistent; for it is
estabUshed that Aditya etc. are superior. Indeed, through
propitiation of the deities such as Aditya etc. even sacrifi-
cial acts become the means of bringing about then: fruits.
Therefore, Udgitha etc. which are the subsidiaries of the
sacrificial acts, ought to be viewed as Aditya etc.
Topic 5 : Meditation in a sitting posture
7. (One should meditate) in a sitting posture; because
(in that way alone) meditation is possible.
It was said before that knowledge (i.e. jiiana), which
is set forth by the Vedanta texts as the means of attaming
final Release, and denoted by the terms meditation (dhydna),
worship (updsana) etc. is to be frequently practised. This
meditation, it was said, is of the nature of continued succes-
sion of remembrances. The question is how to practise it.
As there is no rule, the opponent holds that the meditator
may practise it either sitting or sleepmg or standing or
walkmg.
This view is not accepted by the Sutra. One should
meditate in a sitting posture. Why ? Mental concentration
is possible in that way alone. Standing or walking requires
effort and lying down conduces to sleep. Therefore, one
should meditate sitting on some support without any bodily
effort.
442
Sn-Bhdsya
[4.1.8.
8. And on account of meditation.
Since worship (i.e. updsand) is of the nature of medita-
tion, as prescribed by the foUowing text, 'The Self is to be
meditated upon' {Br. IL iv. 5), concentration of the miml
must be necessarUy attained. It has been akeady stated that
meditation is concentration of mind on one object, uninter-
rupted by the ideas of different things.
3T^f ^ W U
9. Immovability is necessary (for meditation).
'The Earth meditates as it were. Ether meditates as it
were. Heaven meditates as it were. Waters meditate as it
were. Mountains meditate as it were' {Chd. VII. vi. 1)
in such statements, meditativeness is ascribed to Ether etc.
having immovabiUty in view. Therefore, immovabUity is
necessary for the meditator in a sitting posture like earth,
mountain etc.
10. The Smrti texts also declare (the same thing).
The Smrti texts also declare that meditation is possible
in a sitting posture'Having estabUshed m a clean spot a
firm seat, neither too high nor too low, having covered it
with sacred grass, then with a deer skin and then with a
cloth, there sittmg on that seat, with a mind concentrated
upon a single object, holding the mind and senses in check,
he should practise yoga for the purification of his own self
{Gitd, VL 11-12).
4.1.13.]
Srl-Bhdsya
443
11. Wherever there is concentration oi mind, (there
meditation is to be practised), there being no specification.
No mention is made of special places and times for the
concentration of mmd. The only thing required is that the
place and the time should be conducive to meditation. The
text, 'Meditation has to be practised in a level and clean
place which is pleasing to the mind' (Sve. II. 10), only
suggests any quiet place fit for concentration of mind.
Topic 6 : Meditation till death
12. It (i.e. meditation) has to be performed till death ;
for, here also scriptural authority is seen.
The question is whether this meditation, which is the
means for final Release, has to be performed only for a day
or to be performed every day tiU death. The opponent holds
that it is to be performed only for a day, as it wiU satisfy
the scriptural purpose.
This view is refuted by this Sutra. Medhation has to be
performed tiU death ; for, scripture declares that medhation
should be performed from the time of commencement of
meditation tiU death : 'Living, indeed, thus throughout his
length of life, he reaches the world of Brahman' (Chd.
WI. XV. 1).
Topic 7 : Fruits of meditation
13. On attaining that, non-clinging and destruction
444 Srl-Bhasya
[ 4.1.13.
of subsequent and previous sins will result respectively, be-
cause it is so declared (by the scriptures).
Havmg thus far investigated the nature of meditation
(i.e. Icnowledge), now, the Sutra-lcara begins to consider
the fruits of meditation.
The scriptures state that, after the attainment of know-
ledge of Brahman, the destruction of previous sms and the
non-clinging of subsequent sins will result with regard to the
meditating devotee, as in the following passages : 'As water
does not wet the lotus leaf, even so no sins cUng to him who
knows this' {Chd. IV. xiv. 3) and 'Just as cotton growmg
on reeds is burnt when thrown into fire, even so are burnt
the sins of one who knowing this offers Agnihotra' {Chd.
V. xxiv. 3).
Here the doubt arises whether or not these non-clinging
and destruction result as the fruits of meditation. The op-
ponent holds that they wiU not result, because the scripture
declares, 'No work, which is not experienced, wiU perish
even after millions of aeons' {Brahma-Vaivarta Purdna :
Prakrti-khanda, XXVI. 70). Non-clinging and destruction
of sins should be taken as eulogy of knowledge.
The Siitra refutes this view and says that, on attaining
meditation, non-clinging and destruction of subsequent and
previous sins will result respectively through the greatness
of knowledge as stated in the above texts. There is no con-
tradiction between the texts above quoted {Chdndogya) and
text quoted by the opponent. According to the opponent,
works produce results through their power ; but the passages
quoted above establish that meditation possesses the capacity
to destroy the power of works done before and also the
capacity to obstruct the power of works done subsequently.
The power of works (sinful actions) to produce results is
4.1.15.]
Sn-Bhdsya 445
nothing but the displeasure of the Lord. So the meditation
on the supreme Person destroys that displeasure, which has
been produced by sins, committed before by the meditator.
Topic 8 : Good deeds and meditation
14. Of the other (i.e. good deeds) also there is thus
non-clinging and destruction; but in regard to some deeds.
non-cUnging occurs only after death.
It has been stated that, on account of meditation, pre-
vious and subsequent sins do not cling and are destroyed.
Shnilarly, owing to the power of meditation good deeds also
do not cling and are destroyed. Thus the texts say : 'All sins
turn back from him' i_Chd. VIII. iv. 1) and 'He shakes off
good and evil deeds' {Kau. I. 4). For one who is desiring
final Release, even good deeds are designated by the term
'sin'. Since good deeds are enjoined by the scriptures and their
fruits are desired by some, a doubt arises that they may not
be antagonistic to meditation ; to remove this doubt the
same reasoning of the previous aphorism is applied here.
But even to a man of knowledge, rains, food etc. are
deshable for the purpose of achieving meditation etc. ; how,
it may be questioned, is their destruction brought about?
The Sutra disposes of this doubt by means of the clause,
'only after death'. After the death of the body, good deeds
which are helpful to meditation are destroyed.
Topic 9 : Deeds which have not begun to yield fruits
15. But only those previous deeds (i.e. good and evil),,
t the effects of which are not yet begun, (perish); since they
446
Sn-Bhdsya
[4.1.15.
(i.e. deeds wliich have begun to yield fruits) last till that
(i.e. death).
It has been stated that all good and evil deeds done
before and after the origination of knowledge of Braliman
are destroyed. Now, past deeds are of two kinds : Those
which have not yet begun to yield fruits (accumulated), and
those which have begun to yield fruits (commenced). The
doubt here is that whether all works, good and evil, are
destroyed fully by knowledge or only those, the effects of
which have not yet begun to bear fruits. The opponent holds
that aU are destroyed, because the text says : 'All sins are
burnt' (Chd. V. xxiv. 3); and the existence of the body
subsequent to the rise of knowledge may be accounted for
by the force of impetus as in the case of revolutions of the
potter's wheel.
The Sutra refutes this view and says that only those
previous deeds are destroyed, the effects of which have not
yet begun to bear fruits; for the text declares, 'For him there
is delay as long as he is not liberated from the body' {Chd.
VI. xiv. 2). Further, apart from the Lord's pleasvure and
displeasure caused by good and evil deeds, there is no proof
for the existence of impetus that causes the existence of the
body.
Topic 10 : Agnihotra and the rest
16. But Agnihotra etc. have to be performed for
generating that effect (i.e. producing knowledge), because
that is seen from the scriptures.
Under the aphorism IV. i. 14, it was stated that there
is non-clingmg of even good deeds on account of the power
4.1.17.]
Srl-Bhasya 447
of knowledge. Since Agnihotra and aU the other daily and
occasional works incumbent on one's own stage of Ihe do
uot have theh fruits clinging to the doer, one who does not
like them need not perform them. The Sutra sets aside this
view.
Agnihotra and other works must be performed since
their fruits are necessary.- The wise man has to perform Agni-
hotra etc. for the production of the effect known as know-
ledge. This is declared in the scriptures : 'The Brahmanas
deske to know hkn by repetition of the Vedas, by sacrifices,
by offering gffts, by penance, by fasting' (Br. IV. iv. 22).
Since knowledge becomes exceUent through practice day after
day untU death, obhgatory duties of the stages of hfe have
to be performed for producing that knowledge. Otherwise,
if there is omission in performing these duties, his mind
would lose its clarity and there will be no generation of
knowledge.
17. Other than these (i.e. Agnihotra and the rest),
(there are many good deeds) among the two (i.e. good deeds
done before and after the generation of knowledge) ; such
is the view of some.
But, ff Agnihotra and other good deeds are intended for
generating knowledge and ff other good deeds prior to the
generation of knowledge are destroyed, according to the texts
{Cha. V. X. 5 ; Br. IV. iv. 6), what is the purport of the
foUowing passage : 'His friends mherk his good deeds'
(Sdtydyana-Brdhmaria)!
Besides Agnihotra and other good deeds, which are
meant to generate knowledge, there are manffold good deeds,
448 Sn-Bhdsya
[ 4.1.17.
prior or subsequent to the production of icnowledge, the fruits
of which are obstructed by more powerful works. Some
Sdkhds (schools) refer to those good deeds as in the follow-
ing texts: 'His sons get his inheritence, his friends his good
deeds, and his enemies his evil deeds' (ibid.), and the text
which declares non-clinging and destruction of works through
knowledge refers to those deeds. The following Sutra recalls
to mind the possibility of obstruction to the fruits of works
actually performed.
18. Because of the text 'that alone (i.e. the sacrificial
act) which is perfonned with knowledge.. .becomes more
vigourous'.
The text declares : 'That alone (i.e. the sacrificial act)
which is performed with knowledge. . .becomes more vig-
ourous' (Chd. I. i. 10). This text referring to the knowledge
of Udgitha, says that knowledge has for its fruits, the non-
obstruction of the fruit of sacrificial act. From this we under-
stand that there is obstruction even to work which are
actually performed. Therefore, this text of Sdtydyana (op.
cit.) refers to those good deeds performed by a man of know-
ledge, the fruits of which have been somehow obstructed.
Topic 11 : Destruction of good and evil deeds
19. But having destroyed by experience of the other
two (i.e. good and evil deeds that have begun to yield
fruits), then he attains (Brahman).
4.1.19.]
Srl-Bhdsya 449
Sutra 15 referred to the destruction of the good and
evil deeds which have not begun to yield fruits through ex-
perience. But there are other good and evU deeds which have
begun to yield fruits. Now the doubt is raised whether these
latter are destroyed at the end of that bodily existence which
originates knowledge, or whether there is no rule regarding
their destruction at the end of that bodUy existence or at
the end of other bodUy existence. The opponent says that
according to the text: 'And for hhn the delay is only as
long as he is not freed from the body' (Chd. VI. xiv. 2),
they are destroyed at the end of the bodily existence. i
This Sutra sets aside this view and says that only after
destroying good and evh deeds that have begun to yield fruits,
he attains Brahman. And, if the fruits of good and evil
deeds are experienced in one bodily existence, then at the
death of that body, Brahman is attained ; if the fruits of the
deeds require many bodies, then at the death of those bodies.
Brahman is attained; for, the deeds which have begun to
yield fruits have to be destroyed solely through experience.
This is the purport of the text (Chd. VI. xiv. 2) quoted by
the opponent. The meaning is : There is no fixmg of any
limit for the bodily existences, as long as aU karmas which
have begun to yield fruits have not been exhausted.
However, aU those works which have not b^un to yield
fruits are at once destroyed on the rise of true knowledge.
And the deeds performed subsequent to the rise of know-
ledge, do not cling to the performer. As sudij the friends
of the knower receive his good deeds on his death, and his
enemies his evil deeds.
29
CHAPTER IV
SECTION n
Topic 1 : Speech
1. Speech (combutes) ivith mind, because it is so seen,
and because also there are scriptural statements (to that
effect).
Now, the Sutra-kara begms an inquny mto the modes
of reaching Brahman on the part of one who knows. At first,
the departure of the individual self is taken up for consi-
deration. In this connection the texts say : 'When a person
departs from here, his speech reaches the mind, the mmd
reaches the Prana, the Prana reaches the Fire, and Fure
reaches the supreme Deity' (CM. VI. viu. 6). Now the
question is whether only the function of speech as such
reaches the mmd or the organ of speech itself ? The opponent
holds that the function of speech reaches the mind. Why?
For the mind is not the material cause of speech, and there-
fore, here the essential nature of speech cannot reach the
mind. As the functions of speech and other organs are con-
trolled by the mmd, the text which speaks of the reaching
of the functions of speech is not mappropfiate.
The Siitra-kara refutes this view and says that the
essential nature of speech combines with the mind ; for even
when the organ of speech loses its function, the activity
of the mmd is seen. According to the scripture, 'speech
reaches the xnind' (CM. VI. viii. 6), and it is not absorbed
4.2.3. ]
Sn-Bhdsya 451
ia the immd, but only it is combined or associated with the
mind.
m m' i ^ n ^ u
2. And for the same reason all (the sense-organs)
follow (speech).
'Speech is combmed or associated with the mind'. This
means only conjunction or association of speech and not its
absorption in the mind ; for that same reason, the text ap-
propriately speaics that the remainmg organs, following
speech, reach the mind ; 'Therefore, with the bodily heat
extinguished, he goes for rebirth, with his senses resting in
mmd' (Pra. III. 9).
Topic 2 i Mind
3. That mind (reaches) Prana, because of the sub-
sequent passage.
The mind, which is jomed with all the senses, reaches
Prana; not merely the fimction of mmd. Why? Because
of the subsequent text : 'Mind reaches Prana.' (Chd. VI.
viii. 6).
Here however, a further doubt is raised. The scriptural
statement, 'Mind consists of earth (or anna)' (Chd. Yl.
vi. 5), says that the mind has anna for its causal substance.
And the statement, 'They (i.e. waters) created anna' (Chd.
VI. vi. 4), declares that anna consists of water. Again, the
statement 'the Prana consists of water' (Chd. VI. vi. 5),
declares that Prana has water for its causal substance.
From the.above passages, we have to understand that the
mind is absorbed in its own causal substance.
452 Sri-Bhdsya
[ 4.2.3.
The reply to the above objection is as foUows : The
text, 'Mind consists of anna, Prana consists of water' (Chd.
VI. vi. 5), means, that the nourishment of mind and Prana
takes place through anna and water respectively, and not
that they are the causal substances of mind and Prana ; for
mind consists of the principle of .ahankdra (the prmciple
of egoism) and Prana is a modification of ether. The term
'Prdna' indicates 'water' in a secondary sense.
Topic 3 : Lord of the senses
4. It (i.e. Prana) (reaches) the lord (of the senses),
on account of approacliing it etc.
In the text cited in the first Siitra, we have 'Prana rea-
ches the fire' (Chd. VI. viu. 6). The opponent, foUowmg
ihe same reason given in the previous Sutras, says that the
Prana reaches only fire.
The answer to this view is as foUows. Prana reaches
the lord of the senses, i.e. individual seh. Why ? For 'Prana
approaches the lord' and so on. That Prana approaches
the departmg individual self at the time of death is
declared in the followmg scriptural text : 'At the time of
death, aU the Pranas go to the individual seh' (Br. IV. ui.
3). Again, the departure of Prana. together with the mdi-
vidual self from the body is declared m the foUowing text :
'When he departs, Prana foUows' (Chd. IV. iv. 2). Agam,
its- co-existence with the individu^ seh. is. mentioned in the
foUiDwmg text: 'In whose departure shaU 1; be departing ?
In whose staying shaU I be staymg?' (Pra^ VI. 3). We,
therefore, conclude that Prana conjoined with the individual
4.2.6. ]
Sn-Bhdsya 453
self, reaches the ^fire; that is the meaning of the passage
'Prana reaches the fire'.
Topic 4 : The elements
^ U R U
5 . (Prana reaches) the elehiehts, as it is declared in
the scripture.
In the text 'Prana reaches the fire' (Chd. VI. vui. 6),
the conjunction of Prana with the individual self was men-
tioned. Here the question is whether this conjunction is
with the fire only or with afi the elements? If it is said
that it is with the fire only, as declared by the scripture,
our reply is no. Why ? Because Prana with the individual
self reaches all the elements. Another text declares that the
individual self, when departing, consists of all the elements :
'It consists of earth, water, fixe' (Br. IV. iv. 5).
^^^w\^ u ^ \
6. Not with one element (is there any joining of
Prana) ; for, both (Sruti and Smrti) declare so.
From the text quoted in the previous Siitra (Br. IV.
iv. 5) one may conclude that Prana and the self get united
with each element in succession, one at a time. This Sutra
rejects this view. As each element is incapable of generating
any effect, the Sutra says, 'not with one element'. Both Sruti
and Smrti show such incapability. The foUowing Sruti says
that tripartite combination is taught for rendering such
capabUity to evolve names and forms : 'Having entered
into these three divinities (i.e. fire, water, earth) with this
' individual self, which is Myseff, let me evolve names and
454 Sri-Bhasya
[4.2.6.
formslet me make each of'thfeih triparthe' (C/wv-VI. hi.
2); Smrti also says so : 'Then the elements, being separate,
were not able to produce beings without combmation. Havmg
secured mutual combination, they produced the cosmic sphere
beginning with Mahat down to individual selves' (Vi. I. ii.
52-54). Therefore in the text, 'Prana reaches the fire (Chd.
VT, vui, 6), 'fire' means combination of other elements with
fire. Thus the conclusion is that the Prana reaches other
elements.
Topic 5 : Attainment oj the Supreme
7. (Departure of the individual self from the body)
is common (for knower and ignorant) up to the begmning
of the path; and the immortality (of the knower is obtained)
without having burned.
Is this'departure of the hidividual seh from the body
at the time of death common to the the knower and
the ignorant or whether it belongs to the ignorant only?
The opponent holds that h relates only to the ignorant.
Why ? Because, for, the knower there is no departure at
aU as is declared in the foUowmg text'When aU deshes of
the heart subside, then he becomes immortal and experiences
Brahman here' (Br. IV, iv. 7).
This view is set aside by the Sutra. The departure of
the mdividual self from the body is common to the man of
knowledge as weU as the ignorant up to the beghming of
the path; that is, before the entermg of the individual,self
into the veins. The text says that the meditator passes out
through a particular vein (susumnd)i 'There are a hundred
and one arteries of the heart; of these, one passes up to
4.2.8.]
$ri-Bhasyfi 455
the crown of the head; going up through that, one attams
immortality; the others are for, departmg in various, direc-
tions' (Chd. VIII. vi. 6). Smce the text declares the self's
entry through a particular vein, we have to accept the
departure. There is no difference in thek entrance into the
vein. After the entrance, a difference is declared by the
scripture: 'The individual seff departs by that light,
cither through the eye, or through the head, or through
other bodily parts' (5r. IV. iv. 2), As the text (Br. IV.
iv. 2) must be interpreted in consonance with the text (CM.
VIII. vi. 6) to impart the unity of meaning, we have to
understand that the departure of the seff through the head
relates to the man of knowledge, while other ways of
departiu:e belong to the ignorant.
As regards,the text that the individual seff attains im-
mortality here, the reply is as follows : 'The immortality of
the knower is obtamed without haviiig buriied' means with-
out burning connection of the soul with the body, and senses
etc. The unmortality (i.e. non-clkigmg and destruction of
later and earlier sms) attained is referred to iri the text:
'When aU deskes of the heart subside' (Br. TV. iv., 7); and
the text, 'he enjoys Brahman here' (Br. IV. iV, 7). The
meaning is that at the time of meditation the knower has the
experience of Brahman.
8. That (i.e. immortality is as stated above); because,
up to the attainment of Bralnnan, the scripture declares
the state of Saihsara.
The immortality referred to must not be understood as
implying the dissolution of the connection of the individual
self with the body that has not been burnt up. Why ? Because,
456 Sn-Bhdsya
[4.2.8.
upto the attamment of Brahman, the scriptmre declares the
state of Samsara. 'Aplti' means 'the attamment of Brahman'.
The Sutra-kara shows later on that this attainment takes
place after the hidividual self travelling to a particular place
through the path beghmmg with light etc. 'Samsara' means
'connection with the body' ; the scripture says that this con-
nection continues up to the attainment of Brahman : 'And
for him the delay is only as long as he is not freed from
the body' (Cha. VI. xiv. 2) ; 'Shakmg off evff, just as a
horse shakes off hahs, and as the moon releases himseff
from the mouth bf Rahu, I, a perfected seff, havmg shaken
off the body, attam the uncreated world of Brahman' {Chd.
VIII. xiu. 1).
9. And the subtle body persists, for it is so observed
through means of knowledge.
For this reason also the bondage of him who knows is
not burnt; i.e. because the subtle body continues to presist.
This is known in the scripture, an authoritative means of
knowledge. For, the scripture says that the knowmg mdi-
vidual seff, traveUing on the path of gods, speaks with the
presidmg deity of the moon and others : 'He is to reply'
{Kau. I. 3). Therefore, subtle body continues to persist till
he attains Brahman.
10. Hence, not in the way of destruction of the body
(does he attam immortality).
Attainmg hnmortahty does not mean the destruction of
the body as is seen in the text: 'When aU desires of the
4,2.12.]
Srl-Bhdsya 457
heart subside, then he becomes immortal and experiences
Brahman here' (Br. IV. iv. 7).
3!^^>qq^m \ \ \ \ \ \
11. And the warmth belongs to the subtle body; be-
cause it is appropriate.
Gn account of the subtle body existing in some place
in the body of the dying man who is a knower, warmth is
seen in some parts of the gross body. This warmth cannot
really belong to the gross body, for it is not perceived in
all parts of the body. Thus the observation of warmth in
some part of the gross body is due to the subtle body of the
knower which is about to depart.
Slfrl^snfefrT ^TRtTRT^ ^qs> WV< "
12. If it be said that the departure is denied (in the
scriptures) ; we say 'no'; because (non-separation of the
Prana) from the individual self (is alone said); this is
clear according to some.
In the text, 'But he who does not desire, who is with-
out desire, free from desire, who has satisfied his desire,
who desires the Self onlyof hun (tasyd) the pranas do
not depart; being Brahman he attains Brahman' (Br. IV.
iv. 6), the departure of the self from the body at the time
of death is denied in the case of a knower. This view of the
opponent is set aside by the Siitra-kara.
Here the departure of the pranas from the individual
self is denied, but not from the body. The term Uasya' (of
him) refers to the mdividual self who is the subject-matter
in the text, 'but he who does not desire', and not to the body.
The genetive case 'tasya' denotes the individual self as bemg
connected with the pranas. Here, there is no cause for any
458 'Sn-Bhdsya
dispute. Indeed, this is clear according to Madhyandinas,
who in theh text refer to the individual seh as the starting-
point of the pranas : 'But he who does not deshe, who is
without deshe, free from deshe, who has satisfied his deshe
from him (tasmat) the pranas do not depart' (Br. Madh-
yandina, IV. iv. 6). Here in the text 'tasmaf denotes the
knower, who is without deshes. The pranas wiU not desert
the individual self through the path of gods, until he attains
Brahman.
13. And the Smrti also says so.
The Smrti also declares that the seh'of the knower
departs through the artery in the head, as in the text : 'Oi"
the arteries, one stands above ; (by it the knower goes)
piercing the orb of the Sun and passing beyond the world
of Brahma, reaches the supreme goaV (Yajnavalkya Smrti,
III. 167).
Topic 6 : Subtle elements are merged in the Supreme
^'k q ^ ?fn ^ wvsw
14. Those (elements are merged) in the supreme
Deity; for thus the scripture says.
It has been shown above that the individual self, at the
tune of death, along with the group of senses and: the
I pranas, becomes merged with the subde elements, fire and
ithe'rest. The doubt here is whether those subtle elements,
which are merged with the individual self, produce their
appropriate effects according to the works or meditation ;
or whether they merge themselves in the supreme Deity.
The opponent holds that at the intermediate stage of attaining
4.2.15.]
Sn-Bhasya .459
"the. supreme Self, no effects; :i.e.';i experience bf pleasure
and.paia, are seen; and therefore,; they proceed further to
get theur effects according to the works and meditation.
The Sutra refutes this view and says;that they.merge
themselves in the supreme Deity.' Why? For the scripture
declares : 'The tejas (i.e. subtle elements along with the
individual seff) merge in the supreme Deity' (CM. VI.
viii. 6). The meaning is that, the effects have to be viewed
in accordance with the scripture. Just as in the states of
deep sleep and imiversal dissolution, there is, on account
of merging in the supreme Deity, rest for the individual seff
from the experience of pain and pleasure, so it is in this
case also.
Topic 7 : Non-differentiation of the individual self
15. Non-differentiatibn (o the:individual:self with
the supreme Self); because the scripture says so.'.
What is the nature of 'mergmg' (_samdpatti)llsthis
mergmg of the individual seff with the supreme Seff of the
character of dissolution into its cause, as is the case with
the dissolution of the world at the tune of universal absorp-
tion ? Or whether it has the character of non-differentiation
as quoted in the text: 'Speech reaches the mmd' (CM.
VI. viii. 6).
The answer is thus given: There is,non-;differentiation
or non-division. The meaning is that the individual; jeff
along with the subtle elements is mcapable of empirical
distinctions from the supreme Seff. The scriptural statements
support this view:. As the text 'The tejas merges in the
supreme Deity' (CM. VI. viii. 6) is connected with the
460
Sri-Bhdsya
[4.2.15.
previous clause 'speech reaches the mmd', the verb 'merges'
denotes a special kind of association, and because, when a
word is transferred from one place to another, there is no
authority to indicate any change in its meaning ; and further,
no purpose is served, at the time of death, by the elements
resolving into thek causal condition ; and finally, there is
no statement as regards new evolution from the causal
condition.
Topic 8 : The heart which is the abode of the
individual self
rR^qr hr s ^' ^ ?TrSl^if5l?rgRt fsf^RTWSijfcr^
16. Owing to the power of meditation and owing to the
meditation on the path, which is its subsidiary, the individ-
ual self is blessed by the Lord who abides within the
heart; his abode (i.e. heart) becomes lighted from above;
and having its passage illumined by the Lord, he goes out
through the hundred and first artery.
It has aheady been stated that up to the self's entry on
the path, the mode of departure of the knower and the
ignorant is the same. Now, the speciality of the man of medi-
tation is stated. The texts declare on this point : 'There are
a hundred and one arteries of the heart; of these, one passes
up to the crown of the head ; going up through that, one
attains immortality ; the others are for departing in various
dkections' (Chd. VIII. vi. 6). The doubt now is whether this
departure for the knower is through this hundred and first
artery in the crown of the head, or through other arteries
as in the case of the ignorant. The opponent says that there
4.2.17. ]
Sri-Bhasya 461
is no such rule on this point. Why ? Because the arteries
being many and minute, they are difficult to distinguish,
and, therefore, the individual self is unable to follow any
particular artery. The text merely refers to what is already
established i.e. the departure from the body through any
artery.
The Sutra rejects this view and says that the self of the
knower departs from the body through the hundred and
first artery in the crown of the head ; the knower can easily
distinguish this particular artery through the power of medi-
tation (i.e. knowledge), which is dear to the supreme Person;
and through the repeated remembrance of the path, which
is its subsidiary, the supreme Person, who abides within the
heart, is pleased ; and by Him the knower is favoured ; and
then the heart, the residence of the individual self, is lighted
up from above ; and in this way, through the grace of
the supreme Person, the individual self, having its passage
illumined, distinguishes that artery.
Topic 9 : The knower follows the rays of the Sun
17. He follows the rays (of the Sun).
In the Chandogya Upanisad we have, 'Now, when he
departs from this body, he goes up through these rays only'
(VHL vi. 5). Now the point to be considered is whether
there is any rule that the knower of Brahman should follow
the rays of the Sun after his departure from the body ; since,
if the knower dies during the night, it is not possible to
follow the rays of the Sun. The conclusion is that there is
MO rule or restriction. The statement of the text refers to a
few cases only.
462
SrirBMsya
[4:2.17.
The Sutra repudiates this view and says that he moves
upwards foUowmg the rays of the Sun. Why ? The word in
the text, 'eva' (only), leaves no other alternative; even
during night also, the knower can foUow the rays of the Sun.
The heat is felt during the summer nights, and is present in
winter also though it is not felt in winter, being overpowered
by snow. According to the scriptmral texts, there is mutual
connection betWeen arteries and the rays of the Sun. 'Just
as a great highway goes to tWo vUlages, this one. and that
one, so also, these rays of the Sun go to the two worlds,
this one and that one! They stretch themselves forth from
the Sun and enter into his arteries ; they are spread out
from these arteries and coimected with the yonder Sun'
{Cha. VIII. vi. 2). Therefore, the conclusion is that as the
rays of the Sim are present during nights also, the knower
of Vidya attains Brahman through the rays of the Sun only.
Topic 10 : The attainment is possible even during night
18. If it foe said that'it cannot be in the night, we say
'no'; because the connection continues as long as the body
lasts; the scripture also declares this.
The existence of the rays of the Sun may be admitted
at night also ; the knower may move upwards at night also
foUowmg the rays of the Sun. But the scriptures speak of
death during the nights as highly objectionable, as in the
passage, 'Day-thne, the bright fortnight, and the northern
course of the Sun, these are favourable for those about to
die ; the contrary tunes are unfavourable'. So, dying at night
4.2.19.]
Sn-Bhasya 463
may lead the knower to an mferior state and not to the
attainment of Brahman.
The Sutra refutes this view and says that in the case
of a man of knowledge, the coimection with works (karma)
continues as long as the body lasts. The meaning is because
the works, which are the cause of future inferior births, are
destroyed by the contact with knowledge, because there is
non-clingmg of later works, and becatise these works, which
have begun to yield their fmits,conie to an;end:with :the final
body, there is no cause for bondage to last further. Thus, m
the case of a man who knows, the attainment of Brahman
is established, though he may die at:night.;And; the scripture
also declares to that effect: 'And for him, the delay is only
as long as he is not freed from the body; then he wUl be
united' (CM. VI. xiv.-2). The text begmnmg with 'day-
time, bright fortnight.. .' refers to a man without knowledge.
Topic 11 : Southern course of the Sun
19. And for the very reason even during southern
course of the Sun (the knower attains Brahman).
On account of the very reason stated above, the attain-
ment of Brahman is possible, even for one who may happen
to die, during the southern course of the Sun. But a fiurdier
doubt arises here; because of the text, 'he who dies during
the southern course of the Sun, reaches the glory of the
manes and experiences union with the presidmg deity of
the Moon' (Ma. XXV. 1), one who dies durmg the southern
course of the Sun reaches the Melon; and because also of
the texts, 'When karma gets exhausted' (Br. VI, ii. 16),
464 Sri-Bhasya
[4;2.19.
and the Chdndogya passage 'they return agam' (Chd. V.
X. 2); and because Bhisma and others, who were devoted
to Brahma-Vidya, awaited the return of the northern course
of the Sun, the attaimnent of Brahman is not possible for
one who dies during the southern course of the Sim.
The answer to the above objection is as fohows. Those
who are without knowledge attain the presiding deity of the
Moon through the path of manes ; only they return to the
world. On the contrary, he who has knowledge, even after
he has gone to the Moon, does not come back to the world ;
for, the supplementary text in the Mahdnardyana Upanisad,
'From there he attains the glory of Brahman' (XXV. 1),
says that the place in the Moon is a stage for rest for him
who dies during the southern course of the Sun. Bhisma
and others, who could choose the time of theh death through
the power of Yoga, postponed it in order to demonstrate
the excellence of the northern course of the Sun for the
purpose of promoting Dharma and dcdra.
20. And these two paths are mentioned in the SmrtiS;
with reference 1^ yogins, as tilings to be meditated.
In the Gitd (VIII. 23-26), we have an authoritative
statenient, which declares that persons who die durmg day,
etc. do not return any more to this world and that persons
who die during night, etc. do return to this mortal world.
Here, special time of death for those about to die is not
taught in the Smrti, but it rather teaches two things to be
remernberedthe path of the gods and the path of the
manes^for persons practising Yoga dahy. In the passage
of the Gita. mentioned above, the words time, etc. should
be taken to denote the deities presidmg-over tiftte, etc.
CHAPTER IV
SECTION III
Topic 1 : The path beginning with light
3T%T^?n rT?5lf?^: \ \ \ \ \
1. Through the path beginning with light (the self of the
knower reaches Brahman); because it is well known (from
the scriptures).
In the last section, the departure of the individual self
from the body through a particular artery with the help of
the blessing of the supreme Self who is seated in the heart,
was described. Now the Sutras go on to determine the path,
which the individual self follows. The scriptures give different
versions of the path. In the Chdndogya, there is a detailed
version where it is declared, "Whether the sons of the dead
perform funeral ceremonies or not' etc. (IV. xv.). In the
eighth section of the same Upanisad, there is a different
' account : 'Then, he goes up through these very rays' (Chd.
VIII. vi. 5).
The Kausitakins, in their text, give a different version :
'He, after reaching this path of the gods, comes to the world
of Agni' etc. (I. 3). Again, we read in the Brhaddranyaka :
'Those who know it thus and those who in the forest medi-
tate on Brahman with faith etc' (VI. ii. 15). The same
Upanisad gives a different version in another place : 'When
a person departs from the world, he goes to Vayu' etc. (Br.
* V. X. ).
30
466 Srl-Bhasya
[4.3.1.
The question is whether these texts refer to one and tb?
same path begmning with light or whether they describe
different paths, so that either through those paths or through
that single path he reaches Brahman, and thus there is no
restriction as to this or that path. The opponent holds that
these texts refer to different paths ; for the paths are many
and independent of one another.
The Sutra refutes this view and says that these texts refer
to one and same path beginning with light; because that
path is weU known everywhere, i.e. different texts describe it
with more or less completeness. The details which are men-
tioned in one text have to be transferred to another place,
as in the case with the combination of the attributes in
various meditations. Both in the Upakosala-Vidya and Pan-
cagni-Vidya of the Chandogya, the path is described to be
one and the same. And in the Paiicagni-Vidya of the Brha-
ddranyaka, the same path beginning with light is declared
with a shght difference. And we recognize everywhere Agni,
the Sun, etc. as the deities at certain stages of the path.
Topic 2 : The presiding deity of Vdyu
^i|M<9^Krg5ttnvmt^ u ^ w
2. From the Year to Vayu, because of general and
specific words (to indicate it).
In the last Sutra, it was stated that persons possessing
knowledge reach Brahman only through the path begin-
ning with light. In connection with the path beginning with
light, the Chdndogya Upanisad (V. x. 2) places the Year
between the month and the Sun : 'From the months (they
go to) the Year ; from the Year to the Sun'. But in the
Brhaddrariyaka Upanisad (VI. ii. 15) the world of the
4.3.2. ]
Srl-Bhasya 467
gods is placed between the months and the Sun : 'From
the months to the world of gods, from the world of gods
to the Sun'. Now, as the path given m both the texts is
same, we have to supplement each by the additional item
given in the other. Here, in the case of Year and the world
of the gods, stated after the months, the order of succession
is the same according to the scripture which uses the ablative
case. Further, according to the Chandogya (V. x. 1), the
progress is throughout from the shorter periods of tune to the
longer duration ; therefore, the Year^which is longer^has
to be placed after the months, which is shorter. Thus it is
determined that the world of gods comes after the Year.
The Vajasaneyms state that Vayu precedes the Sun,
as in the foUowmg text : 'He goes to Vayu; Vayu makes
room for him. . .He goes upward through that and reaches
the Sun' {Br. V. x. 1). The Kausitakins, on the other hand,
place Vayu after hght or the world of Agni, as in the
following text : 'He having reached the path of the gods,
reaches the world of Agni; then he comes to the world of
Vayu' {Kau. I. 3). Here, according to the order of succes-
sion, Vayu is placed after light. As against this in the order
of succession according to the Vajasaneyhis as expressed in
theh text (V. x. 1), the term 'upward' has greater force
than the order of succession hi the text itself. Therefore,
we have to place Vayu before the Sun.
Thus, before the Sun and after the Year, we have to
place the world of gods and Vayu. Here we have to consider
whether the world of gods and Vayu are different thmgs
which the knower may attain in any order he likes or,
whether, they being one and the same thing, he attains Vayu,
i.e. the world of gods, after the Year. The opponent says that
they are different things, as they are weU known to be so ;
468 Srl-Bhdsya
[4,3,2.
and also because the word in the Brhaddranyaka text 'up-
wards' indicates Vayu, and ablative usage in the Chdndogya
indicates the world of gods. Thus, as there is no specifica-
tion of difference between the two, the knower may attain
them in the order which he likes.
The Sutra rejects this view and says that the mdividual
self, having departed from the Year, attains Vayu ; because
of general and specific words. For, the term 'world of the
gods' is a general one which includes Vayu, while, on the
other hand, the term 'Vayu' specifically denotes Vayu, the
deity. Hence, the knower of Vidya, should attain Vayu
alone after the Year. As regards the 'world of Vayu' in the
text of Kausitakins, the expression only means 'Vayu, who-
is the world'. That Vayu may be viewed as being the world
of the gods, is confirmed in the following passage : 'Vayu
blows in the abodes of the gods' (Jaimini Upanisad-Brdh-
mana, III, 1),
3. After lightnmg Varuna (should come), on account
of the connection (between the two).
According to the Kausitakms, 'The knower comes to
the world of Agni, he then goes to the world of Vayu, to
the world of Varuna, to the world of Sun, to the world of
Indra, to the world of Prajapati, to the world of Brahman'
(Kau. I. 3); here 'the world of Agni' is the same as that of
'light'. In the previous two Sutras it was determined that
Vayu comes after the Year and the Sun is placed after
Vayu, the world of gods. Now, we have to consider the
Topic 3 : Varuria
4.3.4.]
Sn-Bhdsya 469
places of Varuna, Indra etc. The doubt here is whether
Varuna and others ought to be placed after Vayu in accord-
ance with the order of succession in the above text, or to
be placed after lightning according to the series given in
Chd. IV. XV. 5 and V. x. 1. According to the opponent,
following the order of series in the Kausitaki text, Varuna
is to be placed after Vayu.
The Sutra-kara says that after lightning, Varuna is to
be placed. Why ? Because of the connection between the
two. As Varuna, the deity of waters, is naturaUy connected
with lightning, which is within the clouds, connection of it
with Varuna is well known. With the purpose of rendering
the teaching of the Upanisad valid, Varuna and others have
to be placed somewhere. As the order of series according
to meaning is more powerful than the order of series in the
text, Varuna is to be placed after lightning, and it also
foUows that Indra and Prajapati should come after Varuna.
Topic 4 : Guides
4. They are those who guide, because of indicatory
marks.
Now the question is whether the ennumerations of hght
etc. are mere signposts or places of enjoyment or the guides
who lead men of knowledge to attain Brahman. The
opponent says that they are only signposts on the way to
Brahman just as a tree, a river etc. are to a viUage.
The Sutra says that the deities are meant here and not
signposts or places of enjoyment. Vayu etc. are particular
deities appointed by the supreme Person to lead the soul to
470
Sri-Bhdsya
[ 4.3.4.
Brahman ; for this is indicated. In the concludmg passage
of the Chdndogya, it is said : 'There is a superhuman Per-
son, who leads them to Brahman' (V. x. 2). We have to
extend this relationship of the superhuman Person with the
individual self to other deities hke Light etc. The words
'light' etc. mean, the presiding deities, who are the selves of
light etc., as in the text, 'To him the earth spoke' (Tai. Sam.
V. V. 2. 10).
l u ^ ^ HrT??!^^: U St \\
5. Thence, by the person of lightning alone, be-
cause of the scriptures to that effect.
'Thence' means 'after lightning'. Led by the superhuman
Person from lightnmg alone, the man of knowledge journeys
up to the attainment of Brahman, as in the text, 'There is
a superhuman Person who leads them to Brahman' (Chd.
V. X. 2). Varuna, Indra, and Prajapati assist him and thus
they have connection with the superhuman Guide in leading
the individual self on the path of gods.
Topic 5 : Kdrya-Brahman or Hiranyagarbha
6. Badari is of opinion that (they conduct him who
meditates upon the effected Brahman, i.e. Hiranyagarbha);
because going is possible for him.
Now, the question taken up for consideration is this r
Does the group of deities beginning with light lead those
who meditate on the effected Brahman, i.e. Hiranyagarbha;
or those who meditate only on the supreme Brahman; or
those who meditate on the individual seff as having Brah-
4.3.8. ]
Sri-Bhdsya 471
man for its self? The teacher, Badari, is of the opinion
that the group of deities lead only those who meditate on
the Hiranyagarbha. Why ? Because going is possible for hun
who meditates on the Hiranyagarbha. Going or moving is
not possible for him who meditates on the supreme Brah-
man which is absolutely perfect, omniscient, all-pervading,
and the Self of all; as for him. Brahman has already been
attained. Indeed, the effect of true knowledge is only the
cessation of nescience about Brahman which is eternaUy
attained. On the contrary, he who meditates on Brahman as
Hhanyagarbha, to hhn reaching is possible ; for his object
exists in a particular limhed space. Thus the group of deities
which begins with light conducts only him to the world of
Hhanyagarbha.
In the next four Sutras the views of Badari are further
clarhied.
WV9 W
7. Because, it is specified also.
The text says, 'The person, consisting of mind, con-
ducts them to the worlds of Brahman' (Br. VI. u. 15).
Here, by the plural number 'worlds', it is specified that the
superhuman Person conducts him only to the worlds of
Hhanyagarbha ; further, the text, 'I enter the assembly hall
of Prajapati, the abode' (Chd. VIII. xiv. 1), shows that
he, who goes on the path beginning with light, has for his
object, reaching Hiranyagarbha, who is a created being.
^'f\'5tn^ rRSJ^qt?!: u; u
8. But on account of nearness that designation is
given.
Sn-Bhdsya
[4.3.8.
Here, Badari anticipates the objection that the word
'Brahman' is in the neuter gender according to the text
(Chd. V. X. 2) and cannot fit in. On the contrary, if
Hiranyagarbha is meant, the text should declare, 'He con-
ducts them to Brahma'. To this objection the reply is given.
In the text, 'He who creates Brahma' (Sve. VI. 18),
Hiranyagarbha is the first created being ; and as he stands
near to Brahman, he is designated by the word 'Brahman'.
This explanation is arrived at by reasons given above, i.e.
inappropriateness of movement, specification etc.
9. On the dissolution of the effect (i.e. the world of
Brahma), along with its ruler, he goes beyond; so it is
stated.
If the individual self attains Hiranyagarbha through the
path beginning with light, the teachings of the text (Chd.
IV. XV. 6, VIII. vi. 6) declaring that the self attains immor-
tality and does not return, will become inappropriate ; because
the scriptures declare that Hiranyagarbha, who is a created
effect, will pass away at the end of the period known as
'Dvi-Parardha' ; and, in the text, 'AU the world and even
the realm of Brahma, are subject to return' (Gitd, VIII.
16), it is shown that those who have attained Hiranya-
garbha, return again.
To this objection, the reply (Badari's) is as foUows :
On the dissolution of the world of Brahma, along with its
ruler Hiranyagarbha, the individual self himself attains to
true knowledge, and from the world of Hiranyagarbha, he
reaches Brahman. And, thus, he who goes through the path
beginning with light attains immortality and does not return
again. This is clear from the text : 'They, who are in the
4.3.11.]
Sn-Bhdsya 473
world of Brahma, at the end of time known as "Para" become
freed by the supreme immortal Being (Mu. III. ii. 6).
10. And, because the Smrti declares it.
The above meaning is made clear from Smrti also, as
in the following text: 'When the dissolution has come, they
all together with Brahma, at the end of time called "Para",
enter the supreme Abode' (Kurma-Purdna, I. xii. 269).
Thus according to Badari, the group of deities beginning
with light conducts him who meditates on the effect, i.e.
Hiranyagarbha.
11. The supreme (Brahman) (is attained by the individ-
ual selves led by the group of deities), so (says) Jaimini;
on account of the primary meaning (of the word
'Brahman').
Thus according to Badari the group of deities beginning
with light conducts him who meditates on the effect, i.e.
Hiranyagarbha.
Here, Jaimini, by accepting another view, raises an
objection. He is of the opinion that the group of deities
conducts only those who meditate on the supreme Brah-
man. Why? Because in the text, 'there is a superhuman
Person who conducts them to Brahman' (Chd. V. x. 2),
the word 'Brahman' is used in its primary sense, 'supreme
Brahman'. The word 'Brahman' may denote 'Hhanya-
garbha' in a secondary sense only, when the meaning is
determined through some other means of knowledge. And
the mappropriateness of the individual self's movement to-
wards Brahman is not such valid reason ; although the
474 Srl-Bhdsya [4.3.11.
supreme Braliman is all-pervading, the scripture says that
(he self of a knower liberates itself from nescience, having
gone to a particular place. For instance, the origination of
knowledge depends on certain duties of caste and stages
of life, purity, good conduct, place, time, as in the follow-
ing text : 'The Brahmanas desire to know him through the
study of the Veda' ( B r . IV. iv. 22). Similarly, we learn
from the scriptural texts about the path of the knower :
'When the knower is completely free from ignorance, he goes
to a particular place'.
In the text (Br. VI. ii. 15), the plural number, 'Brah-
man-worlds' cannot indicate Hiranyagarbha ; for, according
to the canons of Purva-Mlmdmsd interpretation, the term
Nisdda-Sthapati denotes Sthapati who is a Nisdda. Similarly
the compound, Brahma-loka must be interpreted as the
'Brahman itself is the loka' (i.e. the world). And, according
to scriptures, the supernatural worlds emanating from the
mere will of the supreme Brahman cannot but be infinite
in numbers.
12. Because, also, the ^niti says so.
The Sruti also declares that the individual self, which
has departed by way of artery in the head, and travelled
along the path of the gods, attains the supreme Brahman,
as in the text : 'Now, the serene one, rising up out of this
body, attains the supreme Light and appears in his own
true form' (Chd. VIII. ni. 4; xii. 1).
13. And there is no desire to attain the effected
(Brahman).
4.3.14. ]
Srl-Bhdsya 475
It was stated under Siitra 7, that m the case of one who
travels through the path beginnmg with light, the desire is to
attain Hiranyagarbha (i.e. effected Brahman) as shown by
the text : 'I enter the assembly-haU of Prajapati, the abode'
(Chd. VIII. xiv. 1). To this objection, the Siitra argues
that the deshe of the individual self is not to attain the
effect, i.e. Hhanyagarbha, but the supreme Brahman ; be-
cause the supplementary passage, T become the glory (i.e.
self) of the Brahmanas' (Chd. VIII. xiv. 1), shows that
the intention of the individual seff is to attain the Seff of all
preceded by freedom from nescience ; because, also, the
preceding passage declares (Chd. VIII. xiii. 1) that the
world of Brahman, which is to be attained, is something
uncreated. Therefore, Jaimini holds that the group of
dehies begirmmg with light conducts only those who
meditate on supreme Brahman.
14. Badarayana says that (the group of deities) leads
those who are not dependent on symbols, because there
is fault in both the cases ; and there is also the law of
Tafkratu (i.e. one becomes what he meditates).
Now, the revered Badarayana declares his own view,
which is final.
According to Badarayana, the conductors lead those
who are other than those who are dependent on symbols
to Brahman. The view of Badari that they conduct those
who meditate on the effected Brahman or the view of Jaimini
that they conduct only those who meditate on the supreme
Brahman cannot be held valid. But, they conduct both the
476
Sri-Bhdsya
[4.3.14.
classes of individual selves : Those who meditate on the
supreme Brahman and also those who meditate on the
individual self as free from Matter i.e. Prakrti) and havuig
Brahman for its true Self.
Why ? Because there is fault in both the cases. Badari's
view that they conduct those who meditate on the effected
Brahman, wUI contradict the following text : 'Now, the
serene one, rising up out of this body, attains the supreme
Light' (Chd. VIII. iii. 4). If there is, accordmg to Jaunini,
an invariable prmciple that they conduct those only who
meditate on the supreme Brahman, it will contradict the
view of those who know five fires and those who worship
with faith in the forest and travel along the path of gods
(Chd. V. X. 1).
And there is also the law of Tatkratu ; the meaning of
which is that just as one meditates, so one wUl attain, as
given in the following text : 'According to what is thought
of in this world, thus does he become on departing hence'
(Chd. III. xiv. 1). However, in regard to those who are
dependent on symbols, beginning with Name and ending
with Prana (Chd. VII), the meditation is not established
by both the sets of texts; because, with regard to meditation
of the individual self which is contaminated with insentient
matter, the meditating self does not go by the path of Light
and does not attain Brahman, -according to the law of
latkratu.
15. And the scripture shows the difference.
The text, 'So far as the Name reaches, there is free
movement for him' (Chd. VII. i. 5) teUs that those who
4.3.15. ]
Sn-Bhasya 477
meditate on symbols, beginning with Name and ending with.
Prana, obtain certain fruits of limited duration, which do
not depend for their attainment on any particular path. The
conducting deities do not lead those who meditate on senti-
ent things (or selves) as mbced with non-sentient things or
by themselves, viewmg them as Brahman or as dissociated
from Brahman. On the other hand, the group of conductors,
escort them who meditate on supreme Brahman and those
who meditate on the individual self as separated from
Prakrti and as having Brahman for its Self : this is the.
settled conclusion.
CHAPTER IV
SECTION IV
Topic 1 : Released self manifests its true nature
1. After attaining (Bralunan), the individual self be-
comes manifest (in his own true nature), because of the
term 'in one's own'.
Now, the Sutras begin to take up for consideration the
kind of glorious existence the released selves enjoy. The
text says : 'Now, the serene one, rising up out of this body,
attains the supreme Light and appears in his own true
form' (CM. VIII. xii. 3). Does the individual self who,
rising up out of this body, attaining the supreme Light, have
any association with a new body, which has to be produced
like that of a deity, or is it that he manifests himself in his
own natural form ? This is the doubt. The passage must be
understood in the former sense, the opponent holds. For
otherwise, the scripture referring to final release would teach
an undeshable goal of human endeavour, as one's own
nature is not the deshable goal of human endeavour. When
the pure self abides by himseh dvuing deep sleep without
the functions of the body and the senses, in what way is the
goal of human endeavour attained ? The release is not mere
cessation of pain ; for the scripture clearly declares that the
released self experiences infinite bliss, as in the foUowing
text: 'A hundred tunes bhss of Prajapati is one bhss of
4.4.1. ]
Srl-Bhdsya 479
Brahman and also of a sage who is versed in scriptures and
free from desires' (Tai. II. viii. 1), and 'having tasted that
very bliss, he becomes blissful' (Tai. II. vii. 1). We cannot
say that the true nature of the individual self is conscious-
ness of the nature of unlimited bliss, which is concealed by
nescience in the state of samsdra and becomes manifest
when the self attains the supreme Light. Concealment of
knowledge which is of the nature of Light is nothing but its
destruction. Further, mere luminosity cannot be of the nature
of bliss ; for bliss is pleasure and as such agreeable to one's
own self. If, mere luminosity is the individual self, to whom
is luminosity agreeable ? Thus it is difficult to maintain the
essential nature of bliss in the case of one who holds that
the self is mere limiinosity. Moreover, if the individual self
merely wants to attain his own true form, there is no mean-
ing in the declaration, 'He becomes manifest in his own true
form' (Chd. VIII. xii. 3), a fact which has been akeady
accomplished. Thus, we have to conclude that the individual
self, on approaching the supreme Light, connects himself
with a new form that has to be produced. Therefore the
term, 'appears' will have its primary meanmg and the ex-
pression, 'in one's own form', meaning that form which is
special to oneself, qualified by absolute bliss, fits in.
The Sutra rejects this view and says that, after attaming
Brahman, the individual self becomes manifest in his own
true form. That special condition iato which the individual
self passes, is the manifestation of his own essential form,
not the origination of a new form. Why ? Because of the
term, 'in one's own'. If an adventitious body is accepted,
this specification, 'in his own true form' would be meaning-
less ; for, even without that specification (i.e. his own), it
is his form as it would belong to him.
480
Srl-Bhdsya
[4.4.2.
2. It is the released self (only), because of that being
the subject-matter described here.
If the mdividual self's true form is eternally accom-
plished, the declaration, 'he attains the supreme Light and
becomes manifest' (Chd. VIII. xii. 3), would be meaning-
less. To this objection, the Sutra addresses itseh.
What the text (Chd. VIII. xu. 3) says about the released
self is this : The individual self, freed from the contact with
karmas and the body originated by them, abides in his own
true form. Therefore, even though the essential nature is
eternally accomplished, it is obscured by nescience in the
form of karma ; and the removal of the obsciuation is called
here 'manifestation'. It is that cessation of nescience which
is described here. Why ? Because the released self is the
subject-matter in the passage, 'He who is the seh' (Chd.
VIII. vii. 1); and to picture hun as freed from the states
of waking, dreaming and dreamless sleep and as released
from the body origmated by the karmas, which are caused
by love and hatred, Prajapati says agam and again, T wiU
explain this self who is free from sin, etc' (Chd. VIII. ix.
3). Therefore, with regard to hhn who is mixed with karma,
after he attains the supreme Light, final Release, i.e. cessation
of all bondage, is cahed 'manifestation in his own true form'.
The term, 'manifestation' denotes 'revelation of the nature
of a thing already existent'.
3. It is the self, on account of the context.
If, the opponent argues, the essential nature of the mdi-
vidual self, in the state of deep sleep, is not the goal of
4.4.4. J
Sn-Bhdsya .481
human endeavour, the teaching of the scriptures as regards
final release also will not be beneficial to man; thus the
attainment of another new condition of existence related
to pleasure, like the condition of gods etc. constitutes 'mani-
festation' in his own true form.
The Sutra repfies to this objection. We understand from
the context (Chd. VIII. vii.) that the mdividual self, in his
essential nature, possesses attributes beginning with freedom
from all evil and ending with true will; because the teach-
ing of Prajapati begins as follows: 'The self who is free from
sin, free from old age, free from death, free from hunger
and thirst, and whose desires and will are true' (Chd. VIII.
vii. 1). And that this context deals with the individual self has
been shown under I. iii. 18. Therefore, the individual self,
possessing attributes of freedom from all evil etc. has, in
the state of samsdra, his essential nature obscured by
nescience which is known as karma ; and after reaching the
supreme Light, he manifests his essential nature which is
not originated. Thus the revered Saxmaka says, 'Just as by
polishing the gems, no lustre is produced so by eliminating
the evil, no knowledge is produced in the individual self
(Visnu Dharma IV. 55-7).
Therefore the attributes of knowledge, bUss etc. which
undergo contraction by karmas, manifest in the form of
expansion, when the bondage in the form of karmas is de-
stroyed and the self reaches the supreme Light.
Topic 2 : Experience of inseperableness in liberation
4. (There the released self experiences Brahman) as
inseparable (from Him), for |t is so seen from the scriptures.
31
482 'Sri-Bhdsya
[ 4.4.4.
Whether the hidividual self, who has reached the supreme
Light and freed from ah bondage, experiences his own seh
as separate from the supreme Self or as inseparable from
Hun ? This is the doubt. The opponent afiirms the
former view; for, from the Sruti and the Smrti, we under-
stand that the released seh is closely connected with the
supreme Seh, has simharity with Hhn and has attributes
sunilar to Hhn; 'He attams aU the attributes along with the
omniscient Brahman' (Tai. 11. i. 1) etc., and yet in spite
of the close relation, he feels that he is separate from Brah-
man.
The Sutra-kara rejects this view and says that the
released self experiences his own seh as inseparable from
$he supreme Self (Brahman). For the scriptures say that
the released self perceives hunseh in his own true nature.
What is this true natmre ? It consists in having the supreme
Seh as the self of the individual, whUe the individual con-
stitutes His body and is hence His mode. This is estabhshed
in the scriptural statements which show the relation between
She mdividual self and the supreme Self m co-ordmation
{samdnddhikaranya) 'That thou art' (Chd. VI. viu. 7);
This seh is Brahman' (Br. IV. iv. 5); 'AU this has. . . Hhn
for its self (Chd. VI. vui. 7); 'AU this is Brahman' (Chd.
HI. iv. 1); and in other texts also, 'He who is dweUmg with-
in the self, whom the self does not know, whose body is the
self, who controls the seh from within^He is your hmer
mler and hnmortal Self (Br. Md. III. vu. 22) etc. There-
fore, mseparable from the supreme Brahman, he experiences
Brahman thus : T am Brahman'.
When the scriptmral passages declare the association and
thnilarity of the individual seh with Brahman, the mean-
lag iSi as a mode, he is equal to Brahman; after he gives up
4.4.5. ]
Sn-Bhdsya 483
the body, he attams that pmrity which is equal to that of
Brahman. The meaning of the passage (Tai. II. i . 1) is
that the individual self, experiences Brahman, of which he
is the mode, and also the attributes of Brahman.
Topic 3 : Essential nature of the self that has attained
to Brahman
yi^*)"! ^ X h ^ ' 3q?=q TmF?i: \\ j( ))
5. Jaunini thinks (that the released self becomes
manifest in his essential nature) like that of Brahman; on
account of the scriptural statements etc. to that effect.
Different scriptural texts give different versions of the
individual seff who manffests his essential nature after attain-
ing the supreme Light. Does his essential nature consist
Only of the attributes of being devoid of sin and evil; or is
it mere knowledge ; or does he manffest in these two forms
which are not contradictory.
The teacher, Jaunini, thinks that the individual seff
manffests himseff through the attributes of being devoid of
sin etc. which pertain to Brahman; for we know this from
the scriptural statements to that effect. The attributes of
being devoid of sin etc. which pertain to Brahman is men-
tioned in the Dahara-Vidya of Chandogya Upanisad. The
same attributes are mentioned by Prajapati in connection
with the individual seff also, m the passage which begins
with, 'He who is the self is devoid of sin' and ends with,
'whose will is true' (Chd. VIII. vii. 1). The 'etc' m the
Sutra refei's to the activities of the released seffeating,
playing, rejoicing, etc. (Cha. VIII. xii. 3), which are depend-
ent on the attributes of 'willmg the truth' etc. Thus, accord-
484 Sri-Bhdsya
[ 4.4.5.
ing to Jaimini, the individual self cannot possess the know-
ledge only for his essential nature, because of the scriptural
statements to that effect.
6. Audulomi thinks (that the released self becomes
manifest) as mere consciousness, because it is of that
nature.
The Siitra gives the view of Audulomi. Accordmg to
hhn, the essential nature of the individual seff is mere con-
sciousness and, therefore, the seff manffests through that
form or nature. We know from the scriptural texts that
consciousness only constitutes the essential nature of the seff:
'Just as a mass of salt has neither inside nor outside, but
enthely is a mass of taste, so, verhy, the seff has neither
inside nor outside, but it is enthely a mass of consciousness*
{Br. IV. V. 13). Therefore, as the seff has no other attributes,
the scriptural statements attributing to the seff freedom
from sm etc. {Chd. VIII. vu. 1) mean freedom from qual-
ities such as modification, pleasure and pam etc. which
depend on nescience.
7. Even so, there is no conflict, because of the exist'
ence of attributes (mentioned) earlier; on account oi
statements to that efEect; so says Badarayana.
Now, the view of Badarayana is given which reconciles
fhe views of Jaunini and Audulomi. He is of the opmion
that, even though the essential nature of the mdividual seff
consists only of consciousness, it is not in conflict with the
4.4.8.]
Sn-Bhdsya 485
attributes of willing the truth etc. which are previously stated.
This is known to us from the authority of the declarations
m the Upanisads : 'The self who is free from sin' (Chd.
VIII. vii. 1). When means of knowledge are equally strong,
one cannot contradict another. Though we admit, on the
basis of the text, that the individual self consists only of
consciousness, we deny that the self consists of no other
attributes. Because we learn from the texts that the individual
self, being distinct from the non-sentient, is self-lummbus :
'Just as a mass of salt has neither outside nor uiside, but
entkely is a mass of taste, so verily, this self has neither
inside nor outside, but is entkely a mass of consciousness'
(Br. IV. V. 13). Just as salt has got salty taste, it has got
other attributes like form, hardness, etc. which are not con-
tradicted. So, also, though the individual self is one mass of
consciousness, its nature does not contradict other attributes,
.such as freedom from sin etc. The purport is that the essen-
tial nature of the individual self consists of knowledge or
self-lummosity.
Topic 4 : By the mere will the released self realises
all wishes
^ ^ ^ ^ r T^ : U ^ U
8. But through mere will (the released seU realizes all
his wishes), because the scriptures say so.
Regarding the released self, the scriptures declare that
he realizes all his wishes through his mere will: 'He moves
about there, eating, playing rejoicing. . .or with chariots, or
in the company of relatives' (Chd. VIII. xii. 3). Here the
dpubt arises whether his meeting with relatives etc. is depen-
486
Sri-Bhdsya
[ 4.4.8.
dent upon any other effort or happens merely through his
will as in the case of the wiU of the supreme Person. The
opponent says that an effort is necessary; because we see
in ordinary Iffe that kings and the like, whose wishes are
reaUzed by will, are dependent on other efforts.
Opposing this view, the Sutra says, 'but through mere
will; because scriptures say to that effect'. 'If he has the
desure for the world of fathers, merely out of his wiU fathers
arise' (Chd. VIII. ii. 1). There is no other text which says
that there is need of any other effort.
9. And for this very reason he has no one else as liis
Lord.
Because the released seff realizes all his wishes, he has
no one else as his Lord ; for, to be under a Lord means that
the released seff is not independent and is subject to injunc-
tion and prohibition; and that condition is opposed to his
realizmg wishes by the mere will. For this very reason, the
scripture says : 'He is a seff-ruler' (Chd. VII. xxv. 2).
Topic 5 : The released self can exist with or without
a body
10. There is absence (of the body and the senses iin
the case of the released self) (considers) Badari; because
the scripture says so.
A doubt naturally arises whether the released self
possesses body and senses or not; or whether he has
them or not according to his wUl. The teacher, Badari, says
4.4.12. ]
Sri-Bhasya
487
that the released self does not possess body and senses,:
Why? Because the scripture says so : 'As long as he isi
embodied, there is no freedom from pleasure and pain;,
tbe pleasure and pain do not touch him when he is free froOT,
tlie body' (Chd. VIII. xu. 1). So the scripture says that
pleasure and pain are imavoidable as long as one has coDh
nection with the body. The Upanisad declares that the
released seh is devoid of body ; 'Now, the serene one, rising
up out of this body attains supreme Light and appears in his
own true form' (Chd. VIII. xu. 3).
11. The released self possesses (a body and the sen^
ses), considers Jaimini; because the text declares mani-'
foldness (in regard to him).
The teacher, Jaunini, considers that the released self
possesses a body and senses. Why ? Because of the declara-
tion by the text of manifoldness m regard to hhn : 'He i&
one, he is three-fold, he is five-fold, he is seven-fold' (Cha,
VII. xxvi. 2). Here manifoldness means diversification into
many forms. As the self is mdivisible, he cannot have many
forms ; when scripture says that he becomes three-fold etc
it has reference to body only. The statement as regards dis-
embodiment, however, refers to the absence of a body which
is produced by karma; for such a body is the cause of
pleasure or pain.
IR5 n^3[|Wf^ ^k^WiltSrf: H \R\\
12. From this, Badarayana holds (that the released
self is) of both lands, as in the case of the twelve day-?^
sacrifice.
From this, i.e. through mere wiU, Badarayana thmks
488
Srl-Bhasya
[ 4.4.12.
that the released self can exist both wayswith or without
the body. It is like the twelve days' sacrifice, which is called
vSatra or Ahma, accorduig to the will of the sacrificers. The
Satra sacrifice is enjomed by verbs, 'he resorts to' (upaiti);
the Ahina sacrifice is enjoined by the verbs, 'he sacrifices'
(yajati).
13. In the absence of a body (experience for the re-
leased self) is possible, as in dreams; since tliis is appro-
priate.
It was stated that the released self can create a body
etc. by his mere will. Now, the Satra-kara says that, when
the released self possesses the body and sense-organs, there
is no invariable principle that they should be created by
himself. In the absence of a body and other instruments
created by himself, he may experience bliss through the
instruments created by the supreme Person. For instance, the
text which begms with, 'He creates chariots, horses, roads',
and ends with, 'he creates ponds, wells, rivers ; indeed, he
is the creator' (Br. IV. iii. 10). As the dreaming person
experiences things created by the Lord, so also the released
self experiences playful sport in the world of fathers etc.
created by the Lord.
14. When there is (a body) (experience for the
released self is), as in the waking state.
When the released self possesses a body and the world
of fathers, which are created by his own wUl, he experiences
the joy of sport as a person ui the waking state does. Just
as the supreme Person creates for Himself (at the time of
4.4.16. ]
Sri-Bhdsya 489
incarnation), for His own sport, tlie worlds of fathers etc.
and experiences through them the joy of sport, so also,
the Lord Hunself^for the sake of His own sportcreates
worlds of fathers etc. for the released selves. But sometimes,
the released selves, by theh mere whl, create theh own
worlds of fathers etc. and they are included withui the sphere
of play of the supreme Person.
15. The entrance (into many bodies by tbe released
self) is like that of a lamp; indeed, tbe scripture shows.
But it has been stated that the individual self is of atomic
size; it may be asked, how the atomic-sized self regards
many bodies as his own. Just as a lamp, existing in one
place only, pervades other places through its light, so also,
the individual seh, abiding in one body pervades ah the
bodies through its attributive consciousness and makes them
his own. However, there is this much of difference : The
attributive consciousness of the individual seff hi bondage is
contracted by the influence of karma, and, as such, it cannot
pervade other bodies. But the attributive consciousness of
the released seff, whose consciousness is not contracted,
pervades other bodies as he wflls it and makes them his own.
Indeed, the scripture shows : 'A hundredth part of the point
of hah, subdivided into a hundredfold, and one part of the
latter is of the size of an individual seff and he is capable
of infinity' (Sve. V. 8).
16. It (i.e. Br. IV. iii. 21) has in view either of the
two states, i.e. deep sleep and death; for this is made
clear by the scripture.
490
Srl-Bhdsya
[4.4.16.
The texts say that, when the individual self reaches the
supreme Brahman, aU his inner and outer consciousness
cease : 'Embraced by the Onmiscient Self, the mdividual
self knows nothing that is external and nothing that is within'
(Br. IV. iii. 21). How, then, can it be said that the released
self is omniscient ?
The Sutra answers to this objection. The text (Br. IV.
iii. 21) does not concern itself with the released self; but
it has in view either of the two states, i.e. deep sleep and
death, in accordance with the text beginnmg with, 'Speech
reaches the mind', and ending with, 'Tejas reaches the
supreme Deity' (Chd. VI. viii. 6). The scripture reveals the
absence of consciousness in the state of deep sleep and
death, and attainment of omniscience durmg the state of
release.
In the text, 'He hunself does not know the self as "I am
he", nor indeed, does he know these beings. He has gone to
utter destruction' (Chd. VIII. xi. 1), it is declared that at
the time of deep sleep, there is no consciousness ; in the
same section the text declares omniscience for the released
self : 'He, verily, with divine eye, experiences all the qualities
which are in the Brahman-world' (Chd. VIII. xii. 5). Indeed,
the same thmg is clearly stated in the passage, 'He who sees
this sees all and attains everything everywhere' (Chd. VII.
Kxvi. 2).
The absence of consciousness at death has been declared
thus : 'Rising up from these elements, he goes to destruc-
tion after them' (Br. II. iv. 12). The meaning of 'he goes
to destruction' is 'he does not perceive'. Therefore, the mean-
ing of the text, 'Embraced by the Omniscient Self' (Br. TV.
iii. 21), has in view either of the two states : i.e. deep sleep
and death.
4.4.17.]
Sii-BMsya 491
Topic 6 : The released self has no part in cosmic
activities
17. (The released selves attain all powers of the
Lord) except in the matter of cosmic activities, on account
of the (Lord being) the subject-matter (of all texts, wherein
the cosmic activity is described), and because also, of the
non-proximity (of tbe released selves).
The doubt is raised whether the power of the released
sdf contains also that of lordship of ah which extends up
to cosmic creation etc. and which is distinctive of the supreme
Person, or is limited to the experience of the supreme Person,
devoid of cosmic activities. The opponent holds the former
view ; for, the scriptural text speaks of the attainment of
equahty with the supreme Person : 'Free from taint, he
attains the highest equality' ( MM. III. i. 3); it was also
mentioned that according to the scripture, the released self
has the power of reahzing ah his wishes ; and attainment
of equality and reahzmg aU wishes are not possible without
cosmic control.
To this objection, the Siitra rephes : The released selves
possess ah the powers of the Lord with the exception of
cosmic activity. Cosmic activity consists of control over the
difference of the essential natures, existence and activity of all
sentient and non-sentient thmgs. Free from such activhies,
the released seff, whose veils of ignorance have been removed,
experiences Brahman imconditionaUy. That is the glory and
power of the released seff. The text mentions the controlling
power of Brahman over the entire cosmos : 'From whom
all these beings are born, by whom when born they Uve,
492
Sn-Bhdsya
[4.4.17.
and to whom they enter at deathdesire to know that;
that is Brahman' (Tai. III. i. 1). If this cosmic control is
common to released selves and to Brahman, then Brahman's
extraordinary character of being the cosmic Lord cannot
hold good. Wherever the supreme Brahman is mentioned in
the scriptures as the cosmic cause, sustentation and destruc-
tion, the released selves are not at all mentioned, and hence,
cosmic activity does not belong to the released selves.
18. If it be said (that the released self possesses
cosmic activities) on account of the scriptural teaching, (we
say) no; for, the text refers to (enjoyments) which are in
the spheres of those (deities) who hold special djnties.
The foHowing texts declare that the cosmic activity
belongs to the released self : 'He is a self-ruler; he moves
according to his wishes in all the worlds' (Chd. VII. xxv.
2); 'He moves through these worlds enjoying what he deskes,
and assuming what form he hkes' (Tai. III. x. 5). There-
fore, the released self is not free from cosmic activity.
This view of the opponent is not accepted by the Stitra-
kava. Because the text refers to enjoyments which are in the
sphere of deities such as Hkanyagarbha. The scriptures (Chd.
VII. xxv. 2) say that the released self, free from karmas
also experiences enjoyments in these spheres which are the
manifestations of the glories of Brahman; he is thus fuUy
satisfied.
19. Brahman is beyond all change; thus scripture
declares (that the released self) abides in Brahman.
4.4.20. ]
Srl-Bhdsya 493
If the released self, like a self ui bondage, experiences
enjoyments within the sphere of change, then the sum of
enjoyments of a released self also wiU be finite and limited,^
as in the case of the self hi bondage.
To this objection, the Siitra-kara rephes : The released
seh experiences supreme Brahman, who is free from all
change, who is opposed to aU evh and is the only abode of
aU auspicious attributes, who is bhss absolute etc. ; even the
worlds which are subject to change^because they are in-
cluded in his manifestationsare the objects of enjoyments
of a released seh; for, the scripture declares that the re-
leased self abides as an enjoyer of the supreme Brahman
When he finds fearless foundation in Him who is invisiblCj
bodiless, undefined, supportless, then he has reached the
fearless' (Tai. II. vii. 1). And the foUowing text declares
that the world which is a manifestation of Brahman's glory
is within Hhnself : 'On Hhn the worlds do rest; and no one
goes beyond Him' (Kau. V. 8). The purport of the passage
(Chd. VII. xxv. 2) that the released seh has the freedom-
to move about as he likes, is this ; He experiences Brahman
with the manifestations of His glory and experiences also
the enjoyments, lying within the world of change which exist
in the world of Hhanyagarbha and simUar officers which
also faU withm Brahman's glory; therefore cosmic activity
does not belong to the released self.
20. And thus Sruti and Smrti show.
This Sutra says that absolute control of the entke uni-
verse is the exclusive attribute of the supreme Person ; which
fact is established by both Sruti and Smrti: 'From fear of
494 Sn-Bhasya
[ 4.4.20.
Him the wmd blows' etc. {Tai. II. viii, 1); 'Verily, by the v
command of this imperishable One, O Gargi, the sxm and
moon stand apart' {Br. Ill, viii. 9) and so on. 'Under my
control, Nature gives birth to all that which moves and which
does not move; and because of this, O Arjuna, does the
world spia' {Gitd, IX. 10); 'I with a smgle part of myself
have sustamed this whole universe' {Gitd, X, 42).
Both Sruti and Smrti agree that the supreme Person
is the cause of the bliss enjoyed by the released self: 'He
indeed causes bliss' {Tai. II, vii, 1); and 'He who with the
unswerving devotion serves me, he, crossing beyond the ^
gimas, is fit for becoming Brahman. For I am the ground
of the inner Self, the immortal and the immutable of eternal
Dharma and of absolute bhss' {Glta, XIV, 26-27),
The fine attributes of the individual self devoid of sin etc,
which are manifested ui the condition of releasebelong
to his essential nature ; but this condition itself depends
upon the supreme Person, This eternal state willed by the
supreme Person exists eternally. In the same way, aU the
means of enjoyment and cosmic sport are as eternal as the
Lord Hunself, Thus the true will of the released self and
his having equality with the supreme Person do not extend
to the cosmic activity, '
21. And because of the indication of equality of
enjoyments only (for the released self with Brahman).
The texts teach that the equality of the released self
with Brahman is in respect of mere enjoyment, which is the
experience of Brahman as He is in reality; and he has no
cosmic activity* 'He obtams all the auspicious attributes
4.4.22.]
Sn-Bhdsya 495
together with the omniscient Brahman' (Tai. II. i. 1). The
scriptxxres declare that the supreme Person rules and controls
all the worlds ; we have to understand the equality of the
released self with the supreme Person keeping in mmd the
above fact. Thus the glory of the released selves is absolutely
devoid of cosmic activity.
3T?n|%: 5l5?TcT^ 3?;n|%: 515^?!^ U RR U
22. There is no return (for these released selves), be-
cause the scriptures say so; there is no return (for these
released selves) because the scriptures say so.
If the power and glory of the released seh depends upon
tlie supreme Person, He bemg independent, there is the
possibility of the return of the seh into samsdra, by His whl.
To this doubt, the Sutra-kara gives the solution thus : the
scriptures declare that there is the supreme Person, who is
antagonistic to aU evU and is the origmation of aU auspicious-
ness, who is the cause of origination etc. of the world, who
is enthely different from aU other thhigs, who is omniscient,
who, by His true whl accomplishes everything, who is the
ocean of mercy for aU those who take refuge in Him, who
has none equal or superior to Hun and whose name is
supreme Brahman. Similarly, we know from the scriptures
alone that the supreme Person, pleased with the constant
and continuous meditative worship of his devotees, destroys
their ignorance which consists of the totahty of the infinite
karmas ; and He bestows the supreme and unsurpassed bhss
v/hich consists of experiencing Him in His own true nature ;
and He does not cause them to return into the samsdra.
The scripture definitely declares : 'He, indeed, lives thus
throughout his length of life, reaches the world of Brahman,
496 Srl-Bhdsya
[ 4.4.22.
and does not return again' (Chd. VIII. xv. 1). And the Lord
Himself declares : 'Havmg attamed me, these great souls
are never again subject to rebhth, to this abode of sorrow and
transience, for they have found the highest perfection. All
the worlds, and even the realm of Brahma, are subject ta
return, O Arjuna, but on reaching me, there is no rebirth*^
(Gntd, VIIL 15-16).
As the released self has cut oflf the bondage of karmas
has his knowledge uncontracted, and has his nature rooted
in the experience of Brahman^he cannot possibly desire
anything else or cannot undertake any work on that account;
and the supreme Person will never cause the devotee to
return into samsdra. The Lord Himself has said : 'I am very
dear to the man of knowledge and he is dear to me. Certainly,
all those are great; but I deem the man of knowledge to
be my very self; for he, mtegrated, resorts to me alone as
the highest end. At the end of many births, the man of
knowledge finds refuge in me, realizing that Vasudeva is all.
It is very hard to find such a great-souled person' (Gitd,
Vn. 17-19).
The repetition of the entke Sutra is to show that the
gastra is finished. Thus everything stands relevant, consistent
and explained.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. !ri Ramanujacirya, $ri- sdriraka- mlmdinsd-b'hdsya,
Parts I and II, in Sanskrit. Edited by Kumaratatarya
\ Kavibhusana Swami. Revised by Sri A. V. Narasim-
hacarya and Sri T. V. C. Narasimhacarya. R. Venka-
' teswara Company, Madras, 1909.
2. The Sacred Books of the East, Edited by F. Max
MuUer, Vol. XLVIII, The Veddnta Sutras, Part III
(with the Commentary of Ramanuja). English trans.
George Thibaut. Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1904.
3. Brahma-Sutra VdVeddnta-Darsana (with Srl-Bhdsya),
Parts I and II, Bengali Edition, Trans, and Ed. Durga-
caran, Sankhya-Vedanta-Tlrtha. Ramakamal Sinha.
Calcutta, Bengali era 1318 & 1319 respectively.
4. sri Ramanujacarya, Veddnta-Dlpa, a gloss on the
Brahma-Sutras. Ed. Sri Acarya Bhattanathaswami.
Messrs. Braj B. Das & Co., Benares, 1904.
5. Sri Ramanuj acarya, Veddnta-Sdra, English trans.
University of Madras.
6. The Veddnta Sutras (with Srl-Bhdsya). Vol. I. Trans.
M. Rangacarya and M. B. Varadaraja Aiyangar. The
Brakmavadin Press, Madras, 1899.
7. Pa^dita Sudarsanacarya, Visista Advaita Adhikara-
namdld. Manilal Iccharam Desai, Benaresi, 1904.
8. Kapisthalam Desikacarya, Sri Sdriraka Adhikarana
Ratnamdld, with Prakdsa. Tirupati.
498
sri-Bhdsya
9. The Three Tattuas, English Trans. Diwan Bahadur V.
K. Ramanujacari. Kumbhakonarn, 1932.
10. Das Gupta, S. N., A History of Indian Philosophy,
Vol. in. Cambridge University Press, 1940.
11. Radhakrishnan, S., Indian Philosophy, Vols. I & II,
Revised Second Edition. George Allen & Unwin Ltd.,
London, 1931.
.INDEX
Advaitin, objection by, 3.
his position reviewed, 8
his position refuted, 19-78
his view of the soul, 283
Agnihotra, 147
occasional and permanent,
36,2
fruit of, and New-moon,
FuU-moon sacrifices, 401
for ceUbates, 413, 415, 418
subsidiary to knowledge,
419, 446-7
injimctions, regarding, 424
Ahafikara, not the knower,
37-41
cause of ignorance, 43
Aja, is Pralqrti dependent on
Brahman, 186-9
Akasa (space, ether), 52,
155, 188-91, 264, 318
refers to Brahman, 105-7,
118-20, 177-9, 384
small, is supreme Brahman,
158-61, 163-4; is not tlie
individual soul, 162-4
177-9
not a non-entity, 257-8
created, 272-6
Ak?ara is Brahman, 154-6
Anandamaya, 96, 193, 367 ;
' See olso' Self, consisting
. of bliss: . :
Antaryamih, se$: Ruler inner.
Anupalabdhi, 29, 59-60
Asmarathya, 146, 201
Asrama (s), 7,. 431
duties of, 423-9, 432-3
Atman, 346
its relation to Brahman,
200, 232, 297, 338, 365-6
See also Soul
Atom(s), 220
not the cause of the world,
239-40, 248-51, 253
Atomist, 219, 220-2
See also Vaisesikas
Atreya, his opinion about
meditation on Udgitha, 429
Auilulomi, 202, 430, 484
Avarana Sakti, Advaitin's view,
and its refutation, 9, 59
Avidya, defined, 7
Advaitin's view criticised, 58
not proved by inference, 68
Badarayana, liis views on:
right of the gods to Brahma-
vidya, 166-7
their right to practise cer-
tain upasandJ) 171
the Lord is , the giver of
fruits of action, 354
the highest object of human
endeavour from meditation,
, 405-15 .
whpjn the group of deities -
500
Sn-Bhd^ya
lead to Brahman, 475
nature of the self which
has attained to Brahman,
48:-
the state of the liberated
self, 487
Badari, his views on: imagi-
nation of the Lord in hu-
man form, 146
meaning of karma, 321
whom the group of deities
lead to Brahman, 470-3 ;
refuted, 475-6
the state of the liberated
self, 486
Balaki, instruction to, oh the
cause of the world, 194-7
Bauddhas,-refutation of, 220,
253-64
Bhakti, 7
Bhedabheda, 22
Bhedavadin, 78
Brahma, 157, 164, 169, 312
Brahman, Akasa is, 105-7,
118, 120, 161, 177-8
Aksara is, 154, 156
attributes of, 51-2, 54, 57, 77,
341, 344, 347, 364-5, 379,
385-6, 405, 483
as the Cause and Meet, 75,
234, 282
has for its body all sentient
and ittsentieHt beings, 77,
138, 206, 217, 222, 239,
282, 300
can be known only through
the scriptiu-es, 118, 344
characteristics of, 84, 107
.118, 137, 141, 365; the two-
fold characteristics of,
338-48
is the object of all medita-
tions, 379, 382, 438
definition of, 83, 85, 118
Indra is, 113, 118, 120
inquiry into, 1-4, 8, 81-3,
85, 115
is the internal Ruler, 137-8,
337
is bliss, 53, 114, 135
is Existence, Knowledge,
, BUss, 21, 50-1
is Existence, Knowledge,
Infinite, 4, 8, 12-13, 73,
78-9, 114, 116, 153, 192,
213, 289, 340-1, 350, 364
is the material as. welK as
the efficient cause of the
world, 79, 90, 116, 203-5,
211
is not affected by the imper-
fections of the sentient
and non-sentient beings,
342-3
is the Self of all, matter
and individual soxils, 77-9
117, 1S8, 154, 208, 275,
Index
280, 385
is tlie sole cause of tlie
universe, 79, 117, 132, 180,
192, 194, 202-3, 207-8,
212, 227-9, 240, 385
Karya, 470-4
knower of, 52, 54, 81, 136,
422, 435, 461
light is, 108, 110-11, 119-20
meditation on, 54, 83, 122,
135, 145, 166-7, 170, 410, 414
non-dual, 3, 9, 45, 51,
55, 57
Person in the eye is, 136"
Person of the size of the
thumb is, 165-6, 175-7
possesses infinite auspicious
qualities, 52-4, 118, 132,
164, 208, 229, 314, 337,
341, 345, 409, 493
Praoa is, 107-8, 111, 118, 120,
197
resting place of heaven,
earth, etc. is, 148, 151
Saguna and Nirguria, 12, 52
small Akasa is, 159-61, 163-4
two modes of, 74, 77
Vaisvanara is 141-4, 147
Brahmana, 2-3, 81, 128-9, 200,
382, 419, 423, 431-2, 474-5
his right to Brahma-vidya,
173-4
birth as a, 319'
Buddhi, 129, 293
Yoga, 296
Buddhism, four principal
schools of, 252
refutation of the realist
school of, 253-9
refutation of the idealist
school of. 259-62
refutation of ritualist school
of, 262-4
Buddhist, theory of void, 46,
67 :
four causes of cognition
according to, 256
Cause, first, is an intelligent
principle, 89, 91
not Indra, 111
Akasa is, 105
is the object of inquiry, 180
no contradiction in scriptures
regarding, 191
Brahman as, 90, 93-4, 104,
106, 118-20, 123, 180. 195,
235, 241, 272, 314
meditation on, 111
nature of, 104
Pradhana as, 92, 191-2, 242
refutation of Samkhyan
view, 194, 198
Celibate (s), that knowledge
of Brahman belongs to,
refuted, 413-15
need not kindle sacrificial
fire, 418
502
Srl-Bhasya
must not revert from his
life, 427-8
Chandogas, meditate on Udgi-
tha, 'Om', 361-2
their views about food, 421
Consciousness, essential nature
of the self, 484, 489-90
pure, Advaitins views, 3,
8, 9, 16, 18-19 ; their refu-
tation, 24, 26, 28-44, 49, 54-
57, 60-1, 74-5, 301
that Puru?a is, refuted, 245
attributes of, 18-19, 32-3, 36
object of, 26, 28, 32, 37, 57
states of 27, 30, 35, 47, 53,
69
Dhj^ana, is not mere remem
brance, 437
in a sitting posture, 441
See also Meditation
Dream state. Brahman alone
is the creator even in,
71-2
experience in (Vijnana-
vadin's contention),, 260.;
refuted, 262
text regarding, shows the
soul is an agent, 292
the soul in, 330-3
released self freed from,
480
Gargi, 154-7, 378; 494
Gayatri, metre, 109-10
Gita, Bhagavad, 7, 35, 43, 54,
109, 126, 155, 165, 183,
203, 239, 291-2, 295-6, 299,
306, 310-11, 341, 345, 354,
378, 407, 412, 420, 434, 442,
464, 472, 494, 496
God, see Brahman
Grace, divine, 117, 129, 419,
461
Gupa(s), 103
Maya consists of, 73
Brahman is not Pradhana
consisting of, 89, 94, 155,
242-7
Aja is not Pradhana, 186
self's' activity is due to its
contact with, 292
crossing "beyond the, 494
Guru, approaching a,: 2
Heart, 122
supreme Person dwelling
within the, 157-8 .
small Alcasa within the,
159
size of a thumb, 166
supreme Self to be medita-
ted within the, 360
abode of the individual self,
460
Hiranyagarbha, the object of
meditation on 'Om', and
seeing, 157-8
Index
503
flvoiution of names and
forms is not the worli of,
312-3
meditators on, not led by
the group of deities, 470-5
the released self and the
sphere of, 492-3
world of, 471-2, 493
See also Brahman, Karya
Immortality, 7, 73, 171, 199,
414-15, 419, 454-6, 460, 472
predicated only of Btrah-
man, 136-8
bridge to, 148-9, 151, 349
is attained only through
knowledge of Brahman 81,
149, 200, 454-6
way to, 199, 351
Inference, 23, 26-7, 29-30, 42,
61, 67-8, 89, 167, 247, 249,
266
as a means of knowledge,
258-9
is subservient to scriptures,
273
object of, 60
isvara, 211, 266
Jaimini, his views;, on Vais-
vanara as Brahman, 145-7
on gods and certain upd-
sands, 170
on the Kausitaki text, 197
on religious work and fruits
of action, 353
in Plirva-mimamsa, 379,
388-9
on man's highest goal and
sacrificial acts, 406
celibates' renunciation, 414
fallen celibates and know-
ledge of Brahman, 427-8
on the group of deities and
meditators on, 473-6
on the self that has attained
to Brahman, 483-4, 487
Jainas, 220
refutation of, 264-6
six categories, according to,
264
Janasruti, 171-3
Jati (genus, gener^ charac-
ter), 15, 23, ^5, 39, 41,
70-1, 234, 250
Jiva, cannot be the substrate
of Nescience, 55
connected with matter, is
the body of Brahman, 73-7
bound or released, different
from Brahman; 94, 98 '
is not the 'Self consisting of
bliss', 95
is not Akasa, 179
Jaina view and its refuta-
tion, 264
Pasupata view, 268
Paficaratra. view of, 269-71
504
S'fi-Bhdsya
mode of departure of sacri-
ficers', 317
See also Soul
Kapila, 208-11, 251
Smrti, 209, 212-13
iSTee also Samkhya Smrti
Karma, knowledge contracted
due to past, 38, 55, 96, 481,
489
cause of ignorance (bond-
age), 42, 80, 88, 117, 123-4,
163, 200, 332
Brahman not subject to, 102-3,
118, 120, 128, 151, 166, 216-
18, 221, 297, 337, 339-40
infinite bliss unattainable,
103
past, cause of rebirth, 238,
241, 283, 329
souls descendng from heav-
en have residual, 319-21 ;
in the intermediate stages,
no enjoyment of, 326 9
cause of soul's imperfection,
337
Brahman the giver of
fruits of, 352-3
getting rid of good and evil,
372-7, 413, 448-9, 495-6
its connection with a man
of knowledge, 463
and released self,; 480-1,
492, 496
and body of released self,
486-9
Knowledge of ephemeral re-
sults of work-portion, 1,
115, 119
means of, (pramanas), 9,
14, 17, 29, 44, 61, 69, , 118,
263-4, 266, 280, 297, 385,
416, 456, 473, 485
sources of, 19
object of, 27, 41, 45, 52,
56-7, 67, 185
Liberation, 2-6, 11-12, 34,
Advaitin's views on, and
their refutation, 34, 58,
66, 73
meditation on Sat is means
to, 91-2
a state of disembodiedness,
102
highest good of man, 112,
115
knowledge of Brahman
(Self) alone gives, 120,
134
object of inquiry by those
longing for, 180
Samkhyan views on, and
their refutation, 184-5,
246-7
Pasupatas view^ on, 267
Index
505
See also Moka
Mantra (s), &7-100
eternity of Vedic, 169
(show) that the soul is a
part of the Lord, 298
certain, not part of the
meditations, 371-2
of the upasad, 378-9
application of, 398
Manu, 43, 114, 168, 174-5, 210,
417, 423, 426
Smrti, 209-10. 212-13
Maya, Advaitin's views on
and their refutation, 9, 28
also refers to Prakfti, 73,
188, 203-4
dream creation due to,
331-2
Mayin, 73, 203
Meditation, 199, 314, 455,
458-61, 476
of the nature of knowledge,
3-6, 80
constant remembrance, 6
its results, 52, 476
"to attain calmness (peace)
of mind, 54
injunctions on, 87
on Brahman as Gayatri, 109
devout, and intuition of
Brahman, 117, 146, 344-5
on Brahman, 126-7, 133-4,
146-7, 163-6, 350
gods also entitled to, 166
Sudras not entitled to, 171-5
by simile, to control body,
senses, etc., 182
departure of a man of, 460-
77
object of, 112-13, 121, 125,
157, 185, 314
threefold, on Brahman, 114-
15, 196
on a symbol as Brahman,
135, 489 ; See also (Pra-
tika) Upasana
subsidiaries to, 420
on Udgitha, 361, 387-8,
402-3, 410, 416, 429-30, 435
on Vaisvanara, 360
fruits of, 436-44
possible only in a sitting
posture, 441-2
place and time for, 443
See also Dhyana, Upasana,
Vidya
Mimaihsa, Purva, dispassion
gained by the study of,
1-3, 81-2, 115, 119
principles of, 11, 13, 373-4,
379-80, 388, 430
interpretation of texts accor-
ding to, 390, 393, 400,
406, 474
expiation in, and fallen
Naisthikas, 428
Uttara or ariraka, 2-3, 115
506 Sri-Bhasya
Moksa, 80-1, 117, 357
See also Liberation
Naciketas, 131-2, 185
Naiyayikas, 234
Narada, 152-3, 270
Nescience, cause of bondage
etc. (Advaitin's views), 3,
0, 11, 471, 474-5
and mere textual knowledge
of Vedas, 4-5
refutation of Advaitin's
views on, 31-2
'I' in deep sleep, a witness
of, 42
knowledge of the 'I' with
body for its object is, 43
and direct perception, 44
scriptures and one under, 45,
as defined by Advaitin; 55-69
scriptures do not teach, 72-3
interpretation of 'That thou
art', and, 73-81
and individual soul, 100,
123. 132, 228, 409
and Brahman, 228
soul's real nature obscured
by, 479-81 '
according to Bauddhas.
, . 254 '
See also Avidyd, MSya
Organs, 311, 421, 451 "
, number of; 305-6
size of, 306
presiding deity of, 310
transmigration of, with soul,
316
of speech, 450
Paiicaratra system, 268-71
Pasupata, 266-8
Perception, direct, 29-30, 133
Advaitin's views and their
refutation, 15-16, 23-6
scriptural authority and, 21,
43-5
nescience experienced by, 59
refutation of the Sautrantika
views on, 259
ideas alone are proved hy,
26]
object of, 16, 22-5, 27, 39,,41,
59, 61, 67, 69
determinate (savikalpa) and
non-deterndnate {Nirvi-
kalpa), 21-2
Philosophy, schools of, 70,
181
Pradhana, 19, 197-8
is not the ruler within
138-9
the unseen and the imper-
ishable is not the, 139-41
not the resting place , of
heaven, earth, etc., 150
not Aksara, 155-6
not Avyakta, 181-5
not Aja, 186-8 '
Index
,50T
not even the material cause,
203, 214, 221, 234-5
and Yoga Smrti, 210-13
according to Pasupata
school, 266-7
as the first Cause refuted^
89-94, 100-1, 105, 118-20,
122, 124, 180-1, 191-5, 239-
40, 241-8, 272
cannot be established by
inference, 246
See also Pralcrti
Pragabhdva, non-existence of
knowledge, 59, 63, 68
Prajapati, 53, 164, 177, 338,
395, 397, 469-71, 475, 478,
, 480-1, 483
world of, 468
Prakrti, is Maya, 9, 73, 203
Ahankara is a product of,
37
defects of, riot in Brahman,
50-1, 54
and form Of the presiding
deity in the sun, 103
and - the individual soul,
150, 155
its distinction from Purusa
to be known for' Libera-
tion, 184, 199, 243, 247 '
and Being "to be known,
195, 20C
beginriingless, 239, 270 .
in Sariikhyan philosophy,.
241-3
not an agent, 291-4
conductors escort medita-
tors on individual soul as:
free from, 476-7
See also Pradhana
Prana, Brahman's thought
precedes creation of, 90, 94,.
188, 203
refers to Brahman, 107-8,
111-15, 118, 120-2, 175-6,
194-7, 304-5, 380-1
offerings to, 144, 147
Narada's instruction about,
152-3
Brahman does not depend'
on, 216
origination of, (organs),
303-11
as meaning soul, 344
-vidya, 367
in the context of the knower
reaching Brahman, 450-4,
457-8, 476-7
knower of, 421-2
different forms of, 227, 3(^'
nature of, 307, 309
Presiding deity, 136, 316, 470'
of Brahmaloka, 157
: of eye, 133
of fire, 142
of moon. 456, 463-4 - , '
508
^ri-BMsya
ot organs, 310
of sun, 101-2
of time, 464
of Va3ai, 466
Purdv:.a, 73, 172, 271
Agneya, 428
Brahma-Vaivarta, 444
Kiirma, 473
V m u , 437/
Puru5a, 108, 145, 221, 351
in tlie Samkhyan philosopy.
181-2, 242, 245, 247
in Katha I. iii. 11, 182-4
beginningless, 239
Sukta, 109, 149, 270
Rajas, 89, 155, 186, 242
Raikva, 171-3, 426, 437
Realization, 45
only means to final release,
267
men of and -Karma 374;
their conduct, 406
knowledge requires the help
of, 420, 424-5
Renunciation, 414
Ritual, 172, 394, 400
fruit of, is ephemeral, 81,
119
meant to propitiate Brahman,
210
cannot be the ultimate goal,
88
Ruler, within the gods, worlds.
;etc., 137
released self is a self-, 486
inner or internal (antarya-
min), 54, 77, 79-80, 102-3,
116-18, 133, 137-40, 438,
482
Samadhi, 294
Saihkhya (s), first Cause of,
89, 194, 234, 244-7
and knowledge of soul, 200
on Manu and Kapila Smrtis
212
absurdities in the reasoning
of, 218-20
categories, 182-6, 189-91, 242
philosophy, 241
Pradhana of, 138-40, 180-1,
183, 186, 188
Prakrti, 186, 218
Purua of, 199, 218
refuted, 290
Smrti, 208-11, 214
gandilya, 269
Sannyasa, 412-15
Satapatha Brahmana, 125, 144-
5, 303-5, 368, 390-5
Satkaryavada, 252
Sattva, 89, 186, 242
Satyakamatva, 384
Scriptures, alone are the
means of knowledge, 119-
20
as a soiu-ce of knowledge, 23,
Index.
50
29, 43, 85-6, 235-6^ 240, 455
alone are authority on
supersensuous matters, 219,
233, 273
have for their purport only
Brahman, 118, 120
Self, individual, merging with
supreme Self, 458-9
heart is the abode of,. 460
attributes of, 112, 483-5, 494
relation to supreme Self, 482
discussion of released, 478-96
size ol, 480
nature of, 479-81, 484
consisting of Bliss, (Anan-
damaya KoSa), 94-101, 193,
366-7
consisting of understanding
(Vijiianamaya Kos^), 100,
193, 367
consisting of mind, (Mano-
maya Kosa), 120,125,366-7
consisting of Prana (Praija-
maya Kosa), 96, 365-7
consisting of food (Anna-
maya Kosa), 96, 365
See also Soul
Mrovrata, 359
Sleep, deep, pure Gondous-
ness is not experienced in,
30-1
T, the knower persists in,
41-2
individual soiil inerges in
Sat, in, 93, 160, 197, 459-
soul rises above earthly body-
in, 162
difference between soul and
Brahman in, 178-9
Knowledge in, 2814, 289-90
chief Pra^^a functions, in
311
the soul in, 333-6
and release, 478, 480
reference in Br, IV iii, 21r
489-90
Soul, individual, Advaitin's^
view, of, 283
characteristics of, 114, 148-9'
size of, 283, 285, 290
nature of, 102, 131, 153, 283
not the inner Ruler, 139
a part of Brahman, 296,
298-300
transmigration of, 315-9, 33ff
descent from heaven of,
319-21, 330
descent from moon of, 326-8
in dream state, 330-3
in deep sleep state, 333-6
in the state of swoon, 336-T
released, is a self-ruler,.
486
Sphota, 48-9
Sraddha, same as water, 315-7
state of. sotil, 326
Sruti, more authoritative than
Smrti, 209
510
Sn-Bhdsya
Sun, 466-7
world of, 468
northern and southern cour-
ses oi, 463-4
as path to Brahman, 461-3
Tamas, 89, 155, 186, 242
Tandin, 374
Taittiriyakas, 187, 372
Testimony, verbal, see Scrip-
ture
Udgitha, 360-3, 387, 402-4
Xrpaniad(s), 86, 118, 136, 149,
167, 172, 266, 359-61, 363.
366, 372, 380, 386, 389, 403,
407, 413, 435, 437, 465, 469
485, 487
-ic stories, 417-18
referred to in this text:
Isavasya, 7, 408, 411-12;
Kena, 8, 53, 122; Ka^ho,
72,; 96, 128-32, 145, 176,
181-2, 184-5, 273;, 282, 291-
' 2, 299, 305, 322, 331-3,
344-5, 434 ; Prasna, 90, 136
157-8, 203, 284, 426/451;
Mdndukya, 228 ; Aitareya,
51, 232, 304, "366, 410;
Kaujttakt,-. 111-14, 122, 194,
196-8, 214, 295, 322/ 363,
r, -373-5, 417;; 445, 456, 465-9,
493 ; MahSrLara-yaiia, 149,
188, 351-2, 360, 390, 425,
463-4; Subala, 138 ; Brha-
darariyaka, recensions:
Mddhyandina, 137, 139, 190,
217, 229-30, 438, 458, 482;
Kariva, 137, 139, 190, 283
Upasand, in Uttara-Mimaih-
sa, 3
as knowledge leading to
liberation, 4-5, 419, 441
and form of the Lord, 146,
165, 350
right of the gods to
certain, 170
sudras barred from, 172,175
objects imagined to be fire,
for the sake of, 315
means to attain Brahman, 352
produce results by them-
selves, 353
vedand is synonymous with,
437
how to practise, 441-2
Pratika, 135
. Upasaka, 147
Vaiseika, 53, 222-3, 227, 249-
52, 283
refuted, 248-52, 290-1
See also Atomist
Vaisvanara, as fire, 109
represented as three fires,
144
is Brahman, 142 7, 399
Index
511
worship, 143
Vajasaneyins, 144-7, 197, 361,
467.
Yamadeva, 42-3, 113-14
Vdsanas, refutation of Baud-
dha'a view on, 260-1
Veda(s), 43, 71, 137-8, 270,
424, 431
the Self cannot be attained
by the mere study of, 2,
7, 129, 131
authority of^ 212, 219, 251,
266
and good conduct, 321
and meditations, 397
Pranava is common to all
the, 403
eternity of, 167-9
knowers of, 210
ritualistic portion, 81, 119
study of, 2-3, 6, 115, 173-5,
358, 409, 411, 419, 474
work portion of, 1, 11, 81,
Vedic, sacrifices, 352, 357
rites, 175, 359
studies, 172, 372
texts, 1, 4, 5, 39, 44, 55, 119
296, 414
Vedanta, 3, 19, 115, 132, 219
inquiry into, 19
authority for Brahman, 82,
119
texts, 83, 121, 212, 216-7, 441
refers to Brahman as the
first Cause, 123, 195, 206-8,
210, 214, 272, 314, 409
meditations are the same
in all, 357-8, 360; they are
to be repeated, 436
Vidya, 7
whether one or several, 357
options in, 401
knower of, 462
path of the loiower, 468
Bhuma, 271, 399-400
Brahma, 171-5, 464
Dahara,, 165, 370, 388-9, 393,
430, 483
Madhu, 170-1
Pancagni, 315, 378, 466
Prana, 367-8, 421-2
Puru?a, 371
Sad, 233, 380-2, 400
Samvargya, 172
^an$iilya, 368-9, 400
Udgitha, 362
Upakosala, 377, 400, 466
Vaisvanara, 357, 395, 398,
400
Vijiianamaya, 198,
See also Self consisting of
understanding
Viksepa-sakti, 9, 59
Volition, 99, 230-1, 276
Vyuha, 269-70
Waking state, 162, 330, 480, 488
512
^ri-Bhasya
Brahman is the creator in,
71-2
impressions of, and dream
state, 260
and dream state, 262
knowledge manifests in, 289
Word, 115
power of, 82
relation between, and things,
62, 168
have power of convejdng
knowledge, 119
Vedic, 167
Work(s), results of, ephem-
eral, 3, 81, 115
with desire for results, 80,
117
without desire purifies the
mind, 4
scriptural texts about, 11-12
Being to be known, 195
path of the fathers, and good,
323
religious, 353
knowledge is subsidiary to,
407-8; is not subsidiary,
to, 409-13
need of all, 418
calmness, self-control, and,
421
sacrificial, 423-4
meditation or knowledge,
and fruits of, 444-8, 463
effect of subtle elements
according to, 458-9
Yajiiavalkya, 137, 154, 199,
380-1
smrti, 458
Yoga, 306, 438, 442, 464
smrti, 211-12
Yogi, 133, 464
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