Stonehill vs diokno

Search and Seizure General Warrants Abandonment of the Moncado Doctrine

Stonehill et al and the corporation they form were alleged to have committed acts in violation of Central Bank Laws,
Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code. By the strength of this allegation a search
warrant was issued against their persons and their corporation. The warrant provides authority to search the persons
above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the
following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts,
balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into (2)
major groups, namely:
(a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and
(b) those found seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
Stonehill averred that the warrant is illegal for:
(1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;
(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized;
(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against
them;
(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and
(5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be
disposed of in accordance with law.
The prosecution counters, invoking the Moncado doctrine, that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by
petitioners consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against them. In short, the
criminal cannot be set free just because the government blunders.

ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant issued is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Stonehill et al. The SC emphasized however that Stonehill et al cannot assail the
validity of the search warrant issued against their corporation for Stonehill are not the proper party hence has no cause
of action. It should be raised by the officers or board members of the corporation. The constitution protects the peoples
right against unreasonable search and seizure. It provides; (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to
be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe
the things to be seized. In the case at bar, none of these are met. The warrant was issued from mere allegation that
Stonehill et al committed a violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code. In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof
with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the
warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof
that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a
given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific
acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be a legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a violation
of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code, as alleged in
the aforementioned applications without reference to any determinate provision of said laws or codes.
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was compounded by
the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals,
typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts,
balance sheets and related profit and loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of Stonehill et
al, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of
Stonehill et al and the aforementioned corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit
command of the Bill of Rights that the things to be seized be particularly described as well as tending to defeat its
major objective: the elimination of general warrants. The Moncado doctrine is likewise abandoned and the right of the
accused against a defective search warrant is emphasized.


Borlongan vs Pena
G.R. No. 143591 May 5, 2010TEODORO C. BORLONGAN, JR., CORAZON M. BEJASA, ARTURO E. MANUEL, JR.,
ERIC L. LEE, P. SIERVO H. DIZON,BENJAMIN DE LEON, DELFIN C. GONZALES, JR., and BEN YU LIM, JR.,
Petitioners, vs. MAGDALENO M. PEA and HON. MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR., as Judge Designate of the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities, Bago City, Respondents
FACTS
:
Respondent Pena instituted a civil case for recovery of agents compensation and expenses, damages and attorneys fees
against Urban Bank and petitioners before the RTC. Petitioners filed a Motion to dismiss, including several documents
as evidence. Atty Pena claims that the documents were falsified. He subsequently filed his Complaint-Affidavit with the
City Prosecutor. The prosecutor found probable cause and the Informations were filed before MTCC. Warrants of arrest
were issued for the petitioners / accused. Upon the issuance of the warrant of arrest, petitioners immediately posted
bail as they wanted to avoid embarrassment, being then officers of Urban Ban. On the scheduled date for the
arraignment, despite the petitioners refusal to enter a plea, the court a quo entered a plea of Not Guilty for them.
The accused questioned the validity of the warrant of arrest. However, the trial court ruled that posting of bail
constitutes a waiver of any irregularity in the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
ISSUE
: Can the petitioners still question the validity of the warrant of arrest despite posting bail?
YES

HELD
:The erstwhile ruling of this Court was that posting of bail constitutes a waiver of any irregularity in the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, that has already been superseded by Section 26, Rule 114
of the Revised Rule of Criminal Procedure. The principle that the accused is precluded from questioning the legality of
the arrest after arraignment is true only if he voluntarily enters his plea and participates during trial, without previously
invoking his objections there to. Moreover, considering the conduct of the petitioner after posting her personal bail
bond, it cannot be argued that she waived her right to question the finding of probable cause and to assail the warrant
of arrest issued against herby the respondent judge.
There must be clear and convincing proof that the petitioner had an actual intention to relinquish her right to question
the existence of probable cause. When the only proof of intention rests on what a party does, his act should be so
manifestly consistent with, and indicative of, an intent to voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish the particular right
that no other explanation of his conduct is possible. x x x. Herein petitioners filed the Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall
Warrants of Arrest and/or For Reinvestigation on the same day that they posted bail. Their bail bonds likewise expressly
contained a stipulation that they were not waiving their right to question the validity of their arrest. On the date of their
arraignment, petitioners refused to enter their plea due to the fact that the issue on the legality of their arrest is still
pending with the Court. Thus, when the court a quo entered a plea of not guilty for them, there was no valid waiver of
their right to preclude them from raising the same with the Court of Appeals or this Court. The posting of bail bond was
a matter of imperative necessity to avert their incarceration; it should not be deemed as a waiver of their right to assail
their arrest