Caltex (Phil.), Inc. v.

Palomar
FACTS:
Petitioner conceived the Caltex Hooded Pump Contest where participants have to
estimate the actual number of liters a hooded gas pump can dispense during a
specifc period of time. There was no fee or consideration required to be paid nor
an! purchase of an! Caltex products to be made in order to "oin the contest.
#oreseeing the extensive use of mail for advertising and communications Caltex
requested clearance for $espondent Postmaster %eneral but was denied citing said
contest is a gift enterprise deemed as a non&mailable matter under the anti&
lotter! provisions of the Postal 'aw. Hence Petitioner fled a petition for declarator!
relief.
ISSUE:
()* the Caltex Hooded Pump Contest falls under the term gift enterprisewhich
is banned b! the Postal 'aw.
HELD:
*o said contest is not a gift enterprise. The word lotter! is defned as a game of
chance where the elements of which are +,- consideration +.- chance and +/- pri0e.
The term gift enterprise and scheme in the provision of the Postal 'aw ma1ing
unmailable an! lotter! gift enterprise or scheme for the distribution of mone! or
an! real or personal propert! b! lot chance or drawing of an! 1indmeans such
enterprise as will require consideration as an element. The intent of the prohibition
is to suppress the tendenc! to in2ame the gambling spirit and to corrupt public
morals. There being no element of consideration in said contest the spirit of the law
is preserved.
LATI !A"I!: 3a .4
5 5 5
Daoan# v. !$nici%al &$'#e o( San icola), Iloco) orte
FACTS:
Prior to this case Petitioners contested the adoption of 6uirino 7onilla and (ilson
8arcos b! 9ntero 9gono! and 9manda 9gono! stating that under 9rt. //: of the
Civil Code that those who have legitimate legitimated ac1nowledged natural
children or children b! legal fction cannot adopt. Petitioners stated that the
9gono!s alread! had a daughter of the ;strella 9gono! who is the deceased
mother of the Petitioners and that the 9gono!s also have the Petitioners as
grandchildren. #urthermore the Petitioners argued that the adopting would
introduce a foreign element into the famil! unit and would result in the reduction of
their legitimes in terms of inheritance. The $espondent Court ruled in favor for
9gono!.
ISSUE:
()* the $espondent Court erred in their decision.
HELD:
*o the court was correct. <n enumerating the persons who cannot adopt in 9rt. //:
the children mentioned therein have a clearl! defned meaning in law and do not
include grandchildren. To add grandchildren in this article where no grandchild is
included would violate the legal maxim that what is expressl! included would
naturall! exclude what is not included.
LATI !A"I!: =c 3a />a
5 5 5
A!*+ES v H+ET
Petition to declare ?illanueva as ineligible to hold o@ce as representative of
C<79C for being overage to represent !outh. Change of a@liation must be made six
months before elections. Aouth sector is represented b! .: B/>.
FACTS:
:),C).>>3D Petition for certiorari challenging the assumption of o@ce of one
;mmanuel Eoel ?illanueva as representative of C<79C in the Ho$.
Petitioner arguesD
?illanueva was /, at the time of fling of nomination be!ond the age limit of />
which was the limit imposed b! $9 F3C, for G!outh sectorG.
?illanuevaHs change of a@liation from Aouth Iector to J#( and families not
aKected six months prior to elections.
Respondent argues:
$9 F3C, requirement for GageG for !outh sector representative onl! applicable to
frst three elections after the part! list act.
There was no resultant change in a@liation.
ISSUE:
Whether the requirement for youth sector representatives apply to respondent Villanueva
RULING:
Villauneva ineligible to hold office as a member of HoR representing CIBAC
HELD:
?illanuevaHs arguments are invalid. The law is clear. <f representative of !outh
sector should be between .:to />.
?illanueva is ineligible to also represent J#(. Iectoral representation should be
changed I<L 8J*THI prior to elections.

Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa Manila Railroad Company Credit Union,
In! "s Manila Railroad Company!
#ats:
!etitioner"Appellant# $apisanan ng mga %anggaga&a sa %anila Railroad Company Credit
'nion# Inc( see)s to establish a right granted by section *+ of the Republic Act ,o( +-+.# that the
petitioner contends that under the provisions of R(A +-+.# the loans granted by credit unions to
its members en/oy the first priority in the payroll collection from the respondent0s employees0
&ages and salaries(
Iss$es:
1( &hether or not R(A +-+. provides first priority in the matter of payments to the obligations of
employees in favor of their credit unions2
+( &hether or not the petition for mandamus is clear and certain2
R$ling:
1( ,o( 3he applicable provision of R(A +-+. spea)s for itself( 3here is no ambiguity( !etitioner"
Appellant cannot therefore raise any valid ob/ection( And the lo&er court cannot vie&
it other&ise for it &ould be to alter the la&# it cannot be done by the /udiciary(
+( ,o( !etitioner"Appellant &as unable to sho& a clear legal right# the very la& on &hich he
&ould base his action fails to supply any basis for this petition( If the legal rights of the petitioner
are not &ell defined# clear# and certain# the petition must be dismissed(

Radio Comm$niations o% t&e '&ilippines (! National )eleom! Com!
#*C)S:
!etitioner &as a&arded legislative franchise in 1456 by RA +-.* to operate a radio
communications system# recogni7ed by the !ublic 8ervice Commission 9!8C:( !etitioner then
established services in 8orsogon# %indoro# and 8amar( In 14;-# the Respondent# &hich replaced
the !8C# authori7ed $ayumanggi to set up radio systems in %indoro and 8amar too(
Respondent# after conducting a hearing upon a complaint by $ayumanggi# ordered !etitioner to
stop operating# because it didn<t have a certificate of public convenience# &hich is necessary
under => 5?* for any public service to operate(
ISSUE:
W@, !etitioner still needs a certificate of candidacy before it can validly operate(
HELD:
Aes# they need such certificates to validly operate( !etitioner &as created under RA +-.*#
governed by the !ublic 8ervice Commission( 'nder it# radio companies did not need a certificate
of public convenience to operate( Ho&ever# !(B( 1 abolished the !ublic 8ervice Commission and
=> 5?* created the Respondent Commission( 'nder => 5?*# Respondent must issue a certificate
of public convenience for the operation of radio communications systems( !etitioner did not
avail of it &hen they should have(
L*)IN M*+IM: +a# *c# .-# ?*a# ?4

Rep$,li (s )oledano -.. SCR* /!
#at o% t&e Case:
>n Cebruary +1# 144- Alvin Clouse# a natural born citi7en of America and his &ife =velyn A
Clause# Cilipino at birth &ho later became a natural citi7en of the 'nited 8tates petition to adopt
8olomon Doseph Alcala( >n Dune +-# 144- the /udge decree said Cilipino minor be their child by
adoption(
Republic of the !hilippines# the petitioner here# appealed that the lo&er court erred in granting
the petition for adoption for the spouses are not qualified to adopt under the !hilippine Ea&(
Iss$e:
Whether or not the spouses Alvin and =velyn Clouse being an alien are disqualified to adopt
under the !hilippine la&(
Held:
Aes( 3he spouse are disqualified to adopt the Cilipino child 8olomon( Article 1;?# paragraph 9.:
of =Fecutive >rder ,o( +-4 eFpressly enumerates the persons &ho are not qualified to adopt#
vi7:
An alien# eFcept:
9a: A former Cilipino citi7en &ho see)s to adopt a relative by consanguinityG
9b: >ne &ho see)s to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Cilipino spouseG or
9c: >ne &ho is married to a Cilipino citi7en and see)s to adopt /ointly the later(
Alvin Clause is not qualified being a natural born citi7en of the 'nited 8tates of America( >n the
other hand =velyn Clouse may seem to be qualified on Article 1;?# ho&ever adoption cannot be
granted in her favor alone for the Camily Code requires that the husband and &ife must /ointly
adopt as stated on Article 1;5(

)anada (! )$(era
#*C)S:
Bue process &as invo)ed by the !etitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of
!residential Becrees &hich they claimed had not been published as required by la&( 3he
government argued that &hile publication &as necessary as a rule# it &as not so &hen it &as
Hother&ise providedI as &hen the decrees themselves declared that they &ere to become
effective immediately upon their approval(
ISSUE:
W@, the clause Hother&ise providedI in Article + of Civil Code pertains to the necessity of
publication(
HELD:
,o# the clause Hother&ise providedI refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication per se# &hich cannot in any event be omitted(
!ublication in full should be indispensable( Without such notice or publication# there &ould be
no basis for the application of the maFim Hignorantia Eegis non eFcusatI( 3he court# therefore#
declares that presidential issuances of general application &hich have not been published shall
have no force and effect# and the court ordered that the unpublished decrees be published in the
>fficial Ja7ette immediately(
L*)IN M*+IM: *c# 4a
Publication Presidential Proclamations etc What unless otherwise provided means in
Article 2 of the Civil Code
With the 8upreme Court<s decision that ordered 3uvera et al to publish in the >fficial Ja7ette the
unpublished presidential issuances &hich are of general application# and unless so published#
they shall have no binding force and effect# 3uvera et al move for reconsideration and
clarification(
ISSUE: Whether or not publication should be made in the >fficial Ja7ette or else&here as long
as the people &ere sufficiently informed(
HELD: 3he 8upreme Court cannot rule upon the &isdom of a la& or repeal or modify it if it
finds the same as impractical( 3hat is not its function for such is the function of the legislature(
3he tas) of the 8upreme Court is merely to interpret and apply the la& as conceived and
approved by the political departments of the government in accordance &ith prescribed
procedure( Hence# the Court declared that all la&s shall immediately upon their approval or as
soon thereafter as possible# be published in full in the >fficial Ja7ette# to become effective only
after 15 days from their publication# or on another date specified by the legislature# in accordance
&ith Article + of the Civil Code( 3he clause Hunless other&ise providedI pertains to the date of
publication and not the requirement of publication(

#loresa (! '&ile0 Mining Corporation
Case No! 12
G!R! No! L3 .451- 6*pril .4, 7/89:
#*C)S:
!etitioners are the surviving family of deceased employees of Respondent Corporation &ho died
as a result of a cave"in &hile &or)ing in underground mining operations( !etitioners# &ith the
eFception of Cloresca# recovered damages under the Wor)men<s Compensation Act( Ho&ever# a
later report on the accident sho&ed there &as negligence on the part of Respondent Corporation(
3hereafter# !etitioners filed a civil suit to recover damages for Respondent Corporation<s
rec)less and &anton negligence(
ISSUE:
W@, !etitioners have the right to choose bet&een availing of the &or)er<s right under the
Wor)men<s Compensation Act or suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher
damages(
HELD:
!etitioners may sue in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages( Ho&ever# in
light of the fact that they have already recovered damages from the Wor)men<s Compensation
Act# if they are a&arded a greater amount in the regular courts# the amount received from this
Act shall be deducted to prevent the instance of double recovery( An in/ured party cannot pursue
both courses of action simultaneously( In allo&ing !etitioners to sue in regular courts# the Court
stated that it did not legislate in this case but rather# applied and gave effect to the constitutional
guarantees of social /ustice(
L*)IN M*+IM: 1# 16# ?-a

Rep$,li (! C* and Molina
Guidelines presented by the court(
3he Camily Code of the !hilippines provides an entirely ne& ground 9in addition to those
enumerated in the Civil Code: to assail the validity of a marriage# namely# Kpsychological
incapacity(K In addition to resolving the present case# the court finds the need to lay do&n
specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article .* of the Camily Code( In the
present case# it appears to that there is a Kdifficulty#K if not outright KrefusalK or KneglectK in the
performance of some marital obligations of the respondent spouse( %ere sho&ing of
Kirreconcilable differencesK and Kconflicting personalitiesK in no &ise constitutes psychological
incapacity( Hence# the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case vis"a"
vis eFisting la& and /urisprudence( Cor psychological incapacity to foster# three characteristics
should manifest# that include gravity# /uridical antecedence and incurability(

'aras (! C;MELEC
#*C)S:
A petition for recall &as filed against !aras# &ho is the incumbent !unong Barangay( 3he recall
election &as deferred due to !etitioner<s opposition that under 8ec( 6? of RA ,o( 61*-# no recall
shall ta)e place &ithin one year from the date of the official<s assumption to office or one year
immediately preceding a regular local election( 8ince the 8angguniang $abataan 98$: election
&as set on the first %onday of %ay +--*# no recall may be instituted(
ISSUE:
W@, the 8$ election is a local election(
HELD:
,o( =very part of the statute must be interpreted &ith reference to its conteFt# and it must be
considered together and )ept subservient to its general intent( 3he evident intent of 8ec( 6? is to
sub/ect an elective local official to recall once during his term# as provided in par( 9a: and par(
9b:( 3he spirit# rather than the letter of a la&# determines its construction( 3hus# interpreting the
phrase Hregular local electionI to include 8$ election &ill unduly circumscribe the Code for
there &ill never be a recall election rendering inutile the provision( In interpreting a statute# the
Court assumed that the legislature intended to enact an effective la&( An interpretation should be
avoided under &hich a statute or provision being construed is defeated# meaningless# inoperative
or nugatory(
L*)IN M*+IM: 4a# 11d# +5b# +6# .*b# .6# .;

C&ina <an=ing Corporation (! ;rtega
#*C)S:
A complaint &as filed against BLB Corest Bevelopment Corporation for the collection of a sum
of money( 3he trial court declared the said corporation in default( 3he !laintiff sought the
garnishment of the ban) deposit of BLB Corest &ith current !etitioner Ban)( 3hus# a notice of
garnishment &as issued by the Beputy 8heriff and served on !etitioner Ban) through its cashier#
3an $im Eiong( He refused to disclose the sought information# citing the provisions of RA 1?-5
&hich prohibits the disclosure of any information relative to ban) deposits to any person eFcept
upon &ritten permission of the depositor( Curthermore# RA 1?-5 also imposes criminal liability
on any official or employee of a ban)ing institution &ho brea)s the confidential nature of this
la&(
ISSUE:
W@, a ban)ing institution may validly refuse to comply &ith a court process garnishing the ban)
deposit of a /udgment debtor# by invo)ing RA 1?-5(
HELD:
,o( It &as not the intention of the la&ma)ers to place ban) deposits beyond the reach of
eFecution to satisfy a final /udgment( 3he discussion of the conference committee report of the
t&o houses of Congress indicates that the prohibition against eFamination of or inquiry into a
ban) deposit under RA 1?-5 does not preclude its being garnished to insure satisfaction of a
/udgment(
L*)IN M*+IM: 4a# 11e# 1+b# .-b# .5# .;b# ?.# b+