The Time Game with Iran INSS Insight No.

103, April 21, 2009

Asculai, Ephraim

Things are heating up in the Middle-East nuclear/political arena. Iran is resisting any
possibility of honestly negotiating the nuclear issue with the West/US alliance, the US
is hinting at possible concessions to Iran, Israeli sources are talking possible offensive
action against Iranian nuclear installations, and US officials are against such action.
Egypt is confronting Iran and instability is in the air. Perhaps more than the recent US
elections, the timetable is now dictated by the closing deadline of Iran's nuclear
progress.
Reading the IAEA periodic reports there is no reason to change the previous estimate
that Iran will have accumulated enough Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) to enable it to
further enrich it and produce 25 kilograms of High Enriched Uranium (HEU), should it
wish to do so, by the end of this year. This deadline is quoted by many as the latest date
at which a diplomatic solution has to be arrived at. There were many calls to set a
deadline for concluding the talks with Iran.
In any case, the talk about the end of this year is politically, not technically or
militarily, motivated. Everybody wants to give President Obama the breathing space he
needs to try to attempt and reach a "diplomatic" solution through engagement. Secretary
of State Clinton's rather strange statement "We really don't know what to believe about
the Iranian program. We've heard many different assessments and claims over the
years" was probably designed to buy time for her president. The US intelligence
community knows very well the status of Iran's nuclear project. One has to read
between the lines of the official statements and testimonies to know that the situation is
getting to be very serious.
Furthermore, any action that would not give the US president a minimal time for even
attempting the diplomatic route that he so actively advocated before and following his
election would probably be counterproductive, especially in the case of Israel, a
historically close ally of the US. This does not mean that Israel would not take military
action alone, once the talks had failed or if Iran was found to be much further advanced
in her quest for nuclear weapons than previously estimated. The statement by US
Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair that Iran may have acquired fissile
materials from external sources does stress the need for urgency. Should engagement
fail, Israel would be in a better position to convince the US, if not to actively support,
then at least not to interfere, with any military action.
No doubt, Secretary Gates's statement that a military attack by Israel would only
delay Iran's nuclear project by one to three years and strengthen its resolve is well taken.
However, the alternative, if and when engagement fails to achieve its aims, is not so
great either. Engagement will fail either through total disagreement between the
negotiating parties, or through a US agreement to the unthinkable today – enrichment
activities in Iran. This has been hinted at and then denied, but there are no serious
assurances that this would not happen. US sanctioned enrichment activities in Iran will
again provide Iran with the time it needs for furthering its nuclear capabilities. Iran does
not have to take a decision now to actually produce nuclear weapons. All will be ready
for that day at a not-too-distant time in the future. The Iranian regime's hatred towards
Israel will not be lessened in any case. The threat will remain the same, or even worsen.
It is certain that once the US formally joined the European Union in the negotiations,
it will take the lead role. No agreement will be reached without US consent, which will
have in effect a veto power over any unsatisfactory solution. The US will therefore be
held responsible for any unsatisfactory effect this could have on the regional states, and
subsequently over the world's energy supply in particular and the overall security
situation in general.
 The need for a firm US stand at talks with Iran is essential. A weak starting position
will only strengthen the Iranian stand, stated many times in recent days by several
Iranian officials (although not by all), that the nuclear project is non-negotiable. Should
the US proceed from this starting point it will not only lose its declared purpose to
prevent Iran from achieving a military nuclear capability, but lose its standing in many
states of the region, especially those bordering the gulf.
The Iranians have already made a significant gain, when the US more than hinted
that there would be no prior linkage between negotiations and the suspension of
enrichment activities. The Iranians are famous for their tactics in playing for time. The
US must not fall into that trap. Therefore, President Obama must set himself a time limit
even if he does not disclose it to anyone. One can understand why a public disclosure
could be seen as presenting Iran with an ultimatum and, given the Iranian sense of pride,
greatly diminish the possibility of reaching an agreement. In setting the time limit, the
President must remember that any time gained by the Iranians during the negotiation
process would be used to further advance their project. In addition, one must bear in
mind that nothing would induce the Iranians to rollback and demolish any achievement,
in materials or facilities, as a part of any agreement. This could only come about by a
profound change in the Iranian regime, and even then this is not certain.
Although for the US there is also the grave economic crisis to deal with, this will be
resolved one way or the other, given enough time and allocated resources. In a way the
Iranian nuclear issue is the Cuban missile crisis all over again. It will test the ability of
the newly-elected US president to confront the adversary and better him. In a way this is
a make or break situation for Obama.