CHAPTER ONE: Statutes

IN GENERAL
Laws, generally
A whole body or system of law
Rule of conduct formulated and made obligatory
by legitimate power of the state
Includes RA, PD, EO (president in the e of
legislati!e power", Presidential issuances
(ordinance power" #urisprudence, ordinances
passed by sanggunians of local go!ernment
units$
%tatutes, generally
An act of legislature (Philippine &ommission, Phil$
Legislature, 'atasang Pambansa, &ongress"
PD(s of )arcos during the period of martial law
*+,- &onstitution
EO of A.uino re!olutionary period /reedom
&onstitution
Public 0 affects the public at large
general 0 applies to the whole state and
operates throughout the state ali1e upon
all people or all of a class$
%pecial 0 relates to particular person or
things of a class or to a particular
community, indi!idual or thing$
Local Law 0 operation is confined to a
specific place or locality (e$g municipal
ordinance"
Pri!ate 0 applies only to a specific person or
sub2ect$
Permanent and temporary statutes
Permanent 3 one whose operation is not limited in
duration but continues until repealed$
4emporary 3 duration is for a limited period of time
fied in the statute itself or whose life ceases
upon the happening of an e!ent$
o E$g$ statute answering to an emergency
Other classes of statutes
Prospecti!e or retroacti!e 0 accdg$ to application
Declaratory, curati!e, mandatory, directory,
substanti!e, remedial, penal 0 accdg$ to operation
According to form
o Affirmati!e
o 5egati!e
)anner of referring to statutes
Public Acts 0 Phil &ommission and Phil
Legislature *+6*3 *+-7
&ommonwealth Acts 0 *+-83 *+98
Republic Acts 0 &ongress *+983 *+,:, *+;, <
'atas Pambansa 0 'atasang Pambansa
Identification of laws 0 serial number and=or title
ENACTMENT OF STATUTES
Legislati!e power, generally
Power to ma1e, alter and repeal laws
>ested in congress 0 *+;, &onstitution
President 0 *+,- ? /reedom (PD and EO
respecti!ely"
%angguniang barangay, bayan, panglungsod,
panlalawigan 0 only within respecti!e 2urisdiction
0 ordinances
Administrati!e or eecuti!e officer
Delegated power
Issue rules and regulations to implement
a specific law
&ongress legislati!e power
4he determination of the legislati!e policy and its
formulation and promulgation as a defined and
binding rule of conduct$
Legislati!e power 3 plenary ecept only to such
limitations as are found in the constitution
Procedural re.uirements, generally
Pro!ided in the constitution (for 'ills, RA"
Pro!ided by congress 0 enactment of laws
Rules of both houses of congress (pro!ided
also by the &onstitution"
Passage of bill
Proposed legislati!e measure introduced by a
member of congress for enactment into law
%hall embrace only one sub2ect which shall be
epressed in the title
%inged by authors
/ile with the %ecretary of the @ouse
'ills may originate from either lower or upper
@ouse
Eclusi!e to lower house
Appropriation
Re!enue= tariff bills
'ills authoriAing increase of public debt
'ills of local application
Pri!ate bills
After - readings, appro!al of either house (see
Art 8 %ec :8 (*""
%ecretary reports the bill for first reading
/irst reading 0 reading the number and title,
referral to the appropriate committee for study
and recommendation
&ommittee 0 hold public hearings and
submits report and recommendation for
calendar for second reading
%econd reading 0 bill is read in full (with
amendments proposed by the committee" 0
unless copies are distributed and such reading is
dispensed with
o 'ill will be sub2ect to debates, motions
and amendments
o 'ill will be !oted on
o A bill appro!ed shall be included in the
calendar of bills for -
rd
reading
4hird reading 0 bill appro!ed on :
nd
reading will
be submitted for final !ote by yeas and nays,
'ill appro!ed on the -
rd
reading will be transmitted
to the BOther @ouseC for concurrence (same
process as the first passage"
o If the BOther @ouseC appro!es without
amendment it is passed to the President
o If the BOther @ouseC introduces
amendments, and disagreement arises,
differences will be settled by the
&onference &ommittees of both houses
o Report and recommendation of the :
&onference &ommittees will ha!e to be
appro!ed by both houses in order to be
considered pass
President
o Appro!es and signs
o >etoes (within -6 days after receipt"
o Inaction
If the President !etoes 0 send bac1 to the @ouse
where it originated with recommendation
o :=- of all members appro!es, it will be
sent to the other house for appro!al
o :=- of the other house appro!es 0 it shall
become a law
o If president did not act on the bill with in
-6 days after receipt, bill becomes a law
%ummary D - ways of how a bill becomes a law$
President signs
inaction of president with in -6 days after
receipt
!etoed bill is repassed by congress by :=-
!otes of all its members, each house !oting
separately$
Appropriations and re!enue bills
%ame as procedure for the enactment of ordinary
bills
Only difference is that they can only originate
from the Lower @ouse but the %enate may
propose= concur with the amendments
Limitations of passage (as per &onstitution" Art 8
%ec$ :, (:"
o congress may not increase the
appropriation recommended by the
President EEE
o particular appropriation limited
o procedure for &ongress is the same to all
other department= agencies (procedure
for appro!ing appropriations "
o special appropriations 0 national
treasurer= re!enue proposal
o no transfer of appropriations authority
to augment
o discretionary funds 0 for public purposes
o general appropriations bills 0 when re3
enacted
o President my !eto any particular item=s in
an appropriation re!enue, or tariff bill$
Authentication of bills
'efore passed to the President
Indispensable
'y signing of %pea1er and %enate President

Fnimpeachability of legislati!e 2ournals

#ournal of proceedings
&onclusi!e with respect to other matters that are
re.uired by the &onstitution
Disputable with respect to all other matters
'y reason of public policy, authenticity of laws
should rest upon public memorials of the most
permanent character
%hould be public
Enrolled bill
'ills passed by congress authenticated by the
%pea1er and the %enate President and appro!ed
by the President
Importing absolute !erity and is binding on the
courts
o It carries on its face a solemn assurance
that it was passed by the assembly by the
legislati!e and eecuti!e departments$
&ourts cannot go behind the enrolled act to
disco!er what really happened
o If only for respect to the legislati!e and
eecuti!e departments
4hus, if there has been any mista1e in the printing
of the bill before it was certified by the officer of
the assembly and appro!ed by the &hief
Eecuti!e, the remedy is by amendment by
enacting a curati!e legislation not by 2udicial
decree$
Enrolled bill and legislati!e 2ournals 3 &onclusi!e
upon the courts
If there is discrepancy between enrolled bill and
2ournal, enrolled bill pre!ails$
Githdrawal of authentication, effect of
%pea1er and %enate President may withdraw if
there is discrepancy between the tet of the bill as
deliberated and the enrolled bill$
EffectD
o 5ullifies the bill as enrolled
o Losses absolute !erity
o &ourts may consult 2ournals
PARTS OF STATUTES
4itle of statute
)andatory law 3 E!ery bill passed by &ongress
shall embrace only one sub2ect which shall be
epressed in the title thereof (Art 8, %ec :8 (*"
*+;, &onstitution"
: limitations upon legislation
o 4o refrain from conglomeration, under
one statute, of heterogeneous sub2ects
o 4itle of the bill should be couched in a
language sufficient to notify the
legislators and the public and those
concerned of the import of the single
sub2ect$
Purposes of re.uirement (on * sub2ect"
Principal purposeD to apprise the legislators of the
ob2ect, nature, and scope of the pro!ision of the
bill and to pre!ent the enactment into law of
matters which ha!e not recei!ed the notice,
action and study of the legislators$
o 4o prohibit duplicity in legislation
In sum of the purpose
o 4o pre!ent hodgepodge= log3rolling
legislation
o 4o pre!ent surprise or fraud upon the
legislature
o 4o fairly apprise the people, through
publication of the sub2ects of the
legislation
o Fsed as a guide in ascertaining
legislati!e intent when the language of
the act does not clearly epress its
purposeH may clarify doubt or ambiguity$
@ow re.uirement construed
Liberally construed
If there is doubt, it should be resol!ed against the
doubt and in fa!or of the constitutionality of the
statute
Ghen there is compliance with re.uirement
&omprehensi!e enough 3 Include general ob2ect
If all parts of the law are related, and are
germane to the sub2ect matter epressed in the
title
4itle is !alid where it indicates in broad but clear
terms, the nature, scope and conse.uences of
the law and its operations
4itle should not be a catalogue or inde of the bill
Principles apply to titles of amendatory acts$
o Enough if it states Ban act to amend a
specific statuteC
5eed not state the precise nature of the
amendatory act$
F% Legislators ha!e titles ending with the words
Band for other purposesC ( F% is not sub2ect to the
same &onstitutional restriction as that embodied
in the Philippine &onstitution"
Ghen re.uirement not applicable
Apply only to bills which may thereafter be
enacted into law
Does not apply to laws in force and eisting at the
time the *+-7 &onstitution too1 effect$
5o application to municipal or city ordinances$
Effect of insufficiency of title
%tatute is null and !oid
Ghere, the sub2ect matter of a statute is not
sufficiently epressed in its title, only so much of
the sub2ect matter as is not epressed therein is
!oid, lea!ing the rest in force, unless the in!alid
pro!isions are inseparable from the others, in
which case the nullity the former !itiates the latter
Enacting clause
Gritten immediately after the title
%tates the authority by which the act is enacted

I* 3 Phil &ommission 0 B 'y authority of the

President of the F%, be it enacted by the F%
Philippine &ommissionC
I: 3 Philippine Legislature3 B by authority of the
F%, be it enacted by the Philippine LegislatureC
I- 3 Ghen I: became bicameralD B'e it enacted
by the %enate and @ouse of Representati!es of
the Philippines in legislature assembled and by
authority of the sameC
I9 3 &ommonwealth3 B'e it enacted by the
5ational Assembly of the Philippines
I7 0 when I9 became bicameralD Bbe it enacted
by the %enate and @ouse of Representati!es in
congress assembledC 0 same *+983*+,:=*+;,3
present$
I8 0 'atasang PambansaD B'e it enacted by the
'atasang Pambansa in session assembledC
I, 0 PD B 5OG 4@ERE/ORE, I JJJJJJ
President of the Philippines, by the powers !ested
in me by the &onstitution do hereby decree as
followsC
I; 0 EO B5ow, therefore, I, JJJJ hereby orderC
Preamble
Defined 0 prefatory statement or eplanation or a
finding of facts, reciting the purpose, reason, or
occasion for ma1ing the law to which it is
prefiedC
/ound after enacting clause and before the body
of the law$
Fsually not used by legislations because content
of the preamble is written in the eplanatory note$
'ut PDs and EOs ha!e preambles$
Pur!iew of statute
that part which tells what the law is about
body of statute should embrace only one sub2ect
should only one sub2ect matter, e!en there
pro!isions should be allied and germane to the
sub2ect and purpose of the bill$
%tatue is usually di!ided into section$ w=c contains
a single proposition$
Parts
o short title
o policy section
o definition section
o administrati!e section
o sections prescribing standards of conduct
o sections imposing sanctions for !iolation
of its pro!isions
o transitory pro!ision
o separability clause
o effecti!ity clause
%eparability clause
it states that if any pro!ision of the act is declared
in!alid, the remainder shall not be affected
thereby$
It is not controlling and the courts may in!alidate
the whole statute where what is left, after the !oid
part, is not complete and wor1able
Presumption 0 statute is effecti!e as a whole
its effectD to create in the place of such
presumption the opposite of separability$
PRESIDENTIAL ISSUANCES, RULES AND
ORDINANCES
Presidential issuances
are those which the president issues in the
eercise of ordinance power$
i$e$ EO, AO (administrati!e orders",
proclamations, )O (memorandum orders", )&
(memorandum circulars", and general or special
orders$
@a!e force and effect of laws$
EO
o acts of the President pro!iding for rules of
a general or permanent character in the
implementation or eecution of
constitutional= statutory powers$
o do not ha!e the force and effect of laws
enacted by congress
o different from EO issued by the President
in the e of her legislati!e power during
the re!olution Presidential decree under
the freedom constitution
AO
o acts of the President which relate to
particular aspects of go!ernmental
operations in pursuance of his duties as
administrati!e head
Proclamations
o acts of the President fiing a date or
declaring a statute or condition of public
moment or interest, upon the eistence of
which the operation of a specific law or
regulation is made to depend
)O
o acts of the President on matters of
administrati!e details or of subordinate or
temporary interest which only concern a
particular officer or office of go!ernment
)&
o acts of the president on matters relating
to internal administration which the
President desires to bring to the attention
of all or some of the departments,
agencies, bureaus, or offices of the
go!ernment, for information of
compliance
Keneral or %pecific Order
o Acts and commands of the President in
his capacity as &ommander3in3&hief of
the A/P
%upreme &ourt circularsH rules and regulations
%ee Art ;, %ec$ 7(7" *+;, &onstitution
%ee Art$ 8, %ec$ -6 *+;, &onstitution
It has been held that a law which pro!ides that a
decision of a .uasi32udicial body be appealable
directly to the %&, if enacted without the ad!ice
and concurrence of the %&, ineffecti!e
o Remedy or applicable procedure 0 go to
&A
Rules of &ourt 0 product of the rule3ma1ing power
of the %&
o Power to repeal procedural rules
o 5o power to promulgate rules substanti!e
in nature (unli1e the legislati!e
department"
%ubstanti!e rules 0 if it affects or ta1es away
!ested rightsH right to appeal
Procedural rules 0 means of implementing
eisting rightH where to file an appeal for
transferring the !enue
Rules and regulations issued by the
administrati!e or eecuti!e officers in accordance
with and authoriAed by law, ha!e the force and
effect of law
o Re.uisites for !alidity
Rules should be germane to the
ob2ects and purposes of the law
Regulations be not in
contradiction with, but conform
to, the standards that the law
prescribes
4he be for the sole purpose of
carrying into effect the general
pro!isions of the law
o Law cannot be restricted or etended
o Law pre!ails o!er regulations, if there are
discrepancies
Rule3ma1ing power of public administrati!e
agency is a delegated legislati!e power 0 if it
enlarges or restricts such statute is in!alid
Re.uisites for delegating a statute by legislati!e
branch to another branch of go!ernment to fill in
details, eecution, enforcement, or administration
of lawL$ the law must beD
o &omplete in itself
o /i a standard which may be epress or
implied
Eample of BstandardC 0
simplicity and dignityH public
interestH public welfareH interest of
law and orderH 2ustice and e.uity
and substantial merit of the caseH
ade.uate and efficient instruction
EampleD
o &hange of Band=orC to BorC 0 in!alid
o &hange of BmayC(permissi!e" to BshallC
(mandatory" 0 in!alid (Krego !
&O)ELE& pp ::"
Administrati!e rule and interpretation distinguished
Rule 0 Bma1esC new law with the force and effect
of a !alid lawH binding on the courts e!en if they
are not in agreement with the policy stated therein
or with its innate wisdom
Interpretation 0 merely ad!isory for it is the courts
that finally determine what the law means
Administrati!e construction is not necessarily
binding upon the courtsH it may be set aside by
2udicial department (if there is an error of law, or
abuse of power or lac1 of 2urisdiction or KAD 0
gra!e abuse of discretion"
'arangay ordinance
%angguniang barangay 0 smallest legislati!e
bodyH may pass an ordinance by ma2ority of all its
membersH sub2ect to re!iew by %angguniang
bayan= panglungsod
%angguniang bayan= panglungsod 0 ta1e action
on the ordinance within -6 days from submissionH
if there(s inaction, it is presumed to be consistent
with the municipal or city ordinanceH if
inconsistency is found, it will remand to the
%angguniang barangay
)unicipal ordinance
Lodged in the %angguniang bayan
)a2ority of the .uorum !oting, ordinance is
passed
Ordinance sent to )ayor within *6 days for
appro!al or !etoH if there(s mayor(s inaction,
ordinance is presumed appro!edH if !etoed and
o!erridden by :=- of all members, ordinance is
appro!ed
Appro!ed ordinance is passed to %angguniang
panlalawigan for re!iew
o Githin -6 days may in!alidate in whole or
in part and its action is finalH if there(s
inaction within -6 days, it is deemed !alid
&ity ordinance
>ested in %angguniang panglungsod
)a2ority of the .uorum !oting, ordinance is
passed
%ubmitted to )ayor within *6 days
o Appro!e
o >eto 0 :=- of all members 0 appro!ed
o Inaction 0 deemed appro!ed
If city or component city 0 submit to %angguniang
panlalawigan for re!iew which shall ta1e action
within -6 days, otherwise, it will be deemed !alid
Pro!incial ordinance
%angguniang panlalawigan 0 ma2ority of .uorum
!oting, passage of ordinance
/orwarded to the Ko!ernor who within *7 days
from receipt shall
o Appro!e
o >eto 0 :=- of all members 0 appro!ed
o Inaction 0 deemed appro!ed
VALIDITY
Presumption of constitutionality
E!ery statute is presumed !alid
o Lies on how a law is enacted
o Due respect to the legislati!e who passed
and eecuti!e who appro!ed
o Responsibility of upholding the
constitution rests not on the courts alone
but on the legislati!e and eecuti!e
branches as well
&ourts cannot in.uire into the wisdom or propriety
of laws
4o declare a law unconstitutional, the repugnancy
of the law to the constitution must be clear and
une.ui!ocal
All reasonable doubts should be resol!ed in fa!or
of the constitutionality of lawH to doubt is to
sustain
/inal arbiter of unconstitutionality of law is the
%upreme &ourt E5 'A5& (ma2ority who too1 part
and !oted thereon"
5onetheless, trial courts ha!e 2urisdiction to
initially decide the issue of constitutionality of a
law in appropriate cases
Re.uisites for eercise of 2udicial power
4he eistence of an appropriate case
Interest personal and substantial by the party
raising the constitutional .uestion
Plea that the function be eercised at the earliest
opportunity
5ecessity that the constitutional .uestion be
passed upon in order to decide the case
Appropriate case
'ona fide case 0 one which raises a 2usticiable
contro!ersy
#udicial power is limited only to real, actual,
earnest, and !ital contro!ersy
&ontro!ersy is 2usticiable when it refers to matter
which is appropriate for court re!iewH pertains to
issues which are inherently susceptible of being
decided on grounds recogniAed by law
&ourts cannot rule on Bpolitical .uestionsC 0
.uestions which are concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom (!$ legality" of a
particular act or measure being assailed
o Bseparation of powersC
o @owe!er, &onstitution epands the
concept of 2udicial re!iew 0 2udicial power
includes the duty of the courts of 2ustice
to settle actual contro!ersies in!ol!ing
rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or
not there has been KAD amounting to
lac1 or ecess of 2urisdiction on the
branch or the part of any branch=
instrumentality of the Ko!ernment
%tanding to sue
Legal standing or locus standi 0 personal=
substantial interest in the case such that the party
has sustained or will sustain direct in2ury as a
result of go!ernmental act that is being
challenged
BinterestC 0 an interest in issue affected by the
decree
&itiAen 0 ac.uires standing only if he can
establish that he has suffered some actual or
threatened concrete in2ury as a result of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the go!ernment
o E$g$ tapayer 0 when it is shown that
public funds ha!e been illegally disbursed
)ember of the %enate or of the @ouse has legal
standing to .uestion the !alidity of the
Presidential !eto or a condition imposed on an
item in an appropriations bills
%& may, in its discretion, ta1e cogniAance of a
suit which does not satisfy the re.uirement of
legal standing
o E$g$ calling by the President for the
deployment of the Philippine )arines to
2oin the P5P in !isibility patrols around
the metro
Ghen to raise constitutionality
at the earliest possible opportunity 0 i$e$ in the
pleading
it may be raised in a motion for reconsideration =
new trial in the lower courtH or
in criminal cases 0 at any stage of the
proceedings or on appeal
in ci!il cases, where it appears clearly that a
determination of the .uestion is necessary to a
decision, and in cases where it in!ol!es the
2urisdiction of the court below
5ecessity of deciding constitutionality
where the constitutional .uestion is of paramount
public interest and time is of the essence in the
resolution of such .uestion, adherence to the
strict procedural standard may be relaed and the
court, in its discretion, may s.uarely decide the
case
where the .uestion of !alidity, though apparently
has become moot, has become of paramount
interest and there is undeniable necessity for a
ruling, strong reasons of public policy may
demand that its constitutionality be resol!ed
4est of constitutionality
L is what the &onstitution pro!ides in relation to
what can or may be done under the statute, and
not by what it has been done under it$
o If not within the legislati!e power to enact
o If !ague 0 unconstitutional in : respects
>iolates due process
Lea!es law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its
pro!isions
o Ghere there(s a change of circumstances
0 i$e$ emergency laws
Ordinances (test of !alidity are"D
o It must not contra!ene the &onstitution or
any statute
o It must not be unfair or oppressi!e
o It must not be partial or discriminatory
o It must not prohibit but may regulate trade
o It must be general and consistent with
public policy
o It must not be unreasonable
Effects of unconstitutionality
It confers no rights
Imposes no duties
Affords no protection
&reates no office
In general, inoperati!e as if it had ne!er been
passed
: !iewsD
o Orthodo !iew 0 unconstitutional act is
not a lawH decision affect ALL
o )odern !iew 0 less stringentH the court in
passing upon the .uestion of
unconstitutionality does not annul or
repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict
with the &onstitutionH decisions affects
parties O5LM and no 2udgment against
the statuteH opinion of court may operate
as a precedentH it does not repeal,
supersede, re!o1e, or annul the statute
In!alidity due to change of conditions
Emergency laws
It is deemed !alid at the time of its enactment as
an eercise of police power
It becomes in!alid only because the change of
conditions ma1es its continued operation !iolati!e
of the &onstitution, and accordingly, the
declaration of its nullity should only affect the
parties in!ol!ed in the case and its effects applied
prospecti!ely
Partial in!alidity
Keneral ruleD that where part of a statute is !oid
as repugnant to the &onstitution, while another
part is !alid, the !alid portion, if separable from
the in!alid, may stand and be enforced
Eception 0 that when parts of a statute are so
mutually dependent and connected, as
conditions, considerations, inducements, or
compensations for each other, as to warrant a
belief that the legislature intended them as a
whole, the nullity of one part will !itiate the rest 0
such as in the case of Tatad v Sec of Department
of Energy and Antonio v. COMELEC
EFFECT AND OPERATION
Ghen laws ta1e effect
Art : && 3 B laws to be effecti!e must be
published either in the Official KaAette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the countryC
o 4he effecti!ity pro!ision refers to all
statutes, including those local and
pri!ate, unless there are special laws
pro!iding a different effecti!ity
mechanism for particular statutes
%ec *; &hapter 7 'oo1 * of Administrati!e &ode
Effecti!ity of laws
o default rule 0 *73day period
o must be published either in the OK or
newspaper of general circulation in the
countryH publication must be full
4he clause Bunless it is otherwise pro!idedC 0
solely refers to the *73day period and not to the
re.uirement of publication
Ghen Presidential issuances, rules and regulations ta1e
effect
4he President(s ordinance power includes the
authority to issue EO, AO, Proclamations, )O,
)& and general or specific orders
Re.uirement of publication applies ecept if it is
merely interpretati!e or internal in nature not
concerning the public
: typesD
o 4hose whose purpose is to enforce or
implement eisting law pursuant to a !alid
delegation or to fill in the details of a
statuteH re.uires publication
o 4hose which are merely interpretati!e in
nature or internalH does not re.uire
publication
Re.uirements of filing (*+;, Administrati!e
&ode"D
o E!ery agency shall file with the FP Law
&enter - certified copies of e!ery rule
adopted by it$ Rules in force on the date
of effecti!ity of this &ode which are not
filed within - months from that date shall
not thereafter be the basis of any
sanction against any party= persons
Ghen local ordinance ta1es effect
Fnless otherwise stated, the same shall ta1e
effect *6 days from the date a copy is posted in a
bulletin board at the entrance of the pro!incial
capitol or city, municipality or barangay hall, A5D
in at least : other conspicuous places in the local
go!ernment unit concerned
4he secretary to the %angguinian concerned shall
cause the posting not later than 7 days after
appro!alH tet will be disseminated in English or
4agalogH the secretary to the %angguinian
concerned shall record such fact in a boo1 1ept
for that purpose, stating the dates of appro!al and
posting
Kist of ordinance with penal sanctions shall be
published in a newspaper of general circulation
within the respecti!e pro!ince concernedH if 5O
newspaper of general circulation in the pro!ince,
PO%4I5K shall be made in all municipalities and
cities of the pro!ince where the %anggunian of
origin is situated
/or highly urbaniAed and independent component
cities, main features of the ordinance, in addition
to the posting re.uirement shall be published
once in a local newspaper$ In the absence of
local newspaper, in any newspaper of general
circulation
o @ighly urbaniAed city 0 minimum
population of :66,666 and with latest
annual income of at least 76) Php
%tatutes continue in force until repealed
Permanent= indefinite 0 law once established
continues until changed by competent legislati!e
power$ It is not changed by the change of
so!ereignty, ecept that of political nature
4emporary 0 in force only for a limited period, and
they terminate upon epiration of the term stated
or upon occurrence of certain e!entsH no
repealing statute is needed
4erritorial and personal effect of statutes
All people within the 2urisdiction of the Philippines
)anner of computing time
%ee Art$ *- &&
Ghere a statute re.uires the doing of an act
within a specified number of days, such as ten
days from notice, it means ten calendar days and
5O4 ten wor1ing days
E$g$ * year from Oct$ 9, *+98 is Oct$ 9, *+9,
If last day falls on a %unday or holiday, the act
can still be done the following day
Principle of Beclude the first, include the lastC
DOE% 5O4 APPLM to the computation of the
period of prescription of a crime, in which rule, is
that if the last day in the period of prescription of a
felony falls on a %unday or legal holiday, the
information concerning said felony cannot be filed
on the net wor1ing day, as the offense has by
then already prescribed
CHAPTER TWO: Construt!on an" Inter#retat!on
NATURE AND PURPOSE
&onstruction defined
&onstruction is the art or process of disco!ering
and epounding the meaning and intention of the
authors of the law, where that intention rendered
doubtfully reason of ambiguity in its language or
of the fact that the gi!en case is not eplicitly
pro!ided for in the law$
&onstruction is drawing of warranted conclusions
beyond direct epression of the tet epressions
which are in spirit though not within the tet$
ine!itably, there enters into the construction of
statutes the play of #FDI&IAL #FDK)E54 within
the limits of the rele!ant legislati!e materials
it in!ol!es the EEER&I%E O/ &@OI&E 'M 4@E
#FDI&IARM
&onstruction and interpretation distinguished
4hey are so ali1e in practical results and so are
used interchangeablyH synonymous$
&onstruction Interpretation
3 process of drawing
warranted conclusions
not always included in
direct epressions, or
determining the
application of words to
facts in litigation
3 art of finding the true
meaning and sense of
any form of words
Rules of construction, generally
Rules of statutory construction are tools used to
ascertain legislati!e intent$
5O4 rules of law but mere aioms of eperience
In enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed
to 1now the rules of statutory construction, in
case of doubt, be construed in accordance with
the settled principles of interpretation$
Legislature sometimes adopts rules of statutory
construction as part of the pro!isions of the
statuteD 3 see eamples page 9+376
Legislature also defines to ascertain the meaning
of !ague, broad words= terms
Purpose of ob2ect of construction
4he purpose is to ascertain and gi!e effect to the
intent of the law$
4he ob2ect of all 2udicial interpretation of a statute
is to determine legislati!e intent, either epressly
or impliedly, by the language usedH to determine
the meaning and will of the law ma1ing body and
disco!er its true interpretations of law$
Legislati!e intent, generally
L is the essence of the law
Intent is the spirit which gi!es life to legislati!e
enactment$ It must be enforced when
ascertained, although it may not be consistent
with the strict letter of the statute$ It has been
held, howe!er, that that the ascertainment of
legislati!e intent depend more on a determination
of the purpose and ob2ect of the law$
Intent is sometimes e.uated with the word Bspirit$C
Ghile the terms purpose, meaning, intent, and
spirit are oftentimes interchangeably used by the
courts, not entirely synonymous
Legislati!e purpose
A legislati!e purpose is the reason why a
particular statute was enacted by legislature$
Legislation Bis an acti!e instrument and
go!ernment which, for the purpose of
interpretation means that laws ha!e ends to be
achie!edC
Legislati!e meaning
Legislati!e meaning is what the law, by its
language, means$
Ghat it comprehendsH
Ghat it co!ers or embracesH
Ghat its limits or confines are$
Intent and )eaning 0 synonymous
If there is ambiguity in the language used in a
statute, its purpose may indicate the meaning of
the language and lead to what the legislati!e
intent is
Kraphical illustration 0
Federation of Free Farmers v CA.
RA 5o$ ;6+ %ec$ * 0 BIn absence of a written
milling agreements between the ma2ority of the
planters and the millers, the unrefined sugar as
well as all by3products shall be di!ided between
themC
RA ;6+ %ec$ + 0 B4he proceeds of any increase in
participation granted by the planters under this
act and abo!e their present share shall be di!ided
between the planter and his laborer in the
proportion of 86N laborer and 96N planterC
4o gi!e literal import in interpreting the two
section will defeat the purpose of the Act
4he purposeD
o &ontinuous production of sugar
o 4o grant the laborers a share in the
increased participation of planters in the
sugar produce
4he legislati!e intent is, thus to ma1e the act
operati!e irrespecti!e of whether there eists a
milling agreement between central and the sugar
planters$
)atters in.uired into in construing a statute
BIt is not enough to ascertain the intention of the
statuteH it is also necessary to see whether the
intention or meaning has been epressed in such
a way as to gi!e it legal effect or !alidityC
4husD 4he ob2ect of in.uiry is not only to 1now
what the legislature used sufficiently epresses
that meaning$ 4he legal act is made up of :
elementsD
o internal 0 intention
o eternal3 epression
/ailure of the latter may defeat the former
Ghere legislati!e intent is ascertained
4he primary source of legislati!e intent is the
statute itself$
If the statute as a whole fails to indicate the
legislati!e intent because of ambiguity, the court
may loo1 beyond the statute such asD
o Legislati!e history 0 what was in the
legislati!e mind at the time the statute
was enactedH what the circumstances
wereH what e!il was meant to be
redressed
o Purpose of the statute 0 the reason or
cause which induced the enactment of
the law, the mischief to be suppressed,
and the policy which dictated its passage
o when all these means fail, loo1 into the
effect of the law$
If the -
rd
means (effect of the law"
is first used, it will be 2udicial
legislation
POWER TO CONSTRUE
&onstruction is a 2udicial function
It is the court that has the final word as to what
the law means$
It construes laws as it decide cases based on fact
and the law in!ol!ed
Laws are interpreted in the contet of a peculiar
factual situation of each case
&ircumstances of time, place, e!ent, person and
particularly attendant circumstances and actions
before, during and after the operati!e fact ha!e
ta1en their totality so that 2ustice can be rationally
and fairly dispensed$
)oot and academic 0
o Purpose has become stale
o 5o practical relief can be granted
o Relief has no practical effect
Keneral rule (on mootness" 0 dismiss the case
o EceptionD
If capable of repetition, yet
e!ading re!iew
Public interest re.uires its
resolution
Rendering decision on the merits
would be of practical !alue
Legislati!e cannot o!errule 2udicial construction
It cannot preclude the courts from gi!ing the
statute different interpretation
Legislati!e 0 enact laws
Eecuti!e3 to eecute laws
#udicial3 interpretation and application
If the legislature may declare what a law means 0
it will cause confusionLit will be !iolati!e of the
fundamental principles of the constitution of
separation powers$
Legislati!e construction is called resolution or
declaratory act
Endencia v David
Eplains why legislati!e cannot o!errule %upreme
&ourt(s decision
Perfecto v. Meer
Art$ ; %ec$ + *+-7 &onstitution 0 %&(s
interpretationD Bshall recei!e such compensation
as may be fied by law, which shall not be
diminished during their continuance in officeC 0
eempt from income ta
Legislati!e passed RA 7+6 %ec$ *- 0 Bno salary
whene!er recei!ed by any public officer of the
Republic shall be considered eempt from the
income ta, payment of which is hereby declared
not to be a diminution of his compensation fied
by the &onstitution or by lawC
%ource of confusion
>iolati!e of principle on separation of powers
RA 7+6 %ec *- 0 unconstitutional
Art ; %ec$ + *+-7 0 repealed by Art$ *7 %ec$ 8
*+,- &onstitution 0 Bno salary or any form of
emolument of any public officer or employee,
including constitutional officers, shall be eempt
from payment of income taC
4hus, 2udiciary is not eempt from payment of ta
anymore
Ghen 2udicial interpretation may be set aside
BInterpretations may be set aside$C 4he
interpretation of a statute or a constitutional
pro!ision by the courts is not so sacrosanct as to
be beyond modification or nullification$
4he %upreme &ourt itself may, in an appropriate
case change or o!errule its pre!ious construction$
4he rule that the %upreme &ourt has the final
word in the interpretation or construction of a
stature merely means that the legislature cannot,
by law or resolution, modify or annul the 2udicial
construction without modifying or repealing the
!ery statute which has been the sub2ect of
construction$ It can, and it has done so, by
amending or repealing the statute, the
conse.uence of which is that the pre!ious 2udicial
construction of the statute is modified or set aside
accordingly$
Ghen court may construe statute
B4he court may construe or interpret a statute
under the condition that 4@ERE I% DOF'4 OR
A)'IKFI4MC
Ambiguity 0 a condition of admitting : or more
meanings$ %usceptible of more than one
interpretation$
Only when the law is ambiguous or doubtful of
meaning may the court interpret or construe its
intent$
&ourt may not construe where statute is clear
A statute that is clear and unambiguous is not
susceptible of interpretations$
/irst and fundamental duty of court 0 to apply the
law
&onstruction 0 !ery last function which the court
should eercise
Law is clear 0 no room for interpretation, only
room for application
&ourts cannot enlarge or limit the law if it is clear
and free from ambiguity (e!en if law is harsh or
onerous
A meaning that does not appear nor is intended
or reflected in the !ery language of the statute
cannot be placed therein by construction
Manikan v. Tanodbayan
%ec$ , PD *,*83A 0 Bsole police authorityC of
EPOA officials may not be construed as an
eception to, or limitation on, the authority of the
4anodbayan to in!estigate complaints for !iolation
of the anti3graft law committed by the EPOA
officials
EPOA(s power 0 not eclusi!eH BsoleC refers to
police authority not emplyed to describe other
power
Lapid v. CA
IssueD whether or not the decision of the
Ombudsman imposing a penalty of suspension of
one year without pay is immediately eecutory
Administrati!e &ode and LK& 0 not suppletory to
Ombudsman Act
4hese three laws are related or deal with public
officers, but are totally different statutes
An administrati!e agency tas1ed to implement a
statute may not construe it by epanding its
meaning where its pro!isions are clear and
unambiguous
Land ank v. CA
DAR interpreted BdepositsC to include trust
accountsC
%& held that BdepositsC is limited only to cash and
L'P bonds
Libanan v. !"ET
IssueD whether ballots not signed at the bac1 by
the chairman of the 'oard of Election Inspectors
('EI" are spurious, since it !iolated %ec$ :9 RA
,*88
@eldD not spuriousH only renders the 'EI
accountable
Rulings of %upreme &ourt part of legal system
Art$ ; && 0 B#udicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the &onstitution shall form
part of the legal system of the PhilippinesC
Legis interpretato #egis vim obtinet 0 authoritati!e
interpretation of the %& of a statute ac.uires the
force of law by becoming a part thereof as of the
date of its enactment , since the court(s
interpretation merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislati!e intent that the
statute thus construed intends to effectuate
Stare decisis et non $%ieta novere & when the %&
has once laid down a principle of law as
applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere
to that principle and apply it to all future casese
where the facts are substantially the same
o /or stability and certainty
%upreme &ourt becomes, to the etent
applicable, the criteria that must control the
actuations not only of those called upon to abide
thereby but also of those duty3bound to enforce
obedience thereto$
%& rulings are binding on inferior courts
#udicial rulings ha!e no retroacti!e effect
Le prospicit not respicit 3 the law loo1s forward,
not bac1ward
RationaleD Retroacti!e application of a law usually
di!est rights that ha!e already become !ested or
impairs he obligations of contract and hence is
unconstitutional$
Peo !$ #abinal
Peo ! )acarandang 0 peace officer eempted
from issuance of license of firearms 0 included a
secret agent hired by a go!ernor
Peo$ !$ )apa 0 abandoned doctrine of
)acarandang in *+8,
4he present case, #abinal was arraigned while
the )acarandang Doctrine was still pre!ailing,
howe!er, the decision was promulgated when the
)apa doctrine was in place
4he &ourt held that #abinal is ac.uitted using
stare decisis doctrine and retroacti!ity doctrine
Co. v. CA
On 'P ::, &o is ac.uitted in relying on the
&ircular issuedH Pue doctrine, which con!icted
Pue under 'P ::, was not gi!en retroacti!e
application
"oa v. Co##ector of C%stoms
Fsed 2us soli (place of birth"
%& fa!ored 2us sanguinis (by blood"
@owe!er, the abandonment of the principle of 2us
soli did not di!est the citiAenship of those who, by
!irtue of the principle before its re2ection, became
of were declared citiAens of the Philippines
en'onan v. CA
IssueD when to count the 73year period to
repurchase land granted &A *9*
)onge ! Angeles (*+7," and 4upas ! Damaso
(*+;9" 0 from the date of con!eyance or
foreclosure sale
'elisario !$ IA& (*+;;" 0 from the period after the
epiration of the *3year period of repurchase
4he %& held that the doctrine that should apply is
that which was enunciated in )onge and 4upas
because the transactions in!ol!ed too1 place
prior to 'elisario and not that which was laid
down in the latter case which should be applied
prospecti!ely
&ourt may issue guidelines in construing statute
In construing a statute, the enforcement of which
may tread on sensiti!e areas of constitutional
rights, the court may issue guidelines in applying
the statute, not to enlarge or restrict it but to
clearly delineate what the law is$
Peo. v. Ferrer
Ghat acts that may be considered liable under
the Anti3%ub!ersion Act
Mora#es v. Enri#e
Rights of a person under custodial in!estigation
"P v. CA( Mo#ina
Kuidelines for ascertaining psychological
incapacity of an erring spouse in a !oid marriage
under Art$ -8 /&
LIMITATIONS ON POWER TO CONSTRUE
&ourts may not enlarge nor restrict statutes
&ourts are not authoriAed to insert into the law
what they thin1 should be in it or to supply what
they the legislature would ha!e supplied if its
intention had been called to the omission$
4hey should not by construction, re!ise e!en the
most arbitrary or unfair action of the legislature,
nor rewrite the law to conform to what they thin1
should be the law$
5either should the courts construe statutes which
are perfectly !ague for it !iolates due process
o /ailure to accord persons fair notice of
the conduct to a!oid
o Lea!e law enforcers unbridled discretion
in carrying out its pro!isions
: leading stars on 2udicial construction
o Kood faith
o commonsense
an utterly !ague act on its face cannot be clarified
by either a sa!ing clause or by construction
&ourts not to be influenced by .uestions of wisdom
&ourts do not sit to resol!e the merit of conflicting
theories
&ourts do not pass upon .uestion of wisdom,
2ustice or epediency of legislation, for it(s not
within their pro!ince to super!ise legislation and
1eep it within the bounds of common sense$
4he court merely interpret regardless of whether
or not they wise or salutary$
CHAPTER THREE: A!"s to Construt!on
IN GENERAL
Kenerally
Ghere the meaning of a statue is ambiguous, the
court is warranted in a!ailing itself of all
illegitimate aids to construction in order that it can
ascertain the true intent of the statute$
4he aids to construction are those found in the
printed page of the statute itselfH 1now as the
intrinsic aids, and those etraneous facts and
circumstances outside the printed page, called
e)trinsic aids$
4itle
It is used as an aid, in case of doubt in its
language to its construction and to ascertaining
legislati!e will$
If the meaning of the statute is obscure, courts
may resort to the title to clear the obscurity$
4he title may indicate the legislati!e intent to
etend or restrict the scope of law, and a statute
couched in a language of doubtful import will be
constructed to conform to the legislati!e intent as
disclosed in its title$
Resorted as an aid where there is doubt as to the
meaning of the law or as to the intention of the
legislature in enacting it, and not otherwise$
%er!e as a guide to ascertaining legislati!e intent
carries more weight in this 2urisdiction because of
the constitutional re.uirement that Be!ery bill shall
embrace only one sub2ect who shall be epressed
in the title thereof$
4he constitutional in2unction ma1es the title an
indispensable part of a statute$
ag%io v. Marcos
4he .uestion raised is when to count the 96 yr
period to file a petition for reopening of cadastral
proceedings (to settle and ad2udicate the titles to
the !arious lots embraced in the sur!ey" as
authoriAed by RA +-* co!ering the lands that
ha!e been or about to be declared land of public
domain, by !irtue of 2udicial proceedings instituted
w=in the 96 years net preceding the appro!al of
this act$
4he .uestion is as1ed if the proceeding be
reopened originally instituted in court April *:,
*+*: or 5o!ember :7, *+::, the counted date
form which the decision therein rendered became
final$ Petition was filed on #uly :7, *+8*
4itle of the Law BAn Act to authoriAe the filing in
the proper court under certain conditions of
certain claims of title to parcels of land that ha!e
been declared public land, by !irtue of the
appro!al of this act$C
4here was an apparent inconsistency between
the title and body of the law$
It ruled that the starting date to count the period is
the date the final decision was rendered$
It recites that it authoriAes court proceedings of
claims to parcels of land declared public by !irtue
of 2udicial decisions rendered within forty years
net preceding the appro!al of this act$
4hat title written in capital letters by &ongress
itselfH such 1ind of title then is not to be classed
with words or titles used by compilers of statues
because it is the legislature spea1ing$
Gords by !irtue of 2udicial decisions rendered in
the title of the law stand in e.ual importance to
the phrase in %ections * thereof by !irtue of
2udicial proceedings instituted$
4he court ruled that eamining Act no$ :;,9 in
detail was intended to apply to public lands only
for the title of the act, always indicati!e of
legislati!e intent$
5o bill shall embrace more than one sub2ect,
which sub2ect shall be epressed in the title of the
bill, the words and for other purposes( when found
in the title ha!e been held to be without force or
effect whatsoe!er and ha!e been altogether
discarded in construing the Act$
Ebar#e v. S%ca#dito
4he issue is raised whether Eecuti!e order no$
:89 entitled B Outlining the procedure by which
complaints charging go!ernment officials and
employees with commission of irregularities
should be guidedC applies to criminal actions, to
the end that no preliminary in!estigation thereof
can be underta1en or information file in court
unless there is pre!ious compliance with the
eecuti!e order$
EO only applies to administrati!e and not to
criminal complaints$
4he !ery title spea1s of commission of
irregularities$
Ghen resort to title not authoriAed
4he tet of the statute is clear and free from
doubt, it is improper to resort to its title to ma1e it
obscure$
4he title may be resorted to in order to remo!e,
but not to create doubt$
Preamble
It is a part of the statute written immediately after
its title, which states the purpose, reason for the
enactment of the law$
Fsually epress in whereas clauses$
Kenerally omitted in statutes passed byD
Phil$ &ommission
Phil$ Legislature
5ational Assembly
&ongress of the Phil
'atasang Pambansa
4hese legislati!e bodies used the eplanatory
note to eplain the reasons for the enactment of
statutes$
Etensi!ely used if Presidential decrees issued by
the President in the eercise of his legislati!e
power$
Ghen the meaning of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, the preamble can neither epand
nor restrict its operation, much less pre!ail o!er
its tet$ 5or can be used as basis for gi!ing a
statute a meaning$
Ghen the statute is ambiguous, the preamble can
be resorted to clarify the ambiguity$
Preamble is the 1ey of the statute, to open the
minds of the lawma1ers as to the purpose is
achie!ed, the mischief to be remedied, and the
ob2ect to be accomplished, by the pro!isions of
the legislature$
)ay decide the proper construction to be gi!en to
the statute$
)ay restrict to what otherwise appears to be a
broad scope of law$
It may epress the legislati!e intent to ma1e the
law apply retroacti!ely in which case the law has
to be gi!en retroacti!e effect$
Illustration of rule
Peop#e v. P%risima
A person was charged w= !iolation of PD + which
penaliAes, among others, the carrying outside of
one(s residence any bladed, blunt or pointed
weapon not used as a necessary tool or
implement for li!elihood, with imprisonment
ranging from fi!e to ten years$
Puestion rose whether the carrying of such
weapon should be in relation to sub!ersion,
rebellion, insurrection, lawless !iolence,
criminality, chaos or public disorder as a
necessary element of the crime$
4he mere carrying of such weapon outside one(s
residence is sufficient to constitute a !iolation of
the law
Pursuant to the preamble which spelled out the
e!ents that led to the enactment of the decree the
clear intent and spirit of the decree is to re.uire
the moti!ation mentioned in the preamble as in
indispensable element of the crime$
4he se!erity of the penalty for the !iolation of the
decree suggests that it is a serious offense, which
may only be 2ustified by associating the carrying
out of such bladed of blunt weapon with any of
the purposes stated in its preamble$
Peo v. Ec*ave'
IssueD whether a person who s.uatted on a
pastoral land could be held criminally liable for the
!iolation of PD ,,: Bany person who, with the use
of force, intimidation or threat, or ta1ing
ad!antage of the absence or tolerance of the land
owner, succeeds in occupying or possessing the
property of the latter against his will for
residential, commercial or any other purposes$
4he decree was promulgated to sol!e the
s.uatting problem which according to its
preamble is still a ma2or problem in urban
communities all o!er the country and because
many persons and entities found to ha!e been
unlawfully occupying public and pri!ate lands
belong to the affluent class$
4he court said that crime may only be committed
in urban communities and not in agricultural and
pastural lands because the preamble of the
decree shows that it was intended to apply for
s.uatting in urban lands, more particularly to
illegal constructions$
&ontet of whole tet
4o ascertain legislati!e intent is the statute itself
ta1en as a whole and in relation to one another
considering the whole contet of the statute and
not from an isolated part of the pro!ision$
4he meaning dictated by the contet pre!ails$
E!ery section, pro!ision, or clause of the statute
must be epounded by reference to each other in
order to arri!e at the effect contemplated by the
legislature$
Punctuation mar1s
%emi3 colon 0 used to indicate a separation in the
relation of the thought, what follows must ha!e a
relation to the same matter it precedes it$
&omma and semi3 colon are use for the same
purpose to di!ide sentences, but the semi 0 colon
ma1es the di!ision a little more pronounce$ 'oth
are not used to introduce a new idea$
Punctuation mar1s are aids of low degree and
can ne!er control against the intelligible meaning
of written words$
An ambiguity of a statute which may be partially
or wholly sol!ed by a punctuation mar1 may be
considered in the construction of a statute$
4he .ualifying effect of a word or phrase may be
confined to its last antecedent if the latter is
separated by a comma from the other
antecedents$
An argument based on punctuation is not
persuasi!e$
Illustrati!e eamples
F#orentino v. P+
Bwho may be willing to accept the same for such
settlementC 0 this implies discretion
%& heldD only the last antecedent 0 Bany citiAen of
the Philippines or any association or corporation
organiAed under the laws of the PhilippinesC
pursuant to which bac1pay certificate3holders
can compel go!ernment3owned ban1s to accept
said certificates for payment of their obligations
subsisting at the time of the amendatory act was
appro!ed
+era v. ,arcia
Bif the charge against such subordinate or
employee in!ol!es dishonesty, oppression, or
gra!e misconduct or neglect in the performance
of his dutyC
BdishonestyC and BoppressionC 0 need not be
committed in the course of the performance of
duty by the person charges
Peo. v. S%bido
%ubsidiary imprisonment in case of insol!ency
.ualifies both non3payment of indemnity and non3
payment of fine
&apitaliAation of letters
An aid of low degree in the construction of
statute$
@eadnotes or epigraphs
%econdary aids
4hey are prefied to sections, or chapters of a
statute for ready reference or classification$
5ot entitled too much weight, and inferences
drawn there from are of little !alue and they can
ne!er control the plain terms of the enacting
clauses, for they are not part of the law$
4he pro!isions of each article are controlling upon
the sub2ect thereof and operate as a general rule
for settling such .uestions as are embraced
therein$
Ghen the tet of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, there is neither necessity nor
propriety to resort to the headings or epigraphs of
a section for interpretation of the tet, especially
when they are mere reference aids indicating the
general nature of the tet that follows$
Lingual tet
Rule is that, unless pro!ided, where a statute is
promulgated in English and %panish, English
shall go!ern but in case of ambiguity, %panish
may be consulted to eplain the English tet$
A statute is officially promulgated in %panish or in
English, or in /ilipino
BIn the interpretation of a law or administrati!e
issuance promulgated in all the official languages,
the English tet shall control, unless otherwise
pro!ided$
Intent or spirit of law
It is the law itself$
&ontrolling factor, leading star and guiding light in
the application and interpretation of a statute$
A statute must be according to its spirit or intent$
4he courts cannot assume an intent in no way
epressed and then construe the statute to
accomplish the supposed intentionH otherwise
they would pass beyond the bounds of 2udicial
power to usurp legislati!e power$
Policy of law
%hould be gi!en effect by the 2udiciary$
One way to accomplish this mandate is to gi!e a
statute of doubtful meaning, a construction that
will promote public policy$
Tinio v. Francis
Policy of the law 0 to conser!e the land of the
homesteader
not be sub2ect to encumbrance= alienation
from the date of the appro!al of the application
and for a term of 7 years from and after the date
of the issuance of the patent or grant
o from the ORDER for the issuance of
patent
o if literal interpretation is to be used, policy
will be defeated
Ca-i%at v. Mat*ay
policy 0 against double pensions for the same
ser!ices
a law which grants retirable employees certain
gratuity Bin addition to other benefits which they
are entitled under eisting lawsC &A55O4 be
construed as to authoriAe the grant of double
gratuity
Bother benefitsC may be
o Refund of contributions
o Payment of the money !alue of
accumulated !acation and sic1 lea!es
Purpose of law or mischief to be suppressed
Intended to be remo!ed or suppressed and the
causes which induced the enactment of the law
are important factors to be considered in this
construction$
o Purpose or ob2ect of the law
o )ischief intended to be remo!ed
o &auses which induced the enactment of
the law
)ust be read in such a way as to gi!e effect to
the purpose pro2ected in the statute$
4he purpose of the general rule is not
determinati!e of the proper construction to be
gi!en to the eceptions$
Purpose of statute is more important than the
rules of grammar and logic in ascertaining the
meaning
Dictionaries
A statute does not define word or phrases used$
Kenerally define words in their natural plain and
ordinary acceptance and significance$
&onse.uences of !arious constructions
In.uired as an additional aid to interpretation$
A construction of a statute should be re2ected that
will cause in2ustice and hardship, result in
absurdity, defeat legislati!e intent or spirit,
preclude accomplishment of legislati!e purpose
or ob2ect, render certain words or phrases a
surplusage, nullify the statute or ma1e any of its
pro!isions nugatory$
Presumptions
'ased on logic, eperience, and common sense,
and in the absence of compelling reasons to the
contrary, doubts as to the proper and correct
construction of a statute will be resol!ed in fa!or
of that construction which is in accord with the
presumption on the matter$
o &onstitutionality of a statute
o &ompleteness
o Prospecti!e operation
o Right and 2ustice
o Effecti!e, sensible, beneficial and
reasonable operation as a whole
o Against inconsistency and implied repeal
unnecessary changes in law
impossibility
absurdity
in2ustice and hardship
incon!enience
ineffecti!eness$
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Kenerally
A statute is susceptible of se!eral interpretations
or where there is ambiguity in the language, there
is no better means of ascertaining the will and
intention of the legislature than that which is
afforded by the history of the statute$
Ghat constitutes legislati!e history
@istory of a statute refers to all its antecedents
from its inception until its enactment into law$
Its history proper co!ers the period and the steps
done from the time the bill is introduced until it is
finally passed by the legislature$
Ghat it includesD
o President(s message if the bill is enacted
in response thereto,
o 4he eplanatory note accompanying the
bill
o &ommittee reports of legislati!e
in!estigations
o Public hearings on the sub2ect of the bill
o %ponsorship speech
o Debates and deliberations concerning the
bill
o Amendments and changes in
phraseology in which it undergoes before
final appro!al thereof$
o If the statute is based from a re!ision, a
prior statute, the latter(s practical
application and 2udicial construction,
o >arious amendments it underwent
o &ontemporary e!ents at the
President(s message to legislature
4he president shall address the congress at the
opening of its regular session or appear before it
at any other time$
Fsually contains proposed legal measures$
Indicates his thin1ing on the proposed legislation,
when enacted into law, follows his line of thin1ing
on the matter$
Eplanatory note
A short eposition of eplanation accompanying a
proposed legislation by its author or proponent$
Ghere there is ambiguity in a statute or where a
statute is susceptible of more than one
interpretation, courts may resort to the
eplanatory note to clarify the ambiguity and
ascertain the purpose or intent of the statute$
Fsed to gi!e effect to the purpose or intent as
disclosed in its eplanatory note$
A statute affected or changed an eisting law and
the eplanatory note to the bill which has
e!entually enacted into a law states that the
purpose is too simply to secure the prompt action
on a certain matter by the officer concerned and
not to change the eisting lawH the statute should
be construed to carry out such purpose$
It may be used as a basis for gi!ing a statute a
meaning that is inconsistent with what is
epressed in the tet of the statute$
Legislati!e debates, !iews and deliberations
&ourts may a!ail to themsel!es the actual
proceedings of the legislati!e body to assist in
determining the construction of a statute of
doubtful meaning$
4here is doubt to what a pro!ision of a statute
means, that meaning which was put to the
pro!ision during the legislati!e deliberation or
discussion on the bill may be adopted$
>iews epressed are as to the bill(s purpose,
meaning or effect are not controlling in the
interpretation of the law$
It is impossible to determine with authority what
construction was put upon an act by the members
of the legislati!e body that passed the bill$
4he opinions epressed by legislators in the
course of debates concerning the application of
eisting laws are not also gi!en decisi!e weight,
especially where the legislator was not a member
of the assembly that enacted the said laws$
Ghen a statute is clear and free from ambiguity,
courts will not in.uire into the moti!es which
influence the legislature or indi!idual members, in
!oting for its passageH no indeed as to the
intention of the draftsman, or the legislators, so
far as it has not been epressed into the act$
Reports of commissions
&ommissions are usually formed to compile and
collate all laws on a particular sub2ect and to
prepare the draft of the proposed code$
Prior laws from which statute is based
&ourts are permitted to prior laws on the same
sub2ect and to in!estigate the antecedents of the
statute in!ol!ed$
4his is applicable in the interpretation of codes,
re!ised or compiled statutes, for the prior law
which ha!e been codified, compiled or re!ised will
show the legislati!e history that will clarify the
intent of the law or shed light on the meaning and
scope of the codified or re!ised statute$
Peo. v. Manantan
IssueD whether or not 2ustice of peace is included
&ontention of )anantan, who is a 2ustice of
peace, is that the omission of B2ustice of peaceC
re!ealed the intention of the legislature to eclude
such from its operation
@eldD contention denied$ In holding that the word
B2udgeC includes B2ustice of peaceC, the &ourt said
that Ba re!iew of the history of the Re!ised
Election &ode will help 2ustify and clarify the
abo!e conclusionC
Director of Lands v. Abaya
Ghen to count the *63year period, either from the
date the decision was rendered or from the date
2udicial proceedings instituted in cadastral cases
@eldD court resol!ed the issue by referring to 9
older laws which ha!e in common that counting of
the period starts from the date of the institution of
the 2udicial proceeding and not from the date the
2udgment is rendered
Sa#aysay v. Castro
BActually holdingC < Blastly electedC
4hus, a !ice mayor acting as mayor is not
included in the pro!ision
&hange in phraseology by amendments
Intents to change the meaning of the pro!ision$
A statute has undergone se!eral amendments,
each amendment using different phraseology, the
deliberate selection of language differing from
that of the earlier act on the sub2ect indicates that
a change in meaning of the law was intended and
courts should so construe that statute as to reflect
such change in meaning$
Commissioner of C%stoms v. CTA
Bnational portC (new law" not the same as Bany
portC (old law"H otherwise, BnationalC will be a
surplusage
Amendment by deletion
Deletion of certain words or phrases in a statute
indicates that the legislature intended to change
the meaning of the statute, for the presumption is
that the legislation would not ha!e made the
deletion had the intention been not effect a
change in its meaning$
A statute containing a pro!ision prohibiting the
doing of a certain thing is amended by deleting
such pro!ision$
,#oria v. CA
IssueD whether a public officer or employee, who
has been pre!enti!ely suspended pending
in!estigation of the administrati!e charges against
him, is entitled to his salary and other benefits
during such pre!enti!e suspension
@eldD &ourt answered in the negati!e because
such pro!ision with regard to payment of salaries
during suspension was deleted in the new law
%enaseda v. F#avier
Ombusman and his deputy can only pre!enti!ely
suspend respondents in administrati!e cases who
are employed in his office, and not those who are
employees in other department or offices of the
go!ernment
Eceptions to the rule (of amendment by deletion"
An amendment of the statue indicates a change
in meaning from that which the statute originally
had applies only when the intention is clear to
change the pre!ious meaning of the old law$
Rules don(t apply when the intent is clear that the
amendment is precisely to plainly epress the
construction of the act prior to its amendment
because its language is not sufficiently epressi!e
of such construction$
/re.uently, words do not materially affect the
sense will be omitted from the statute as
incorporated in the code or re!ised statute, or that
some general idea will be epressed in brief
phrases$
Adopted statutes
/oreign statutes are adopted in this country or
from local laws are patterned form parts of the
legislati!e history of the latter$
Local statutes are patterned after or copied from
those of another country, the decision of the
courts in such country construing those laws are
entitled to great weight in the interpretation of
such local statutes$
Limitations of rule
A statute which has been adopted from that of a
foreign country should be construed in
accordance with the construction gi!en it in the
country of origin is not without limitations$
Principles of common law
Qnown as Anglo3American 2urisprudence which is
no in force in this country, sa!e only insofar as it
is founded on sound principles applicable to local
conditions and is not in conflict with eisting law,
ne!ertheless, many of the principles of the
common law ha!e been imported into this
2urisdiction as a result of the enactment of laws
and establishment of institutions similar to those
of the F%$
&onditions at time of enactment
In enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed
to ha!e ta1en into account the eisting conditions
of things at the time of its enactment$
In the interpretations of a statute, consider the
physical conditions of the country and the
circumstances then obtain understanding as to
the intent of the legislature or as to the meaning
of the statute$
@istory of the times
A court may loo1 to the history of the times,
eamining the state of things eisting when the
statute was enacted$
A statute should not be construed in a spirit as if it
were a protoplasm floating around in space$
In determining the meaning, intent, and purpose
of a law or constitutional pro!ision, the history of
the times of which I grew and to which it may be
rationally supposed to bear some direct
relationship, the e!ils intended to be remedied
and the good to be accomplished are proper
sub2ects of in.uiry$
Law being a manifestation of social culture and
progress must be interpreted ta1ing into
consideration the stage of such culture and
progress including all the concomitant
circumstances$
Law is not a watertight compartment sealed or
shut off from the contact with the drama of life
which unfolds before our eyes$
CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION
Kenerally
Are the constructions placed upon statutes at the
time of, or after their enactment by the eecuti!e,
legislati!e or 2udicial authorities, as well as by
those who in!ol!e in the process of legislation are
1nowledgeable of the intent and purpose of the
law$
&ontemporary construction is strongest in law$
Eecuti!e construction, generallyH 1inds of
Is the construction placed upon the statute by an
eecuti!e or administrati!e officer$
4hree types of interpretation
o &onstruction by an eecuti!e or
administrati!e officer directly called to
implement the law$
o &onstruction by the secretary of 2ustice in
his capacity as the chief legal ad!iser of
the go!ernment$
o @anded down in an ad!ersary proceeding
in the form of a ruling by an eecuti!e
officer eercising .uasi32udicial power$
Geight accorded to contemporaneous construction
Ghere there is doubt as to the proper
interpretation of a statute, the uniform
construction placed upon it by the eecuti!e or
administrati!e officer charged with its
enforcement will be adopted if necessary to
resol!e the doubt$
4rue epression of the legislati!e purpose,
especially if the construction is followed for a
considerable period of time$
+est#e P*i#ippines. /nc. v. CA
Reasons for why interpretation of an
administrati!e agency is generally accorded great
respect
o Emergence of multifarious needs of a
moderniAing society
o Also relates to eperience and growth of
specialiAed capabilities by the
administrati!e agency
o 4hey ha!e the competence, epertness,
eperience and informed 2udgment, and
the fact that they fre.uently are the
drafters of the law they interpret
P*i#ippine S%gar Centra# v. Co##ector of C%stoms
IssueD whether the go!ernment can legally collect
duties Bas a charge for wharfageC re.uired by a
statute upon all articles eported through
pri!ately3owned whar!es
@eldD the court reasoned in the affirmati!e by
saying Bthe language of the Act could ha!e been
made more specific and certain, but in !iew of its
history, its long continuous construction, and what
has been done and accomplished by and under it,
we are clearly of the opinion that the go!ernment
is entitled to ha!e and recei!e the money in
.uestion, e!en though the sugar was shipped
from a pri!ate wharf
Geight accorded to usage and practice
&ommon usage and practice under the statute, or
a course of conduct indicating a particular
underta1ing of it, especially where the usage has
been ac.uiesced in by all the parties concerned
and has etended o!er a long period of time$
Optim%s interpres rer%m %s%s & the best
interpretation of the law is usage$
&onstruction of rules and regulations
4his rule3ma1ing power, authorities sustain the
principle that the interpretation by those charged
with their enforcement is entitled to great weight
by the court in the latter(s construction of such
rules and regulations$
Reasons why contemporaneous construction is gi!en
much weight
It is entitled to great weight because it comes
from the particular branch of go!ernment called
upon to implement the law thus construed$
Are presumed to ha!e familiariAed themsel!es
with all the considerations pertinent to the
meaning and purpose of the law, and to ha!e
formed an independent, conscientious and
competent epert opinion thereon
Ghen contemporaneous construction disregarded
Ghen there is no ambiguity in the law$
If it is clearly erroneous, the same must be
declared null and !oid$
Erroneous contemporaneous construction does not
preclude correction nor create rightsH eceptions
4he doctrine of estoppel does not preclude
correction of the erroneous construction by the
officer himself by his successor or by the court in
an appropriate case$
An erroneous contemporeaneous construction
creates no !ested right on the part of those relied
upon, and followed such construction$
Legislati!e interpretation
4a1e form of an implied ac.uiescence to, or
appro!al of, an eecuti!e or 2udicial construction
of a statute$
4he legislature cannot limit or restrict the power
granted to the courts by the constitution$
Legislati!e appro!al
Legislati!e is presumed to ha!e full 1nowledge of
a contemporaneous or practical construction of a
statute by an administrati!e or eecuti!e officer
charged with its enforcement$
4he legislature may appro!e or ratify such
contemporaneous construction$
)ay also be showmen by the legislature
appropriating money for the officer designated to
perform a tas1 pursuant to interpretation of a
statute$
Legislati!e ratification is e.ui!alent to a mandate$
Reenactment
)ost common act of appro!al$
4he re3enactment of a statute, pre!iously gi!en a
contemporaneous construction is persuasi!e
indication of the adoption by the legislature of the
prior construction$
Re3enactment if accorded greater weight and
respect than the contemporaneous construction
of the statute before its ratification$
%tare decisis
#udicial interpretation of a statute and is of
greater weight than that of an eecuti!e or
administrati!e officer in the construction of other
statutes of similar import$
It is an in!aluable aid in the construction or
interpretation of statutes of doubtful meaning$
%tare decisis et non .uieta mo!ere 0 one should
follow past precedents and should not disturb
what has been settled$
%upreme &ourt has the constitutional duty not
only of interpreting and applying the law in
accordance with prior doctrines but also of
protecting society from the impro!idence and
wantonness wrought by needless uphea!als in
such interpretations and applications
In order that it will come within the doctrine of
stare decisis, must be categorically stated on an
issue epressly raised by the partiesH it must be a
direct ruling, not merely an obiter dictum
Obiter dictum 0 opinion epressed by a court
upon some .uestion of law which is not
necessary to the decision of the case before itH
not binding as a precedent
4he principle presupposes that the facts of the
precedent and the case to which it is applied are
substantially the same$
Ghere the facts are dissimilar, then the principle
of stare decisis does not apply$
4he rule of stare decisis is not absolute$ It does
not apply when there is a conflict between the
precedent and the law$
4he duty of the court is to forsa1e and abandon
any doctrine or rule found to be in !iolation of law
in force
Inferior courts as well as the legislature cannot
abandon a precedent enunciated by the %&
ecept by way of repeal or amendment of the law
itself
CHAPTER FOUR: A"$erene to, or "e#arture %ro&,
'an(ua(e o% statute
LITERAL INTERPRETATION
Literal meaning or plain3meaning rule
Keneral ruleD if statute is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be gi!en its literal meaning and
applied without attempted interpretation
o >erba legis
o Inde animi sermo 0 speech is the inde
of intention
o Gords employed by the legislature in a
statute correctly epress its intent or will
o >erba legis non est recedendum 0 from
the words of a statute there should be no
departure
o 4hus, what is not clearly pro!ided in the
law cannot be etended to those matters
outside its scope
#udicial legislation 0 an encroachment upon
legislati!e prerogati!e to define the wisdom of the
law
o &ourts must administer the law as they
find it without regard to conse.uences
+ationa# Federation of Labor v. +L"C
Employees were claiming separation pay on the
basis of Art$ :;- Labor &ode which states that
Bemployer )AM also terminate the employment of
an employeeC for reasons therein by ser!ing
notice thereof and paying separation pay to
affected employees
4here was compulsory ac.uisition by the
go!ernment of the employer(s land (Patalon
&oconut Estate" for purposes of agrarian reform
which forced the employer to cease his operation
IssueD whether or not employer is liable for
separation payR
@eldD 5O, employer is not liable for separation
payS
o It is a unilateral and !oluntary act by the
employer if he wants to gi!e separation
pay
o 4his is gleaned from the wording B)AMC in
the statute
o B)AMC denotes that it is directory in
nature and generally permissi!e only
o Plain3meaning rule is applicable
o Ano yun, ipapasara ng go!ernment tapos
magbabayad pa ang employer ng
separation payRSR Ang daya3dayaS Lugi
na nga si employer, 1i1ita pa si
employeeRSR FnfairS &annot beS 5oS 5oS
o 4o depart from the meaning epressed by
the words is to alter the statute, to
legislate and not interpret
o )aledicta est eposition .uae corrumpit
tetum 0 dangerous construction which is
against the tet
Dura le sed le
Dura le sed le 0 the law may be harsh but it is
still the law
Absoluta sentential epositore non indigent 0
when the language of the law is clear, no
eplanation of it is re.uired
Ghen the law is clear, it is not susceptible of
interpretation$ It must be applied regardless of
who may be affected, e!en if it may be harsh or
onerous
@oc .uidem per.uam durum est, sed ital e
scripta est 0 it is eceedingly hard but so the law
is written
A decent regard to the legislati!e will shoud inhibit
the court from engaging in 2udicial legislation to
change what it thin1s are unrealistic statutes that
do not conform with ordinary eperience or
practice (respeto nalang sa ating mga
mambabatasS Ghate!erRSR @aha 2o1e only"
If there is a need to change the law, amend or
repeal it, remedy may be done through a
legislati!e process, not by 2udicial decree
Ghere the law is clear, appeals to 2ustice and
e.uity as 2ustification to construe it differently are
una!ailing 0 Philippines is go!erned by &I>IL
LAG or PO%I4I>E LAG, not common law
E.uity is a!ailable only in the absence of law and
not its replacement 0 (so, pag may law, walang
e.uity e.uityS Pero pag walang law, pwedeng
mag3e.uity, getsRSR$$$ important toS"
Ae.uitas nun.uam contra!enit legis 0 e.uity
ne!er acts in contra!ention of the law
DEPARTURE FROM LITERAL INTERPRETATION
%tatute must be capable of interpretation, otherwise
inoperati!e
If no 2udicial certainty can be had as to its
meaning, the court is not at liberty to supply nor to
ma1e one
Santiago v. COMELEC
In this case, the &ourt adopted a literal meaning
thus, concluded that RA 8,-7 is inade.uate to
implement the power of the people to amend the
&onstitution (initiati!e on amendments" for the
following reasonsD
o Does not suggest an initiati!e on
amendments on to the &onstitution
because it is silent as to amendments on
the &onstitution and the word
B&onstitutionC is neither germane nor
rele!ant to said section
o Does not pro!ide for the contents of a
petition for initiati!e on the &onstitution
o Does not pro!ide for subtitles for initiati!e
on the &onstitution
o RA is incomplete and does not pro!ide a
sufficient standard
#ustice Puno (anoRSR #ustice 4reeRS" dissentsD
o Legislati!e intent is also shown by the
deliberations on the bill that became RA
8,-7L (there are 9 more reasons 0 see
page *-63*-*, which are not so
important"
Interpretation of RA 8,-7 was not in 1eeping with
the maim interpretation fienda est ut res magis
!aleat .uam pereat 0 that interpretation as will
gi!e the thing efficacy is to be adopted
Ghat is within the spirit is within the law
Don(t literally construe the law if it will render it
meaningless, lead to ambiguity, in2ustice or
contradiction
4he spirit of the law controls its letter
Ratio legis 0 interpretation according to the spirit
or reason of the law
%pirit or intention of a statute pre!ails o!er the
letter
A law should accordingly be so construed as to
be in accordance with, and not repugnant to, the
spirit of the law
PresumptionD undesirable conse.uences were
ne!er intended by a legislati!e measure
Literal import must yield to intent
>erba intentioni, non e contra, debent inser!ire 0
words ought to be more subser!ient to the intent
and not the intent to the words (ahhh parang
intent is to woman as word is to man 0 so man is
subser!ient to womanL logicalS"
Kuide in ascertaining intent 0 conscience and
e.uity
%o it is possible that a statute may be etended to
cases not within the literal meaning of its terms,
so long as they come within its spirit or intent
Limitation of rule
&onstrue (intent o!er letter" only if there is
ambiguityS
&onstruction to accomplish purpose
PFRPO%E or REA%O5 which induced the
enactment of the statute 0 1ey to open the brain
of the legislature= legislati!e intentS
%tatutes should be construed in the light of the
ob2ect to be achie!ed and the e!il or mischief to
be suppressed
As between two statutory interpretations, that
which better ser!es the purpose of the law should
pre!ail
Sarcos v. Casti##o
4his case eplains why legislati!e purpose to
determine legislati!e intent
/ran1furter
o Legislati!e words are not inert but deri!ed
!itality from the ob!ious purposes at
which they are aimed
o Legislation 0 wor1ing instrument of
go!ernment and not merely as a
collection of English words
'en2amin 5atham &ardoAo
o Legislation is more than a composition
o It is an acti!e instrument of go!ernment
which means that laws ha!e ends to be
achie!ed
@olmes
o Gords are fleible
o 4he general purpose is a more important
aid to the meaning than any rule which
grammar or formal logic may lay down
o &ourts are apt to err by stic1ing too
closely to the words of law where those
words import a policy that goes beyond
them
Soriano v. Offs*ore S*ipping and Manning Corp
A literal interpretation is to be re2ected if it would
be un2ust or lead to absurd results
Illustration of rule
0ing v. !ernande'
IssueD whether or not a &hinese (parang si RA
and %erge" may be employed in a non3control
position in a retail establishment, a wholly
nationaliAed business under RA **;6 Retail 4rade
Law (btw, wala na tong law na Tto$ It has been
repealed by the Retail 4rade LiberaliAation Act 0
my thesisS "
@eldD 5oS (1asi duduraan 1a lang ng mga intsi1S
#o1e onlyS" the law has to be construed with the
Anti3Dummy Law 0 prohibiting an alien from
inter!ening in the management, operation,
administration or control thereof
Ghen the law says you cannot employ such alien,
you cannot employ an alienS 4he unscrupulous
alien may resort to flout the law or defeat its
purposeS (maggulang daw mga intsi1L ultimo
tubig sa pasig ri!er, which is supposed to be free,
bottles it and then sells itS @uwatRSR"
It is imperati!e that the law be interpreted in a
manner that would sta!e off any attempt at
circum!ention of the legislati!e purpose
%stamante v. +L"C
IssueD how to compute for bac1wages to which an
illegally dismissed employee would be entitled
until his actual reinstatement (ta1e note of this
case$$ it(s a labor caseL 1iliti ni Kolangco"
- waysD
o *
st
0 before Labor &ode 0 to be deducted
from the amount of bac1wages is the
earnings elsewhere during the period of
illegal dismissal
o :
nd
0 Labor &ode Art$ :,+ 0 the amount of
bac1wages is fied without deductions or
.ualifications but limited to not more than
- years
o -
rd
0 amended Art$ :,+ 0 full bac1wages
or without deductions from the time the
laborer(s compensation was withheld until
his actual reinstatement
4he clear legislati!e intent of the amendment in
RA 8,*7 (Labor &ode" is to gi!e more benefits to
wor1ers than was pre!iously gi!en them under
the )ercury Drug rule or the *
st
way
1S v. Toribio
4he prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for
human consumption so long as these animals are
fit for agricultural wor1= draft purposes was a
Breasonable necessary limitationC on pri!ate
ownership
Purpose or ob2ect of the law 0 to protect large
cattle against theft and to ma1e easy reco!ery
and return of such cattle to their owners, when
lost, strayed or stolen
IssueD whether the slaughter of large cattle
outside the municipal slaughterhouse without a
permit by the municipal treasurer is prohibitedR
@eldD ME%S Outside or inside without permit is
prohibited
ocobo v. Estanis#ao
IssueD whether the &/I and a municipal court in
the capital of a pro!ince ha!e concurrent
2urisdiction o!er the crime of libel
RP& 0 grants 2urisdiction with &/I
#udiciary Act grants 2urisdiction with the municipal
court in the capital of a pro!ince in offenses
where the penalty is not more than prission
correctional or fine not eceeding 8,666Php
(penalty for libel"
%o ano naRSR
,odines v. CA
Patent Law 0 grants the patentee the eclusi!e
right to ma1e, use, and sell his patented machine,
article or product
Doctrine of e.ui!alents 0 when a de!ice
appropriates a prior in!ention by incorporating its
inno!ati!e concept, and albeit with some
modification and change, performs substantially
the same function in substantially the same way
to achie!e substantially the same result (ano ba
TtoRSR Puro substantiallyR"
P#anters Association of So%t*ern +egros. /nc. v.
Ponferrada
: apparently conflicting pro!isions should be
construed as to realiAe the purpose of the law
4he purpose of the law is to I5&REA%E the
wor1er(s benefits
'enefits under RA 8+;: shall be I5 ADDI4IO5 to
the benefits under RA ;6+ and PD 8:*
B%ubstitutedC cannot be gi!en literal interpretation
Ghen reason of law ceases, law itself ceases
4he reason which induced the legislature to enact
a law is the heart of the law
&essante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa le 0 when
the reason of the law ceases, the law itself
ceases
Ratio legis est anima 0 reason of the law is its
soul
Peo v. A#m%ete
Agricultural 4enancy Act is repealed by the
Agricultural Land Reform &ode
Agricultural 4enancy Act 0 punishes prereaping or
prethreshing of palay on a date other than that
pre!iously set without the mutual consent of the
landlord and tenant
o %hare tenancy relationship
Agricultural Land Reform &ode 0 abolished share
tenancy relationship, thus does not punish
prereaping or prethreshing of palay on a date
other than that pre!iously set without the mutual
consent of the landlord and tenant anymore
o Leasehold system
Commendador v. De 2i##a
IssueD whether PD -+, which withdrew the right to
peremptorily challenge members of a military
tribunal, had been rendered inoperati!e by PD
:697 proclaiming the termination of a state of
martial law
@eldD ME%S 4he termination of the martial law and
the dissolution of military tribunals created
thereunder, the reason for the eistence of PD -+
ceased automatically and the decree itself ceased
2as$%e' v. ,iap
Ghere the mischief sought to be remedied by a
statute has already been remo!ed in a gi!en
situation, the statute may no longer apply in such
case
4he law bans aliens from ac.uiring and owning
lands, the purpose is to preser!e the nation(s
lands for future generations of /ilipinos
A sale of land in fa!or of an alien, in !iolation of
the said law, no longer be .uestioned after the
alien becomes a /ilipino citiAen
%upplying legislati!e omission
if it is clearly ascertainable from the
&O54EE4S
)ay supply legislati!e omission to ma1e the
statute conform to ob!ious intent of the legislature
or to pre!ent the act from being absurd
5oteD differentiate from 2udicial legislation
&orrecting clerical errors
As long as the meaning intended is apparent on
the face of the whole enactment and no specific
pro!ision is abrogated
4his is not 2udicial legislation
Illustration rule
"%fino Lope' 3 Sons. /nc. v. CTA
&ourt change the phrase Bcollector of customsC to
Bcommissioner of customsC to correct an ob!ious
mista1e in law
%ec , 0 Bcommissioner of customsC 0 grants the
&4A 2urisdiction to re!iew decisions of the
&ommissioner of &ustoms
%ec ** 0 Bcollector of customsC 0 refers to the
decision of the &ollector of &ustoms that may be
appealed to the ta court
B&ommissionerC pre!ails 0 &ommissioner of
&ustoms has super!ision and control o!er
&ollectors of &ustoms and the decisions of the
latter are re!iewable by the &ommissioner of
&ustoms
Lamp v. P*ipps
BOrdinary &OFR4% of lawC to BOrdinary &OFR%E
of lawC
Farinas v. arba
IssueD who is the appointing power to fill a
!acancy created by the sanggunian member who
did not belong to any political party, under the
pro!ision of the Local Ko!ernment &ode
Blocal chief eecuti!eC 0 a misnomer
It should be Bauthorities concernedC
'ecause the President is not a Blocal chief
eecuti!eC but under %ec$ 76 of the Local
Ko!ernment &ode, the BPresident, Ko!ernor,
)ayor ha!e the eecuti!e power to appoint in
order to fill !acancies in local councils or to
suspend local officials
Pualification of rule (of correcting clerical errors"
Only those which are clearly clerical errors or
ob!ious mista1es, omissions, and misprintsH
otherwise, is to rewrite the law and in!ade the
domain of the legislature, it is 2udicial legislation in
the guise of interpretation
&onstruction to a!oid absurdity
ReasonD it is always presumed that the legislature
intended eceptions to its language which would
a!oid conse.uences of this character
4hus, statutes may be etended to co!er cases
not within the literal meaning of the terms if their
eact and literal import would lead to absurd or
mischie!ous results
Interpretation talis in ambiguis simper fienda est
ut e!itetur incon!eniens et absurdum 0 where
there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will
a!oid incon!enience and absurdity is to be
adopted
&ourts test the law by its results 0 if law appears
to be arbitrary, courts are not bound to apply it in
sla!ish disobedience to its language
&ourts should construe a statute to effectuate,
and not to defeat, its pro!isionsH nor render
compliance with its pro!isions impossible to
perform
Peo v. D%$%e
%urplusageSSS
%ec$ : of Act 5o$ --:8 0 prescription of offenses
o Prescription shall begin to run from
4he day of the commission of the
!iolation
/rom the time of disco!ery A5D
institution of 2udicial proceedings
for in!estigation and punishment
'ut the pre!ailing rule is that prescripti!e period is
tolled upon the institution of 2udicial proceedings 0
an act of grace by the %tate
&ourt held that the phrase Binstitution of 2udicial
proceedings for its in!estigation and punishmentC
may be either disregarded as surplusage or
should be deemed preceded by the word BuntilC
O#iveros v. 2i##a#%'
IssueD whether or not the suspension order
against an electi!e official following an
information for !iolation of the Anti3Kraft law filed
against him, applies not only to the current term
of office but also to another term if the accused
run for reelection and won
%ec *- of the Anti3Kraft Law 0 suspension unless
ac.uitted, reinstatedS
@eldD only refers to the current term of the
suspended officer (and not to a future un1nown
and uncertain new term unless supplemented by
a new suspension order in the e!ent of reelection"
for if his term shall ha!e epired at the time of
ac.uittal, he would ob!iously be no longer entitled
to reinstatementH otherwise it will lead to
absurdities
Peo v. 4% !ai
IssueD when does a crime punishable by arresto
menor prescribeR
%tate says *6 years as pro!ided for in Art +6 RP&
o Art$ :8 (correctional offenses" 0 ma fine
of :66Php 0 correctional penalty 0
prescribes in *6 years (Art$ +6"
&ourt held that this is not rightSSSS It is wrongS
o Art$ + (light offenses" 0 not more than
:66Php 0 light felonies 0 : months
o *Php ma1es a difference of + years and
*6 monthsS (huwatRSR"
o Arresto mayor (correctional penalty"
prescribes in 7 years
o Less gra!e 0 prescribe e!en shorter
o Also, prescripti!e period cannot be
ascertained not until the court decides
which of the alternati!e penalties should
be imposed 0 imprisonment ba or fine
langL yun lang poS
Peo v. "eyes
Dangerous Drugs Act
RA ,87+
o E U :66 grams 0 ma penalty is reclusion
perpetua
o E V :66 grams 0 min penalty is
reclusion perpetua
&ourt ruled thatD
o E U :66 grams 0 penalty ranging from
prision correctional to reclusion temporal
*-93*++grams 0 reclusion
temporal
883*-- 0 prison mayor
Less than 88 grams 0 prision
correcional
%tat&on 0 duty of the court to harmoniAe
conflicting pro!isions to gi!e effect to the whole
lawH to effectuate the intention of legislature
Ma#on'o v. 5amora
&ontentionD the &ity &ounsel of &aloocan cannot
!alidly pass an ordinance appropriating a
supplemental budget for the purpose of
epropriating a certain parcel of land, without first
adopting or updating its house rules of procedure
within the first +6 days following the election of its
members, as re.uired by %ecs$ 76 and 7: of the
LK&
&ourt said this is absurdSSSS &ontention is re2ectedS
o Adoption or updating of house rules
would necessarily entail wor1L local
council(s hands were tied and could not
act on any other matter if we hold the
absurd contentionS
o %o much incon!enienceS %hioS And this
could not ha!e been intended by the law
&onstruction to a!oid in2ustice
Presumption 0 legislature did not intend to wor1 a
hardship or an oppressi!e result, a possible
abuse of authority or act of oppression, arming
one person with a weapon to impose hardship on
the other
Ea est accipienda interpretation .uae !itio caret 0
that interpretation is to be adopted which is free
from e!il or in2ustice
Amatan v. A%-ero
Rodrigo Fmpad was charged with homicide
Pursuant to some pro!ision in criminal procedure,
he entered into a plea bargaining agreement,
which the 2udge appro!ed of, downgrading the
offense charge of homicide to attempted homicide
to which Fmpad pleaded guilty thereto$
@elloRSR 5amatay na nga tapos attempted
langRSR )ababaliw a1o sayo, 2udge, whoe!er you
areSSS
/iat 2usticia, ruat coelum 0 let the right be done,
though the hea!ens fall (ano dawRSR"
%tated differently, when a pro!ision of the law is
silent or ambiguougs, 2udges ought to in!o1e a
solution responsi!e to the !ehement urge of
conscience (ahhhL ano daw ulitRSR"
Peo v. P%risima
It was contended that PD +(-" 0 is a malum
prohibitumH thus intent to use such prohibited
weapons is immaterial by reason of public policy
&ourt said that use the preamble to construe such
act whether penaliAed or not
)oreo!er the court said that legislature did not
intend in2ustice, absurdity and contradiction
&ourt ga!e an eampleL
o %o if I borrowed a bolo then I return this
to my lender, then in the course or my
2ourney I(m caught, I(m penaliAed under
the Decree for 73*6 years imprisonmentS
(ang labo namanS"
1rs%a v. CA
IssueD whether or not the isolated use, at one
instance, of a name other than a person(s true
name to secure a copy of a document from a
go!ernment agency, constitutes !iolation of &A
*9: 0 Anti3alias Law
@eldD 5OS (isang beses lang naman eh$$ hehehe
2o1e langS"
o 4he purpose of the Anti3alias Law is to
pre!ent confusion and fraud in business
transactions
o %uch isolated use of a different name is
not prohibited by the lawH otherwise,
in2ustice, absurdity and contradiction will
result
&onstruction to a!oid danger to public interest
Co 0im C*am v. 2a#de' Tan 0e*
%a &onsti Tto ahS La langL hehe (yihee, %ergeS"
BprocessesC in the proclamation that Ball laws
regulations and processesC of the so3called RP
during the #apanese occupation of the country
Bare null and !oid and without legal effectC )AM
5O4 be construed to embrace #FDI&IAL
PRO&E%%E% as this would lead to great
incon!enience and public hardship and public
interest would be endangered
o &riminals freed
o >ested right, impaired
&onstruction in fa!or of right and 2ustice
Art$ *6 &&D In case of doubt in the interpretation
or application of laws, it is presumed that the law3
ma1ing body intended right and 2ustice to pre!ail
Art$ + &&D 4he fact that a statute is silent,
obscure, or insufficient with respect to a .uestion
before the court will not 2ustify the latter from
declining to render 2udgment thereon
In balancing conflicting solutions, that one is
percei!ed to tip the scales which the court
belie!es will best promote the public welfare is its
probable operation as a general rule or principle
Sa#vacion v. SP
Kreg 'artelli raped his alleged niece *6 times and
detained her in his apartment for 9 days
&ourt ga!e a fa!orable 2udgment of more than
*)Php
'%P re2ected the writ of attachment alleging %ec
**- of the &entral 'an1 &ircular 5o$ +86
(applicable to transient foreigners"
IssueD whether the dollar ban1 deposit in a
Philippine ban1 of a foreign tourist can be
attached to satisfy the moral damages awarded in
fa!or of the latter(s *:3year3old rape !ictim
'%P did not honor the writ of attachment pursuant
to RA89:8 %ec ; 0 Bforeign currency deposits
shall be eempt from attachment, garnishment, or
any other order or process of any court,
legislati!e body, go!ernment agency or any
administrati!e body whatsoe!erC
&ourt held thatD A5O 'ARSR 5a3rape na nga ayaw
pang magbayad ng moral damages dahil lang sa
isang silly lawRSR (hehe$$ 2o1e lang$$ I(m so bored
na ehS"
o &ourt applied the principles of right and
2ustice to pre!ail o!er the strict and literal
words of the statute
o 4he purpose of RA 89:8 to eempt such
assets from attachmentD at the time the
said law was enacted, the country(s
economy was in a shambles$ 'ut in the
present time it is still in shambles$$$ hehe
2o1e langL but in the present time, the
country has reco!ered economically$ 5o
reason why such assets cannot be
attached especially if it would satisfy a
2udgment to award moral damages to a
*:3year3old rape !ictimS
%urplusage and superfluity disregarded
Ghere a word, phrase or clause in a statute is
de!oid of meaning in relation to the contet or
intent of the statute, or where it suggests a
meaning that nullifies the statute or renders it
without sense, the word, phrase or clause may be
re2ected as surplusage and entirely ignored
%urplusagium non noceat 0 surplusage does not
!itiate a statute
Ftile per inutile non !itiatur 0 nor is the useful
!itated by the non3useful
Demafi#es v. COMELEC
IssueD whether a pre3proclamation election case
has become moot because the proclaimed winner
had immediately ta1en his oath pursuant to %ec :
RA 9;,6 which pro!ides that the Bfirst mayor,
!ice3mayor and councilors of the municipality of
%ebaste shall be elected in the net general
elections for local officials and shall ha!e
.ualifiedC
It was contended that Bshall ha!e .ualifiedC
begins immediately after their proclamationS
&ourt held that this is wrongS
o 4he said phrase is a 2argon and does not
warrant the respondent(s reading that the
term of office of the first municipal officials
of %ebaste begins immediately after their
proclamation
o 4he Qing in TAlice in Gonderland(D if there
is no meaning in it, that sa!es a world of
trouble, you 1now, as we need not try to
find any
o Apply the general rule when such term
begin 0 the term of municipal officials
shall begin on the *
st
day of #anuary
following their election
Redundant words may be re2ected
%elf3eplanatory, ano buAAAARSR
Obscure or missing word or false description may not
preclude construction
/alsa demonstration non nocet, cum de corpore
constat 0 false description does not preclude
construction nor !itiate the meaning of the statute
which is otherwise clear
Eemption from rigid application of law
Ibi .uid generaliter conceditur 0 e!ery rule is not
without an eception
Inest haec eception, si non ali.uid sit contras 2us
bas.ue 0 where anything is granted generally,
this eception is implied
&ompelling reasons may 2ustify reading an
eception to a rule e!en where the latter does not
pro!ide anyH otherwise the rigor of the law would
become the highest in2ustice 0 summum 2us,
summa in2uria
Law does not re.uire the impossible
5emo tenetur ad impossible 0 the law obliges no
one to perform an impossibility
Impossibilium nulla obligation est 0 no obligation
to do an impossible thing
Impossible compliance !ersus %ubstantial
compliance (as re.uired by law"
Lim co C*%i v Posadas
Publication in the Official KaAette wee1ly, for
three times and consecuti!ely, to ac.uire
2urisdiction o!er naturaliAation case
It was an impossibility to fulfill such re.uirement
as the OK was not, at the time, published wee1ly
4hus, &ourt held that compliance with the other :
re.uirements would be deemed sufficient to
ac.uire 2urisdiction o!er the naturaliAation case
Akbayan v. COMELEC
4his case is about the statutory grant of stand3by
power to the &O)ELE& as pro!ided for in %ec$
:; RA ;9-8
Petitioners were as1ing the respondent to
eercise such power so as to accommodate
potential !oters who were not able to register for
the upcoming election
&O)ELE& denied the petition alleging the
impossibility of late registration to accommodate
potential !oters
&ourt ruled that the pro!ision must be gi!en such
interpretation that is in accordance with logic,
common sense, reasonableness and practicality
Ghere time constraint and the surrounding
circumstances ma1e it impossible or the
&O)ELE& to conduct special registration of
!oters, the &O)ELE& cannot be faulted for
refusing to do so, for the law does not re.uire the
impossible to be doneH there is no obligation to ho
the impossible thing
&O)ELE&(s decision is sustained
5umber and gender of words
Ghen the contet of a statute so indicates, words
in plural include the singular, and !ice !ersa$
A plural word in a statute may thus apply to a
singular person or thing, 2ust as a singular word
may embrace two or more persons or things
Art$ ++8 && 0 (law on succession" such article
also applies to a situation where there is only one
child because BchildrenC includes BchildC
Election &ode 0 BcandidateC comprehends Bsome
candidatesC or Ball candidatesC
On gender 0 the masculine, but not the feminine,
includes all genders, unless the contet in which
the word is used in the statute indicates otherwise
IMPLICATIONS
Doctrine of necessary implication
%o3called gaps in the law de!elop as the law is
enforced
%tat&on ruleD to fill in the gap is the doctrine of
necessary implication
Doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is
as much a part thereof as that which is epressed
E necessitate legis 0 from the necessity of the
law
E!ery statutory grant of power, right or pri!ilege is
deemed to include all incidental power, right or
pri!ilege
In eo .uod plus sit, simper inest et minus 0
greater includes the lesser
5ecessity 0
o includes such inferences as may be
logically be drawn from the purpose or
ob2ect of the statute, from what the
legislature must be presumed to ha!e
intended, and from the necessity of
ma1ing the statute effecti!e and operati!e
o ecludes what is merely plausible,
beneficial, or desirable
must be consistent with the &onstitution or to
eisting laws
an implication which is !iolati!e of the law is
un2ustified or unwarranted
C*%a v. Civi# Service Commission
IssueD whether a coterminous employee, or one
whose appointment is co3eistent with the
duration of a go!ernment pro2ect, who has been
employed as such for more than : years, is
entitled to early retirement benefits under %ec :
RA 88;-
&ourt held that ME%, &hua is entitledS
o A coterminous employee is no different
from a casual or temporary employee,
and by necessary implication, the
inclusion of the latter in the class of
go!ernment employees entitled to the
benefits of the law necessarily implies
that the former should also be entitled to
such benefits
o Grong application of the maim Bepresio
uniusest eclusion alteriusC
Remedy implied from a right
Fbi 2us, ibi remedium 3 where there is a right,
there is a remedy for !iolation thereof
Right 3V Obligation 3V Remedy
4he fact that the statute is silent as to the remedy
does not preclude him from !indicating his right,
for such remedy is implied from such right
Once a right is established, the way must be
cleared for its enforcement, and technicalities in
procedure, 2udicial as well as administrati!e, must
gi!e way
Ghere there is Bwrong,C (depri!ation or !iolation
of a right" there is a remedy
If there(s no right, principle does not apply
at%ngbaka# v +ationa# Deve#opment Co
Petitioner was suspended and remo!ed from
office which pro!ed to be illegal and !iolati!e not
only of the Administrati!e &ode but of the
&onstitution itself
&ourt ruled that to remedy the e!il and wrong
committed, there should be reinstatement and
payment of bac1wages, among other things
@owe!er, there was a legal problem as to his
reinstatement, for when he was suspended and
e!entually dismissed, somebody was appointed
to his position
IssueD whether remedy is denied petitioner
@eldD position was ne!er B!acantC$ %ince there is
no !acancy, the present incumbent cannot be
appointed permanently$ 4he incumbent is only
holding a temporary position$ )oreo!er, the
incumbent(s being made to lea!e the post to gi!e
way to the employee(s superior right may be
considered as remo!al for cause
Krant of 2urisdiction
&onferred only by the &onstitution or by statute
&annot be conferred by the Rules of &ourt
&annot be implied from the language of a statute,
in the absence of clear legislati!e intent to that
effect
Pimente# v. COMELEC
&O)ELE& has appellate 2urisdiction o!er election
cases filed with and decided by the R4& in!ol!ing
municipal electi!e officials DOE% 5O4 I)PLM the
grant of authority upon the &O)ELE& to issue
writs of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus
concerning said election cases
Peo v. Pa#ana
%tatute grants a special court 2urisdiction o!er
criminal cases in!ol!ing offenders under *8 at the
time of the filing of the action, a subse.uent
statute defining a youthful offender as one who is
o!er + but below :* years of age may not be so
construed as to confer by implication upon said
special court the authority to try cases in!ol!ing
offenders *8 but below :* years of age
Ghat may be implied from grant of 2urisdiction
4he grant of 2urisdiction to try actions carries with
it all necessary and incidental powers to employ
all writs, processes and other means essential to
ma1e its 2urisdiction effecti!e
Ghere a court has 2urisdiction o!er the main
cause of action, it can grant reliefs incidental
thereto, e!en if they would otherwise be outside
its 2urisdiction
o E$g$ forcible entry and detainer is
cogniAable in )4&L )4& can order
payment of rentals e!en though the
amount eceeds the 2urisdictional amount
cogniAable by them, the same merely
incidental to the principal action
%tatutes conferring 2urisdiction to an
administrati!e agency must be liberally construed
to enable the agency to discharge its assigned
duties in accordance with the legislati!e purpose
o E$g$ the power granted the 5@A to hear
and decide claims in!ol!ing refund and
any other claims filed , include
attorney(s fees and other damages
Krant of power includes incidental power
Ghere a general power is conferred or duty
en2oined, e!ery particular power necessary for the
eercise of one or the performance of the other is
also conferred
4he incidental powers are those which are
necessarily included in, and are therefore of
lesser degree than the power granted
o Eamples
Power to establish an office
includes authority to abolish it,
unless
Garrant issued shall be made
upon probable cause determined
by the 2udge implies the grant
of power to the 2udge to conduct
preliminary in!estigations
Power to appro!e a license
includes by implication the power
to re!o1e it
Power to re!o1e is
limited by the authority to
grant license, from which
it is deri!ed
Power to deport includes the
power to arrest undesirable
aliens after in!estigation
Power to appoint !ested in the
President includes the power to
ma1e temporary appointments ,
unless
Power to appropriate money
includes power to withdraw
unepended money already
appropriated
EtcL see page *,*3*,:
Krant of power ecludes greater power
4he principle that the grant of power includes all
incidental powers necessary to ma1e the eercise
thereof effecti!e implies the eclusion of those
which are greater than that conferred
o Power of super!ision DOE% 5O4
I5&LFDE power to suspend or remo!al
o Power to reorganiAe DOE% 5O4
I5&LFDE the authority to depri!e the
courts certain 2urisdiction and to transfer it
to a .uasi32udicial tribunal
o Power to regulate business DOE% 5O4
I5&LFDE power to prohibit
Ghat is implied should not be against the law
Power to appoint includes power to suspend or
remo!e 0
o &onstitutional restriction of &I>IL
%ER>I&E E)PLOMEE%, that it must be a
cause pro!ided for by law precludes such
implication (unless the appointment was
made outside the ci!il ser!ice law
Power to appoint a public officer by the President
includes power to remo!e
o Pro!ided that such remo!al is made with
2ust cause
o Ecept is such statute pro!ides that term
of office to be at the pleasure of the
appointing officer, power to appoint
carries with it power to remo!e anytime
Power to in!estigate officials DOE% 5O4
I5&LFDE the power to delegate the authority to
ta1e testimony of witnesses whose appearance
may be re.uired by the compulsory process of
subpoena$ 5or does such power to in!estigate
include the power to delegate the authority to
administer oath
Authority to charge against public funds may not be
implied
It is well3settled that unless a statute epressly so
authoriAes, no claim against public funds may be
allowed
o %tatute grants lea!e pri!ileges to
APPOI54I>E officials, this cannot be
construed to include ELE&4I>E officials
o BemployerC to pay *-
th
month pay, does
not imply that it includes Bgo!ernment
Illegality of act implied from prohibition
In pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis 3
where a statute prohibits the doing of an act, the
act done in !iolation thereof is by implication null
and !oid
Prohibited act cannot ser!e as foundation of a
cause of action for relief
E dolo malo non oritur actio 0 no man can be
allowed to found a claim upon his own
wrongdoing or ine.uity
5ullus coomodum capere potest de in2uria sua
propria 0 no man should be allowed to ta1e
ad!antage of his own wrong
Public policy re.uires that parties to an act
prohibited by statute be left where they are, to
ma1e the statute effecti!e and to accomplish its
ob2ect
o Party to an illegal contract cannot come
to court of law and as1 that his illegal
ob2ect be carried out
o A citiAen who sold his land to an alien in
!iolation of the constitutional restriction
cannot annul the same and reco!er the
land, for both seller and buyer are guilty
of ha!ing !iolated the &onstitution
4wo (:" Eceptions to the rule
Pari delicto doctrine will not apply when its
enforcement or application will !iolate an a!owed
%un"a&enta' #o'!) or #u*'! !nterest
De#os Santos v. "oman Cat*o#ic C*%rc*
@omestead Law 0 to gi!e and preser!e in the
homesteader and his family a piece of land for his
house and culti!ation
4he law prohibits the alienation of a homestead
within 7 years following the issuance of the patent
and pro!ides that any contract of a con!eyance in
contra!ention thereof shall be null and !oid
4he seller or his heirs, although in pari delicto,
may reco!er the land sub2ect of such illegal sale
arsobia v. C%enco
Another eception is that when the transat!on !s
not !''e(a' #er se *ut &ere') #ro$!*!te" and the
prohibition by law is designed for protection of
one party, the court may grant relief in fa!or of the
latter
Ghat cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly
Puando ali.uid prohibetur e directo, prohibetur
et per obli.uum 0 what cannot, by law, be done
directly cannot be done indirectly
Peo v. Concepcion
Ghere a corporation is forbidden from doing an
act, the prohibition etends to the board of
directors and to each director separately and
indi!idually
Ghere the board of directors is prohibited from
granting loans to its director, a loan to a
partnership of which the wife of a director is a
partner falls within the prohibition
Peop#es ank and Tr%st Co. v. P+
Ghere a statute prohibits the payment of the
principal obligation during a fied period, the
interest thereon during the eistence of the
restriction is not demandable
Cr%' v. Tant%ico
Law eempts retirement benefits of a public
officer or employee from attachment, garnishment
etc
Earlier law authoriAes the go!ernment to withhold
an amount due such officer or employee to pay
his indebtedness to the go!ernment %@OFLD
5O4 'E &O5%4RFED to withhold so much of his
retirement benefits as this amount to attachment
garnishment etc$
Tant%ico. 6r. v Domingo
Law eempts retirement benefits of a public
officer or employee from attachment, garnishment
etc
Ko!ernment cannot withhold payment of
retirement benefits of a public officer until his
accountabilities with the go!ernment shall ha!e
been cleared, as such action is doing indirectly
what the go!ernment is prohibited from doing
directly
4here should be no penalty from compliance with law
A person who complies with what a statute
re.uires cannot, by implication, be penaliAed
thereby
/or Bsimple logic and fairness and reason cannot
countenance an eaction or a penalty for an act
faithfully done in compliance with the lawC
CHAPTER FIVE: Inter#retat!on o% +or"s an" #$rases
IN GENERAL
Kenerally
A word or phrase used in a statute may ha!e an
ordinary, generic, restricted, technical, legal,
commercial or trading meaning
)ay be defined in the statute 0 if this is done, use
such definition because this is what the
legislature intended
4as1D
o ascertain intent from statute
o ascertain intent from etraneous ?
rele!ant circumstance
o construe word or phrase to effectuate
such intent
Keneral rule in interpreting the meaning and
scope of a term used in the lawD
o Re!iew of the G@OLE law in!ol!ed as
well as the I54E5D)E54 of law (not of
an isolated part or a particular pro!ision
alone"
%tatutory definition
Ghen statute defines words ? phrase3 legislati!e
definition controls the meaning of statutory word,
irrespecti!e of any other meaning word ha!e in
ordinary usual sense$
Ghere a statute defines a word or phrase, the
word or phrase, should not by construction, be
gi!en a different meaning$
Legislature restricted meaning as it adopted
specific definition, thus, this should be used
4erm or phrase specifically defined in particular
law, definition must be adopted$
5o usurpation of court function in interpreting but
it merely legislates what should form part of the
law itself
2ictorias Mi##ing Co. v. Socia# Sec%rity Commission
7compensation8 RA **8*, %ec$ ;(f"V
9compensation: to inc#%de a## ren%merations.
e)cept bon%ses. a##o;ances 3 overtime pay
Definition was amendedD deleted BeceptionsC
Legislati!e IntentD the amendment shows
legislati!e intent that bonuses ? o!ertime pay
now included in employee(s renumeration$
PrincipleD by !irtue of epress substantial change
in phraseology, whate!er prior 2udicial or
eecuti!e construction should gi!e way to
mandate of new law$
Peo. v. 2envia-e 7 C*iropractic<
IssueD Ghether person who practiced chiropractic
without ha!ing been duly licensed, may be
criminally liable for !iolation of medical law$
@eldD 4hough term Bpractice of medicine,C
chiropractic may in ordinary sense fall within its
meaningH statutorily defined 3 includes
manipulations employed in chiropracticH thus, one
who practices chiropractic without license is
criminally liable$
C*ang 4%ng Fa v. ,ian'on7 a#ien<
IssueD whether alien who comes into country as
temporary !isitor is an BimmigrantRC
@eldD while BimmigrantC in ordinary definition3 Ban
alien who comes to the Philippines for permanent
residenceCH 4he Immigration Act ma1es own
definition of term, which is Bany alien departing
from any place outside the Philippines destined
for the Philippines, other than a non3immigrant$
(so 1elangan part siya nung Bother than a non3
immigrantC$" 3V yep yep, %ergeS 'ut more
importantly, the definition emphasiAes an
immigrant, who is an alien, who comes to the
Philippines either to reside 4E)PORARILM or
PER)A5E54LM 0 no distinction
definition of terms gi!en weight in construction
terms ? phrases, being part ? parcel of whole
statute, gi!en effect in their E54IR4M, as
harmonious, coordinated, and integrated unit
words ? phrases construed in light of contet of
G@OLE statute$
Pualification of rule
%tatutory definition of word or term controlling
only as used in the ActH
not conclusi!e as to the meaning of same word or
term in other statutes
Especially to transactions that too1 place prior to
enactment of act$
%tatutory definition controlling statutory words
does not apply whenD
o application creates incongruities
o destroy its ma2or purposes
o becomes illogical as result of change in
its factual basis$
Ernest v. CA 7 RA 9*88 ? EO +66, +6*V
Bsugarcane planterC is defined as a planter3owner
of sugarcane plantation w=in particular sugar mill
district, who has been allocated eport and=or
domestic ? reser!e sugar .uotas$
%tatutory definition ecludes emergency, non3
.uota, non3district and accommodation planters,
they ha!ing no sugar .uota$ @owe!er, in *+77,
.uota system abolished
Gith change in situation, illogical to continue
adhering to pre!ious definition that had lost their
legal effect$
Amadora v. CA
@owe!er, where statute remains unchanged,
interpreted according to its clear and original
mandateH until legislature ta1ing into account
changes sub2ected to be regulated, sees fit to
enact necessary amendment$
Gords construed in their ordinary sense
Keneral ruleD In the absence of legislati!e intent,
words and phrases should be gi!en their plain,
ordinary, and common usage meaning$
%hould be read and considered in their natural,
ordinary, commonly accepted, and most ob!ious
signification, according to good and appro!ed
usage and without resulting to forced or subtle
construction$
Centra# A'%carera Don Pedro v. Centra# ank
A statute Beempts certain importations from ta
and foreign echange, which are actually used in
the manufacture or preparation of local products,
forming part thereof$C
B/orming part thereofC not to mean that the
imported products ha!e to be mied
mechanically, chemically, materially into the local
product ? lose its identity$
)eans that the imported article is needed to
accomplish the locally manufactured product for
eport$
C/" v. Mani#a %siness Lodge =>?
BbusinessC (if un.ualified" in ta statuteD plain and
ordinary meaning to embrace acti!ity or affair
where profit is the purpose ? li!elihood is the
moti!e$
In this case, a fraternal social club selling li.uor at
its clubhouse in a limited scale only to its
members, without intention to obtain profit
5ot engaged in business$
P*iippine# Association of ,overnment "etirees v. ,S/S
7 9present va#%e:<
%tatuteD Bfor those who are at least 87 yrs of age,
lump sum payment of present !alue of annuity for
the first 7 years, and future annuity to be paid
monthly$ Provided *o;ever. that there shall be no
discount from annuity for the first 7 yrs$ of those
who are 87 yrs or o!er, on the day the law too1
effect$C
>ocabularyD
o lump sum 3 amount of money gi!en in
single payment
o annuity 3 amount of money paid to
somebody yearly or at some other regular
inter!al
%hould there be discount from the present !alue
of his annuityR
5O$ Fsed in ordinary sense as said law grants to
the retired employee substantial sum for his
sustenance considering his age$ Any doubt in this
law should be ruled in his fa!or$
Mat%g%ina /ntegrated @ood Prod%cts /nc. v. CA
Ghether transferee of a forest concession is
liable for obligations arising from transferor(s
illegal encroachment into another forest
concessionaire, which was committed prior to the
transfer
%ec$ 8* of PD ,67 Bthe transferee shall assume
all the obligations of the transferor$C
&ourt held that the transferee is 5O4 liable and
eplainedD BObligationsC construed to mean
obligations incurred by transferor in the ordinary
course of business$ 5ot those as a result of
transgressions of the law, as these are personal
obligations of transferor$
PrincipleD &onstrue using ordinary meaning ?
a!oid absurdity$
M%stang L%mber. /nc. v CA
%tatuteD %ec$ 8; PD ,67 3 penaliAes the cutting,
gathering ? or collecting timber or other forest
products without a license$
Is BlumberC included in BtimberC
Re!ersing *
st
ruling, %& says lumber is included
in timber$
B4he Re!ised /orestry &ode contains no
definition of timber or lumber$ 4imber is included
in definition of forestry prod%cts par (." %ec$-$
Lumber 3 same definitions as Bprocessing plantsC
Processing plant is any mechanical set3up,
machine or combination of machine used for
processing of logs ? other forest raw materials
into #%mber !eneer, plywood etcL p$ *;-$
%imply means, #%mber is a processed log or
forest raw material$ 4he &ode uses lumber in
ordinary common usage$ In *++- ed$ of Gebster(s
International Dictionary, #%mber is defined as
timber or logs after being prepared for the mar1et$
4herefore, lumber is a processed log or timber$
%ec 8; of PD ,67 ma1es no distinction between
raw ? processed timber$
Keneral words construed generally
,enera#ia verba s%nt genera#iter inte##igenda A
what is generally spo1en shall be generally
understoodH general words shall be understood in
a general sense$
,enera#e dict%m genera#iter est interpretand%m A
a general statement is understood in a general
sense
In case word in statute has both restricted and
general meaning, KE5ERAL must pre!ailH Fnless
nature of the sub2ect matter ? contet in which it
is employed clearly indicates that the limited
sense is intended$
Keneral words should not be gi!en a restricted
meaning when no restriction is indicated$
RationaleD if the legislature intended to limit the
meaning of a word, it would ha!e been easy for it
to ha!e done so$
Application of rule
,atc*a#ian v. COMELEC
BforeignerC3 in Election &ode, prohibiting any
foreigner from contributing campaign funds
includes 2uridical person
BpersonC3 comprehends pri!ate 2uridical person
BpersonC3 in penal statute, must be a Bperson in
law,C an artificial or natural person
2argas v. "i##aro'a
B2udgeC without any modifying word or phrase
accompanying it is to be construed in generic
sense to comprehend all 1inds of 2udgesH inferior
courts or 2ustices of %&$
C 3 C Commercia# Corp v. +A@ASA
Bgo!ernmentC 3 without .ualification should be
understood in implied or generic sense including
KO&&s$

Centra# ank v. CA
B5ational Ko!ernmentC 3 refers only to central
go!ernment, consisting of eecuti!e, legislati!e
and 2udiciary, as well as constitutional bodies ( as
distinguished from local go!ernment ? other
go!ernmental entities" 2ers%sA<
94he Ko!ernment of the Republic of the
PhilippinesC or BPhilippine Ko!ernmentC 0
including central go!ernments as well as local
go!ernment ? KO&&s$
"ep%b#ic F#o%r Mi##s v. Commissioner of C%stoms
Bproduct of the PhilippinesC 0 any product
produced in the country, e$g$ bran (ipa" ? pollard
(dara1" produced from wheat imported into the
country are Bproducts of the PhilippinesC
Keneric term includes things that arise thereafter
Progressi!e interpretation 3 A word of general
signification employed in a statute, in absence of
legislati!e intent, to comprehend not only peculiar
conditions obtaining at its time of enactment but
those that may normally arise after its appro!al as
well
Progressi!e interpretation etends to the
application of statute to all sub2ects or conditions
within its general purpose or scope that come into
eistence subse.uent from its passage
RationaleD to 1eep statute from becoming
ephemeral (short3li!ed" and transitory (not
permanent or lasting"$
%tatutes framed in general terms apply to new
cases and sub2ects that arise$
Keneral rule in %tat&onD Legislati!e enactments
in general comprehensi!e operation, apply to
persons, sub2ects and businesses within their
general pur!iew and scope coming into eistence
subse.uent to their passage$
,eotina v. CA
Barticles of prohibited importationC 3 used in 4ariff
and &ustoms &ode embrace not only those
declared prohibited at time of adoption, but also
goods and articles sub2ect of acti!ities underta1en
in subse.uent laws$
,atc*a#ian v. COMELEC
Bany electionC 3 not only the election pro!ided by
law at that time, but also to future elections
including election of delegates to &onstitutional
&on!ention
Gords with commercial or trade meaning
Gords or phrases common among merchants
and traders, ac.uire commercial meanings$
Ghen any of words used in statute, should be
gi!en such trade or commercial meaning as has
been generally understood among merchants$
Fsed in the followingD tariff laws, laws of
commerce, laws for the go!ernment of the
importer$
4he law to be applicable to his class, should be
construed as uni!ersally understood by importer
or trader$
Asiatic Petro#e%m Co. v. C/"
5o ta shall be collected on articles which, before
its ta1ing effect, shall ha!e been Bdisposed ofC
LayD parting away w= something
)erchantD to sell (this must be used"
San Mig%e# Corp. v. M%nicipa# Co%nci# of Manda%e
Bgross !alue of moneyC
)erchantD Bgross selling priceC which is the total
amount of money or its e.ui!alent which
purchaser pays to the !endor to recei!e the
goods$
Gords with technical or legal meaning
Keneral ruleD words that ha!e, or ha!e been used
in, a technical sense or those that ha!e been
2udicially construed to ha!e a certain meaning
should be interpreted according to the sense in
which they ha!e been PRE>IOF%LM used,
although the sense may !ary from the strict or
literal meaning of the words
PresumptionD language used in a statute, which
has a technical or well31nown meaning, is used in
that sense by the legislature
Mani#a !era#d P%b#is*ing Co. v. "amos
%ec *9 of Rule 7+ of Rules of &ourt which
prescribes the steps to be ta1en when property
attached is claimed by a person other than the
defendant or his agent
%tatuteD Bnothing herein contained shall pre!ent
such third person from !indicating his claim to the
property by any proper action.C
IssueD Bproper actionC limits the -
rd
party(s remedy
to inter!ene in the action in which the writ of
attachment is issued
@eldD BactionC has ac.uired a well3defined
meaning as an Bordinary suit in a court of 2ustice
by which one party prosecutes another for the
enforcement or protection of a right or pre!ent
redress or wrongL
GhileL
%ec : Rule : of Rules of &ourtH B&ommencement
of ActionC
%tatuteD B&i!il action may be commenced by filing
a complaint with the proper courtC
GordD commencement 3 indicates the origination
of entire proceeding
It was appropriate to use proper action (in *
st
statute" than inter!ention, since asserted right of
-
rd
party claimant necessarily flows out of pending
suitH if the word Tinter!ention( is used, it becomes
strange$
Ma#anyaon v. Lising
%ec$ *- of Anti3Kraft Law
%tatuteD B if a public officer is ac.uitted, he shall
be entitled to reinstatement and to his salaries
and benefits which he failed to recei!e during the
suspensionC
IssueD Gill a public officer whose case has been
dismissed not Bac.uittedC be entitled to benefits
in %ec$ *-R
@eldD 5o$ Ac.uittal B#ega# meaningC A finding of
not guilty based on the merit$
Dismissal does not amount to ac.uittal ecept
when, the dismissal comes after the prosecution
has presented all its e!idence and is based on
insufficiency of such e!idence$
"%ra v. Lopena
Probation law 3 Dis.ualified from probation thoseD
Bwho ha!e been pre!iously con!icted by final
2udgment of an offense punished by imprisonment
of not less than * month ? a fine of no less than
Php :66$C
IssueD Bpre!iously con!ictedC
@eldD it refers to date of con!iction, not date of
commission of crimeH thus a person con!icted on
same date of se!eral offenses committed in
different dates is not dis.ualified$
@ow identical terms in the statute construed
Keneral ruleD a word or phrase repeatedly used in a
statute will bear the same meaning throughout the
statuteH unless a different intention is clearly
epressed$
RationaleD word used in statute in a gi!en sense
presumed to be used in same sense throughout the
law$ 4hough rigid and peremptory, this is applicable
where in the statute the words appear so near each
other physically, particularly where the word has a
technical meaning and that meaning has been
defined in the statute$
De #a Pa' v. Co%rt of Agrarian "e#ations UBRicelandCV
share tenancy 3 a!erage produce per hectare for
the - agricultural years net preceding the current
har!est
leasehold 3 according to normal a!erage har!est
of the - preceding yrs
BMearC3 agricultural year not calendar year
BAgricultural yearC 3 represents * cropH if in *
calendar yr : crops are raised that(s : agricultural
years$
0rivenko v. "egister of Deeds
%tatuteD In %ec$* , Art$ EIII of *+-7 &onstitution 3
Bpublic agricultural lands shall not be alienatedC
ecept in fa!or of /ilipinos, %A)E as %ec$ 7 Bno
pri!ate agricultural land shall be transferred or
assigned$C
both ha!e same meaning being based on same
policy of nationaliAation and ha!ing same sub2ect$

)eaning of word .ualified by purpose of statute
Purpose may indicate whether to gi!e word,
phrase, ordinary, technical, commercial restricted
or epansi!e meaning$
In construing, court adopts interpretation that
accords best with the manifest purpose of statuteH
e!en disregard technical or legal meaning in fa!or
of construction which will effectuate intent or
purpose$
Gord or phrase construed in relation to other pro!isions
Keneral ruleD word, phrase, pro!ision, should not
be construed in isolation but must be interpreted
in relation to other pro!isions of the law$
4his is a >ARIA4IO5 of the rule that, statute
should be construed as a whole, and each of its
pro!ision must be gi!en effect$
C#a%dio v. COMELEC
%tatute (LK&"D B5o recall shall ta1e place within *
yr from the date of the official(s assumption of
office or * year immediately preceding a regular
electionC
IssueD Does the *
st
limitation embraces the entire
recall proceedings (e$g$ preparatory recall
assemblies" or only the recall electionR
@eldD the &ourt construed BrecallC in relation to
%ec$8+ which states that, Bthe power of recallL
shall be eercised by the registered !oters of an
LKF to which the local electi!e official belongs$C
@ence, not apply to all recall proceedings since
power !ested in electorate is power to elect an
official to office and not power to initiate recall
proceedings$
Gord or pro!ision should not be construed in
isolation form but should be interpreted in relation
to other pro!isions of a statute, or other statutes
dealing on same sub2ect in order to effectuate
what has been intended$
,arcia v. COMELEC
@istory of statuteD
o In the &onstitution, it re.uires that
legislature shall pro!ide a system of
initiati!e and referendum whereby people
can directly appro!e or re2ect any act or
law or part thereof passed by &ongress
or local legislati!e body$
o Local Ko!t$ &ode, a later law, defines
#oca# initiative as Bprocess whereby
registered !oters of an LKF may directly
propose, enact, or amend any
ordinance$C
It is claimed by respondents that
since resolution is not included in
this definition, then the same
cannot be sub2ect of an initiati!e$
IssueD whether a local resolution of a municipal
council can be sub2ect to an initiati!e and
referendumR
@eldD Ge re2ect respondent(s narrow and literal
reading of abo!e pro!ision for it will collide with
the &onstitution and will sub!ert the intent of the
lawma1ers in enacting the pro!isions of the Local
Ko!ernment &ode (LK&" of *++* on initiati!e ?
referendum
4he subse.uent enactment of the LK& did not
change the scope of its co!erage$ In %ec$ *:9 of
the same code$ It statesD (b" /nitiative s*a## e)tend
on#y to s%b-ects or matters ;*ic* are ;it*in t*e
#ega# po;ers of t*e Sangg%nians to enact.:
4his pro!ision clearly does not limit the
application of local initiati!e to ordinances, but to
all Bsub2ects or matters which are within the legal
powers of the Sangg%nians to enact, which
undoubtedly includes resolutions$C
,e#ano v. C.A.
In &orporation Law, authoriAes a dissol!ed
corporation to continue as a body corporate for -
yrs$ for the purpose of defending and prosecuting
suits by or against it, and during said period to
con!ey all its properties to a BtrusteeC for benefits
of its members, stoc1holders, creditors and other
interested persons, the transfer of the properties
to the trustee being for the protection of its
creditors and stoc1holders$
Gord BtrusteeC 3 not to be understood in legal or
technical sense, but in KE5ERAL concept which
would include a lawyer to whom was entrusted
the prosecution of the cases for reco!ery of sums
of money against corporation(s debtors$
"ep%b#ic v. As%ncion
IssueD Ghether the Sandiganbayan is a regular
court within the meaning of R$A$ 8+,7R
%tatuteD RA 8+,7 which ma1es criminal actions
in!ol!ing members of the P5P come Bwithin the
eclusi!e 2urisdiction of the reg%#ar co%rts.
Fsed Bregular courtsC ? Bci!il courtsC
interchangeably
&ourt martial 3 not courts within the Philippine
#udicial %ystemH they pertain to the eecuti!e
department and simply instrumentalities of the
eecuti!e power$
Regular courts 3 those within the 2udicial
department of the go!ernment namely the %&
and lower courts which includes the
Sandiganbayan.
@eldD &ourts considered the purpose of the law
which is to remo!e from the court martial, the
2urisdiction o!er criminal cases in!ol!ing
members of the P5P and to !est it in the courts
within the 2udicial system$
Mo#ina v. "afferty
IssueD Ghether BAgricultural productsC includes
domesticated animals and fish grown in ponds$
%tatuteD Phrase used in ta statute which
eempts such products from payment of taes,
purpose is to encourage the de!elopment of such
resources$
@eldD phrase not only includes !egetable
substances but also domestic and domesticated
animals, animal products, and fish or bangus
grown in ponds$ &ourt ga!e epansi!e meaning
to promote ob2ect of law$
M%no' 3 Co. v. !ord
IssueD B&onsumptionC limited or broad meaning
%tatuteD word is used in statute which pro!ides
that Becept as herein specifically eempted,
there shall be paid by each merchant and
manufacturer a ta at the rate of *=- of *N on
gross !alue of money in all goods, wares and
merchandise sold, bartered, or echanged for
domestic consumption$
@eldD &onsidering the purpose of the law, which is
to ta all merchants ecept those epressly
eempted, it is reasonable and fair to conclude
that legislature used in commercial use and not in
limited sense of total destruction of thing sold$
Mottom%# v. de #a Pa'
IssueD Ghether the word BcourtC refers to the
&ourt of Appeals or the trial courtR
%tatuteD RA 7-9- Effect of Appea#A Appeal shall
not stay the award, order, ruling, decision or
2udgment unless the officer or body rendering the
same or t*e co%rt, on motion, after hearing ? on
such terms as it may deem 2ust should pro!ide
otherwise$
@eldD It refers to the 4RIAL &OFR4$ If the
ad!erse party intends to appeal from a decision of
the %E& and pending appeal desires to stay the
eecution of the decision, then the motion must
be filed with and be heard by the %E& before the
ad!erse party perfects its appeal to the &ourt of
Appeals$
Purpose of the lawD the need for immediacy of
eecution of decisions arri!ed at by said bodies
was imperati!e$
)eaning of term dictated by contet
4he contet in which the word or term is
employed may dictate a different sense
2erba accipienda s%nt sec%nd%m materiamA a
word is to be understood in the contet in which it
is used$
Peop#e v. C*ave'
%tatuteD /amily home etra2udicially formed shall
be eempt from eecution, forced sale or
attachment, ecept for Bnon payment of debtsC
Gord BdebtsC 0 means obligations in general$
0rivenko v. "egister of Deeds
%tatuteD lands were classified into timber, mineral
and agricultural
Gord BagriculturalC 0 used in broad sense to
include all lands that are neither timber, nor
mineral, such being the contet in which the term
is used$
Sant%#an v. E)ec%tive. Secretary.
%tatuteD A riparian owner of the property ad2oining
foreshore lands, marshy lands or lands co!ered
with water bordering upon shores of ban1s of
na!igable la1es shall ha!e preference to apply for
such lands ad2oining his property$
/actD Riparian 3 one who owns land situated on
the ban1s of ri!er$
@eldD Fsed in a more broader sense referring to a
property ha!ing a water frontage, when it
mentioned Bforeshore lands,C Bmarshy lands,C or
Blands co!ered with water$C
Peo. v. Ferrer
Bcase ;*ere conte)t may #imit t*e meaningC
GordD BO!erthrowC
%tatuteD Anti3%ub!ersion Act B1nowingly ? willfully
and by o!ert acts$C
Re2ects the metaphorical BpeacefulC sense ?
limits its meaning to Bo!erthrowC by force or
!iolence$
Peo. v. +a'ario
%tatuteD )unicipal ta ordinance pro!ides Bany
owner or manager of fishpondsC shall pay an
annual ta of a fied amount per hectare and it
appears that the owner of the fishponds is the
go!ernment which leased them to a pri!ate
person who operates them
GordD BOwnerC 0 does not include go!ernment as
the ancient principle that go!ernment is immune
from taes$
Ghere the law does not distinguish
1bi #e) non disting%it. nec nos disting%ere
debem%s A where the law does not distinguish,
courts should not distinguish$
&orollary principleD Keneral words or phrases in a
statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural
and general significance
Keneral term or phrase should not be reduced
into parts and one part distinguished from the
other to 2ustify its eclusion from operation$
&orollary principleD where the law does not ma1e
any eception, courts may not ecept something
therefrom, unless there a compelling reason to
2ustify it$
ApplicationD when legislature laid down a rule for
one class, no difference to other class$
PresumptionD that the legislature made no
.ualification in the general use of a term$
"ob#es v. 5amba#es C*romite Co.
%tatuteD grants a person against whom the
possession of Bany landC is unlawfully withheld the
right to bring an action for unlawful detainer$
@eldD any land not eclusi!e to pri!ate or not
eclusi!ely to publicH hence, includes all 1inds of
land$
Director of Lands v. ,on'a#es
%tatuteD authoriAes the director of lands to file
petitions for cancellation of patents co!ering
public lands on the ground therein pro!ided$
@eldD not distinguished whether lands belong to
national or local go!ernment
SSS v. City of aco#od
IssueD eempts the payment of realty taes to
Bproperties owned by RPC
@eldD no distinction between properties held in
so!ereign, go!ernmental, or political capacity and
those possessed in proprietary or patrimonial
character$
2e#asco v. Lope'
%tatuteD certain BformalitiesC be followed in order
that act may be considered !alid$
@eldD no distinction between essential or non3
essential formalities
Co#gateAPa#mo#ive P*i#s v. ,imene'
%tatuteD does not distinguish between BstabiliAer
and fla!orsC used in the preparation of food and
those used in the manufacture of toothpaste or
dental cream
O#iva v. Lamadrid
%tatuteD allows the redemption or repurchase of a
homestead property w=in 7 years from its
con!eyance
@eldD Bcon!eyanceC not distinguished 3 !oluntary
or in!oluntary$
Escos%ra v. San Mig%e# re;ery /nc.
%tatuteD grants employee Blea!es of absence with
payC
@eldD Bwith payC refers to full pay and not to half or
less than full payH to all lea!es of absence and not
merely to sic1 or !acation lea!es$
O#fato v. COMELEC
%tatuteD ma1es &O)ELE& the sole 2udge of Ball
pre3 proclamation contro!ersiesC
@eld D BallC 0 co!ers national, pro!incial, city or
municipal
P*i#. ritis* Ass%rance Co. v. /ntermediate Ape##ate Co%rt
%tatuteD A counterbond is to secure the payment
of Bany 2udgment,C when eecution is returned
unsatisfied
@eldD Bany 2udgmentC includes not only final and
eecutory but also 2udgment pending appeal
whose eecution ordered is returned unsatisfied$
"amire' v. CA
%tatuteD BAct to Prohibit ? PenaliAe Gire 4apping
and Other related >iolations of Pri!ate
&ommunications and Other PurposesC
BIt shall be unlawful, not being authoriAed by all
the parties to any pri!ate communication or
spo1en word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using
any other de!ice or arrangementLC
IssueD Ghether !iolation thereof refers to the
taping of a communication ot*er t*an a
participant to the communication or e!en to the
taping by a participant who did not secure the
consent of the party to the con!ersations$
@eldD Law did not distinguish whether the party
sought to be penaliAed ought to be party other
than or different from those in!ol!ed in the pri!ate
communication$ 4he intent is to penaliAe all
persons unauthoriAed to ma1e any such
recording, underscored by BanyC
Ligget 3 Myers Tobacco Co. v. C/"
%tatuteD imposes a Bspecific taC on cigarettes
containing >irginia tobacco L$ Pro!ided that of
the length eceeds ,* millimeters or the weight
per thousand eceeds *W 1ilos, the ta shall be
increased by *66N$
IssueD whether measuring length or weight of
cigars, filters should be ecluded therefrom, so
that ta would come under the general pro!ision
and not under the pro!isoR
@eldD 5ot ha!ing distinguished between filter and
non3filter cigars, court should not distinguish$
Ti% San v. "ep%b#ic
IssueD whether the con!iction of an applicant for
naturaliAation for !iolation of a municipal
ordinance would dis.ualify him from ta1ing his
oath as a citiAen$
%tatuteD An applicant may be allowed to ta1e his
oath as a citiAen after : years from the
promulgation of the decision granting his petition
for naturaliAation if he can show that during the
inter!ening period Bhe has not been con!icted of
any offense or !iolation of go!ernment rulesC
@eldD law did not ma1e any distinction between
ma#a in se and ma#a pro*ibita. &on!iction of the
applicant from !iolation of municipal ordinance is
comprehended within the statute and precludes
applicant from ta1ing his oath$
Pera#ta v. CSC
IssueD whether pro!ision of RA :8:7, that
go!ernment employees are entitled to *7 days
!acation lea!es of absence with full pay and *7
days sic1 lea!es with full pay, eclusi!es of
%aturday, %undays or holidays in both cases,
applies only to those who ha!e lea!e credits and
not to those who ha!e none$
@eldD Law spea1s of granting of a right and does
not distinguish between those who ha!e
accumulated and those who ha!e none$
Pi#ar v. COMELEC
%tatuteD RA ,*88 pro!ides that BE!ery candidate
shall, within -6 days after the day of the election
file true and itemiAed statement of all
contributions and ependitures in connection with
the election$
@eldD Law did not distinguish between a
candidate who pushed through and one who
withdrew it$
BE!ery candidateC refers to one who pursued and
e!en to those who withdrew his candidacy$
Sanciagco v. "ono
B;*ere t*e distinction appears from t*e stat%te.
t*e co%rts s*o%#d make t*e distinctionC
%tatuteD %ec *- of 'P 'lg$ 8+, which pro!ides
thatD 9Any person holding public appointi!e or
position shall ipso facto cease in office or position
as of the time he filed his certificate of candidacyC
Ko!ernors, mayors, members of !arious
sangg%nians or barangay officia#s shall upon the
filing of candidacy, be considered on forced lea!e
of absence from office
/actsD an electi!e 'arangay$ &aptain was elected
President of Association of 'arangay &ouncils
and pursuant thereto appointed by the President
as member of the Sangg%nian Pan#%ngsod. @e
ran for &ongress but lost$
IssueD @e then wants to resume his duties as
member of sangg%iniang pan#%ngsod. @e was
merely forced on lea!e when he ran for
&ongress$
@eldD the %ecretary of Local Ko!ernment denied
his re.uestH being an appointi!e sangg%nian
member, he was deemed automatically resigned
when he filed his certificate of candidacy$
,arvida v. Sa#es. 6r.
IssueD whether petitioner who was o!er :* but
below :: was .ualified to be an electi!e %Q
member
%tatuteD %ec$9:9 of the LK& pro!ides that a
member of the 0atip%nan ng 0abataan must not
be :* yrs old$
%ec$ 9:; as additional re.uirement pro!ides that
electi!e official of Sangg%niang 0abataan must
not be more than :* yrs$ Bon the day of electionC
@eldD the distinction is apparentD the member may
be more than :* years of age on election day or
on the day he registers as member of 0atip%nan
ng 0abataan. 'ut the electi!e official, must not be
more than :* years of age on the day of election$
Dis2uncti!e and con2uncti!e words
Gord BorC is a dis2uncti!e term signifying
disassociation and independence of one thing
from each other$
Peo v. Martin
%tatuteD %ec$ 96 of &ommonwealth Act 8*,
punishes Bany indi!idual who shall bring into or
land in the Philippines or conceals or harbors any
alien not duly admitted by any immigration
officerL
does not 2ustify gi!ing the word a dis2uncti!e
meaning, since the words Bbring intoC BlandC,
BconcealsC and BharborsC being four separate acts
each possessing its distincti!e, different and
disparate meaning$
C/" v. Mani#a 6ockey C#%b
%tatuteD imposes amusement taes on gross
receipts of Bproprietor, lessee, or operator of
amusement placeC
@eldD BorC implies that ta should be paid by either
proprietor, lessee, or operator, as the case may
be, single ? not by all at the same time$
Fse of BorC between : phrases connotes that
either phrase ser!es as .ualifying phrase$
BorC means BandC, G@E5 4@E %PIRI4 OR
&O54EE4 O/ 4@E LAG %O GARRA54%
Trinidad v. erm%de' (e$g$ of BorC to mean BandC"
%tatuteD %ec$ :, Rule **: of Rules of &ourt
authoriAing municipal 2udges to conduct
Bpreliminary eamination or in!estigationC
BorC e.ui!alent of Bthat is to sayC
SMC v. M%nicipa#ity of Manda%e (e$g$ of BorC e.ui!alent of
Bthat is to sayC"
OrdinanceD imposes graduated .uarterly fied ta
Bbased on the gross !alue in money or actual
mar1et !alueC of articlesH phrase Bor actual mar1et
!alueC intended to eplain Bgross !alue in money$C
BorC means successi!ely
%tatuteD Art$ -99 of the Re!ised Penal &ode 3 Bthe
offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of
lasci!iousness, shall not be prosecuted ecept
upon a complaint by the offended party or her
parents, grandparents or guardianL$C
Although these persons are mentioned
dis2uncti!ely, pro!ision must be construed as
meaning that the right to institute a criminal
proceeding is eclusi!ely and successi!ely
reposed in said persons in the order mentioned,
no one shall proceed if there is any person
pre!iously mentioned therein with legal capacity
to institute the action$
BAndC is a con2unction pertinently defined as
meaning Btogether with,C B2oined with,C Balong
with,C Badded to or lin1ed toC
o 5e!er to mean BorC
o Fsed to denote 2oinder or union
Band=orC 3 means that effect should be gi!e to both
con2uncti!e and dis2uncti!e term
o term used to a!oid construction which by
use of dis2uncti!e BorC alone will eclude
the combination of se!eral of the
alternati!es or by the use of con2uncti!e
BandC will eclude the efficacy of any one
of the alternati!es standing alone$
ASSOCIATED WORDS
5oscitur a sociis
where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in
itself or e.ually susceptible of !arious meanings,
its correct construction may be made clear and
specific by considering the company of words in
which it is found or with which it is associated$
to remo!e doubt refer to the meaning of
associated or companion words
%enaseda v. F#avier
%tatuteD %ec$ *-(-", Art EI of the &onstitution
grants Ombudsman power to BDirect the officer
concerned to ta1e appropriate action against a
public official or employee at fault, and
recommend his remo!al, suspension, demotion,
fine censure or prosecution$
BsuspensionC 0 is a penalty or puniti!e measure
not pre!enti!e
Magta-as v. Pryce Properties Corp.
%tatD %ec$ 97; of LK& authoriAed local
go!ernment units to pre!ent or suppress
BKambling ? other prohibited games of chance$C
BKamblingC 0 refers only to illegal gambling, li1e
other prohibited games of chance, must be
pre!ented or suppressed ? not to gambling
authoriAed by specific statutes$
Carandang v. Santiago
IssueD Ghether an offended party can file a
separate and independent ci!il action for
damages arising from physical in2uries during
pendency of criminal action for frustrated
homicide$
%tatuteD Art$ -- of &i!il &ode Bin case of
defamation, fraud, ? physical in2uriesLC
@eldD &ourt ruled that Bphysical in2uriesC not as
one defined in RP&, but to mean bodily harm or
in2ury such as physical in2uries, frustrate
homicide, or e!en death$
Co 0im C*an v. 2a#de' Tan 0e*
IssueD Ghether proceedings in ci!il cases
pending in court under the so called Republic of
the Philippines established during the #apanese
military occupation are affected by the
proclamation of Ken$ )cArthur issued on
October :-, *+99 that Ball laws, regulations and
processes of any other go!ernment in the
Philippines than that of the said &ommonwealth
are null and !oid and without legal effect$C
BProcessesC does not refer to 2udicial processes
but to the eecuti!e orders of the &hairman of
the Philippine Eecuti!e &ommittee, ordinances
promulgated by the President of so3called RP,
and others that are of the same class as the
laws and regulations with which the word
BprocessesC is associated$
Commissioner of C%stoms v. P*i#. Acety#ene Co.
%tatuteD %ec$ 8 of RA *-+9 pro!ides that Bta
pro!ided for in %ec$ * of this Act shall not be
imposed against the importation into the
Philippines of machinery or raw materials to be
used by new and necessary industry H
machinery e.uipment, spare parts, for use of
industriesLC
IssueD Is the word BindustriesC used in ordinary,
generic sense, which means enterprises
employing relati!ely large amounts of capital
and=or laborR
@eldD %ince BindustriesC used in the law for the
:
nd
time Bis classified togetherC with the terms
miners, mining industries, planters and farmers,
ob!ious legislati!e intent is to confine the
meaning of the term to acti!ities that tend to
produce or create or manufacture such as those
miners, mining enterprises, planters and
farmers$
If used in ordinary sense, it becomes
inconsistent and illogical
Peo. v. Santiago
IssueD Ghether defamatory statements through
the medium of an amplifier system constitutes
slander or libelR
LibelD committed by means of Bwriting, printing,
lithography, engra!ing, radio, cinematographic
ehibiton$C
It is argued that BamplifierC similar to radio
@eldD 5o$ Radio should be considered as same
terms with writing and printing whose common
characteristic is the Bpermanent means of
publication$C
San Mig%e# Corp. v. +L"C
IssueD Ghether claim of an employee against his
employer for cash reward or submitting process
to eliminate defects in .uality ? taste of %an
)iguel product falls within 2urisdiction of the
labor arbiter of 5LR&R
@eldD 5o$ Outside of 2urisdiction$ 5ot necessary
that entire uni!erse of money claims under
2urisdiction of labor arbiter but only those to *$"
unfair labor practices, :$" claims concerning
terms ? conditions of employment 9$" claims
relating to household ser!ices 7$" acti!ities
prohibited to employers ? employees$
%tatuteD B2urisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the
5LR&, as last amended by 'P 'lg$ ::,
including paragraph - Ball money claims of
wor1ers, including hose based on nonpayment
or underpayment of wages, o!ertime
compensation, separation pay, and other
benefits pro!ided by law or appropriate
agreement, ecept claims for employees
compensation, social security, medicare and
maternity benefits$C
Ebar#e v. S%ca#dito
%tatuteD EO :87 outlines the procedure which
complainants charging go!ernment officials and
employees with commission of irregularities
should be guided, applies to criminal actions or
complaints$
EO :87 0 Bcomplaints against public officials and
employees shall be promptly acted upon and
disposed of by the officials or authorities
concerned in accordance with pertinent laws and
regulations so that the erring officials and
employees can be soonest remo!ed or otherwise
disciplines and the innocent, eonerated or
!indicated in li1e manner, and to the end also that
other remedies, including court action, may be
pursued forthwith by the interested parties, after
administrati!e remedies shall ha!e been
ehaustedC
@eldD eecuti!e order does not apply to criminal
actions$ 4he term is closely o!ershadowed by the
.ualification 3 9After administrative remedies s*a##
*ave been e)*a%sted.: which suggest ci!il suits
sub2ect to pre!ious administrati!e actions$
Mottom%# v. de#a Pa'
IssueD Ghether the word Tcourt( in %ec 7, Art
79-9D Appeal shall not stay the award, order,
ruling, decision or 2udgment unless the officer or
body rendering the same or the court, on motion
after hearing, and on such terms as it may deem
2ust should pro!ide otherwise$ 4he propriety of a
stay granted by the officer or body rendering the
award, order, ruling, decision or 2udgment may
be raised only by motion in the main case,C
refers to the &A or to the &ourt of Agrarian
RelationsR
@eldD &orrect construction made clear with
reference to %ec$ * of RA 79-9, where the court,
officers or bodies whose decision, award are
appealable to the &ourt of Appeals, enumerated
as followsD &ourt of Agrarian Relations, %ec$ of
Labor, %ocial %ecurity &ommission etcLH /rom
grouping, the enumeration in %ec$ 7 means
&ourt of Agrarian Relations not &A$
E2usdem generis (or the same 1ind or species"
Keneral ruleD where a general word or phrase
follows an enumeration of particular and specific
words of the same class or where the latter
follow the former, the general word or phrase is
to be construed to include, or to be restricted to,
persons, things or cases a1in to, resembling, or
of the same 1ind or class as those specifically
mentioned$
PurposeD gi!e effect to both particular or general
words, by treating the particular words as
indicating the class and the general words as
indicating all that is embraced in said class,
although not specifically named by the particular
words$
PrincipleD based on proposition that had the
legislature intended the general words to be
used in their generic and unrestricted sense, it
would ha!e not enumerated the specific words$
PresumptionD legislators addressed specifically
to the particulariAation
Illustration
M%t%c v. COMELEC
%tatuteD Act ma1es unlawful the distribution of
electoral propaganda gadgets, pens, lighters,
fans, flashlights, athletic goods, materials and t*e
#ike:
@eldD and the li1e, does not embrace taped
2ingles for campaign purposes
M%rp*y. Morris 3 Co. v. Co##ector of C%stoms
%tatuteD Dynamos, generators, eciters, and other
machinery for the generation of electricity for
lighting or for powerH
@eldD phrase Bother machineryC would not include
steam turbines, pumps, condensers, because not
same 1ind of machinery with dynamos,
generators and eciters$
2era v. C%evas
%tatuteD all condensed s1immed mil1 and all mil1
in whate!er form shall be clearly and legibly
mar1ed on its immediate containers with wordsD
B4his mil1 is not suitable for nourishment for
infants less than * year of ageC
@eldD restricts the phrase Ball mil1 in whate!er
form,C ecluded filled mil1$
,rap*i#on v. M%nicipa# Co%rt of Cigara
%tatuteD the !ice3mayor shall be entitled to
assume the office of the mayor during the
absence, suspension or other temporary disability
@eldD anything which disables the mayor from
eercising the power and prerogati!es of his
office, since Btheir temporary disabilityC follows the
words BabsenceC and BsuspensionC
Peo. v. Maga##anes
Ghere a law grants a court eclusi!e 2urisdiction
to hear and decide Boffenses or felonies
committed by public officials and employees in
relation to their office,C the phrase BI5 RELA4IO5
4O 4@EIR O//I&EC .ualifies or restricts the
offense to one which cannot eist without the
office, or the office is a constituent element of the
crime defined in the statute or one perpetuated in
the performance, though improper or irregular, of
his official functions
C% 1n-ieng Sons. /nc. v. ord of Ta) Appea#s
IssueD whether losses due to the war were to be
deductible from gross income of *+97 when they
were sustained, or in *+76 when Philippine Gar
Damage &ommission ad!ised that no payment
would be made for said lossesR
%tatuteD BIn the case of a corporation, all losses
actually sustained and not charged off within the
taable year and not compensated for by
insurance or otherwise$C
&ontentionD the assurances of responsible public
officials before the end of *+97 that property
owners would be compensated for their losses as
a result of the war sufficed to place the losses
within the phrase Bcompensated otherwiseC
than by insurance
@eldD Re2ectedS BOtherwiseC in the clause
9compensated for by ins%rance or ot*er;ise:
refers to compensation due under a title
analogous or similar to insurance$ Inasmuch as
the latter is a contract establishing a legal
obligation, it follows that in order to be deemed
Bcompensated for Totherwise,( the losses
sustained by a tapayer must be co!ered by a
2udicially enforceable right, springing from any of
the 2uridical sources of obligations, namely, law,
contract, .uasi3contract, torts, or crimes,C and not
mere pronouncement of public officials
Ceb% /nstit%te of Tec*no#ogy v. Op#e
IssueD Ghether teachers hired on contract basis
are entitled to ser!ice incenti!e lea!e benefits as
against the claim that they are not soR
%tatuteD Rule > of IRR of Labor &odeD B4his rule
(on ser!ice incenti!e lea!es" shall apply to all
employees, ecept Bfiled personnel and other
employees whose performance is unsuper!ised
by the employer including those who are
engaged on tas1 or contract basis$C
@eldD Bthose who were employed on tas1 or
contract basisC should be related with Bfield
personnel,C apply the principle, clearly teachers
are not field personnel and therefore entitled to
ser!ice incenti!e lea!e benefits$
Cagayan 2a##ey Enterprises v. CA
IssueD whether the phrase Bother lawful
be!eragesC which gi!es protection to
manufacturer with the Phil$ Patent Office its duly
stamped or mar1ed bottles used for Bsoda water,
mineral or aerated waters, cider, mil1, cream or
other lawful be!erages,C includes hard li.uorR
%tatute titleD BAn Act to regulate the use of
stamped or mar1ed bottles, boes, cas1s, 1egs,
barrels, ? other similar containers$C
@eldD 4he title clearly shows intent to gi!e
protection to all mar1ed bottles of all lawful
be!erages regardless of nature of contents$
+ationa# Po;er Corp. v. Angas
IssueD whether the term 2udgment, refers to any
2udgment directing the payment of legal interest$
%tatuteD &entral 'an1 &ircular I 9*8 0 Bby !irtue
of the authority granted to it under %ec$ * of Act
5umber :877, as amended, otherwise 1nown as
Fsury Law, the )onetary 'oard in a resolution
prescribed that the rate of interest for loan or
forbearance of any money, good or credit ? the
rate allowed in 2udgment in the absence of
epress contract shall be *:N per annum$
@eldD #udgments should mean only 2udgments
in!ol!ing loans or forbearance money, goods or
credit, these later specific terms ha!ing restricted
the meaning B2udgmentsC to those same class or
the same nature as those specifically
enumerated$
"ep%b#ic v. Migrino
/actsD retired military officer was in!estigated by
the P&KK for !iolation of Anti3Kraft Act in relation
to EO I * ? : authoriAing the P&KK to reco!er ill3
gotten wealth from the former President(s
Bsubordinates and close associatesC
IssueD Does P&KK ha!e 2urisdiction to in!estigate
such military officer for being in ser!ice during the
administration of the former PresidentR
@eldD B%ubordinatesC refers only to one who
en2oys close association or relation to the former
President and his wifeH term Bclose associatesC
restricted the meaning of BsubordinatesC
Limitations of e2usdem generis
Re.uisitesD
o %tatute contains an enumeration of
particular ? specific words, followed by
general word or phrase
o Particular and specific words constitute a
class or are the same 1ind
o Enumeration of the particular ? specific
words is not ehausti!e or is not merely
by eamples
o 4here is no indication of legislati!e intent
to gi!e the general words or phrases a
broader meaning
Rule of e-%sdem generis. is not of uni!ersal
applicationH it should use to carry out, not defeat
the intent of the law$
1S v. Santo +ino
%tatuteD It shall be unlawful to for any person to
carry concealed about his person any bowie,
1nife, dagger, 1ris or other deadly weapon$
Provided prohibition shall not apply to firearms
who ha!e secured a license or who are entitled to
carry the same under the pro!isions of this Act$C
IssueD does Bthe deadly weaponC include an
unlicensed re!ol!erR
@eldD MesS &arrying such would be in !iolation of
statute$ 'y the pro!iso, it manifested its intention
to include in the prohibition weapons other than
armas blancas therein specified$
Cagayan 2a##ey Enterprises. /nc. v. CA & previo%s page.
sa 1abilang column
"oman Cat*o#ic Arc*bis*op of Mani#a v. Socia# Sec%rity
Commission
IssueD a religious institution in!o1ing e-%sdem
generi whether TemployerC be limited to
underta1ing an acti!ity which has an element of
profit or gainR
%tatuteD Bany person, natural or 2uridical, domestic
or foreign, who carried in the Philippines any
trade, business, industryL$ and uses the ser!ices
of another person, who under his orders as
regard the employment, ecept the Ko!ernment,
and any of its political subdi!isions branches or
instrumentalities and KO&&sC$
@eldD 5o$ the rule of e-%sdem generis applies
only when there is uncertainty$ 4he definition is
sufficiently comprehensi!e to include charitable
institutions and charities not for profitH it contained
eceptions which said institutions and entities are
not included$
Epressio unius est eclusion alterius
4he epress mention of one person, thing or
conse.uence implies the eclusion of all others$
Rule may be epressed in a number of waysD
o E)press%m facit cessare tacit%m A what is
epressed puts an end to that which is
implied where a statute, by its terms, is
epressly limited to certain matters, it
may not, by interpretation or construction,
be etended to other matters$
o E)ceptio firmat reg%#am in casib%s non
e)ceptis 3 A thing not being ecepted
must be regarded as coming within the
pur!iew of the general rule
o E)pressio %ni%s est e)c#%sion a#teri%s 3
4he epression of one or more things of a
class implies the eclusion of all not
epressed, e!en though all would ha!e
been implied had none been epressedH
opposite the doctrine of necessary
implication
5egati!e3opposite doctrine
Arg%ment%m a contrarioA what is epressed puts
an end to what is implied$
C*%ng Fook v. @*ite
%tatuteD case eempts the wife of a naturaliAed
American from detention, for treatment in a
hospital, who is afflicted with a contagious
disease$
@eldD &ourt denied petition for writ of habeas
corpus (filed by the nati!e3born American citiAen
on behalf of wife detained in hospital", court
resorted to negati!e3opposite doctrine, stating
that statute plainly relates to wife of a naturaliAed
citiAen ? cannot interpolate Bnati!e3bornC citiAen$
AnalysisD court(s application results to in2ustice
(as should not discriminate against nati!e3born
citiAens", which is not intent of law, should ha!e
used doctrine of necessary implication$
Application of e)pression %ni%s rule
Kenerally used in construction of statutes
granting powers, creating rights and remedies,
restricting common rights, imposing rights ?
forfeitures, as well as statutes strictly construed$
Acosta v. F#or
%tatuteD specifically designates the persons who
may bring actions for $%o ;arranto. ecludes
others from bringing such actions$
Escribano v. Avi#a
%tatuteD for libel, Bpreliminary in!estigations of
criminal actions for written defamation shall
be conducted by the city fiscal of pro!ince or city
or by municipal court of city or capital of the
pro!ince where such actions may be instituted
precludes all other municipal courts from
conducting such preliminary in!estigations
Peo. v. Lantin
%tatuteD crimes which cannot be prosecuted de
oficio namely adultery, concubinage, seduction,
rape or acts of lasci!iousnessH crimes such as
slander can be prosecuted de oficio.
)ore short eamples on p$ ::7
Mani#a Lodge +o. =>? v. CA
Santos v. CA
Ler%m v. Cr%'
Centra# arrio v. City Treas%rer of Davao
2era v. Fernande'
%tatuteD All claims for money against the
decedent, arising from contracts, epress or
implied, whether the same be due, not due, or
contingent, all claims for funeral epenses and
epenses for the last sic1ness of the decedent,
and 2udgment for money against decedent, must
be filled within the time limit of the notice,
otherwise barred fore!er$
@eldD 4he taes due to the go!ernment, not being
mentioned in the rule are ecluded from the
operation of the rule$
Mendeni##a v. Omandia
%tatuteD changed the form of go!ernment of a
municipality into a city pro!ides that the
incumbent mayor, !ice3mayor and members of
the municipal board shall continue in office until
the epiration of their terms$
@eldD all other municipal offices are abolished$
%tte v. Man%e# 1y 3 Sons. /nc.
%tatuteD Legislature deliberately selected a
particular method of gi!ing notice, as when a co3
owner is gi!en the right of legal redemption within
-6 days from notice in writing by the !endor in
case the other co3owner sells his share is the co3
owned property,
@eldD the method of gi!ing notice must be
deemed ecusi!e ? a notice sent by !endee is
ineffecti!e$
2i##an%eva v. City of /#oi#o
%tatuteD Local Autonomy Act, local go!ernments
are gi!en broad powers to ta e!erything, ecept
those which are specifically mentioned therein$ If
a sub2ect matter does not come within the
eceptions, an ordinance imposing a ta on such
sub2ect matter is deemed to come within the
broad taing power, e)ception firmat reg%#am in
casib%s non e)ceptis.
Samson v. Co%rt of Appea#s
Ghere the law pro!ides that positions in the
go!ernment belong to the competiti!e ser!ice,
ecept those declared by law to be in the
noncompetiti!e ser!ice and those which are
policy3determining, primarily confidential or highly
technical in nature and enumerates those in the
noncompetiti!e as including %E&RE4ARIE% O/
KO>ER5OR% A5D )AMOR%, the clear intent is
that assistant secretaries of go!ernors and
mayors fall under the competiti!e ser!ice, for by
ma1ing an enumeration, the legislature is
presumed to ha!e intended to eclude those not
enumerated, for otherwise it would ha!e included
them in the enumeration
Firman ,enera# /ns%rance Corp. v. CA
4he insurance company disclaimed liability since
death resulting from murder was impliedly
ecluded in the insurance policy as the cause of
death is not accidental but rather a deliberate and
intentional act, ecluded by the !ery nature of a
personal accident insurance$
@eldD the principle Bepresssio unius est eclusio
3 the mention of one thing implies the eclusion of
the other thing 3 not ha!ing been epressly
included in the enumeration of circumstances that
would negate liability in said insurance policy
cannot be considered by implication to discharge
the petitioner insurance company to include death
resulting from murder or assault among the
prohibited ris1s lead ine!itably to the conclusion
that it did not intend to limit or eempt itself from
liability for such death
Insurance company still liable for the in2ury,
disability and loss suffered by the insured$ (sobra
Tto, I swearS )inurder na nga, ayaw pang
bayaranS %obraS @indi daw accidentalL eh di
mas lalo ng 1ailangang bayaran dahil murderS
%usS %usS"
Centeno v. 2i##a#onAPorni##os
IssueD whether the solicitation for religious
purposes, i$e$, reno!ation of church without
securing permit fro Department of %ocial
%er!ices, is a !iolation of PD *789, ma1ing it a
criminal offense for a person to solicit or recei!e
contributions for charitable or public welfare
purposes$
@eldD 5o$ &haritable and religious specifically
enumerated only goes to show that the framers of
the law in .uestion ne!er intended to include
solicitations for religious purposes within its
co!erage$
Limitations of the rule
*$ It is not a rule of law, but merely a tool in statutory
construction
:$ E)pressio %ni%s est e)c#%sion a#teri%s. no more
than auiliary rule of interpretation to be ignored
where other circumstances indicate that the
enumeration was not intended to be eclusi!e$
-$ Does not apply where enumeration is by way of
eample or to remo!e doubts only$
,ome' v. 2ent%ra
IssueD whether the prescription by a physician of
opium for a patient whose physical condition did
not re.uire the use of such drug constitutes
Bunprofessional conductC as to 2ustify re!ocation
of physician(s license to practice
@eldD %till liableS Rule of e)pressio %ni%s not
applicable
&ourt said, I cannot be seriously contended that
aside from the fi!e eamples specified, there can
be no other conduct of a physician deemed
Tunprofessional$( 5or can it be con!incingly
argued that the legislature intended to wipe out all
other forms of Tunprofessional( conduct therefore
deemed grounds for re!ocation of licenses
9$ Does not apply when in case a statute appears
upon its face to limit the operation of its pro!ision
to particular persons or things enumerating them,
but no reason eists why other persons or things
not so enumerated should not ha!e been
included and manifest in2ustice will follow by not
including them$
7$ If it will result in incongruities or a !iolation of the
e.ual protection clause of the &onstitution$
8$ If adherence thereto would cause incon!enience,
hardship and in2ury to the public interest$
Doctrine of casus omissus
A person, ob2ect or thing omitted from an
enumeration must be held to ha!e been omitted
intentionally$
4he maim operates only if and when the
omission has been clearly established, and in
such a case what is omitted in the enumeration
may not, by construction, be included therein$
EceptionD where legislature did not intend to
eclude the person, thing or ob2ect from the
enumeration$ If such legislati!e intent is clearly
indicated, the court may supply the omission if to
do so will carry out the clear intent of the
legislature and will not do !iolence to its language
Doctrine of last antecedent
Pualifying words restrict or modify only the words
or phrases to which they are immediately
associated not those which are distantly or
remotely located$
Ad pro)im%m antecedens fiat re#atio nisi
impediat%r sententia & relati!e words refer to the
nearest antecedents, unless the contet
otherwise re.uires
RuleD use of a comma to separate an antecedent
from the rest eerts a dominant influence in the
application of the doctrine of last antecedent$
Illustration of rule
Pangi#inan v. A#vendia
)embers of the family of the tenant includes the
tenant(s son, son3in3law, or grandson, e!en
though they are not dependent upon him for
support and li!ing separately from him 'E&AF%E
the .ualifying phrase Bwho are dependent upon
him for supportC refers solely to its last
antecedent, namely, Bsuch other person or
persons, whether related to the tenant or notC
F#orentino v. P+
IssueD whether holders of bac1pay certificates can
compel go!ernment3owned ban1s to accept said
certificates in payment of the holder(s obligations
to the ban1$
%tatuteD Bobligations subsisting at the time of the
appro!al of this amendatory act for which the
applicant may directly be liable to the go!ernment
or to any of its branches or instrumentalities, or to
corporations owned or controlled by the
go!ernment, or to any citiAens of the Philippines
or to any association or corporation organiAed
under the laws of the Philippines, who may be
wiling to accept the same for such settlementC
@eldD the court, in!o1ing the doctrine of last
antecedent, ruled that the phrase .ualify only to
its last antecedent namely Bany citiAen of the
Philippines or association or corporation
organiAed under the laws of the PhilippinesC
4he court held that bac1pay certificate holders
can compel go!ernment3owned ban1s to accept
said certificates for payment of their obligations
with the ban1$
Pualifications of the doctrine$
*$ %ub2ect to the eception that where the intention
of the law is to apply the phrase to all
antecedents embraced in the pro!ision, the same
should be made etensi!e to the whole$
:$ Doctrine does not apply where the intention is not
to .ualify the antecedent at all$
Reddendo singular singuilis
>ariation of the doctrine of last antecedent
Referring each to eachH
Referring each phrase or epression to its
appropriate ob2ect, or let each be put in its proper
place, that is, the word should be ta1en
distributi!ely$
Peo. v Tamani
IssueD when to count the *73day period within
which to appeal a 2udgment of con!iction of
criminal actionXdate of promulgation of 2udgment
or date of receipt of notice of 2udgment$
%tatuteD %ec$ 8, Rule *:: of the Rules of &ourt
@eldD %hould be from Tpromulgation( should be
referring to T2udgment,( while notice refer to order$
0ing v. !ernande'
IssueD Ghether a &hinese holding a noncontrol
position in a retail establishment, comes within
the prohibition against aliens inter!ening Bin the
management, operation, administration or controlC
followed by the phrase Bwhether as an officer,
employee or laborerL
@eldD /ollowing the principle, the entire scope of
personnel acti!ity, including that of laborers, is
co!ered by the prohibition against the
employment of aliens$
Amadora v. CA
IssueD whether Art :*;6 of &i!il &ode, which
states that Blastly teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trade shall be liable for
damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices so long as they remain in their
custodyC applies to all schools, academic as well
as non3academic
@eldD teachers pupils and studentsH heads of
establishments of arts and trades to
apprentices
Keneral ruleD responsibility for the tort committed
by the student will attach to the teacher in charge
of such student (where school is academic"
EceptionD responsibility for the tort committed by
the student will attach to the head, and only he,
(who" shall be held liable (in case of the
establishments of arts and tradesH technical or
!ocational in nature"
PROVISOS, E,CEPTIONS AND CLAUSES
Pro!isos, generally
to limit the application of the enacting clause,
section or pro!ision of a statute, or ecept
something, or to .ualify or restrain its generality,
or eclude some possible ground of
misinterpretation of it, as etending to cases not
intended by legislature to be brought within its
pur!iew$
RuleD restrain or .ualify the generality of the
enacting clause or section which it refers$
PurposeD limit or restrict the general language or
operation of the statute, not to enlarge it$
LocationD commonly found at the end of a statute,
or pro!ision ? introduced, as a rule, by the word
BPro!idedC$
Determined byD Ghat determines whether a
clause is a pro!iso is its substance rather than its
form$ If it performs any of the functions of a
pro!iso, then it will be regarded as such,
irrespecti!e of what word or phrase is used to
introduce it$
Pro!iso may enlarge scope of law
It is still the duty of the courts to ascertain the
legislati!e intention and it pre!ails o!er pro!iso$
4hus it may enlarge, than restrict
1.S. v. Santo +ino
%tatuteD it shall be unlawful for any person to
carry concealed about his person any bowie,
1nife, dagger, 1ris or any other deadly weaponD
Provided. that this pro!ision shall not apply to
firearms in the possession of persons who ha!e
secured a license therefore or who are entitled to
same under pro!isions of this Act$
@eldD through the Pro!iso it manifested the
intention to include in the prohibition weapons
other than armas b#ancas as specified$
Pro!iso as additional legislation
Epressed in the opening statement of a section
of a statute
Gould mean eactly the re!erse of what is
necessarily implied when read in connection with
the limitation
PurposeD
o 4o limit generalities
o Eclude from the scope of the statute that
which otherwise would be within its terms
Ghat pro!iso .ualifies
Keneral ruleD .ualifies or modifies only the phrase
immediately preceding itH or restrains or limits
the generality of the clause that it immediately
follows$
EceptionD unless it clearly appears that the
legislature intended to ha!e a wider scope
C*inese F#o%r /mporters Assn v. Price Stabi#i'ation oard
%tatuteD %ec$ *7 RA 9:8 3 Any eisting law,
eecuti!e order or regulation to the contrary
notwithstanding, no go!ernment agency ecept
the Import &ontrol &ommission shall allocate the
import .uota among the !arious importers$
Provided. 4hat the Philippine Rehabilitation and
4rade Administration shall ha!e eclusi!e power
and authority to determine and regulate the
allocation of wheat flour among importers$C
IssueD whether or not the pro!iso ecluded wheat
flour from the scope of act itself$
@eldD 5OS Pro!iso refer to the clause
immediately preceding it and can ha!e no other
meaning than that the function of allocating the
wheat flour instead of assigning to Import &ontrol
&ommission was assigned to PR4A$
If wheat flour is eempted from the pro!isions of
the Act, the pro!iso would ha!e been placed in
the section containing the repealing clause
Co##ector of /nterna# "even%e v. Ange#es
Ghen an earlier section of statute contains
pro!iso, not embodied in later section, the
pro!iso, not embodied in a later section thereof, in
the absence of legislati!e intent, be confined to
.ualify only the section to which it has been
appended$
F#ores v. Miranda
IssueD Petitioner that appro!al of the Public
%er!ice &ommission of the sale of public ser!ice
!ehicle was not necessary because of pro!iso in
%ec$ :6 of &ommonwealth Act 5o$ *98
%tatuteD It shall be unlawful for any public ser!ice
!ehicle or for the owner, lessee or operator
thereof, without the pre!ious appro!al and
authority of the &ommission pre!iously had to
sell, alienate its property, franchiseH Provided.
*o;ever. that nothing herein contained shall be
construed to pre!ent the transaction from being
negotiated or completed before its appro!al or to
pre!ent the sale, alienation, or lease by any
public ser!ice of any of its property in the ordinary
course of businessC
@eldD
o the pro!iso means only that the sale
without the re.uired appro!al is still !alid
and binding between the partiesH also
o the phrase Bin the ordinary course of
business could not ha!e been
intended to include sale of !ehicle itself,
but at most may refer only to such
property that may be concei!ably
disposed of by the carrier in the ordinary
course of its business, li1e 2un1ed
e.uipment$
Mercado Sr. v. +L"C
@eldD the pro!iso in par : of Art :;6 relates only
to casual employeesH not to pro2ect employees$
Applying rule that pro!iso to be construed with
reference to immediately preceding part of the
pro!ision which it is attached and not to other
sections thereof, unless legislati!e intent was to
restrict or .ualify$
Eception to the rule
Pro!iso construed to .ualify only the immediately
preceding part of the section to which it is
attachedH if no contrary legislati!e intent is
indicated$
Ghere intent is to .ualify or restrict the phrase
preceding it or the earlier pro!isions of the statute
or e!en the statute itself as a whole, then the
pro!iso will be construed in that manner, in order
that the intent of the law may be carried out
Repugnancy between pro!iso and main pro!ision
Ghere there is a conflict between the pro!iso and
the main pro!ision, that which is located in a later
portion of the statute pre!ails, unless there is
legislati!e intent to the contrary$
Latter pro!ision, whether pro!ision or not, is gi!en
preference for it is the latest epression of the
intent of the legislation$
Eceptions, generally
Eception consists of that which would otherwise
be included in the pro!ision from which it is
ecepted$
It is a clause which eempts something from the
operation of a statute by epress words$
Becept,C Bunless otherwise,C and Bshall not applyC
)ay not be introduced by words mentioned
abo!e, as long as if such remo!es something
from the operation of a pro!ision of law$
/unctionD to confirm the general ruleH .ualify the
words or phrases constituting the general rule$
E)ceptio firmat reg%#am in casib%s e)ceptis A A
thing not being ecepted, must be regarded as
coming within the pur!iew of the general rule$
DoubtsD resol!ed in fa!or of general rule
Eception and Pro!iso distinguished
EceptionD
Eempts something absolutely from the operation
of statute
4a1es out of the statute something that otherwise
would be a part of the sub2ect matter of it$
Part of the enactment itself, absolutely ecluding
from its operation some sub2ect or thing that
would otherwise fall within the scope$
Pro!isoD
Defeats its operation conditionally$
A!oids by way of defeasance or ecuse
If the enactment is modified by engrafting upon it
a new pro!ision, by way of amendment, pro!iding
conditionally for a new case3 this is the nature of
pro!iso$
%imilarD in a way since one of the functions of pro!iso is to
ecept something from an enacting clause$
Illustration of eception

ME"ALCO v. P%b#ic 1ti#ities Emp#oyeesD Association
%tatuteD 5o person, firm, or corporation, business
establishment or place shall compel an employee
or laborer to wor1 on %undays? legal holidays,
unless paid an additional sum of at least :7N of
his renumerationD Provided. that this prohibition
shall not apply to public utilities performing public
ser!ice, e$g$ supplying gas, electricity, power,
water etcL
IssueD Is )ERAL&O liable to pay the :7N for
employees who wor1 during holidays and
%undaysR
@eldD 5egati!e$ :
nd
part is an eception although
introduced by BPro!ided$C As appellant is a public
utility that supplies electricity ? pro!ides means of
transportation, it is e!ident that appellant is
eempt from .ualified prohibition established in
the enactment clause$
To#entino v. Secretary of Finance
%tatuteD 5o bill shall be passed by either @ouse
shall become a law unless it has passed -
readings on separate days, ? printed copies
thereof in its final form ha!e been distributed to its
)embers - days before its passage, e)cept when
the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency$
@eldD it .ualifies only its nearest antecedent,
which is the distribution of the printed bill in its
final form - days from its final passage$? not the
- readings on separate days$
Pendon v. Diasnes
IssueD whether a person con!icted of a crime
against property, who was granted absolute
pardon by the President, is entitled to !oteR
%tatuteD A person shall not be .ualified to !ote
Bwho has been sentenced by final 2udgment to
suffer one year or more from imprisonment, such
disability not ha!ing been remo!ed any plenary
pardonC or Bwho has been declared by final
2udgment guilty of any crime against property$C
*
st
clause3 : ecpetions 0 (a" Person penaliAed by
less than * yr$H and (:" Person granted an
absolute pardon
:
nd
clause 3 creates eception to *
st
but not to :
nd
that a person con!icted of crime against property
cannot !ote unless there(s pardon$
@eldD absolute pardon for any crime for which one
year of imprisonment or more was meted out
restores the prisoner to his political rights$
If penalty less * yr, dis.ualification not apply,
ecept when against property3 needs pardon$
4he :
nd
clause creates the eception to the *
st

,orospe v. CA Be)ception need not be introd%ced by
9e)cept: or 9%n#ess:C
%tatuteD Rule :, of Rules of &ourt, Bser!ice by
registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by
the addresseeH but if fail to claim his mail from the
post office within 7 days from ate of first notice of
the postmaster, ser!ice shall ta1e effect at the
epiration of such time$C
IssueD Ghether actual receipt the date of a
registered mail after 7 day period, is the date from
which to count the prescripti!e period to comply
with certain re.uirements$
@eldD %er!ice is completed on the 7
th
day after the
*
st
notice, e!en if he actually recei!ed the mail
months later$
:
nd
part is separated by semicolon, and begins
with Tbut( which indicates eception$
%a!ing clause
Pro!ision of law which operates to ecept from
the effect of the law what the clause pro!ides, or
sa!e something which would otherwise be lost$
Fsed to sa!e something from effect of repeal of
statute
Legislature, in repealing a statute, may preser!e
in the form of a sa!ing clause, the right of the
state to prosecute and punish offenses committed
in !iolation of the repealed law$
Ghere eisting procedure is altered or substituted
by another, usual to sa!e proceedings under the
old law at the time the new law ta1es effect, by
means of sa!ing clause
&onstruedD in light of intent by legislature
Ki!en strict or liberal meaning depending on
nature of statute$
CHAPTER SI,: Statute Construe" as W$o'e an" !n
Re'at!on to ot$er Statutes
STATUTE CONSTRUED AS WHOLE
Kenerally
%tatute is passed as a whole
o It should ha!e one purpose and one
intent
o &onstrue its parts and section in
connection with other parts
o GhyR 4o BproduceC a harmonious whole
5e!erD
o Di!ide by process of etymological
dissertation (whyR 'ecause there are
instances when the intention of the
legislati!e body is different from that of
the definition in its original sense"
o %eparate the words (remember that the
whole point of this chapter is to construe
it as a whole"
o %eparate contet
o 'ase definitions on leicographer (what is
a leicographerR A person who studies
leicography$ Ghat is leicography thenR
AnalyAes semantic relationships between
leicon and language 0 not important$
5e!er mind " 0 ang 1ulitS
4he whole point of this part is to construe the
whole statute and its part together (actually 1ahit
ito nalang tandaan hanggang matapos 1asi ito
lang yung sinasabi ng boo1"
Intent ascertained from statute as whole
Legislati!e meaning and intent should be
etracted=ascertained from statutes as a whole
(hence the titleL"
o GhyR 'ecause the law is the best
epositor of itself
Optima Statuti Interpretatio est ipsum
statutum 3 the best interpreter of a statute is the
statute itself
o Yremember t*is story to memori'e t*e
ma)imD Optima at %tatuti /rutti where
interpreting as to why when
coc1roaches(IPI%" when added results to
%F) (ipsum" a stadium (statutum"Z 0
sorry bloc1mates, weird si cherryS
Do not in.uire too much into the moti!es which
influenced the legislati!e body unless the moti!e
is stated or disclosed in the statute themsel!es$
Aisporna v. CA
pointed out that words, clauses, phrases should
not be studied as detached=isolated epressions
o &onsider e!ery part in understanding the
meaning of its part to produce a
harmonious whole
o )eaning of the law is borne in mind and
not to be etracted from a single word
o )ost importantD E!ery part of the statute
must be interpreted with reference to the
contet
Aboiti' S*ipping Corp v. City of Ceb%
Described that if the words or phrases of statute
be ta1en indi!idually it might con!ey a meaning
different form the one intended by the author$
Interpreting words or phrases separately may limit
the etent of the application of the pro!ision
,aanan v. /ntermediate Appe##ate Co%rt
&ase of wire tapping
4here is a pro!ision which states that B it shall be
unlawful for any person, not being authoriAed by
all the parties to any pri!ate communication or
spo1en word to tap any wire or cable or by using
any other de!ice or arrangement, to secretly
o!erhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spo1en word by using such
de!ice commonly 1nown as dictagraphLC
IssueD whether the phrase de!ice or arrangement
includes party line and etension
%tatconD it should not be construed in isolation$
Rather it should be interpreted in relation to the
other words (tap, to o!erhear" thus party line or
telephone etension is not included because the
words in the pro!ision limit it to those that ha!e a
physical interruption through a wiretap or the
deliberate installation of de!ice to o!erhear$
(Remember the maim noscitus a sociis because
in here they applied an association with other
words in construing the intention or limitation of
the statute"
+ationa# Tobacco Administration v. COA
IssueD whether educational assistance gi!en to
indi!iduals prior to the enactment of RA 8,7;
should be continued to be recei!edR
@eldD Mes$ Proper interpretation of section*: RA
8,7; depends on the combination of first and
second paragraph
/irst sentence states that Bsuch other additional
compensation not otherwise specified as may be
determined by the D') shall be deemed included
in the standardiAed salary rates herein
prescribed$C 4he second sentence states Bsuch
other additional compensation, whether in cash or
in 1ind, being recei!ed by incumbents only as of
#uly *, *+;+ not integrated into the standard shall
continue to be authoriAed$C (you can as1 cheery
na lang to eplain it, ang haba ng nasa boo1 "
statconD do not isolate or detach the parts$
&onstruing a statute as a whole includes
reconciling and harmoniAing conflicting pro!isions
Purpose or contet as controlling guide
construe whole statute and ascertain the meaning
of the words or phrases base on its contet, the
nature of the sub2ect, and purpose or intention of
the legislati!e body who enacted the statute
gi!e it a reasonable construction
Leeway are accepted on grammatical
construction, letters of the statutes, rhetorical
framewor1 if it can pro!ide a clear and definite
purpose of the whole statute ( as long as it can
produce a clear and definite statutes, it is
sometimes affected to be la on the construction
of grammar"
@armoniAe the parts of each other and it should
be consistent with its scope and ob2ect
Ki!ing effect to statute as a whole
Ghy construe a statute as a wholeR 3 'ecause it
implies that one part is as important as the other
Ghat if the pro!ision=section is unclear by itselfR 3
One can ma1e it clear by reading and construing
it in relation to the whole statute
@ow do you properly and intelligently construe a
pro!ision=statuteR 3 - waysD (*" Fnderstand its
meaning and scopeH (:" apply to an actual caseH
(-" courts should consider the whole act itself
Ghy should e!ery part of the statute be gi!en
effectR 3 'ecause it is enacted as an integrated
measure not a hodgepodge of conflicting
pro!isions
Gays on how the courts should construe a statute
(according to "ep%b#ic v. "eyes"D
o Interpret the thought con!eyed by the
statute as whole
o &onstrue constituent parts together
o Ascertain legislati!e intent form whole
part
o &onsider each and e!ery pro!ision in
light of the general purpose
o )a1e e!ery part effecti!e, harmonious
and sensible (adopt a construction which
would gi!e effect to e!ery part of the of
the statute"
Ft res magis !aleat .uam pereat
3 the construction is to be sought
which gi!es effect to the whole of
the statute 3 of its e!ery word$
Apparently conflicting pro!isions reconciled
included in the rule of construing statute as a
whole, is the reconciling and harmoniAing
conflicting pro!isions because it is by this that the
statute will be gi!en effect as a whole$
Ghy is it a must for courts to harmoniAe
conflicting pro!isionR 3 'ecause they are e.ually
the handiwor1 of the same legislature
"P v. CA
IssueD whether or not an appeal of cases
in!ol!ing 2ust compensation should be made first
by DARA' before R4& under %ec$ 7,
@eldD %& said that the contention of the Republic
and the Land 'an1 in the affirmati!e side has no
merit because although DARA' is granted a
2urisdiction o!er agrarian reform matters, it does
not ha!e 2urisdiction o!er criminal cases$
Sa-onas v. CA
IssueD what period an ad!erse claim annotated at
the bac1 of a transfer certificate effecti!eR
@eldD In construing the law %ec$ ,6 of PD *7:+
(ad!erse claim shall be effecti!e for a period of -6
days from the date of the registrationL" care
should be ta1en to ma1e e!ery part effecti!e
%pecial and general pro!isions in same statute
special would o!errule the general
special must be operati!eH general affect only
those it applies
ecept to general pro!ision
&onstruction as not to render pro!ision nugatory
another conse.uence of the ruleD pro!ision of a
statute should not be construed as to nullify or
render another nugatory in the same statute
Interpretatio fienda est et res magis !aleat .uam
pereat 3 a law should be interpreted with a !iew to
upholding rather than destroying
o Do not construe a statute wherein one
portion will destroy the other
o A!oid a construction which will render to
pro!ision inoperati!e
Reason for the rule
because of the presumption that the legislature
has enacted a statute whose pro!isions are in
harmony and consistent with each other and that
conflicting intentions is the same statute are
ne!er supported or regarded
Pualification of rule
Ghat if the parts cannot be harmoniAed or
reconciled without nullifying the otherR 3 Rule is
for the court to re2ect the one which is least in
accord with the general plan of the whole statute
Ghat if there is no choiceR 3 the latter pro!ision
must !acate the formerH last in order is fre.uently
held to pre!ail unless intent is otherwise
Ghat if the conflict cannot be harmoniAed and
made to stand togetherR 3 one must in.uire into
the circumstances of their passage
&onstruction as to gi!e life to law
pro!ide sensible interpretation to promote the
ends of which they were enacted
construct them in a reasonable and practical way
to gi!e life to them
Interpretatio fienda es ut res magis !aleat .uam
pereat 3 interpretation will gi!e the efficacy that is
to be adopted$
&onstruction to a!oid surplusage
construe the statute to ma1e no part or pro!ision
thereof as surplasage
each and e!ery part should be gi!en due effect
and meaning
do not construe a legal pro!ision to be a useless
surplusage and meaningless
eert all efforts to pro!ide the meaning$ GhyR
'ecause of the presumption that the legislature
used the word or phrase for a purpose
Application of rule
Me-ia v.a#a#ong
IssueD how to constru Bnet general electionC in
%ec$ ;; of the &ity &harter of Dagupan &ityR
@eldD the phrase refers to the net general
election after the city came into being and not the
one after its organiAation by Presidential
Proclamation$
+iere v. CF/ of +egros Occidenta#
IssueD does the city mayor ha!e the power to
appoint a city engineer pursuant to %ec$ * of the
&ity &harter of La &arlote
@eldD no, the city mayor does not ha!e such
power$ 4he phrase Band other heads and other
employees of such departments as may be
createdC whom the mayor can appoint, refers to
the heads of city departments that may be
created after the law too1 effect, and does not
embrace the city engineer$ 4o rule otherwise is to
render the first con2unction BandC before the words
Bfire departmentC a superfluity and without
meaning at all
1ytengs% v "ep%b#ic
IssueD whether the re.uirement the re.uirement
for naturaliAation that the applicant Bwill reside
continuously in the Philippines from the date of
the filing of the petition up to the time of his
admission to Philippine citiAenshipC refers to
actual residence or merely to legal residence or
domicile
@eldD such re.uirement refers to actual or
physical residence because to construe it
otherwise is to render the clause a surplusage$
An applicant for naturaliAation must be actually
residing in the Philippines from the filing of the
petition for naturaliAation to its determination by
the court
Mani#a Lodge +o. =>? v. CA
IssueD whether the reclaimed land is patrimonial
or public dominionR
@eldD to say that the land is patrimonial will render
nugatory and a surplusage the phrase of the law
to the effect that the &ity of )anila Bis hereby
authoriAed to lease or sellC
A sale of public dominion needs a legislati!e
authoriAation, while a patrimonial land does not$
%tatute and its amendments construed together
rule applies to the construction and its
amendments
Ghate!er changes the legislature made it should
be gi!en effect together with the other parts$
A#meda v. F#orentino
Law 0 Bthe municipal board shall ha!e a secretary
who shall be appointed by it to ser!e during the
term of office of the members thereofC
Amendment 0 Bthe !ice3mayor shall appoint all
employees of the board who may be suspended
or remo!ed in accordance with lawC
&onstruction of both Law and Amendment 0 the
power of the !ice3mayor to ma1e appointment
pursuant to the amendatory act is limited to the
appointment of all employees of the board other
than the board secretary who is to be appointed
by the board itself
STATUTE CONSTRUED IN RELATION TO
CONSTITUTION AND OTHER STATUTES
%tatute construed in harmony with the &onstitution
&onstitution3 the fundamental law to which all
laws are subser!ient
Keneral RuleD Do not interpret a statute
independent from the constitution
&onstrue the statute in harmony with the
fundamental lawD GhyR 'ecause it is always
presumed that the legislature adhered to the
constitutional limitations when they enacted the
statute
It is also important to understand a statute in light
of the constitution and to a!oid interpreting the
former in conflict with the latter
Ghat if the statute is susceptible to two
constructions, one is constitutional and the other
is unconstitutionalR AD 4he construction that
should be adopted should be the one that is
constitutional and the one that will render it in!alid
should be re2ected$
4he &ourt should fa!or the construction that gi!es
a statute of sur!i!ing the test of constitutionality
4he &ourt cannot in order to bring a statute within
the fundamental law, amend it by construction
TaEada v. T%vera
this is the case regarding Art$ : of the &i!il &ode
especially the phrase Bunless otherwise
pro!idedC$
%tatconD one should understand that if the phrase
refers to the publication itself it would !iolate the
constitution (since all laws should be made
public" Yif malabo, !ague, ehR huhR 0 cherry will
eplain it na lang Z
%tatutes in Pari Materia
pari materia 3 refers to any the followingD
o same person or thing
o same purpose of ob2ect
o same specific sub2ect matter
Later statutes may refer to prior laws$
Ghat if the later law ha!e no reference to the
prior law, does that mean they are not in pari
materiaR 3 5o$ It is sufficient that they ha!e the
same sub2ect matter$
Ghen is a statute not in pari materiaR 3 4he
conditions abo!e are the determinants of
ascertaining if a statute is in pari materia, thus
e!en if two statutes are under the same broad
sub2ect as along as their specific sub2ects are not
the same, they are 5O4 in pari material
@ow statutes in Pari Materia construed
Interpretare et concordare leges legibus est
optimus interpretandi modus 0 e!ery statute must
be so construed and harmoniAed with other
statutes as to form a uniform system of
2urisprudence (parang ganun din nung first part,
construe it as a whole$ 'ut also bear in mind that
it should also be in harmony with other eisting
laws"
&onstrue statutes in pari materia together to
attain the purpose of an epress national policy
Ghy should they be construed togetherR 3
'ecause of the assumption that when the
legislature enacted the statutes they were
thin1ing of the prior statute$ Prior statutes relating
to the same sub2ect matter are to be compared
with the new pro!isions$
Again it is important to harmoniAe the statutes$
&ourts should not render them in!alid without
ta1ing the necessary steps in reconciling them
2da de 1rbano v. ,S/S
there were no facts gi!en in the boo1 ecept that
it was in this case that in pari materia was
eplained well$ 4he eplanation are the same in
the aforementioned
Other things to consider in constructing statutes
which are in pari materia
o @istory of the legislation on the sub2ect
o Ascertain the uniform purpose of the
legislature
o Disco!er the policy related to the sub2ect
matter has been changed or modified
o &onsider acts passed at prior sessions
e!en those that ha!e been repealed
Distingue tempora et concordabis 2ura 0
distinguish times and you will harmoniAe laws
In cases of two or more laws with the same
sub2ect matterD
o Puestion is usually whether the later act
impliedly repealed the prior act$
o RuleD the only time a later act will be
repealed or amended is when the act
itself states so (that it supersedes all the
prior acts" or when there is an
irreconcilable repugnancy between the
two$
o In the case of BimpliedC the doubt will be
resol!ed against the repeal or
amendment and in fa!or of the
harmoniAation of the laws on the sub2ect
(later will ser!e as a modification"
Reasons why laws on same sub2ect are reconciled
: main reasonsD
o 4he presumption that the legislature too1
into account prior laws when they
enacted the new one$
Borbiter dict%m ni c*erryF t*is c*apter keeps pointing o%t
t*at t*e #egis#at%re are kno;#edgeab#e on t*e #a;. b%t /
;onder *o; t*e actors fitG /m not discriminating b%t *o;
did Lito Lapid. Loi E-ercito. etc kne; t*e prior #a;sG /
*eard t*ey *ave researc*ers ;*o do it for t*em. @*y
donDt ;e vote t*ose researc*ers insteadG 4%n #ang. /
*ave been reading t*e ;*o#e pres%mption t*at t*e
#egis#at%re is kno;#edgeab#e. Madaming namamatay sa
aka#a. /s agpa#o sti## a#iveG*a*a*a "
o 'ecause enactments of the same
legislature on the same sub2ect are
supposed to form part of one uniform
system (GhyR 'ecause later statutes are
supplementary to the earlier enactments"
If possible construe the two
statutes wherein the pro!isions of
both are gi!en effect
Ghere harmoniAation is impossible
Earlier law should gi!e way to the later law
because it is the BcurrentC or later epression of
the legislati!e will
Illustration of the rule (in pari materia"
Lacson v. "o$%e
IssueD the phrase unless sooner remo!ed of a
statute that states Bthe mayor shall hold office for
four years unless sooner remo!edC
statconD the court held that the phrase should be
construed in relation to remo!al statutes$ 4hus
the phrase meant that although the mayor cannot
be remo!ed during his term of office, once he
!iolates those that are stated in remo!al statutes$
C*in O* Foo v. Concepcion
criminal case Article *:(*" eempting
circumstance (imbecile or insane"
%tatconD the phrase Bshall not be permitted to
lea!e without first obtaining permission of the
same courtC should be reconciled with another
statute that states Bany patient confined in a
mental institution may be released by the Director
of @ealth once he is cured$ 4he Director shall
inform the 2udge that appro!ed the confinementC$
4hese two statutes refers to a person who was
criminally charged but was pro!en to be an
imbecile or insane, thus they should be construed
together$ 4heir construction would mean that in
order for the patient to be release there should be
an appro!al of both the court and the Director of
@ealth$
0ing v. !ernae'
%tatconD relation of RA **;6 (Retail 4rade
5ationaliAation Act" to &ommonwealth Act *6;
(Anti Dummy Law"
Dia#das v. Percides
/actsD a alien who operated a retail store in &ebu
decided to close his &ebu store and transfer it to
Dumaguete$ R4L (retail trade law" and 4a &ode
%ec$ *++ were the statutes ta1en into
consideration in this case$ 4he former authoriAes
any alien who on )ay *7, *+79 is actually
engaged in retail, to continue to engage therein
until his !oluntary retirement from such business,
but not to establish or open additional stores for
retail business$ 4he latter pro!ides that any
business for which the pri!ilege ta has been paid
may be remo!ed and continued in any other
place without payment of additional ta$
IssueD whether the transfer by the alien from
&ebu to Dumaguete can be considered as a
!oluntary retirement from business$
@eldD 5o$ Although the trial court affirmed the
.uestion, the %& ruled otherwise stating that R4&
o!erloo1ed the clear pro!ision of %ec$ *++$
C 3 C Commercia# Corp v. +ationa# @ater;orks and
Se;erage A%t*ority
/actsD R$A$ +*: (:" states that in construction or
repair wor1 underta1en by the Ko!ernment,
Philippine made materials and products,
whene!er a!ailable shall be used in construction
or repair wor1$
/lag Law (&ommonwealth Act *-;" gi!es nati!e
products preference in the purchase of articles by
Ko!ernment, including go!ernment owned or
controlled corporations$
IssueD interpretation of two statutes re.uiring that
preference be made in the purchase and use of
Phil$ )ade materials and products
@eldD 4he %& relates the two statutes as in pari
materia and they should be construed to attain
the same ob2ecti!e that is to gi!e preference to
locally produced materials$
Cabada v. A#%nan ///
IssueD whether or not an appeal lies from the
decision of regional appellate board (RA'"
imposing disciplinary action against a member of
the P5P under %ec$ 97 of RA 8+,7 regarding
finality of disciplinary action
4he court held that the BgapC in the law which is
silent on filing appeals from decisions of the RA'
rendered within the reglementary period should
be construed and harmoniAed with other statutes,
i$e$ %ec :(*", Article IE3' of the *+;, &onstitution
because the P5P is part, as a bureau, of the
reorganiAed DILK, as to form a unified system of
2urisprudence
%tatconD if RA' fails to decide an appealed case
within 86 days from receipt of the notice of
appeal, the appealed decision is deemed final
and eecutory, and the aggrie!ed party may
forthwith appeal therefrom to the %ecretary of
DILK$ Li1ewise, if the RA' has decided the
appeal within 863day reglementary period, its
decision may still be appealed to the %ecretary of
DILK
Mani#a 6ockey C#%b /nc. v. CA
IssueD who was entitled to brea1ages (*6N
di!idend of winning horse race tic1ets"
%tatconD 4here are two statutes that should be
considered$ RA -6+ (amended by 88-* ?88-:" is
silent on the matter but the practice is to use
brea1ages for anti boo1ie dri!e and other sale
promotions$ E$O$ ;; ? ;+ which allocated
brea1ages therein specified$ 4hese two should be
construed in pari materia, thus all brea1ages
deri!ed from all races should be distributed and
allocated in accordance with Eecuti!e Orders
because no law should be !iewed in isolation$
(supplementary"
Keneral and special statutes
Keneral statutes3 applies to all of the people of
the state or to a particular class of persons in the
state with e.ual force$
o Fni!ersal in application
%pecial statutes3 relates to particular persons or
things of a class or to particular portion or section
of the state only
&onsidered as statutes in pari materia thus they
should be read together and harmoniAed (and
gi!en effect"
Ghat if there are two acts which contain one
general and one specialR
o If it produces conflict, the special shall
pre!ail since the legislati!e intent is more
clear thus it must be ta1en as intended to
constitute an eception$
o 4hin1 of it as one general law of the land
while the other applies only to a particular
case
Ghat if the special law is passed before the
general lawR It doesn(t matter because the
special law will still be considered as an eception
unless epressly repealed$
So#id !omes /nc. v. Paya;a#
/irst statute pro!ides that 5ational @ousing
Authority shall ha!e eclusi!e 2urisdiction to hear
and decide cases in!ol!ing unsound real estate
(P$D$ 5o$ +7+"$
%econd statute grants R4& general 2urisdiction
o!er such cases$
IssueD Ghich one will pre!ailR
@eldD 4he first statute will pre!ail because it is a
special law, as compared to the latter which is
general law, thus it is an eception to the Bgeneral
2urisdictionC of the R4&
Magta-as v. Pryce Properties Corp
/actsD P$D$ 5o$ *;8+ authoriAed PAK&OR to
centraliAe and regulate all games of chance$
LK& of *++*, a later law, empowers all
go!ernment units to enact ordinances to pre!ent
and suppress gambling and other games of
chance$
%taconD 4hese two should be harmoniAed rather
than annulling one and upholding the other$ &ourt
said that the solution to this problem is for the
go!ernment units to suppress and pre!ent all
1inds of gambling ecept those that are allowed
under the pre!ious law
Leveri'a v. /ntermediate Appe##ate Co%rt
RA ,,8 empowers the general manager of the
&i!il Aeronautics Administration to lease real
property under its administration$
Administrati!e &ode authoriAes the President to
eecute a lease contract relating to real property
belonging to the republic
@ow do you apply the ruleR 3 In this case, the
prior (special" law should pre!ail
Reason for the rule
the special law is considered an eception to the
general law (as long as same sub2ect"
Pualification of the rule
4he rule aforementioned is not absolute$
EceptionsD
o If the legislature clearly intended the
general enactment to co!er the whole
sub2ect and to repeal all prior laws
inconsistent therewith
o Ghen the principle is that the special law
merely establishes a general rule while
the general law creates a specific and
special rule
Reference statutes
a statute which refers to other statutes and ma1es
them applicable to the sub2ect of legislation
used to a!oid encumbering the statute boo1s of
unnecessary repetition
should be construed to harmoniAe and gi!e effect
to the adopted statute$
%upplemental statutes
Intended to supply deficiencies in eisting
statutes
%upplemental statutes should be read with the
original statute and construed together
Reenacted statutes
statute which reenacts a pre!ious statute or
pro!ision$
Reproducing an earlier statute with the same or
substantially the same words$
Monte#ibano v. Ferrer
IssueD application of %ec$ - fo the &ity &harter of
)anila is !alid in the criminal complaint directly
file by an offended party in the city court of
'acolodR
@eldD 4he court ruled that the criminal complaint
filed directly by the offended party is in!alid and it
ordered the city court to dismiss it$
4he pro!isions of the &ity &harter of )anila
'acolod on the same sub2ect are identically
worded, hence they should recei!e the same
construction$
RFLED two statutes with a parallel scope, purpose
and terminology should each in its own field, ha!e
a li1e interpretation
Adoption of contemporaneous construction
in construing the reenacted statute, the court
should ta1e into account prior contemporaneous
construction and gi!e due weight and respect to
it$
Pualification of the rule
rule that is aforementioned is applicable only
when the statute is capable of the construction
gi!en to it and when that construction has
become a settled rule of conduct
Adopted statutes
a statute patterned after a statute of a foreign
country$
&ourt should ta1e into consideration how the
courts of other country construe the law and its
practices
CHAPTER SEVEN: Str!t or L!*era' Construt!on
IN GENERAL
Kenerally
Ghether a statute is to be gi!en a strict or liberal
construction will depend upon the followingD
4he nature of the statute
4he purpose to be subser!ed
4he mischief to be remedied
PurposeD to gi!e the statute the interpretation that
will best accomplish the end desired and
effectuate legislati!e intent
%trict construction, generally
&onstruction according to the strict letter of the
statute, which recogniAes nothing that is not
epressed, ta1es the language used in its eact
meaning, and admits no e.uitable consideration
5ot to mean that statutes are construed in its
narrowest meaning
It simply means that the scope of the statute shall
not be etended or enlarged by implication,
intendment, or e.uitable consideration beyond
the literal meaning of its terms
It is a close and conser!ati!e adherence to the
literal or tetual interpretation
4he antithesis of liberal construction
Liberal construction, defined
E.uitable construction as will enlarge the letter of
a statute to accomplish its intended purpose,
carry out its intent, or promote 2ustice
5ot to mean enlargement of a pro!ision which is
clear, unambiguous and free from doubt
It simply means that the words should recei!e a
fair and reasonable interpretation, so as to attain
the intent, spirit and purpose of the law
Liberal construction applied, generally
Ghere a statute is ambiguous, the literal meaning
of the words used may be re2ected if the result of
adopting said meaning would be to defeat the
purpose of the law
1t res magis va#eat $%am pereat & that
construction is to be sought which gi!es effect to
the whole of the statute 0 its e!ery word
Liberal &onstruction #udicial Interpretation
E.uitable construction as
will enlarge the letter of a
statute to accomplish its
intended purpose, carry
out its intent, or promote
2ustice
Act of the court in
engrafting upon a law
something which it
belie!es ought to ha!e
been embraced therein
Legitimate eercise of
2udicial power
/orbidden by the tripartite
di!ision of powers among
the - departments of
go!ernment
A statute may not be liberally construed to read
into it something which its clear and plain
language re2ects
&onstruction to promote social 2ustice
%ocial 2ustice must be ta1en into account in the
interpretation and application of laws
%ocial 2ustice mandate is addressed or meant for
the three departmentsD the legislati!e, eecuti!e,
and the 2udicial
%ocial 2ustice (included in the &onstitution" was
meant to be a !ital, articulate, compelling principle
of public policy
It should be obser!ed in the interpretation not
only of future legislations, but also of laws already
eisting on 5o!ember *7, *+-7$
It was intended to change the spirit of our laws,
present and future$
&onstruction ta1ing into consideration general welfare or
growth ci!iliAation
&onstrue to attain the general welfare
Sa#%s pop%#i est s%prema #e) & the !oice of the
people is the supreme law
Stat%ta pro p%b#ico commodo #ate interpretant%r &
statutes enacted for the public good are to be
construed liberally
4he reason of the law is the life of the lawH the
reason lies in the soil of the common welfare
4he 2udge must go out in the open spaces of
actuality and dig down deep into his common soil,
if not, he becomes subser!ient to formalism
&onstrue in the light of the growth of ci!iliAation
and !arying conditions
o 4he interpretation that Bif the man is too
long for the bed, his head should be
chopped off rather than enlarge the old
bed or purchase a new oneC should 5O4
be gi!en to statutes
STATUTES STRICTLY CONSTRUED
Penal statutes, generally
Penal statutes are those that define crimes, treat
of their nature and pro!ide for their punishment
o Acts of legislature which prohibit certain
acts and establish penalties for their
!iolation
4hose which impose punishment for an offense
committed against the state, and which the chief
eecuti!e has the power to pardon
A statute which decrees the forfeiture in fa!or of
the state of uneplained wealth ac.uired by a
public official while in office is criminal in nature
Penal statutes, strictly construed
Penal statutes are strictly construed against the
%tate and liberally construed in fa!or of the
accused
o Penal statutes cannot be enlarged or
etended by intendment, implication, or
any e.uitable consideration
o 5o person should be brought within its
terms if he is not clearly made so by the
statute
o 5o act should be pronounces criminal
which is not clearly made so
Peo v. Atop
%ec$ ** of RA ,87+, which amended Art$ --7 of
the RP&, pro!ides that the death penalty for rape
may be imposed if the Boffender is a parent,
ascendant, step3parent, guardian, relati!e by
consanguinity or affinity within the -
rd
ci!il degree,
or the common3law spouse of the parent of the
!ictimC
Is the common3law husband of the girl(s
grandmother includedR
5oS &ourts must not bring cases within the
pro!isions of the law which are not clearly
embraced by it$
o 5o act can be pronounced criminal which
is not clearly within the terms of a statute
can be brought within them$
o Any reasonable doubt must be resol!ed
in fa!or of the accused
%trict construction but not as to nullify or destroy
the ob!ious purpose of the legislature
o If penal statute is !ague, it must be
construed with such strictness as to
carefully %A/EKFARD the RIK@4% of
the defendant and at the same time
preser!e the ob!ious intention of the
legislature
o &ourts must endea!or to effect
substantial 2ustice
Centeno v. 2i##a#onAPorni##os
PD *789, which punishes a person who solicits or
recei!es contribution for Bcharitable or public
welfare purposesC without any permit first secured
from the Department of %ocial %er!ices, DID 5O4
include Breligious purposesCC in the acts
punishable, the law &A55O4 be construed to
punish the solicitation of contributions for religious
purposes, such as repair or reno!ation of the
church
Reason why penal statutes are strictly construedg
4he law is tender in fa!or of the rights of the
indi!idualH
4he ob2ect is to establish a certain rule by
conformity to which man1ind would be safe, and
the discretion of the court limited
Purpose of strict construction is 5O4 to enable a
guilty person to escape punishment through
technicality but to pro!ide a precise definition of
forbidden acts
Acts ma#a in se and ma#a pro*ibita
Keneral ruleD to constitute a crime, e!il intent
must combine with an act
Act%s non facit re%m nisi mens sit rea & the act
itself does not ma1e a man guilty unless his
intention were so
Act%s me invite fact%s non est me%s act%s & an
act done by me against my will is not my act
)ala in se )ala prohibita
&riminal intent, apart
from the act itself is
4he only in.uiry is, has
the law been !iolated
re.uired
RP& %pecial penal laws
@owe!er, if special penal laws use such words as
Bwillfully, !oluntarily, and 1nowinglyC intent must
be pro!edH thus good faith or bad faith is essential
before con!iction
Application of rule
Peo v. 4adao
A statute which penaliAes a Bperson assisting a
claimantC in connection with the latter(s claim for
!eterans benefit, does not penaliAe Bone who
O//ER% to assistC
S%y v. Peop#e
Ghere a statute penaliAes a store owner who
sells commodities beyond the retail ceiling price
fied by law, the ambiguity in the EO classifying
the same commodity into : classes and fiing
different ceiling prices for each class, should be
resol!ed in fa!or of the accused
Peo v. Terreda
%horter prescripti!e period is more fa!orable to
the accused
Peo v. Manantan
4he rule that penal statutes are gi!en a strict
construction is not the only factor controlling the
interpretation of such laws
Instead, the rule merely ser!es as an additional
single factor to be considered as an aid in
detrmining the meaning of penal laws
Peo v. P%risima
4he language of the a statute which penaliAes the
mere carrying outside of residence of bladed
weapons, i$e$, a 1nife or bolo, not in connection
with one(s wor1 or occupation, with a !ery hea!y
penalty ranging from 73*6 years of imprisonment,
has been narrowed and strictly construed as to
include, as an additional element of the crime, the
carrying of the weapon in furtherance of rebellion,
insurrection or sub!ersion, such being the e!il
sought to be remedied or pre!ented by the statute
as disclosed in its preamble
A'arcon v. Sandiganbayan
IssueD whether a pri!ate person can be
considered a public officer by reason if his being
designated by the 'IR as a depository of
distrained property, so as to ma1e the con!ersion
thereof the crime of mal!ersation
@eldD 5OS the 'IR(s power authoriAing a pri!ate
indi!idual to act as a depository cannot include
the power to appoint him as public officer
A pri!ate indi!idual who has in his charge any of
the public funds or property enumerated in Art
::: RP& and commits any of the acts defined in
any of the pro!isions of &hapter 9, 4itle , of the
RP&, should li1ewise be penaliAed with the same
penalty meted to erring public officers$ 5owhere
in this pro!ision is it epressed or implied that a
pri!ate indi!idual falling under said Art ::: is to
be deemed a public officer
Limitation of rule
Limitation I* 0 Ghere a penal statute is capable
of : interpretations, one which will operate to
eempt an accused from liability for !iolation
thereof and another which will gi!e effect to the
manifest intent of the statute and promote its
ob2ect, the latter interpretation should be adopted
1S v. ,o C*ico
A law punishes the display of flags Bused duringC
the insurrection against the F% may not be so
construed as to eempt from criminal liability a
person who displays a replica of said flag
because said replica is not the one BusedC during
the rebellion, for to so construe it is to nullify the
statute together
Ko &hico is liable though flags displayed were
2ust replica of the flags Bused duringC insurrection
against F%
Limitation I: 0 strict construction of penal laws
applies only where the law is ambiguous and
there is doubt as to its meaning
Peo v. ,atc*a#ian
A statute re.uires that an employer shall pay a
minimum wage of not less than a specified
amount and punishes any person who willfully
!iolates any of its pro!isions
4he fact that the nonpayment of the minimum
wage is not specifically declared unlawful, does
not mean that an employer who pays his
employees less than the prescribed minimum
wage is not criminally liable, for the nonpayment
of minimum wage is the !ery act sought to be
en2oined by the law
%tatutes in derogation of rights
Rights are not absolute, and the state, in the
eercise of police power, may enact legislations
curtailing or restricting their en2oyment
As these statutes are in derogation of common or
general rights, they are generally strictly
construed and rigidly confined to cases clearly
within their scope and purpose
EamplesD
o %tatutes authoriAing the epropriation of
pri!ate land or property
o Allowing the ta1ing of deposition
o /iing the ceiling of the price of
commodities
o Limiting the eercise of proprietary rights
by indi!idual citiAens
o %uspending the period of prescription of
actions
Ghen : reasonably possible constructions, one
which would diminish or restrict fundamental right
of the people and the other if which would not do
so, the latter construction must be adopted so as
to allow full en2oyment of such fundamental right
%tatutes authoriAing epropriations
Power of eminent domain is essentially legislati!e
in nature
)ay be delegated to the President, LKFs, or
public utility company
Epropriation plus 2ust compensation
A derogation of pri!ate rights, thus strict
construction is applied
%tatutes epropriating or authoriAing the
epropriation of property are strictly construed
against the epropriating authority and liberally in
fa!or of property owners
%tatutes granting pri!ileges
%tatutes granting ad!antages to pri!ate persons
or entities ha!e in many instances created special
pri!ileges or monopolies for the grantees and
ha!e thus been !iewed with suspicion and strictly
construed
Privi#egia recipient #argam interpretationem
vo#%ntati consonam concedentis & pri!ileges are
to be interpreted in accordance with the will of
him who grants them
And he who fails to strictly comply with the will of
the grantor loses such pri!ileges
%t%an Sa;mi##. /nc. v. ayvie; T*eater. /nc
Ghere an entity is granted a legislati!e franchise
to operate electric light and power, on condition
that it should start operation within a specified
period, its failure to start operation within the
period resulted in the forfeiture of the franchise
Legislati!e grants to local go!ernment units
Krants of power to local go!ernment are to be
construed strictly, and doubts in the interpretation
should be resol!ed in fa!or of the national
go!ernment and against the political subdi!isions
concerned
ReasonD there is in such a grant a gratuitous
donation of public money or property which
results in an unfair ad!antage to the grantee and
for that reason, the grant should be narrowly
restricted in fa!or of the public
%tatutory grounds for remo!al of officials
%tatutes relating to suspension or remo!al of
public officials are strictly construed
ReasonD the remedy of remo!al is a drastic one
and penal in nature$ In2ustice and harm to the
public interest would li1ely emerge should such
laws be not strictly interpreted against the power
of suspension or remo!al
Oc*ate v. De#ing
Krounds for remo!al 0 Bneglect of duty,
oppression, corruption or other forms of
maladministration in officeC
o Bin officeC 0 a .ualifier of all acts$
o )ust be in relation to the official as an
officer and not as a pri!ate person
!ebron v "eyes
Procedure for remo!al or suspension should be
strictly construed
%tatuteD local electi!e officials are to be remo!ed
or suspended, after in!estigation, by the
pro!incial board, sub2ect to appeal to the
President
President has no authority on his own to conduct
the in!estigation and to suspend such electi!e
official
5aturaliAation laws
5aturaliAation laws are strictly construed against
the applicant and rigidly followed and enforced
5aturaliAation is statutory than a natural right
%tatutes imposing taes and customs duties
4a statutes must be construed strictly against the
go!ernment and liberally in fa!or of the tapayer
Power to ta in!ol!es power to destroy
4aing act are not to be etended by implication
4a statutes should be clearly, epressly, and
unambiguously imposed
Reason for strict constructionD taation is a
destructi!e power which interferes with the
personal property rights of the people and ta1es
from them a portion of their property for the
support of the go!ernment
%tatutes granting ta eemptions
Law frowns against eemption from taation
because taes are the lifeblood of the nation
Laws granting ta eemptions are thus construed
strictissimi -%ris against the tapayer and liberally
in fa!or of the taing authority
'urden of proof 0 on the tapayer claiming to be
eempted
'asis for strict construction 0 to minimiAe the
different treatment and foster impartiality, fairness,
and e.uality of treatment among tapayers
4a eemptions are not fa!ored in law, nor are
they presumed$
C/" v. CA
IssueD whether containers and pac1aging
materials can be credited against the miller(s
deficiency ta
'IR claimed that there should be no ta credit
@eldD pro!iso should be strictly construed to apply
only to raw materials and not to containers and
pac1ing materials which are not raw materialsH
hence, the miller is entitled to ta credit
Restriction in the pro!iso is limited only to sales,
miller(s ecise taes paid Ton raw materials used
in the milling process(
eng%et Corporation v. Cenrtra# oard of Assessment
Appea#s
PD *+77 withdrew all ta eemptions, ecept
those embodied in the Real Property &ode, a law
which grants certain industries real estate ta
eemptions under the Real Estate &ode
&ourts cannot epand eemptiom
Esso Standard Eastern. /nc. v Acting Commissioner of
C%stoms
Ghere a statute eempts from special import ta,
e.uipment Bfor use of industries,C the eemption
does not etend to those used in dispensing
gasoline at retail in gasoline stations
C/" v. Mani#a 6ockey C#%b. /nc.
%tatuteD Bracing club holding these races shall be
eempt from the payment of any municipal or
national taC
&annot be construed to eempt the racing club
from paying income ta on rentals paid to it for
use of the race trac1s and other paraphernalia,
for what the law eempts refers only to those to
be paid in connection with said races
L#adoc v. C/"
%tatuteD eemption from taation charitable
institutions, churches, parsonages or co!enants
appurtenant thereto, mos.ues, and non3profit
cemeteries, and all lands buildings, and
impro!ements actually, directly, and eclusi!ely
used for religious or charitable purposes
Eemption only refer to property taes and not
from all 1inds of taes
La Car#ota S%gar Centra# v. 6imene'
%tatuteD ta pro!ided shall not be collected on
foreign echange used for the payment of
BfertiliAers when imported by planters or farmers
directly or through their cooperati!esC
4he importation of fertiliAers by an entity which is
neither a planter nor a farmer nor a cooperati!e of
planters or farmers is not eempt from payment of
the ta, e!en though said entity merely acted as
agent of planter or farmer as a sort of
accommodation without ma1ing any profit from
the transaction, for the law uses the word
BdirectlyC which means without anyone inter!ening
in the importation and the phrase Bthrough their
cooperati!esC as the only eemption
C/" v. P*i#. Acety#ene Co.
%ee page -67
Power of taation if a high prerogati!e of
so!ereignty, its relin.uishment is ne!er presumed
and any reduction or diminution thereof with
respect to its mode or its rate must be strictly
construed
P*i#. Te#egrap* and Te#ep*one Corp. v. COA
On Bmost fa!ored treatment clauseC
: franchisee are not competitors
4he first franchisee is will not en2oy a reduced
rate of ta on gross receipts
Pualification of rule
%trict construction does not apply in the case of
ta eemptions in fa!or of the go!ernment itself or
its agencies
Pro!isions granting eemptions to go!ernment
agencies may be construed liberally in fa!or of
non3ta liability of such agencies
4he epress eemption should not be construed
with the same degree of strictness that applies to
eemptions contrary to policy of the state, since
as to such property eemption is the rule and the
taation is the eemption
E$g$ ta eemption in fa!or of 5APO&OR 0
whether direct or indirect taes, eempted
%tatutes concerning the so!ereign
Restricti!e statutes which impose burdens on the
public treasury or which diminish rights and
interests are strictly construed$
Fnless so specified, the go!ernment does not fall
within the terms of any legislation
A##iance of ,overnment @orkers v. Minister of Labor and
Emp#oyment
PD ;7* 0 re.uires BemployersC to pay a *-
th
month pay to their employees
BemployersC does not embrace the RP, the law
not ha!ing epressly included it within its scope
%tatutes authoriAing suits against the go!ernment
Art$ E>I, %ec$ -, *+;, &onstitution 0 B4he %tate
may not be sued without its consentC
o Keneral ruleD so!ereign is eempt from
suit
o EceptionD in the form of statute, state
may gi!e its consent to be sued
%tatute is to be strictly construed
and wai!er from immunity from
suit will not be lightly inferred
+%##%m temp%s occ%rrit regi & there can be no
legal right as against the authority that ma1es the
law on which the right depends
Reason for non3suability 0 not to sub2ect the state
to incon!enience and loss of go!ernmental
efficiency
Mobi# P*i#. E)p#oration. /nc. v. C%stoms Arrastre Services
4he law authoriAing the 'ureau of &ustoms to
lease arrastre operations, a proprietary function
necessarily incident to its go!ernmental function,
may 5O4 be construed to mean that the state
has consented to be sued, when it underta1es to
conduct arrastre ser!ices itself, for damage to
cargo
%tate3immunity may not be circum!ented by
directing the action against the officer of the state
instead of the state itself
o 4he state(s immunity may be !alidly
in!o1ed against the action A% LO5K A%
I4 &A5 'E %@OG5 that the suit really
affects the property, rights, or interests of
the state and not merely those of the
officer nominally made party defendant
E!en if the state consents, law should 5O4 be
interpreted to authoriAe garnishment of public
funds to satisfy a 2udgment against go!ernment
property
o ReasonD
Public policy forbids it
Disbursement of public funds
must be co!ered by a
corresponding appropriation as
re.uired by law
/unctions and ser!ice cannot be
allowed to be paralyAed or
disrupted by the di!ersion of
public funds from their legitimate
and specific ob2ects, as
appropriated by law
%tatutes prescribing formalities of the will
%trictly construed, which means, wills must be
eecuted in accordance with the statutory
re.uirements, otherwise, it is entirely !oid
4he court is see1ing to ascertain and apply the
intent of the legislators and not that of the
testator, and the latter(s intention is fre.uently
defeated by the non3obser!ance of what the
statute re.uires
Eceptions and pro!isos
%hould be strictly but reasonably construed
All doubts should be resol!ed in fa!or of the
general pro!ision rather than the eceptions
o @owe!er, always loo1 at the intent of
legislators if it will accord reason and
2ustice not to apply the rule that Ban
epress eception ecludes all othersC
4he rule on eecution pending appeal must be
strictly construed being an eception to the
general rule
%ituations which allows eceptions to the
re.uirement of warrant of arrest or search warrant
must be strictly construedH to do so would infringe
upon personal liberty and set bac1 a basic right
A preference is an eception to the general rule
A pro!iso should be interpreted strictly with the
legislati!e intent
o %hould be strictly construed
o Only those epressly eempted by the
pro!iso should be freed from the
operation of the statute
STATUTES LI-ERALLY CONSTRUED
Keneral social legislation
Keneral welfare legislations
o 4o implement the social 2ustice and
protection3to3labor pro!isions of the
&onstitution
o &onstrued liberally
o Resol!e any doubt in fa!or of the persons
whom the law intended to benefit
o Includes the following 0 labor laws,
tenancy laws, land reform laws, and
social security laws
Tamayo v. Mani#a !ote#
Law grants employees the benefits of holiday pay
ecept those therein enumerated
%tatcon 0 all employees, whether monthly paid or
not, who are not among those ecepted are
entitled to the holiday pay
Labor laws construed 0 the wor1ingman(s welfare
should be the primordial and paramount
consideration
o Article 9 5ew Labor &ode 0 Ball doubts in
the implementation and interpretation of
the pro!isions of the Labor &ode
including its implementing rules and
regulations shall be resol!ed in fa!or of
laborC
Liberal construction applies only if statute is
!ague, otherwise, apply the law as it is stated
Keneral welfare clause
: branches
o One branch attaches to the main trun1 of
municipal authority 0 relates to such
ordinances and regulations as may be
necessary to carry into effect and
discharge the powers and duties
conferred upon local legislati!e bodies by
law
o Other branch is much more independent
of the specific functions enumerated by
law 0 authoriAes such ordinances as shall
seem necessary and proper to pro!ide for
the health and safety, promote the
prosperity, impro!e the morals, peace,
good order of the LKF and the
inhabitants thereof, and for the protection
of the property therein
&onstrued in fa!or of the LKFs
4o gi!e more powers to local go!ernments in
promoting the economic condition, social welfare,
and material progress of the people in the
community
&onstrued with proprietary aspects, otherwise
would cripple LKFs
)ust be elastic and responsi!e to !arious social
conditions
)ust follow legal progress of a democratic way of
life
Krant of power to local go!ernments
Old ruleD municipal corporations, being mere
creatures of law, ha!e only such powers as are
epressly granted to them and those which are
necessarily implied or incidental to the eercise
thereof
5ew ruleD RA ::89 BLocal Autonomy ActC
o %ec *: 0 Bimplied power of a pro!ince, a
city, or a municipality shall be liberally
construed in its fa!or$ Any fair and
reasonable doubt as to the eistence of
the power should be interpreted in fa!or
of the local go!ernment and it shall be
presumed to eistC
%tatutes granting taing power (on municipal
corporations"
'efore *+,- &onstitution 0 inferences,
implications, and deductions ha!e no place in the
interpretation of the taing power of a municipal
corporation
5ew &onstitution 0 Art$ E, %ec 7 *+;,
&onstitution 0 Beach local go!ernment unit shall
ha!e the power to create its own sources of
re!enue and to le!y taes, fees, and charges
sub2ect to such guidelines and limitations as the
&ongress may pro!ide, consistent with the basic
policy of local autonomyC
o %tatutes prescribing limitations on the
taing power of LKFs must be strictly
construed against the national
go!ernment and liberally in fa!or of the
LKFs, and any doubt as to the eistence
of the taing power will be resol!ed in
fa!or of the local go!ernment
%tatutes prescribing prescripti!e period to collect taes
'eneficial for both go!ernment and tapayer
o 4o the go!ernment 0 ta officers are
obliged to act promptly in the ma1ing of
the assessments
o 4o the tapayer 0 would ha!e a feeling of
security against unscrupulous ta agents
who will always find an ecuse to inspect
the boo1s of tapayers
Laws on prescription 0 remedial measure 0
interpreted liberally affording protection to the
tapayers
%tatutes imposing penalties for nonpayment of ta
liberally construed in fa!or of go!ernment and
strictly construed against the tapayer
intention to hasten ta payments or to punish
e!asions or neglect of duty in respect thereto
liberal construction would render penalties for
delin.uents nugatory
Election laws
Election laws should be reasonably and liberally
construed to achie!e their purpose
Purpose 0 to effectuate and safeguard the will of
the electorate in the choice of their
representati!es
- parts
o Pro!isions for the conduct of elections
which election officials are re.uired to
follow
o Pro!isions which candidates for office are
re.uired to perform
o Procedural rules which are designed to
ascertain, in case of dispute, the actual
winner in the elections
Different rules and canons or statutory construction
go!ern such pro!isions of the election law
Part *D
o Rules and regulations for the conduct of
elections
'efore election 0 mandatory (part
*"
After election 0 directory (part
-"
o Kenerally 0 the pro!isions of a statute as
to the manner of conducting the details of
an election are 5O4 mandatoryH and
irregularities in conducting an election
and counting the !otes, not preceding
from any wrongful intent and which
depri!es no legal !oter of his !otes, will
not !itiate an election or 2ustify the
re2ection of the entire !otes of a precinct
Against disenfranchisement
Remedy against election official
who did not do his duty 0 criminal
action against them
Part :D
o Pro!isions which candidates for office are
re.uired to perform are mandatory
o 5on3compliance is fatal
Part -D
o Procedural rules which are designed to
ascertain, in case of dispute, the actual
winner in the elections are liberally
construed
o 4echnical and procedural barriers should
not be allowed to stand if they constitute
an obstacle in the choice of their electi!e
officials
/or where a candidate has recei!ed popular
mandate, o!erwhelmingly and clearly epressed,
all possible doubts should be resol!ed in fa!or of
the candidates eligibility, for to rule otherwise is to
defeat the will of the electorate
Amnesty proclamations
Amnesty proclamations should be liberally
construed as to carry out their purpose
Purpose 0 to encourage to return to the fold of the
law of those who ha!e !eered from the law
E$g$ in case of doubt as to whether certain
persons come within the amnesty proclamation,
the doubt should be resol!ed in their fa!or and
against the state
%ame rule applies to pardon since pardon and
amnesty is synonymous
%tatutes prescribing prescriptions of crimes
Liberally construed in fa!or of the accused
Reason 0 time wears off proof and innocence
%ame as amnesty and pardon
Peo v. "eyes
Art$ +* RP& 0 Bperiod of prescription shall
commence to run from the day the crime is
disco!ered by the offended, authorities, C
Ghen does the period of prescription start 0 day
of disco!ery or registration in the Register of
DeedsR
@eldD /rom the time of registration
5otice need not be actual for prescription to runH
constructi!e notice is enough
)ore fa!orable to the accused if prescripti!e
period is counted from the time of registration
Adoption statutes
Adoption statutes are liberally construed in fa!or
of the child to be adopted
Paramount consideration 0 child and not the
adopters
>eteran and pension laws
>eteran and pension laws are enacted to
compensate a class of men who suffered in the
ser!ice for the hardships they endured and the
dangers they encountered in line of duty
o Epression of gratitude to and recognition
of those who rendered ser!ice to the
country by etending to them regular
monetary benefit
>eteran and pension laws are liberally construed
in fa!or of grantee
De# Mar v. P*i#. 2eterans Admin
Ghere a statute grants pension benefits to war
!eterans, ecept those who are actually recei!ing
a similar pension from other go!ernment funds
%tatcon 0 Bgo!ernment fundsC refer to funds of the
same go!ernment and does not preclude war
!eterans recei!ing similar pensions from the F%
Ko!ernment from en2oying the benefits therein
pro!ided
oard of Administrators 2eterans Admin v. a%tista
>eteran pension law is silent as to the effecti!ity
of pension awards, it shall be construed to ta1e
effect from the date it becomes due and 5O4
from the date the application for pension is
appro!ed, so as to grant the pensioner more
benefits and to discourage inaction on the part of
the officials who administer the laws
C*ave' v. Mat*ay
Ghile !eteran or pension laws are to be
construed liberally, they should be so construed
as to pre!ent a person from recei!ing double
pension or compensation, unless the law pro!ides
otherwise
Santiago v. COA
Eplained liberal construction or retirement laws
Intention is to pro!ide for sustenance, and
hopefully e!en comfort when he no longer has the
stamina to continue earning his li!elihood
@e deser!es the appreciation of a grateful
go!ernment at best concretely epressed in a
generous retirement gratuity commensurate with
the !alue and length of his ser!ice
Orti' v. COMELEC
IssueD whether a commissioner of &O)ELE& is
deemed to ha!e completed his term and entitled
to full retirement benefits under the law which
grants him 73year lump3sum gratuity and
thereafter lifetime pension, who Bretires from the
ser!ice after ha!ing completed his term of office,C
when his courtesy resignation submitted in
response to the call of the President following
ED%A Re!olution is accepted
@eldD MesS Entitled to gratuity
Liberal construction
&ourtesy resignation 0 not his own will but a mere
manifestation of submission to the will of the
political authority and appointing power
/n "e App#ication for ,rat%ity enefits of Associate
6%stice Efren / P#ana
IssueD whether #ustice Plana is entitled to gratuity
and retirement pay when, at the time of his
courtesy resignation was accepted following
ED%A Re!olution and establishment of a
re!olutionary go!ernment under the /reedom
&onstitution, he lac1ed a few months to meet the
age re.uirement for retirement under the law but
had accumulated a number of lea!e of credits
which, if added to his age at the time, would
eceed the age re.uirement
@eldD yes, entitled to gratuityS Liberal construction
applied
/n "e Pineda
Eplained doctrine laid down in the pre!ious case
4he crediting of accumulated lea!es to ma1e up
for lac1 of re.uired age or length of ser!ice is not
done discriminately
only if satisfied that the career of the retiree
was mar1ed by competence, integrity, and
dedication to the public ser!ice
/n "e Martin
IssueD whether a 2ustice of the %&, who a!ailed of
the disability retirement benefits pursuant to the
pro!ision that Bif the reason for the retirement be
any permanent disability contracted during his
incumbency in office and prior to the date of
retirement he shall recei!e only a gratuity
e.ui!alent to *6 years salary and allowances
aforementioned with no further annuity payable
monthly during the rest of the retiree(s natural lifeC
is entitled to a monthly lifetime pension after the
*63year period
@eldD MesS *63year lump sum payment is intended
to assist the stric1en retiree meeting his hospital
and doctor(s bills and epenses for his support
4he retirement law aims to assist the retiree in his
old age, not to punish him for ha!ing sur!i!ed
Cena v. CSC
IssueD whether or not a go!ernment employee
who has reached the compulsory retirement age
of 87 years, but who has rendered less than *7
years of go!ernment ser!ice, may be allowed to
continue in the ser!ice to complete the *73year
ser!ice re.uirement to enable him to retire with
benefits of an old3age pension under %ec **(b"
PD **98
@owe!er, &%& )emorandum &ircular 5o :,
pro!ides that Bany re.uest for etension of
compulsory retirees to complete the *73years
ser!ice re.uirement for retirement shall be
allowed only to permanent appointees in the
career ser!ice who are regular members of the
K%I% and shall be granted for a period not
eceeding * year
@eldD &%& )emorandum &ircular 5o :,
unconstitutionalS It is an administrati!e regulation
which should be in harmony with the lawH liberal
construction of retirement benefits
Rules of &ourt
R& are procedural 0 to be construed liberally
Purpose of R& 0 the proper and 2ust
determination of a litigation
Procedural laws are no other than technicalities,
they are adopted not as ends in themsel!es but
as means conduci!e to the realiAation of the
administration of law and 2ustice
R& should not be interpreted to sacrifice
substantial rights at the epense of technicalities
Case v. 6%go
Lapses in the literal obser!ance of a rule of
procedure will be o!erloo1ed when they do not
in!ol!e public policyH when they arose from an
honest mista1e or unforeseen accidentH when
they ha!e not pre2udiced the ad!erse party and
ha!e not depri!ed the court of its authority
Literal stricture ha!e been relaed in fa!or of
liberal construction
o Ghere a rigid application will result in
manifest failure or miscarriage of 2ustice
o Ghere the interest of substantial 2ustice
will be ser!ed
o Ghere the resolution of the emotion is
addressed solely to the sound and
2udicious discretion of the court
o Ghere the in2ustice to the ad!erse party
is not commensurate with the degree of
his thoughtlessness in not complying with
the prescribed procedure
Liberal construction of R& does not mean they
may be ignoredH they are re.uired to be followed
ecept only for the most persuasi!e reasons
Other statutes
&urati!e statutes 0 to cure defects in prior law or
to !alidate legal proceedings which would
otherwise be !oid for want of conformity with
certain legal re.uirementsH retroacti!e
Redemption laws 0 remedial in nature 0
construed liberally to carry out purpose, which is
to enable the debtor to ha!e his property applied
to pay as many debtor(s liability as possible
%tatutes pro!iding eemptions from eecution are
interpreted liberally in order to gi!e effect to their
beneficial and humane purpose
Laws on attachment 0 liberally construed to
promote their ob2ects and assist the parties
obtaining speedy 2ustice
Garehouse receipts 0 instrument of credit 0
liberally construed in fa!or of a bona fide holders
of such receipts
Probation laws 0 liberally construed
o PurposeD to gi!e first3hand offenders a
second chance to maintain his place in
society through the process of
reformation
%tatute granting powers to an agency created by
the &onstitution should be liberally construed for
the ad!ancement of the purposes and ob2ecti!es
for which it was created
CHAPTER EIGHT: Man"ator) an" D!retor) Statutes
IN GENERAL
Kenerally
)andatory and directory classification of statutes
0 importanceD what effect should be gi!en to the
mandate of a statute
)andatory and directory statutes, generally
)andatory statute 0 commands either positi!ely
that something be done in a particular way, or
negati!ely that something be not doneH it re.uires
O'EDIE5&E, otherwise !oid
Directory statute 0 permissi!e or discretionary in
nature and merely outlines the act to be done in
such a way that no in2ury can result from ignoring
it or that its purpose can be accomplished in a
manner other than that prescribed and
substantially the same result obtainedH confer
direction upon a personH non3performance of what
it prescribes will not !itiate the proceedings
therein ta1en
Ghen statute is mandatory or directory
5o absolute test to determine whether a statute is
directory or mandatory
/inal arbiter 0 legislati!e intent
Legislati!e intent does not depend on the form of
the statuteH must be gi!en to the entire statute, its
ob2ect, purpose, legislati!e history, and to other
related statutes
)andatory in form but directory in nature 0
possible
Ghether a statute is mandatory or directory
depends on whether the thing directed to be done
is of the essence of the thing re.uired, or is a
mere matter of form, what is a matter of essence
can often be determined only by 2udicial
construction
o &onsidered directory 0 compliance is a
matter of con!enienceH where the
directions of a statute are gi!en merely
with a !iew to the proper, orderly and
prompt conduct of businessH no
substantial rights depend on it
o &onsidered mandatory 0 a pro!ision
relating to the essence of the thing to be
done, that is, to matters of substanceH
interpretation shows that the legislature
intended a compliance with such
pro!ision to be essential to the !alidity of
the act or proceeding, or when some
antecedent and prere.uisite conditions
must eist prior to the eercise of the
power, or must be performed before
certain other powers can be eercised
4est to determine nature of statute
4est is to ascertain the conse.uences that will
follow in case what the statute re.uires is not
done or what it forbids is performed
Does the law gi!e a person no alternati!e choiceR
0 if yes, then it is mandatory
Depends on the effects of compliance
o If substantial rights depend on it and
in2ury can result from ignoring itH intended
for the protection of the citiAens and by a
disregard of which their rights are
in2uriously affected 0 mandatory
o Purpose is accomplished in a manner
other than that prescribed and
substantially the same results obtained 3
directory
%tatutes couched in mandatory form but
compliance is merely directory in nature
o If strict compliance will cause hardship or
in2ustice on the part of the public who is
not at fault
o If it will lead to absurd, impossible, or
mischie!ous conse.uences
If an officer is re.uired to do a
positi!e act but fails because
such actions will lead to the
aforementioned, he will only be
sub2ect to administrati!e sanction
for his failure to do what the law
re.uires
Language used
Kenerally mandatory 0 command words
o %hall or %hall not
o )ust or )ust not
o Ought or Ought not
o %hould or %hould not
o &an or &annot
Kenerally directory 0 permissi!e words
o )ay or )ay not
Fse of BshallC or BmustC
Kenerally, BshallC and BmustC is mandatory in
nature
If a different interpretation is sought, it must rest
upon something in the character of the legislation
or in the contet which will 2ustify a different
meaning
4he import of the word ultimately depends upon a
consideration of the entire pro!ision, its nature,
ob2ect and the conse.uences that would follow
from construing it one way or the other
Loyo#a ,rand 2i##a !omeo;ners BSo%t*C Assn.. /nc. v. CA
BmustC construed as directory
&orporation &ode %ec 98 reads B e!ery
corporation formed under this &ode )F%4 within
one month after receipt of official notice of the
issuance of its certification of incorporation with
the %E&, adopt a code of by3laws for its
go!ernment not inconsistent with this &odeC
PD +6:3A which is in pari materia# with the
&orporation &ode states that the non3filing of the
by3laws does not imply the BdemiseC of the
corporationH that there should be a notice and
hearing before the certificate of registration may
be cancelled by the failure to file the by3laws
One test whether mandatory or directory
compliance must be made 0 whether non3
compliance with what is re.uired will result in the
nullity of the actH if it results in the nullity, it is
mandatory
Director of Land v. CA
Law re.uires in petitions for land registration that
Bupon receipt of the order of the court setting the
time for initial hearing to be published in the OK
and once in a newspaper of general circulation in
the PhilippinesC
Law epressly re.uires that the initial hearing be
published in the OK A5D in the newspaper of
general circulation 0 reasonD OK is not as widely
read of the newspaper of general circulation
BshallC is imperati!e= mandatory
Githout initial hearing being published in a
newspaper of general circulation is a nullity
Fse of BmayC
An auiliary !erb showing opportunity or
possibility
Kenerally, directory in nature
Fsed in procedural or ad2ecti!e lawsH liberally
construed
EampleD %ec 8- of the corporation &ode 0
Bshares of stoc1 so issued are personal property
and )AM be transferred by deli!ery of the
certificate or certificated endorsed by the owner
o BmayC is merely directory and that the
transfer of the shares may be effected in
a manner different from that pro!ided for
in law
Ghen BshallC is construed as BmayC and !ice !ersa
RuleD BmayC should be read BshallC
o where such construction is necessary to
gi!e effect to the apparent intention of the
legislature
o where a statute pro!ides for the doing of
some act which is re.uired by 2ustice or
public duty
o where it !ests a public body or officer with
power and authority to ta1e such action
which concerns for the public interest or
rights of indi!iduals
RuleD BshallC should be read BmayC
o Ghen so re.uired by the contet or by
the intention of the legislature
o Ghen no public benefit or pri!ate right
re.uires that it be gi!en an imperati!e
meaning
Diokno v. "e*abi#itiation Finance Corp
%ec$ : RA -69 reads Bban1s or other financial
institutions owned or controlled by the
Ko!ernment %@ALL, sub2ect to a!ailability of
funds accept at a discount at not more than
:6N for *6 years of such bac1pay certificateC
B%hallC implies discretion because of the phrase
Bsub2ect to a!ailability of fundsC
,overmnent v. E# !ogar Fi#ipino
&orporation &odes reads B%@ALL, upon such
!iolation being pro!ed, be dissol!ed by $%o
;arranto proceedingsC
B%hallC construed as BmayC
erces. Sr. v. ,%ingona
%ec$ 8; Ra ,*86 (LK&" pro!ides that an appeal
from an ad!erse decision against a local electi!e
official to the President B%@ALL not pre!ent a
decision from becoming final and eecutorC
B%hallC is not mandatory because there is room to
construe said pro!ision as gi!ing discretion to the
re!iewing officials to stay the eecution of the
appealed decision
Fse of negati!e, prohibitory or eclusi!e terms
A negati!e statute is mandatoryH epressed in
negati!e words or in a form of an affirmati!e
proposition .ualified by the word BonlyC
BonlyC eclusionary negation
Prohibiti!e or negati!e words can rarely, if e!er,
be discretionary
MANDATORY STATUTES
%tatutes conferring power
Kenerally regarded as mandatory although
couched in a permissi!e form
%hould construe as imposing absolute and
positi!e duty rather than conferring pri!ileges
Power is gi!en for the benefit of third persons, not
for the public official
Kranted to meet the demands of rights, and to
pre!ent a failure of 2ustice
Ki!en as a remedy to those entitled to in!o1e its
aid
%tatutes granting benefits
&onsidered mandatory
/ailure of the person to ta1e the re.uired steps or
to meet the conditions will ordinarily preclude him
from a!ailing of the statutory benefits
2igi#antib%s et non dormientib%s -%ra s%bveni%nt &
the laws aid the !igilant, not those who slumber
on their rights
Potior est in tempoe. potior est in -%re 0 he who is
first in time is preferred in right
%tatutes prescribing 2urisdictional re.uirements
&onsidered mandatory
Eamples
o Re.uirement of publication
o Pro!ision in the 4a &ode to the effect
that before an action for refund of ta is
filed in court, a written claim therefore
shall be presented with the &IR within the
prescribed period is mandatory and
failure to comply with such re.uirement is
fatal to the action
%tatutes prescribing time to ta1e action or to appeal
Kenerally mandatory
@eld as absolutely indispensable to the
pre!ention of needless delays and to the orderly
and speedy discharge or business, and are
necessary incident to the proper, efficient, and
orderly discharge of 2udicial functions
%trict not substantial compliance
5ot wai!able, nor can they be the sub2ect of
agreements or stipulation of litigants
"eyes v. COA
%ec$ *;, RA ,*86 0 process of appeal of
dissatisfied tapayer on the legality of ta
ordinance
o Appeal to the %ec of #ustice within -6
days of effecti!ity of the ta ordinance
o If %ec of #ustice decides the appeal, a
period of -6 days is allowed for an
aggrie!ed party to go to court
o If the %ec of #ustice does not act thereon,
after the lapse of 86 days, a party could
already proceed to see1 relief in court
Purpose of mandatory complianceD to pre!ent
delays and enhance the speedy and orderly
discharge of 2udicial functions
Fnless the re.uirements of law are complied with,
the decision of the lower court will become final
and preclude the appellate court from ac.uiring
2urisdiction to re!iew it
/nterest reipiciae %t sit finis #iti%m & public interest
re.uires that by the !ery nature of things there
must be an end to a legal contro!ersy
,ac*on v. Devera. 6r
IssueD whether %ec 8 of the Rule on %ummary
Procedure, which reads B should the defendant
fail to answer the complaint within the period
abo!e pro!ided, the &ourt, mot% proprio, or on
motion of the plaintiff, %@ALL render 2udgment as
may be warranted by the facts alleged in the
complaint and limited to what is prayed for
therein,C is mandatory or directory, such that an
answer filed out of time may be accepted
@eldD mandatory
o )ust file the answer within the
reglementary period
o Reglementary period shall be Tnon3
etendible(
o Otherwise, it would defeat the ob2ecti!e of
epediting the ad2udication of suits
%tatutes prescribing procedural re.uirements
&onstrued mandatory
Procedure relating to 2urisdictional, or of the
essence of the proceedings, or is prescribed for
the protection or benefit of the party affected
Ghere failure to comply with certain procedural
re.uirements will ha!e the effect of rendering the
act done in connection therewith !oid, the statute
prescribing such re.uirements is regarded as
mandatory e!en though the language is used
therein is permissi!e in nature
De Mesa v. Mencias
%ec *,, Rule - R& 0 Bafter a party dies and the
claim is not thereby etinguished, the court shall
order, upon proper notice, the legal representati!e
of the deceased to appear and to be substituted
$ If legal representati!e fails to appear ,
the court )AM order the opposing party to
produce the appointment of a legal representati!e
C
Although )AM was used, pro!ision is mandatory
Procedural re.uirement goes to the !ery
2urisdiction of the court, for Bunless and until a
legal representati!e is for him is duly named and
within the 2urisdiction of the trial court, no
ad2udication in the cause could ha!e been
accorded any !alidity or the binding effect upon
any party, in representation of the deceased,
without trenching upon the fundamental right to a
day in court which is the !ery essence of the
constitutionally enshrined guarantee of due
process
Election laws on conduct of election
&onstrued as mandatory
'efore election 0 mandatory
After election 0 directory, in support of the result
unless of a character to affect an obstruction to
the free and intelligent casting of the !otes, or to
the ascertainment of the result, or unless it is
epressly declared by the statute that the
particular act is essential to the !alidity of an
election, or that its omission shall render it !oid
(whew, and habaS"
Ghen the !oters ha!e honestly cast their ballots,
the same should not be nullified simply because
the officers appointed under the law to direct the
elections and guard the purity of the ballot ha!e
not done their duty
/or where a candidate has recei!ed popular
mandate, o!erwhelmingly and clearly epressed,
all possible doubts should be resol!ed in fa!or of
the candidates eligibility, for to rule otherwise is to
defeat the will of the electorate
De#os "eyes v. "odrig%e'
4he circumstance that the coupon bearing the
number of the ballot is not detached at the time
the ballot is !oted, as re.uired by law, does not
2ustify the court in re2ecting the ballot
Election laws on .ualification and dis.ualification
4he rule of Bbefore3mandatory and after3directoryC
in election laws only applies to procedural
statutesH
5ot applicable to pro!isions of the election laws
prescribing the time limit to file certificate of
candidacy and the .ualifications and
dis.ualifications of electi!e office 0 considered
mandatory e!en after election
%tatutes prescribing .ualifications for office
Eligibility to a public office is of a continuing
nature and must eist at the commencement of
the term and during the occupancy of the office
%tatutes prescribing the eligibility or .ualifications
of persons to a public office are regarded as
mandatory
Eample in the boo1 0 lawyer32udgeH 2udge3
disbarment as lawyer
%tatutes relating to assessment of taes
Intended for the security of the citiAens, or to
insure the e.uality of taation, or for certainty as
to the nature and amount of each other(s ta 0
)A5DA4ORM
o E$g$ %tatutes re.uiring the assessor to
notify the tapayer of the assessment of
his property within a prescribed period
4hose designed merely for the information or
direction of officers or to secure methodical and
systematic modes of proceedings 3 DIRE&4ORM
%tatutes concerning public auction sale
&onstrued mandatory
Procedural steps must be strictly followed
Otherwise, !oid
DIRECTORY STATUTES
%tatutes prescribing guidance for officers
Regulation designed to secure order, system, and
dispatch in proceedings, and by a disregard of
which the rights of parties interested may not be
in2uriously affected 0 directory
o Eception 0 unless accompanied by
negati!e words importing that the acts
re.uired shall not be done in any other
manner or time than that designated
%tatutes prescribing manner of 2udicial action
&onstrued directory
Procedure is secondary in importance to
substanti!e right
Kenerally, non3compliance therewith is not
necessary to the !alidity of the proceedings
%tatutes re.uiring rendition of decision within prescribed
period
%ec *7(*" Art$ >III, *+;, &onstitution 0 the
maimum period within which a case or matter
shall be decided or resol!ed from the date of its
submission shall be
o :9 months 0 %&
o *: months 0 lower collegiate courts
o - months 0 all other lower courts
%ec , Art$ IE3A, *+;, &onstitution 0
o 86 days from the date of its submission
for resolution 0 for all &onstitutional
&ommissions
'efore the &onstitution too1 effect 3 %tatutes
re.uiring rendition of decision within prescribed
period 0 Directory
o Ecept
intention to the contrary is
manifest
time is of the essence of the thing
to be done
language of the statute contains
negati!e words
designation of the time was
intended as a limitation of power,
authority or right
always loo1 at intent to ascertain whether to gi!e
the statute a mandatory or directory construction
o basisD EEPEDIE5&M 0 less in2ury results
to the general public by disregarding than
enforcing the little of the law and that
2udges would otherwise abstain from
rendering decisions after the period to
render them had lapsed because they
lac1ed 2urisdiction to do so
H%er%bin v. CA
%tatuteD appeals in election cases Bshall be
decided within - months after the filing of the
case in the office of the cler1 of courtC
IssueD whether or not &A has 2urisdiction in
deciding the election case although the re.uired
period to resol!e it has epired
@eldD yes, otherwise is to defeat the
administration of 2ustice upon factors beyond the
control of the partiesH would defeat the purpose of
due processH dismissal will constitute miscarriage
of 2usticeH speedy trial would be turned into denial
of 2ustice
o /ailure of 2udge to ta1e action within the
said period merely depri!es him of their
right to collect their salaries or to apply for
lea!es, but does not depri!e them of the
2urisdiction to act on the cases pending
before them
&onstitutional time pro!ision directory
Marce#ino v. Cr%'
%ec *7(*" Art$ >III, *+;, &onstitution 0 the
maimum period within which a case or matter
shall be decided or resol!ed from the date of its
submission shall be
o :9 months 0 %&
o *: months 0 lower collegiate courts
o - months 0 all other lower courts
%ec *7(*" Art$ >III, *+;, &onstitution 0 directory
ReasonsD
o %tatutory pro!isions which may be thus
departed from with impunity, without
affecting the !alidity of statutory
proceedings, are usually those which
relate to the mode or time of doing that
which is essential to effect the aim and
purpose of the legislature or some
incident of the essential act 0 thus
directory
o Liberal construction 0 departure from
strict compliance would result in less
in2ury to the general public than would its
strict application
o &ourts are not di!ested of their
2urisdiction for failure to decide a case
within the +63day period
o Only for the guidance of the 2udges
manning our courts
o /ailure to obser!e said rule constitutes a
ground for administrati!e sanction against
the defaulting 2udge
A certification to this effect is
re.uired before 2udges are
allowed to draw their salaries
CHAPTER NINE: Pros#et!.e an" Retroat!.e
Statutes
IN GENERAL
Prospecti!e and retroacti!e statutes, defined
Prospecti!e 0
o operates upon facts or transactions that
occur after the statute ta1es effect
o loo1s and applies to the future$
Retroacti!e 0
o Law which creates a new obligation,
imposes a new duty or attaches a new
disability in respect to a transaction
already past$
o A statute is not made retroacti!e because
it draws on antecedent facts for its
operation, or part of the re.uirements for
its action and application is drawn from a
time antedating its passage$
1ma#i vs. Estanis#ao
A law may be made operati!e partly on facts that
occurred prior to the effecti!ity of such law without
being retroacti!e$
%tatuteD RA ,*8,3 granting increased personal
eemptions from income ta to be a!ailable
thenceforth, that is, after said Act became
effecti!e and on or before the deadline for filing
income ta returns, with respect to compensation
income earned or recei!ed during the calendar
year prior to the date the law too1 effect$
Castro v. Saga#es
A retroacti!e law (in a legal sense"
o one which ta1es away or impairs !ested
rights ac.uired under eisting laws
o creates a new obligation and imposes a
new duty
o attaches a new disability in respect of
transactions or considerations already
past
Laws operate prospecti!ely, generally
It is a settled rule in statutory construction that
statutes are to be construed as ha!ing only
prospecti!e operation, unless the intendment of
the legislature is to gi!e them a retroacti!e effect,
epressly declare or necessarily implied from the
language used$
5o court will hold a statute to be retroacti!e when
the legislature has not said so$
Art$ 9 of the &i!il &ode which pro!ides that BLaws
shall ha!e no retroacti!e effect, unless the
contrary is pro!ided$C
Le) prospicit. non respicit & the law loo1s forward,
not bac1ward
Le) de f%t%re. -%de) de praeterito & the law
pro!ides for the future, the 2udge for the past$
If the law is silent as to the date of its application
and that it is couched in the past tense does not
necessarily imply that it should ha!e retroacti!e
effect$
,rego v. Come#ec
A statute despite the generality of its language,
must not be so construed as to o!erreach acts,
e!ents, or matters which transpired before its
passage
%tatuteD %ec$96 of the LK& dis.ualifying those
remo!ed from office as a result of an
administrati!e case from running for local electi!e
positions cannot be applied retroacti!ely$
@eldD It cannot dis.ualify a person who was
administrati!ely remo!ed from his position prior to
the effecti!ity of said &ode from running for an
electi!e position$
RationaleD a law is a rule established to guide
actions with no binding effect until it is enacted$
+ova constit%tion f%t%ris formam imponere debet
non praeteretis & A new statute should affect the
future, not the past$
Prospecti!ity applies toD
o %tatutes
o Administrati!e rulings and circulars
o #udicial decisions
4he principle of prospecti!ity of statutes, original
or amendatory, has been applied in many cases$
4hese includeD
%yco v. P+
%tatuteD RA *7,8 which di!ested the P5' of
authority to accept bac1 pay certificates in
payment of loans
@eldD does not apply to an offer of payment made
before effecti!ity of the act$
Lagardo v. Masaganda
@eldD RA :8*-, as amended by RA -6+6 O5
#une *++*, granting inferior courts 2urisdiction
o!er guardianship cases, could not be gi!en
retroacti!e effect in the absence of a sa!ing
clause$
Larga v. "anada 6r.
@eldD %ec$ + ? *6 of E$O$ +6 amending %ec 9 of
P$D$ *,7: could ha!e no retroacti!e application$
Peo v. H%e Po Lay
@eldD a person cannot be con!icted of !iolating
&ircular :6 of the &entral 'an1, when the alleged
!iolation occurred before publication of the
&ircular on the Official KaAette$
a#ta'ar v. CA
@eldD It denied retroacti!e application to PD :,
decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the
bondage of the soil, ? PD -*8, prohibiting
e2ectment of tenants from rice ? corn
farmholdings pending promulgation of rules ?
regulations implementing PD :,
+i#o v CA
@eldD remo!ed Tpersonal culti!ation( as the ground
for e2ectment of a tenant can(t be gi!en
retroacti!e effect in absence of statutory
statement for retroacti!ity$
Applied to administrati!e rulings ? circularsD
ASAC+ roadcasting v. CTA
@eldD a circular or ruling of the &IR cannot be
gi!en retroacti!e effect ad!ersely to a tapayer$
Sanc*e' v. COMELEC
@eldD the holding of recall proceedings had no
retroacti!e application
"om%a#de' v. CSC
@eldD &%& )emorandum &ircular 5o$ :+ cannot
be gi!en retrospecti!e effect so as to entitle to
permanent appointment an employee whose
temporary appointment had epired before the
&ircular was issued$
Applied to 2udicial decisions for e!en though not
laws, are e!idence of what the laws mean and is
the basis of Art$; of the &i!il &ode wherein laws
of the &onstitution shall form part of the legal
system of the Philippines$
Presumption against retroacti!ity
Presumption is that all laws operate prospecti!ely,
unless the contrary clearly appears or is clearly,
plainly and une.ui!ocally epressed or
necessarily implied$
In case of doubtD resol!ed against the retroacti!e
operation of laws
If statute is susceptible of construction other than
that of retroacti!ity or will render it
unconstitutional3 the statute will be gi!en
prospecti!e effect and operation$
Presumption is strong against substanti!e laws
affecting pending actions or proceedings$ 5o
substanti!e statute shall be so construed
retroacti!ely as to affect pending litigations$
Gords or phrases indicating prospecti!ity
Indicating prospecti!e operationD
o A statute is to apply BhereafterC or
BthereafterC
o Bfrom and after the passing of this ActC
o Bshall ha!e been madeC
o Bfrom and afterC a designated date
B%hallC implies that the law ma1es intend the
enactment to be effecti!e only in f%t%re.
%tatutes ha!e no retroacti!e but prospecti!e
effectD
o BIt shall ta1e effect upon its appro!alC
o %hall ta1e effect on the date the President
shall ha!e issued a proclamation or E$O$,
as pro!ided in the statute
Retroacti!e statutes, generally
4he &onstitution does not prohibit the enactment
of retroacti!e statutes which do not impair the
obligation of contract, depri!e persons of property
without due process of law, or di!est rights which
ha!e become !ested, or which are not in the
nature of e) post facto laws$
%tatutes by nature which are retroacti!eD
o Remedial or curati!e statutes
o %tatutes which create new rights
o %tatute epressly pro!ides that it shall
apply retroacti!ely
o Ghere it uses words which clearly
indicate its intent
Problem in construction is when it is applied
retroacti!ely, to a!oid frontal clash with the
&onstitution and sa!e the law from being
declared unconstitutional$
STATUTES GIVEN PROSPECTIVE EFFECT
Penal statutes, generally
Penal laws operate prospecti!ely$
Art$ :* of the RP& pro!ides that Bno felony shall
be punishable by any penalty not prescribed by
law prior to its commission$
Pro!ision is recognition to the uni!ersally
accepted principle that no penal law can ha!e a
retroacti!e effect, no act or omission shall be held
to be a crime, nor its author punished, ecept by
!irtue of a law in force at the time the act was
committed$
+%##%m crimen sine poena. n%##a poena sine #egis
& there is no crime without a penalty, there is no
penalty without a law$
E) post facto law
&onstitution pro!ides that no e) post facto law
shall be enacted$ It also prohibits the retroacti!e
application of penal laws which are in the nature
of e) post facto laws$
E) post facto laws are any of the followingD
o Law ma1es criminal an act done before
the passage of the law and which was
innocent when done, and punishes such
act
o Law which aggra!ates a crime, ma1es it
greater than it was, when committed
o Law which changes the punishment ?
inflicts a greater punishment than that
anneed to the crime when committed
o Law which alters the legal rules of
e!idence, authoriAes con!iction upon less
or different testimony than the law
re.uired at the time of the commission of
the offense
o Law which assumes to regulate ci!il
rights and remedies only, but in effect
imposes penalty or depri!ation of a right
for something which when done was
lawful
o Law which depri!es a person accused of
a crime of some lawful protection to
which he has become entitled, such as
protection of a former con!iction or
ac.uittal, or proclamation of amnesty$
4est if e) post facto clause is !iolatedD Does the
law sought to be applied retroacti!ely ta1e from
an accused any right !ital for protection of life and
libertyR
%copeD applies only to criminal or penal matters
It does 5O4 apply to laws concerning ci!il
proceedings generally, or which affect or regulate
ci!il or pri!ate rights or political pri!ilege
A#via v. Sandiganbayan
LawD as of the date of the effecti!ity of this
decree, any case cogniAable by the
Sandiganbayan is not an e) post facto law
because it is not a penal statute nor dilutes the
right of appeal of the accused$
'ill of attainder
&onstitution pro!ides that no bill of attainder shall
be enacted$
'ill of attainder 0 legislati!e act which inflicts
punishment without 2udicial trial
EssenceD substitution of a legislati!e for a 2udicial
determination of guilt
%er!es to implement the principle of separation of
powers by confining the legislature to rule3ma1ing
? thereby forestalling legislati!e usurpation of
2udicial functions$
@istoryD 'ill of Attainder was employed to
suppress unpopular causes ? political minorities,
and this is the e!il sought to be suppressed by
the &onstitution$
@ow to spot a 'ill of AttainderD
o %ingling out of a definite minority
o Imposition of a burden on it
o A legislati!e intent
o retroacti!e application to past conduct
suffice to stigmatiAe
'ill of Attainder is ob2ectionable because of its e)
post facto features$
Accordingly, if a statute is a 'ill of Attainder, it is
also an e) post facto law$
Ghen penal laws applied retroacti!ely
Penal laws cannot be gi!en retroacti!e effect,
ecept when they are fa!orable to the accused$
Art$:: of RP& Bpenal laws shall ha!e a retroacti!e
effect insofar as they fa!or the person guilty of a
felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term
is defined in Rule 7 Art 8: of the &ode , although
at the time of the application of such laws a final
sentence has been pronounced and the con!ict is
ser!ing the same$
4his is not an e) post facto law$
Eception to the general rule that all laws operate
prospecti!ely$
Rule is founded on the principle thatD the right of
the state to punish and impose penalty is based
on the principles of 2ustice$
Favorabi#ia s%nt amp#ianda. adiiosa restrigenda &
&onscience and good law 2ustify this eception$
Eception was inspired by sentiments of humanity
and accepted by science$
: laws affecting the liability of accusedD
o In force at the time of the commission of
the crime 0 during the pendency of the
criminal action, a statute is passed
reducing the degree of penalty
eliminating the offense itself
remo!ing subsidiary
imprisonment in case of
insol!ency to pay the ci!il liability
prescription of the offense
such statute will be
applied retroacti!ely and
the trial court before the
finality of 2udgment or the
appellate court on appeal
from such 2udgment
should ta1e such statute
in consideration$
o Enacted during or after the trial of the
criminal action
Director v. Director of Prisons
Ghen there is already a final 2udgment ? accused
is ser!ing sentence, remedy is to file petition of
*abeas corp%s. alleging that his continued
imprisonment is illegal pursuant to said statute ?
praying that he be forthwith released$
Eceptions to the ruleD
o Ghen accused is habitual delin.uent
o Ghen statute pro!ides that it shall not
apply to eisting actions or pending cases
o Ghere accused disregards the later law ?
in!o1es the prior statute under which he
was prosecuted$
Keneral ruleD An amendatory statute rendering an
illegal act prior to its enactment no longer illegal is
gi!en retroacti!e effect does not apply when
amendatory act specifically pro!ides that it shall
only apply prospecti!ely$
%tatutes substanti!e in nature
%ubstanti!e law
o creates, defines or regulates rights
concerning life, liberty or property, or the
powers of agencies or instrumentalities
for administration of public affairs$
o that part of law which creates, defines ?
regulates rights, or which regulates rights
or duties which gi!e rise to a cause of
action
o that part of law which courts are
established to administer
o when applied to criminal lawD that which
declares which acts are crimes and
prescribe the punishment for committing
them
o &annot be construed retroacti!ely as it
might affect pre!ious or past rights or
obligations
%ubstanti!e rights
o One which includes those rights which
one en2oys under the legal system prior
to the disturbance of normal relations$
&ases with substanti!e statutesD
To#entino v. A'a#te
In the absence of a contrary intent, statutes which
lays down certain re.uirements to be complied
with be fore a case can be brought to court$
Espirit% v. Cipriano
/reeAes the amount of monthly rentals for
residential houses during a fied period
Spo%ses Tirona v. A#e-o
LawD &omprehensi!e Land Reform Law granting
complainants tenancy rights to fishponds and
pursuant to which they filed actions to assert
rights which subse.uently amended to eempt
fishponds from co!erage of statute
@eldD Amendatory law is substanti!e in nature as
it eempts fishponds from its co!erage$
4est for procedural lawsD
o if rule really regulates procedure, the
2udicial process for enforcing rights and
duties recogniAed by substanti!e law ?
for 2ustly administering remedy and
redress for a disregard or infraction of
them
o If it operates as a means of implementing
an eisting right
4est for substanti!e lawsD
o If it ta1es away a !ested right
o If rule creates a right such as right to
appeal
Fabian v. Desierto
Ghere to prosecute an appeal or transferring the
!enue of appeal is procedural
EampleD
o Decreeing that appeals from decisions of
the Ombudsman in administrati!e actions
be made to the &ourt of Appeals
o Re.uiring that appeals from decisions of
the 5LR& be filed with the &ourt of
Appeals
Kenerally, procedural rules are retroacti!e and
are applicable to actions pending and undermined
at the time of the passage of the procedural law,
while substanti!e laws are prospecti!e
Effects on pending actions
%tatutes affecting substanti!e rights may not be
gi!en retroacti!e operation so as to go!ern
pending proceedings$
/b%ran v. Labes
Ghere court originally obtains and eercises
2urisdiction, a later statute restricting such
2urisdiction or transferring it to another tribunal will
not affect pending action, unless statute pro!ides
? unless prohibitory words are used$
Lagardo v. Masagana
Ghere court has no 2urisdiction o!er a certain
case but ne!ertheless decides it, from which
appeal is ta1en, a statute enacted during the
pendency of the appeal !esting 2urisdiction upon
such trial court o!er the sub2ect matter or such
case may not be gi!en retroacti!e effect so as to
!alidate the 2udgment of the court a $%o, in the
absence of a sa!ing clause$
"ep%b#ic v. Prieto
Ghere a complaint pending in court is defecti!e
because it did not allege sufficient action, it may
not be !alidated by a subse.uent law which
affects substanti!e rights and not merely
procedural matters$
Rule against the retroacti!e operation of statutes
in general applies more strongly with respect to
substanti!e laws that affect pending actions or
proceedings$
Pualification of rule
A substanti!e law will be construed as applicable
to pending actions if such is the clear intent of the
law$
4o promote social 2ustice or in the eercise of
police power, is intended to apply to pending
actions
As a rule, a case must be decided in the light of
the law as it eists at the time of the decision of
the appellate court, where the statute changing
the law is intended to be retroacti!e and to apply
to pending litigations or is retroacti!e in effect
4his rule is true though it may result in the
re!ersal of a 2udgment which as correct at the
time it was rendered by the trial court$ 4he rule is
sub2ect to the limitation concerning constitutional
restrictions against impairment of !ested rights
%tatutes affecting !ested rights
A !ested right or interest may be said to mean
some right or interest in property that has become
fied or established and is no longer open to
doubt or contro!ersy
Rights are !ested when the right to en2oyment,
present or prospecti!e, has become the property
of some particular person or persons, as a
present interest
4he right must be absolute, complete and
unconditional, independent of a contingency
A mere epectancy of future benefit or a
contingent interest in property founded on
anticipated continuance of eisting laws does not
constitute a !ested right
Inchoate rights which ha!e not been acted on are
not !ested
A statute may not be construed and applied
retroacti!ely under the following circumstancesD
o if it impairs substanti!e right that has
become !estedH
o as disturbing or destroying eisting right
embodied in a 2udgmentH
o creating new substanti!e right to
fundamental cause of action where none
eisted before and ma1ing such right
retroacti!eH
o by arbitrarily creating a new right or
liability already etinguished by operation
of law
Law creating a new right in fa!or of a class of
persons may not be so applied if the new right
collides with or impairs any !ested right ac.uired
before the establishment of the new right nor, by
the terms of which is retroacti!e, be so applied ifD
o it ad!ersely affects !ested rights
o unsettles matter already done as re.uired
by eisting law
o wor1s in2ustice to those affected thereby
eng%et Conso#idated Mining Co v. Pineda
Ghile a person has no !ested right in any rule of
law entitling him to insist that it shall remain
unchanged for his benefit, nor has he a !ested
right in the continued eistence of a statute which
precludes its change or repeal, nor in any
omission to legislate on a particular matter, a
subse.uent statute cannot be so applied
retroacti!ely as to impair his right that accrued
under the old law$
%tatutes must be so construed as to sustain its
constitutionality, and prospecti!e operation will be
presumed where a retroacti!e application will
produce in!alidity$
Peo v. Pata#in
4he abolition of the death penalty and its
subse.uent re3imposition$ 4hose accused of
crimes prior to the re3imposition of the death
penalty ha!e ac.uired !ested rights under the law
abolishing it$
&ourts ha!e thus gi!en statutes strict constriction
to pre!ent their retroacti!e operation in order that
the statutes would not impair or interfere with
!ested or eisting rights$ Accused3appellant Ts
rights to be benefited by the abolition of the
death penalty accrued or attached by !irtue of
Article :: of the Re!ised Penal &ode$ 4his benefit
cannot be ta1en away from them$
%tatutes affecting obligations of contract
Any contract entered into must be in accordance
with, and not repugnant to, the applicable law at
the time of eecution$ %uch law forms part of, and
is read into, the contract e!en without the parties
epressly saying so$
Laws eisting at the time of the eecution of
contracts are the ones applicable to such
transactions and not later statutes, unless the
latter pro!ide that they shall ha!e retroacti!e
effect$
Later statutes will not, howe!er, be gi!en
retroacti!e effect if to do so will impair the
obligation of contracts, for the &onstitution
prohibits the enactment of a law impairing the
obligations of contracts$
Any law which enlarges, abridges, or in any
manner changes the intention of the parties
necessarily impairs the contract itself
A statute which authoriAes any de!iation from the
terms of the contract by postponing or
accelerating the period of performance which it
prescribes, imposing conditions not epressed in
the contract, or dispensing with those which are
howe!er minute or apparently immaterial in their
effect upon the contract, impairs the obligation,
and such statute should not therefore be applied
retroacti!ely$
As between two feasible interpretations of a
statute, the court should adopt that which will
a!oid the impairment of the contract$
If the contract is legal at it inception, it cannot be
rendered illegal by a subse.uent legislation$
A law by the terms of which a transaction or
agreement would be illegal cannot be gi!en
retroacti!e effect so as to nullify such transactions
or agreement eecuted before said law too1
effect$
1.S. Tobacco Corp. v. Lina
4he importation of certain goods without import
license which was legal under the law eisting at
the time of shipment is not rendered illegal by the
fact that when the goods arri!ed there was
already another law prohibiting importation
without import license$ 4o rule otherwise in any of
these instances is to impair the obligations of
contract$
Illustration of rule
Peop#e v. 5eta
Eisting lawD authoriAing a lawyer to charge not
more than 7N of the amount in!ol!ed as
attorney(s fees in the prosecution of certain
!eteran(s claim$
/actsD A lawyer entered into a contract for
professional ser!ices on contingent basis and
actually rendered ser!ice to its successful
conclusion$ 'efore the claim was collected, a
statute was enacted$
5ew statuteD Prohibiting the collection of
attorney(s fees for ser!ices rendered in
prosecuting !eteran(s claims$
IssueD /or collecting his fees pursuant to the
contract for professional ser!ices, the lawyer was
prosecuted for !iolation of the statute$
@eldD In eonerating the lawyer, the court saidD
the statute prohibiting the collection of attorney(s
fees cannot be applied retroacti!ely so as to
ad!ersely affect the contract for professional
ser!ices and the fees themsel!es$
4he 7N fee was contingent and did not become
absolute and unconditional until the !eteran(s
claim had been collected by the claimant when
the statute was already in force did no alter the
situation$
/or the Bdistinction between !ested and absolute
rights is not helpful and a better !iew to handle
the problem is to declare those statutes
attempting to affect rights which the courts find to
be unalterable, in!alid as arbitrary and
unreasonable, thus lac1ing in due process$C
4he 7N fee allowed by the old law is Bnot
unreasonable$ %er!ices were rendered
thereunder to claimant(s benefits$ 4he right to
fees accrued upon such rendition$ Only the
payment of the fee was contingent upon the
appro!al of the claimH therefore, the right was
contingent$ /or a right to accrue is one thingH
enforcement thereof by actual payment is
another$ 4he subse.uent law enacted after the
rendition of the ser!ices should not as a matter of
simple 2ustice affect the agreement, which was
entered into !oluntarily by the parties as
epressly directed in the pre!ious law$ 4o apply
the new law to the case of defendant3appellant s
as to depri!e him of the agreed fee would be
arbitrary and unreasonable as destructi!e of the
in!iolability of contracts, and therefore in!alid as
lac1ing in due processH to penaliAe him for
collecting such fees, repugnant to our sense of
2ustice$C
Repealing and amendatory acts
%tatutes which repeal earlier or prior laws operate
prospecti!ely, unless the legislati!e intent to gi!e
them retroacti!e effect clearly appears$
Although a repealing state is intended to be
retroacti!e, it will not be so construed if it will
impair !ested rights or the obligations of
contracts, or unsettle matters that had been
legally done under the old law$
Repealing statutes which are penal in nature are
generally applied retroacti!ely if fa!orable to the
accused, unless the contrary appears or the
accused is otherwise not entitled to the benefits of
the repealing act$
Ghile an amendment is generally construed as
becoming a part of the original act as if it had
always been contained therein , it may not be
gi!en a retroacti!e effect unless it is so pro!ided
epressly or by necessary implication and no
!ested right or obligations of contract are thereby
impaired$
4he general rule on the prospecti!e operation of
statutes also applies to amendatory acts
San 6ose v. "e*abi#itation Finance Corp
RA 96* which condoned the interest on pre3war
debts from #anuary *, *+9: to December -*,
*+97 amended by RA 8,* on #une *8, *+7* by
!irtually reenacting the old law and pro!iding that
9if t*e debtor. *o;ever. makes vo#%ntary payment
of t*e entire preA;ar %npaid principa# ob#igation
on or before December I?. ?JKL. t*e interest on
s%c* principa# ob#igation corresponding from
6an%ary ?. ?JM> to day of payment are #ike;ise
condonedC
@eldD a debtor who paid his pre3war obligation
together with the interests on )arch *9, *+7* or
before the amendment was appro!ed into law, is
not entitled to a refund of the interest paid from
#anuary *, *+98 to )arch *9, *+7* the date the
debtor paid the obligation$
ReasonD
o Bma1es !oluntary paymentC 0 denotes a
present or future actH thereby not
retroacti!ely
o Bunpaid principal obligationC and
BcondoneC 0 imply that amendment does
not co!er refund of interests paid after its
appro!al$
C/" v. La Tondena
%tatuteD imposes ta on certain business acti!ities
is amended by eliminating the clause pro!iding a
ta on some of such acti!ities, and the amended
act is further amended, after the lapse of length of
time, by restoring the clause pre!iously
eliminated, which re.uires that the last
amendment should not be gi!en retroacti!e effect
so as to co!er the whole period$
/mperia# v. C/"
An amendment which imposes a ta on a certain
business which the statute prior to its amendment
does not ta, may not be applied retroacti!ely so
as to re.uire payment of the ta on such business
for the period prior to the amendment
%yco v. P*i#ippine +ationa# ank
IssueD can 'uyco compel the P5' to accept his
bac1pay certificate in payment of his
indebtedness to the ban1
April :9, *+783 RA ;+, ga!e 'uyco the right to
ha!e said certificate applied in payment of is
obligation thus at that time he offered to pay with
his bac1pay certificate$
#une *8, *+78, RA *7,8 was enacted amending
the charter of the P5' and pro!ided that the ban1
shall ha!e no authority to accept bac1pay
certificate in payment of indebtedness to the
ban1$
@eldD 4he &ourt fa!ored 'uyco$ All statutes are
construed as ha!ing prospecti!e operation,
unless the purpose of the legislature is to gi!e
them retroacti!e effect$
4his principle also applies to amendments$ RA
*7,8 does not contain any pro!ision regarding its
retroacti!e effect$ It simply states its effecti!ity
upon appro!al$ 4he amendment therefore, has
no retroacti!e effect, and the present case should
be go!erned by the law at the time the offer in
.uestion was made
4he rule is familiar that after an act is amended,
the original act continues to be in force with
regard to all rights that had accrued prior to such
amendment$
/ns%#ar ,overnment v. Frank
Ghere a contract is entered into by the parties on
the basis of the law then pre!ailing, the
amendment of said law will not affect the terms of
said contract$
4he rule applies e!en if one of the contracting
parties is the go!ernment

STATUTES GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT
Procedural laws
4he general law is that the law has no retroacti!e
effect$
EceptionsD
o procedural laws
o curati!e laws, which are gi!en retroacti!e
operation
Procedural laws
o ad2ecti!e laws which prescribe rules and
forms of procedure of enforcing rights or
obtaining redress for their in!asion
o they refer to rules of procedure by which
courts applying laws of all 1inds can
properly administer in2ustice
o they include rules of pleadings, practice
and e!idence
o Applied to criminal law, they pro!ide or
regulate the steps by which one who
commits a crime is to be punished$
o Remedial statutes or statutes relating to
modes of procedure3 which do not create
new or ta1e away !ested rights, but only
operate in furtherance of the remedy or
confirmation of the rights already eisting,
do not come within the legal conception
of a retroacti!e law, or the general rule
against the retroacti!e operation of
statutes$
o A new statute which deals with procedure
only is presumpti!ely applicable to all
actions 0 those which ha!e accrued or
are pending$
o %tatutes regulating the procedure of the
courts will be construed as applicable to
actions pending and undetermined at the
time of their passage$
4he retroacti!e application of procedural laws is
notD
o !iolati!e of any right of a person who may
feel that he is ad!ersely affectedH
o nor constitutionally ob2ectionable$
"ationa#eF no !ested right may attach to, nor arise
from, procedural laws$
A person has no !ested right in any particular
remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the
application to the trial of his case, whether ci!il or
criminal, of any other than the eisting rules of
procedure
A#day v. Cami##on
Pro!isionD 'P *:+3 Bnor record or appeal shall be
re.uired to ta1e an appeal$C (procedural in nature
and should be applied retroacti!ely"
IssueD Ghether an appeal from an ad!erse
2udgment should be dismissed for failure of
appellant to file a record on appeal within -6 days
as re.uired under the old rules$
%uch .uestion is pending resolution at the time
the 'P 'lg too1 effect, became academic upon
effecti!ity of said law because the law no longer
re.uires the filing a of a record on appeal and its
retroacti!e application remo!ed the legal obstacle
to gi!ing due course to the appeal$
Castro v. Saga#es
A statute which transfers the 2urisdiction to try
certain cases from a court to a .uasi32udicial
tribunal is a remedial statute that is applicable to
claims that accrued before its enactment but
formulated and filed after it too1 effect$
@eldD 4he court that has 2urisdiction o!er a claim
at the time it accrued cannot !alidly try to claim
where at the time the claim is formulated and
filed, the 2urisdiction to try it has been transferred
by law to a .uasi32udicial tribunal$
"ationa#eF for e!en actions pending in one court
may be !alidly be ta1en away and transferred to
another and no litigant can ac.uire a !ested right
to be heard by one particular court$
An administrati!e ruleD which is interpretati!e of a
pre3eisting statue and not declarati!e of certain
rights with obligations thereunder is gi!en
retroacti!e effect as of the date of the effecti!ity of
the statute$
At#as Conso#idated Mining 3 Deve#opment Corp. v. CA
IssueD whether a trial court has been di!ested of
2urisdiction to hear and decide a pending case
in!ol!ing a mining contro!ersy upon the
promulgation of PD *:;* which !ests upon the
'ureau of )ines Original and eclusi!e
2urisdiction to hear and decide mining
contro!ersies$
@eldD Mes$ PD *:;* is a remedial statute$
It does not create new rights nor ta1e away rights
that are already !ested$ It only operates in
furtherance of a remedy or confirmation of rights
already in eistence$
It does not come within the legal pur!iew of a
prospecti!e law$ As such, it can be gi!en
retrospecti!e application of statutes$
'eing procedural in nature, it shall apply to all
actions pending at the time of its enactment
ecept only with respect to those cases which
had already attained h character of a final and
eecutor 2udgment$
Gere it not so, the purpose of the Decree, which
is to facilitate the immediate resolution of mining
contro!ersies by granting 2urisdiction to a body or
agency more adept to the technical compleities
of mining operations, would be thwarted and
rendered meaningless$
Litigants in a mining contro!ersy cannot be
permitted to choose a forum of con!enience$
#urisdiction is imposed by law and not by any of
the parties to such proceedings$
/urthermore, PD *:;* is a special law and under
a well3accepted principle in stat con, the special
law will pre!ail o!er a stature or law of general
application$
S%bido. 6r. v. Sandiganbayan
&ourt ruled that RA ,+,7, in further amending PD
*868 as regards the %andiganbayan(s 2urisdiction,
mode of appeal, and other procedural matters, is
clearly a procedural law, i.e. one which prescribes
rules and forms of procedure enforcing rights or
obtaining redress for their in!asion, or those
which refer to rules of procedure by which courts
applying laws of all 1inds can properly administer
2ustice$
4he petitioners suggest that it is li1ewise curati!e
or remedial statute, which cures defects and adds
to the means of enforcing eisting obligations$
As a procedural and curati!e statute, RA ,+,7
may !alidly be gi!en retroacti!e effect, there
being no impairment of contractual or !ested
rights$
Martine' v. Peop#e
%tatutes regulating the procedure of the courts
will be construed as applicable to actions pending
and undermined at the time of their passage$
Ghere at the time the action was filed, the Rules
of &ourtD Ba petition to be allowed to appeal as
pauper shall not be entertained by the appellate
courtC
4he subse.uent amendment thereto deleting the
sentence implies that the appellate court is no
longer prohibited from entertaining petitions to
appear as pauper litigants, and may grant the
petition then pending action, so long as its
re.uirements are complied with$
Eceptions to the rule
4he rule does not apply whereD
o the statute itself epressly or by
necessary implication pro!ides that
pending actions are ecepted from it
operation, or where to apply it to pending
proceedings would impair !ested rights
o &ourts may deny the retroacti!e
application of procedural laws in the
e!ent that to do so would not be feasible
or would wor1 in2ustice$
o 5or may procedural laws be applied
retroacti!ely to pending actions if to do so
would in!ol!e intricate problems of due
process or impair the independence of
the courts$
Tayag v. CA
IssueD whether an action for recognition filed by
an illegitimate minor after the death of his alleged
parent when Art :;7 of the &i!il &ode was still in
effect and has remained pending Art *,7 of the
/amily &ode too1 effect can still be prosecuted
considering that Art *,7, which is claimed to be
procedural in nature and retroacti!e in
application, does not allow filing of the action after
the death of the alleged parent$
@eldD 4he rule that a statutory change in matters
of procedure may affect pending actions and
proceedings, unless the language of the act
ecludes them from its operation, is not so
per!asi!e that it may be used to !alidate or
in!alidate proceedings ta1en before it goes into
effect, since procedure must be go!erned by the
law regulating it at the time the .uestion of
procedure arises especially where !ested rights
maybe pre2udiced$
Accordingly, Art *,7 of the /amily &ode finds no
proper application to the instant case since it will
ineluctably affect ad!ersely a right of pri!ate
respondent and, conse.uentially, of the minor
child she represents, both of which ha!e been
!ested with the filing of the complaint in court$
4he trial court is, therefore, correct in applying the
pro!isions of Art :;7 of the &i!il &ode and in
holding that pri!ate respondent(s cause of action
has not yet prescribed$C
&urati!e statutes
curati!e remedial statutes are healing acts
they are remedial by curing defects and adding to
the means of enforcing eisting obligations
the rule to curati!e statutes is that if the thing
omitted or failed to be done, and which
constitutes the defect sought to be remo!ed or
made harmless, is something which the
legislature might ha!e dispensed with by a
pre!ious statute, it may do so by a subse.uent
one
curati!e statutes are intended to supply defects,
abridge superfluities in eisting laws, and curb
certain e!ils$ 4hey are designed and intended,
but has failed of epected legal conse.uence by
reason of some statutory disability or irregularity
in their own action$ 4hey ma1e !alid that which,
before the enactment of the statute, was in!alid$
4heir purpose is to gi!e !alidity to acts done that
would ha!e been in!alid under eisting laws, as if
eisting laws ha!e been complied with
Friva#do v. COMELEC
(rested the definition of curati!e statutes"
4olentino
o those which underta1e to cure errors?
irregularities, thereby !alidating 2udicial
2udicial or administrati!e proceedings,
acts of public officers, or pri!ate deeds or
contracts which otherwise would not
produce their intended conse.uences by
reason of some statutory disability or
failure to comply with some technical
re.uirement
Agpalo
o curati!e statutes are healing acts curing
defects and adding to the means of
enforcing eisting obligations
o and are intended to supply defects
abridge superfluities in eisting laws?
curb certain e!ils
o by their !ery nature, curati!e statutes are
retroacti!e and reach bac1 to the past
e!ents to correct errors or irregularities ?
to render !alid ? effecti!e attempted acts
which would be otherwise ineffecti!e for
the purpose the parties intended
&urati!e statutes are forms of retroacti!e
legislations which reach bac1 on past e!ents to
correct errors or irregularities ? to render !alid ?
effecti!e attempted acts which would be
otherwise ineffecti!e for the purpose the parties
intended$
Erectors. /nc. v. +L"C (hahhha for the petitioner"
%tatuteD EO ***, amended Art :*, of the Labor
&ode to widen the wor1ers, access to the
go!ernment for redress of grie!ances by gi!ing
the Regional Directors ? the Labor Arbiters
concurrent 2urisdiction o!er cases in!ol!ing
money claims
IssueD Amendment created a situation where the
2urisdiction of the RDs and LAs o!erlapped$
RemedyD RA 8,*7further amended Art :*, by
delineating their respecti!e 2urisdictions$ Fnder
RA 8,*7, the RD has eclusi!e 2urisdiction o!er
cases in!ol!ing claims, pro!idedD
o the claim is presented by an employer or
person employed in domestic or
household ser!ices or household help
under the &ode$
o the claimant no longer being employed
does not see1 reinstatement
o the aggregate money claim of the
employee or househelper doesn(t eceed
P7,666$
All other cases are within the eclusi!e
2urisdiction of the Labor Arbiter$
@eldD EO *** ? RA 8,*7 are therefore curati!e
statutes$
A curati!e statute is enacted to cure defects in a
prior law or to !alidate legal proceedings,
instruments or acts of public authorities which
would otherwise be !oid for want of conformity
with certain eisting legal re.uirements
Adong v. C*eong Seng ,ee
%tatutes intended to !alidate what otherwise !oid
or in!alid marriages, being curati!e, will be gi!en
retroacti!e effect$
Santos v. D%ata
%tatute which pro!ides that a contract shall
presumed an e.uitable mortgage in any of the
cases therein enumerated, and designed
primarily to curtail e!ils brought about by
contracts of sale with right of repurchase, is
remedial in nature ? will be applied retroacti!ely
to cases arising prior to the effecti!ity of the
statute$

Abad v. P*i# American ,enera# /nc.

Ghere at the time action is filed in court the latter
has no 2urisdiction o!er the sub2ect matter but a
subse.uent statute clothes it with 2urisdiction
before the matter is decided$
4he statute is in the nature of a curati!e law with
retroacti!e operation to pending proceedings and
cures the defect of lac1 of 2urisdiction of the court
at the commencement of the action$
Legarda v. Masaganda
Ghere a curati!e statute is enacted after the court
has rendered 2udgment, which 2udgment is
naturally !oid as the court has at the time no
2urisdiction o!er the sub2ect of the action, the
enactment of the statute conferring 2urisdiction to
the court does not !alidate the !oid 2udgment for
the legislature has no power to ma1e a 2udgment
rendered without 2urisdiction of a !alid 2udgment$
Friva#do v. COMELEC
(an eample considered curati!e ? remedial as
well as one which creates new rights ? new
remedies, generally held to e retroacti!e in
nature3 PD ,:7, which liberaliAes the procedure
of repatriation"
@eldD PD ,:7 ? the re3ac.uisition of the /ilipino
citiAenship by administrati!e repatriation pursuant
to said decree is retroacti!e$
De Castro v. Tan
@eldD what has been gi!en retroacti!e effect in
Friva#do is not only the law itself but also Phil$
&itiAenship re3ac.uired pursuant to said law to
the date of application for repatriation, which
meant that his lac1 of /ilipino citiAenship at the
time he registered as a !oter, one of the
.ualification is as a go!ernor, or at the time he
filed his certificate of candidacy for go!ernorship,
one of the .ualification is as a go!ernor, was
cured by the retroacti!e application of his
repatriation$
"ep%b#ic v. Atencio
&urati!e statuteD one which confirms, refines and
!alidate the sale or transfer of a public land
awarded to a grantee, which a prior law prohibits
its sale within a certain period ? otherwise in!alid
transaction under the old law$
M%nicipa#ity of San +arciso. H%e'on v. Mende'
%tatuteD %ec$ 99:(d" of the Local Ko!ernment
&ode of *++*, pro!ides that municipal districts
organiAed pursuant to presidential issuances or
eecuti!e orders ? which ha!e their respecti!e
sets of electi!e municipal officials holding at the
time of the effecti!ity of the code shall henceforth
be considered as a regular municipalities
4his is a curati!e statute as it !alidates the
creation of municipalities by EO which had been
held to be an in!alid usurpation of legislati!e
power$
Tatad v. ,arcia 6r.
IssueD Ghere there is doubt as to whether
go!ernment agency under the then eisting law,
has the authority to enter intoa negotiated
contract for the construction of a go!ernment
pro2ect under the build3lease3and transfer scheme
@eldD 4he subse.uent enactment of a statute
which recogniAes direct negotiation of contracts
under such arrangement is a curati!e statute$
As all doubts and procedural lapses that might
ha!e attended the negotiated contract ha!e been
cured by the subse.uent statute
Limitations of rule
remedial statutes will not be gi!en retroacti!e
effect if to do so would impair the obligations of
contract or disturb !ested rights
only administrati!e or curati!e features of the
statute as will not ad!ersely affect eisting rights
will be gi!en retroacti!e operation
the eception to the foregoing limitations of the
rule is a remedial or curati!e statute which is
enacted as a police power measure
%tatutes of this type may be gi!en retroacti!e
effect e!en though they impair !ested rights or
the obligations of contract, if the legislati!e intent
is to gi!e them retrospecti!e operation
"ationa#eF 4he constitutional restriction against
impairment against obligations of contract or
!ested rights does not preclude the legislature
from enacting statutes in the eercise of its police
power
Police power legislations
as a rule, statutes which are enacted in the
eercise of police power to regulate certain
acti!ities, are applicable not only to those
acti!ities or transactions coming into being after
their passage, but also to those already in
eistence
"ationa#eF the non3impairment of the obligations
of contract or of !ested rights must yield to the
legitimate eercise of power, by the legislature, to
prescribe regulations to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order, safety and
general welfare of the people
Any right ac.uired under a statute or under a
contract is sub2ect to the condition that it may be
impaired by the state in the legitimate eercise of
its police power, since the reser!ation of the
essential attributes of so!ereign power is deemed
read into e!ery statute or contract as a postulate
of the legal order
%tatutes relating to prescription
Keneral ruleD a statute relating to prescription of
action, being procedural in nature, applies to all
actions filed after its effecti!ity$ In other words,
such a statute is bothD
o prospecti!e in the sense that it applies to
causes that accrued and will accrue after
it too1 effect, and
o retroacti!e in the sense that it applies to
causes that accrued before its passage
@owe!er, a statute of limitations will not be gi!en
retroacti!e operation to causes of action that
accrued prior to its enactment if to do so will
remo!e a bar of limitation which has become
complete or disturb eisting claims without
allowing a reasonable time to bring actions
thereon
+agrampa v. +agrampa
%tatuteD Art$ ***8 of the &i!il &odeD Bprescription
already running before the effecti!ity of this &ode
shall be go!erned by laws pre!iously in forceH but
if since the time this &ode too1 effect the entire
period herein re.uired for prescription should
elapse, the present &ode shall be applicable e!en
though by the former laws a longer period might
be re.uired$C
@eldD 4he pro!ision is retroacti!e since it applied
to a cause that accrued prior to its effecti!ity
which when filed has prescribed under the new
&i!il &ode e!en though the period of prescription
prescribed under the old law has not ended at the
time the action is filed in court
4he fact that the legislature has indicated that the
statute relating to prescription should be gi!en
retroacti!e effect will not warrant gi!ing it if it will
impair !ested rights
%tatute of limitations prescribing a longer period
to file an action than that specified under the law
may not be construed as ha!ing retroacti!e
application if it will re!i!e the cause that already
prescribed under the old statute for it will impair
!ested rights against whom the cause is asserted$
%tatute which shorten the period of prescription ?
re.uires that causes which accrued prior to its
effecti!ity be prosecuted or filed not later than a
specific date may not be construed to apply to
eisting causes which pursuant to the old law
under which they accrued, will not prescribe until
a much longer period than that specified in the
later enactment because the right to bring an
action is founded on law which has become
!ested before the passage of the new statute of
limitations
Apparently conflicting decisions on prescription
i##ones v. C/"
IssueD whether %ec$ ,A of &ommon wealth Act
*99, amended by RA *++-, to the effect that Bany
action to enforce an cause (i.e. non payment of
;ages or overtime compensationC under this Act
shall be commenced within - years after such
cause of action accrued, otherwise it shall be
fore!er barred$ Provided. *o;ever. that actions
already commenced before the effecti!e day of
this Act shall not be affected by the period herein
prescribed$
As statute shortened the period of prescription
from 8 to - yrs$ from the date the cause of action
accrued, it was contended that to gi!e retroacti!e
effect would impair !ested rights since it would
operate to preclude the prosecution of claims that
accrued more than - but less than 8 yrs$
@eldD a statute of limitations is procedural in
nature and no !ested right can attach thereto or
arise therefrom$
Ghen the legislature pro!ided that Bactions
already commenced before the effecti!ity of this
Act shall not be affected by the period herein
prescribed,C it intended to apply the statute to all
eisting actions filed after the effecti!ity of the law$
'ecause the statute shortened the period within
which to bring an action ? in order to !iolate the
constitutional mandate, claimants are in2uriously
affected should ha!e a reasonable period of * yr$
from time new statute too1 effect within which to
sue on such claims$
Cora#es v. Emp#oyeeDs Compensation Commission
%ame issue on 'illones but &ourt arri!ed at a
different conclusion$
IssueD Ghether a claim for wor1men(s
compensation which accrued under the old
Gor1men(s &ompensation Act (G&A" but filed
under after )arch -*, *+,7 is barred by the
pro!ision of the 5ew Labor &ode which repealed
the G&A$
G&A re.uires that Bwor1men(s compensation
claims accruing prior to the effecti!ity of this &ode
shall be filed with the appropriate regional offices
of the Department of Labor not later than )arch
-*, *+,7, otherwise shall be barred fore!er$C
@eldD Pro!ision doesn(t apply to wor1men(s
compensation that accrued before Labor &ode
too1 effect, e!en if claims were not filed not later
than )arch -*, *+,7$
"ationa#eF prescripti!e period for claims which
accrued under G&A as amended *6 yrs$ which is
Ba right found on statuteC ? hence a !ested right,
that cannot be impaired by the retroacti!e
application of the Labor &ode$
&omparison of 'illones and &orales
'illones
Ghile &ourt said that such
right to bring an action
accrued under the old law
is not !ested right, it did
not say that the right is one
protected by the due
process clause of the
&onstitution$
/or 'O4@ casesD In
sol!ing how to safeguard
the right to bring action
whose prescripti!e period
to institute it has been
shortened by lawR
Ka!e the claimants whose
rights ha!e been affected,
one year from the date the
law too1 effect within which
to sue their claims$
&orales
&ourt considered the right
to prosecute the action that
accrued under the old law
as one founded on law ? a
!ested right$
&ourt construed the statute
of limitations as
inapplicable to the action
that accrued before the law
too1 effect$
(It is generally held that the
court has no power to read
into the law something
which the law itself did not
pro!ide epressly or
impliedly$ Cora#es case
seems to be on firmer
grounds$
Prescription in criminal and ci!il cases
Keneral ruleD laws on prescription of actions apply
as well to crimes committed before the enactment
as afterwards$ 4here is, howe!er, a distinction
between a statute of limitations in criminal actions
and that of limitations in ci!il suits, as regards
their construction$
In &I>IL %FI43 statute is enacted by the
legislature as an impartial arbiter, between two
contending parties$ In the construction of such
statute, there is no intendment to be made in
fa!or of either party$ 5either grants right to the
otherH there is therefore no grantor against whom
no ordinary presumptions of construction are to
be made$
&RI)I5AL &A%E%D the state is the grantor,
surrendering by act of grace its right to prosecute
or declare that the offense is no longer sub2ect of
prosecution after the prescripti!e period$ %uch
statutes are not only liberally construed but are
applied retroacti!ely if fa!orable to the accused$
%tatutes relating to appeals
4he right to appeal from an ad!erse 2udgment,
other than that which the &onstitution grants, is
statutory and may be restricted or ta1en away
A statute relating to appeals is remedial or
procedural in nature and applies to pending
actions in which no 2udgment has yet been
promulgated at the time the statute too1 effect$
%uch statute, li1e other statutes, may not howe!er
be construed retroacti!ely so as to impair !ested
rights$ @ence, a statute which eliminates the right
to appeal and considers the 2udgment rendered in
a case final and unappealable, destroys the right
to appeal a decision rendered after the statute
went into effect, but 5O4 the right to prosecute an
appeal that has been perfected before the
passage of the law, for in the latter case, the right
of the appellant to appeal has become !ested
under the old law and may not therefore be
impaired$
%tature shortening the period for ta1ing appeals is
to be gi!en prospecti!e effect and may not be
applies to pending proceedings in which 2udgment
has already been rendered at the time of its
enactment ecept if there(s clear legislati!e intent$
er#iner v. "oberts
Ghere a statute shortened the period for ta1ing
appeals form thirty days to fifteen days from
notice of 2udgment, an appeal ta1en within thirty
days but beyond fifteen days from notice of
2udgment promulgated before the statute too1
effect is deemed seasonably perfected$
CHAPTER TEN: A&en"&ent, Re.!s!on, Co"!%!at!on
an" Re#ea'
AMENDMENT
Power to Amend
4he legislature has the authority to amend,
sub2ect to constitutional re.uirements, any
eisting law$
Authority to amend is part of the legislati!e power
to enact, alter and repeal laws$
4he %& in the eercise of its rule3ma1ing power
or of its power to interpret the law, has no
authority to amend or change the law, such
authority being the eclusi!e to the legislature$
@ow amendment effected
Amendment 0 the change or modification, by
deletion, alteration, of a statute which sur!i!es in
its amended form$
4he amendment of a statute is effected by the
enactment of an amendatory act modifying or
altering some pro!isions of a statute either
epressly or impliedly$
Epress amendment 0 done by pro!iding in the
amendatory act that specific sections or
pro!isions of a statute be amended as recited
therein or as common indicated, Bto read as
follows$C
Amendment by implication
E!ery statute should be harmoniAed with other
laws on the same sub2ect, in the absence of a
clear inconsistency$
Legislati!e intent to amend a prior law on the
same sub2ect is shown by a statement in the later
act that any pro!ision of law that is inconsistent
therewith is modified accordingly$
Implied Amendment3 when a part of a prior
statute embracing the same sub2ect as the later
may not be enforced without nullifying the
pertinent pro!ision of the latter in which e!ent, the
prior act is deemed amended or modified to the
etent of repugnancy$
H%impo v. Mendo'a
Ghere a statute which re.uires that the
annual realty ta on lands or buildings be paid
on or before the specified date, sub2ect to
penalty of a percentage of the whole amount
of ta in case of delayed payment, is
amended by authoriAing payment of the ta in
four e.ual installments to become due on or
before specified dates$
4he penalty pro!ision of the earlier statute is
modified by implication that the penalty for
late payment of an installment under the later
law will be collected and computed only on
the installment that became due and unpaid,
and not on the whole amount of annual ta as
pro!ided in the old statute$
Legislati!e intent to change the basis is clear
when the later law allowed payment in four
installments$
Peop#e v. Macatanda
A statute punishing an act which is also a
crime under the RP& pro!ides a penalty as
prescribed in the said &ode, such statute is
not a special law but an amendment by
implication$
Ghen amendment ta1es effect
*7 days following its publication in the Official
KaAette or newspaper of general circulation,
unless a date is specified therein after such
publication$
@ow amendment is construed, generally
%tatute and amendment 0 read as a whole
Amendment act is ordinarily construed as if the
original statute has been repealed and a new
independent act in the amended form had been
adopted$
Amended act is regarded as if the statute has
been originally enacted in it amended form$
Read in a connection with other sections as if all
had been enacted in the same statute$
Ghere an amendment lea!es certain portions of
an act unchanged, such portions are continued in
force, with the same meaning and effect they
ha!e before the amendment$
Ghere an amendatory act pro!ides that an
eisting statute shall be amended to read as
recited in the amendatory act, such portions of
the eisting law as are retained either literally or
substantially
Estrada v. Caseda
Ghere a statute which pro!ides that it shall
be in force for a period of four years after its
appro!al, the four years is to be counted from
the date the original statute was appro!ed
and not from the date the amendatory act
was amended$
)eaning of law changed by amendment
An amended act should be gi!en a construction
different from the law prior to its amendment, for
its is presumed that the legislature would not
ha!e amended it had not it not wanted to change
its meaning$
Prior to the introduction of the amendment, the
statute had a different meaning which the
amendment changed in all the particulars
touching which a material change in the language
of the later act eists$
Deliberate selection of language in the
amendatory act different from that of the original
act indicates that the legislature intended a
change in the law or in its meaning$
2ictorias Mi##ing Co. v. SSS
A statutory definition of term containing a
general rule and an eception thereto is
amended by eliminating the eception, the
legislati!e intent is clear that the term should
now include the eception within the scope of
the general rule$
Parras v. Land "egistration Commissions
%ection of a statute re.uiring the eact
payment of publication fees in land
registration proceedings, ecept in cases
where the !alue of the land does not eceed
P76,666 is amended by deleting the
ecepting clause, it means that the statute as
amended now re.uires payment of the
publication fees regardless of the !alue of the
land in!ol!ed
%uppression of the ecepting clause amount
to the withdrawal of the eemption allowed
under the original act$
Amendment Operates Prospecti!ely
An amendment will not be construed as ha!ing a
retroacti!e effect, unless the contrary is pro!ided
or the legislati!e intent to gi!e it a retroacti!e
effect is necessarily implied from the language
used and only if no !ested right is impaired$
/mperia# v. Co##ector of /nterna# "even%e
A statute amending a ta law is silent as to
whether it operates retroacti!ely, the
amendment will not be gi!ing retroacti!e
effect so as to sub2ect to ta past transactions
not sub2ect to ta under the original act$
Di% v. Co%rt of Appea#s
%tatutes relating to procedure in courts are
applicable to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage$
Effect of Amendment on >ested Rights
After a statute is amended, the original act
continues to be in force with regard to all rights
that had accrued prior to the amendment or to
obligations that were contracted under the prior
act and such rights and obligations will continue
to be go!erned by the law before its amendment$
5ot applied retroacti!ely so as to nullify such
rights$
Effect of amendment on 2urisdiction
#urisdiction of a court to try cases is determined
by the law in force at the time the action is
instituted$
#urisdiction remains with the court until the case
is finally decided therein$
"i##aro'a v. Arciaga
Absence of a clear legislati!e intent to the
contrary, a subse.uent statute amending a
prior act with the effect of di!esting the court
of 2urisdiction may not be construed to
operate but to oust 2urisdiction that has
already attached under the prior law$
/b%raan v. Labes
Ghere a court originally obtains and
eercises 2urisdiction pursuant to an eisting
law, such 2urisdiction will not be o!erturned
and impaired by the subse.uent amendment
of the law, unless epress prohibitory words
or words of similar import are used$
Applies to .uasi32udicial bodies
Erectors. /nc v. +L"C
PD *8+* and *-+* !ested Labor Arbiters with
original and eclusi!e 2urisdiction o!er all
cases in!ol!ing employer3employee relations,
including money claims arising out of any law
or contract in!ol!ing /ilipino wor1ers for
o!erseas employment
/actsD An o!erseas wor1er filed a money
claim against his recruiter, and while the case
is pending, EO ,+, was enacted, which
!ested POEA with original and eclusi!e
2urisdiction o!er all cases, including money
claims, arising out of law or contract in!ol!ing
/ilipino wor1ers for o!erseas employment$
IssueD whether the decision of the labor
arbiter in fa!or of the o!erseas wor1er was
in!alid
@eldD the court sustained the !alidity of the
decision and ruled that the labor arbiter still
had the authority to decide the cease
because EO ,+,b did not di!est the labor
arbiter his authority to hear and decide the
case filed by the o!erseas wor1er prior to its
effecti!ity$
#urisdiction o!er the sub2ect matter is
determined by the law in force at the time of
the commencement of the actionH laws should
only be applied prospecti!ely unless the
legislati!e intent to gi!e them retroacti!e
effect is epressly declared or is necessarily
implied from the language used$
Effect of nullity of prior or amendatory act
Ghere a statute which has been amended is
in!alid, nothing in effect has been amended
4he amendatory act, complete by itself, will be
considered as an original or independent act$
,overnment v. Agonci##o
Ghere the amendatory act is declared
unconstitutional, it is as if the amendment did
not eist, and the original statute before the
attempted amend remains unaffected and in
force$
REVISION AND CODIFICATION
Kenerally
PurposeD to restate the eisting laws into one
statute and simply complicated pro!isions, and
ma1e the laws on the sub2ect easily found$
&onstruction to harmoniAe different pro!isions
PresumptionD author has maintained a consisted
philosophy or position$
4he different pro!isions of a re!ised statute or
code should be read and construed together$
RuleD a code enacted as a single, comprehensi!e
statute, and is to be considered as such and not
as a series of disconnected articles or pro!isions$
Lic*a%co 3 Co. v. Aposto#
A irreconcilable conflict between parts of a
re!ised statute or a code, that which is best in
accord with the general plan or, in the
absence of circumstances upon which to
base a choice, that which is later in physical
position, being the latest epression of
legislati!e will, will pre!ail$
Ghat is omitted is deemed repealed
all laws and pro!isions of the old laws that are
omitted in the re!ised statute or code are deemed
repealed, unless the statute or code pro!ides
otherwise
ReasonD re!ision or codification is, by its !ery
nature and purpose, intended to be a complete
enactment on the sub2ect and an epression of
the whole law thereon, which thereby indicates
intent on the part of the legislature to abrogate
those pro!isions of the old laws that are not
reproduced in the re!ised statute or code$
Possible only if the re!ised statute or code was
intended to co!er the whole sub2ect to is a
complete and perfect system in itself$
RuleD a subse.uent statute is deemed to repeal a
prior law if the former re!ises the whole sub2ect
matter of the former statute$
Ghen both intent and scope clearly e!ince the
idea of a repeal, then all parts and pro!ision of
the prior act that are omitted from the re!ised act
are deemed repealed$
Mecano v. Commission on A%dit
&laim for reimbursement by a go!ernment
official of medical and hospitaliAation
epenses pursuant to %ection 8++ of the
Re!ised Administration &ode of *+*,, which
authoriAes the head of office to case a
reimbursement of payment of medical and
hospital epenses of a go!ernment official in
case of sic1ness or in2ury caused by or
connected directly with the performance of his
official duty$
&oA denied the claim on the ground that A&
of *+;, which re!ised the old A&, repealed
%ec$ 8++ because it was omitted the re!ised
code$
%& ruled that the legislature did not intend, in
enacting the new &ode, to repeal %ec$ 8++ of
the old code$
BAll laws, decrees, orders, rules and
regulation, or portions thereof, inconsistent
with this &ode are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly$C
5ew code did not epressly repeal the old as
the new &ode fails to identify or designate the
act to be repealed$
4wo categories of repeal by implication
Pro!isions in the two acts on the same
sub2ect matter that are in irreconcilable
conflict$
Later act to the etent of the conflict
constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier
If the later act co!ers the whole sub2ect of the
earlier one and is clearly intended as a
statute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law$
4here is no irreconcilable conflict between the two
codes on the matter of sic1ness benefits because
the pro!ision has not been restated in the 5ew
&ode$
4he whereas clause is the intent to co!er only
those aspects of go!ernment that pertain to
administration, organiAation and procedure, and
understandably because of the many changes
that transpired in the go!ernment structure since
the enactment of the old code$
&hange in phraseology
It is a well settled rule that in the re!ision or
codification of statutes, neither an alteration in
phraseology nor the admission or addition of
words in the later statute shall be held necessarily
to alter the construction of the former acts$
Gords which do not materially affect the sense
will be omitted from the statute as incorporated in
the re!ise statute or code, or that some general
idea will be epressed in brief phrases$
If there has been a material change or omission,
which clearly indicates an intent to depart from
the pre!ious construction of the old laws, then
such construction as will effectuate such intent
will be adopted$
&ontinuation of eisting laws$
A codification should be construed as the
continuation of the eisting statutes$
4he codifiers did not intend to change the law as
it formerly eisted$
4he rearrangement of sections or parts of a
statute, or the placing of portions of what formerly
was a single section in seprate sections, does not
operate to change the operation, effect of
meaning of the statute, unless the changes are of
such nature as to manifest clearly and
unmista1ably a legislati!e intent to change the
former laws$
REPEAL
Power to repeal
Power to repeal a law is as complete as the
power to enact one$
4he legislature cannot in and of itself enact
irrepealable laws or limit its future legislati!e acts$
Repeal, generally
RepealD total or partial, epress or implied
4otal repeal 0 re!o1ed completely
Partial repeal 0 lea!es the unaffected portions of
the statute in force$
A particular or specific law, identified by its
number of title, is repealed is an epress repeal$
All other repeals are implied repeals$
/ailure to add a specific repealing clause
indicates that the intent was not to repeal any
eisting law, unless an irreconcilable
inconsistency and repugnancy eist in the terms
of the new and old laws, latter situation falls under
the category of an implied repeal$
Repealed only by the enactment of subse.uent
laws$
4he change in the condition and circumstances
after the passage of a law which is necessitated
the enactment of a statute to o!ercome the
difficulties brought about by such change does
not operate to repeal the prior law, nor ma1e the
later statute so inconsistent with the prior act as
to repeal it$
Repeal by implication
Ghere a statute of later date clearly re!eals an
intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate
a prior act on the sub2ect, that intention must be
gi!en effect$
4here must be a sufficient re!elation of the
legislati!e intent to repeal$
Intention to repeal must be clear and manifest
Keneral ruleD the latter act is to be construed as a
continuation not a substitute for the first act so far
as the two acts are the same, from the time of the
first enactment$
4wo categories of repeals by implication
Ghere pro!isions in the two acts on the same
sub2ect matter are in an irreconcilable conflict
and the later act to the etent of the conflict
constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier$
If the later act co!ers the whole sub2ect of the
earlier one and is clearly intended as a
substitute, it will operate similarly as a repeal
of the earlier act$
Irreconcilable inconsistency
Implied repeal brought about by irreconcilable
repugnancy between two laws ta1es place when
the two statutes co!er the same sub2ect matterH
they are so clearly inconsistent and incompatible
with each other that they cannot be reconciled or
harmoniAed and both cannot be gi!en effect,
once cannot be enforced without nullifying the
other$
Implied repeal 0 earlier and later statutes should
embrace the same sub2ect and ha!e the same
ob2ect$
In order to effect a repeal by implication, the later
statute must be so irreconcilably inconsistent and
repugnant with the eisting law that they cannot
be made to reconcile and stand together$
It is necessary before such repeal is deemed to
eist that is be shown that the statutes or
statutory pro!isions deal with the same sub2ect
matter and that the latter be inconsistent with the
former$
the fact that the terms of an earlier and later
pro!isions of law differ is not sufficient to create
repugnance as to constitute the later an implied
repeal of the former$
Ag%-etas v. Co%rt of Appea#s
/act that %ec :; of RA ,*88 pertaining to
can!assing by boards of can!assers is silent
as to how the board of can!assers shall
prepare the certificate of can!ass and as to
what will be its basis, w=c details are pro!ided
in the second paragraph of %ec:-* of the
Omnibus Election &ode, an earlier statute,
Brespecti!e boards of can!assers shall
prepare a certificate of can!ass duly signed
and affied with the imprint of the thumb of
the right hand of each member, supported by
a statement of the !otes and recei!ed by
each candidate in each polling place and on
the basis thereof shall proclaim as elected the
candidates who obtained the highest number
of !otes coast in the pro!inces, city,
municipality or barangay, and failure to
comply with this re.uirement shall constitute
an election offenseC
Did not impliedly repeal the second
paragraph of %ec :-* of OE& and render the
failure to comply with the re.uirement no
longer an election offense$
Irreconcilable inconsistency between to laws
embracing the same sub2ect may also eist when
the later law nullifies the reason or purpose of the
earlier act, so that the latter law loses all meaning
and function$
Smit*. e## 3 Co. v. Estate of Maroni##a
A prior law is impliedly repealed by a later act
where the reason for the earlier act is beyond
perad!enture remo!ed$
Repeal by implication 0 based on the cardinal rule
that in the science of 2urisprudence, two
inconsistent laws on the same sub2ect cannot co3
eist in one 2urisdiction$
4here cannot be two conflicting law on the same
sub2ect$ Either reconciled or later repeals prior
law$
Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant (a
later law repeals the prior law on the sub2ect
which is repugnant thereto"
Mecano v. Commission on A%dit
IssueD whether %ec$ 8++ of the Re!ised
Administrati!e &ode has been repealed by
the *+;, Administrati!e &ode$
*+;, Administration &ode pro!ides thatD BAll
laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations,
or portions thereof, inconsistent with this code
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly
&ourt ruled that the new &ode did not repeal
%ec 8++D
Implied repeal by irreconcilable
inconsistency ta1es place when two
statutes co!er the same sub2ect matter,
they are so clearly inconsistent and
incompatible with each other that they
cannot be reconciled or harmoniAed, and
both cannot be gi!en effect, that one law
cannot be enforced without nullifying the
other$
4he new &ode does not co!er not
attempt to the co!er the entire sub2ect
matter of the old &ode$
4here are se!eral matters treated in the
old &ode that are not found in the new
&ode$ (pro!isions on notary publicH lea!e
law, public bonding law, military
reser!ations, claims for sic1ness benefits
under section 8++ and others"
&oA failed to demonstrate that the
pro!isions of the two &odes on the matter
of the sub2ect claim are in an
irreconcilable conflict$
4here can no conflict because the
pro!ision on sic1ness benefits of the
nature being claimed by petitioner has
not been restated in old &ode$
4he contention is untenable$
4he fact that a later enactment may relate
to the same sub2ect matter as that of an
earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to
cause an implied repeal of the prior act
new statute may merely be cumulati!e or
a continuation of the old one$
%econd &ategoryD possible only if the
re!ised statute or code was intended to
co!er the whole sub2ect to be a complete
and perfect system in itself$
RuleD a subse.uent is deemed to
repeal a prior law if the former re!ises
the whole sub2ect matter of the
former statute$
Ghen both intent and scope clearly
e!ince the idea of a repeal, then all parts
and pro!isions of the prior act that are
omitted from the re!ised act are deemed
repealed$
'efore there can be an implied repeal
under this category, it must be the clear
intent of the legislature that later act be
the substitute of the prior act$
Opinion ,- s$*++* of the %ecretary of
#usticeD what appears clear is the intent
to co!er only those aspects of
go!ernment that pertain to administration,
organiAation and procedure,
understandably because of the many
changes that transpired in the
go!ernment structure since the
enactment of RA&$
Repeals of statutes by implication are not
fa!ored$ Presumption is against the
inconsistency and repugnancy for the
legislature is presumed to 1now the
eisting laws on the sub2ect and not to
ha!e enacted inconsistent or conflicting
statutes$
Ty v. Trampe
IssueD whether PD +:* on real estate taes
has been repealed impliedly by RA ,*86,
otherwise 1now as the Local Ko!ernment
&ode of *++* on the same sub2ect$
@eldD that there has been no implied repeal
&ourtD it is clear that the two law are not
coetensi!e and mutually inclusi!e in their
scope and purpose$
RA ,*86 co!ers almost all go!ernmental
functions delegated to local go!ernment
units all o!er the country$
PD +:* embraces only )etropolitan
)anila Area and is limited to the
administration of financial ser!ices
therein$
%ec$+ PD+:* re.uires that the schedule
of !alues of real properties in the
)etropolitan )anila Area shall be
prepared 2ointly by the city assessors
states that the schedules shall be
prepared by the pro!incial, city and
municipal assessors of the municipalities
within )etropolitan )anila Area for the
different classes of real property situated
in their respecti!e local go!ernment units
for enactment by ordinance of the
sanggunian concerned$
!agad v. ,o'oADado#e
%ec$*+ RA 88,6, the Ombudsman Act grants
disciplinary authority to the Ombudsman to
discipline electi!e and appointi!e officials,
ecept those impeachable officers, has been
repealed, RA ,*86, the Local Ko!ernment
&ode, insofar as local electi!e officials in the
!arious officials therein named$
@eldD both laws should be gi!en effect
because there is nothing in the Local
Ko!ernment &ode to indicate that it has
repealed, whether epressly or impliedly$
4he two statutes on the specific matter in
.uestion are not so inconsistent, let alone
irreconcilable, as to compel us to uphold
one and stri1e down the other$
4wo laws must be incompatible, and a
clear finding thereof must surface, before
the inference of implied repeal may be
drawn$
/nterpretare et concordare #eges #egib%s.
est optim%s interpretandi mod%s. i. e
(e!ery statute must be so construed and
harmoniAed with other statutes as to form
uniform system of 2urisprudence$
the legislature should be presumed to
ha!e 1nown the eisting laws on the
sub2ect and not to ha!e enacted
conflicting statutes$
/nitia. 6r v. CoA
implied repeal will not be decreed unless
there is an irreconcilable inconsistency
between two pro!isions or laws is RA ,-79 in
relation to PD *7+,$
RA ,-79 0 in part of the Postmaster
Keneral, sub2ect to the appro!al of the
'oard of Directors of the Philippines
Postal &orporation, shall ha!e the power
to Bdetermine the staffing pattern and the
number of personnel, define their duties
and responsibilities, and fi their salaries
and emoluments in accordance with the
appro!ed compensation structure of the
&orporation$C
%ec$8 PD *7+, 0 B eemptions
notwithstanding, agencies shall report to
the President, through the 'udget
&ommission, on their position
classification and compensation plans,
policies, rates and other related details
following such specifications as may be
prescribed by the President$C
IssueD whether %ec8 of PD*7+,, the two laws
being reconcilable$
Ghile the Philippine Postal &orporation is
allowed to fi its own personnel compensation
structure through its board of directors, the
latter is re.uired to follow certain standards in
formulating said compensation system, and
the role of D') is merely to ensure that the
action ta1en by the board of directors
complies the re.uirements of the law$
Ceb% /nstit%te of Tec*no#ogy v. Op#e
%ec$ -(a" PD 97* and %ec$ 9: of 'P :-:
illustrates repeal by implication$
%ec -(a" pro!idesD Bno increase in tuition
or other school fees or charges shall be
appro!ed unless 86N of the proceed is
allocated to increase in salaries or wages
of the member of the faculty$C
'P :-:D Beach pri!ate school shall
determine its rate of tuition and other
school fees or charges$ 4he rates or
charges adopted by schools pursuant to
this pro!ision shall be collectible, and
their application or use authoriAed,
sub2ect to rules and regulations
promulgated by the )inistry of Education,
&ulture and %ports$C
IssueD whether %ec$ 9: of 'P :-: impliedly
repealed %ec$ -(a" of PD 97*
@eldD there was implied repeal because there
are irreconcilable differences between the two
laws$
Implied repeal by re!ision or codification
Re!ised statute is in effect a legislati!e
declaration that whate!er is embraced in the new
statute shall pre!ail and whate!er is ecluded
there from shall be discarded$
)ust be intended to co!er the whole sub2ect to be
a complete and perfect system in itself in order
that the prior statutes or part thereof which are
not repeated in the new statute will be deemed
impliedly repealed$
Peop#e v. en%ya
Ghere a statute is re!ised or a series of
legislati!e acts on the same sub2ect are
re!ised or consolidated into one, co!ering the
entire field of sub2ect matter, all parts and
pro!isions of the former act or acts
that are omitted from the re!ised act are
deemed repealed$
6oa$%in v. +avarro
Ghere a new statute is intended to furnish the
eclusi!e rule on a certain sub2ect, it repeals
by implication the old law on the same
sub2ect,
Ghere a new statute co!ers the whole
sub2ect matter of an old law and adds new
pro!isions and ma1es changes, and where
such law, whether it be in the form of an
amendment or otherwise, is e!idently
intended to be a re!ision of the old act, it
repeals the old act by implication$
Peop#e v. A#m%ete
Re!ision of the Agricultural 4enancy Act by
the Agricultural Land Reform &ode$
%ec -+ of A4& (RA **++" Bit shall be unlawful
for either the tenant or landlord without
mutual consent, to reap or thresh a portion of
the crop at any time pre!ious to the date set,
for its threshing$C
An action for !iolation of this penal pro!ision
is pending in court, the Agricultural Land
Reform &ode superseded the Agricultural
4enancy Act, abolished share tenancy, was
not reproduced in the Agricultural Land
Reform &ode$
4he effect of such non3reenactment is a
repeal of %ection -+$
It is a rule of legal hermeneutics that an act
which purports to set out in full all that it
intends to contain, operates as a repeal of
anything omitted which was contained in the
old act and not included in the act as re!ised$
A substitute statute, and e!idently intended as
the substitute for it, operates to repeal the
former statute$
T%ng C*in !%i v. "odrig%e'
IssueD whether %ec$*; Rule 9* of the pre3
*66, Rules of &ourt, which pro!ided the
appeal in habeas corpus cases to be ta1en
within 9; hours from notice of 2udgment, has
been replaced by the *++, Rules of &i!il
Procedure, which pro!ides in %ec$ - Rule 9*
thereof, that appeal from 2udgment or final
order shall be ta1en within *7 days from
receipt thereof, in !iew of the fact that the
%ec$ *; was repealed, in accordance with the
well3settled rule of statutory construction that
pro!isions of an old law that were not
reproduced in the re!ision thereof co!ering
the same sub2ect are deemed repealed and
discarded
@eldD %& in this case to abrogate those
pro!isions of the old laws that are not
reproduced in the re!ised statute or &ode$
Repeal by reenactment
Ghere a statute is a reenactment of the whole
sub2ect in substitution of the pre!ious laws on the
matter, the latter disappears entirely and what is
omitted in the reenacted law is deemed repealed$
Parras v. Land "egistration Commission
Ghere a law amends a specific section of a
prior act by pro!iding that the same is
amended so as to read as follows, which then
.uotes the amended pro!ision, what is not
included in the reenactment is deemed
repealed$
4he new statute is a substitute for the original
section and all matters in the section that are
omitted in the amendment are considered
repealed$
Other forms of implied repeal
4he most powerful implication of repeal is that
which arises when the later of two laws is
epressed in the form of a uni!ersal negati!e$
4here is a clear distinction between affirmati!e
and negati!e statutes in regard to their repealing
effects upon prior legislation$
Affirmati!e statute does not impliedly repeal
the prior law unless an intention to effect a
repeal is manifest,
A negati!e statute repeals all conflicting
pro!isions unless the contrary intention is
disclosed$
Legislati!e intent to repeal is also shown where it
enacts something in general term and afterwards
it passes another on the same sub2ect, which
though epressed in affirmati!e language
introduces special conditions or restrictions
4he subse.uent statute will usually be
considered as repealing by implication the
former regarding the matter co!ered by the
subse.uent act$
4he epress repeal of a pro!ision of law from
which an eecuti!e official deri!es his authority to
enforce another pro!ision of the same law
operates to repeal by implication the latter and to
depri!e the official of the authority to enforce it$
4he enactment of a statute on a sub2ect, whose
purpose or ob2ect is diametrically opposed to that
of an earlier law on the same sub2ect which
thereby depri!es it of its reason for being,
operates to repeal by implication the prior law,
e!en though the pro!isions of both laws are not
inconsistent$
BAll laws or parts thereof which are inconsistent with
this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly,C
construed$
5ature of repealing clause
5ot epress repealing clauses because it fails
to identify or designate the act or acts that are
intended to be repealed$
A clause, which predicates the intended
repeal upon the condition that a substantial
conflict must be found on eisting and prior
acts of the same sub2ect matter$
4he presumption against implied repeal and
the rule on strict construction regarding
implied repeal apply e proprio !igore$
Legislature is presumed to 1now the eisting
law so that if repeal of particular or specific
law or laws is intended, the proper step is to
so epress it$
2a#de' v. T%ason
Bsuch a clause repeals nothing that would not
be e.ually repealed without it$
Either with or without it, the real .uestion to
be determined is whether the new statute is in
fundamental and irreconcilable conflict with
the prior statute on the sub2ect$
%ignificance of the repealing clauseD the presence
of such general repealing clause in a later statute
clearly indicates the legislati!e intent to repeal all
prior inconsistent laws on the sub2ect matter
whether or not the prior law is a special law$
A later general law will ordinarily not repeal a
prior special law on the same sub2ect, as the
latter is generally regarded as an eception to
the former$
Gith such clause contained in the subse.uent
general law, the prior special law will be
deemed repealed, as the clause is a clear
legislati!e intent to bring about that result$
Repeal by implication not fa!ored
Presumption is against inconsistency or
repugnancy and, accordingly, against implied
repeal
Legislature is presumed to 1now the eisting laws
on the sub2ect and not to ha!e enacted
inconsistent or conflicting statutes$
A construction which in effect will repeal a statute
altogether should, if possible, be re2ected$
In case of doubt as to whether a later statute has
impliedly repealed a prior law on the same
sub2ect, the doubt should be resol!ed against
implied repeal$
1S v. Pa#acio
Repeals by implication are not fa!ored, and
will not be decreed unless it is manifest that
the legislature so intended$
As laws are presumed to be passed with
deliberation and with full 1nowledge of all
eisting ones on the sub2ect
It is but reasonable to conclude that in
passing a statute it was not intended to
interfere with or abrogate any former law
relating to some matter
Fnless the repugnancy between the two is
not only irreconcilable, but also clear and
con!incing, and flowing necessarily form the
language used, the later act fully embraces
the sub2ect matter of the earlier, or unless the
reason for the earlier act is beyond
perad!enture remo!ed$
E!ery effort must be used to ma1e all acts
stand and if, by any reasonable construction,
they can be reconciled, the later act will not
operate as a repeal of the earlier$
+APOCO" v. Angas
Illustrates the application of the principle that
repeal or amendment by implication is not
fa!ored$
IssueD whether &entral 'an1 &ircular 9*8 has
impliedly repealed or amended Art ::6+ of
the &i!il &ode
@eldD in answering the issue in the negati!e,
the court ruled that repeals or e!en
amendments by implication are not fa!ored if
two laws can be fairly reconciled$ 4he
statutes contemplate different situations and
apply to different transactions in!ol!ing loan
or forbearance of money, goods or credits, as
well as 2udgments relating to such load or
forbearance of money, goods, or credits, the
&entral 'an1 &ircular applies$
In cases re.uiring the payment of indemnities
as damages, in connection with any delay in
the performance of an obligation other than
those in!ol!ing loan or forbearance of money,
goods or credits, Art ::6+ of the && applies
&ourts are slow to hold that one statute has
repealed another by implication and they will not
ma1e such ad2udication if they can refrain from
doing so, or if they can arri!e at another result by
any construction which is 2ust and reasonable$
&ourts will not enlarge the meaning of one act in
order to decide that is repeals another by
implication, nor will they adopt an interpretation
leading to an ad2udication of repeal by implication
unless it is ine!itable and a clear and eplicit
reason thereof can be adduced$
As between two laws, one passed later pre!ails
Leges posteriors priores contrarias abrogant
(later statute repeals prior ones which are not
repugnant thereto$"
Applies e!en if the later act is made to ta1e
effect ahead of the earlier law$
As between two acts, the one passed later and
going into effect earlier will pre!ail o!er one
passed earlier and going into effect later$
Mani#a Trading 3 S%pp#y Co. v. P*i#. Labor 1nion
an act passed April *8
th
and in force April :*
st
was held to pre!ail o!er an act passed April
+
th
and in effect #uly 9
th
of the same year$
And an act going into effect immediately has
been held to pre!ail o!er an act passed
before but going into effect later$
Ghene!er two statutes of different dates and of
contrary tenor are of e.ual theoretical application
to a particular case, the statute of later date must
pre!ail, being a later epression of legislati!e will$
P*i#ippine +ationa# ank v. Cr%'
As between the order of preference of credit
set forth in Articles ::9* to ::97 of the &&
and that of Article **6 of the Labor &ode,
gi!ing first preference to unpaid wages and
other monetary claims of labor, the former
must yield to the latter, being the law of the
later enactment$
4he later law repeals an earlier one because it is
the later legislati!e will$
PresumptionD the lawma1ers 1new the older
law and intended to change it$
In enacting the older law, the legislators could
not ha!e 1nown the newer one and could not
ha!e intended to change what they did not
1now$
&&D laws are repealed only by subse.uent
ones, not the other way around$
David v. COMELEC
%ec$ * of RA 88,+ pro!ides that the term of
barangay officials who were to be elected on
the second )onday of )ay *++9 is 7 years
4he later act RA ,*86 %ec 9- (c" states that
the term of office of barangay officials who
were to be elected also on the :
nd
)onday of
)ay *++9 is - years$
4here being a clear inconsistency between
the two laws, the later law fiing the term
barangay officials at - years shall pre!ail$
Keneral law does not repeal special law, generally
A general law on a sub2ect does not operate to
repeal a prior special law on the same sub2ect,
unless it clearly appears that the legislature has
intended by the later general act to modify or
repeal the earlier special law$
Presumption against implied repeal is stronger
when of two laws, one is special and the other
general and this applies e!en though the terms of
the general act are broad enough to include the
matter co!ered by the special statute$
,enera#ia specia#ib%s non derogant & a general
law does not nullify a specific or special law
4he legislature considers and ma1es pro!ision for
all the circumstances of the particular case$
Reason why a special law pre!ails o!er a general
lawD the legislature considers and ma1es
pro!ision for all the circumstances of the
particular case$
Keneral and special laws are read and construed
together, and that repugnancy between them is
reconciled by constituting the special law as an
eception to the general law$
Keneral law yields to the special law in the
specific law in the specific and particular sub2ect
embraced in the latter$
Applies irrespecti!e of the date of passage of the
special law$
Application of rule
Sto. Domingo v. De #os Ange#es
4he court in!ariably ruled that the special law
is not impliedly repealed and constitutes an
eception to the general law whene!er the
legislature failed to indicate in unmista1able
terms its intent to repeal or modify the prior
special act$
+APOCO" v. Arca
IssueD whether %ec$ : of &om$ Act *:6
creating the 5APO&OR, a go!ernment3
owned corporation, and empowering it Bto sell
electric power and to fi the rates and pro!ide
for the collection of the charges for any
ser!ices renderedD Pro!ided, the rates of
charges shall not be sub2ect to re!ision by the
Public %er!ice Act has been repealed by RA
:8,, amending the Public %er!ice Act and
granting the Public %er!ice &ommission the
2urisdiction to fi the rate of charges of public
utilities owned or operated by the go!ernment
or go!ernment3owned corporations$
@eldD a special law, li1e &om$ Act *:6,
pro!iding for a particular case or class of
cases, is not repealed by a subse.uent
statute, general in its terms, li1e RA :8,,,
although the general statute are broad
enough to include the cases embraced in the
special law, in the absence of a clear intent to
repeal$
4here appears no such legislati!e intent to
repeal or abrogate the pro!isions of the
earlier law$
4he eplanatory note to @ouse 'ill 96-6 the
later became RA :8,,, it was eplicit that the
2urisdiction conferred upon the Republic
%er!ice &ommission o!er the public utilities
operated by go!ernment3owned or controlled
corporations is to be confined to the fiing of
rates of such public ser!ices
4he harnessing and then distribution and sale
of electric power to the consuming public, the
contingency intended to be met by the legal
pro!ision under consideration would not eist$
4he authority of the Public %er!ice
&ommission under RA :8,, o!er the fiing of
rate of charges of public utilities owned or
operated by KO&&(s can only be eercised
where the charter of the go!ernment
corporation concerned does not contain any
pro!ision to the contrary$
P*i#ippine "ai#;ay Co. v. Co##ector of /nterna# "even%e
PR& was granted a legislati!e franchise to
operate a railway line pursuant to Act 5o$
*9+, %ec$ *- which readD BIn consideration of
the premises and of the operation of this
concession or franchise, there shall be paid
by the grantee to the Philippine Ko!ernment,
annually, an amount e.ual to one3half of
one per centum of the gross earnings of the
grantee $C
%ec :7+ of Internal Re!enue &ode, as
amended by RA -+, pro!ides that Bthere shall
be collected in respect to all eisting and
future franchises, upon the gross earnings or
receipts from the business co!ered by the law
granting a franchise ta of 7N of such taes,
charges, and percentages as are specified in
the special charters of the corporation upon
whom suc franchises are conferred,
whiche!er is higher, unless the pro!isions
hereof preclude the imposition of a higher ta
$
IssueD whether %ection :7+ of the 4a &ode
has repealed %ection *- of Act *9+,, stand
upon a different footing from general laws$
Once granted, a charter becomes a pri!ate
contract and cannot be altered nor amended
ecept by consent of all concerned, unless
the right to alter or repeal is epressly
reser!ed$
ReasonD the legislature, in passing a special
charter, has its attention directed to the
special facts and circumstances in the
particular case in granting a special charter,
for it will not be considered that the
legislature, by adopting a general law
containing the pro!isions repugnant to the
pro!isions of the charter, and without any
mention of its intention to amend or modify
the charter, intended to amend, repeal or
modify the special act$
4he purpose of respecting the ta rates
incorporated in the charters, as shown by the
clause$
LLDA v. CA
IssueD which agency of the go!ernment,
LLDA or the towns and municipalities
compromising the region should eercise
2urisdiction o!er the Laguna La1e and its
en!irons insofar as the issuance of permits
for fishery pri!ileges is concerned$
4he LLDA statute specifically pro!ides that
the LLDA shall ha!e eclusi!e 2urisdiction to
issue permits for the use of all surface water
for any pro2ects in or affecting the said region,
including the operation of fish pens$
RA ,*86 the LK& of *++* grants the
municipalities the eclusi!e authority to grant
fishery pri!ileges in municipal waters$
@eldD two laws should be harmoniAed, and
that the LLA statute, being a special law, must
be ta1en as an eception to RA ,*86 a
general law,
,arcia v. Pasc%a#
&ler1s of courts municipal courts shall be
appointed by the municipal 2udge at the
epense of the municipality and where a later
law was enacted pro!iding that employees
whose salaries are paid out of the municipal
funds shall be appointed by the municipal
mayor, the later law cannot be said to ha!e
repealed the prior law as to !est in the
municipal mayor the power to appoint
municipal clec1 of court, as the subse.uent
law should be construed to comprehend only
subordinate officials of the municipality and
not those of the 2udiciary$
,ordon v. CA
A city charter gi!ing real estate owner a
period of one year within which to redeem a
property sold by the city for nonpayment of
realty ta from the date of such auction sale,
being a special law, pre!ails o!er a general
law granting landowners a period of two years
to ma1e the redemption$
Sto. Domingo v. De#os Ange#es
4he &i!il %er!ice law on the procedure for the
suspension or remo!al of ci!il ser!ice
employees does not apply with respect to the
suspension or remo!al of members of the
local police force$
Ghen special or general law repeals the other$
4here is always a partial repeal where the later
act is a special law$
2a#era v. T%ason
A subse.uent general law on a sub2ect has
repealed or amended a prior special act on
the same sub2ect by implication is a .uestion
of legislati!e intent$
Intent to repeal may be shown in the act itself
the eplanatory note to the bill before its
passage into law, the discussions on the floor
of the legislature,
Intent to repeal the earlier special law where the
later general act pro!ides that all laws or parts
thereof which are inconsistent therewith are
repealed or modified accordingly
If the intention to repeal the special law is clear,
then the rule that the special law will be
considered as an eception to the general law
does not applyH what applies is the rule that the
special law is deemed impliedly repealed$
A general law cannot be construed to ha!e
repealed a special law by mere implication admits
of eception$
City ,overnment of San Pab#o v. "eyes
%ec$ * PD 77* pro!ides that any pro!ision of
law or local ordinance to the contrary, the
franchise ta payable by all grantees of
franchise to generate, distribute, and sell
electric current for light, heat, and power shall
be :7 of their gross receipts$
%ec$ *-, of the LK& statesD 5otwithstanding
any eemption granted by any law or other
special law, the pro!ince may impose a ta on
business en2oying a franchise at a rate not
eceeding 76N of *N of the gross annul
receipts$
@eldD the phrase is all3encompassing and
clear that the legislature intended to withdraw
all ta eemptions en2oyed by franchise
holders and this intent is made more manifest
by %ec$ *+- of the &ode, when it pro!ides
that unless otherwise pro!ided in this code
ta eemptions or incenti!es granted to or
presently en2oyed by all persons, ecept local
water districts, cooperati!es, and non3stoc1
and non3profit hospitals and educational
institutions, are withdrawn upon the effecti!ity
of the &ode$
,aer#an v. Cat%big
IssueD whether %ec$ *: of RA *,6 as
amended, the &ity &harter of Dagupan &ity,
which fied the minimum age .ualification for
members of the city council at :- years has
been repealed by %ec$8 of RA ::7+
@eldD there was an implied repeal of %ec$ *:
of the charter of Dagupan &ity because the
legislati!e intent to repeal the charter
pro!ision is clear from the fact that Dagupan
&ity, unli1e some cities, is not one of those
cities epressly ecluded by the law from its
operation and from the circumstance that it
pro!ides that all acts or parts thereof which
are inconsistent therewith are repealed$
4he last statute is so broad in its terms and
so clear and eplicit in its words so as to
show that it was intended to co!er the whole
sub2ect and therefore to displace the prior
statute$
agatsing v. "amire'
A charter of a city, which is a special law, may
be impliedly modified or superseded by a
later statute, and where a statute is
controlling, it must be read into the charter,
notwithstanding any of its particular
pro!isions$
A subse.uent general law similarly applicable
to all cities pre!ails o!er any conflicting
charter pro!ision, for the reason that a charter
must not be inconsistent with the general
laws and public policy of the state$
%tatute remains supreme in all matters not
purely local$
A charter must yield to the constitution and
general laws of the state$
P*i#ippine /nternationa# Trading Corp v. CoA
&oA contended that the PI4& charter had
been impliedly repealed by the %ec$ *8 RA
8,7;
@eldD that there was implied repeal, the
legislati!e intent to do so being manifest$
PI4& should now be considered as co!ered
by laws prescribing a compensation and
position classification system in the
go!ernment including RA 8,7;$
Effects of repeal, generally
Appeal of a statute renders it inoperati!e as of the
date the repealing act ta1es effect$
Repeal is by no means e.ui!alent to a declaration
that the repealed statute is in!alid from the date
of its enactment$
4he repeal of a law does not undo the
conse.uences of the operation of the statute
while in force, unless such result is directed by
epress language or by necessary implication,
ecept as it may affect rights which become
!ested when the repealed act was in force$
"amos v. M%nicipa#ity of Daet
'P --, 1nown as the LK& was repealed by
RA ,*86 1nown as LK& of *++*, which too1
effect on #anuary *, *++:$
%ec$ 7 (d" of the new code pro!ides that
rights and obligations eisting on the date of
the effecti!ity of the new code and arising out
of contracts or any other source of prestation
in!ol!ing a local go!ernment unit shall be
go!erned by the original terms and conditions
of said contracts or the law in force at the
time such rights were !ested$
On 2urisdiction, generally
5either the repeal nor the eplanation of the law
depri!es the court or administrati!e tribunal of the
authority to act on the pending action and to
finally decide it$
Keneral ruleD where a court or tribunal has
already ac.uired and is eercising 2urisdiction
o!er a contro!ersy, its 2urisdiction to proceed to
final determination of the cause is not affected by
the new legislation repealing the statute which
originally conferred 2urisidiction$
RuleD once the court ac.uires 2urisdiction o!er a
contro!ersy, it shall continue to eercise such
2urisdiction until the final determination of the case
and it is not affected by subse.uent legislation
!esting 2urisdiction o!er such proceedings in
another tribunal admits of eceptions$
Repeal or epiration of a statute under which a
court or tribunal originally ac.uired 2urisdiction to
try and decide a case, does not ma1e its decision
subse.uently rendered thereon null and !oid for
want of authority, unless otherwise pro!ided$
In the absence of a legislati!e intent to the
contrary, the epiration or repeal of a statute does
not render legal what, under the old law, is an
illegal transaction, so as to depri!e the court or
tribunal the court or tribunal of the authority to act
on a case in!ol!ing such illegal transaction$
Ghere a law declares certain importations to be
illegal, sub2ect to forfeiture by the &ommissioner
of &ustoms pursuant to what the latter initiated
forfeiture proceedings, the epiration of the law
during the pendency of the proceedings does not
di!est the &ommissioner of &ustoms of the
2urisdiction to continue to resol!e the case, nor
does it ha!e the effect of ma1ing the illegal
importation legal or of setting aside the decision
of the commissioner on the matter$
On 2urisdiction to try criminal case
Once a 2urisdiction to try a criminal case is
ac.uired, that 2urisdiction remains with the court
until the case is finally determined$
A subse.uent statute amending or repealing a
prior act under which the court ac.uired
2urisdiction o!er the case with the effect of
remo!ing the courts( 2urisdiction may not operate
to oust 2urisdiction that has already attached$
On actions, pending or otherwise
RuleD repeal of a statute defeats all actions and
proceedings, including those, which are still
pending, which arose out of or are based on said
statute$
4he court must conform its decision to the law
then eisting and may, therefore, re!erse a
2udgment which was correct when pronounced in
the subordinate tribunal, if it appears that pending
appeal a statute which was necessary to support
the 2udgment of the lower court has been
withdrawn by an absolute repeal$
On !ested rights
repeal of a statute does not destroy or impair
rights that accrued and became !ested under the
statute before its repeal$
4he statute should not be construed so as to
affect the rights which ha!e !ested under the old
law then in force, or as re.uiring the abatement of
actions instituted for the enforcement of such
rights$
Rights accrued and !ested while a statute is in
force ordinarily sur!i!e its repeal$
4he constitution forbids the state from impairing,
by enactment or repeal of a law, !ested rights or
the obligations of contract, ecept in the
legitimate eercise of police power$
%yco v. P+
Ghere a statute gi!es holders of bac1pay
certificates the right to use said certificates to
pay their obligations to go!ernment financial
institutions, the repeal of the law disallowing
such payment will not depri!e holders thereof
whose rights become !ested under the old
law of the right to use the certificates to pay
their obligations to such financial institutions$
1n Pak Le%ng v. +igorra
A statute gi!es an appellant the right to
appeal from an ad!erse decision, the repeal
of such statute after an appellant has already
perfected his appeal will not destroy his right
to prosecute the appeal not depri!e the
appellate court of the authority to decide the
appealed case$
"ep%b#ic v. Migrino
IssueD whether prosecution for uneplained
wealth under RA *-,+ has already
prescribed$
@eldD Bin his pleadings, pri!ate respondent
contends that he may no longer be
prosecuted because of the prescription$
It must be pointed out that %ec$ : RA *-,+
should be deemed amended or repealed by
Art$ EI, %ec$ *7 of the *+;, &onstitution$
On contracts
Ghere a contract is entered into by the parties on
the basis of the law then obtaining, the repeal or
amendment of said law will not affect the terms of
the contract nor impair the right of the parties
thereunder$
Effect of repeal of ta laws
Rule fa!oring a prospecti!e construction of
statutes is applicable to statutes which repeal ta
laws$
%uch statute is not made retroacti!e, a ta
assessed before the repeal is collectible
afterwards according to the law in force when the
assessment or le!y was made$
Effect of repeal and reenactment
%imultaneous repeal and reenactment of a statute
does not affect the rights and liabilities which
ha!e accrued under the original statute, since the
reenactment neutraliAes the repeal and continues
the law in force without interruption$
4he repeal of a penal law, under which a person
is charged with !iolation thereof and its
simultaneous reenactment penaliAing the same
act done by him under the old law, will not
preclude the accused(s prosecution, nor depri!e
the court of the 2urisdiction to try and con!ict him$
Peop#e v. A#m%ete
Ghere the reenactment of the repealed law is
not simultaneous such that the continuity of
the obligation and the sanction for its !iolation
form the repealed law to the reenacted law is
bro1en, the repeal carries with it the
depri!ation of the court of its authority to try,
con!ict, and sentence the person charged
with !iolation of the old law to its repeal$
Effect of repeal of penal laws
Ghere the repeal is absolute, so that the crime no
longer eists, prosecution of the person charged
under the old law cannot be had and the action
should be dismissed$
Ghere the repeal of a penal law is total and
absolute and the act which was penaliAed by a
prior law ceases to be criminal under the new law,
the pre!ious offense is obliterated$
4hat a total repeal depri!es the courts of
2urisdiction to try, con!ict, and sentence, persons,
charged with !iolations of the old law prior to the
repeal$
Repeal of a statute which pro!ides an
indispensable element in the commission of a
crime as defined in the RP& li1ewise operates to
depri!e the court of the authority to decide the
case, rule rests on the same principle as that
concerning the effect of a repeal of a penal law
without .ualification$
ReasonD the repeal of a penal law without
dis.ualification is a legislati!e act of rendering
legal what is pre!iously decreed as illegal, so that
the person who committed it is as if he ne!er
committed an offence
EceptionD
where the repealing act reenacts the statute
and penaliAes the same act pre!iously
penaliAed under the repealed law, the act
committed before reenactment continues to
be a crime, and pending cases are not
thereby affected$
Ghere the repealing act contains a sa!ing
clause pro!iding that pending actions shall
not be affected, the latter will continue to be
prosecuted in accordance with the old law$
Distinction as to effect of repeal and epiration of law
In absolute repeal, the crime is obliterated and
the stigma of con!iction of an accused for
!iolation of the penal law before its repeal is
erased$
Effect of repeal of municipal charter
4he repeal of a charter destroys all offices under
it, and puts an end to the functions of the
incumbents$
4he con!ersation of a municipality into a city by
the passage of a charter or a statute to that effect
has the effect of abolishing all municipal offices
then eisting under the old municipality offices
then the eisting under the old municipality, sa!e
those ecepted in the charter itself$
Repeal or nullity of repealing law, effect of
Ghen a law which epressly repeals a prior law is
itself repealed, the law first repealed shall not
thereby re!i!ed unless epressly so pro!ided
Ghere a repealing statute is declared
unconstitutional, it will ha!e no effect of repealing
the former statute, the former or old statute
continues to remain in force$
CHAPTER ELEVEN: Const!tut!ona' Construt!on
&onstitution defined
fundamental law which sets up a form of
go!ernment and defines and delimits the powers
thereof and those of its officers, reser!ing to the
people themsel!es plenary so!ereignty
written charter enacted and adopted by the
people by which a go!ernment for them is
established
permanent in nature thus it does not only apply to
eisting conditions but also to future needs
basically it is the fundamental laws for the
go!ernance and administration of a nation
absolute and unalterable ecept by amendments
all other laws are epected to conform to it
Origin and history of the Philippine &onstitutions
*+-7 &onstitution
Peop#e v. Linsangan 0 eplained as to how this
&onstitution came aboutD
4ydings3)cduffie Law3 allowed the /ilipinos to
adopt a constitutions but sub2ect to the conditions
prescribed in the Act$
o Re.uired - stepsD
drafting and appro!al of the
constitution must be authoriAed
it must be certified by the
President of the F%
it must be ratified by the people
of the Philippines at a plebiscite
*+,- &onstitution
o adopted in response to popular clamor to
meat the problems of the country
o )arch *8, *+8,D &ongress passed
Resolution 5o$:, which was amended by
Resolution 5o$ 9, calling a con!ention to
propose amendments to the &onstitution
*+;, &onstitution
o after ED%A Re!olution
o also 1nown as the *+;, &harter
Primary purpose of constitutional construction
primary tas1 of constitutional construction is to
ascertain the intent or purpose of the framers of
the constitution as epressed in its language
purpose of our &onstitutionD to protect and
enhance the people(s interests
&onstitution construed as enduring for ages
&onstitution is not merely for a few years but it
also needs to endure through a long lapse of
ages
WHY/ 'ecause it go!erns the life of the people
not only at the time of its framing but far into the
indefinite future
it must be adaptable to !arious crisis of human
affairs but it must also be solid permanent and
substantial
Its stability protects the rights, liberty, and
property of the people (rich or poor"
It must be construed as a dynamic process
intended to stand for a great length of time to be
progressi!e and not static
Ghat it is 5O4D
o It should 5O4 change with emergencies
or conditions
o It should 5O4 be infleible
o It should 5O4 be interpreted narrowly
Gords employed should not be construed to yield
fied and rigid answers because its meaning is
applied to meet new or changed conditions as
they arise
&ourts should construe the constitution so that it
would be consistent with reason, 2ustice and the
public interest
@ow language of constitution construed
primary source in order to ascertain the
constitution is the LA5KFAKE itself
4he words that are used are broad because it
aims to co!er all contingencies
Gords must be understood in their common or
ordinary meaning ecept when technical terms
are employee
o G@MR 'ecause the fundamental law if
essentially a document of the people
Do not construe the constitution in such a way
that its meaning would change
Ghat if the words used ha!e both general and
restricted meaningR
RuleD general pre!ails o!er the restricted unless
the contrary is indicated$
Ordi##o v. COMELEC
IssueD whether the sole pro!ince of Ifugao can be
!alidly constituted in the &ordillera Autonomous
Region under %ection *7, Article *6
@eldD 5o$ the 1eywords pro!inces, cities,
municipalities and geographical areas connotes
that a region consists of more than one unit$ In its
ordinary sense region means two or more
pro!inces, thus Ifugao cannot be constituted the
&ordillera Autonomous Region
Marcos v. C*ief of Staff
IssuesD
o the meaning or scope of the words any
court in %ection *, Article *, of the *+-7
&onstitution
o Gho are included under the terms inferior
court in section : Article ,
@eldD %ection *, of Article *, prohibits any
members of the &ongress from appearing as
counsel in any criminal case $ 4his is not
limited to ci!il but also to a military court or court
martial since the latter is also a court of law and
2ustice as is any ci!il tribunal$
Inferior courts are meant to be construed in its
restricted sense and accordingly do not include
court martials or military courts for they are
agencies of eecuti!e character and do not
belong to the 2udicial branch unli1e the term
inferior court is$
Another RFLED words used in one part are to
recei!e the same interpretation when used in
other parts unless the contrary is
applied=specified$
Lo'ada v COMELEC
the term B'atasang Pambansa,C which means the
regular national assembly, found in many sections
of the *+,- &onstitution refers to the regular, not
to the interim 'atasang Pambansa
words which ha!e ac.uired a technical meaning
before they are used in the constitution must be
ta1en in that sense when such words as thus
used are construed
Aids to construction, generally
apart from its language courts may refer to the
following in construing the constitutionD
o history of the times, )ischief to be
suppressed, Ob2ect to be accomplished
o proceedings of the con!ention
o prior laws and 2udicial decisions
o contemporaneous constructions
o conse.uences of alternati!e interpret3
tations
these aids are called etraneous aids because
though their effect is not in precise rules their
influence describes the essentials of the process
(remember preambleR ganito lang din yun"
Realities eisting at time of adoptionH ob2ect to be
accomplished
@istory basically helps in ma1ing one understand
as to how and why certain laws were incorporated
into the constitution$
In construing constitutional law, the history must
be ta1en into consideration because there are
certain considerations rooted in the historical
bac1ground of the en!ironment at the time of its
adoption (Legaspi !$ )inister of /inance"
A$%ino v. COMELEC
IssueD what does the term Bincumbent president in
sec$ - of Article *, of the *+,- &onstitution refer
toR
@eldD @istory shows that at that time the term of
President )arcos was to terminate on December
-6, *+,-, the new constitution was appro!ed on
5o!ember -6, *+,: still during his incumbency
and as being the only incumbent president at the
time of the appro!al it 2ust means that the term
incumbent president refers to )r$ )arcos
#ustice Antonio concurring opinion statesD the
only rational way to ascertain the meaning and
intent is to read its language in connection with
the 1nown conditions of affairs out of which the
occasion for its adoption had arisen and then
construe it$
/n re erm%de'
incumbent president referred to in section 7 of
Article *; of the *+;, constitution refers to
incumbent President A.uino and >P Doy Laurel
Civi# Liberties 1nion v. E)ec%tive Secretary
issueD whether EO :;9, which authoriAes a
cabinet member, undersecretary and assistant
secretary to hold not more than two positions in
the go!ernment and KO&&s and to recei!e
corresponding compensation therefore, !iolates
%ec$ *-, Art$ , of the *+;, &onstitution
court eamined the history of the times, the
conditions under which the constitutional
pro!isions was framed and its ob2ect
heldD before the adoption of the constitutional
pro!ision, Bthere was a proliferation of newly3
created agencies, instrumentalities and KO&&s
created by PDs and other modes of presidential
issuances where &abinet members, their
deputies or assistants were designated to head or
sit as members of the board with the
corresponding salaries, emoluments, per diems,
allowances and other prere.uisites of office
since the e!ident purpose of the framers of the
*+;, &onstitution is to impose a stricter
prohibition on the President, >ice President,
members of the &abinet, their deputies and
assistants with respect to holding multiple
go!ernment offices or employment in the
Ko!ernment during their tenure, the eception to
this prohibition must be read with e.ual se!erity
on its face, the language of %ec *- Art$ , is
prohibitory so that it must be understood as
intended to be a positi!e and une.ui!ocal
negation of the pri!ilege of holding multiple
go!ernment offices or employment
Proceedings of the con!ention
RFLED If the language of the constitutional
pro!ision is plain it is not necessary to resort to
etrinsic aids
EE&EP4IO5D when the intent of the framer
doesn(t appear in the tet or it has more than one
construction$
Intent of a constitutional con!ention member
doesn(t necessarily mean it is also the people(s
intent
4he proceedings of the con!ention are usually
in.uired into because it sheds light into what the
framers of the constitution had in mind at that
time$ (refers to the debates, interpretations and
opinions concerning particular pro!isions"
L%' Farms v. Secretary of DA"
Ghether the term BagricultureC as used in the
&onstitution embraces raising li!estoc1, poultry
and swine
4ranscript of the deliberations of the
&onstitutional &ommission of *+;8 on the
meaning of BagricultureC clearly shows that it was
ne!er the intention of the framers of the
&onstitution to include li!estoc1 and poultry
industry in the co!erage of the constitutionally3
mandated agrarian reform program of the
Ko!ernment
Agricultural lands do not include commercial
industrial, and residential lands
@eldD it is e!ident in the foregoing discussion that
%ec : of RA 887, which includes Bpri!ate
agricultural lands de!oted to commercial
li!estoc1, poultry and swine raisingC in the
definition of Bcommercial farmsC is I5>ALID, to the
etent of the aforecited agro3industrial acti!ities
are made to be co!ered by the agrarian reform
program of the %tate
Monte-o v. COMELEC
Ghether the &O)ELE& has the power to
transfer, by resolution, one or more municipalities
from one congressional district to another district
within a pro!ince, pursuant to %ec : of the
Ordinance appended to the *+;, &onstitution
4he &ourt relied on the proceedings of the
&onstitutional &ommission on Bminor
ad2ustmentsC which refers only to the instance
where a municipality which has been forgotten
(ano ba TtoL1inalimutan ang municipality" is
included in the enumeration of the composition of
the congressional district and not to the transfer
of one municipality from one district to another,
which has been considered a substanti!e or
ma2or ad2ustment
&ontemporaneous construction and writings
may be used to resol!e but not to create
ambiguities
In construing statutes, contemporaneous
construction are entitled to great weight howe!er
when it comes to the constitution it has no weight
and will not be allowed to change in any way its
meaning$
Gritings of delegates 0 has persuasi!e force but it
depends on two thingsD
o if opinions are based on fact 1nown to
them and not established it is immaterial
o on legal hermeneutics, their conclusions
may not be a shade better in the eyes of
the law$
Pre!ious laws and 2udicial rulings
framers of the constitution is presumed to be
aware of pre!ailing 2udicial doctrines concerning
the sub2ect of constitutional pro!isions$ 4@F%
when courts adopt principles different from prior
decisions it is presumed that they did so to
o!errule said principle
&hanges in phraseology
'efore a constitution is ratified it undergoes a lot
of re!isions and changes in phraseology (e$
deletion of words" and these changes may be
in.uired into to ascertain the intent or purpose of
the pro!ision as appro!ed
@OGE>ER mere deletion, as negati!e guides,
cannot pre!ail o!er the positi!e pro!isions nor is it
determinati!e of any conclusion$
&ertain pro!isions in our constitution (from *+-7
to the present" are mere reenactments of prior
constitutions thus these changes may indicate an
intent to modify or change the meaning of the old
pro!isions$
,a#man v. Pamaran
the phraseC no person shall be compelled in
a criminal case be a witness against himselfC is
changed in such a way the words criminal cases
had been deleted simply means that it is not
limited to criminal cases only$
&onse.uences of alternati!e constructions
conse.uences that may follow from alternati!e
construction of doubtful constitutional pro!isions
constitute an important factor to consider in
construing them$
if a pro!ision has more than one interpretation,
that construction which would lead to absurd,
impossible or mischie!ous conse.uences must
be re2ected$
e$g$ directory and mandatory interpretationD Art$ ;
%ec *7(*" re.uires 2udges to render decision
within specific periods from date of submission for
decision of cases (construed as directory
because if otherwise it will cause greater in2ury to
the public"
&onstitution construed as a whole
pro!ision should not be construed separately from
the rest it should be interpreted as a whole and
be harmoniAed with conflicting pro!isions so as to
gi!e them all force and effect$
sections in the constitution with a particular
sub2ect should be interpreted together to
effectuate the whole purpose of the &onstitution$
To#entino v. Secretary of Finance
>A4 Law, passage of bill
in!ol!ed are article 8 %ec$ :9 and RA ,,*8 (>A4
Law"
contention of the petitionerD RA ,,*8 did not
originate eclusi!ely from the @OR as re.uired by
the &onstitution because it is the result of the
consolidation of two distinct bills$
&ourtD re2ected such interpretation$ (guys alam
niyo na naman to, that it should originate from
@OR but it could still be modified by the %enate"

)andatory or directory
RFLED constitutional pro!isions are to be
construed as mandatory unless a different
intention is manifested$
GhyR 'ecause in a constitution, the so!ereign
itself spea1s and is laying down rules which for
the time being at least are to control ali1e the
go!ernment and the go!erned$
failure of the legislature to enact the necessary
re.uired by the constitution does not ma1e the
legislature is illegal$
Prospecti!e or retroacti!e
RFLED constitution operates prospecti!ely only
unless the words employed are clear that it
applies retroacti!ely
Magtoto v. Mang%era
%ec :6 of Article I> of the *+,- &onstitutionD Bno
person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself$ Any confession obtained in !iolation
of this section shall be inadmissible in e!idenceC
&ourt held that this specific portion of the
mandate should be gi!en a prospecti!e
application
Co v. E#ectric Trib%na#
%ec$ *(-" Art$ 9 of the *+;, &onstitution states
that those born before #anuary *,, *+,- of
/ilipino mothers, who elect Philippine citiAenship
upon reaching the age of ma2orityC are citiAens of
the Philippines has a retroacti!e effect as shown
to the clear intent of the framers through the
language used
Applicability of rules of statutory construction
Doctrines used in Sarmiento v. Mison is a good
eample in which the %& applied a number of
rules of statutory construction$
IssueD whether or not the appointment of a
&ommissioner of &ustoms is sub2ect to
confirmation by the &ommission on appointments
Kenerally, constitutional pro!isions are self3eecuting
RFLED constitutional pro!isions are self eecuting
ecept when pro!isions themsel!es epressly
re.uire legislations to implement them$
%EL/ EEE&F4I5K PRO>I%IO5%3 pro!isions
which are complete by themsel!es and becomes
operati!e without the aid of supplementary
legislation$
#ust because legislation may supplement and add
or prescribe a penalty does not render such
pro!ision ineffecti!e in the absence of such
legislation$
In case of DoubtR &onstrue such pro!ision as self
eecuting rather than non3self eecuting$
Mani#a Prince !ote# v. ,S/S
IssueD w=n the sale at public bidding of the
ma2ority ownership of the )anila @otel a .ualified
entity can match the winning bid of a foreigner
@eldD resolution depends on whether the issue is
self eecuting or not$ 4he court ruled that the
.ualified /ilipino entity must be gi!en preference
by granting it the option to match the winning bid
because the pro!ision is self eecuting$
3 4he End 3
B4hat in all things, KOD may be glorifiedC
%ec$*8 Art$ >II of the *+;, &onstitution states in partD
&hapter , 0 **$