G.R. No.

L-24803 May 26, 1977

PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, n !"#$ %a&a%!y a' A'%#ndan!' o( A)a&!o E*%ano,
d#%#a'#d,plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
REGINALD +ILL, ,no$, and MAR-IN +ILL, a' (a!"#$ and Na!.$a* G.a$dan o( 'ad
,no$, defendants-appellees.
/ARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated January 29, 9!" in Civil
Case #o. Q-$%2, &edro 'lcano et al. vs. (e)inald *ill et al. dismissin), upon motion to dismiss of
defendants, the complaint of plaintiffs for recovery of dama)es from defendant (e)inald *ill, a minor,
married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant +arvin *ill, ,ith ,hom he ,as livin)
and )ettin) su-sistence, for the .illin) -y (e)inald of the son of the plaintiffs, named A)apito 'lcano, of
,hich, ,hen criminally prosecuted, the said accused ,as ac/uitted on the )round that his act ,as not
criminal, -ecause of 0lac. of intent to .ill, coupled ,ith mista.e.0
Actually, the motion to dismiss -ased on the follo,in) )rounds1
. 2he present action is not only a)ainst -ut a violation of section , (ule %3, ,hich
is no, (ule III, of the (evised (ules of Court4
2. 2he action is -arred -y a prior 5ud)ment ,hich is no, final and or in res-adjudicata4
6. 2he complaint had no cause of action a)ainst defendant +arvin *ill, -ecause he
,as relieved as )uardian of the other defendant throu)h emancipation -y marria)e.
7&. 26, (ecord 8p. 9, (ecord on Appeal.:;
,as first denied -y the trial court. It ,as only upon motion for reconsideration of the defendants of such
denial, reiteratin) the a-ove )rounds that the follo,in) order ,as issued1
Considerin) the motion for reconsideration filed -y the defendants on January 9,
9!" and after thorou)hly e<aminin) the ar)uments therein contained, the Court finds
the same to -e meritorious and ,ell-founded.
=*'('F>(', the >rder of this Court on ?ecem-er $, 9!9 is here-y reconsidered
-y orderin) the dismissal of the a-ove entitled case.
@> >(?'('?.
Quezon City, &hilippines, January 29, 9!". 7p. 9%, (ecord 8p. 2, (ecord on Appeal.;
*ence, this appeal ,here plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses 'lcano, are presentin) for >ur resolution
the follo,in) assi)nment of errors1
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(ecord.;
It appears that for the .illin) of the son, A)apito, of plaintiffs-appellants, defendant- appellee (e)inald
*ill ,as prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case #o. "%2 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City.
After due trial, he ,as ac/uitted on the )round that his act ,as not criminal -ecause of 0lac. of intent to
.ill, coupled ,ith mista.e.0 &arenthetically, none of the parties has favored Bs ,ith a copy of the
decision of ac/uittal, presuma-ly -ecause appellants do not dispute that such indeed ,as the -asis
stated in the courtGs decision. And so, ,hen appellants filed their complaint a)ainst appellees (e)inald
and his father, Atty. +arvin *ill, on account of the death of their son, the appellees filed the motion to
dismiss a-ove-referred to.
As =e vie, the fore)oin) -ac.)round of this case, the t,o decisive issues presented for >ur resolution
are1
. Is the present civil action for dama)es -arred -y the ac/uittal of (e)inald in the criminal case
,herein the action for civil lia-ility, ,as not reversedH
2. +ay Article 2$% 72nd and last para)raphs; of the Civil Code he applied a)ainst Atty. *ill,
not,ithstandin) the undisputed fact that at the time of the occurrence complained of. (e)inald, thou)h
a minor, livin) ,ith and )ettin) su-sistenee from his father, ,as already le)ally marriedH
2he first issue presents no more pro-lem than the need for a reiteration and further clarification of the
dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or ne)li)ence as a source of o-li)ation ,hich ,as firmly
esta-lished in this 5urisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 36 &hil. !%3. In that case, this Court postulated, on
the -asis of a scholarly dissertation -y Justice Doco-o on the nature of culpa aquiliana in relation
to culpa criminal or delito and mereculpa or fault, ,ith pertinent citation of decisions of the @upreme
Court of @pain, the ,or.s of reco)nized civilians, and earlier 5urisprudence of our o,n, that the same
)iven act can result in civil lia-ility not only under the &enal Code -ut also under the Civil Code. 2hus,
the opinion holds1
2he, a-ove case is pertinent -ecause it sho,s that the same act machinist. come
under -oth the &enal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the a)ent
.illeth un5ustified and fraudulent and therefore could have -een the su-5ect of a
criminal action. And yet, it ,as held to -e also a proper su-5ect of a civil action under
article 9%2 of the Civil Code. It is also to -e noted that it ,as the employer and not
the employee ,ho ,as -ein) sued. 7pp. !"-!!, 36 &hil.;.
1
It ,ill -e noticed that the defendant in the a-ove case could have -een prosecuted in
a criminal case -ecause his ne)li)ence causin) the death of the child ,as punisha-le
-y the &enal Code. *ere is therefore a clear instance of the same act of ne)li)ence
-ein) a proper su-5ect matter either of a criminal action ,ith its conse/uent civil
lia-ility arisin) from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for
fault or ne)li)ence under article 9%2 of the Civil Code. 2hus, in this 5urisdiction, the
separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has
-een fully and clearly reco)nized, even ,ith re)ard to a ne)li)ent act for ,hich the
,ron)doer could have -een prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for
,hich, after such a conviction, he could have -een sued for this civil lia-ility arisin)
from his crime. 7p. !3, 36 &hil.;
2
It is most si)nificant that in the case 5ust cited, this Court specifically applied article
9%2 of the Civil Code. It is thus that althou)h J. F. *ouse could have -een criminally
prosecuted for rec.less or simple ne)li)ence and not only punished -ut also made
civilly lia-le -ecause of his criminal ne)li)ence, nevertheless this Court a,arded
dama)es in an independent civil action for fault or ne)li)ence under article 9%2 of
the Civil Code. 7p. !$, 36 &hil.;
3
2he le)al provisions, authors, and cases already invo.ed should ordinarily -e
sufficient to dispose of this case. Dut inasmuch as ,e are announcin) doctrines that
have -een little understood, in the past, it mi)ht not he inappropriate to indicate their
foundations.
Firstly, the (evised &enal Code in articles 6!" punishes not only rec.less -ut also
simple ne)li)ence. If ,e ,ere to hold that articles 9%2 to 9% of the Civil Code refer
only to fault or ne)li)ence not punished -y la,, accordin)ly to the literal import of
article %96 of the Civil Code, the le)al institution of culpa aquiliana ,ould have very
little scope and application in actual life. ?eath or in5ury to persons and dama)e to
property- throu)h any de)ree of ne)li)ence - even the sli)htest - ,ould have to -e
Idemnified only throu)h the principle of civil lia-ility arisin) from a crime. In such a
state of affairs, ,hat sphere ,ould remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquilianaH =e are
loath to impute to the la,ma.er any intention to -rin) a-out a situation so a-surd and
anomalous. #or are ,e, in the interpretation of the la,s, disposed to uphold the letter
that .illeth rather than the spirit that )iveth life. =e ,ill not use the literal meanin) of
the la, to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient ori)in and
such full-)ro,n development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, ,hich is conserved
and made endurin) in articles 9%2 to 9% of the @panish Civil Code.
@econdary, to find the accused )uilty in a criminal case, proof of )uilt -eyond
reasona-le dou-t is re/uired, ,hile in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is
sufficient to ma.e the defendant pay in dama)es. 2here are numerous cases of
criminal ne)li)ence ,hich can not -e sho,n -eyond reasona-le dou-t, -ut can -e
proved -y a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and
should -e made responsi-le in a civil action under articles 9%2 to 9% of the Civil
Code. >ther,ise. there ,ould -e many instances of unvindicated civil ,ron)s. 0Ubi
jus Idemnified remedium.0 7p. !2%,36 &hil.;
Fourthly, -ecause of the -road s,eep of the provisions of -oth the &enal Code and
the Civil Code on this su-5ect, ,hich has )iven rise to the overlappin) or concurrence
of spheres already discussed, and for lac. of understandin) of the character and
efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has )ro,n up a common practice to
see. dama)es only -y virtue of the civil responsi-ility arisin) from a crime, for)ettin)
that there is another remedy, ,hich is -y invo.in) articles 9%2-9% of the Civil
Code. Althou)h this ha-itual method is allo,ed -y, our la,s, it has nevertheless
rendered practically useless and nu)atory the more e<peditious and effective remedy
-ased on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, ,e are
as.ed to help perpetuate this usual course. Dut ,e -elieve it is hi)h time ,e pointed
out to the harms done -y such practice and to restore the principle of responsi-ility for
fault or ne)li)ence under articles 9%2 et se/. of the Civil Code to its full ri)or. It is
hi)h time ,e caused the stream of /uasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flo, on its o,n
natural channel, so that its ,aters may no lon)er -e diverted into that of a crime
under the &enal Code. 2his ,ill, it is -elieved, ma.e for the -etter safe)uardin) or
private ri)hts -ecause it realtor, an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further
reason that an independent civil action, not dependin) on the issues, limitations and
results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed -y the party ,ron)ed or his
counsel, is more li.ely to secure ade/uate and efficacious redress. 7p. !2, 36 &hil.;
Contrary to an immediate impression one mi)ht )et upon a readin) of the fore)oin) e<cerpts from the
opinion in Carcia that the concurrence of the &enal Code and the Civil Code therein referred to
contemplate only acts of ne)li)ence and not intentional voluntary acts - deeper reflection ,ould reveal
that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, -ut that in fact it actually e<tends to fault
or culpa. 2his can -e seen in the reference made therein to the @entence of the @upreme Court of
@pain of Fe-ruary 9, 99, supra, ,hich involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a ne)li)ent act. Indeed,
Article %96 of the Civil Code of @pain, in force here at the time of Carcia, provided te<tually that
o-li)ations 0,hich are derived from acts or omissions in ,hich fault or ne)li)ence, not punishable by
law, intervene shall -e the su-5ect of Chapter II, 2itle IF of this -oo. 7,hich refers to /uasi-delicts.;0
And it is precisely the underline /ualification, 0not punisha-le -y la,0, that Justice Doco-o emphasized
could lead to an ultimo construction or interpretation of the letter of the la, that 0.illeth, rather than the
spirit that )iveth lift- hence, the rulin) that 07=;e ,ill not use the literal meanin) of the la, to smother
and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient ori)in and such full-)ro,n development as culpa
aquiliana orquasi-delito, ,hich is conserved and made endurin) in articles 9%2 to 9% of the @panish
Civil Code.0 And so, -ecause Justice Daco-o ,as Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the
ori)inal te<t of the ne, Civil Code, it is to -e noted that the said Code, ,hich ,as enacted after the
Carcia doctrine, no lon)er uses the term, not punisha-le -y la,,0 there-y ma.in) it clear that the
concept of culpa aquiliana includes acts ,hich are criminal in character or in violation of the penal la,,
,hether voluntary or matter. 2hus, the correspondin) provisions to said Article %96 in the ne, code,
,hich is Article !2, simply says, 0>-li)ations derived from quasi-delicto shall -e )overned -y the
provisions of Chapter 2, 2itle IFII of this Doo., 7on quasi-delicts; and -y special la,s.0 +ore precisely, a
ne, provision, Article 233 of the ne, code provides1
A(2. 233. (esponsi-ility for fault or ne)li)ence under the precedin) article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil lia-ility arisin) from ne)li)ence under the &enal
Code. Dut the plaintiff cannot recover dama)es t,ice for the same act or omission of
the defendant.
Accordin) to the Code Commission1 02he fore)oin) provision 7Article 233; throu)h at first si)ht
startlin), is not so novel or e<traordinary ,hen ,e consider the e<act nature of criminal and civil
ne)li)ence. 2he former is a violation of the criminal la,, ,hile the latter is a 0culpa a/uiliana0 or /uasi-
delict, of ancient ori)in, havin) al,ays had its o,n foundation and individuality, separate from criminal
ne)li)ence. @uch distinction -et,een criminal ne)li)ence and 0culpa e<tracontractual0 or 0cuasi-delito0
has -een sustained -y decision of the @upreme Court of @pain and maintained as clear, sound and
perfectly tena-le -y +aura, an outstandin) @panish 5urist. 2herefore, under the proposed Article 233,
ac/uittal from an accusation of criminal ne)li)ence, ,hether on reasona-le dou-t or not, shall not -e a
-ar to a su-se/uent civil action, not for civil lia-ility arisin) from criminal ne)li)ence, -ut for dama)es
due to a /uasi-delict or Gculpa a/uilianaG. Dut said article forestalls a dou-le recovery.0, 7(eport of the
Code; Commission, p. !2.;
Althou)h, a)ain, this Article 233 does seem to literally refer to only acts of ne)li)ence, the same
ar)ument of Justice Daco-o a-out construction that upholds 0the spirit that )iveth lift- rather than that
,hich is literal that .illeth the intent of the la,ma.er should -e o-served in applyin) the same. And
considerin) that the preliminary chapter on human relations of the ne, Civil Code definitely esta-lishes
the separa-ility and independence of lia-ility in a civil action for acts criminal in character 7under Articles
29 to 62; from the civil responsi-ility arisin) from crime fi<ed -y Article %% of the (evised &enal Code,
and, in a sense, the (ules of Court, under @ections 2 and 6 7c;, (ule , contemplate also the same
separa-ility, it is 0more con)ruent ,ith the spirit of la,, e/uity and 5ustice, and more in harmony ,ith
modern pro)ress0- to -orro, the felicitous relevant lan)ua)e in Raes vs. !tlantic. Gulf and "acific #o.,
3 &hil. 6"9, to hold, as =e do hold, that Article 23!, ,here it refers to 0fault or ne)li)encia covers not
only acts 0not punisha-le -y la,0 -ut also acts criminal in character, ,hether intentional and voluntary
or ne)li)ent. Conse/uently, a separate civil action lies a)ainst the offender in a criminal act, ,hether or
not he is criminally prosecuted and found )uilty or ac/uitted, provided that the offended party is not
allo,ed, if he is actually char)ed also criminally, to recover dama)es on -oth scores, and ,ould -e
entitled in such eventuality only to the -i))er a,ard of the t,o, assumin) the a,ards made in the t,o
cases vary. In other ,ords, the e<tinction of civil lia-ility referred to in &ar. 7e; of @ection 6, (ule ,
refers e<clusively to civil lia-ility founded on Article %% of the (evised &enal Code, ,hereas the civil
lia-ility for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not estin)uished even
-y a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act char)ed has not happened or has not -een
committed -y the accused. Driefly stated, =e here hold, in reiteration of Carcia, thatculpa
aquiliana includes voluntary and ne)li)ent acts ,hich may -e punisha-le -y la,.
4
It results, therefore, that the ac/uittal of (e)inal *ill in the criminal case has not e<tin)uished his lia-ility
for quasi-delict, hence that ac/uittal is not a -ar to the instant action a)ainst him.
Comin) no, to the second issue a-out the effect of (e)inaldGs emancipation -y marria)e on the
possi-le civil lia-ility of Atty. *ill, his father, it is also >ur considered opinion that the conclusion of
appellees that Atty. *ill is already free from responsi-ility cannot -e upheld.
=hile it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child 7Article 623, Civil
Code;, and under Article 693, emancipation ta.es place 0-y the marria)e of the minor 7child;0, it is,
ho,ever, also clear that pursuant to Article 699, emancipation -y marria)e of the minor is not really full
or a-solute. 2hus 07';mancipation -y marria)e or -y voluntary concession shall terminate parental
authority over the childGs person. It shall ena-le the minor to administer his property as thou)h he ,ere
of a)e, -ut he cannot -orro, money or alienate or encum-er real property ,ithout the consent of his
father or mother, or )uardian. *e can sue and -e sued in court only ,ith the assistance of his father,
mother or )uardian.0
#o, under Article 2$%, 072;he o-li)ation imposed -y article 23! is demanda-le not only for oneGs o,n
acts or omissions, -ut also for those of persons for ,hom one is responsi-le. 2he father and, in case of
his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsi-le. 2he father and, in case of his death or incapacity,
the mother, are responsi-le for the dama)es caused -y the minor children ,ho live in their company.0 In
the instant case, it is not controverted that (e)inald, althou)h married, ,as livin) ,ith his father and
)ettin) su-sistence from him at the time of the occurrence in /uestion. Factually, therefore, (e)inald
,as still su-servient to and dependent on his father, a situation ,hich is not unusual.
It must -e -orne in mind that, accordin) to +anresa, the reason -ehind the 5oint and solidary lia-ility of
presuncion ,ith their offendin) child under Article 2$% is that is the o-li)ation of the parent to supervise
their minor children in order to prevent them from causin) dama)e to third persons.
0
>n the other hand,
the clear implication of Article 699, in providin) that a minor emancipated -y marria)e may not,
nevertheless, sue or -e sued ,ithout the assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not
carry ,ith it freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can )ive rise to 5udicial liti)ation. 7@ee
+anresa, Id., Fol. II, pp. 3!!-3!3, 33!.; And surely, .illin) someone else invites 5udicial action.
>ther,ise stated, the marria)e of a minor child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that
the child, ,hile still a minor, does not )ive ans,era-le for the -orro,in)s of money and alienation or
encum-erin) of real property ,hich cannot -e done -y their minor married child ,ithout their consent.
7Art. 6994 +anresa, supra.;
Accordin)ly, in >ur considered vie,, Article 2$% applies to Atty. *ill not,ithstandin) the emancipation
-y marria)e of (e)inald. *o,ever, inasmuch as it is evident that (e)inald is no, of a)e, as a matter of
e/uity, the lia-ility of Atty. *ill has -ecome millin), su-sidiary to that of his son.
=*'('F>(', the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is ordered to proceed in
accordance ,ith the fore)oin) opinion. Costs a)ainst appellees.
$ernando %#hairman&' !ntonio' and (artin' )).' concur.
G.R. No. L-33171 May 31, 1979
POR1IRIO P. CINCO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
+ON. MATEO CANONO2, P$#'dn) 3.d)# o( !"# T"$d /$an%" o( !"# Co.$! o( 1$'! In'!an%# o(
C#4., +ON. LOREN5O /. /ARRIA C!y 3.d)# o( Manda.# C!y, 6#%ond /$an%" ROMEO +ILOT,
-ALERIANA PEPITO and CARLO6 PEPITO, respondents-appellees.
MELENCIO-+ERRERA, J.:
2his is a &etition for (evie, on certiorari of the ?ecision of the Court of First Instance of Ce-u rendered
on #ovem-er ", 93%.
2he -ac.)round facts to the controversy may -e set forth as follo,s1
&etitioner herein filed, on Fe-ruary 2", 93%, a Complaint in the City Court of +andaue City, Ce-u,
Dranch II, for the recovery of dama)es on account of a vehicular accident involvin) his automo-ile and
a 5eepney driven -y (omeo *ilot and operated -y Faleriana &epito and Carlos &epito, the last three
-ein) the private respondents in this suit. @u-se/uent thereto, a criminal case ,as filed a)ainst the
driver, (omeo *ilot, arisin) from the same accident. At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private
respondents moved to suspend the civil action pendin) the final determination of the criminal suit,
invo.in) (ule , @ection 6 7-; of the (ules of Court, ,hich provides1
7-; After a criminal action has -een commenced. no civil action arisin) from the same
offense can -e prosecuted, and the same shall -e suspended, in ,hatever sta)e it
may -e found, until final 5ud)ment in the criminal proceedin) has -een rendered4
2he City Court of +andaue City in an >rder dated Au)ust , 93%, ordered the suspension of the civil
case. &etitionerGs +otion for (econsideration thereof, havin) -een denied on Au)ust 2",
93%,
1
petitioner elevated the matter on certiorari to the Court of First Instance of Ce-u, respondent
Jud)e presidin), on @eptem-er , 93%, alle)in) that the City Jud)e had acted ,ith )rave a-use of
discretion in suspendin) the civil action for -ein) contrary to la, and 5urisprudence.
2
>n #ovem-er ", 93%, respondent Jud)e dismissed the &etition for certiorari on the )round that there
,as no )rave a-use of discretion on the part of the City Court in suspendin) the civil action inasmuch
as dama)e to property is not one of the instances ,hen an independent civil action is proper4 that
petitioner has another plain, speedy, and ade/uate remedy under the la,, ,hich is to su-mit his claim
for dama)es in the criminal case4 that the resolution of the City Court is interlocutory and, therefore,
certiorari is improper4 and that the &etition is defective inasmuch as ,hat petitioner actually desires is a
=rit of mandamus 7Anne< 0(0;. &etitionerGs +otion for (econsideration ,as denied -y respondent
Jud)e in an >rder dated #ovem-er 9,93% 7Anne< 0@0 and Anne< 0B0;.
*ence, this &etition for (evie, -efore this 2ri-unal, to ,hich ,e )ave due course on Fe-ruary 2",
93.
3
&etitioner ma.es these1
A@@IC#+'#2@ >F '((>(
. 2*' 2(IAA C>B(2, ('@&>#?'#2 JB?C' +A2'> CA#>#>E, '(('? I#
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C>B(2 >F +A#?AB' @*>BA? D' @B@&'#?'? B#2IA AF2'( A FI#AA
JB?C+'#2 I@ ('#?'('? I# 2*' C(I+I#AA CA@'.
2. 2*A2 2*' C>B(2 '(('? I# *>A?I#C 2*A2 I# >(?'( 2> AF>I? ?'AAE
2*' >FF'#?'? &A(2E +AE @BD+I2 *I@ CAAI+ F>( ?A+AC'@ I# 2*'
C(I+I#AA CA@'.
6. 2*A2 2*' C>B(2 '(('? I# *>A?I#C 2*A2 2*' &'2I2I># F>( certiorari I@
#>2 &(>&'(, D'CAB@' 2*' ('@>AB2I># I# QB'@2I># I@ I#2'(A>CB2>(E.
9. 2*A2 2*' C>B(2 '(('? I# *>A?I#C 2*A2 2*' &'2I2I># I@ ?'F'C2IF'.
4
all of ,hich can -e synthesized into one decisive issue1 ,hether or not there can -e an independent
civil action for dama)e to property durin) the pendency of the criminal action.
From the Complaint filed -y petitioner -efore the City Court of +andaue City, Ce-u, it is evident that the
nature and character of his action ,as quasi-delictual predicated principally on Articles 23! and 2$%
of the Civil Code, ,hich provide1
Art. 23!. =hoever -y act or omission causes dama)e to another, there -ein) fault or
ne)li)ence is o-li)ed to pay for the dama)e done. @uch fault or ne)li)ence, if there is
no pre-e<istin) contractual relation -et,een the parties, is caned a quasi-delict and is
)overned -y the provisions of this Chapter. 79%2a;
Art. 2$%. 2he o-li)ation imposed -y article 23! is demanda-le not only for oneGs
o,n acts or omissions -ut also for those of persons for ,hom one is responsi-le.
<<< <<< <<<
'mployers shall -e lia-le for the dama)es cause -y their employees and household
helpers actin) ,ithin the scope of their assi)ned tas.s, even thou)h the former are
not en)a)ed in any -usiness or industry.
<<< <<< <<<
2he responsi-ility treated of in this article shall cease ,hen the persons herein
mentioned prove that they o-served all the dili)ence of a )ood father of a family to
prevent dama)e. 79%6a;
2hus, plaintiff made the essential averments that it ,as the fault or ne)li)ence of the driver, (omeo
*ilot, in the operation of the 5eepney o,ned -y the &epitos ,hich caused the collision -et,een his
automo-ile and said 5eepney4 that dama)es ,ere sustained -y petitioner -ecause of the collision4 that
there ,as a direct causal connection -et,een the dama)es he suffered and the fault and ne)li)ence of
private respondents.
@imilarly, in the Ans,er, private respondents contended, amon) others, that defendant, Faleriana
&epito, o-served due dili)ence in the selection and supervision of her employees, particularly of her co-
defendant (omeo *ilot, a defense peculiar to actions -ased on quasi-delict.
0
Aia-ility -ein) predicated on quasi-delict the civil case may proceed as a separate and independent civil
action, as specifically provided for in Article 233 of the Civil Code.
Art. 233. (esponsi-ility for fault or ne)li)ence under the precedin) article is entirely
separate and distinct from the civil lia-ility arisin) from ne)li)ence under the &enal
Code. Dut the plaintiff cannot recover dama)es t,ice for the same act or omission of
the defendant. 7n;
2he crucial distinction -et,een criminal ne)li)ence and quasi-delict' ,hich is readily
discerni-le from the fore)oin) codal provision, has -een e<pounded in Barredo
vs. Garcia' et al., 36 &hil. !%3, !2%-!2,
6
thus1
Firstly, the (evised &enal Code in article 6!" punishes not only rec.less -ut also
simple imprudence. if ,e ,ere to hold that articles 9%2 to 9% of the Civil Code
refer only to fault or ne)li)ence not punished -y la,, accordin) to the literal import of
article %96 of the Civil Code, the le)al institution ofculpa aquiliana ,ould have very
little scope and application in actual life. ?eath or in5ury to personsand dama*e to
property throu)h any de)ree of ne)li)ence J even the sli)htest ,ould have to -e
indemnified only throu)h the principle of civil ha-ility arisin) from crime. In such a
state of affairs, ,hat sphere ,ould remain for /uasidelito or culpa a/uiliana =e are
loath to impute to the la,ma.er any intention to -rin) a-out a situation so a-surd and
anomalous. #or are ,e, in the interpretation of the la,s, disposed to uphold the letter
that .illeth rather than the spirit that )iveth life. =e ,ill not use the literal meanin) of
the la, to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient ori)in and
such full-)ro,n development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito, ,hich is conserved
and made endurin) in articles 9%2 to 9% of the @panish Civil Code.
@econdly, to find the accused )uilty in a criminal case, proof of )uilt -eyond
reasona-le dou-t is re/uired, ,hile in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is
sufficient to ma.e the defendant pay in dama)es. 2here are numerous cases of
criminal ne)li)ence ,hich cannot -e sho,n -eyond reasona-le dou-t, -ut can -e
proved -y a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and
should -e made responsi-le in a civil action under articles 9%2 to 9% of the Civil
Code, other,ise, there ,ould -e many instances of unvindicated civil ,ron)s. B-i 5us
i-i remedium.
2hirdly, to hold that there is only one ,ay to ma.e defendants lia-ility effective, and
that is, to sue the driver and e<haust his 7the latterGs; property first, ,ould -e
tantamount to compellin) the plaintiff to follo, a devious and cum-ersome method of
o-tainin) a reliel 2rue, there is such a remedy under our la,s, -ut there is also a
more e<peditious ,ay, ,hich is -ased on the primary and direct responsi-ility of the
defendant under article 9%6 of the Civil Code. >ur vie, of the la, is more li.ely to
facilitate remedy for civil ,ron)s -ecause the procedure indicated -y the defendant is
,asteful and productive of delay, it -ein) a matter of common .no,led)e that
professional drivers of ta<is and similar pu-lic conveyances usually do not have
sufficient means ,ith ,hich to pay dama)es. =hy, then, should the plaintiff -e
re/uired in all cases to )o throu)h this round-a-out, unnecessary, and pro-a-ly
useless procedureH In construin) the la,s, courts have endeavored to shorten and
facilitate the path,ays of ri)ht and 5ustice.
At this 5uncture, it should -e said that the primary and direct responsi-ility of
employers and their presumed ne)li)ence are principles calculated to protect society.
=or.men and employees should -e carefully chosen and supervised in order to avoid
in5ury to the pu-lic. It is the masters or employers ,ho principally reap the profits
resultin) from the services of these servants and employees. It is -ut ri)ht that they
should )uarantee the latterGs careful conduct for the personnel and patrimonial safety
of others. As 2heilhard has said, 0they should reproach themselves, at least, some for
their ,ea.ness, others for their poor selection and all for their ne)li)ence.0 And
accordin) to +anresa, 0It is much more e/uita-le and 5ust that such responsi-ility
should fail upon the principal or director ,ho could have chosen a careful and prudent
employee, and not upon the such employee -ecause of his confidence in the principal
or director.0 7Fol. 2, p. !22, 2nd 'd.; +any 5urists also -ase this primary
responsi-ility of the employer on the principle of representation of the principal -y the
a)ent. 2hus, >yuelos says in the ,or. already cited 7Fol. 3, p. 393; that -efore third
persons the employer and employee vienen a ser como una sola personalidad, por
refundicion de la del dependiente en la de /uien la emplea y utihza 7-ecome as one
personality -y the mer)in) of the person of the employee in that of him ,ho employs
and utilizes him.; All these o-servations ac/uire a peculiar force and si)nificance
,hen it comes to motor accidents, and there is need of stressin) and accentuatin)
the responsi-ility of o,ners of motor vehicles.
Fourthly, -ecause of the -road s,eep of the provisions of -oth the &enal Code and
the Civil Code on this su-5ect, ,hich has )iven rise to overlappin) or concurrence of
spheres already discussed, and for lac. of understandin) of the character and
efficacy of the action for culpaa/uiliana there has )ro,n up a common practice to
see. dama)es only -y virtue of the Civil responsi-ility arisin) from crime, for)ettin)
that there is another remedy, ,hich is -y invo.in) articles 9%2-9% of the Civil
Code. Althou)h this ha-itual method is allo,ed -y our la,s, it has nevertheless
rendered practically useless and nu)atory the more e<peditious and effective remedy
-ased on culpa a/uiliana or culpa e<tra-contractual. In the present case, ,e are
as.ed to help perpetuate this usual course. Dut ,e -elieve it is hi)h time ,e pointed
out to the harm done -y such practice and to restore the principle of responsi-ility for
fault or ne)li)ence under articles 9%2 et se/. of the Civil Code to its full ri)or. It is
hi)h time ,e cause the stream of quasi-delict or culpa a/uiliana to flo, on its o,n
natural channel, so that its ,aters may no lon)er -e diverted into that of a crime
under the &enal Code. 2his ,ill, it is -elieved, ma.e for the -et ter safe)uardin) of
private ri)hts -ecause it re-esta-lishes an ancient and additional remedy, and for the
further reason that an independent civil action, not dependin) on the issues, stations
and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed -y the party ,ron)ed or his
counsel is more li.ely to secure ade/uate and efficacious redress. 7Carcia vs. Florida
"2 @C(A 92%, 929-92", Au). 6, 936;. 7'mphasis supplied;
2he separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is also clearly reco)nized in section 2, (ule
of the (ules of Court, readin)1
@ec. 2. Independent civil action. + In the cases provided for in Articles 6, 62, 66, 69
and 233 of the Civil Code of the &hilippines, Are independent civil action entirely
separate and distinct from the c action, may -e -rou)ht -y the in5ured party durin) the
pendency of the criminal case, provided the ri)ht is reserved as re/uired in the
precedin) section. @uch civil action sha) proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall re/uire only a preponderance of evidence.
@i)nificant to note is the fact that the fore)oin) section cate)orically lists cases provided for in !rticle
,-.. of the Civil Code, supra, as allo,in) of an 0independent civil action.0
2ested -y the hereina-ove-/uoted le)al tenets, it has to -e held that the City Court, in surroundin) the
civil action, erred in placin) reliance on section 6 7-; of (ule of the (ules of Court, supra ,hich
refers to 0other civil actions arisin) from cases not included in the section 5ust cited0 7i.e., @ection 2,
(ule a-ove /uoted;, in ,hich case ! once the criminal action has -ein) commenced, no civil action
arisin) from the same offense can -e prosecuted and the same shall -e suspended in ,hatever sta)e it
may -e found, until final 5ud)ment in the criminal proceedin) has -een rendered.0 @tated other,ise, the
civil action referred to in @ecs. 67a; and 67-; of (ule of the (ules of Court, ,hich should -e
suspended after the criminal action has -een instituted is that arisin) from the criminal offense not the
civil action -ased on quasi-delict
Article 6 of the Civil Code then clearly assumes relevance ,hen it provides1
Art. 6. =hen the civil action is -ased on an o-li)ation not arisin) from the act or
omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of
the criminal proceedin)s and re)ardless of the result of the latter.
For o-viously, the 5ural concept of a quasi-delict is that of an independent source of o-li)ation 0not
arisin) from the act or omission complained of as a felony.0 Article "3 of the Civil Code -olsters this
conclusion ,hen it specifically reco)nizes that1
Art. "3. >-li)ations arise from1
7; Aa,4
72; Contracts4
76; Quasi-contracts4
79; Acts or omissions punished -y la,4 and
7"; /uasi-delicts. 7%$9a;
7'mphasis supplied;
It -ears emphasizin) that petitionerGs cause of action is -ased on quasi-delict. 2he concept of
/uasidelica as enunciated in Article 23! of the Civil Code 7supra;, is so -road that it includes not only
in5uries to persons -ut also dama)e to property.
7
It ma.es no distinction -et,een 0dama)e to persons0
on the one hand and 0dama)e to property0 on the other. Indeed, the ,ord 0dama)e0 is used in t,o
concepts1 the 0harm0 done and 0reparation0 for the harm done. And ,ith respect to harm it is plain that it
includes -oth in5uries to person and property since 0harm0 is not limited to personal -ut also to property
in5uries. In fact, e<amples of quasi-delict in the la, itself include dama)e to property. An instance is
Article 2972; of the Civil Code ,hich holds proprietors responsi-le for dama)es caused -y e<cessive
smo.e ,hich may -e harmful to persons or property.0
In the li)ht of the fore)oin) dis/uisition, ,e are constrained to hold that respondent Jud)e )ravely
a-used his discretion in upholdin) the ?ecision of the City Court of +andaue City, Ce-u, suspendin)
the civil action -ased on a quasi-delict until after the criminal case is finally terminated. *avin) arrived at
this conclusion, a discussion of the other errors assi)ned -ecomes unnecessary.
=*'('F>(', )rantin) the =rit of certiorari prayed for, the ?ecision of the Court of First Instance of
Ce-u sou)ht to -e revie,ed is here-y set aside, and the City Court of +andaue City, Ce-u, Dranch ,
is here-y ordered to proceed ,ith the hearin) of Civil Case #o. $9 of that Court.
=ithout pronouncement as to costs.
@> >(?'('?.
G.R. No. 108017 A&$* 3, 1990
MARIA /ENITA A. D7LA2, n "#$ o8n 4#"a*( and n 4#"a*( o( !"# ,no$ %"*d$#n 9RI5TEEN
ELI5A/ET+, /E-ERL2 MARIE and NAPOLEON II, a** '.$na,#d D7LA2, petitioners,
vs.
T+E CO7RT O1 APPEAL6, 1o$,#$ E)"!" D:'on, +ON. TEODORO P. REGINO, n "' %a&a%!y
a' P$#'dn) 3.d)# o( !"# R#)ona* T$a* Co.$! Na!ona* Ca&!a* R#)on, ;.#<on C!y, /$. 84,
6A1EG7ARD IN-E6TIGATION AND 6EC7RIT2 CO., INC., and 67PERG7ARD 6EC7RIT2
CORPORATION, respondents.
/IDIN, J.:
2his petition for certiorari prays for the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated >cto-er
29, 99 in CA-C.(. CF #o. 29!9! ,hich affirmed the order of the (e)ional 2rial Court dismissin) Civil
Case #o. Q-$9-3", and its resolution dated #ovem-er 3, 99 denyin) herein, petitionerGs motion
for reconsideration.
2he antecedent facts of the case are as follo,s1
>n ?ecem-er 3, 9$$, an altercation -et,een Deni)no 2orzuela and Atty. #apoleon ?ulay occurred at
the 0Di) Dan) @a Ala-an),0 Ala-an) Filla)e, +untinlupa as a result of ,hich Deni)no 2orzuela, the
security )uard on duty at the said carnival, shot and .illed Atty. #apoleon ?ulay.
*erein petitioner +aria Denita A. ?ulay, ,ido, of the deceased #apoleon ?ulay, in her o,n -ehalf and
in -ehalf of her minor children, filed on Fe-ruary $, 9$9 an action for dama)es a)ainst Deni)no
2orzuela and herein private respondents @afe)uard Investi)ation and @ecurity Co., Inc.,
70@AF'CBA(?0; andKor @uper)uard @ecurity Corp. 70@B&'(CBA(?0;, alle)ed employers of
defendant 2orzuela. 2he complaint, doc.eted as Civil Case #o. Q-$9-3" amon) others alle)es the
follo,in)1
. . . .
?efendants @AF'CBA(? I#F'@2ICA2I># A#? @'CB(I2E C>., I#C., 7?efendant
@afe)uard; and @B&'(CBA(? @'CB(I2E C>(&>(A2I># 7?efendant
@uper)uard; are corporations duly or)anized and e<istin) in accordance ,ith
&hilippine la,s, ,ith offices at %th Floor, +anufacturers Duildin), Inc., &laza @anta
Cruz, +anila. 2hey are impleaded as alternative defendants for, ,hile the former
appears to -e the employer of defendant D'#IC#> 2>(LB'AA 7defendant
2>(LB'AA;, the latter impliedly ac.no,led)ed responsi-ility for the acts of
defendant 2>(LB'AA -y e<tendin) its sympathies to plaintiffs.
?efendant D'#IC#> 2>(LB'AA is of le)al a)e, an employee of defendant
@AF'CBA(? andKor defendant @B&'(CBA(? and, at the time of the incident
complained of, ,as under their control and supervision. . . .
6. >n ?ecem-er 3, 9$$ at around $1%% a.m., defendant 2>(LB'AA, ,hile he ,as
on duty as security )uard at the 0Di) Dan) sa Ala-an),0 Ala-an) Filla)e, +untinlupa,
+etro +anila shot and .illed #A&>A'># F. ?BAAE ,ith a .6$ cali-er revolver
-elon)in) to defendant @AF'CBA(?, andKor @B&'(CBA(? 7per &olice (eport
dated January 3, 9$9, copy attached as Anne< A;4
9. 2he incident resultin) in the death of #A&>A'># F. ?BAAE ,as due to the
concurrin) ne)li)ence of the defendants. ?efendant 2>(LB'AAG@ ,anton and
rec.less dischar)e of the firearm issued to him -y defendant @AF'CBA(? andKor
@B&'(CBA(? ,as the immediate and pro<imate cause of the in5ury, ,hile the
ne)li)ence of defendant @AF'CBA(? andKor @B&'(CBA(? consists in its havin)
failed to e<ercise the dili)ence of a )ood father of a family in the supervision and
control of its employee to avoid the in5ury.
<<< <<< <<<
7Rollo, pp. 3-$;
&etitioners prayed for actual, compensatory, moral and e<emplary dama)es, and attorneyGs fees. 2he
said Civil Case #o. Q-$9-3" ,as raffled to Dranch $9 of the (e)ional 2rial Court of Quezon City,
presided -y respondent Jud)e 2eodoro (e)ino.
>n +arch 2, 9$9, private respondent @B&'(CBA(? filed a +otion to ?ismiss on the )round that the
complaint does not state a valid cause of action. @B&'(CBA(? claimed that 2orzuelaGs act of shootin)
?ulay ,as -eyond the scope of his duties, and that since the alle)ed act of shootin) ,as committed
,ith deli-erate intent 7dolo;, the civil lia-ility therefor is )overned -y Article %% of the (evised &enal
Code, ,hich states1
Art. %%. Civil lia-ility of a person )uilty of a felony. J 'very person criminally lia-le
for a felony is also civilly lia-le.
(espondent @B&'(CBA(? further alle)ed that a complaint for dama)es -ased on ne)li)ence under
Article 23! of the #e, Civil Code, such as the one filed -y petitioners, cannot lie, since the civil lia-ility
under Article 23! applies only to /uasi-offenses under Article 6!" of the (evised &enal Code. In
addition, the private respondent ar)ued that petitionersG filin) of the complaint is premature considerin)
that the conviction of 2orzuela in a criminal case is a condition sine qua non for the employerGs
su-sidiary lia-ility 7Rollo, p. ""-"9;.
(espondent @AF'CBA(? also filed a motion prayin) that it -e e<cluded as defendant on the )round
that defendant 2orzuela is not one of its employees 7Rollo, p. 9!;.
&etitioners opposed -oth motions, statin) that their cause of action a)ainst the private respondents is
-ased on their lia-ility under Article 2$% of the #e, Civil Code, ,hich provides1
Art. 2$%. 2he o-li)ation imposed -y Article 23! is demanda-le not only for oneGs
o,n acts or omissions, -ut also for those of persons for ,hom one is responsi-le.
<<< <<< <<<
0mployers shall be liable for the dama*es caused by their employees and household
helpers actin* within the scope of their assi*ned tass' even thou*h the former are
not en*a*ed in any business or an industry.
<<< <<< <<<
7'mphasis supplied;
&etitioners contended that a suit a)ainst alternative defendants is allo,ed under (ule 6, @ection 6 of
the (ules of Court. 2herefore, the inclusion of private respondents as alternative defendants in the
complaint is 5ustified -y the follo,in)1 the Initial Investi)ation (eport prepared -y &at. +ario 2u-on
sho,in) that 2orzuela is an employee of @AF'CBA(?4 and throu)h overt acts, @B&'(CBA(?
e<tended its sympathies to petitioners 7Rollo, pp. !9 and 9$;.
+ean,hile, an Information dated +arch 2, 9$9 char)in) Deni)no 2orzuela ,ith homicide ,as filed
-efore the (e)ional 2rial Court of +a.ati and ,as doc.eted as Criminal Case #o. $9-$9!.
>n April 6, 9$9, respondent Jud)e (e)ino issued an order )rantin) @B&'(CBA(?G@ motion to
dismiss and @AF'CBA(?G@ motion for e<clusion as defendant. 2he respondent 5ud)e held that the
complaint did not state facts necessary or sufficient to constitute a /uasi-delict since it does not mention
any ne)li)ence on the part of 2orzuela in shootin) #apoleon ?ulay or that the same ,as done in the
performance of his duties. (espondent 5ud)e ruled that mere alle)ations of the concurrin) ne)li)ence of
the defendants 7private respondents herein; ,ithout statin) the facts sho,in) such ne)li)ence are mere
conclusions of la, 7Rollo, p. %!;. (espondent 5ud)e also declared that the complaint ,as one for
dama)es founded on crimes punisha-le under Articles %% and %6 of the (evised &enal Code as
distin)uished from those arisin) from, /uasi-delict. 2he dispositive portion of the order dated April 6,
9$9 states1
=*'('F>(', this Court holds that in vie, of the material and ultimate facts alle)ed
in the verified complaint and in accordance ,ith the applica-le la, on the matter as
,ell as precedents laid do,n -y the @upreme Court, the complaint a)ainst the
alternative defendants @uper)uard @ecurity Corporation and @afe)uard Investi)ation
and @ecurity Co., Inc., must -e and 7sic; it is here-y dismissed. 7Rollo, p. %;
2he a-ove order ,as affirmed -y the respondent court and petitionersG motion for reconsideration
thereof ,as denied.
&etitioners ta.e e<ception to the assailed decision and insist that /uasi-delicts are not limited to acts of
ne)li)ence -ut also cover acts that are intentional and voluntary, citin) Andamo v. IAC 79 @C(A 9"
899%:;. 2hus, petitioners insist that 2orzuelaG s act of shootin) #apoleon ?ulay constitutes a /uasi-delict
actiona-le under Article 23! of the #e, Civil Code.
&etitioners further contend that under Article 2$% of the #e, Civil Code, private respondents are
primarily lia-le for their ne)li)ence either in the selection or supervision of their employees. 2his lia-ility
is independent of the employeeGs o,n lia-ility for fault or ne)li)ence and is distinct from the su-sidiary
civil lia-ility under Article %6 of the (evised &enal Code. 2he civil action a)ainst the employer may
therefore proceed independently of the criminal action pursuant to (ule @ection 6 of the (ules of
Court. &etitioners su-mit that the /uestion of ,hether 2orzuela is an employee of respondent
@B&'(CBA(? or @AF'CBA(? ,ould -e -etter resolved after trial.
+oreover, petitioners ar)ue that 2orzuelaGs act of shootin) ?ulay is also actiona-le under Article 66 of
the #e, Civil Code, to ,it1
Art. 66. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical in5uries, a civil action for
dama*es' entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action' may be brou*ht by
the injured party. @uch civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall re/uire only a preponderance of evidence. 7'mphasis
supplied;
In the same vein, petitioners cite @ection 6, (ule of the (ules of Court ,hich provides1
(ule . . . . .
@ec. 6. =hen civil action may proceed independently J In the cases provided for in
Articles 62, 66, 69 and 23! of the Civil Code of the &hilippines, the independent civil
action which has been reserved may be brou*ht by the offended party' shall proceed
independently of the criminal action' and shall require only a preponderance of
evidence. 7'mphasis supplied;
2he term 0physical in5uries0 under Article 66 has -een held to include consummated, frustrated and
attempted homicide. 2hus, petitioners maintain that 2orzuelaGs prior conviction is unnecessary since the
civil action can proceed independently of the criminal action. >n the other hand, it is the private
respondentsG ar)ument that since the act ,as not committed ,ith ne)li)ence, the petitioners have no
cause of action under Articles 2! and 233 of the #e, Civil Code. 2he civil action contemplated in
Article 233 is not applica-le to acts committed ,ith deli-erate intent, -ut only applies to /uasi-offenses
under Article 6!" of the (evised &enal Code. 2orzuelaGs act of shootin) Atty. ?ulay to death, aside from
-ein) purely personal, ,as done ,ith deli-erate intent and could not have -een part of his duties as
security )uard. And since Article 2$% of the #e, Civil Code covers only1 acts done ,ithin the scope of
the employeeGs assi)ned tas.s, the private respondents cannot -e held lia-le for dama)es.
=e find for petitioners.
It is undisputed that Deni)no 2orzuela is -ein) prosecuted for homicide for the fatal shootin) of
#apoleon ?ulay. (ule of the (ules on Criminal &rocedure provides1
@ec. . Institution of criminal and civil actions. =hen a criminal action is instituted, the
civil action for the recovery of civil lia-ility is impliedly instituted ,ith the criminal
action, unless the offended party waives the civil action ' reserves his ri*ht to institute
it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
@uch civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the (evised &enal Code, and
dama)es under Articles 62, 66, 69, and 23! of the Civil Code of the &hilippines
arisin) from the same act or omission of the accused. 7'mphasis supplied;
It is ,ell-settled that the filin) of an independent civil action -efore the prosecution in the criminal action
presents evidence is even far -etter than a compliance ,ith the re/uirement of e<press reservation
7Ea.ult &hilippines v. Court of Appeals, 9% @C(A 6"3 899%:;. 2his is precisely ,hat the petitioners
opted to do in this case. *o,ever, the private respondents opposed the civil action on the )round that
the same is founded on a delict and not on a /uasi-delict as the shootin) ,as not attended -y
ne)li)ence. =hat is in dispute therefore is the nature of the petitionerGs cause of action.
2he nature of a cause of action is determined -y the facts alle)ed in the complaint as constitutin) the
cause of action 7(epu-lic v. 'stenzo, "$ @C(A 2$2 89$$:;. 2he purpose of an action or suit and the
la, to )overn it is to -e determined not -y the claim of the party filin) the action, made in his ar)ument
or -rief, -ut rather -y the complaint itself, its alle)ations and prayer for relief. 7?e 2avera v. &hilippine
2u-erculosis @ociety, 2 @C(A 296 89$2:;. An e<amination of the complaint in the present case ,ould
sho, that the plaintiffs, petitioners herein, are invo.in) their ri)ht to recover dama)es a)ainst the
private respondents for their vicarious responsi-ility for the in5ury caused -y Deni)no 2orzuelaGs act of
shootin) and .illin) #apoleon ?ulay, as stated in para)raphs and 2 of the complaint.
Article 23! of the #e, Civil Code provides1
Art. 23!. =hoever -y act or omission causes dama)e to another, there -ein) fault or
ne)li)ence, is o-li)ed to pay for the dama)e done. @uch fault or ne)li)ence, if there
is no pre-e<istin) contractual relation -et,een the parties is called a /uasi-delict and
is )overned -y the provisions of this Chapter.
Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no 5ustification for limitin) the scope of Article
23! of the Civil Code to acts or omissions resultin) from ne)li)ence. =ell-entrenched is the doctrine
that article 23! covers not only acts committed ,ith ne)li)ence, -ut also acts ,hich are voluntary and
intentional. As far -ac. as the definitive case of 'lcano v. *ill 733 @C(A 9$ 8933:;, this Court already
held that1
. . . !rticle ,-.1' where it refers to 2fault or ne*li*ence'2 covers not only acts 2not
punishable by law2 but also acts criminal in character3 whether intentional and
voluntary or ne*li*ent. #onsequently' a separate civil action a*ainst the offender in a
criminal act' whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found *uilty or acquitted'
provided that the offended party is not allowed' if he is actually char*ed also
criminally' to recover dama*es on both scores, and ,ould -e entitled in such
eventuality only to the -i))er a,ard of the t,o, assumin) the a,ards made in the t,o
cases vary. In other ,ords, the e<tinction of civil lia-ility referred to in &ar. 7e; of
@ection 6, (ule , refers e<clusively to civil lia-ility founded on Article %% of the
(evised &enal Code, ,hereas the civil lia-ility for the same act considered as /uasi-
delict only and not as a crime is not e<tin)uished even -y a declaration in the criminal
case that the criminal act char)ed has not happened or has not -een committed -y
the accused. Driefly stated, =e here hold, in reiteration of Carcia, that culpa aquiliana
includes voluntary and ne*li*ent acts which may be punishable by law. 7'mphasis
supplied;
2he same doctrine ,as echoed in the case of !ndamo v. Intermediate !ppellate #ourt 79 @C(A 9"
899%:;, ,herein the Court held1
!rticle ,-.1' whenever it refers to 2fault or ne*li*ence'2 covers not only acts criminal
in character' whether intentional and voluntary or ne*li*ent. Conse/uently, a civil
action lies a)ainst the offender in a criminal act, ,hether or not he is prosecuted or
found )uilty or ac/uitted, provided that the offended party is not allo,ed, 7if the
tortfeasor is actually also char)ed criminally;, to recover dama)es on -oth scores,
and ,ould -e entitled in such eventuality only to the -i))er a,ard of the t,o,
assumin) the a,ards made in the t,o cases vary. 8citin) Firata v. >choa, $ @C(A
932: 7'mphasis supplied;
&rivate respondents su-mit that the ,ord 0intentional0 in the !ndamo case is inaccurate o-iter, and
should -e read as 0voluntary0 since intent cannot -e coupled ,ith ne)li)ence as defined -y Article 6!"
of the (evised &enal Code. In the a-sence of more su-stantial reasons, this Court ,ill not distur- the
a-ove doctrine on the covera)e of Article 23!.
&rivate respondents further aver that Article 66 of the #e, Civil Code applies only to in5uries
intentionally committed pursuant to the rulin) in +arcia v. CA 72% @C(A 96 89$6:;, and that the
actions for dama)es allo,ed thereunder are ex-delicto. *o,ever, the term 0physical in5uries0 in Article
66 has already -een construed to include -odily in5uries causin) death 7Capuno v. &epsi-Cola Dottlin)
Co. of the &hilippines, 2 &hil. !6$ 89!";4 Carandan) v. @antia)o, 93 &hil. 99 89"":;. It is not the
crime of physical in5uries defined in the (evised &enal Code. It includes not only physical in5uries -ut
also consummated, frustrated, and attempted homicide 7+ade5a v. Caro, 2! @C(A 296 89$6:;.
Althou)h in the +arcia case 7supra;, it ,as held that no independent civil action may -e filed under
Article 66 ,here the crime is the result of criminal ne)li)ence, it must -e noted ho,ever, that 2orzuela,
the accused in the case at -ar, is char)ed ,ith homicide, not ,ith rec.less imprudence, ,hereas the
defendant in (arcia ,as char)ed ,ith rec.less imprudence. 2herefore, in this case, a civil action -ased
on Article 66 lies.
&rivate respondents also contend that their lia-ility is su-sidiary under the (evised &enal Code4 and
that they are not lia-le for 2orzuelaGs act ,hich is -eyond the scope of his duties as a security )uard. It
havin) -een esta-lished that the instant action is not ex-delicto, petitioners may proceed directly a)ainst
2orzuela and the private respondents. Bnder Article 2$% of the #e, Civil Code as afore/uoted, ,hen
an in5ury is caused -y the ne)li)ence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of la, that
there ,as ne)li)ence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the servant or
employee, or in supervision over him after selection or -oth 7Aayu)an v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
!3 @C(A 6!6 89$$:;. 2he lia-ility of the employer under Article 2$% is direct and immediate4 it is not
conditioned upon prior recourse a)ainst the ne)li)ent employee and a prior sho,in) of the insolvency
of such employee 7Mapalaran Dus Aines v. Coronado, 3! @C(A 392 89$9:;. 2herefore, it is incum-ent
upon the private respondents to prove that they e<ercised the dili)ence of a )ood father of a family in
the selection and supervision of their employee.
@ince Article 23! covers not only acts of ne)li)ence -ut also acts ,hich are intentional and voluntary, it
,as therefore erroneous on the part of the trial court to dismiss petitionerGs complaint simply -ecause it
failed to ma.e alle)ations of attendant ne)li)ence attri-uta-le to private respondents.
=ith respect to the issue of ,hether the complaint at hand states a sufficient cause of action, the
)eneral rule is that the alle)ations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action a)ainst
the defendants if, admittin) the facts alle)ed, the court can render a valid 5ud)ment upon the same in
accordance ,ith the prayer therein. A cause of action e<ist if the follo,in) elements are present,
namely1 7; a ri)ht in favor of the plaintiff -y ,hatever means and under ,hatever la, it arises or is
created4 72; an o-li)ation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such ri)ht4 and
76; an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the ri)ht of the plaintiff or constitutin) a
-reach of the o-li)ation of the defendant to the plaintiff for ,hich the latter may maintain an action for
recovery of dama)es 7?el Dros *otel Corporation v. CA, 2% @C(A 66 8992:;4 ?evelopment Dan. of
the &hilippines v. &undo)ar, 2$ @C(A $ 8996:;
2his Court finds, under the fore)oin) premises, that the complaint sufficiently alle)ed an actiona-le
-reach on the part of the defendant 2orzuela and respondents @B&'(CBA(? andKor @AF'CBA(?. It
is enou)h that the complaint alle)ed that Deni)no 2orzuela shot #apoleon ?ulay resultin) in the latterGs
death4 that the shootin) occurred ,hile 2orzuela ,as on duty4 and that either @B&'(CBA(? andKor
@AF'CBA(? ,as 2orzuelaGs employer and responsi-le for his acts. 2his does not operate ho,ever, to
esta-lish that the defendants -elo, are lia-le. =hether or not the shootin) ,as actually rec.less and
,anton or attended -y ne)li)ence and ,hether it ,as actually done ,ithin the scope of 2orzuelaGs
duties4 ,hether the private respondents @B&'(CBA(? andKor @AF'CBA(? failed to e<ercise the
dili)ence of a )ood father of a family4 and ,hether the defendants are actually lia-le, are /uestions
,hich can -e -etter resolved after trial on the merits ,here each party can present evidence to prove
their respective alle)ations and defenses. In determinin) ,hether the alle)ations of a complaint are
sufficient to support a cause of action, it must -e -orne in mind that the complaint does not have to
esta-lish or alle)e the facts provin) the e<istence of a cause of action at the outset4 this ,ill have to -e
done at the trial on the merits of the case 7?el Dros *otel Corporation v. CA, supra;. If the alle)ations in
a complaint can furnish a sufficient -asis -y ,hich the complaint can -e maintained, the same should
not -e dismissed re)ardless of the defenses that may -e assessed -y the defendants 7(ava ?evGt.
Corp. v. CA, 2 @C(A "2 8992: citin) Consolidated Dan. N 2rust Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
93 @C(A !!6 899:;. 2o sustain a motion to dismiss for lac. of cause of action, the complaint must
sho, that the claim for relief does not e<ist rather than that a claim has -een defectively stated, is
am-i)uous, indefinite or uncertain 7Azur v. &rovincial Doard, 23 @C(A "% 89!9:;. @ince the petitioners
clearly sustained an in5ury to their ri)hts under the la,, it ,ould -e more 5ust to allo, them to present
evidence of such in5ury.
=*'('F>(', premises considered, the petition for revie, is here-y C(A#2'?. 2he decision of the
Court of Appeals as ,ell as the >rder of the (e)ional 2rial Court dated April 6, 9$9 are here-y
('F'(@'? and @'2 A@I?'. Civil Case #o. Q-$9-3" is remanded to the (e)ional 2rial Court for trial
on the merits. 2his decision is immediately e<ecutory.
@> >(?'('?.
4arvasa' #.).' Re*alado' "uno and (endo5a' )).' concur.
G.R. No. L-30090 A.).'! 31, 1973
GERMAN C. GARCIA, L7MINO6A L. GARCIA, and E6TER 1RANCI6CO, petitioners,
vs.
T+E +ONORA/LE MARIANO M. 1LORIDO O1 T+E CO7RT O1 1IR6T IN6TANCE O1 MI6AMI6
OCCIDENTAL, MARCELINO INE6IN, RICARDO -A26ON, MACTAN TRAN6IT CO., INC., and
PEDRO T7MALA 2 DIGAL,respondents.
ANTONIO, J.:
Appeal -y certiorari from the decision of the Court of First Instance of +isamis >ccidental, Dranch III, in
Civil Case #o. 2$"% 7Cerman C. Carcia, et al. vs. +arcelino Inesin et al.; dated >cto-er 2, 93,
dismissin) petitionersG action for dama)es a)ainst respondents, +actan 2ransit Co., Inc. and &edro
2umala 0,ithout pre5udice to refilin) the said civil action after conviction of the defendants in the criminal
case filed -y the Chief of &olice of @indan)an Lam-oan)a del #orte0, and from the order of said Court
dated January 2, 932, denyin) petitionersG motion for reconsideration.
>n Au)ust 9, 93, petitioners, Cerman C. Carcia, Chief of the +isamis >ccidental *ospital, to)ether
,ith his ,ife, Auminosa A. Carcia, and 'ster Francisco, -oo..eeper of said hospital, hired and -oarded
a &B car ,ith plate #o. 29-$ C >zamis 3 o,ned and operated -y respondent, +arcelino Inesin, and
driven -y respondent, (icardo Fayson, for a round-trip from >ro/uieta City to Lam-oan)a City, for the
purpose of attendin) a conference of chiefs of )overnment hospitals, hospital administrative officers,
and -oo..eepers of (e)ional *ealth >ffice #o. 3 at Lam-oan)a City. At a-out 916% a.m., ,hile the &B
car ,as ne)otiatin) a sli)ht curve on the national hi)h,ay at .ilometer 2 in Darrio Cuisu.an,
@indan)an, Lam-oan)a del #orte, said car collided ,ith an oncomin) passen)er -us 7#o. 2"; ,ith
plate #o. 33-9 = L.#. 3 o,ned and operated -y the +actan 2ransit Co., Inc. and driven -y defendant,
&edro 2umala. As a result of the aforesaid collision, petitioners sustained various physical in5uries ,hich
necessitated their medical treatment and hospitalization.
Alle)in) that -oth drivers of the &B car and the passen)er -us ,ere at the time of the accident drivin)
their respective vehicles at a fast clip, in a rec.less, )rossly ne)li)ent and imprudent manner in )ross
violation of traffic rules and ,ithout due re)ard to the safety of the passen)ers a-oard the &B car,
petitioners, Cerman C. Carcia, Auminosa A. Carcia, and 'ster Francisco, filed on @eptem-er , 93
,ith respondent Court of First Instance of +isamis >ccidental an action for dama)es 7Civil Case #o.
2$"%; a)ainst the private respondents, o,ners and drivers, respectively, of the &B car and the
passen)er -us that fi)ured in the collision, ,ith prayer for preliminary attachment.
>n @eptem-er !, 93, +arcelino Inesin and (icardo Fayson filed their ans,er in the aforementioned
Civil Case #o. 2$"% admittin) the contract of carria)e ,ith petitioners -ut alle)ed, -y ,ay of defense,
that the accident ,as due to the ne)li)ence and rec.less imprudence of the -us driver, as ,hen
(icardo Fayson, driver of the &B car, sa, the oncomin) passen)er -us #o. 2" comin) from the
opposite direction ascendin) the incline at an e<cessive speed, chasin) another passen)er -us, he had
to stop the &B car in order to )ive ,ay to the passen)er -us, -ut, in spite of such precaution, the
passen)er -us -umped the &B car, thus causin) the accident in /uestion, and, therefore, said private
respondents could not -e held lia-le for the dama)es caused on petitioners.
>n @eptem-er 29, 93, respondents, +actan 2ransit Co., Inc. and &edro 2umala, filed a motion to
dismiss on three 76; )rounds, namely1 ; that the plaintiffs 7petitioners; had no cause of action4 2; that
the complaint carries ,ith it a prayer for attachment -ut ,ithout the re/uisite verification, hence
defective under the provision of @ec. 6, (ule "3 of the (ules of Court4 and 6; that the defendants
7respondents;, +actan 2ransit Co., Inc. and its driver, accused &edro 2umala, had operated said
passen)er -us ,ith ma<imum care and prudence.
2he principal ar)ument advanced in said motion to dismiss ,as that the petitioners had no cause of
action for on Au)ust , 93, or 2% days -efore the filin) of the present action for dama)es,
respondent &edro 2umala ,as char)ed in Criminal Case #o. 99!% of the +unicipal Court of @indan)an,
Lam-oan)a del #orte, in a complaint filed -y the Chief of &olice for 0dou-le serious and less serious
physical in5uries throu)h rec.less imprudence0, and that, ,ith the filin) of the aforesaid criminal case,
no civil action could -e filed su-se/uent thereto unless the criminal case has -een finally ad5udicated,
pursuant to @ec. 6 of (ule of the (ules of Court, and, therefore, the filin) of the instant civil action is
premature, -ecause the lia-ility of the employer is merely su-sidiary and does not arise until after final
5ud)ment has -een rendered findin) the driver, &edro 2umala )uilty of ne)li)ence4 that Art. 66 of the
#e, Civil Code, is not applica-le -ecause Art. 66 applied only to the crimes of physical in5uries or
homicide, not to the ne)li)ent act or imprudence of the driver.
>n >cto-er 9, 93, petitioners filed an opposition to said motion to dismiss alle)in) that the aforesaid
action for dama)es ,as instituted not to enforce the civil lia-ility of the respondents under Art. %% of
the (evised &enal Code -ut for their civil lia-ility on /uasi-delicts pursuant to Articles 23!-299, as the
same ne)li)ent act causin) dama)es may produce civil lia-ility arisin) from a crime under the (evised
&enal Code or create an action for /uasi-delict or culpa e<tra-contractual under the Civil Code, and the
party see.in) recovery is free to choose ,hich remedy to enforce.
In dismissin) the complaint for dama)es in Civil Case #o. 2$"%, the lo,er court sustained the
ar)uments of respondents, +actan 2ransit Co., Inc. and &edro 2umala, and declared that ,hether or
not 0the action for dama)es is -ased on criminal ne)li)ence or civil ne)li)ence .no,n as culpa
a/uiliana in the Civil Code or tort under American la,0 there 0should -e a sho,in) that the offended
party e<pressly ,aived the civil action or reserved his ri)ht to institute it separately0 and that 0the
alle)ations of the complaint in culpa a/uiliana must not -e tainted -y any assertion of violation of la, or
traffic rules or re)ulations0 and -ecause of the prayer in the complaint as.in) the Court to declare the
defendants 5ointly and severally lia-le for moral, compensatory and e<emplary dama)es, the Court is of
the opinion that the action ,as not -ased on 0culpa a/uiliana or /uasi-delict.0
&etitionersG motion for reconsideration ,as denied -y the trial court on January 2, 932, hence this
appeal oncertiorari.
2here is no /uestion that from a careful consideration of the alle)ations contained in the complaint in
Civil Case #o. 2$"%, the essential averments for a /uasi-delictual action under Articles 23!-299 of
the #e, Civil Code are present, namely1 a; act or omission of the private respondents4 -; presence of
fault or ne)li)ence or the lac. of due care in the operation of the passen)er -us #o. 2" -y respondent
&edro 2umala resultin) in the collision of the -us ,ith the passen)er car4 c; physical in5uries and other
dama)es sustained -y petitioners as a result of the collision4 d; e<istence of direct causal connection
-et,een the dama)e or pre5udice and the fault or ne)li)ence of private respondents4 and e; the
a-sence of pre-e<istin) contractual relations -et,een the parties. 2he circumstance that the complaint
alle)ed that respondents violated traffic rules in that the driver drove the vehicle 0at a fast clip in a
rec.less, )rossly ne)li)ent and imprudent manner in violation of traffic rules and ,ithout due re)ard to
the safety of the passen)ers a-oard the &B car0 does not detract from the nature and character of the
action, as one -ased on culpa a/uiliana. 2he violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of the failure
of said driver to o-serve for the protection of the interests of others, that de)ree of care, precaution and
vi)ilance ,hich the circumstances 5ustly demand, ,hich failure resulted in the in5ury on petitioners.
Certainly e<cessive speed in violation of traffic rules is a clear indication of ne)li)ence. @ince the same
ne)li)ent act resulted in the filin) of the criminal action -y the Chief of &olice ,ith the +unicipal Court
7Criminal Case #o. 99!%; and the civil action -y petitioners, it is inevita-le that the averments on the
driversG ne)li)ence in -oth complaints ,ould su-stantially -e the same. It should -e emphasized that
the same ne)li)ent act causin) dama)es may produce a civil lia-ility arisin) from a crime under Art. %%
of the (evised &enal Code or create an action for /uasi-delict or culpa e<tra-contractual under Arts.
23!-299 of the #e, Civil Code. 2his distinction has -een amply e<plained in Barredo vs. Garcia' et
al. 736 &hil. !%3, !2%-!2;.
1
It is true that under @ec. 2 in relation to @ec. of (ule of the (evised (ules of Court ,hich -ecame
effective on January , 9!9, in the cases provided for -y Articles 6, 66, 69 and 233 of the Civil Code,
an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the civil action, may -e instituted -y the
in5ured party durin) the pendency of the criminal case, provided said party has reserved his ri)ht to
institute it separately, -ut it should -e noted, ho,ever, that neither @ection nor @ection 2 of (ule
fi<es a time limit ,hen such reservation shall -e made. In 6actaquin v. "alileo,
2
,here the reservation
,as made after the tort-feasor had already pleaded )uilty and after the private prosecutor had entered
his appearance 5ointly ,ith the prosecutin) attorney in the course of the criminal proceedin)s, and the
tort-feasor ,as convicted and sentenced to pay dama)es to the offended party -y final 5ud)ment in said
criminal case, =e ruled that such reservation is le)ally ineffective -ecause the offended party cannot
recover dama)es t,ice for the same act or omission of the defendant. =e e<plained in (eneses vs.
7uat
3
that ,hen the criminal action for physical in5uries a)ainst the defendant did not proceed to trial as
he pleaded )uilty upon arrai)nment and the Court made no pronouncement on the matter or dama)es
suffered -y the in5ured party, the mere appearance of private counsel in representation of the offended
party in said criminal case does not constitute such active intervention as could impart an intention to
press a claim for dama)es in the same action, and, therefore, cannot -ar a separate civil action for
dama)es su-se/uently instituted on the same )round under Article 66 of the #e, Civil Code.
In the case at -ar, there is no /uestion that petitioners never intervened in the criminal action instituted
-y the Chief of &olice a)ainst respondent &edro 2umala, much less has the said criminal action -een
terminated either -y conviction or ac/uittal of said accused.
It is, therefore, evident that -y the institution of the present civil action for dama)es, petitioners have in
effect a-andoned their ri)ht to press recovery for dama)es in the criminal case, and have opted instead
to recover them in the present civil case.
As a result of this action of petitioners the civil lia-ility of private respondents to the former has ceased
to -e involved in the criminal action. Bndou-tedly an offended party loses his ri)ht to intervene in the
prosecution of a criminal case, not only ,hen he has ,aived the civil action or e<pressly reserved his
ri)ht to institute, -ut also ,hen he has actually instituted the civil action. For -y either of such actions his
interest in the criminal case has disappeared.
As ,e have stated at the outset, the same ne)li)ent act causin) dama)es may produce a civil lia-ility
arisin) from crime or create an action for /uasi-delict or culpa e<tra-contractual. 2he former is a
violation of the criminal la,, ,hile the latter is a distinct and independent ne)li)ence, havin) al,ays had
its o,n foundation and individuality. @ome le)al ,riters are of the vie, that in accordance ,ith Article
6, the civil action -ased upon /uasi-delict may proceed independently of the criminal proceedin) for
criminal ne)li)ence and re)ardless of the result of the latter. *ence, 0the proviso in @ection 2 of (ule
,ith reference to ... Articles 62, 66 and 69 of the Civil Code is contrary to the letter and spirit of the
said articles, for these articles ,ere drafted ... and are intended to constitute as e<ceptions to the
)eneral rule stated in ,hat is no, @ection of (ule . 2he proviso ,hich is procedural, may also -e
re)arded as an unauthorized amendment of su-stantive la,, Articles 62, 66 and 69 of the Civil Code,
,hich do not provide for the reservation re/uired in the proviso.0
4
Dut in ,hatever ,ay =e vie, the
institution of the civil action for recovery of dama)es under /uasi-delict -y petitioners, ,hether as one
that should -e )overned -y the provisions of @ection 2 of (ule of the (ules ,hich re/uire
reservation -y the in5ured party considerin) that -y the institution of the civil action even -efore the
commencement of the trial of the criminal case, petitioners have there-y foreclosed their ri)ht to
intervene therein, or one ,here reservation to file the civil action need not -e made, for the reason that
the la, itself 7Article 66 of the Civil Code; already ma.es the reservation and the failure of the offended
party to do so does not -ar him from -rin)in) the action, under the peculiar circumstances of the case,
=e find no le)al 5ustification for respondent courtGs order of dismissal.
=*'('F>(', the decision and order appealed from are here-y reversed and set aside, and the
court a quo is directed to proceed ,ith the trial of the case. Costs a)ainst private respondents.
8aldivar' #astro $ernando' 6eehanee' (aasiar and 0s*uerra' )).' concur.
(aalintal' !ct*.' #.).' concurs in the result.

G.R. No. 74761 No:#,4#$ 6, 1990
NATI-IDAD -. ANDAMO and EMMAN7EL R. ANDAMO, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE CO7RT =1$'! C:* Ca'#' D:'on> and MI66IONARIE6 O1 O7R
LAD2 O1 LA 6ALETTE, INC., respondents.
1ERNAN, C.J.:
2he pivotal issue in this petition for certiorari, prohi-ition and mandamus is ,hether a corporation, ,hich
has -uilt throu)h its a)ents, ,aterpaths, ,ater conductors and contrivances ,ithin its land, there-y
causin) inundation and dama)e to an ad5acent land, can -e held civilly lia-le for dama)es under
Articles 23! and 233 of the Civil Code on /uasi-delicts such that the resultin) civil case can proceed
independently of the criminal case.
2he antecedent facts are as follo,s1
&etitioner spouses 'mmanuel and #atividad Andamo are the o,ners of a parcel of land situated in Di)a
7Diluso; @ilan), Cavite ,hich is ad5acent to that of private respondent, +issionaries of >ur Aady of Aa
@alette, Inc., a reli)ious corporation.
=ithin the land of respondent corporation, ,aterpaths and contrivances, includin) an artificial la.e, ,ere
constructed, ,hich alle)edly inundated and eroded petitionersG land, caused a youn) man to dro,n,
dama)ed petitionersG crops and plants, ,ashed a,ay costly fences, endan)ered the lives of petitioners
and their la-orers durin) rainy and stormy seasons, and e<posed plants and other improvements to
destruction.
In July 9$2, petitioners instituted a criminal action, doc.eted as Criminal Case #o. 2C-9%3-$2, -efore
the (e)ional 2rial Court of Cavite, Dranch 9 72a)aytay City;, a)ainst 'fren +usn)i, >rlando @apuay and
(utillo +allillin, officers and directors of herein respondent corporation, for destruction -y means of
inundation under Article 629 of the (evised &enal Code.
@u-se/uently, on Fe-ruary 22, 9$6, petitioners filed another action a)ainst respondent corporation,
this time a civil case, doc.eted as Civil Case #o. 2C-39$, for dama)es ,ith prayer for the issuance of a
,rit of preliminary in5unction -efore the same court.
1
>n +arch , 9$6, respondent corporation filed its ans,er to the complaint and opposition to the
issuance of a ,rit of preliminary in5unction. *earin)s ,ere conducted includin) ocular inspections on the
land. *o,ever, on April 2!, 9$9, the trial court, actin) on respondent corporationGs motion to dismiss or
suspend the civil action, issued an order suspendin* further hearin)s in Civil Case #o, 2C-39$ until
after 5ud)ment in the related Criminal Case #o. 2C-9%3-$2.
(esolvin) respondent corporationGs motion to dismiss filed on June 22, 9$9, the trial court issued on
Au)ust 23, 9$9 the disputed order dismissin* Civil Case #o. 2C-39$ for lac. of 5urisdiction, as the
criminal case ,hich ,as instituted ahead of the civil case ,as still unresolved. @aid order ,as anchored
on the provision of @ection 6 7a;, (ule III of the (ules of Court ,hich provides that 0criminal and civil
actions arisin) from the same offense may -e instituted separately, -ut after the criminal action has
-een commenced the civil action cannot -e instituted until final 5ud)ment has -een rendered in the
criminal action.0
2
&etitioners appealed from that order to the Intermediate Appellate Court.
3
>n Fe-ruary 3, 9$!, respondent Appellate Court, First Civil Cases ?ivision, promul)ated a
decision
4
affirmin) the /uestioned order of the trial court.
0
A motion for reconsideration filed -y
petitioners ,as denied -y the Appellate Court in its resolution dated +ay 9, 9$!.
6
?irectly at issue is the propriety of the dismissal of Civil Case #o. 2C-39$ in accordance ,ith @ection 6
7a; of (ule of the (ules of Court. &etitioners contend that the trial court and the Appellate Court
erred in dismissin) Civil Case #o. 2C-39$ since it is predicated on a /uasi-delict. &etitioners have
raised a valid point.
It is a<iomatic that the nature of an action filed in court is determined -y the facts alle)ed in the
complaint as constitutin) the cause of action.
7
2he purpose of an action or suit and the la, to )overn it,
includin) the period of prescription, is to -e determined not -y the claim of the party filin) the action,
made in his ar)ument or -rief, -ut rather -y the complaint itself, its alle)ations and prayer for
relief.
8
2he nature of an action is not necessarily determined or controlled -y its title or headin) -ut the
-ody of the pleadin) or complaint itself. 2o avoid possi-le denial of su-stantial 5ustice due to le)al
technicalities, pleadin)s as ,ell as remedial la,s should -e li-erally construed so that the liti)ants may
have ample opportunity to prove their respective claims.
9
Quoted hereunder are the pertinent portions of petitionersG complaint in Civil Case #o. 2C-39$1
9; 2hat ,ithin defendantGs land, li.e,ise located at Di)a 7Diluso;, @ilan), Cavite,
ad5acent on the ri)ht side of the aforesaid land of plaintiffs, defendant constructed
,aterpaths startin) from the middle-ri)ht portion thereof leadin) to a -i) hole or
openin), also constructed -y defendant, thru the lo,er portion of its concrete hollo,-
-loc.s fence situated on the ri)ht side of its cemented )ate frontin) the provincial
hi)h,ay, and connected -y defendant to a man hei)ht inter-connected cement
culverts ,hich ,ere also constructed and lain -y defendant cross-,ise -eneath the
tip of the said cemented )ate, the left-end of the said inter-connected culverts a)ain
connected -y defendant to a -i) hole or openin) thru the lo,er portion of the same
concrete hollo,-loc.s fence on the left side of the said cemented )ate, ,hich hole or
openin) is li.e,ise connected -y defendant to the cemented mouth of a -i) canal,
also constructed -y defendant, ,hich runs north,ard to,ards a -i) hole or openin)
,hich ,as also -uilt -y defendant thru the lo,er portion of its concrete hollo,--loc.s
fence ,hich separates the land of plaintiffs from that of defendant 7and ,hich serves
as the e<it-point of the flood,ater comin) from the land of defendant, and at the same
time, the entrance-point of the same flood,ater to the land of plaintiffs, year after
year, durin) rainy or stormy seasons.
"; 2hat moreover, on the middle-left portion of its land 5ust -eside the land of plaintiffs,
defendant also constructed an artificial la.e, the -ase of ,hich is soil, ,hich utilizes
the ,ater -ein) channeled thereto from its ,ater system thru inter-connected
)alvanized iron pipes 7#o. 2; and complimented -y rain ,ater durin) rainy or stormy
seasons, so much so that the ,ater -elo, it seeps into, and the e<cess ,ater a-ove
it inundates, portions of the ad5oinin) land of plaintiffs.
!; 2hat as a result of the inundation -rou)ht a-out -y defendantGs aforementioned
,ater conductors, contrivances and manipulators, a youn) man ,as dro,ned to
death, ,hile herein plaintiffs suffered and ,ill continue to suffer, as follo,s1
a; &ortions of the land of plaintiffs ,ere eroded and converted to
deep, ,ide and lon) canals, such that the same can no lon)er -e
planted to any crop or plant.
-; Costly fences constructed -y plaintiffs ,ere, on several
occasions, ,ashed a,ay.
c; ?urin) rainy and stormy seasons the lives of plaintiffs and their
la-orers are al,ays in dan)er.
d; &lants and other improvements on other portions of the land of
plaintiffs are e<posed to destruction. ...
10
A careful e<amination of the afore/uoted complaint sho,s that the civil action is one under Articles 23!
and 233 of the Civil Code on /uasi-delicts. All the elements of a /uasi-delict are present, to ,it1 7a;
dama)es suffered -y the plaintiff, 7-; fault or ne)li)ence of the defendant, or some other person for
,hose acts he must respond4 and 7c; the connection of cause and effect -et,een the fault or
ne)li)ence of the defendant and the dama)es incurred -y the plaintiff.
11
Clearly, from petitionerGs complaint, the ,aterpaths and contrivances -uilt -y respondent corporation are
alle)ed to have inundated the land of petitioners. 2here is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection
-et,een the act of -uildin) these ,aterpaths and the dama)e sustained -y petitioners. @uch action if
proven constitutes fault or ne)li)ence ,hich may -e the -asis for the recovery of dama)es.
In the case of 9amson vs. :ionisio,
12
the Court applied Article 9%2, no, Article 23! of the Civil Code
and held that 0any person ,ho ,ithout due authority constructs a -an. or di.e, stoppin) the flo, or
communication -et,een a cree. or a la.e and a river, there-y causin) loss and dama)es to a third
party ,ho, li.e the rest of the residents, is entitled to the use and en5oyment of the stream or la.e, shall
-e lia-le to the payment of an indemnity for loss and dama)es to the in5ured party.
=hile the property involved in the cited case -elon)ed to the pu-lic domain and the property su-5ect of
the instant case is privately o,ned, the fact remains that petitionersG complaint sufficiently alle)es that
petitioners have sustained and ,ill continue to sustain dama)e due to the ,aterpaths and contrivances
-uilt -y respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals of the complaint, the alle)ed presence of dama)e
to the petitioners, the act or omission of respondent corporation supposedly constitutin) fault or
ne)li)ence, and the causal connection -et,een the act and the dama)e, ,ith no pre-e<istin)
contractual o-li)ation -et,een the parties ma.e a clear case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana.
It must -e stressed that the use of oneGs property is not ,ithout limitations. Article 96 of the Civil Code
provides that 0the o,ner of a thin) cannot ma.e use thereof in such a manner as to in5ure the ri)hts of a
third person.0 @IC B2'(' 2B> B2 AAI'#B+ #># AA'?A@. +oreover, ad5oinin) lando,ners have
mutual and reciprocal duties ,hich re/uire that each must use his o,n land in a reasona-le manner so
as not to infrin)e upon the ri)hts and interests of others. Althou)h ,e reco)nize the ri)ht of an o,ner to
-uild structures on his land, such structures must -e so constructed and maintained usin) all
reasona-le care so that they cannot -e dan)erous to ad5oinin) lando,ners and can ,ithstand the usual
and e<pected forces of nature. If the structures cause in5ury or dama)e to an ad5oinin) lando,ner or a
third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the in5ury or dama)e suffered.
Article 23! of the Civil Code imposes a civil lia-ility on a person for dama)e caused -y his act or
omission constitutin) fault or ne)li)ence, thus1
Article 23!. =hoever -y act or omission causes dama)e to another, there -ein) fault
or ne)li)ence, is o-li)ed to pay for the dama)e done. @uch fault or ne)li)ence, if
there is no pre-e<istin) contractual relation -et,een the parties, is called a /uasi-
delict and is )overned -y the provisions of this chapter.
Article 23!, ,henever it refers to 0fault or ne)li)ence0, covers not only acts 0not punisha-le -y la,0 -ut
also acts criminal in character, ,hether intentional and voluntary or ne)li)ent. Conse/uently, a separate
civil action lies a)ainst the offender in a criminal act, ,hether or not he is criminally prosecuted and
found )uilty or ac/uitted, provided that the offended party is not allo,ed, 7if the tortfeasor is actually
char)ed also criminally;, to recover dama)es on -oth scores, and ,ould -e entitled in such eventuality
only to the -i))er a,ard of the t,o, assumin) the a,ards made in the t,o cases vary.
13
2he distinctness of /uasi-delicta is sho,n in Article 233 of the Civil Code, ,hich states1
Article 233. (esponsi-ility for fault or ne)li)ence under the precedin) article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil lia-ility arisin) from ne)li)ence under the
&enal Code. Dut the plaintiff cannot recover dama)es t,ice for the same act or
omission of the defendant.
Accordin) to the (eport of the Code Commission 0the fore)oin) provision thou)h at first si)ht startlin),
is not so novel or e<traordinary ,hen ,e consider the e<act nature of criminal and civil ne)li)ence. 2he
former is a violation of the criminal la,, ,hile the latter is a distinct and independent ne)li)ence, ,hich
is a 0culpa a/uiliana0 or /uasi-delict, of ancient ori)in, havin) al,ays had its o,n foundation and
individuality, separate from criminal ne)li)ence. @uch distinction -et,een criminal ne)li)ence and
0culpa e<tra-contractual0 or 0cuasi-delito0 has -een sustained -y decisions of the @upreme Court of
@pain ...
14
In the case of #astillo vs. #ourt of !ppeals'
10
this Court held that a /uasi-delict or culpa a/uiliana is a
separate le)al institution under the Civil Code ,ith a su-stantivity all its o,n, and individuality that is
entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime J a distinction e<ists -et,een the civil lia-ility
arisin) from a crime and the responsi-ility for /uasi-delicts or culpa e<tra-contractual. 2he same
ne)li)ence causin) dama)es may produce civil lia-ility arisin) from a crime under the &enal Code, or
create an action for /uasi-delicts or culpa e<tra-contractual under the Civil Code. 2herefore, the
ac/uittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case, unless, of course, in the
event of an ac/uittal ,here the court has declared that the fact from ,hich the civil action arose did not
e<ist, in ,hich case the e<tinction of the criminal lia-ility ,ould carry ,ith it the e<tinction of the civil
lia-ility.
In !5ucena vs. "otenciano'
16
the Court declared that in /uasi-delicts, 07t;he civil action is entirely
independent of the criminal case accordin) to Articles 66 and 233 of the Civil Code. 2here can -e no
lo)ical conclusion than this, for to su-ordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the
result of the criminal prosecution J ,hether it -e conviction or ac/uittal J ,ould render meanin)less
the independent character of the civil action and the clear in5unction in Article 6, that his action may
proceed independently of the criminal proceedin)s and re)ardless of the result of the latter.0
=*'('F>(', the assailed decision dated Fe-ruary 3, 9$! of the then Intermediate Appellate Court
affirmin) the order of dismissal of the (e)ional 2rial Court of Cavite, Dranch $ 72a)aytay City; dated
Au)ust 3, 9$9 is here-y ('F'(@'? and @'2 A@I?'. 2he trial court is ordered to reinstate Civil
Case #o. 2C-39$ entitled 0#atividad F. Andamo and 'mmanuel (. Andamo vs. +issionaries of >ur
Aady of Aa @alette Inc.0 and to proceed ,ith the hearin) of the case ,ith dispatch. 2his decision is
immediately e<ecutory. Costs a)ainst respondent corporation.
@> >(?'('?.
G.R. No. L-4977 Ma$%" 22, 1910
DA-ID TA2LOR, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
T+E MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIG+T COMPAN2, defendant-appellant.
CAR6ON, J.:
An action to recover dama)es for the loss of an eye and other in5uries, instituted -y ?avid 2aylor, a
minor, -y his father, his nearest relative.
2he defendant is a forei)n corporation en)a)ed in the operation of a street rail,ay and an electric li)ht
system in the city of +anila. Its po,er plant is situated at the eastern end of a small island in the &asi)
(iver ,ithin the city of +anila, .no,n as the Isla del &rovisor. 2he po,er plant may -e reached -y -oat
or -y crossin) a foot-rid)e, impassa-le for vehicles, at the ,esterly end of the island.
2he plaintiff, ?avid 2aylor, ,as at the time ,hen he received the in5uries complained of, " years of a)e,
the son of a mechanical en)ineer, more mature than the avera)e -oy of his a)e, and havin)
considera-le aptitude and trainin) in mechanics.
>n the 6%th of @eptem-er, 9%", plaintiff, ,ith a -oy named +anuel Claparols, a-out 2 years of a)e,
crossed the foot-rid)e to the Isla del &rovisor, for the purpose of visitin) one +urphy, an employee of
the defendant, ,ho and promised to ma.e them a cylinder for a miniature en)ine. Findin) on in/uiry
that +r. +urphy ,as not in his /uarters, the -oys, impelled apparently -y youthful curiosity and perhaps
-y the unusual interest ,hich -oth seem to have ta.en in machinery, spent some time in ,anderin)
a-out the companyGs premises. 2he visit ,as made on a @unday afternoon, and it does not appear that
they sa, or spo.e to anyone after leavin) the po,er house ,here they had as.ed for +r. +urphy.
After ,atchin) the operation of the travellin) crane used in handlin) the defendantGs coal, they ,al.ed
across the open space in the nei)h-orhood of the place ,here the company dumped in the cinders and
ashes from its furnaces. *ere they found some t,enty or thirty -rass fulminatin) caps scattered on the
)round. 2hese caps are appro<imately of the size and appearance of small pistol cartrid)es and each
has attached to it t,o lon) thin ,ires -y means of ,hich it may -e dischar)ed -y the use of electricity.
2hey are intended for use in the e<plosion of -lastin) char)es of dynamite, and have in themselves a
considera-le e<plosive po,er. After some discussion as to the o,nership of the caps, and their ri)ht to
ta.e them, the -oys pic.ed up all they could find, hun) them on stic., of ,hich each too. end, and
carried them home. After crossin) the foot-rid)e, they met a little )irl named Jessie Adrian, less than 9
years old, and all three ,ent to the home of the -oy +anuel. 2he -oys then made a series of
e<periments ,ith the caps. 2hey trust the ends of the ,ires into an electric li)ht soc.et and o-tained no
result. 2hey ne<t tried to -rea. the cap ,ith a stone and failed. +anuel loo.ed for a hammer, -ut could
not find one. 2hen they opened one of the caps ,ith a .nife, and findin) that it ,as filled ,ith a
yello,ish su-stance they )ot matches, and ?avid held the cap ,hile +anuel applied a li)hted match to
the contents. An e<plosion follo,ed, causin) more or less serious in5uries to all three. Jessie, ,ho ,hen
the -oys proposed puttin) a match to the contents of the cap, -ecame fri)htened and started to run
a,ay, received a sli)ht cut in the nec.. +anuel had his hand -urned and ,ounded, and ?avid ,as
struc. in the face -y several particles of the metal capsule, one of ,hich in5ured his ri)ht eye to such an
e<tent as to the necessitate its removal -y the sur)eons ,ho ,ere called in to care for his ,ounds.
2he evidence does definitely and conclusively disclose ho, the caps came to -e on the defendantGs
premises, nor ho, lon) they had -een there ,hen the -oys found them. It appears, ho,ever, that some
months -efore the accident, durin) the construction of the defendantGs plant, detonatin) caps of the
same size and .ind as those found -y the -oys ,ere used in sin.in) a ,ell at the po,er plant near the
place ,here the caps ,ere found4 and it also appears that at or a-out the time ,hen these caps ,ere
found, similarly caps ,ere in use in the construction of an e<tension of defendantGs street car line to Fort
=illiam +cMinley. 2he caps ,hen found appeared to the -oys ,ho pic.ed them up to have -een lyin)
for a considera-le time, and from the place ,here they ,ere found ,ould seem to have -een discarded
as detective or ,orthless and fit only to -e thro,n upon the ru--ish heap.
#o measures seems to have -een adopted -y the defendant company to prohi-it or prevent visitors
from enterin) and ,al.in) a-out its premises unattended, ,hen they felt disposed so to do. As admitted
in defendant counselGs -rief, 0it is undou-tedly true that children in their play sometimes crossed the foot
-rid)e to the islands40 and, ,e may add, roamed a-out at ,ill on the uninclosed premises of the
defendant, in the nei)h-orhood of the place ,here the caps ,ere found. 2here is evidence that any
effort ever ,as made to for-id these children from visitin) the defendant companyGs premises, althou)h
it must -e assumed that the company or its employees ,ere a,are of the fact that they not infre/uently
did so.
2,o years -efore the accident, plaintiff spent four months at sea, as a ca-in -oy on one of the
interisland transports. Aater he too. up ,or. in his fatherGs office, learnin) mechanical dra,in) and
mechanical en)ineerin). A-out a month after his accident he o-tained employment as a mechanical
draftsman and continued in that employment for si< months at a salary of &2."% a day4 and it appears
that he ,as a -oy of more than avera)e intelli)ence, taller and more mature -oth mentally and
physically than most -oys of fifteen.
2he facts set out in the fore)oin) statement are to our mind fully and conclusively esta-lished -y the
evidence of record, and are su-stantially admitted -y counsel. 2he only /uestions of fact ,hich are
seriously disputed are plaintiffGs alle)ations that the caps ,hich ,ere found -y plaintiff on defendant
companyGs premises ,ere the property of the defendant, or that they had come from its possession and
control, and that the company or some of its employees left them e<posed on its premises at the point
,here they ,ere found.
2he evidence in support of these alle)ations is mea)er, and the defendant company, apparently relyin)
on the rule of la, ,hich places the -urden of proof of such alle)ations upon the plaintiff, offered no
evidence in re-uttal, and insists that plaintiff failed in his proof. =e thin., ho,ever, that plaintiffGs
evidence is sufficient to sustain a findin) in accord ,ith his alle)ations in this re)ard.
It ,as proven that caps, similar to those found -y plaintiff, ,ere used, more or less e<tensively, on the
+cMinley e<tension of the defendant companyGs trac.4 that some of these caps ,ere used in -lastin) a
,ell on the companyGs premises a fe, months -efore the accident4 that not far from the place ,here the
caps ,ere found the company has a storehouse for the materials, supplies and so forth, used -y it in its
operations as a street rail,ay and a purveyor of electric li)ht4 and that the place, in the nei)h-orhood of
,hich the caps ,ere found, ,as -ein) used -y the company as a sort of dumpin) )round for ashes and
cinders. Fulminatin) caps or detonators for the dischar)e -y electricity of -lastin) char)es -y dynamite
are not articles in common use -y the avera)e citizen, and under all the circumstances, and in the
a-sence of all evidence to the contrary, ,e thin. that the discovery of t,enty or thirty of these caps at
the place ,here they ,ere found -y the plaintiff on defendantGs premises fairly 5ustifies the inference
that the defendant company ,as either the o,ner of the caps in /uestion or had the caps under its
possession and control. =e thin. also that the evidence tends to disclose that these caps or detonators
,ere ,illfully and .no,in)ly thro,n -y the company or its employees at the spot ,here they ,ere
found, ,ith the e<pectation that they ,ould -e -uried out of the si)ht -y the ashes ,hich it ,as en)a)ed
in dumpin) in that nei)h-orhood, they -ein) old and perhaps defective4 and, ho,ever this may -e, ,e
are satisfied that the evidence is sufficient to sustain a findin) that the company or some of its
employees either ,illfully or throu)h an oversi)ht left them e<posed at a point on its premises ,hich the
)eneral pu-lic, includin) children at play, ,here not prohi-ited from visitin), and over ,hich the
company .ne, or ou)ht to have .no,n that youn) -oys ,ere li.ely to roam a-out in pastime or in play.
Counsel for appellant endeavors to ,ea.en or destroy the pro-ative value of the facts on ,hich these
conclusions are -ased -y intimidatin) or rather assumin) that the -lastin) ,or. on the companyGs ,ell
and on its +cMinley e<tension ,as done -y contractors. It ,as conclusively proven, ho,ever, that ,hile
the ,or.man employed in -lastin) the ,ell ,as re)ularly employed -y J. C. =hite and Co., a firm of
contractors, he did the ,or. on the ,ell directly and immediately under the supervision and control of
one of defendant companyGs foremen, and there is no proof ,hatever in the record that the -lastin) on
the +cMinley e<tension ,as done -y independent contractors. >nly one ,itness testified upon this
point, and ,hile he stated that he understood that a part of this ,or. ,as done -y contract, he could not
say so of his o,n .no,led)e, and .ne, nothin) of the terms and conditions of the alle)ed contract, or
of the relations of the alle)ed contractor to the defendant company. 2he fact havin) -een proven that
detonatin) caps ,ere more or less e<tensively employed on ,or. done -y the defendant companyGs
directions and on its -ehalf, ,e thin. that the company should have introduced the necessary evidence
to support its contention if it ,ished to avoid the not unreasona-le inference that it ,as the o,ner of the
material used in these operations and that it ,as responsi-le for tortious or ne)li)ent acts of the a)ents
employed therein, on the )round that this ,or. had -een intrusted to independent contractors as to
,hose acts the ma<im respondent superior should not -e applied. If the company did not in fact o,n or
ma.e use of caps such as those found on its premises, as intimated -y counsel, it ,as a very simple
matter for it to prove that fact, and in the a-sence of such proof ,e thin. that the other evidence in the
record sufficiently esta-lishes the contrary, and 5ustifies the court in dra,in) the reasona-le inference
that the caps found on its premises ,ere its property, and ,ere left ,here they ,ere found -y the
company or some of its employees.
&laintiff appears to have rested his case, as did the trial 5ud)e his decision in plaintiffGs favor, upon the
provisions of article %$9 of the Civil Code read to)ether ,ith articles 9%2, 9%6, and 9%$ of that
code.
A(2. %$9 >-li)ations are created -y la,, -y contracts, -y /uasi-contracts, and illicit acts and
omissions or -y those in ,hich any .ind of fault or ne)li)ence occurs.
A(2. 9%2 A person ,ho -y an act or omission causes dama)e to another ,hen there is fault
or ne)li)ence shall -e o-li)ed to repair the dama)e so done.
A(2. 9%6 2he o-li)ation imposed -y the precedin) article is demanda-le, not only for
personal acts and omissions, -ut also for those of the persons for ,hom they should -e
responsi-le.
2he father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is lia-le for the dama)es caused -y the
minors ,ho live ,ith them.
<<< <<< <<<
>,ners or directors of an esta-lishment or enterprise are e/ually lia-le for dama)es caused
-y their employees in the service of the -ranches in ,hich the latter may -e employed or on
account of their duties.
<<< <<< <<<
2he lia-ility referred to in this article shall cease ,hen the persons mentioned therein prove
that they employed all the dili)ence of a )ood father of a family to avoid the dama)e.
A(2. 9%$ 2he o,ners shall also -e lia-le for the dama)e caused J
Dy the e<plosion of machines ,hich may not have -een cared for ,ith due dili)ence, and for
.indlin) of e<plosive su-stances ,hich may not have -een placed in a safe and proper place.
Counsel for the defendant and appellant rests his appeal strictly upon his contention that the facts
proven at the trial do not esta-lished the lia-ility of the defendant company under the provisions of
these articles, and since ,e a)ree ,ith this vie, of the case, it is not necessary for us to consider the
various /uestions as to form and the ri)ht of action 7analo)ous to those raised in the case of (a.es vs.
Atlantic, Culf and &acific Co., 3 &hil. (ep., 6"9;, ,hich ,ould, perhaps, -e involved in a decision
affirmin) the 5ud)ment of the court -elo,.
=e a)ree ,ith counsel for appellant that under the Civil Code, as under the )enerally accepted doctrine
in the Bnited @tates, the plaintiff in an action such as that under consideration, in order to esta-lish his
ri)ht to a recovery, must esta-lish -y competent evidence1
7; ?ama)es to the plaintiff.
72; #e)li)ence -y act or omission of ,hich defendant personally, or some person for ,hose
acts it must respond, ,as )uilty.
76; 2he connection of cause and effect -et,een the ne)li)ence and the dama)e.
2hese proposition are, of course, elementary, and do not admit of discussion, the real difficulty arisin) in
the application of these principles to the particular facts developed in the case under consideration.
It is clear that the accident could not have happened and not the fulminatin) caps -een left e<posed at
the point ,here they ,ere found, or if their o,ner had e<ercised due care in .eepin) them in an
appropriate place4 -ut it is e/ually clear that plaintiff ,ould not have -een in5ured had he not, for his o,n
pleasure and convenience, entered upon the defendantGs premises, and strolled around thereon ,ithout
the e<press permission of the defendant, and had he not pic.ed up and carried a,ay the property of the
defendant ,hich he found on its premises, and had he not thereafter deli-erately cut open one of the
caps and applied a match to its contents.
Dut counsel for plaintiff contends that -ecause of plaintiffGs youth and ine<perience, his entry upon
defendant companyGs premises, and the intervention of his action -et,een the ne)li)ent act of
defendant in leavin) the caps e<posed on its premises and the accident ,hich resulted in his in5ury
should not -e held to have contri-uted in any ,ise to the accident, ,hich should -e deemed to -e the
direct result of defendantGs ne)li)ence in leavin) the caps e<posed at the place ,here they ,ere found
-y the plaintiff, and this latter the pro<imate cause of the accident ,hich occasioned the in5uries
sustained -y him.
In support of his contention, counsel for plaintiff relies on the doctrine laid do,n in many of the courts of
last resort in the Bnited @tates in the cases .no,n as the 02orpedo0 and 02urnta-le0 cases, and the
cases -ased thereon.
In a typical cases, the /uestion involved has -een ,hether a railroad company is lia-le for an in5ury
received -y an infant of tender years, ,ho from mere idle curiosity, or for the purposes of amusement,
enters upon the railroad companyGs premises, at a place ,here the railroad company .ne,, or had )ood
reason to suppose, children ,ould -e li.ely to come, and there found e<plosive si)nal torpedoes left
une<posed -y the railroad companyGs employees, one of ,hich ,hen carried a,ay -y the visitor,
e<ploded and in5ured him4 or ,here such infant found upon the premises a dan)erous machine, such as
a turnta-le, left in such condition as to ma.e it pro-a-le that children in playin) ,ith it ,ould -e e<posed
to accident or in5ury therefrom and ,here the infant did in fact suffer in5ury in playin) ,ith such machine.
In these, and in )reat variety of similar cases, the )reat ,ei)ht of authority holds the o,ner of the
premises lia-le.
As laid do,n in Railroad #o. vs. 9tout 73 =all. 7$9 B. @.;, !"3;, ,herein the principal /uestion ,as
,hether a railroad company ,as lia-le for in in5ury received -y an infant ,hile upon its premises, from
idle curiosity, or for purposes of amusement, if such in5ury ,as, under circumstances, attri-uta-le to the
ne)li)ence of the company;, the principles on ,hich these cases turn are that 0,hile a railroad company
is not -ound to the same de)ree of care in re)ard to mere stran)ers ,ho are unla,fully upon its
premises that it o,es to passen)ers conveyed -y it, it is not e<empt from responsi-ility to such
stran)ers for in5uries arisin) from its ne)li)ence or from its tortious acts40 and that 0the conduct of an
infant of tender years is not to -e 5ud)ed -y the same rule ,hich )overns that of adult. =hile it is the
)eneral rule in re)ard to an adult that to entitle him to recover dama)es for an in5ury resultin) from the
fault or ne)li)ence of another he must himself have -een free from fault, such is not the rule in re)ard to
an infant of tender years. 2he care and caution re/uired of a child is accordin) to his maturity and
capacity only, and this is to -e determined in each case -y the circumstances of the case.0
2he doctrine of the case of Railroad #ompany vs. 9tout ,as vi)orously controverted and sharply
criticized in several state courts, and the supreme court of +ichi)an in the case of Ryan vs. 6owar 72$
+ich., 9!6; formally repudiated and disapproved the doctrine of the 2urnta-le cases, especially that laid
do,n in Railroad #ompany vs. 9tout, in a very a-le decision ,herein it held, in the lan)ua)e of the
sylla-us1 7; 2hat the o,ner of the land is not lia-le to trespassers thereon for in5uries sustained -y
them, not due to his ,anton or ,illful acts4 72; that no e<ception to this rule e<ists in favor of children
,ho are in5ured -y dan)erous machinery naturally calculated to attract them to the premises4 76; that an
invitation or license to cross the premises of another can not -e predicated on the mere fact that no
steps have -een ta.en to interfere ,ith such practice4 79; that there is no difference -et,een children
and adults as to the circumstances that ,ill ,arrant the inference of an invitation or a license to enter
upon anotherGs premises.
@imilar criticisms of the opinion in the case of Railroad #ompany vs. 9tout ,ere indul)ed in -y the
courts in Connecticut and +assachusetts. 7#olan vs. (ailroad Co., "6 Conn., 9!4 "9 +ass., 699;. And
the doctrine has -een /uestioned in =isconsin, &ennsylvania, #e, *ampshire, and perhaps in other
@tates.
>n the other hand, many if not most of the courts of last resort in the Bnited @tates, citin) and
approvin) the doctrine laid do,n in 'n)land in the leadin) case of 7ynch vs. 4urdin* 7 Q. D., 29, 6",
6!;, lay do,n the rule in these cases in accord ,ith that announced in the Railroad #ompany vs.
9tout 7supra;, and the @upreme Court of the Bnited @tates, in a unanimous opinion delivered -y Justice
*arlan in the case of Union "acific Railway #o. vs. (c:onal and reconsidered the doctrine laid do,n in
(ailroad Co. vs. @tout, and after an e<haustive and critical analysis and revie, of many of the ad5ud)ed
cases, -oth 'n)lish and American, formally declared that it adhered 0to the principles announced in the
case of Railroad #o. vs. 9tout.0
In the case of Union "acific Railway #o. vs. (ac:onald 7supra; the facts ,ere as follo,s1 2he plaintiff,
a -oy 2 years of a)e, out of curiosity and for his o,n pleasure, entered upon and visited the
defendantGs premises, ,ithout defendantGs e<press permission or invitation, and ,hile there, ,as -y
accident in5ured -y fallin) into a -urnin) slac. pile of ,hose e<istence he had no .no,led)e, -ut ,hich
had -een left -y defendant on its premises ,ithout any fence around it or anythin) to )ive ,arnin) of its
dan)erous condition, althou)h defendant .ne, or had reason the interest or curiosity of passers--y. >n
these facts the court held that the plaintiff could not -e re)arded as a mere trespasser, for ,hose safety
and protection ,hile on the premises in /uestion, a)ainst the unseen dan)er referred to, the defendant
,as under no o-li)ation to ma.e provision.
=e /uote at len)th from the discussion -y the court of the application of the principles involved to the
facts in that case, -ecause ,hat is said there is stri.in)ly applica-le in the case at -ar, and ,ould seem
to dispose of defendantGs contention that, the plaintiff in this case -ein) a trespasser, the defendant
company o,ed him no duty, and in no case could -e held lia-le for in5uries ,hich ,ould not have
resulted -ut for the entry of plaintiff on defendantGs premises.
=e adhere to the principles announced in Railroad #o. vs. 9tout 7supra;. Applied to the case
no, -efore us, they re/uire us to hold that the defendant ,as )uilty of ne)li)ence in leavin)
un)uarded the slac. pile, made -y it in the vicinity of its depot -uildin). It could have for-idden
all persons from comin) to its coal mine for purposes merely of curiosity and pleasure. Dut it
did not do so. >n the contrary, it permitted all, ,ithout re)ard to a)e, to visit its mine, and
,itness its operation. It .ne, that the usual approach to the mine ,as -y a narro, path s.irtin)
its slac. pit, close to its depot -uildin), at ,hich the people of the villa)e, old and youn), ,ould
often assem-le. It .ne, that children ,ere in the ha-it of fre/uentin) that locality and playin)
around the shaft house in the immediate vicinity of the slac. pit. 2he sli)htest re)ard for the
safety of these children ,ould have su))ested that they ,ere in dan)er from -ein) so near a
pit, -eneath the surface of ,hich ,as concealed 7e<cept ,hen sno,, ,ind, or rain prevailed; a
mass of -urnin) coals into ,hich a child mi)ht accidentally fall and -e -urned to death. Bnder
all the circumstances, the railroad company ou)ht not to -e heard to say that the plaintiff, a
mere lad, moved -y curiosity to see the mine, in the vicinity of the slac. pit, ,as a trespasser,
to ,hom it o,ed no duty, or for ,hose protection it ,as under no o-li)ation to ma.e provisions.
In 6ownsend vs. ;athen 79 'ast, 233, 2$; it ,as held that if a man dan)erous traps, -aited
,ith flesh, in his o,n )round, so near to a hi)h,ay, or to the premises of another, that do)s
passin) alon) the hi)h,ay, or .ept in his nei)h-ors premises, ,ould pro-a-ly -e attracted -y
their instinct into the traps, and in conse/uence of such act his nei)h-orGs do)s -e so attracted
and there-y in5ured, an action on the case ,ould lie. 0=hat difference,0 said Aord
'llen-orou)h, C.J., 0is there in reason -et,een dra,in) the animal into the trap -y means of
his instinct ,hich he can not resist, and puttin) him there -y manual forceH0 =hat difference, in
reason ,e may o-serve in this case, is there -et,een an e<press license to the children of this
villa)e to visit the defendantGs coal mine, in the vicinity of its slac. pile, and an implied license,
resultin) from the ha-it of the defendant to permit them, ,ithout o-5ection or ,arnin), to do so
at ,ill, for purposes of curiosity or pleasureH (eferrin) it the case of 6ownsend vs. ;athen'
)ud*e 6hompson, in his ,or. on the Aa, of #e)li)ence, volume , pa)e 6%", note, ,ell says1
0It ,ould -e a -ar-arous rule of la, that ,ould ma.e the o,ner of land lia-le for settin) a trap
thereon, -aited ,ith stin.in) meat, so that his nei)h-orGs do) attracted -y his natural instinct,
mi)ht run into it and -e .illed, and ,hich ,ould e<empt him from lia-ility for the conse/uence
of leavin) e<posed and un)uarded on his land a dan)erous machine, so that his nei)h-orGs
child attracted to it and tempted to intermeddle ,ith it -y instincts e/ually stron), mi)ht there-y
-e .illed or maimed for life.0
Chief Justice Cooley, voicin) the opinion of the supreme court of +ichi)an, in the case of "owers vs.
<arlow 7"6 +ich., "%3;, said that 7p. "";1
Children, ,herever they )o, must -e e<pected to act upon childli.e instincts and impulses4 and
others ,ho are char)ea-le ,ith a duty of care and caution to,ard them must calculate upon
this, and ta.e precautions accordin)ly. If they leave e<posed to the o-servation of children
anythin) ,hich ,ould -e temptin) to them, and ,hich they in their immature 5ud)ment mi)ht
naturally suppose they ,ere at li-erty to handle or play ,ith, they should e<pect that li-erty to
-e ta.en.
And the same eminent 5urist in his treatise or torts, alludin) to the doctrine of implied invitation to visit
the premises of another, says1
In the case of youn) children, and other persons not fully sui juris, an implied license mi)ht
sometimes arise ,hen it ,ould not on -ehalf of others. 2hus leavin) a temptin) thin) for
children to play ,ith e<posed, ,here they ,ould -e li.ely to )ather for that purpose, may -e
e/uivalent to an invitation to them to ma.e use of it4 and, perhaps, if one ,ere to thro, a,ay
upon his premises, near the common ,ay, thin)s temptin) to children, the same implication
should arise. 7Chap. %, p. 6%6.;
2he reasonin) ,hich led the @upreme Court of the Bnited @tates to its conclusion in the cases
of Railroad #o. vs. 9tout 7supra; and Union "acific Railroad #o. vs. (c:onald 7supra; is not less co)ent
and convincin) in this 5urisdiction than in that ,herein those cases ori)inated. Children here are
actuated -y similar childish instincts and impulses. ?ra,n -y curiosity and impelled -y the restless spirit
of youth, -oys here as ,ell as there ,ill usually -e found ,henever the pu-lic is permitted to
con)re)ate. 2he movement of machinery, and indeed anythin) ,hich arouses the attention of the youn)
and in/uirin) mind, ,ill dra, them to the nei)h-orhood as inevita-ly as does the ma)net dra, the iron
,hich comes ,ithin the ran)e of its ma)netic influence. 2he o,ners of premises, therefore, ,hereon
thin)s attractive to children are e<posed, or upon ,hich the pu-lic are e<pressly or impliedly permitted
to enter or upon ,hich the o,ner .no,s or ou)ht to .no, children are li.ely to roam a-out for pastime
and in play, 0 must calculate upon this, and ta.e precautions accordin)ly.0 In such cases the o,ner of
the premises can not -e heard to say that -ecause the child has entered upon his premises ,ithout his
e<press permission he is a trespasser to ,hom the o,ner o,es no duty or o-li)ation ,hatever. 2he
o,nerGs failure to ta.e reasona-le precautions to prevent the child from enterin) his premises at a place
,here he .no,s or ou)ht to .no, that children are accustomed to roam a-out of to ,hich their childish
instincts and impulses are li.ely to attract them is at least e/uivalent to an implied license to enter, and
,here the child does enter under such conditions the o,nerGs failure to ta.e reasona-le precautions to
)uard the child a)ainst in5ury from un.no,n or unseen dan)ers, placed upon such premises -y the
o,ner, is clearly a -reach of duty, responsi-le, if the child is actually in5ured, ,ithout other fault on its
part than that it had entered on the premises of a stran)er ,ithout his e<press invitation or permission.
2o hold other,ise ,ould -e e<pose all the children in the community to un.no,n perils and
unnecessary dan)er at the ,him of the o,ners or occupants of land upon ,hich they mi)ht naturally
and reasona-ly -e e<pected to enter.
2his conclusion is founded on reason, 5ustice, and necessity, and neither is contention that a man has a
ri)ht to do ,hat ,ill ,ith his o,n property or that children should -e .ept under the care of their parents
or )uardians, so as to prevent their enterin) on the premises of others is of sufficient ,ei)ht to put in
dou-t. In this 5urisdiction as ,ell as in the Bnited @tates all private property is ac/uired and held under
the tacit condition that it shall not -e so used as to in5ure the e/ual ri)hts and interests of the community
7see B. @. vs. 2ori-io,

#o. "%!%, decided January 2!, 9%;, and e<cept as to infants of very tender
years it ,ould -e a-surd and unreasona-le in a community or)anized as is that in ,hich ,e lived to
hold that parents or )uardian are )uilty of ne)li)ence or imprudence in every case ,herein they permit
)ro,in) -oys and )irls to leave the parental roof unattended, even if in the event of accident to the child
the ne)li)ence of the parent could in any event -e imputed to the child so as to deprive it a ri)ht to
recover in such cases J a point ,hich ,e neither discuss nor decide.
Dut ,hile ,e hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendantGs property ,ithout defendantGs e<press
invitation or permission ,ould not have relieved defendant from responsi-ility for in5uries incurred there
-y plaintiff, ,ithout other fault on his part, if such in5ury ,ere attri-uta-le to the ne)li)ence of the
defendant, ,e are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the ne)li)ence of the
defendant in leavin) the caps e<posed on its premises ,as not the pro<imate cause of the in5ury
received -y the plaintiff, ,hich therefore ,as not, properly spea.in), 0attri-uta-le to the ne)li)ence of
the defendant,0 and, on the other hand, ,e are satisfied that plaintiffs action in cuttin) open the
detonatin) cap and puttin) match to its contents ,as the pro<imate cause of the e<plosion and of the
resultant in5uries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore is not civilly responsi-le for
the in5uries thus incurred.
&laintiff contends, upon the authority of the 2urnta-le and 2orpedo cases, that -ecause of plaintiffGs
youth the intervention of his action -et,een the ne)li)ent act of the defendant in leavin) the caps
e<posed on its premises and the e<plosion ,hich resulted in his in5ury should not -e held to have
contri-uted in any ,ise to the accident4 and it is -ecause ,e can not a)ree ,ith this proposition,
althou)h ,e accept the doctrine of the 2urnta-le and 2orpedo cases, that ,e have thou)ht proper to
discuss and to consider that doctrine at len)th in this decision. As ,as said in case of Railroad #o. vs.
9tout 7supra;, 0=hile it is the )eneral rule in re)ard to an adult that to entitle him to recover dama)es for
an in5ury resultin) from the fault or ne)li)ence of another he must himself have -een free from fault,
such is not the rule in re)ard to an infant of tender years. 2he care and caution re/uired of a child is
accordin) to his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in each case by the
circumstances of the case.0 As ,e thin. ,e have sho,n, under the reasonin) on ,hich rests the
doctrine of the 2urnta-le and 2orpedo cases, no fault ,hich ,ould relieve defendant of responsi-ility for
in5uries resultin) from its ne)li)ence can -e attri-uted to the plaintiff, a ,ell-)ro,n -oy of " years of
a)e, -ecause of his entry upon defendantGs uninclosed premises ,ithout e<press permission or
invitationG -ut it is ,holly different /uestion ,hether such youth can -e said to have -een free from fault
,hen he ,illfully and deli-erately cut open the detonatin) cap, and placed a match to the contents,
.no,in), as he undou-tedly did, that his action ,ould result in an e<plosion. >n this point, ,hich must
-e determined -y 0the particular circumstances of this case,0 the doctrine laid do,n in the 2urnta-le and
2orpedo cases lends us no direct aid, althou)h it is ,orthy of o-servation that in all of the 02orpedo0 and
analo)ous cases ,hich our attention has -een directed, the record discloses that the plaintiffs, in ,hose
favor 5ud)ments have -een affirmed, ,ere of such tender years that they ,ere held not to have the
capacity to understand the nature or character of the e<plosive instruments ,hich fell into their hands.
In the case at -ar, plaintiff at the time of the accident ,as a ,ell-)ro,n youth of ", more mature -oth
mentally and physically than the avera)e -oy of his a)e4 he had -een to sea as a ca-in -oy4 ,as a-le
to earn &2."% a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the in5ury ,as incurred4 and the record
discloses throu)hout that he ,as e<ceptionally ,ell /ualified to ta.e care of himself. 2he evidence of
record leaves no room for dou-t that, despite his denials on the ,itness stand, he ,ell .ne, the
e<plosive character of the cap ,ith ,hich he ,as amusin) himself. 2he series of e<periments made -y
him in his attempt to produce an e<plosion, as descri-ed -y the little )irl ,ho ,as present, admit of no
other e<planation. *is attempt to dischar)e the cap -y the use of electricity, follo,ed -y his efforts to
e<plode it ,ith a stone or a hammer, and the final success of his endeavors -rou)ht a-out -y the
application of a match to the contents of the caps, sho, clearly that he .ne, ,hat he ,as a-out. #or
can there -e any reasona-le dou-t that he had reason to anticipate that the e<plosion mi)ht -e
dan)erous, in vie, of the fact that the little )irl, 9 years of a)e, ,ho ,as ,ithin him at the time ,hen he
put the match to the contents of the cap, -ecame fri)htened and ran a,ay.
2rue, he may not have .no,n and pro-a-ly did not .no, the precise nature of the e<plosion ,hich
mi)ht -e e<pected from the i)nition of the contents of the cap, and of course he did not anticipate the
resultant in5uries ,hich he incurred4 -ut he ,ell .ne, that a more or less dan)erous e<plosion mi)ht -e
e<pected from his act, and yet he ,illfully, rec.lessly, and .no,in)ly produced the e<plosion. It ,ould -e
)oin) far to say that 0accordin) to his maturity and capacity0 he e<ercised such and 0care and caution0
as mi)ht reasona-ly -e re/uired of him, or that defendant or anyone else should -e held civilly
responsi-le for in5uries incurred -y him under such circumstances.
2he la, fi<es no ar-itrary a)e at ,hich a minor can -e said to have the necessary capacity to
understand and appreciate the nature and conse/uences of his o,n acts, so as to ma.e it ne)li)ence
on his part to fail to e<ercise due care and precaution in the commission of such acts4 and indeed it
,ould -e impractica-le and perhaps impossi-le so to do, for in the very nature of thin)s the /uestion of
ne)li)ence necessarily depends on the a-ility of the minor to understand the character of his o,n acts
and their conse/uences4 and the a)e at ,hich a minor can -e said to have such a-ility ,ill necessarily
depends of his o,n acts and their conse/uences4 and at the a)e at ,hich a minor can -e said to have
such a-ility ,ill necessarily vary in accordance ,ith the varyin) nature of the infinite variety of acts
,hich may -e done -y him. Dut some idea of the presumed capacity of infants under the la,s in force in
these Islands may -e )athered from an e<amination of the varyin) a)es fi<ed -y our la,s at ,hich
minors are conclusively presumed to -e capa-le of e<ercisin) certain ri)hts and incurrin) certain
responsi-ilities, thou)h it can not -e said that these provisions of la, are of much practical assistance in
cases such as that at -ar, e<cept so far as they illustrate the rule that the capacity of a minor to -ecome
responsi-le for his o,n acts varies ,ith the varyin) circumstances of each case. Bnder the provisions of
the &enal Code a minor over fifteen years of a)e is presumed to -e capa-le of committin) a crime and
is to held criminally responsi-le therefore, althou)h the fact that he is less than ei)hteen years of a)e
,ill -e ta.en into consideration as an e<tenuatin) circumstance 7&enal Code, arts. $ and 9;. At % years
of a)e a child may, under certain circumstances, choose ,hich parent it prefers to live ,ith 7Code of
Civil &rocedure, sec. 33;. At 9 may petition for the appointment of a )uardian 7Id., sec. "";, and may
consent or refuse to -e adopted 7Id., sec. 3!";. And males of 9 and females of 2 are capa-le of
contractin) a le)al marria)e 7Civil Code, art. $64 C. >., #o. !$, sec. ;.
=e are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and understandin) to -e sensi-le of
the dan)er to ,hich he e<posed himself ,hen he put the match to the contents of the cap4 that he
,as sui juris in the sense that his a)e and his e<perience /ualified him to understand and appreciate
the necessity for the e<ercise of that de)ree of caution ,hich ,ould have avoided the in5ury ,hich
resulted from his o,n deli-erate act4 and that the in5ury incurred -y him must -e held to have -een the
direct and immediate result of his o,n ,illful and rec.less act, so that ,hile it may -e true that these
in5uries ,ould not have -een incurred -ut for the ne)li)ence act of the defendant in leavin) the caps
e<posed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiffGs o,n act ,as the pro<imate and principal cause of the
accident ,hich inflicted the in5ury.
2he rule of the (oman la, ,as1 /uod quis ex culpa sua damnum sentit' non intelli*itur sentire. 7?i)est,
-oo. "%, tit. 3 rule 2%6.;
2he "atidas contain the follo,in) provisions1
2he 5ust thin) is that a man should suffer the dama)e ,hich comes to him throu)h his o,n
fault, and that he can not demand reparation therefor from another. 7Aa, 2", tit. ", "artida 6.;
And they even said that ,hen a man received an in5ury throu)h his o,n acts the )rievance
should -e a)ainst himself and not a)ainst another. 7Aa, 2, tit. 3, "artida 2.;
Accordin) to ancient sa)es, ,hen a man received an in5ury throu)h his o,n acts the )rievance
should -e a)ainst himself and not a)ainst another. 7Aa, 2, tit. 3 "artida 2.;
And ,hile there does not appear to -e anythin) in the Civil Code ,hich e<pressly lays do,n the la,
touchin) contri-utory ne)li)ence in this 5urisdiction, nevertheless, the interpretation placed upon its
provisions -y the supreme court of @pain, and -y this court in the case of Raes vs. !tlantic' Gulf and
"acific #o. 73 &hil. (ep., 6"9;, clearly deny to the plaintiff in the case at -ar the ri)ht to recover
dama)es from the defendant, in ,hole or in part, for the in5uries sustained -y him.
2he 5ud)ment of the supreme court of @pain of the 3th of +arch, 9%2 796 )urisprudencia #ivil, 69;, is
directly in point. In that case the court said1
Accordin) to the doctrine e<pressed in article 9%2 of the Civil Code, fault or ne)li)ence is a
source of o-li)ation ,hen -et,een such ne)li)ence and the in5ury there e<ists the relation of
cause and effect4 -ut if the in5ury produced should not -e the result of acts or omissions of a
third party, the latter has no o-li)ation to repair the same, althou)h such acts or omission ,ere
imprudent or unla,ful, and much less ,hen it is sho,n that the immediate cause of the in5ury
,as the ne)li)ence of the in5ured party himself.
2he same court, in its decision of June 2, 9%%, said that 0the e<istence of the alle)ed fault or
ne)li)ence is not sufficient ,ithout proof that it, and no other cause, )ave rise to the dama)e.0
@ee also 5ud)ment of >cto-er 2, 9%6.
2o similar effect @caevola, the learned @panish ,riter, ,ritin) under that title in
his )urisprudencia del #odi*o #ivil 79%2 Anuario, p. 9"";, commentin) on the decision of
+arch 3, 9%2 of the Civil Code, fault or ne)li)ence )ives rise to an o-li)ation ,hen -et,een it
and the dama)e there e<ists the relation of cause and effect4 -ut if the dama)e caused does
not arise from the acts or omissions of a third person, there is no o-li)ation to ma.e )ood upon
the latter, even thou)h such acts or omissions -e imprudent or ille)al, and much less so ,hen
it is sho,n that the immediate cause of the dama)e has -een the rec.lessness of the in5ured
party himself.
And a)ain J
In accordance ,ith the fundamental principle of proof, that the -urden thereof is upon the
plaintiff, it is apparent that it is duty of him ,ho shall claim dama)es to esta-lish their
e<istence. 2he decisions of April 9, $9!, and +arch $, July, and @eptem-er 23, $9$, have
especially supported the principle, the first settin) forth in detail the necessary points of the
proof, ,hich are t,o1 !n act or omission on the part of the person ,ho is to -e char)ed ,ith
the lia-ility, and the production of the dama)e -y said act or omission.
2his includes, -y inference, the esta-lishment of a relation of cause or effect -et,een the act
or omission and the dama)e4 the latter must -e the direct result of one of the first t,o. As the
decision of +arch 22, $$, said, it is necessary that the dama)es result immediately and
directly from an act performed culpa-ly and ,ron)fully4 0necessarily presupposin) a le)al
)round for imputa-ility.0 7?ecision of >cto-er 29, $$3.;
#e)li)ence is not presumed, -ut must -e proven -y him ,ho alle)es it.
7@cavoela, )urisprudencia del #odi*o #ivil' vol. !, pp. ""-""2.;
7Cf. decisions of supreme court of @pain of June 2, 9%%, and June 26, 9%%.;
Finally ,e thin. the doctrine in this 5urisdiction applica-le to the case at -ar ,as definitely settled in this
court in the maturely considered case of Raes vs. !tlantic' Gulf and "acific #o. 7supra;, ,herein ,e
held that ,hile 02here are many cases 7personal in5ury cases; ,as e<onerated,0 on the )round that 0the
ne)li)ence of the plaintiff ,as the immediate cause of the casualty0 7decisions of the "th of January,
the 9th of Fe-ruary, and the 3th of +arch, 9%2, stated in Alcu-illaGs Inde< of that year;4 none of the
cases decided -y the supreme court of @pain 0define the effect to -e )iven the ne)li)ence of its causes,
thou)h not the principal one, and ,e are left to see. the theory of the civil la, in the practice of other
countries40 and in such cases ,e declared that la, in this 5urisdiction to re/uire the application of 0the
principle of proportional dama)es,0 -ut e<pressly and definitely denied the ri)ht of recovery ,hen the
acts of the in5ured party ,ere the immediate causes of the accident.
2he doctrine as laid do,n in that case is as follo,s1
?ifficulty seems to -e apprehended in decidin) ,hich acts of the in5ured party shall -e
considered immediate causes of the accident. 2he test is simple. ?istinction must -e made
-et,een the accident and the in5ury, -et,een the event itself, ,ithout ,hich there could have
-een no accident, and those acts of the victim not enterin) into it, independent of it, -ut
contri-utin) to his o,n proper hurt. For instance, the cause of the accident under revie, ,as
the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. 2his produces the event )ivin)
occasion for dama)esJthat is, the sin.in) of the trac. and the slidin) of the iron rails. 2o this
event, the act of the plaintiff in ,al.in) -y the side of the car did not contri-ute, althou)h it ,as
an element of the dama)e ,hich came to himself. *ad the crosspiece -een out of place ,holly
or partly throu)h his act or omission of duty, that ,ould have -een one of the determinin)
causes of the event or accident, for ,hich he ,ould have -een responsi-le. =here he
contri-utes to the principal occurrence, as one of its determinin) factors, he can not recover.
=here, in con5unction ,ith the occurrence, he contri-utes only to his o,n in5ury, he may
recover the amount that the defendant responsi-le for the event should pay for such in5ury,
less a sum deemed a suita-le e/uivalent for his o,n imprudence.
=e thin. it is /uite clear that under the doctrine thus stated, the immediate cause of the e<plosion, the
accident ,hich resulted in plaintiffGs in5ury, ,as in his o,n act in puttin) a match to the contents of the
cap, and that havin) 0contri-uted to the principal occurrence, as one of its determinin) factors, he can
not recover.0
=e have not deemed it necessary to e<amine the effect of plaintiffGs action in pic.in) up upon
defendantGs premises the detonatin) caps, the property of defendant, and carryin) the relation of cause
and effect -et,een the ne)li)ent act or omission of the defendant in leavin) the caps e<posed on its
premises and the in5uries inflicted upon the plaintiff -y the e<plosion of one of these caps. Bnder the
doctrine of the 2orpedo cases, such action on the part of an infant of very tender years ,ould have no
effect in relievin) defendant of responsi-ility, -ut ,hether in vie, of the ,ell-.no,n fact admitted in
defendantGs -rief that 0-oys are snappers-up of unconsidered trifles,0 a youth of the a)e and maturity of
plaintiff should -e deemed ,ithout fault in pic.in) up the caps in /uestion under all the circumstances of
this case, ,e neither discuss nor decide.
2,enty days after the date of this decision let 5ud)ment -e entered reversin) the 5ud)ment of the court
-elo,, ,ithout costs to either party in this instance, and ten days thereafter let the record -e returned to
the court ,herein it ori)inated, ,here the 5ud)ment ,ill -e entered in favor of the defendant for the costs
in first instance and the complaint dismissed ,ithout day. @o ordered.
!rellano' #.).' 6orres and (oreland' )).' concur.
)ohnson' ).' concurs in the result.
G.R. No. L-00909 3.*y 23, 1980
+EIR6 O1 PEDRO TA2AG, 6R., petitioners,
vs.
+ONORA/LE 1ERNANDO 6. ALCANTARA, P+ILIPPINE RA//IT /76 LINE6, INC. and ROMEO
-ILLA 2 C7NANAN, respondents.

CONCEPCION 3R., J.:
2his is a petition for certiorari, premised upon the follo,in) facts1
>n @eptem-er 2", 939, the petitioners, heirs of &edro 2aya), @r., namely1 Crisanta @alazar, &edro
2aya), Jr., (enato 2aya), Ca-riel 2aya), Corazon 2aya) and (odolfo 2aya), filed ,ith the Court of First
Instance of 2arlac, Dranch I, presided over -y the respondent Jud)e, a complaint
1
for dama)es a)ainst
the private respondents &hilippine (a--it Dus Aines, Inc. and (omeo Filla y Cunanan J doc.eted
therein as Civil Case #o. "9 J alle)in) amon) others that in the afternoon of @eptem-er 2, 939,
,hile &edro 2aya) @r. ,as ridin) on a -icycle alon) +acArthur *i)h,ay at Do. @an (afael, 2arlac,
2arlac on his ,ay home, he ,as -umped and hit -y a &hilippine (a--it Dus -earin) Dody #o. %3 and
&late #o. EA !%9 &BD G39, driven -y (omeo Filla, as a result of ,hich he sustained in5uries ,hich
caused his instantaneous death. In due time, the private respondents filed their ans,er,
2
admittin)
some alle)ations and denyin) the other alle)ations of the complaint
2hereafter, the private respondents filed a motion to suspend the trial
3
dated April 6%, 93", on the
)round that the criminal case
4
a)ainst the driver of the -us (omeo Filla ,as still pendin) in said court,
and that @ection 6, (ule Ill of the (evised (ules of Court en5oins the suspension of the civil action until
the criminal action is terminated. 2he respondent Jud)e )ranted the motion, and conse/uently,
suspended the hearin) of Civil Case #o. "9.
0
>n >cto-er 2", 933, the respondent Jud)e rendered a decision
6
in Criminal Case #o. $6!, ac/uittin)
the accused (omeo Filla of the crime of homicide on the )round of reasona-le dou-t.
2hereafter, the private respondents filed a motion to dismiss
7
Civil Case #o. "9 on the )round that
the petitioners have no cause of action a)ainst them the driver of the -us havin) -een ac/uitted in the
criminal action. 2he petitioners opposed the motions
8
alle)in) that their cause of action is not -ased on
crime -ut on quasi-delict.
Actin) upon the said motion as ,ell as the opposition thereto, the respondent Jud)e issued an
order
9
dated April 6, 93$, dismissin) the complaint in Civil Case #o. "9.
2he petitioners moved to reconsider4
10
ho,ever, the same ,as denied -y respondent Jud)e in his
order
11
dated +ay 6%, 939.
*ence, the petitioners interposed the present petition for certiorari, to annul and set aside the order of
respondent Jud)e dated April 6, 933, claimin) that the respondent Jud)e acted ,ithout or in e<cess
of his 5urisdiction and for ,ith )rave a-use of discretion in issuin) the disputed order, and that there is
no plain, speedy and ade/uate remedy in the ordinary course of la, e<cept thru the present petition.
After the private respondents had filed their comment,
12
this Court (esolved to consider the said
comment as ans,er to the petition, and the case ,as deemed su-mitted for decision on @eptem-er 6,
939.
2he only issue to -e resolved in the instant case is ,hether or not the respondent Jud)e acted ,ithout
or in e<cess of his 5urisdiction andKor ,ith )rave a-use of discretion in dismissin) Civil Case #o. "9.
2he petition is meritorious. Article 6 of the Civil Code provides as follo,s1
Art. 6. =hen the civil action is -ased on an o-li)ation not arisin) from the act or
commission complained of as a felony. such civil action may proceed independently
of the criminal proceedin)s and re)ardless of the result of the latter.
'vidently, the a-ove /uoted provision of the Civil Code refers to a civil action -ased, not on the act or
omission char)ed as a felony in a criminal case, -ut one -ased on an o-li)ation arisin) from other
sources,
13
li.e quasi delict.
14
In the case at -ar, the alle)ations of the complaint clearly sho, that petitionersG cause of action ,as
-ased upon aquasi delict.
10
2hus, the complaint alle)ed amon) others1
< < < < < < < < <
9. 2hat on @eptem-er 2, 939, at a-out !1%% oGcloc. in the afternoon at @itio &a)-asa,
Do. @an (afael 2arlac, 2arlac, alon) +acArthur *i)h,ay and ,hile ridin) on a -icycle
on his ,ay home to Do. @an @e-astian, 2arlac, 2arlac, &edro 2aya), @r. ,as -umped
and hit -y a &hilippine (a--it Dus -earin) Dody #o. %3 and &late #o. EA !%9 &BD
G39 and as result of ,hich he sustained physical in5uries ,hich cause his
instantaneous death and the -icycle he ,as ridin) on ,as dama)ed and destroyed4
". 2hat the &hilippine (a--it Dus ... ,as at the time of the accident -ein) driven -y
defendant (omeo Filla y Cunanan in a faster and )reater speed than ,hat ,as
reasona-le and proper and in a )ray ne)li)ent, careless, rec.less and imprudent
manner, ,ithout due re)ards to in5uries to persons and dama)e to properties and in
violation of traffic rules and re)ulations4
!. 2hat defendant &hilippine (a--it Dus Aines Inc. has failed to e<ercise the dili)ence
of a )ood father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees,
particularly defendant (omeo Filla y Cunanan other,ise the accident in /uestion
,hich resulted in the death of &edro 2aya), @r. and dama)e to his property ,ould not
have occurred.
< < < < < < < < <
All the essential averments for a /uasi delictual action are present, namely1 7; an act or omission
constitutin) fault or ne)li)ence on the part of private respondent4 72; dama)e caused -y the said act or
commission4 76; direct causal relation -et,een the dama)e and the act or commission4 and 79; no pre-
e<istin) contractual relation -et,een the parties. In the case of 0lcano vs. <ill,
16
this Court held that1
... a separate civil action lies a)ainst the offender in a criminal act, ,hether or not he
is criminality prosecuted and found )uilty or ac/uitted, provided that the offended
party is not sno,ed, if he is actually char)ed also criminally, to receiver dama)es on
-oth scores, and ,ould -e entitled in such eventuality only to the -i))er a,ard of the
t,o, assumin) the a,ards made in the t,o cases vary. In other ,ords, the e<tinction
of civil lia-ility referred to in &ar. 7e;, @ection 6, (ule III, refers e<clusively to civil
lia-ility founded on Article %% of the (evised &enal Code, ,hereas the civil lia-ility
for the same act considered as a /uasi-delict only and not as a crime is not
e<tin)uished even -y a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act char)ed
has not happened or has not -een committed -y the accused. Driefly stated, =e here
hold, in reiteration of Carcia that culpa a/uiliana includes voluntary and ne)li)ent acts
,hich may -e punisha-le -y la,.
2he petitionersG cause of action -ein) -ased on a quasi delict the ac/uittal of the driver, private
respondent (omeo Filla, of the crime char)ed in Criminal Case #o. $6! is not a -ar to the prosecution
of Civil Case #o. "9 for dama)es -ased on quasi-delict.
17
In the li)ht of the fore)oin), =e hold that respondent Jud)e acted ,ith )rave a-use of discretion
amountin) to lac. of 5urisdiction in dismissin) Civil Case #o. "9.
=*'('F>(', the order of dismissal should -e, as it is here-y set aside, and the case is remanded to
the lo,er court for further proceedin)s, ,ith costs a)ainst the private respondents.
@> >(?'('?.
DR. NINE-ETC+ CR75, petitioner, vs. CO7RT O1 APPEAL6 and L2DIA 7MALI, respondents.
D E C I 6 I O N
1RANCI6CO, J.?
"Doctors are protected by a special law. They are not guarantors of care. They do not even warrant a good
result. They are not insurers against mishap or unusual consequences. Furthermore they are not liable for honest
mistake of judgment"
!"
2he present case a)ainst petitioner is in the nature of a medical malpractice suit, ,hich in simplest
term is the type of claim ,hich a victim has availa-le to him or her to redress a ,ron) committed -y a
medical professional ,hich has cause -odily harm.
82:
In this 5urisdiction, ho,ever, such claims are most
often -rou)ht as a civil action for dama)es under Article 23! of the Civil Code,
86:
and in some
instances, as a criminal case under Article 6!" of the (evised &enal Code
89:
,ith ,hich the civil action
for dama)es is impliedly instituted. It isvia the latter type of action that the heirs of the deceased sou)ht
redress for the petitionerGs alle)ed imprudence and ne)li)ence in treatin) the deceased there-y causin)
her death. 2he petitioner and one ?r. Aina 'rcillo ,ho ,as the attendin) anaesthesiolo)ist durin) the
operation of the deceased ,ere char)ed ,ith 0rec.less imprudence and ne)li)ence resultin) to 7sic;
homicide0 in an information ,hich reads1
"That on or about #arch $%& !''!& in the (ity of )an *ablo& +epublic of the *hilippines and within the jurisdiction
of this ,onorable (ourt& the accused abovenamed& being then the attending anaesthesiologist and surgeon&
respectively& did then and there& in a negligence -sic.& careless& imprudent& and incompetent manner& and failing to
supply or store sufficient provisions and facilities necessary to meet any and all e/igencies apt to arise before&
during and0or after a surgical operation causing by such negligence& carelessness& imprudence& and incompetence&
and causing by such failure& including the lack of preparation and foresight needed to avert a tragedy& the untimely
death of said 1ydia 2mali on the day following said surgical operation."
3"
2rial ensued after -oth the petitioner and ?r. Aina 'rcillo pleaded not )uilty to the a-ove-
mentioned char)e. >n +arch 9, 999, the +unicipal 2rial Court in Cities 7+2CC; of @an &a-lo City
rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of ,hich is hereunder /uoted as follo,s1
"4,5+5F6+5& the court finds the accused Dr. 1ina 5rcillo not guilty of the offense charged for insufficiency of
evidence while her co7accused Dra. 8inevetch (ru9 is hereby held responsible for the death of 1ydia 2mali on
#arch $:& !''!& and therefore guilty under ;rt. %<3 of the +evised *enal (ode& and she is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of $ months and ! day imprisonment of arresto mayor with costs."
<"
2he petitioner appealed her conviction to the (e)ional 2rial Court 7(2C; ,hich affirmed in toto the
decision of the +2CC
83:
promptin) the petitioner to file a petition for revie, ,ith the Court of Appeals -ut
to no avail. *ence this petition for revie, on certiorari assailin) the decision promul)ated -y the Court of
Appeals on >cto-er 29, 99" affirmin) petitionerGs conviction ,ith modification that she is further
directed to pay the heirs of Aydia Bmali &"%,%%%.%% as indemnity for her death.
8$:
In su-stance, the petition -rou)ht -efore this Court raises the issue of ,hether or not petitionerGs
conviction of the crime of rec.less imprudence resultin) in homicide, arisin) from an alle)ed medical
malpractice, is supported -y the evidence on record.
First the antecedent facts.
>n +arch 22, 99, prosecution ,itness, (o,ena Bmali ?e >campo, accompanied her mother to
the &erpetual *elp Clinic and Ceneral *ospital situated in Dala)tas @treet, @an &a-lo City, Aa)una.
2hey arrived at the said hospital at around 916% in the afternoon of the same day.
89:
&rior to +arch 22,
99, Aydia ,as e<amined -y the petitioner ,ho found a 0myoma0
8%:
in her uterus, and scheduled her
for a hysterectomy operation on +arch 26, 99.
8:
(o,ena and her mother slept in the clinic on the
evenin) of +arch 22, 99 as the latter ,as to -e operated on the ne<t day at 1%% oGcloc. in the
afternoon.
82:
Accordin) to (o,ena, she noticed that the clinic ,as untidy and the ,indo, and the floor
,ere very dusty promptin) her to as. the attendant for a ra) to ,ipe the ,indo, and the floor ,ith.
86:
Decause of the untidy state of the clinic, (o,ena tried to persuade her mother not to proceed ,ith
the operation.
89:
2he follo,in) day, -efore her mother ,as ,heeled into the operatin) room, (o,ena
as.ed the petitioner if the operation could -e postponed. 2he petitioner called Aydia into her office and
the t,o had a conversation. Aydia then informed (o,ena that the petitioner told her that she must -e
operated on as scheduled.
8":
(o,ena and her other relatives, namely her hus-and, her sister and t,o aunts ,aited outside the
operatin) room ,hile Aydia under,ent operation. =hile they ,ere ,aitin), ?r. 'rcillo ,ent out of the
operatin) room and instructed them to -uy ta)amet ampules ,hich (o,enaGs sister immediately
-ou)ht. A-out one hour had passed ,hen ?r. 'rcillo came out a)ain this time to as. them to -uy -lood
for Aydia. 2hey -ou)ht type 0A0 -lood from the @t. Cerald Dlood Dan. and the same ,as -rou)ht -y the
attendant into the operatin) room. After the lapse of a fe, hours, the petitioner informed them that the
operation ,as finished. 2he operatin) staff then ,ent inside the petitionerGs clinic to ta.e their snac.s.
@ome thirty minutes after, Aydia ,as -rou)ht out of the operatin) room in a stretcher and the petitioner
as.ed (o,ena and the other relatives to -uy additional -lood for Aydia. Bnfortunately, they ,ere not
a-le to comply ,ith petitionerGs order as there ,as no more type 0A0 -lood availa-le in the -lood -an..
2hereafter, a person arrived to donate -lood ,hich ,as later transfused to Aydia. (o,ena then noticed
her mother, ,ho ,as attached to an o<y)en tan., )aspin) for -reath. Apparently the o<y)en supply had
run out and (o,enaGs hus-and to)ether ,ith the driver of the accused had to )o to the @an &a-lo
?istrict *ospital to )et o<y)en. Aydia ,as )iven the fresh supply of o<y)en as soon as it arrived.
8!:
Dut
at around %1%% oGcloc. &.+. she ,ent into shoc. and her -lood pressure dropped to !%K"%. AydiaGs
unsta-le condition necessitated her transfer to the @an &a-lo ?istrict *ospital so she could -e
connected to a respirator and further e<amined.
83:
2he transfer to the @an &a-lo City ?istrict *ospital
,as ,ithout the prior consent of (o,ena nor of the other relatives present ,ho found out a-out the
intended transfer only ,hen an am-ulance arrived to ta.e Aydia to the @an &a-lo ?istrict *ospital.
(o,ena and her other relatives then -oarded a tricycle and follo,ed the am-ulance.
8$:
Bpon AydiaGs arrival at the @an &a-lo ?istrict *ospital, she ,as ,heeled into the operatin) room
and the petitioner and ?r. 'rcillo re-operated on her -ecause there ,as -lood oozin) from the
a-dominal incision.
89:
2he attendin) physicians summoned ?r. Dartolome An)eles, head of the
>-stetrics and Cynecolo)y ?epartment of the @an &a-lo ?istrict *ospital. *o,ever, ,hen ?r. An)eles
arrived, Aydia ,as already in shoc. and possi-ly dead as her -lood pressure ,as already %K%. ?r.
An)eles then informed petitioner and ?r. 'rcillo that there ,as nothin) he could do to help save the
patient.
82%:
=hile petitioner ,as closin) the a-dominal ,all, the patient died.
82:
2hus, on +arch 29, 99,
at 61%% oGcloc. in the mornin), Aydia Bmali ,as pronounced dead. *er death certificate states 0shoc.0
as the immediate cause of death and 0?isseminated Intravascular Coa)ulation 7?IC;0 as the antecedent
cause.
822:
In convictin) the petitioner, the +2CC found the follo,in) circumstances as sufficient -asis to
conclude that she ,as indeed ne)li)ent in the performance of the operation1
"/ / /& the clinic was untidy& there was lack of provision like blood and o/ygen to prepare for any contingency that
might happen during the operation. The manner and the fact that the patient was brought to the )an *ablo District
,ospital for reoperation indicates that there was something wrong in the manner in which Dra. (ru9 conducted the
operation. There was no showing that before the operation& accused Dr. (ru9 had conducted a cardio pulmonary
clearance or any typing of the blood of the patient. =t was -sic. said in medical parlance that the "abdomen of the
person is a temple of surprises" because you do not know the whole thing the moment it was open -sic. and
surgeon must be prepared for any eventuality thereof. The patient -sic. chart which is a public document was not
presented because it is only there that we could determine the condition of the patient before the surgery. The court
also noticed in 5/h. "F7!" that the sister of the deceased wished to postpone the operation but the patient was
prevailed upon by Dra. (ru9 to proceed with the surgery. The court finds that 1ydia 2mali died because of the
negligence and carelessness of the surgeon Dra. 8inevetch (ru9 because of loss of blood during the operation of
the deceased for evident unpreparedness and for lack of skill& the reason why the patient was brought for operation
at the )an *ablo (ity District ,ospital. ;s such& the surgeon should answer for such negligence. 4ith respect to
Dra. 1ina 5rcillo& the anaesthesiologist& there is no evidence to indicate that she should be held jointly liable with
Dra. (ru9 who actually did the operation."
$%"
2he (2C reiterated the a-ovementioned findin)s of the +2CC and upheld the latterGs declaration
of 0incompetency, ne)li)ence and lac. of foresi)ht and s.ill of appellant 7herein petitioner; in handlin)
the su-5ect patient -efore and after the operation.0
829:
And li.e,ise affirmin) the petitionerGs conviction,
the Court of Appeals echoed similar o-servations, thus1
"/ / /. 4hile we may grant that the untidiness and filthiness of the clinic may not by itself indicate negligence& it
nevertheless shows the absence of due care and supervision over her subordinate employees. Did this unsanitary
condition permeate the operating room> 4ere the surgical instruments properly sterili9ed> (ould the conditions in
the 6+ have contributed to the infection of the patient> 6nly the petitioner could answer these& but she opted not
to testify. This could only give rise to the presumption that she has nothing good to testify on her defense. ;nyway&
the alleged "unverified statement of the prosecution witness" remains unchallenged and unrebutted.
1ikewise undisputed is the prosecution?s version indicating the following facts@ that the accused asked the patient?s
relatives to buy Tagamet capsules while the operation was already in progressA that after an hour& they were also
asked to buy type ";" blood for the patientA that after the surgery& they were again asked to procure more type ";"
blood& but such was not anymore available from the sourceA that the o/ygen given to the patient was emptyA and
that the son7in7law of the patient& together with a driver of the petitioner& had to rush to the )an *ablo (ity District
,ospital to get the much7needed o/ygen. ;ll these conclusively show that the petitioner had not prepared for any
unforeseen circumstances before going into the first surgery& which was not emergency in nature& but was elective
or pre7scheduledA she had no ready antibiotics& no prepared blood& properly typed and cross7matched& and no
sufficient o/ygen supply.
#oreover& there are a lot of questions that keep nagging 2s. 4as the patient given any cardio7pulmonary
clearance& or at least a clearance by an internist& which are standard requirements before a patient is subjected to
surgery. Did the petitioner determine as part of the pre7operative evaluation& the bleeding parameters of the patient&
such as bleeding time and clotting time> There is no showing that these were done. The petitioner just appears to
have been in a hurry to perform the operation& even as the family wanted the postponement to ;pril <& !''!.
6bviously& she did not prepare the patientA neither did she get the family?s consent to the operation. #oreover& she
did not prepare a medical chart with instructions for the patient?s care. =f she did all these& proof thereof should
have been offered. But there is none. =ndeed& these are overwhelming evidence of recklessness and
imprudence."
$3"
2his court, ho,ever, holds differently and finds the fore)oin) circumstances insufficient to sustain
a 5ud)ment of conviction a)ainst the petitioner for the crime of rec.less imprudence resultin) in
homicide. 2he elements of rec.less imprudence are1 7; that the offender does or fails to do an act4 72;
that the doin) or the failure to do that act is voluntary4 76; that it -e ,ithout malice4 79; that material
dama)e results from the rec.less imprudence4 and 7"; that there is ine<cusa-le lac. of precaution on
the part of the offender, ta.in) into consideration his employment or occupation, de)ree of intelli)ence,
physical condition, and other circumstances re)ardin) persons, time and place.
=hether or not a physician has committed an 0ine<cusa-le lac. of precaution0 in the treatment of
his patient is to -e determined accordin) to the standard of care o-served -y other mem-ers of the
profession in )ood standin) under similar circumstances -earin) in mind the advanced state of the
profession at the time of treatment or the present state of medical science.
82!:
In the recent case
of 7eonila Garcia-Rueda v. ;ilfred 7. "acasio' et. al.,
823:
this Court stated that in acceptin) a case, a
doctor in effect represents that, havin) the needed trainin) and s.ill possessed -y physicians and
sur)eons practicin) in the same field, he ,ill employ such trainin), care and s.ill in the treatment of his
patients. *e therefore has a duty to use at least the same level of care that any other reasona-ly
competent doctor ,ould use to treat a condition under the same circumstances. It is in this aspect of
medical malpractice that e<pert testimony is essential to esta-lish not only the standard of care of the
profession -ut also that the physicianGs conduct in the treatment and care falls -elo, such standard.
82$:
Further, inasmuch as the causes of the in5uries involved in malpractice actions are determina-le only
in the li)ht of scientific .no,led)e, it has -een reco)nized that e<pert testimony is usually necessary to
support the conclusion as to causation.
829:
Immediately apparent from a revie, of the records of this case is the a-sence of any e<pert
testimony on the matter of the standard of care employed -y other physicians of )ood standin) in the
conduct of similar operations. 2he prosecutionGs e<pert ,itnesses in the persons of ?r. Floresto Arizala
and ?r. #ieto @alvador, Jr. of the #ational Dureau of Investi)ation 7#DI; only testified as to the possi-le
cause of death -ut did not venture to illuminate the court on the matter of the standard of care that
petitioner should have e<ercised.
All three courts -elo, -e,ail the inade/uacy of the facilities of the clinic and its untidiness4 the
lac. of provisions such as -lood, o<y)en, and certain medicines4 the failure to su-5ect the patient to a
cardio-pulmonary test prior to the operation4 the omission of any form of -lood typin) -efore transfusion4
and even the su-se/uent transfer of Aydia to the @an &a-lo *ospital and the reoperation performed on
her -y the petitioner. Dut ,hile it may -e true that the circumstances pointed out -y the courts -elo,
seemed -eyond cavil to constitute rec.less imprudence on the part of the sur)eon, this conclusion is
still -est arrived at not throu)h the educated surmises nor con5ectures of laymen, includin) 5ud)es, -ut
-y the un/uestiona-le .no,led)e of e<pert ,itnesses. For ,hether a physician or sur)eon has
e<ercised the re/uisite de)ree of s.ill and care in the treatment of his patient is, in the )enerality of
cases, a matter of e<pert opinion.
86%:
2he deference of courts to the e<pert opinion of /ualified physicians
stems from its realization that the latter possess unusual technical s.ills ,hich laymen in most instances
are incapa-le of intelli)ently evaluatin).
86:
'<pert testimony should have -een offered to prove that the
circumstances cited -y the courts -elo, are constitutive of conduct fallin) -elo, the standard of care
employed -y other physicians in )ood standin) ,hen performin) the same operation. It must -e
remem-ered that ,hen the /ualifications of a physician are admitted, as in the instant case, there is an
inevita-le presumption that in proper cases he ta.es the necessary precaution and employs the -est of
his .no,led)e and s.ill in attendin) to his clients, unless the contrary is sufficiently esta-lished.
862:
2his
presumption is re-utta-le -y e<pert opinion ,hich is so sadly lac.in) in the case at -ench.
'ven )rantin) ar*uendo that the inade/uacy of the facilities and untidiness of the clinic4 the lac. of
provisions4 the failure to conduct pre-operation tests on the patient4 and the su-se/uent transfer of
Aydia to the @an &a-lo *ospital and the reoperation performed on her -y the petitioner do indicate,
even ,ithout e<pert testimony, that petitioner ,as rec.lessly imprudent in the e<ercise of her duties as a
sur)eon, no co)ent proof e<ists that any of these circumstances caused petitionerGs death. 2hus, the
a-sence of the fourth element of rec.less imprudence1 that the in5ury to the person or property ,as a
conse/uence of the rec.less imprudence.
In liti)ations involvin) medical ne)li)ence, the plaintiff has the -urden of esta-lishin) appellantGs
ne)li)ence and for a reasona-le conclusion of ne)li)ence, there must -e proof of -reach of duty on the
part of the sur)eon as ,ell as a casual connection of such -reach and the resultin) death of his patient.
866:
In #han 7u*ay v. 9t 7ue=s <ospital' Inc.,
869:
,here the attendin) physician ,as a-solved of lia-ility
for the death of the complainantGs ,ife and ne,-orn -a-y, this court held that1
"=n order that there may be a recovery for an injury& however& it must be shown that the ?injury for which recovery
is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong doneA the connection between the negligence and the
injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events& unbroken by intervening efficient causes.? =n other words&
the negligence must be the pro/imate cause of the injury. For& ?negligence& no matter in what it consists& cannot
create a right of action unless it is the pro/imate cause of the injury complained of. ? ;nd ?the pro/imate cause of an
injury is that cause& which& in natural and continuous sequence& unbroken by any efficient intervening cause&
produces the injury& and without which the result would not have occurred.???
%3"
-2nderscoring supplied..
?r. Arizala ,ho conducted an autopsy on the -ody of the deceased summarized his findin)s as
follo,s1
0Atty. Cachero1
Q. Eou mentioned a-out your Autopsy (eport ,hich has -een mar.ed as '<h. 0A---0.
2here appears here a si)nature a-ove the type,ritten name Floresto Arizala, Jr.,
,hose si)nature is thatH
A. 2hat is my si)nature, sir.
Q. ?o you affirm the truth of all the contents of '<h. 0A---0H
A. >nly as to the autopsy report no. 9-%9, the time and place and everythin) after the post
mortem findin)s, sir.
Q. Eou mentioned on your 0&ost +ortem Findin)s0 a-out sur)ical incision, 91% cm.,
infraum-ilical area, anterior a-dominal area, midline, ,ill you please e<plain that in your
o,n lan)ua)eH
A. 2here ,as incision ,ound 7sic; the area 5ust -elo, the navel, sir.
Q. And the last para)raph of the postmortem findin)s ,hich I read1 Bterus, pear-shaped
and pale measurin) 3." < "." < ".% cm, ,ith some surface nodulation of the fundic area
posteriorly. Cut-section sho,s diffusely pale myometrium ,ith areas of strea.
induration. 2he ovaries and adne<al structures are missin) ,ith the ra, surfaces
patched ,ith clotted -lood. @ur)ical sutures ,ere noted on the operative site.
Intestines and mesenteries are pale ,ith -lood clots noted -et,een the
mesentric folds.
*emoperitonium1 6%% s.s.,
ri)ht paracolic )utter,
"% c.c., left paracolic )utter
2%% c.c., mesentric area,
%% c.c., ri)ht pelvic )utter
stomach empty.
>ther visceral or)ans, pale.G,
,ill you please e<plain that on 7sic; your o,n lan)ua)e or in ordinaryOOOOO
A. 2here ,as a uterus ,hich ,as not attached to the adne<al structures namely ovaries
,hich ,ere not present and also si)n of previous sur)ical operation and there ,ere
7sic; clotted -lood, sir.
Q. *o, a-out the ovaries and adne<al structuresH
A. 2hey are missin), sir.
Q. Eou mean to say there are no ovariesH
A. ?urin) that time there are no ovaries, sir.
Q. And there ,ere li.e,ise si)n of sur)ical suturesH
A. Ees, sir.
Q. *o, a-out the intestines and mesenteries are place 7sic; ,ith -lood clots noted -et,een
the mesenteric folds, ,ill you please e<plain on 7sic; thisH
A. In the peritoneal cavity, they are mostly perritonial -loodOOO.
Q. And ,hat could have caused this -loodH
A. =ell, ordinarily -lood is found inside the -lood vessel. Dlood ,ere 7sic; outside as a
result of the in5uries ,hich destroyed the inte)rity of the vessel allo,in) -lood to sip
7sic; out, sir.
Q. Dy the nature of the postmortem findin)s indicated in '<h. A--D, can you tell the court
the cause of deathH
A. Ees, sir. 2he cause of death is1 Cross findin)s are compati-le ,ith hemorrha)ic shoc..
Q. Can you tell the us ,hat could have caused this hemorrha)ic shoc.H
A. =ell hemorrha)ic shoc. is the result of -lood loss.
Q. =hat could have the effect of that loss of -loodH
A. Bnattended hemorrha)e, sir.
86!:
7Bnderscorin) supplied.;
2he fore)oin) ,as corro-orated -y ?r. #ieto @alvador1
0Q. And ,ere you a-le to determine the cause of death -y virtue of the e<amination of the
specimen su-mitted -y ?r. ArizalaH
A. =ithout .no,led)e of the autopsy findin)s it ,ould -e difficult for me to determine the
cause of death, sir.
Q. *ave you e<amined the post mortem of ?r. ArizalaH
A. Ees, sir, and -y virtue of the autopsy report in connection ,ith your patholo)y report.
Q. =hat could have caused the death of the victimH
A. 2his patholo)ic e<amination are 7sic; compati-le ,ith the person ,ho died, sir.
Q. =ill you e<plain to us the meanin) of hemorrha)ic compati-leH
A. It means that a person died of -lood loss. +eanin) a person died of non-replacement of
-lood and so the victim -efore she died there ,as shoc. of diminish of -lood of the
circulation. @he died most pro-a-ly -efore the actual complete -lood loss, sir.
Court1 Is it possi-le doctor that the loss of the -lood ,as due on 7sic; operationH
A. Dased on my patholo)y findin)s, sir.
Q. =hat could have caused this loss of -loodH
A. +any, sir. A patient ,ho have under)one sur)ery. Another may -e a -lood vessel may
-e cut ,hile on operation and this cause 7sic; -leedin), or may -e set in the course of
the operation, or may -e 7sic; he died after the operation. >f course there are other
cause 7sic;.
Atty. Cachero1
Q. 'specially so doctor ,hen there ,as no -lood replacementH
A. Ees, sir.0
863:
7Bnderscorin) supplied.;
2he testimonies of -oth doctors esta-lish hemorrha)e or hemorrha)ic shoc. as the cause of
death. *o,ever, as li.e,ise testified to -y the e<pert ,itnesses in open court, hemorrha)e or
hemorrha)ic shoc. durin) sur)ery may -e caused -y several different factors. 2hus, ?r. @alvadorGs
ela-oration on the matter1
0Atty. &ascual1
Q. ?octor, amon) the causes of hemorrha)e that you mentioned you said that it could -e at
the moment of operation ,hen one losses 7sic; control of the presence, is that correctH
?urin) the operation there is lost 7sic; of control of the cut vesselH
A. Ees, sir.
Q. >r there is a failure to li)ate a vessel of considera-le sizeH
A. Ees, sir.
Q. >r even if the vessel ,ere li)ated the .not may have slipped later onH
A. Ees, sir.
Q. And you also mentioned that it may -e possi-le also to some clottin) defect, is
that correctH
A. +ay -e 7sic;.0
86$:
7Bnderscorin) supplied;.
?efense ,itness, ?r. Du C. Castro also )ave the follo,in) e<pert opinion1
0Q. ?octor even a patient after an operations 7sic; ,ould suffer hemorra)e ,hat ,ould -e
the possi-le causes of such hemorra)e 7sic;H
A. Amon) those ,ould -e ,hat ,e call Intravascular Coa)ulation and this is the reason for
the -leedin), sir, ,hich cannot -e prevented -y anyone, it ,ill happen to anyone,
anytime and to any persons 7sic;, sir.
C>B(21
=hat do you thin. of the cause of the -leedin), the cuttin) or the operations done in the
-odyH
A. #ot related to this one, the -leedin) here is not related to any cuttin) or operation that I
7sic; have done.
Q. Aside from the ?IC ,hat could another causes 7sic; that could -e the cause for the
hemorrha)e or -leedin) in a patient -y an operations 7sic;H
A. In )eneral sir, if there ,as an operations 7sic; and it is possi-le that the li)ature in the
suture ,as 7sic; -ecome 7sic; loose, it is 7sic; -ecomes loose if proven.
< < < < < < < < <
Q. If the person ,ho performed an autopsy does not find any unti)ht 7sic; clot 7sic; -lood
vessel or any suture that -ecome 7sic; loose the cause of the -leedin) could not -e
attri-uted to the fault of the su-5ectH
A. ?efinitely, sir.0
869:
7Bnderscorin) supplied.;
Accordin) to -oth doctors, the possi-le causes of hemorrha)e durin) an operation are1 7; the
failure of the sur)eon to tie or suture a cut -lood vessel4 72; allo,in) a cut -lood vessel to )et out of
control4 76; the su-se/uent loosenin) of the tie or suture applied to a cut -lood vessel4 and 79; and a
clottin) defect .no,n as ?IC. It is si)nificant to state at this 5uncture that the autopsy conducted -y ?r.
Arizala on the -ody of Aydia did not reveal any untied or unsutured cut -lood vessel nor ,as there any
indication that the tie or suture of a cut -lood vessel had -ecome loose there-y causin) the
hemorrha)e.
89%:
*ence the follo,in) pertinent portion of ?r. ArizalaGs testimony1
0Q1 ?octor, in e<aminin) these structures did you .no, ,hether these ,ere sutured li)ature
or plain li)ature
A1 Ai)ature, sir.
Q1 =e ,ill e<plain that later on. ?id you recall if the cut structures ,ere tied -y first suturin)
it and then tyin) a .not or the tie ,as merely placed around the cut structure and tiedH
A1 I cannot recall, sir.
Q1 As a matter of fact, you cannot recall -ecause you did not even -othered 7sic; to
e<amine, is that correctH
A1 =ell, I -othered enou)h to .no, that they ,ere sutured, sir.
Q1 @o, therefore, ?octor, you ,ould not .no, ,hether any of the cut structures ,ere not
sutured or tied neither ,ere you a-le to determine ,hether any loose suture ,as found
in the peritoneal cavityH
A1 I could not recall any loose sutured 7sic;, sir.0
89:
>n the other hand, the findin)s of all three doctors do not preclude the pro-a-ility that ?IC caused
the hemorrha)e and conse/uently, AydiaGs death. ?IC ,hich is a clottin) defect creates a serious
-leedin) tendency and ,hen massive ?IC occurs as a complication of sur)ery leavin) ra, surface,
ma5or hemorrha)e occurs.
892:
And as testified to -y defense ,itness, ?r. Du C. Castro, hemorrha)e due
to ?IC 0cannot -e prevented, it ,ill happen to anyone, anytime.0
896:
*e testified further1
0Q. #o,, under the circumstance one of the possi-ility as you mentioned in 7sic; ?ICH
A. Ees, sir.
Q. And you mentioned that it cannot -e preventedH
A. Ees, sir.
Q. Can you even predict if it really happen 7sic;H
A. &ossi-le, sir.
Q. Are there any specific findin)s of autopsy that ,ill tell you ,hether this patient suffered
amon) such thin)s as ?ICH
A. =ell, I did reserve -ecause of the condition of the patient.
Q. #o,, ?octor you said that you ,ent throu)h the record of the deceased Aydia Bmali
loo.in) for the chart, the operated 7sic; records, the post mortem findin)s on the
histophanic 7sic; e<amination -ased on your e<amination of record, doctor, can you
more or less says 7sic; ,hat part are 7sic; concerned could have -een the caused 7sic;
of death of this Aydia BmaliH
A. As far as the medical record is concern 7sic; the caused 7sic; of death is dessimulated
7sic; Intra Fascular Coa)ulation or the ?IC ,hich resulted to hemorrha)e or -leedin)s,
sir.
Q. ?octor -ased on your findin)s then there is .no,in) 7sic; the doctor ,ould say ,hether
the doctor her 7sic; has -een 7sic; faultH
A22E. +AAF'?A1
=e ,ill moved 7sic; to stri.e out the 7sic; -ased on findin) they 5ust read the chart as ,ell as
the other record.
A22E. &A@CBAA1
&recisely -ased on this e<amination.
A22E. +AAF'?A1
#ot findin), there ,as no findin) made.
C>B(21
*e is only readin) the record.
A22E. &A@CBAA1
Ees, sir.
A. #o, sir, there is no fault on the part of the sur)eon, sir.0
899:
2his court has no recourse -ut to rely on the e<pert testimonies rendered -y -oth prosecution and
defense ,itnesses that su-stantiate rather than contradict petitionerGs alle)ation that the cause of
AydiaGs death ,as ?IC ,hich, as attested to -y an e<pert ,itness, cannot -e attri-uted to the petitionerGs
fault or ne)li)ence. 2he pro-a-ility that AydiaGs death ,as caused -y ?IC ,as unre-utted durin) trial
and has en)endered in the mind of this Court a reasona-le dou-t as to the petitionerGs )uilt. 2hus, her
ac/uittal of the crime of rec.less imprudence resultin) in homicide. =hile ,e condole ,ith the family of
Aydia Bmali, our hands are -ound -y the dictates of 5ustice and fair dealin) ,hich hold inviola-le the
ri)ht of an accused to -e presumed innocent until proven )uilty -eyond reasona-le dou-t.
#evertheless, this Court finds the petitioner civilly lia-le for the death of Aydia Bmali, for ,hile a
conviction of a crime re/uires proof -eyond reasona-le dou-t, only a preponderance of evidence is
re/uired to esta-lish civil lia-ility.
89":
2he petitioner is a doctor in ,hose hands a patient puts his life and lim-. For insufficiency of
evidence this Court ,as not a-le to render a sentence of conviction -ut it is not -lind to the rec.less
and imprudent manner in ,hich the petitioner carried out her duties. A precious life has -een lost and
the circumstances leadin) thereto e<acer-ated the )rief of those left -ehind. 2he heirs of the deceased
continue to feel the loss of their mother up to the present time
89!:
and this Court is a,are that no amount
of compassion and commiseration nor ,ords of -ereavement can suffice to assua)e the sorro, felt for
the loss of a loved one. Certainly, the a,ard of moral and e<emplary dama)es in favor of the heirs of
Aydia Bmali are proper in the instant case.
@+ERE1ORE, premises considered, petitioner ?(. #I#'F'2C* C(BL is here-y ACQBI22'? of
the crime of rec.less imprudence resultin) in homicide -ut is ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased
Aydia Bmali the amount of FIF2E 2*>B@A#? &'@>@ 7&"%,%%%.%%; as civil lia-ility, >#' *B#?('?
2*>B@A#? &'@>@ 7&%%,%%%.%%; as moral dama)es, and FIF2E 2*>B@A#? &'@>@ 7&"%,%%%.%%;
as e<emplary dama)es.
Aet the copy of this decision -e furnished to the &rofessional (e)ulation Commission 7&(C; for
appropriate action.
6O ORDERED.
Romero' (elo' and "an*aniban' )).' concur.
4arvasa' #.).' %#hairman&' on leave.
P+ILIPPINE RA//IT /76 LINE6, INC., petitioner, vs. PEOPLE O1 T+E P+ILIPPINE6, respondent.
D E C I 6 I O N
PANGANI/AN, J.:
=hen the accused-employee a-sconds or 5umps -ail, the 5ud)ment meted out -ecomes final and
e<ecutory. 2he employer cannot defeat the finality of the 5ud)ment -y filin) a notice of appeal on its
o,n -ehalf in the )uise of as.in) for a revie, of its su-sidiary civil lia-ility. Doth the primary civil lia-ility
of the accused-employee and the su-sidiary civil lia-ility of the employer are carried in one sin)le
decision that has -ecome final and e<ecutory.
T"# Ca'#
Defore this Court is a &etition for (evie,
8:
under (ule 9" of the (ules of Court, assailin) the
+arch 29, 2%%%
82:
and the +arch 23, 2%%
86:
(esolutions of the Court of Appeals 7CA; in CA-C( CF #o.
"969%. &etitionerPs appeal from the 5ud)ment of the (e)ional 2rial Court 7(2C; of @an Fernando, Aa
Bnion in Criminal Case #o. 2"6" ,as dismissed in the first (esolution as follo,s1
C4,5+5F6+5& for all the foregoing& the motion to dismiss is GRANTED and the appeal is ordered
D=)#=))5D.D
89:
2he second (esolution denied petitionerPs +otion for (econsideration.
8":
T"# 1a%!'
2he facts of the case are summarized -y the CA in this ,ise1
C6n Euly $F& !'':& accused 8apoleon +oman y #acadangdang" was found guilty and convicted of the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide& multiple physical injuries and damage to property and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of four -:. years& nine -'. months and eleven -!!. days to si/ -<. years& and to pay
damages as follows@
Ga. to pay the heirs of E2)T=86 T6++5) the sum of *3H&HHH.HH as indemnity for his death& plus
the sum of *$3&%I%.HH& for funeral e/penses& his unearned income for one year at *$&3HH.HH a
month& *3H&HHH.HH as indemnity for the support of +enato Torres& and the further sum
of *%HH&HHH.HH as moral damagesA
Gb. to the heirs of 5)T+511; J515+6& the sum of *3H&HHH.HH as indemnity for her death& the
sum of *$%F&%$%.F3 for funeral e/penses& her unearned income for three years at *:3&HHH.HH
per annum& and the further sum of *!&HHH&HHH.HH as moral damages and *$HH&HHH.HH as
attorneyKs feesA"
Gc. to the heirs of 16+8; ;8(,5T;& the sum of *3H&HHH.HH as indemnity for her death& the sum
of *$$&I%I.HH as funeral e/penses& the sum of *$H&3::.': as medical e/penses and her loss of
income for %H years at *!&HHH.HH per month& and the further sum of *!HH&HHH.HH for moral
damagesA
Gd. to #;2+558 B+588;8& the sum of *$$'&<3:.HH as hospital e/penses& doctorKs fees
of *!FH&HHH.HH for the orthopedic surgeon& *$$&3HH.HH for the n"eurologist& an additional
indemnity of" at least *!3H&HHH.HH to cover future correction of deformity of her limbs& and
moral damages in the amount of *!&HHH&HHH.HHA
Ge. to +6)=5 B;1;E6& the sum of *%&3<!.:< as medical e/penses& *$&HHH.HH as loss of income&
and *$3&HHH.HH as moral damagesA
Gf. to T5+5)=T; T;#68D68L& the sum of *!'&IHH.:F as medical e/penses& *IHH.HH for loss of
income& and *$3&HHH.HH as moral damagesA
Gg. to E21=;8; T;BT;B& the amount of *3IH.I! as medical e/penses& *:&<HH.HH as actual
damages and her loss earnings of *!&:HH.HH as well as moral damages in the amount
of*!H&HHH.HHA
Gh. to #=L251 ;+M2=T61;& the sum of *!$&:F%.I$ as hospital e/penses& *!:&3%H.HH as doctorKs
fees& *!&HHH.HH for medicines and *3H&HHH.HH as moral damagesA
Gi. to (1;+=T; (;B;8B;8& the sum of *!33.HH for medical e/penses& *IF.HH for
medicines& *!&F!H.HH as actual damages and *3&HHH.HH as moral damagesA
Gj. to #;+=;86 (;B;8B;8& the sum of *!&%'3.HH for hospital bills& *3HH.HH for
medicine& *$&!HH.HH as actual damages& *!&$HH.HH for loss of income and *3&HHH.HH as moral
damagesA
Gk. to 1a 2nion 5lectric (ompany as the registered owner of the Toyota ,i7;ce Jan& the amount
of *$3H&HHH.HH as actual damages for the cost of the totally wrecked vehicleA to the owner of
the jeepney& the amount of *$$&<'I.%I as actual damagesAK
CThe court further ruled that petitioner"& in the event of the insolvency of accused& shall be liable for the civil
liabilities of the accused. 5vidently& the judgment against accused had become final and e/ecutory.
C;dmittedly& accused had jumped bail and remained at7large. =t is worth mentioning" that )ection I& +ule !$: of
the +ules of (ourt authori9es the dismissal of appeal when appellant jumps bail. (ounsel for accused& also
admittedly hired and provided by petitioner"& filed a notice of appeal which was denied by the trial court. 4e
affirmed the denial of the notice of appeal filed in behalf of accused.
C)imultaneously& on ;ugust <& !'':& petitioner" filed its notice of appeal from the judgment of the trial
court. 6n ;pril $'& !''F& the trial court gave due course to petitionerKs" notice of appeal. 6nDecember I& !''I&
petitioner" filed its brief. 6n December '& !''I& the 6ffice of the )olicitor Leneral received a" copy of
petitionerKs" brief. 6n Eanuary I& !'''& the 6)L moved to be e/cused from filing respondentsK" brief on the
ground that the 6)LKs authority to represent *eople is confined to criminal cases on appeal. The motion was
however denied per 6ur resolution of #ay %!& !'''. 6n #arch $& !'''& respondent"0private prosecutor filed the
instant motion to dismiss.D
8!:
-(itations omitted.
R.*n) o( !"# Co.$! o( A&&#a*'
2he CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution also of the civil action
arisin) from the offense. 2hus, once determined in the criminal case a)ainst the accused-employee,
the employerPs su-sidiary civil lia-ility as set forth in Article %6 of the (evised &enal Code -ecomes
conclusive and enforcea-le.
2he appellate court further held that to allo, an employer to dispute independently the civil lia-ility
fi<ed in the criminal case a)ainst the accused-employee ,ould -e to amend, nullify or defeat a final
5ud)ment. @ince the notice of appeal filed -y the accused had already -een dismissed -y the CA, then
the 5ud)ment of conviction and the a,ard of civil lia-ility -ecame final and e<ecutory. Included in the
civil lia-ility of the accused ,as the employerPs su-sidiary lia-ility.
*ence, this &etition.
83:
T"# I''.#'
&etitioner states the issues of this case as follo,s1
C;. 4hether or not an employer& who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused7employee& may
appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused.
CB. 4hether or not the doctrines of Alvarez v. Court of Appeals -!3I )(+; 3F. and Yusay v. Adil -!<:
)(+; :':. apply to the instant case.D
8$:
2here is really only one issue. Item D a-ove is merely an ad5unct to Item A.
T"# Co.$!A' R.*n)
2he &etition has no merit.
Man I''.#?
Propriety of Appeal by the Employer
&ointin) out that it had seasona-ly filed a notice of appeal from the (2C ?ecision, petitioner
contends that the 5ud)ment of conviction a)ainst the accused-employee has not attained finality. 2he
former insists that its appeal stayed the finality, not,ithstandin) the fact that the latter had 5umped
-ail. In effect, petitioner ar)ues that its appeal ta.es the place of that of the accused-employee.
=e are not persuaded.
Appeals in Criminal Cases
@ection of (ule 22 of the 2%%% (evised (ules of Criminal &rocedure states thus1
C;ny party may appeal from a judgment or final order& unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy.D
Clearly, -oth the accused and the prosecution may appeal a criminal case, -ut the )overnment
may do so only if the accused ,ould not there-y -e placed in dou-le 5eopardy.
89:
Furthermore, the
prosecution cannot appeal on the )round that the accused should have -een )iven a more severe
penalty.
8%:
>n the other hand, the offended parties may also appeal the 5ud)ment ,ith respect to their
ri)ht to civil lia-ility. If the accused has the ri)ht to appeal the 5ud)ment of conviction, the offended
parties should have the same ri)ht to appeal as much of the 5ud)ment as is pre5udicial to them.
8:
Appeal by the Accused
Who Jumps Bail
=ell-esta-lished in our 5urisdiction is the principle that the appellate court may, upon motion
or motu proprio, dismiss an appeal durin) its pendency if the accused 5umps -ail. 2he second
para)raph of @ection $ of (ule 29 of the 2%%% (evised (ules of Criminal &rocedure provides1
CThe (ourt of ;ppeals may also& upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio& dismiss the appeal if the appellant
escapes from prison or confinement& jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal.D
82:
2his rule is -ased on the rationale that appellants lose their standin) in court ,hen they
a-scond. Bnless they surrender or su-mit to the courtPs 5urisdiction, they are deemed to have ,aived
their ri)ht to see. 5udicial relief.
86:
+oreover, this doctrine applies not only to the accused ,ho 5umps -ail durin) the appeal, -ut also
to one ,ho does so durin) the trial. Justice Florenz ?. (e)alado succinctly e<plains the principle in this
,ise1
C/ / /. 4hen& as in this case& the accused escaped after his arraignment and during the trial& but the trial in
absentia proceeded resulting in the promulgation of a judgment against him and his counsel appealed& since he
nonetheless remained at large his appeal must be dismissed by analogy with the aforesaid provision of this +ule
+ule !$:& NI of the +ules on (riminal *rocedure". / / /D
89:
2he accused cannot -e accorded the ri)ht to appeal unless they voluntarily su-mit to the
5urisdiction of the court or are other,ise arrested ,ithin " days from notice of the 5ud)ment a)ainst
them.
8":
=hile at lar)e, they cannot see. relief from the court, as they are deemed to have ,aived the
appeal.
8!:
Finality of a ecision
in a Criminal Case
As to ,hen a 5ud)ment of conviction attains finality is e<plained in @ection 3 of (ule 2% of the
2%%% (ules of Criminal &rocedure, ,hich ,e /uote1
C; judgment of conviction may& upon motion of the accused& be modified or set aside before it becomes final or
before appeal is perfected. 5/cept where the death penalty is imposed& a judgment becomes final after the lapse of
the period for perfecting an appeal& or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served& or when
the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal& or has applied for probation.D
In the case -efore us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to surrender to the proper
authorities4 thus, he is deemed to have a-andoned his appeal. Conse/uently, the 5ud)ment a)ainst him
has -ecome final and e<ecutory.
83:
!iability of an Employer
in a Findin" of #uilt
Article %2 of the (evised &enal Code states the su-sidiary civil lia-ilities of inn.eepers, as
follo,s1
C=n default of the persons criminally liable& innkeepers& tavernkeepers& and any other persons or corporations shall
be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments& in all cases where a violation of municipal
ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees.
C=nnkeepers are also subsidiary liable for restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses from
guests lodging therein& or for payment of the value thereof& provided that such guests shall have notified in
advance the innkeeper himself& or the person representing him& of the deposit of such goods within the innA and
shall furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them
with respect to the care and vigilance over such goods. 8o liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence
against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeperKs employees.D
+oreover, the fore)oin) su-sidiary lia-ility applies to employers, accordin) to Article %6 ,hich
reads1
CThe subsidiary liability established in the ne/t preceding article shall also apply to employers& teachers& persons&
and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants& pupils& workmen&
apprentices& or employees in the discharge of their duties.D
*avin) laid all these -asic rules and principles, ,e no, address the main issue raised -y
petitioner.
Civil !iability eemed $nstituted
in the Criminal Prosecution
At the outset, ,e must e<plain that the 2%%% (ules of Criminal &rocedure has clarified ,hat civil
actions are deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution.
@ection of (ule of the current (ules of Criminal &rocedure provides1
C4hen a criminal action is instituted& the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action&
reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
C/ / / / / / / / /D
>nly the civil lia-ility of the accused arisin) from the crime char)ed is deemed impliedly instituted
in a criminal action, that is, unless the offended party ,aives the civil action, reserves the ri)ht to
institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal action.
8$:
*ence, the su-sidiary civil lia-ility of
the employer under Article %6 of the (evised &enal Code may -e enforced -y e<ecution on the -asis
of the 5ud)ment of conviction meted out to the employee.
89:
It is clear that the 2%%% (ules deleted the re/uirement of reservin) independent civil actions and
allo,ed these to proceed separately from criminal actions. 2hus, the civil actions referred to in Articles
62,
82%:
66,
82:
69
822:
and 23!
826:
of the Civil Code shall remain Qseparate, distinct and independentR of any
criminal prosecution -ased on the same act. *ere are some direct conse/uences of such revision and
omission1
. 2he ri)ht to -rin) the fore)oin) actions -ased on the Civil Code need not -e reserved in the
criminal prosecution, since they are not deemed included therein.
2. 2he institution or the ,aiver of the ri)ht to file a separate civil action arisin) from the crime
char)ed does not e<tin)uish the ri)ht to -rin) such action.
6. 2he only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more than once for the same act or
omission.
829:
=hat is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil lia-ility arisin) from the crime or
delict per se 7civil lia-ility ex delicto;, -ut not those lia-ilities arisin) from /uasi-delicts, contracts or
/uasi-contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil lia-ility in the criminal
prosecution remains, and the offended party may -- su-5ect to the control of the prosecutor -- still
intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the remainin) civil interest therein.
82":
2his discussion is completely in accord ,ith the (evised &enal Code, ,hich states that Q8e:very
person criminally lia-le for a felony is also civilly lia-le.R
82!:
&etitioner ar)ues that, as an employer, it is considered a party to the criminal case and is
conclusively -ound -y the outcome thereof. Conse/uently, petitioner must -e accorded the ri)ht to
pursue the case to its lo)ical conclusion -- includin) the appeal.
2he ar)ument has no merit. Bndisputedly, petitioner is not a direct party to the criminal case,
,hich ,as filed solely a)ainst #apoleon +. (oman, its employee.
In its +emorandum, petitioner cited a comprehensive list of cases dealin) ,ith the su-sidiary
lia-ility of employers. 2hereafter, it noted that none can -e applied to it, -ecause Qin all th8o:se cases,
the accusedPs employer did not interpose an appeal.R
823:
Indeed, petitioner cannot cite any sin)le case in
,hich the employer appealed, precisely -ecause an appeal in such circumstances is not possi-le.
2he cases dealin) ,ith the su-sidiary lia-ility of employers uniformly declare that, strictly
spea.in), they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted a)ainst their employees.
82$:
Althou)h in
su-stance and in effect, they have an interest therein, this fact should -e vie,ed in the li)ht of their
su-sidiary lia-ility. =hile they may assist their employees to the e<tent of supplyin) the latterPs la,yers,
as in the present case, the former cannot act independently on their o,n -ehalf, -ut can only defend the
accused.
Waiver of Constitutional %afe"uard
A"ainst ouble Jeopardy
&etitionerPs appeal o-viously aims to have the accused-employee a-solved of his criminal
responsi-ility and the 5ud)ment revie,ed as a ,hole. 2hese intentions are apparent from its AppellantPs
Drief
829:
filed ,ith the CA and from its &etition
86%:
-efore us, -oth of ,hich claim that the trial courtPs findin)
of )uilt Qis not supported -y competent evidence.R
86:
An appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a ,aiver of the constitutional safe)uard
a)ainst dou-le 5eopardy and thro,s the ,hole case open to a revie, -y the appellate court. 2he latter
is then called upon to render 5ud)ment as la, and 5ustice dictate, ,hether favora-le or unfavora-le to
the appellant.
862:
2his is the ris. involved ,hen the accused decides to appeal a sentence of conviction.
866:
Indeed, appellate courts have the po,er to reverse, affirm or modify the 5ud)ment of the lo,er court
and to increase or reduce the penalty it imposed.
869:
If the present appeal is )iven course, the ,hole case a)ainst the accused-employee -ecomes
open to revie,. It thus follo,s that a penalty hi)her than that ,hich has already -een imposed -y the
trial court may -e meted out to him. &etitionerPs appeal ,ould thus violate his ri)ht a)ainst dou-le
5eopardy, since the 5ud)ment a)ainst him could -ecome su-5ect to modification ,ithout his consent.
=e are not in a position to second-)uess the reason ,hy the accused effectively ,aived his ri)ht
to appeal -y 5umpin) -ail. It is clear, thou)h, that petitioner may not appeal ,ithout violatin) his ri)ht
a)ainst dou-le 5eopardy.
Effect of Abscondin"
on the Appeal Process
+oreover, ,ithin the meanin) of the principles )overnin) the prevailin) criminal procedure, the
accused impliedly ,ithdre, his appeal -y 5umpin) -ail and there-y made the 5ud)ment of the court
-elo, final.
86":
*avin) -een a fu)itive from 5ustice for a lon) period of time, he is deemed to have ,aived
his ri)ht to appeal. 2hus, his conviction is no, final and e<ecutory. 2he Court in "eople v. !n*
Gioc
86!:
ruled1
CThere are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even by the accused himself& but the right of appeal
is not one of them. This right is granted solely for the benefit of the accused. ,e may avail of it or not& as he
pleases. ,e may waive it either e/pressly or by implication. 4hen the accused flees after the case has been
submitted to the court for decision& he will be deemed to have waived his right to appeal from the judgment
rendered against him. / / /.D
863:
Dy fleein), the herein accused e<hi-ited contempt of the authority of the court and placed himself
in a position to speculate on his chances for a reversal. In the process, he .ept himself out of the reach
of 5ustice, -ut hoped to render the 5ud)ment nu)atory at his option.
86$:
@uch conduct is intolera-le and
does not invite leniency on the part of the appellate court.
869:
Conse/uently, the 5ud)ment a)ainst an appellant ,ho escapes and ,ho refuses to surrender to
the proper authorities -ecomes final and e<ecutory.
89%:
2hus far, ,e have clarified that petitioner has no ri)ht to appeal the criminal case a)ainst the
accused-employee4 that -y 5umpin) -ail, he has ,aived his ri)ht to appeal4 and that the 5ud)ment in the
criminal case a)ainst him is no, final.
%ubsidiary !iability
&pon Finality of Jud"ment
As a matter of la,, the su-sidiary lia-ility of petitioner no, accrues. &etitioner ar)ues that the
rulin)s of this Court in (iranda v. (alate Gara*e > 6axicab' Inc.'
89:
!lvare5 v. #!
892:
and ?usay v.
!dil
896:
do not apply to the present case, -ecause it has follo,ed the CourtPs directive to the employers in
these cases to ta.e part in the criminal cases a)ainst their employees. Dy participatin) in the defense
of its employee, herein petitioner tries to shield itself from the undisputed rulin)s laid do,n in these
leadin) cases.
@uch posturin) is untena-le. In dissectin) these cases on su-sidiary lia-ility, petitioner lost trac.
of the most -asic tenet they have laid do,n -- that an employerPs lia-ility in a findin) of )uilt a)ainst its
accused-employee is su-sidiary.
Bnder Article %6 of the (evised &enal Code, employers are su-sidiarily lia-le for the ad5udicated
civil lia-ilities of their employees in the event of the latterPs insolvency.
899:
2he provisions of the (evised
&enal Code on su-sidiary lia-ility -- Articles %2 and %6 -- are deemed ,ritten into the 5ud)ments in the
cases to ,hich they are applica-le.
89":
2hus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need
not e<pressly pronounce the su-sidiary lia-ility of the employer.
In the a-sence of any collusion -et,een the accused-employee and the offended party, the
5ud)ment of conviction should -ind the person ,ho is su-sidiarily lia-le.
89!:
In effect and implication, the
sti)ma of a criminal conviction surpasses mere civil lia-ility.
893:
2o allo, employers to dispute the civil lia-ility fi<ed in a criminal case ,ould ena-le them to
amend, nullify or defeat a final 5ud)ment rendered -y a competent court.
89$:
Dy the same to.en, to allo,
them to appeal the final criminal conviction of their employees ,ithout the latterPs consent ,ould also
result in improperly amendin), nullifyin) or defeatin) the 5ud)ment.
2he decision convictin) an employee in a criminal case is -indin) and conclusive upon the
employer not only ,ith re)ard to the formerPs civil lia-ility, -ut also ,ith re)ard to its amount. 2he lia-ility
of an employer cannot -e separated from that of the employee.
899:
Defore the employersP su-sidiary lia-ility is e<acted, ho,ever, there must -e ade/uate evidence
esta-lishin) that 7; they are indeed the employers of the convicted employees4 72; that the former are
en)a)ed in some .ind of industry4 76; that the crime ,as committed -y the employees in the dischar)e
of their duties4 and 79; that the e<ecution a)ainst the latter has not -een satisfied due to insolvency.
8"%:
2he resolution of these issues need not -e done in a separate civil action. Dut the determination
must -e -ased on the evidence that the offended party and the employer may fully and freely
present. @uch determination may -e done in the same criminal action in ,hich the employeePs lia-ility,
criminal and civil, has -een pronounced4
8":
and in a hearin) set for that precise purpose, ,ith due notice
to the employer, as part of the proceedin)s for the e<ecution of the 5ud)ment.
Just -ecause the present petitioner participated in the defense of its accused-employee does not
mean that its lia-ility has transformed its nature4 its lia-ility remains su-sidiary. #either ,ill its
participation erase its su-sidiary lia-ility. 2he fact remains that since the accused-employeePs
conviction has attained finality, then the su-sidiary lia-ility of the employer ipso facto attaches.
Accordin) to the ar)ument of petitioner, fairness dictates that ,hile the finality of conviction could
-e the proper sanction to -e imposed upon the accused for 5umpin) -ail, the same sanction should not
affect it. In effect, petitioner-employer splits this case into t,o1 first, for itself4 and second, for its
accused-employee.
2he untena-ility of this ar)ument is clearly evident. 2here is only one criminal case a)ainst the
accused-employee. A findin) of )uilt has -oth criminal and civil aspects. It is the hei)ht of a-surdity for
this sin)le case to -e final as to the accused ,ho 5umped -ail, -ut not as to an entity ,hose lia-ility is
dependent upon the conviction of the former.
2he su-sidiary lia-ility of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil lia-ility of
the accused-employee. @ince the civil lia-ility of the latter has -ecome final and enforcea-le -y reason
of his fli)ht, then the formerPs su-sidiary civil lia-ility has also -ecome immediately
enforcea-le. (espondent is correct in ar)uin) that the concept of su-sidiary lia-ility is hi)hly contin)ent
on the imposition of the primary civil lia-ility.
'o eprivation
of ue Process
As to the ar)ument that petitioner ,as deprived of due process, ,e reiterate that ,hat is sou)ht to
-e enforced is the su-sidiary civil lia-ility incident to and dependent upon the employeePs criminal
ne)li)ence. In other ,ords, the employer -ecomes ipso facto su-sidiarily lia-le upon the conviction of
the employee and upon proof of the latterPs insolvency, in the same ,ay that ac/uittal ,ipes out not only
his primary civil lia-ility, -ut also his employerPs su-sidiary lia-ility for his criminal ne)li)ence.
8"2:
It should -e stressed that the ri)ht to appeal is neither a natural ri)ht nor a part of due process.
8"6:
It is merely a procedural remedy of statutory ori)in, a remedy that may -e e<ercised only in the
manner prescri-ed -y the provisions of la, authorizin) such e<ercise.
8"9:
*ence, the le)al re/uirements
must -e strictly complied ,ith.
8"":
It ,ould -e incorrect to consider the re/uirements of the rules on appeal as merely harmless and
trivial technicalities that can -e discarded.
8"!:
Indeed, deviations from the rules cannot -e tolerated.
8"3:
In
these times ,hen court doc.ets are clo))ed ,ith numerous liti)ations, such rules have to -e follo,ed
-y parties ,ith )reater fidelity, so as to facilitate the orderly disposition of those cases.
8"$:
After a 5ud)ment has -ecome final, vested ri)hts are ac/uired -y the ,innin) party. If the proper
losin) party has the ri)ht to file an appeal ,ithin the prescri-ed period, then the former has the
correlative ri)ht to en5oy the finality of the resolution of the case.
8"9:
In fact, petitioner admits that -y helpin) the accused-employee, it participated in the proceedin)s
-efore the (2C4 thus, it cannot -e said that the employer ,as deprived of due process. It mi)ht have
lost its ri)ht to appeal, -ut it ,as not denied its day in court.
8!%:
In fact, it can -e said that -y 5umpin) -ail,
the accused-employee, not the court, deprived petitioner of the ri)ht to appeal.
All told, ,hat is left to -e done is to e<ecute the (2C ?ecision a)ainst the accused. It should -e
clear that only after proof of his insolvency may the su-sidiary lia-ility of petitioner -e enforced. It has
-een sufficiently proven that there e<ists an employer-employee relationship4 that the employer is
en)a)ed in some .ind of industry4 and that the employee has -een ad5ud)ed )uilty of the ,ron)ful act
and found to have committed the offense in the dischar)e of his duties. 2he proof is clear from the
admissions of petitioner that Q8o:n 2! Au)ust 99%, while on its re*ular trip from 7aoa* to (anila,
a passen*er bus owned by petitioner, bein* then operated by petitioner@s driver, #apoleon
(oman, fi*ured in an accident in 9an )uan' 7a Union < < <.R
8!:
#either does petitioner dispute that there
,as already a findin) of )uilt a)ainst the accused ,hile he ,as in the dischar)e of his duties.
@+ERE1ORE, the &etition is here-y :04I0:' and the assailed (esolutions !$$IR(0:. Costs
a)ainst petitioner.
6O ORDERED.
G.R. No. 74041 3.*y 29, 1987
T+E PEOPLE O1 T+E P+ILIPPINE6, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROGELIO LIGON y TRIA6 and 1ERNANDO GA/AT y ALMERA, accused,
1ERNANDO GA/AT y ALMERA, accused-appellant.
2AP, J.:
2his is an appeal from the 5ud)ment of the (e)ional 2rial Court of +anila, Dranch II, rendered on
Fe-ruary 3, 9$!, convictin) the accused-appellant, Fernando Ca-at, of the crime of (o--ery ,ith
*omicide and sentencin) him to reclusion perpetua. 2he victim ,as Jose (osales y >rtiz, a
,@eventeen-year old ,or.in) student ,ho ,as earnin) his .eep as a ci)arette vendor. *e ,as alle)edly
ro--ed of 's ci)arette -o< containin) ci)arettes ,orth &6%%.%% more or less.

>nly Fernando Ca-at ,as arrested and -rou)ht to trial and convicted. 2he other accused, (o)elio
Ai)on, ,as never apprehended and is still at lar)e.
2he fatal incident happened on a @unday, >cto-er 26, 9$6 at a-out !1% p.m. 2he accused, Fernando
Ca-at, ,as ridin) in a 93$ Fol.s,a)en Mom-i o,ned -y his father, Antonio Ca-at, and driven -y the
other accused, (o)elio Ai)on. 2he Mom-i ,as comin) from 'spana @treet )oin) to,ards the direction
of Quiapo. Fernando Ca-at ,as seated -eside the driver, in the front seat -y the ,indo, on the ri)ht
side of the Mom-i. At the intersection of Quezon Doulevard and Aerma @treet -efore turnin) left to,ards
the underpass at C.+. (ecto Avenue, the Mom-i had to stop as the traffic li)ht ,as red. =hile ,aitin)
for the traffic li)ht to chan)e, Fernando Ca-at -ec.oned a ci)arette vendor, Jose (osales y >rtiz
7(osales for short; to -uy some ci)arettes from him. (osales approached the Mom-i and handed Ca-at
t,o stic.s of ci)arettes. =hile this transaction ,as occurrin), the traffic li)ht chan)ed to )reen, and the
Mom-i driven -y (o)elio Ai)on suddenly moved for,ard. As to ,hat precisely happened -et,een Ca-at
and (osales at the crucial moment, and immediately thereafter, is the su-5ect of conflictin) versions -y
the prosecution and the defense. It is not controverted, ho,ever, that as the Mom-i continued to speed
to,ards Quiapo, (osales clun) to the ,indo, of the Mom-i -ut apparently lost his )rip and fell do,n on
the pavement. (osales ,as rushed -y some -ystanders to the &hilippine Ceneral *ospital, ,here he
,as treated for multiple physical in5uries and ,as confined thereat until his death on >cto-er 6%, 9$6.
Follo,in) close -ehind the Mom-i at the time of the incident ,as a ta<ica- driven -y &rudencio Castillo.
*e ,as -ehind the Mom-i, at a distance of a-out three meters, travellin) on the same lane in a sli)htly
o-li/ue position 70a little -it to the ri)ht0;.
2
As the Mom-i did not stop after the victim fell do,n on the
pavement near the foot of the underpass, Castillo pursued it as it sped to,ards (o<as Doulevard,
-eepin) his horn to ma.e the driver stop. =hen they reached the Auneta near the (izal monument,
Castillo sa, an o,ner-type 5eep ,ith t,o persons in it. *e sou)ht their assistance in chasin) the Mom-i,
tellin) them 0naaasidente n* tao.0
6
2he t,o men in the 5eep 5oined the chase and at the intersection of
Fito Cruz and (o<as Doulevard, Castillo ,as a-le to overta.e the Mom-i ,hen the traffic li)ht turned
red. *e immediately -loc.ed the Mom-i ,hile the 5eep pulled up ri)ht -ehind it. 2he t,o men on -oard
the 5eep turned out to -e police officers, &atrolmen Aeonardo &u)ao and &eter I)nacio. 2hey dre, their
)uns and told the driver, (o)elio Ai)on, and his companion, Fernando Ca-at, to ali)ht from the Mom-i.
It ,as found out that there ,as a third person inside the Mom-i, a certain (odolfo &rimicias ,ho ,as
sleepin) at the rear seat.
9
2he three ,ere all -rou)ht -y the police officers to the =estern &olice ?istrict
and turned over to &fc. Fernan &ayuan. 2he ta<ica- driver, &rudencio Castillo, also ,ent alon) ,ith
them. 2he ,ritten statements of Castillo and (odolfo &rimicias ,ere ta.en -y the traffic investi)ator,
&fc. Fernan &ayuan.
"
&ayuan also prepared a 2raffic Accident (eport, dated >cto-er 26,
9$6.
!
Fernando Ca-at and (odolfo &rimicias ,ere released early mornin) the follo,in) day, -ut
(o)elio Ai)on ,as detained and turned over to the City FiscalGs >ffice for further investi)ation.
Investi)atin) Fiscal Alfredo Cantos, filed an information in court a)ainst (o)elio Ai)on dated ?ecem-er
!, 9$6 char)in) him ,ith *omicide thru (ec.less Imprudence.
3
@i< months later, ho,ever, or on June
2$, 9$9, Assistant Fiscal Cantos filed another information a)ainst (o)elio Ai)on and Fernando Ca-at
for (o--ery ,ith *omicide.
$
*e filed the latter information on the -asis of a @upplemental Affidavit of
&rudencio Castillo
9
and a 5oint affidavit of Armando 'spino and (omeo Castil, ci)arette vendors, ,ho
alle)edly ,itnessed the incident on >cto-er 26, 9$6.
%
2hese affidavits ,ere already prepared and
merely s,orn to -efore Fiscal Cantos on January 3, 9$9.
>n >cto-er 6, 9$6, an autopsy ,as conducted -y the medico-le)al officer of the #ational Dureau of
Investi)ation, ?r. >rlando F. @alvador, ,ho stated in his autopsy report that the cause of death of
(osales ,as 0pneumonia hypostatic, -ilateral, secondary to traumatic in5uries of the head.0

2he prosecution tried to esta-lish, throu)h the sole testimony of the ta<ica- driver, &rudencio Castillo,
that Ca-at )ra--ed the -o< of ci)arettes from (osales and pried loose the latterGs hand from the
,indo, of the Mom-i, resultin) in the latter fallin) do,n and hittin) the pavement. In its decision, the
trial court summarized the testimony of Castillo as follo,s1 At a-out !1%% oGcloc. in the evenin) of
>cto-er 26, 9$6, Castillo ,as then drivin) his ta<ica- alon) Aerma @treet near Far 'astern Bniversity,
and at the intersection of Aerma and Quezon Doulevard, the traffic li)ht chan)ed from )reen to red. 2he
vehicular traffic stopped and &rudencio CastilloGs ta<i ,as ri)ht -ehind a Fol.s,a)en Mom-i. =hile
,aitin) for the traffic li)ht to chan)e to )reen, Castillo Idly ,atched the Fol.s,a)en Mom-i and sa,
Ca-at, the passen)er sittin) -eside the driver, si)nal to a ci)arette vendor. 2he ci)arette vendor,
(osales, approached the ri)ht side of the Mom-i. =hile (osales ,as handin) the ci)arettes to Ca-at,
the traffic li)ht suddenly chan)ed to )reen. =hen the Mom-i moved for,ard, Ca-at suddenly )ra--ed
the ci)arette -o< held -y (osales. 2a.en a-ac., Jose (osales ran -eside the Mom-i and ,as a-le to
hold on to the ,indo,sill of the ri)ht front door ,ith his ri)ht hand. =hile (osales ,as clin)in) to the
,indo,sill, ,ith -oth feet off the )round, the Mom-i continued to speed to,ards the C.+. (ecto
underpass. Castillo, ,ho ,as closely follo,in) the Mom-i, then sa, Ca-at forci-ly remove the hand of
(osales from the ,indo,sill and the latter fell face do,n on Quezon Doulevard near the (ecto
underpass.
2
2he version of the defense, on the other hand, ,as summarized -y the court as follo,s1 >n the date
and time in /uestion, Fernando Ca-at, 6 years old, an under,riter, ,as on -oard the Fol.s,a)en
Mom-i driven -y (o)elio Ai)on. 2he Mom-i had to stop at the intersection of Aerma @treet and Quezon
Doulevard ,hen the traffic li)ht turned red. Fernando Ca-at, ,ho ,anted to -uy ci)arettes, called a
ci)arette vendor ,ho approached the ri)ht side of the Mom-i. Ca-at -ou)ht t,o stic.s of ci)arettes and
handed to the ci)arette vendor, (osales, a &".%% -ill. In order to chan)e the &".%% -i), (osales placed
his ci)arette -o< containin) assorted ci)arettes on the ,indo,sill of the front door of the Mom-i -et,een
the arm of Ca-at and the ,indo, frame. @uddenly, the traffic li)ht chan)ed from red to )reen and
(o)elio Ai)on moved the vehicle for,ard, heedless of the transaction -et,een Ca-at and the ci)arette
vendor. As the vehicle sped on,ard, the ci)arette -o< ,hich ,as s/ueezed -et,een the ri)ht arm of
Ca-at and the ,indo, frame fell inside the Mom-i. (osales then ran -eside the vehicle and clun) to the
,indo,sill of the movin) vehicle. Ca-at testified that ,hen he sa, the ci)arette vendor clin)in) on the
side of the front door, he told Ai)on to veer to the ri)ht in order that (osales could )et off at the
side,al.. *o,ever, Ca-at declared, that Ai)on said that it could not -e done -ecause of the movin)
vehicular traffic. 2hen, ,hile the vehicle slo,ed do,n and Ai)on ,as maneuverin) to the ri)ht in an
attempt to )o to,ard the side,al., (osales lost his )rip on the ,indo, frame and fell to the pavement of
Quezon Doulevard. Ca-at alle)edly shouted at Ai)on to stop -ut Ai)on replied that they should )o on to
Aas &inas and report the incident to the parents of Ca-at, and later they ,ould come -ac. to the scene
of the incident. *o,ever, ,hile the Mom-i ,as speedin) alon) ?e,ey Doulevard, it ,as -loc.ed -y the
ta<i of &rudencio Castillo and a 5eep driven -y policemen. Ca-at and Ai)on ,ere -rou)ht to police
head/uarters, -ut neither of them e<ecuted any ,ritten statement.
6
2he trial court )ave full credence to the prosecutionGs version, statin) that there can -e no dou-t that
Ca-at forci-ly too. or )ra--ed the ci)arette -o< from (osales -ecause, other,ise, there could -e no
reason for the latter to run after the Mom-i and han) on to its ,indo,. 2he court also -elieved CastilloGs
testimony that Ca-at forci-ly removed or pried off the ri)ht hand of (osales from the ,indo,sill of the
Mom-i, other,ise, the latter could not have fallen do,n, havin) already -een a-le to -alance himself on
the step-oard.
>n the other hand, the trial court dismissed as incredi-le the testimony of Ca-at that the ci)arette
vendor placed the ci)arette -o< on the ,indo,sill of the Mom-i, holdin) it ,ith his left hand, ,hile he
,as tryin) to )et from his poc.et the chan)e for the "-peso -ill of Ca-at. 2he court said that it is of
common .no,led)e that ci)arette vendors plyin) their trade in the streets do not let )o of their ci)arette
-o<4 no vendor lets )o of his precious -o< of ci)arettes in order to chan)e a peso -in )iven -y a
customer.
As a rule, the findin)s of fact of the trial court are accorded )reat respect and are not distur-ed on
appeal, unless it is sho,s that the findin)s are not supported -y the evidence, or the court failed to
consider certain material facts and circumstances in its evaluation of the evidence. In the case at -ar, a
careful revie, of the record sho,s that certain material facts and circumstances had -een overloo.ed
-y the trial court ,hich, if ta.en into account, ,ould alter the result of the case in that they ,ould
introduce an element of reasona-le dou-t ,hich ,ould entitle the accused to ac/uittal.
=hile the prosecution ,itness, Castillo, may -e a disinterested ,itness ,ith no motive, accordin) to the
court a quo, 0other than to see that 5ustice -e done,0 his testimony, even if not tainted ,ith -ias, is not
entirely free from dou-t -ecause his o-servation of the event could have -een faulty or mista.en. 2he
ta<ica- ,hich Castillo ,as drivin) ,as lo,er in hei)ht compared to the Mom-i in ,hich Ca-at ,as
ridin)-a fact admitted -y Castillo at the trial.
9
Judicial notice may also -e ta.en of the fact that the rear
,indshield of the 93$ Fol.s,a)en Mom-i is on the upper portion, occupyin) appro<imately one-third
7K6; of the rear end of the vehicle, thus ma.in) it visually difficult for Castillo to o-serve clearly ,hat
transpired inside the Mom-i at the front end ,here Ca-at ,as seated. 2hese are circumstances ,hich
must -e ta.en into consideration in evaluatin) CastilloGs testimony as to ,hat e<actly happened
-et,een Ca-at and the ci)arette vendor durin) that crucial moment -efore the latter fell do,n. As the
ta<ica- ,as ri)ht -ehind the Mom-i, follo,in) it at a distance of a-out three meters, CastilloGs line of
vision ,as partially o-structed -y the -ac. part of the Mom-i. *is testimony that he sa, Ca-at )ra- the
ci)arette -o< from (osales and forci-ly pry loose the latterGs hand from the ,indo,sill of the Mom-i is
thus su-5ect to a reasona-le dou-t, specially considerin) that this occurrence happened in 5ust a matter
of seconds, and -oth vehicles durin) that time ,ere movin) fast in the traffic.
=e find it si)nificant that in his statement )iven to the police that very evenin),
"
Castillo did not mention
that he sa, Ca-at forci-ly pryin) off the hand of (osales from the ,indo,sill of the Mom-i, althou)h the
police report prepared -y the investi)atin) officer, &fc. Fermin +. &ayuan, on the same date, stated that
,hen the traffic si)nal chan)ed to )reen and the driver stepped on the )as, the ci)arette -o< of the
ci)arette vendor 7(osales; ,as )ra--ed -y the passen)er Ca-at and 0instantly the former clun) to the
door and ,as dra))ed at a distance ,hile at the same time the latter punched the vendorGs arm until the
same 7sic; fell to the pavement,0 thus sho,in) that durin) the police investi)ation Castillo must have
)iven a statement to the police ,hich indicated that Ca-at did somethin) to cause (osales to fall from
the Mom-i.
!
It ,as -y ,ay of a supplementary affidavit prepared -y the la,yer of the complainant and
s,orn to -y Castillo -efore the Assistant City Fiscal on January 3, 9$9 that this vital detail ,as added.
2his supplementary affidavit ,as made the -asis for filin) another information char)in) -oth Ca-at and
the driver ,ith the crime of (o--ery ,ith *omicide.
Considerin) the a-ove circumstances, the Court is not convinced ,ith moral certainty that the )uilt of
the accused Fernando Ca-at has -een esta-lished -eyond reasona-le dou-t. In our vie,, the /uantum
of proof necessary to sustain Ca-atGs conviction of so serious a crime as ro--ery ,ith homicide has not
-een met in this case. *e is therefore entitled to ac/uittal on reasona-le dou-t.
*o,ever, it does not follo, that a person ,ho is not criminally lia-le is also free from civil
lia-ility.-avvphi- =hile the )uilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must -e esta-lished -eyond
reasona-le dou-t, only a preponderance of evidence is re/uired in a civil action for dama)es.
3
2he
5ud)ment of ac/uittal e<tin)uishes the civil lia-ility of the accused only ,hen it includes a declaration
that the facts from ,hich the civil lia-ility mi)ht arise did not e<ist.
$
2he reason for the provisions of Article 29 of the Civil Code, ,hich provides that the ac/uittal of the
accused on the )round that his )uilt has not -een proved -eyond reasona-le dou-t does not
necessarily e<empt him from civil lia-ility for the same act or omission, has -een e<plained -y the Code
Commission as follo,s1
2he old rule that the ac/uittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil
lia-ility is one of the most serious fla,s in the &hilippine le)al system. It has )iven rise to
num-erless instances of miscarria)e of 5ustice, ,here the ac/uittal ,as due to a reasona-le
dou-t in the mind of the court as to the )uilt of the accused. 2he reasonin) follo,ed is that
inasmuch as the civil responsi-ility is derived from the criminal offense, ,hen the latter is not
proved, civil lia-ility cannot -e demanded.
2his is one of those cases ,here confused thin.in) leads to unfortunate and deplora-le
conse/uences. @uch reasonin) fails to dra, a clear line of demarcation -et,een criminal
lia-ility and civil responsi-ility, and to determine the lo)ical result of the distinction. 2he t,o
lia-ilities are separate and distinct from each other. >ne affects the social order and the other,
private ri)hts. >ne is for the punishment or correction of the offender ,hile the other is for
reparation of dama)es suffered -y the a))rieved party. 2he t,o responsi-ilities are so different
from each other that article $6 of the present 7@panish; Civil Code reads thus1 02here may
-e a compromise upon the civil action arisin) from a crime4 -ut the pu-lic action for the
imposition of the le)al penalty shall not there-y -e e<tin)uished.0 It is 5ust and proper that, for
the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should -e proved
-eyond reasona-le dou-t. Dut for the purpose of indemnifyin) the complainin) party, ,hy
should the offense also -e proved -eyond reasona-le dou-tH Is not the invasion or violation of
every private ri)ht to -e proved only -y a preponderance of evidenceH Is the ri)ht of the
a))rieved person any less private -ecause the ,ron)ful act is also punisha-le -y the criminal
la,H
For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform under discussion.
It ,ill correct a serious defect in our la,. It ,ill close up an ine<hausti-le source of in5ustice a
cause for disillusionment on the part of the innumera-le persons in5ured or ,ron)ed.
9
In the instant case, ,e find that a preponderance of evidence e<ists sufficient to esta-lish the facts from
,hich the civil lia-ility of Ca-at arises. >n the -asis of the trial courtGs evaluation of the testimonies of
-oth prosecution and defense ,itnesses at the trial and applyin) the /uantum of proof re/uired in civil
cases, ,e find that a preponderance of evidence esta-lishes that Ca-at -y his act and omission ,ith
fault and ne)li)ence caused dama)e to (osales and should ans,er civilly for the dama)e done.
Ca-atGs ,ilfull act of callin) (osales, the ci)arette vendor, to the middle of a -usy street to -uy t,o
stic.s of ci)arettes set the chain of events ,hich led to the death of (osales. 2hrou)h fault and
ne)li)ence, Ca-at 7; failed to prevent the driver from movin) for,ard ,hile the purchase ,as
completed4 72; failed to help (osales ,hile the latter clun) precariously to the movin) vehicle, and 76;
did not enforce his order to the driver to stop. Finally, Ca-at ac/uiesced in the driverGs act of speedin)
a,ay, instead of stoppin) and pic.in) up the in5ured victim. 2hese proven facts ta.en to)ether are firm
-ases for findin) Ca-at civilly lia-le under the Civil Code
2%
for the dama)e done to (osales.
=*'('F>(', 5ud)ment is rendered ac/uittin) the appellant Ca-at for the crime of (o--ery ,ith
*omicide. *o,ever, he is here-y held civilly lia-le for his acts and omissions, there -ein) fault or
ne)li)ence, and sentenced to indemnify the heirs of Jose (osales y >rtiz in the amount of &".%%%.%%
for the latterGs death, &,366.6" for hospital and medical e<penses, and &9,%%.%% for funeral
e<penses. 2he alle)ed loss of income amountin) to &2%,%%%.%%, not -ein) supported -y sufficient
evidence, is ?'#I'?. Costs de officio.
@> >(?'('?.
G.R. No. L-12191 O%!o4#$ 14, 1918
3O6E CANGCO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MANILA RAILROAD CO., defendant-appellee.
Ramon 9otelo for appellant.
Aincaid > <arti*an for appellee.

1I6+ER, J.:
At the time of the occurrence ,hich )ave rise to this liti)ation the plaintiff, Jose Can)co, ,as in the
employment of +anila (ailroad Company in the capacity of cler., ,ith a monthly ,a)e of &2". *e lived
in the pue-lo of @an +ateo, in the province of (izal, ,hich is located upon the line of the defendant
railroad company4 and in comin) daily -y train to the companyGs office in the city of +anila ,here he
,or.ed, he used a pass, supplied -y the company, ,hich entitled him to ride upon the companyGs trains
free of char)e. Bpon the occasion in /uestion, January 2%, 9", the plaintiff arose from his seat in the
second class-car ,here he ,as ridin) and, ma.in), his e<it throu)h the door, too. his position upon the
steps of the coach, seizin) the upri)ht )uardrail ,ith his ri)ht hand for support.
>n the side of the train ,here passen)ers ali)ht at the @an +ateo station there is a cement platform
,hich -e)ins to rise ,ith a moderate )radient some distance a,ay from the companyGs office and
e<tends alon) in front of said office for a distance sufficient to cover the len)th of several coaches. As
the train slo,ed do,n another passen)er, named 'milio LuSi)a, also an employee of the railroad
company, )ot off the same car, ali)htin) safely at the point ,here the platform -e)ins to rise from the
level of the )round. =hen the train had proceeded a little farther the plaintiff Jose Can)co stepped off
also, -ut one or -oth of his feet came in contact ,ith a sac. of ,atermelons ,ith the result that his feet
slipped from under him and he fell violently on the platform. *is -ody at once rolled from the platform
and ,as dra,n under the movin) car, ,here his ri)ht arm ,as -adly crushed and lacerated. It appears
that after the plaintiff ali)hted from the train the car moved for,ard possi-ly si< meters -efore it came to
a full stop.
2he accident occurred -et,een 3 and $ oGcloc. on a dar. ni)ht, and as the railroad station ,as li)hted
dimly -y a sin)le li)ht located some distance a,ay, o-5ects on the platform ,here the accident occurred
,ere difficult to discern especially to a person emer)in) from a li)hted car.
2he e<planation of the presence of a sac. of melons on the platform ,here the plaintiff ali)hted is found
in the fact that it ,as the customary season for harvestin) these melons and a lar)e lot had -een
-rou)ht to the station for the shipment to the mar.et. 2hey ,ere contained in numerous sac.s ,hich
has -een piled on the platform in a ro, one upon another. 2he testimony sho,s that this ro, of sac.s
,as so placed of melons and the ed)e of platform4 and it is clear that the fall of the plaintiff ,as due to
the fact that his foot ali)hted upon one of these melons at the moment he stepped upon the platform.
*is statement that he failed to see these o-5ects in the dar.ness is readily to -e credited.
2he plaintiff ,as dra,n from under the car in an unconscious condition, and it appeared that the in5uries
,hich he had received ,ere very serious. *e ,as therefore -rou)ht at once to a certain hospital in the
city of +anila ,here an e<amination ,as made and his arm ,as amputated. 2he result of this operation
,as unsatisfactory, and the plaintiff ,as then carried to another hospital ,here a second operation ,as
performed and the mem-er ,as a)ain amputated hi)her up near the shoulder. It appears in evidence
that the plaintiff e<pended the sum of &39%.2" in the form of medical and sur)ical fees and for other
e<penses in connection ,ith the process of his curation.
Bpon Au)ust 6, 9", he instituted this proceedin) in the Court of First Instance of the city of +anila to
recover dama)es of the defendant company, foundin) his action upon the ne)li)ence of the servants
and employees of the defendant in placin) the sac.s of melons upon the platform and leavin) them so
placed as to -e a menace to the security of passen)er ali)htin) from the companyGs trains. At the
hearin) in the Court of First Instance, his *onor, the trial 5ud)e, found the facts su-stantially as a-ove
stated, and dre, therefrom his conclusion to the effect that, althou)h ne)li)ence ,as attri-uta-le to the
defendant -y reason of the fact that the sac.s of melons ,ere so placed as to o-struct passen)ers
passin) to and from the cars, nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in ali)htin)
from the coach and ,as therefore precluded form recoverin). Jud)ment ,as accordin)ly entered in
favor of the defendant company, and the plaintiff appealed.
It can not -e dou-ted that the employees of the railroad company ,ere )uilty of ne)li)ence in pilin)
these sac.s on the platform in the manner a-ove stated4 that their presence caused the plaintiff to fall
as he ali)hted from the train4 and that they therefore constituted an effective le)al cause of the in5uries
sustained -y the plaintiff. It necessarily follo,s that the defendant company is lia-le for the dama)e
there-y occasioned unless recovery is -arred -y the plaintiffGs o,n contri-utory ne)li)ence. In resolvin)
this pro-lem it is necessary that each of these conceptions of lia-ility, to-,it, the primary responsi-ility of
the defendant company and the contri-utory ne)li)ence of the plaintiff should -e separately e<amined.
It is important to note that the foundation of the le)al lia-ility of the defendant is the contract of carria)e,
and that the o-li)ation to respond for the dama)e ,hich plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the
-reach of that contract -y reason of the failure of defendant to e<ercise due care in its performance.
2hat is to say, its lia-ility is direct and immediate, differin) essentially, in le)al vie,point from that
presumptive responsi-ility for the ne)li)ence of its servants, imposed -y article 9%6 of the Civil Code,
,hich can -e re-utted -y proof of the e<ercise of due care in their selection and supervision. Article
9%6 of the Civil Code is not applica-le to o-li)ations arisin) e< contractu, -ut only to e<tra-contractual
o-li)ations J or to use the technical form of e<pression, that article relates only to culpa a/uiliana and
not to culpa contractual.
+anresa 7vol. $, p. !3; in his commentaries upon articles %6 and %9 of the Civil Code, clearly points
out this distinction, ,hich ,as also reco)nized -y this Court in its decision in the case of
(a.es vs. Atlantic, Culf and &acific Co. 73 &hil. rep., 6"9;. In commentin) upon article %96 +anresa
clearly points out the difference -et,een 0culpa, su-stantive and independent, ,hich of itself constitutes
the source of an o-li)ation -et,een persons not formerly connected -y any le)al tie0
and culpa considered as an accident in the performance of an o-li)ation already e<istin) . . . .0
In the (a.es case 7supra; the decision of this court ,as made to rest s/uarely upon the proposition that
article 9%6 of the Civil Code is not applica-le to acts of ne)li)ence ,hich constitute the -reach of a
contract.
Bpon this point the Court said1
2he acts to ,hich these articles 89%2 and 9%6 of the Civil Code: are applica-le are
understood to -e those not )ro,in) out of pre-e<istin) duties of the parties to one another. Dut
,here relations already formed )ive rise to duties, ,hether sprin)in) from contract or /uasi-
contract, then -reaches of those duties are su-5ect to article %, %6, and %9 of the same
code. 7(a.es vs. Atlantic, Culf and &acific Co., 3 &hil. (ep., 6"9 at 6!".;
2his distinction is of the utmost importance. 2he lia-ility, ,hich, under the @panish la,, is, in certain
cases imposed upon employers ,ith respect to dama)es occasioned -y the ne)li)ence of their
employees to persons to ,hom they are not -ound -y contract, is not -ased, as in the 'n)lish Common
Aa,, upon the principle of respondeat superior + if it ,ere, the master ,ould -e lia-le in every case
and unconditionally J -ut upon the principle announced in article 9%2 of the Civil Code, ,hich
imposes upon all persons ,ho -y their fault or ne)li)ence, do in5ury to another, the o-li)ation of ma.in)
)ood the dama)e caused. >ne ,ho places a po,erful automo-ile in the hands of a servant ,hom he
.no,s to -e i)norant of the method of mana)in) such a vehicle, is himself )uilty of an act of ne)li)ence
,hich ma.es him lia-le for all the conse/uences of his imprudence. 2he o-li)ation to ma.e )ood the
dama)e arises at the very instant that the uns.illful servant, ,hile actin) ,ithin the scope of his
employment causes the in5ury. 2he lia-ility of the master is personal and direct. Dut, if the master has
not -een )uilty of any ne)li)ence ,hatever in the selection and direction of the servant, he is not lia-le
for the acts of the latter, ,hatever done ,ithin the scope of his employment or not, if the dama)e done
-y the servant does not amount to a -reach of the contract -et,een the master and the person in5ured.
It is not accurate to say that proof of dili)ence and care in the selection and control of the servant
relieves the master from lia-ility for the latterGs acts J on the contrary, that proof sho,s that the
responsi-ility has never e<isted. As +anresa says 7vol. $, p. !$; the lia-ility arisin) from e<tra-
contractual culpa is al,ays -ased upon a voluntary act or omission ,hich, ,ithout ,illful intent, -ut -y
mere ne)li)ence or inattention, has caused dama)e to another. A master ,ho e<ercises all possi-le
care in the selection of his servant, ta.in) into consideration the /ualifications they should possess for
the dischar)e of the duties ,hich it is his purpose to confide to them, and directs them ,ith e/ual
dili)ence, there-y performs his duty to third persons to ,hom he is -ound -y no contractual ties, and he
incurs no lia-ility ,hatever if, -y reason of the ne)li)ence of his servants, even ,ithin the scope of their
employment, such third person suffer dama)e. 2rue it is that under article 9%6 of the Civil Code the la,
creates a presumption that he has -een ne)li)ent in the selection or direction of his servant, -ut the
presumption is re-utta-le and yield to proof of due care and dili)ence in this respect.
2he supreme court of &orto (ico, in interpretin) identical provisions, as found in the &orto (ico Code,
has held that these articles are applica-le to cases of e<tra-contractual culpa e<clusively.
7Carmona vs. Cuesta, 2% &orto (ico (eports, 2".;
2his distinction ,as a)ain made patent -y this Court in its decision in the case of Dahia vs. Aiton5ua and
Aeynes, 76% &hil. rep., !29;, ,hich ,as an action -rou)ht upon the theory of the e<tra-contractual
lia-ility of the defendant to respond for the dama)e caused -y the carelessness of his employee ,hile
actin) ,ithin the scope of his employment. 2he Court, after citin) the last para)raph of article 9%6 of
the Civil Code, said1
From this article t,o thin)s are apparent1 7; 2hat ,hen an in5ury is caused -y the ne)li)ence
of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of la, that there ,as ne)li)ence
on the part of the master or employer either in selection of the servant or employee, or in
supervision over him after the selection, or -oth4 and 72; that that presumption is juris
tantum and not juris et de jure, and conse/uently, may -e re-utted. It follo,s necessarily that if
the employer sho,s to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has
e<ercised the care and dili)ence of a )ood father of a family, the presumption is overcome and
he is relieved from lia-ility.
2his theory -ases the responsi-ility of the master ultimately on his own ne)li)ence and not on
that of his servant. 2his is the nota-le peculiarity of the @panish la, of ne)li)ence. It is, of
course, in stri.in) contrast to the American doctrine that, in relations ,ith stran)ers, the
ne)li)ence of the servant in conclusively the ne)li)ence of the master.
2he opinion there e<pressed -y this Court, to the effect that in case of e<tra-contractual culpa -ased
upon ne)li)ence, it is necessary that there shall have -een some fault attri-uta-le to the defendant
personally, and that the last para)raph of article 9%6 merely esta-lishes a re-utta-le presumption, is in
complete accord ,ith the authoritative opinion of +anresa, ,ho says 7vol. 2, p. !; that the lia-ility
created -y article 9%6 is imposed -y reason of the -reach of the duties inherent in the special relations
of authority or superiority e<istin) -et,een the person called upon to repair the dama)e and the one
,ho, -y his act or omission, ,as the cause of it.
>n the other hand, the lia-ility of masters and employers for the ne)li)ent acts or omissions of their
servants or a)ents, ,hen such acts or omissions cause dama)es ,hich amount to the -reach of a
contact, is not -ased upon a mere presumption of the masterGs ne)li)ence in their selection or control,
and proof of e<ercise of the utmost dili)ence and care in this re)ard does not relieve the master of his
lia-ility for the -reach of his contract.
'very le)al o-li)ation must of necessity -e e<tra-contractual or contractual. '<tra-contractual o-li)ation
has its source in the -reach or omission of those mutual duties ,hich civilized society imposes upon it
mem-ers, or ,hich arise from these relations, other than contractual, of certain mem-ers of society to
others, )enerally em-raced in the concept of status. 2he le)al ri)hts of each mem-er of society
constitute the measure of the correspondin) le)al duties, mainly ne)ative in character, ,hich the
e<istence of those ri)hts imposes upon all other mem-ers of society. 2he -reach of these )eneral
duties ,hether due to ,illful intent or to mere inattention, if productive of in5ury, )ive rise to an o-li)ation
to indemnify the in5ured party. 2he fundamental distinction -et,een o-li)ations of this character and
those ,hich arise from contract, rests upon the fact that in cases of non-contractual o-li)ation it is the
,ron)ful or ne)li)ent act or omission itself ,hich creates the vinculum juris, ,hereas in contractual
relations the vinculum e<ists independently of the -reach of the voluntary duty assumed -y the parties
,hen enterin) into the contractual relation.
=ith respect to e<tra-contractual o-li)ation arisin) from ne)li)ence, ,hether of act or omission, it is
competent for the le)islature to elect J and our Ae)islature has so elected J ,hom such an o-li)ation
is imposed is morally culpa-le, or, on the contrary, for reasons of pu-lic policy, to e<tend that lia-ility,
,ithout re)ard to the lac. of moral culpa-ility, so as to include responsi-ility for the ne)li)ence of those
person ,ho acts or mission are imputa-le, -y a le)al fiction, to others ,ho are in a position to e<ercise
an a-solute or limited control over them. 2he le)islature ,hich adopted our Civil Code has elected to
limit e<tra-contractual lia-ility J ,ith certain ,ell-defined e<ceptions J to cases in ,hich moral
culpa-ility can -e directly imputed to the persons to -e char)ed. 2his moral responsi-ility may consist in
havin) failed to e<ercise due care in the selection and control of oneGs a)ents or servants, or in the
control of persons ,ho, -y reason of their status, occupy a position of dependency ,ith respect to the
person made lia-le for their conduct.
2he position of a natural or 5uridical person ,ho has underta.en -y contract to render service to
another, is ,holly different from that to ,hich article 9%6 relates. =hen the sources of the o-li)ation
upon ,hich plaintiffGs cause of action depends is a ne)li)ent act or omission, the -urden of proof rests
upon plaintiff to prove the ne)li)ence J if he does not his action fails. Dut ,hen the facts averred sho,
a contractual underta.in) -y defendant for the -enefit of plaintiff, and it is alle)ed that plaintiff has failed
or refused to perform the contract, it is not necessary for plaintiff to specify in his pleadin)s ,hether the
-reach of the contract is due to ,illful fault or to ne)li)ence on the part of the defendant, or of his
servants or a)ents. &roof of the contract and of its nonperformance is sufficientprima facie to ,arrant a
recovery.
As a )eneral rule . . . it is lo)ical that in case of e<tra-contractual culpa, a suin) creditor should
assume the -urden of proof of its e<istence, as the only fact upon ,hich his action is -ased4
,hile on the contrary, in a case of ne)li)ence ,hich presupposes the e<istence of a
contractual o-li)ation, if the creditor sho,s that it e<ists and that it has -een -ro.en, it is not
necessary for him to prove ne)li)ence. 7+anresa, vol. $, p. 3 89%3 ed., p. 3!:;.
As it is not necessary for the plaintiff in an action for the -reach of a contract to sho, that the -reach
,as due to the ne)li)ent conduct of defendant or of his servants, even thou)h such -e in fact the actual
cause of the -reach, it is o-vious that proof on the part of defendant that the ne)li)ence or omission of
his servants or a)ents caused the -reach of the contract ,ould not constitute a defense to the action. If
the ne)li)ence of servants or a)ents could -e invo.ed as a means of dischar)in) the lia-ility arisin)
from contract, the anomalous result ,ould -e that person actin) throu)h the medium of a)ents or
servants in the performance of their contracts, ,ould -e in a -etter position than those actin) in person.
If one delivers a valua-le ,atch to ,atchma.er ,ho contract to repair it, and the -ailee, -y a personal
ne)li)ent act causes its destruction, he is un/uestiona-ly lia-le. =ould it -e lo)ical to free him from his
lia-ility for the -reach of his contract, ,hich involves the duty to e<ercise due care in the preservation of
the ,atch, if he sho,s that it ,as his servant ,hose ne)li)ence caused the in5uryH If such a theory
could -e accepted, 5uridical persons ,ould en5oy practically complete immunity from dama)es arisin)
from the -reach of their contracts if caused -y ne)li)ent acts as such 5uridical persons can of necessity
only act throu)h a)ents or servants, and it ,ould no dou-t -e true in most instances that reasona-le
care had -een ta.en in selection and direction of such servants. If one delivers securities to a -an.in)
corporation as collateral, and they are lost -y reason of the ne)li)ence of some cler. employed -y the
-an., ,ould it -e 5ust and reasona-le to permit the -an. to relieve itself of lia-ility for the -reach of its
contract to return the collateral upon the payment of the de-t -y provin) that due care had -een
e<ercised in the selection and direction of the cler.H
2his distinction -et,een culpa aquiliana, as the source of an o-li)ation, and culpa contractual as a
mere incident to the performance of a contract has fre/uently -een reco)nized -y the supreme court of
@pain. 79entencias of June 23, $994 #ovem-er 2%, $9!4 and ?ecem-er 6, $9!.; In the decisions of
#ovem-er 2%, $9!, it appeared that plaintiffGs action arose ex contractu, -ut that defendant sou)ht to
avail himself of the provisions of article 9%2 of the Civil Code as a defense. 2he @panish @upreme
Court re5ected defendantGs contention, sayin)1
2hese are not cases of in5ury caused, without any pre-existin* obli*ation, -y fault or
ne)li)ence, such as those to which article -BC, of the #ivil #ode relates, -ut of dama)es
caused -y the defendantGs failure to carry out the underta.in)s imposed -y the contracts . . . .
A -rief revie, of the earlier decision of this court involvin) the lia-ility of employers for dama)e done -y
the ne)li)ent acts of their servants ,ill sho, that in no case has the court ever decided that the
ne)li)ence of the defendantGs servants has -een held to constitute a defense to an action for dama)es
for -reach of contract.
In the case of Johnson vs. ?avid 7" &hil. (ep., !!6;, the court held that the o,ner of a carria)e ,as not
lia-le for the dama)es caused -y the ne)li)ence of his driver. In that case the court commented on the
fact that no evidence had -een adduced in the trial court that the defendant had -een ne)li)ent in the
employment of the driver, or that he had any .no,led)e of his lac. of s.ill or carefulness.
In the case of Daer @enior N CoGs @uccessors vs. Compania +aritima 7! &hil. (ep., 2";, the plaintiff
sued the defendant for dama)es caused -y the loss of a -ar)e -elon)in) to plaintiff ,hich ,as allo,ed
to )et adrift -y the ne)li)ence of defendantGs servants in the course of the performance of a contract of
to,a)e. 2he court held, citin) +anresa 7vol. $, pp. 29, !9; that if the 0o-li)ation of the defendant )re,
out of a contract made -et,een it and the plaintiff . . . ,e do not thin. that the provisions of articles 9%2
and 9%6 are applica-le to the case.0
In the case of Chapman vs. Bnder,ood 723 &hil. (ep., 639;, plaintiff sued the defendant to recover
dama)es for the personal in5uries caused -y the ne)li)ence of defendantGs chauffeur ,hile drivin)
defendantGs automo-ile in ,hich defendant ,as ridin) at the time. 2he court found that the dama)es
,ere caused -y the ne)li)ence of the driver of the automo-ile, -ut held that the master ,as not lia-le,
althou)h he ,as present at the time, sayin)1
. . . unless the ne)li)ent acts of the driver are continued for a len)th of time as to )ive the
o,ner a reasona-le opportunity to o-serve them and to direct the driver to desist
therefrom. . . . 2he act complained of must -e continued in the presence of the o,ner for such
len)th of time that the o,ner -y his ac/uiescence, ma.es the driverGs acts his o,n.
In the case of Eamada vs. +anila (ailroad Co. and Dachrach Cara)e N 2a<ica- Co. 766 &hil. (ep., $;, it
is true that the court rested its conclusion as to the lia-ility of the defendant upon article 9%6, althou)h
the facts disclosed that the in5ury complaint of -y plaintiff constituted a -reach of the duty to him arisin)
out of the contract of transportation. 2he e<press )round of the decision in this case ,as that article
9%6, in dealin) ,ith the lia-ility of a master for the ne)li)ent acts of his servants 0ma.es the distinction
-et,een private individuals and pu-lic enterprise40 that as to the latter the la, creates a re-utta-le
presumption of ne)li)ence in the selection or direction of servants4 and that in the particular case the
presumption of ne)li)ence had not -een overcome.
It is evident, therefore that in its decision Eamada case, the court treated plaintiffGs action as thou)h
founded in tort rather than as -ased upon the -reach of the contract of carria)e, and an e<amination of
the pleadin)s and of the -riefs sho,s that the /uestions of la, ,ere in fact discussed upon this theory.
Fie,ed from the standpoint of the defendant the practical result must have -een the same in any event.
2he proof disclosed -eyond dou-t that the defendantGs servant ,as )rossly ne)li)ent and that his
ne)li)ence ,as the pro<imate cause of plaintiffGs in5ury. It also affirmatively appeared that defendant had
-een )uilty of ne)li)ence in its failure to e<ercise proper discretion in the direction of the servant.
?efendant ,as, therefore, lia-le for the in5ury suffered -y plaintiff, ,hether the -reach of the duty ,ere
to -e re)arded as constitutin) culpa aquiliana or culpa contractual. As +anresa points out 7vol. $, pp. 29
and !9; ,hether ne)li)ence occurs an incident in the course of the performance of a contractual
underta.in) or its itself the source of an e<tra-contractual underta.in) o-li)ation, its essential
characteristics are identical. 2here is al,ays an act or omission productive of dama)e due to
carelessness or inattention on the part of the defendant. Conse/uently, ,hen the court holds that a
defendant is lia-le in dama)es for havin) failed to e<ercise due care, either directly, or in failin) to
e<ercise proper care in the selection and direction of his servants, the practical result is identical in
either case. 2herefore, it follo,s that it is not to -e inferred, -ecause the court held in the Eamada case
that defendant ,as lia-le for the dama)es ne)li)ently caused -y its servants to a person to ,hom it ,as
-ound -y contract, and made reference to the fact that the defendant ,as ne)li)ent in the selection and
control of its servants, that in such a case the court ,ould have held that it ,ould have -een a )ood
defense to the action, if presented s/uarely upon the theory of the -reach of the contract, for defendant
to have proved that it did in fact e<ercise care in the selection and control of the servant.
2he true e<planation of such cases is to -e found -y directin) the attention to the relative spheres of
contractual and e<tra-contractual o-li)ations. 2he field of non- contractual o-li)ation is much more
-roader than that of contractual o-li)ations, comprisin), as it does, the ,hole e<tent of 5uridical human
relations. 2hese t,o fields, fi)uratively spea.in), concentric4 that is to say, the mere fact that a person is
-ound to another -y contract does not relieve him from e<tra-contractual lia-ility to such person. =hen
such a contractual relation e<ists the o-li)or may -rea. the contract under such conditions that the
same act ,hich constitutes the source of an e<tra-contractual o-li)ation had no contract e<isted
-et,een the parties.
2he contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried ,ith it, -y implication, the duty to carry him in
safety and to provide safe means of enterin) and leavin) its trains 7civil code, article 2"$;. 2hat duty,
-ein) contractual, ,as direct and immediate, and its non-performance could not -e e<cused -y proof
that the fault ,as morally imputa-le to defendantGs servants.
2he railroad companyGs defense involves the assumption that even )rantin) that the ne)li)ent conduct
of its servants in placin) an o-struction upon the platform ,as a -reach of its contractual o-li)ation to
maintain safe means of approachin) and leavin) its trains, the direct and pro<imate cause of the in5ury
suffered -y plaintiff ,as his o,n contri-utory ne)li)ence in failin) to ,ait until the train had come to a
complete stop -efore ali)htin). Bnder the doctrine of comparative ne)li)ence announced in the (a.es
case 7supra;, if the accident ,as caused -y plaintiffGs o,n ne)li)ence, no lia-ility is imposed upon
defendantGs ne)li)ence and plaintiffGs ne)li)ence merely contri-uted to his in5ury, the dama)es should
-e apportioned. It is, therefore, important to ascertain if defendant ,as in fact )uilty of ne)li)ence.
It may -e admitted that had plaintiff ,aited until the train had come to a full stop -efore ali)htin), the
particular in5ury suffered -y him could not have occurred. ?efendant contends, and cites many
authorities in support of the contention, that it is ne)li)ence per se for a passen)er to ali)ht from a
movin) train. =e are not disposed to su-scri-e to this doctrine in its a-solute form. =e are of the
opinion that this proposition is too -adly stated and is at variance ,ith the e<perience of every-day life.
In this particular instance, that the train ,as -arely movin) ,hen plaintiff ali)hted is sho,n conclusively
-y the fact that it came to stop ,ithin si< meters from the place ,here he stepped from it. 2housands of
person ali)ht from trains under these conditions every day of the year, and sustain no in5ury ,here the
company has .ept its platform free from dan)erous o-structions. 2here is no reason to -elieve that
plaintiff ,ould have suffered any in5ury ,hatever in ali)htin) as he did had it not -een for defendantGs
ne)li)ent failure to perform its duty to provide a safe ali)htin) place.
=e are of the opinion that the correct doctrine relatin) to this su-5ect is that e<pressed in 2hompsonGs
,or. on #e)li)ence 7vol. 6, sec. 6%%; as follo,s1
2he test -y ,hich to determine ,hether the passen)er has -een )uilty of ne)li)ence in
attemptin) to ali)ht from a movin) rail,ay train, is that of ordinary or reasona-le care. It is to
-e considered ,hether an ordinarily prudent person, of the a)e, se< and condition of the
passen)er, ,ould have acted as the passen)er acted under the circumstances disclosed -y
the evidence. 2his care has -een defined to -e, not the care ,hich may or should -e used -y
the prudent man )enerally, -ut the care ,hich a man of ordinary prudence ,ould use under
similar circumstances, to avoid in5ury.0 72hompson, Commentaries on #e)li)ence, vol. 6, sec.
6%%.;
>r, it ,e prefer to adopt the mode of e<position used -y this court in &icart vs. @mith 763 &hil. rep., $%9;,
,e may say that the test is this4 =as there anythin) in the circumstances surroundin) the plaintiff at the
time he ali)hted from the train ,hich ,ould have admonished a person of avera)e prudence that to )et
off the train under the conditions then e<istin) ,as dan)erousH If so, the plaintiff should have desisted
from ali)htin)4 and his failure so to desist ,as contri-utory ne)li)ence.-awphDl.net
As the case no, -efore us presents itself, the only fact from ,hich a conclusion can -e dra,n to the
effect that plaintiff ,as )uilty of contri-utory ne)li)ence is that he stepped off the car ,ithout -ein) a-le
to discern clearly the condition of the platform and ,hile the train ,as yet slo,ly movin). In considerin)
the situation thus presented, it should not -e overloo.ed that the plaintiff ,as, as ,e find, i)norant of the
fact that the o-struction ,hich ,as caused -y the sac.s of melons piled on the platform e<isted4 and as
the defendant ,as -ound -y reason of its duty as a pu-lic carrier to afford to its passen)ers facilities for
safe e)ress from its trains, the plaintiff had a ri)ht to assume, in the a-sence of some circumstance to
,arn him to the contrary, that the platform ,as clear. 2he place, as ,e have already stated, ,as dar., or
dimly li)hted, and this also is proof of a failure upon the part of the defendant in the performance of a
duty o,in) -y it to the plaintiff4 for if it ,ere -y any possi-ility concede that it had ri)ht to pile these
sac.s in the path of ali)htin) passen)ers, the placin) of them ade/uately so that their presence ,ould
-e revealed.
As pertinent to the /uestion of contri-utory ne)li)ence on the part of the plaintiff in this case the
follo,in) circumstances are to -e noted1 2he companyGs platform ,as constructed upon a level hi)her
than that of the road-ed and the surroundin) )round. 2he distance from the steps of the car to the spot
,here the ali)htin) passen)er ,ould place his feet on the platform ,as thus reduced, there-y
decreasin) the ris. incident to steppin) off. 2he nature of the platform, constructed as it ,as of cement
material, also assured to the passen)er a sta-le and even surface on ,hich to ali)ht. Furthermore, the
plaintiff ,as possessed of the vi)or and a)ility of youn) manhood, and it ,as -y no means so ris.y for
him to )et off ,hile the train ,as yet movin) as the same act ,ould have -een in an a)ed or fee-le
person. In determinin) the /uestion of contri-utory ne)li)ence in performin) such act J that is to say,
,hether the passen)er acted prudently or rec.lessly J the a)e, se<, and physical condition of the
passen)er are circumstances necessarily affectin) the safety of the passen)er, and should -e
considered. =omen, it has -een o-served, as a )eneral rule are less capa-le than men of ali)htin) ,ith
safety under such conditions, as the nature of their ,earin) apparel o-structs the free movement of the
lim-s. A)ain, it may -e noted that the place ,as perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it ,as his daily
custom to )et on and of the train at this station. 2here could, therefore, -e no uncertainty in his mind
,ith re)ard either to the len)th of the step ,hich he ,as re/uired to ta.e or the character of the platform
,here he ,as ali)htin). >ur conclusion is that the conduct of the plaintiff in underta.in) to ali)ht ,hile
the train ,as yet sli)htly under ,ay ,as not characterized -y imprudence and that therefore he ,as not
)uilty of contri-utory ne)li)ence.
2he evidence sho,s that the plaintiff, at the time of the accident, ,as earnin) &2" a month as a copyist
cler., and that the in5uries he has suffered have permanently disa-led him from continuin) that
employment. ?efendant has not sho,n that any other )ainful occupation is open to plaintiff. *is
e<pectancy of life, accordin) to the standard mortality ta-les, is appro<imately thirty-three years. =e are
of the opinion that a fair compensation for the dama)e suffered -y him for his permanent disa-ility is the
sum of &2,"%%, and that he is also entitled to recover of defendant the additional sum of &39%.2" for
medical attention, hospital services, and other incidental e<penditures connected ,ith the treatment of
his in5uries.
2he decision of lo,er court is reversed, and 5ud)ment is here-y rendered plaintiff for the sum of
&6,29%.2", and for the costs of -oth instances. @o ordered.
Arellano, C.J., 2orres, @treet and AvanceSa, JJ., concur.
L.+. 8o. 17!$!<%
PAZ FORES, petitioner&
vs.
IRENEO MIRANDA, respondent.
Alberto O. Villaraza for petitioner.
Almazan and Ereneta for respondent.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Defendant7petitioner *a9 Fores brings this petition for review of the decision of the (ourt of ;ppeals -(.;. (ase
8o. !:%F7+. awarding to the plaintiff7respondent =reneo #iranda the sums of *3&HHH by way of actual damages
and counsel fees& and *!H&HHH as moral damages& with costs.
+espondent was one of the passengers on a jeepney driven by 5ugenio 1uga. 4hile the vehicle was descending
the )ta. #esa bridge at an e/cessive rate of speed& the driver lost control thereof& causing it to swerve and to his
the bridge wall. The accident occurred on the morning of #arch $$& !'3%. Five of the passengers were injured&
including the respondent who suffered a fracture of the upper right humerus. ,e was taken to the 8ational
6rthopedic ,ospital for treatment& and later was subjected to a series of operationsA the first on #ay $%& !'3%&
when wire loops were wound around the broken bones and screwed into placeA a second& effected to insert a metal
splint& and a third one to remove such splint. ;t the time of the trial& it appears that respondent had not yet
recovered the use of his right arm.
The driver was charged with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence& and upon interposing a plea of
guilty was sentenced accordingly.
The contention that the evidence did not sufficiently establish the identity of the vehicle as the belonging to the
petitioner was rejected by the appellate court which found& among other things& that is carried plate 8o. T*27!!<%&
)5+=5) 6F !'3$& Mue9on (ity& registered in the name of *a9 Fores& -appellant herein. and that the vehicle even
had the name of "DoOa *a9" painted below its wind shield. 8o evidence to the contrary was introduced by the
petitioner& who relied on an attack upon the credibility of the two policemen who went to the scene of the incident.
; point to be further remarked is petitioner?s contention that on #arch $!& !'3%& or one day before the accident
happened& she allegedly sold the passenger jeep that was involved therein to a certain (armen )ackerman.
The initial problem raised by the petitioner in this appeal may be formulated thus P "=s the approval of the *ublic
)ervice (ommission necessary for the sale of a public service vehicle even without conveying therewith the
authority to operate the same>" ;ssuming the dubious sale to be a fact& the court of ;ppeals answered the query
in the affirmative. The ruling should be upheld.
)ection $H of the *ublic )ervice ;ct -Commonwealth Act No. 146. provides@
)ec. $H. )ubject to established limitations and e/ceptions and saving provisions to the contrary& it shall be
unlawful for any public service or for the owner& lessee or operator thereof& without the previous approval and
authority of the (ommission previously had P
/ / / / / / / / /
-g. To sell& alienate& mortgage& encumber or lease its property& franchises& certificates& privileges& or rights& or any
part thereofA or merge or consolidate its property& franchises& privileges or rights& or any part thereof& with those of
any other public service. The approval herein required shall be given& after notice to the public and after hearing
the persons interested at a public hearing& if it be shown that there are just and reasonable grounds for making the
mortgage or encumbrance& for liabilities of more than one year maturity& or the sale& alienation& lease& merger& or
consolidation to be approved and that the same are not detrimental to the public interest& and in case of a sale& the
date on which the same is to be consummated shall be fi/ed in the order of approval@ Provided& however& That
nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent the transaction from being negotiated or completed before
its approval or to prevent the sale& alienation& or lease by any public service of any of its property in the ordinary
course of its business.
=nterpreting the effects of this particular provision of law& we have held in the recent cases of Montoya vs.
Ignacio , 50 Of. Gaz. No. 1, p. 108
[[
*
]]
A imbol vs. Osias! et al.& L. +. 8o. 17F3:F& ;pril %H& !'33&
and Medina vs. "resencia& '' *hil.& 3H<A 3$ 6ff. La9. 8o. !H& p. :<H<& that a transfer contemplated by the
law& if made without the requisite approval of the *ublic )ervice (ommission& is not effective and binding in so far
as the responsibility of the grantee under the franchise in relation to the public is concerned. *etitioner assails&
however& the applicability of these rulings to the instant case& contending that in those cases& the operator did not
convey& by lease or by sale& the vehicle independently of his rights under the franchise. This line of reasoning does
not find support in the law. The provisions of the statute are clear and prohibit the sale& alienation& lease& or
encumbrance of the property& franchise& certificate& privileges or rights& or any part thereof of the owner or
operator of the public service (ommission. The law was designed primarily for the protection of the public
interestA and until the approval of the public )ervice (ommission is obtained the vehicle is& in contemplation of
law& still under the service of the owner or operator standing in the records of the (ommission which the public
has a right to rely upon.
The proviso contained in the aforequoted law& to the effect that nothing therein shall be construed "to prevent the
transaction from being negotiated or complete before its approval"& means only that the sale without the required
approval is still valid and binding between the parties -#ontoya vs. =gnacio& supra.. The phrase "in the ordinary
course of its business" found in the other proviso" or to prevent the sale& alienation& or lease by any public
service of any of its property". ;s correctly observed by the lower court& could not have been intended to include
the sale of the vehicle itself& but at most may refer only to such property that may be conceivably disposed or by
the carrier in the ordinary course of its business& like junked equipment or spare parts.
The case of Indalecio de orres vs. Vicente Ona (6 !h"l., 5#4, 5#$% is enlighteningA and there& it was
held@
2nder the law& the *ublic )ervice (ommission has not only general supervision and regulation of& but also full
jurisdiction and control over all public utilities including the property& equipment and facilities used& and the
property rights and franchise enjoyed by every individual and company engaged i the performance of a public
service in the sense this phrase is used in the *ublic )ervice ;ct or ;ct 8o. %!HI.. By virtue of the provisions of
said ;ct& motor vehicles used in the performance of a service! as the transportation of
freight from one point to another& have to this date been considered P and they cannot but be so considered7
public service propertyA and& by reason of its own nature& a T, truck& which means that the operator thereof
places it at the disposal of anybody who is willing to pay a rental of its use& when he desires to transfer or carry his
effects& merchandise or any other cargo from one place to another& is necessarily a public service property.
-5mphasis supplied.
6f course& this court has held in the case of #achrach Motor co. vs. $amboanga ransportation "o .,
5& !h"l., &44& that there may be a nunc pro tunc authori9ation which has the effect of having the approval
retroact to the date of the transferA but such outcome cannot prejudice rights intervening in the meantime. =t
appears that no such approval was given by the (ommission before the accident occurred.
The *!H&HHH actual damages awarded by the (ourt of First =nstance of #anila were reduced by the (ourt of
;ppeals to only *$&HHH& on the ground that a review of the records failed to disclose a sufficient basis for the trial
court?s appraisal& since the only evidence presented on this point consisted of respondent?s bare statement that his
e/penses and loss of income amounted to *$H&HHH. 6n the other hand& "it cannot be denied&" the lower court said&
"that appellee -respondent. did incur e/penses"? =t is well to note further that respondent was a painter by
profession and a professor of Fine ;rts& so that the amount of *$&HHH awarded cannot be said to be e/cessive -see
;rts. $$$: and $$$3& (ivil (ode of the *hilippines.. The attorney?s fees in the sum of *%&HHH also awarded to the
respondent are assailed on the ground that the (ourt of First =nstance did not provided for the same& and since no
appeal was interposed by said respondent& it was allegedly error for the (ourt of ;ppeals to award them motu
proprio. *etitioner fails to note that attorney?s fees are included in the concept of actual damages under the (ivil
(ode and may be awarded whenever the court deems it is just and equitable -;rt. $$HI& (ivil (ode of the
*hilippines.. 4e see no reason to alter these awards.
;nent the moral damages ordered to be paid to the respondent& the same must be discarded. 4e have repeatedly
ruled -Cache'o (). *an"la +ellow ,a-"ca. Co. /nc., 101 !h"l., 5&0 54 Of. Gaz., [&6],
65##A Nece)"to, et al (). !a'a), 104 !h"l., $50 56 Of. Gaz., [&] 40&& that moral damages are not
recoverable in damage actions predicted on a breach of the contract of transportation& in view of ;rticles $$!' and
$$$H of the new (ivil (ode& which provide as follows@
;rt. $$!'. #oral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases@
-!. ; criminal offense resulting in physical injuriesA
-$. Muasi7delicts causing physical injuriesA
/ / / / / / / / /
;rt. $$$H. 4illful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find
that& under circumstances& such damages are justify due. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the
defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
By contrasting the provisions of these two article it immediately becomes apparent that@
-a. =n case of breach of contract -including one of transportation. proof of bad faith or fraud -dolus.& i.e.& wanton
or deliberately injurious conduct& is essential to justify an award of moral damagesA and
-b. That a breach of contract can not be considered included in the descriptive term "analogous cases" used in ;rt.
$$!'A not only because ;rt. $$$H specifically provides for the damages that are caused by contractual breach& but
because the definition of %uasi&delict in ;rt. $!F< of the (ode e/pressly e'cludes the cases where there is a
"pree/isting contractual relation between the parties."
;rt. $!F<. 4hoever by act or omission causes damage to another& there being fault or negligence& is obliged to pay
for the damage dome. )uch fault or negligence& if there is no pre7e/isting contractual relation between the parties&
is called a quasi7delict and is governed by the provisions of this (hapter.
The e/ception to the basic rule of damages now under consideration is a mishap resulting in the death of a
passenger& in which case ;rticle !F<: makes the common carrier e/pressly subject to the rule of ;rt. $$H<& that
entitles the deceased passenger to "demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the
deceased" -8ecesito vs. *aras& !H: *hil.& I:& +esolution on motion to reconsider& )eptember !!& !'3I.. But the
e/ceptional rule of ;rt. !F<: makes it all the more evident that where the injured passenger does not die& moral
damages are not recoverable unless it is proved that the carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith. 4e think it is
clear that the mere carelessness of the carrier?s driver does not per se constitute of justify an inference of malice
or bad faith on the part of the carrierA and in the case at bar there is no other evidence of such malice to support the
award of moral damages by the (ourt of ;ppeals. To award moral damages for breach of contract& therefore&
without proof of bad faith or malice on the part of the defendant& as required by ;rt. $$H& would be to violate the
clear provisions of the law& and constitute unwarranted judicial legislation.
The (ourt of ;ppeals has invoked our rulings in "astro vs. Acro a'icab "o ., G.1. No. 4#155,
2ecem.e' 14, 1#48 and (ayda vs. "ourt of Appeals , #0 !h"l., $&4A but these doctrines were
predicated upon our former law of damages& before judicial discretion in fi/ing them became limited by the
e/press provisions of the new (ivil (ode -previously quoted.. ,ence& the aforesaid rulings are now inapplicable.
2pon the other hand& the advantageous position of a party suing a carrier for breach of the contract of
transportations e/plains& to some e/tent& the limitations imposed by the new (ode on the amount of the recovery.
The action for breach of contract imposes on the defendant carrier a presumption of liability upon mere proof of
injury to the passengerA that latter is relieved from the duty to established the fault of the carrier& or of his
employees& and the burden is placed on the carrier to prove that it was due to an unforseen event or to force
ma)eure -Can3co (). *an"la 1a"l'oa4 Co., 8 !h"l., $68, $$$.. #oreover& the carrier& unlike in suits
for quasi7delict& may not escape liability by proving that it has e/ercised due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees -;rt. !F3'& new civil codeA (angco vs. #anila +ailroad (o.& supra* Prado vs.
Manila Electric "o.! +, Phil.! -....
The difference in conditions& defenses and proof& as well as the codal concept of %uasi&delict as
essentially e'tra contractual negligence& compel us to differentiate between action e' contractu! and
actions %uasi e' delicto! and prevent us from viewing the action for breach of contract as simultaneously
embodying an action on tort. 8either can this action be taken as one to enforce on employee?s liability under ;rt.
!H% of the 1e(")e4 !enal Co4e& since the responsibility is not alleged to be subsidiary& nor is there on record
any averment or proof that the driver of appellant was insolvent. =n fact& he is not even made a party to the suit.
=t is also suggested that a carrier?s violation of its engagement to safety transport the passenger involves a breach
of the passenger?s confidence& and therefore should be regarded as a breach of contract in bad faith& justifying
recovery of moral damages under ;rt. $$$H. This theory is untenable& for under it the carrier would always be
deemed in bad faith& in every case its obligation to the passenger is infringed& and it would be never accountable
for simple negligenceA while under the law -;rt. !F3<.. the presumption is that common carriers
acted negligently -and not maliciously.& and ;rt. !F<$ speaks of negligence of the common carrier.
;+T. !F3<. =n case of death of or injuries to passengers& common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to
have acted negligently& unless they prove that they observed e/traordinary diligence as prescribed in article !F%%
and !F33.
;+T. !F<$. The contributory negligence of the passenger does not bar recovery of damages for his death or
injuries& if the pro/imate cause thereof is the negligence of the common carrier& but the amount of damages shall
be equitably reduced.
The distinction between fraud& bad faith or malice in the sense of deliberate or wanton wrong doing and
negligence -as mere carelessness. is too fundamental in our law to be ignored -;rts. !!FH7!!F$.A their
consequences being clearly differentiated by the (ode.
;+T. $$H!. =n contracts and quasi7contracts& the damages for which the obligor who acted in good faith is liable
shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the obligation& and which the parties
have foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.
=n case of fraud& bad faith& malice or wanton attitude& the obligor shall be responsible for all damages which may
be reasonably attributed to the non7performance of the obligation.
=t is to be presumed& in the absence of statutory provision to the contrary& that this difference was in the mind of
the lawmakers when in ;rt. $$$H they limited recovery of moral damages to breaches of contract in bad faith. =t is
true that negligence may be occasionally so gross as to amount to maliceA but that fact must be shown in evidence&
and a carrier?s bad faith is not to be lightly inferred from a mere finding that the contract was breached through
negligence of the carrier?s employees.
=n view of the foregoing considerations& the decision of the (ourt of ;ppeals is modified by eliminating the award
of *3&HHH.HH by way of moral damages. -(ourt of ;ppeals +esolution of #ay 3& !'3F.. =n all other respects& the
judgment is affirmed. 8o costs in this instance. )o ordered.
Paras! "./.! #engzon! Padilla! Montemayor! 0eyes! A.! #autista Angelo! (abrador!
"oncepcion and Endencia! //.! concur.
G.R. No. 108164 1#4$.a$y 23, 1990
1AR EA6T /AN9 AND TR76T COMPAN2, petitioner,
vs.
T+E +ONORA/LE CO7RT O1 APPEAL6, L7I6 A. L7NA and CLARITA 6. L7NA, respondents.

-IT7G, J.:
@ome time in >cto-er 9$!, private respondent Auis A. Auna applied for, and ,as accorded, a
FA('A@2CA(? issued -y petitioner Far 'ast Dan. and 2rust Company 70F'D2C0; at its &asi) Dranch.
Bpon his re/uest, the -an. also issued a supplemental card to private respondent Clarita @. Auna.
In Au)ust 9$$, Clarita lost her credit card. F'D2C ,as forth,ith informed. In order to replace the lost
card, Clarita su-mitted an affidavit of loss. In cases of this nature, the -an.Gs internal security
procedures and policy ,ould appear to -e to mean,hile so record the lost card, alon) ,ith the principal
card, as a 0*ot Card0 or 0Cancelled Card0 in its master file.
>n %! >cto-er 9$$, Auis tendered a despedida lunch for a close friend, a Filipino-American, and
another )uest at the Dahia (ooftop (estaurant of the *otel Intercontinental +anila. 2o pay for the lunch,
Auis presented his FA('A@2CA(? to the attendin) ,aiter ,ho promptly had it verified throu)h a
telephone call to the -an.Gs Credit Card ?epartment. @ince the card ,as not honored, Auis ,as forced
to pay in cash the -ill amountin) to &"$$.6. #aturally, Auis felt em-arrassed -y this incident.
In a letter, dated >cto-er 9$$, private respondent Auis Auna, throu)h counsel, demanded from
F'D2C the payment of dama)es. Adrian F. Feste5o, a vice-president of the -an., e<pressed the -an.Gs
apolo)ies to Auis. In his letter, dated %6 #ovem-er 9$$, Feste5o, in part, said1
In cases ,hen a card is reported to our office as lost, FA('A@2CA(? underta.es the
necessary action to avert its unauthorized use 7such as ta))in) the card as hotlisted;, as it is
al,ays our intention to protect our cardholders.
An investi)ation of your case ho,ever, revealed that FA('A@2CA(? failed to inform you
a-out its security policy. Furthermore, an overzealous employee of the Dan.Gs Credit Card
?epartment did not consider the possi-ility that it may have -een you ,ho ,as presentin) the
card at that time 7for ,hich reason, the unfortunate incident occurred;.
1
Feste5o also sent a letter to the +ana)er of the Dahia (ooftop (estaurant to assure the latter that
private respondents ,ere 0very valued clients0 of F'D2C. =illiam Anthony Min), Food and Devera)e
+ana)er of the Intercontinental *otel, ,rote -ac. to say that the credi-ility of private respondent had
never -een 0in /uestion.0 A copy of this reply ,as sent to Auis -y Feste5o.
@till evidently feelin) a))rieved, private respondents, on %" ?ecem-er 9$$, filed a complaint for
dama)es ,ith the (e)ional 2rial Court 70(2C0; of &asi) a)ainst F'D2C.
>n 6% +arch 99%, the (2C of &asi), )iven the fore)oin) factual settin)s, rendered a decision orderin)
F'D2C to pay private respondents 7a; &6%%,%%%.%% moral dama)es4 7-; &"%,%%%.%% e<emplary
dama)es4 and 7c; &2%,%%%.%% attorneyGs fees.
>n appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Its motion for reconsideration havin) -een denied -y the appellate court, F'D2C has come to this Court
,ith this petition for revie,.
2here is merit in this appeal.
In culpa contractual, moral dama)es may -e recovered ,here the defendant is sho,n to have acted in
-ad faith or ,ith malice in the -reach of the contract.
2
2he Civil Code provides1
Art. 222%. =illful in5ury to property may -e a le)al )round for a,ardin) moral dama)es if the
court should find that, under the circumstances, such dama)es are 5ustly due. 6he same rule
applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
7'mphasis supplied;
Dad faith, in this conte<t, includes *ross, -ut not simple, ne)li)ence.
3
'<ceptionally, in a contract
of carria*e, moral dama)es are also allo,ed in case of death of a passen)er attri-uta-le to the fault
7,hich is presumed
4
; of the common carrier.
0
Concededly, the -an. ,as remiss in indeed ne)lectin) to personally inform Auis of his o,n cardGs
cancellation. #othin) in the findin)s of the trial court and the appellate court, ho,ever, can sufficiently
indicate any deli-erate intent on the part of F'D2C to cause harm to private respondents. #either could
F'D2CGs ne)li)ence in failin) to )ive personal notice to Auis -e considered so )ross as to amount to
malice or -ad faith.
+alice or -ad faith implies a conscious and intentional desi)n to do a ,ron)ful act for a dishonest
purpose or moral o-li/uity4 it is different from the ne)ative idea of ne)li)ence in that malice or -ad faith
contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operatin) ,ith furtive desi)n or ill ,ill.
6
=e are not una,are of the previous rulin)s of this Court, such as in !merican 0xpress International'
Inc., vs.Intermediate !ppellate #ourt 7!3 @C(A 2%9; and Ban of "hilippine Islands vs. Intermediate
!ppellate #ourt72%! @C(A 9%$;, sanctionin) the application of Article 2, in relation to Article 223 and
Article 229
7
of the Civil Code to a contractual -reach similar to the case at -ench. Article 2 states1
Art. 2. Any person ,ho ,ilfully causes loss or in5ury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, )ood customs or pu-lic policy shall compensate the latter for the dama)e.
Article 2 of the Code, it should -e o-served, contemplates a conscious act to cause harm. 2hus, even
if ,e are to assume that the provision could properly relate to a -reach of contract, its application can
-e ,arranted only ,hen the defendantGs disre)ard of his contractual o-li)ation is so deli-erate as to
appro<imate a de)ree of misconduct certainly no less ,orse than fraud or -ad faith. +ost importantly,
Article 2 is a mere declaration of a )eneral principle in human relations that clearly must, in any case,
)ive ,ay to the specific provision of Article 222% of the Civil Code authorizin) the )rant of moral
dama)es in culpa contractual solely ,hen the -reach is due to fraud or -ad faith.
+r. Justice Jose D.A. (eyes, in his ponencia in $ores vs. (iranda
8
e<plained ,ith )reat clarity the
predominance that ,e should )ive to Article 222% in contractual relations4 ,e /uote1
Anent the moral dama)es ordered to -e paid to the respondent, the same must -e discarded.
=e have repeatedly ruled 7Cachero vs. +anila Eello, 2a<ica- Co. Inc., % &hil. "264 "9 >ff.
Caz., 82!:, !"994 #ecesito, et al. vs. &aras, %9 &hil., 3"4 "! >ff. Caz., 826: 9%26;, that moral
dama)es are not recovera-le in dama)e actions predicated on a -reach of the contract of
transportation, in vie, of Articles 229 and 222% of the ne, Civil Code, ,hich provide as
follo,s1
Art. 229. +oral dama)es may -e recovered in the follo,in) and analo)ous
cases1
7; A criminal offense resultin) in physical in5uries4
72; Quasi-delicts causin) physical in5uries4
<<< <<< <<<
Art. 222%. =ilful in5ury to property may -e a le)al )round for a,ardin) moral
dama)es if the court should find that, under the circumstances, such
dama)es are 5ustly due. 2he same rule applies to -reaches of contract
,here the defendant acted fraudulently or in -ad faith.
Dy contrastin) the provisions of these t,o articles it immediately -ecomes apparent that1
7a; In case of -reach of contract 7includin) one of transportation; proof of -ad faith or fraud
7dolus;, i.e., ,anton or deli-erately in5urious conduct, is essential to 5ustify an a,ard of moral
dama)es4 and
7-; 2hat a -reach of contract can not -e considered included in the descriptive term
0analo)ous cases0 used in Art. 2294 not only -ecause Art. 222% specifically provides for the
dama)es that are caused contractual -reach, -ut -ecause the definition of /uasi-delict in Art.
23! of the Code e<pressly e<cludes the cases ,here there is a 0pree<isitn) contractual
relations -et,een the parties.0
Art. 23!. =hoever -y act or omission causes dama)e to another, there
-ein) fault or ne)li)ence, is o-li)ed to pay for the dama)e done. @uch fault
or ne)li)ence, if there is no pre-e<istin) contractual relation -et,een the
parties, is called a /uasi-delict and is )overned -y the provisions of this
Chapter.
2he e<ception to the -asic rule of dama)es no, under consideration is a mishap resultin) in
the death of a passen)er, in ,hich case Article 3!9 ma.es the common carrier e<pressly
su-5ect to the rule of Art. 22%!, that entitles the spouse, descendants and ascendants of the
deceased passen)er to 0demand moral dama)es for mental an)uish -y reason of the death of
the deceased0 7#ecesito vs. &aras, %9 &hil. $9, (esolution on motion to reconsider,
@eptem-er , 9"$;. Dut the e<ceptional rule of Art. 3!9 ma.es it all the more evident that
,here the in5ured passen)er does not die, moral dama)es are not recovera-le unless it is
proved that the carrier ,as )uilty of malice or -ad faith. =e thin. it is clear that the mere
carelessness of the carrierGs driver does not per se constitute or 5ustify an inference of malice
or -ad faith on the part of the carrier4 and in the case at -ar there is no other evidence of such
malice to support the a,ard of moral dama)es -y the Court of Appeals. 2o a,ard moral
dama)es for -reach of contract, therefore, ,ithout proof of -ad faith or malice on the part of
the defendant, as re/uired -y Art. 222%, ,ould -e to violate the clear provisions of the la,, and
constitute un,arranted 5udicial le)islation.
<<< <<< <<<
2he distinction -et,een fraud, -ad faith or malice in the sense of deli-erate or ,anton ,ron)
doin) and ne)li)ence 7as mere carelessness; is too fundamental in our la, to -e i)nored 7Arts.
3%-32;4 their conse/uences -ein) clearly differentiated -y the Code.
Art. 22%. In contracts and /uasi-contracts, the dama)es for ,hich the
o-li)or ,ho acted in )ood faith is lia-le shall -e those that are the natural
and pro-a-le conse/uences of the -reach of the o-li)ation, and ,hich the
parties have foreseen or could have reasona-ly foreseen at the time the
o-li)ation ,as constituted.
In case of fraud, -ad faith, malice or ,anton attitude, the o-li)or shall -e
responsi-le for all dama)es ,hich may -e reasona-ly attri-uted to the non-
performance of the o-li)ation.
It is to -e presumed, in the a-sence of statutory provision to the contrary, that this difference
,as in the mind of the la,ma.ers ,hen in Art. 222% they limited recovery of moral dama)es to
-reaches of contract in -ad faith. It is true that ne)li)ence may -e occasionally so )ross as to
amount to malice4 -ut the fact must -e sho,n in evidence, and a carrierGs -ad faith is not to -e
li)htly inferred from a mere findin) that the contract ,as -reached throu)h ne)li)ence of the
carrierGs employees.
2he Court has not in the process overloo.ed another rule that a /uasi-delict can -e the cause for
-reachin) a contract that mi)ht there-y permit the application of applica-le principles on tort
9
even
,here there is a pre-e<istin) contract -et,een the plaintiff and the defendant 7&hil. Airlines vs. Court of
Appeals, %! @C(A 964 @in)son vs. Dan. of &hil. Islands, 26 @C(A 34 and Air France vs.
Carrascoso, $ @C(A "";. 2his doctrine, unfortunately, cannot improve private respondentsG case for it
can aptly )overn only ,here the act or omission complained of ,ould constitute an actiona-le tort
independently of the contract. 2he test 7,hether a /uasi-delict can -e deemed to underlie the -reach of
a contract; can -e stated thusly1 =here, ,ithout a pre-e<istin) contract -et,een t,o parties, an act or
omission can nonetheless amount to an actiona-le tort -y itself, the fact that the parties are
contractually -ound is no -ar to the application of /uasi-delict provisions to the case. *ere, private
respondentsG dama)e claim is predicated solely on their contractual relationship4 ,ithout such
a)reement, the act or omission complained of cannot -y itself -e held to stand as a separate cause of
action or as an independent actiona-le tort.
2he Court finds, therefore, the a,ard of moral dama)es made -y the court a quo, affirmed -y the
appellate court, to -e inordinate and su-stantially devoid of le)al -asis.
'<emplary or corrective dama)es, in turn, are intended to serve as an e<ample or as correction for the
pu-lic )ood in addition to moral, temperate, li/uidated or compensatory dama)es 7Art. 2229, Civil
Code4 see&rudenciado vs. Alliance 2ransport @ystem, 9$ @C(A 99%4 Aopez vs. &an American =orld
Air,ays, ! @C(A 96;. In criminal offenses, e<emplary dama)es are imposed ,hen the crime is
committed ,ith one or more a))ravatin) circumstances 7Art. 226%, Civil Code;. In quasi-delicts, such
dama)es are )ranted if the defendant is sho,n to have -een so )uilty of )ross ne)li)ence as to
appro<imate malice 79ee Art. 226, Civil Code4 CAAC '.C. Cochan)co =or.ers Bnion vs. #A(C, !
@C(A !""4 Clo-e +ac.ay Ca-le and (adio Corp. vs. CA, 3! @C(A 33$;. In contracts and quasi-
contracts, the court may a,ard e<emplary dama)es if the defendant is found to have acted in a ,anton,
fraudulent, rec.less, oppressive, or malevolent manner 7Art. 2262, Civil Code4 &#D vs. Cen.
Acceptance and Finance Corp., ! @C(A 999;.
Civen the a-ove premises and the factual circumstances here o-tainin), it ,ould also -e 5ust as
arduous to sustain the e<emplary dama)es )ranted -y the courts -elo, 7see ?e Aeon vs. Court of
Appeals, !" @C(A !!;.
#evertheless, the -an.Gs failure, even perhaps inadvertent, to honor its credit card issued to private
respondent Auis should entitle him to recover a measure of dama)es sanctioned under Article 222 of
the Civil Code providin) thusly1
Art. 222. #ominal dama)es are ad5udicated in order that a ri)ht of the plaintiff, ,hich has
-een violated or invaded -y the defendant, may -e vindicated or reco)nized, and not for the
purpose of indemnifyin) the plaintiff for any loss suffered -y him.
(easona-le attorneyGs fees may -e recovered ,here the court deems such recovery to -e 5ust and
e/uita-le 7Art. 22%$, Civil Code;. =e see no issue of sound discretion on the part of the appellate court
in allo,in) the a,ard thereof -y the trial court.
=*'('F>(', the petition for revie, is )iven due course. 2he appealed decision is +>?IFI'? -y
deletin) the a,ard of moral and e<emplary dama)es to private respondents4 in its stead, petitioner is
ordered to pay private respondent Auis A. Auna an amount of &",%%%.%% -y ,ay of nominal dama)es. In
all other respects, the appealed decision is AFFI(+'?. #o costs.
@> >(?'('?.
4arvasa' #.).' $eliciano' "adilla' Bidin' Re*alado' :avide' )r.' Romero' Bellosillo' (elo' /uiason' "uno'
Aapunan' (endo5a and $rancisco' )).' concur.
G.R. No. L-21438 6#&!#,4#$ 28, 1966
AIR 1RANCE, petitioner,
vs.
RA1AEL CARRA6CO6O and !"# +ONORA/LE CO7RT O1 APPEAL6, respondents.
7ichauco' "ica5o and !*caoili for petitioner.
Ben*5on Eille*as and 8arra*a for respondent R. #arrascoso.

6ANC+E5, J.:
2he Court of First Instance of +anila

sentenced petitioner to pay respondent (afael Carrascoso
&2",%%%.%% -y ,ay of moral dama)es4 &%,%%%.%% as e<emplary dama)es4 &696.2% representin) the
difference in fare -et,een first class and tourist class for the portion of the trip Dan).o.-(ome, these
various amounts ,ith interest at the le)al rate, from the date of the filin) of the complaint until paid4 plus
&6,%%%.%% for attorneysG fees4 and the costs of suit.
>n appeal,
2
the Court of Appeals sli)htly reduced the amount of refund on CarrascosoGs plane tic.et
from &696.2% to &6$6.%, and voted to affirm the appealed decision 0in all other respects0, ,ith costs
a)ainst petitioner.
2he case is no, -efore us for revie, on certiorari.
2he facts declared -y the Court of Appeals as 0 fully supported -y the evidence of record0, are1
&laintiff, a civil en)ineer, ,as a mem-er of a )roup of 9$ Filipino pil)rims that left +anila for
Aourdes on +arch 6%, 9"$.
>n +arch 2$, 9"$, the defendant, Air France, throu)h its authorized a)ent, &hilippine Air
Aines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a 0first class0 round trip airplane tic.et from +anila to (ome. From
+anila to Dan).o., plaintiff travelled in 0first class0, -ut at Dan).o., the +ana)er of the
defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the 0first class0 seat that he ,as occupyin) -ecause,
in the ,ords of the ,itness 'rnesto C. Cuento, there ,as a 0,hite man0, ,ho, the +ana)er
alle)ed, had a 0-etter ri)ht0 to the seat. =hen as.ed to vacate his 0first class0 seat, the plaintiff,
as ,as to -e e<pected, refused, and told defendantGs +ana)er that his seat ,ould -e ta.en
over his dead -ody4 a commotion ensued, and, accordin) to said 'rnesto C. Cuento, 0many of
the Filipino passen)ers )ot nervous in the tourist class4 ,hen they found out that +r.
Carrascoso ,as havin) a hot discussion ,ith the ,hite man 8mana)er:, they came all across to
+r. Carrascoso and pacified +r. Carrascoso to )ive his seat to the ,hite man0 72ranscript, p.
2, *earin) of +ay 2!, 9"9;4 and plaintiff reluctantly )ave his 0first class0 seat in the plane.
6
. 2he trust of the relief petitioner no, see.s is that ,e revie, 0all the findin)s0
9
of respondent Court of
Appeals. &etitioner char)es that respondent court failed to ma.e complete findin)s of fact on all the
issues properly laid -efore it. =e are as.ed to consider facts favora-le to petitioner, and then, to
overturn the appellate courtGs decision.
Comin) into focus is the constitutional mandate that 0#o decision shall -e rendered -y any court of
record ,ithout e<pressin) therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the la, on ,hich it is -ased0.
"
2his
is echoed in the statutory demand that a 5ud)ment determinin) the merits of the case shall state 0clearly
and distinctly the facts and the la, on ,hich it is -ased04
!
and that 0'very decision of the Court of
Appeals shall contain complete findin)s of fact on all issues properly raised -efore it0.
3
A decision ,ith a-solutely nothin) to support it is a nullity. It is open to direct attac..
$
2he la,, ho,ever,
solely insists that a decision state the 0essential ultimate facts0 upon ,hich the courtGs conclusion is
dra,n.
9
A court of 5ustice is not hide-ound to ,rite in its decision every -it and piece of
evidence
%
presented -y one party and the other upon the issues raised. #either is it to -e -urdened
,ith the o-li)ation 0to specify in the sentence the facts0which a party 2considered as proved2.

2his is
-ut a part of the mental process from ,hich the Court dra,s the essential ultimate facts. A decision is
not to -e so clo))ed ,ith details such that proli<ity, if not confusion, may result. @o lon) as the decision
of the Court of Appeals contains the necessary facts to ,arrant its conclusions, it is no error for said
court to ,ithhold therefrom 0any specific findin) of facts ,ith respect to the evidence for the defense0.
Decause as this Court ,ell o-served, 02here is no la, that so re/uires0.
2
Indeed, 0the mere failure to
specify 7in the decision; the contentions of the appellant and the reasons for refusin) to -elieve them is
not sufficient to hold the same contrary to the re/uirements of the provisions of la, and the
Constitution0. It is in this settin) that in (ani*que, it ,as held that the mere fact that the findin)s 0,ere
-ased entirely on the evidence for the prosecution ,ithout ta.in) into consideration or even mentionin)
the appellantGs side in the controversy as sho,n -y his o,n testimony0, ,ould not vitiate the
5ud)ment.
6
If the court did not recite in the decision the testimony of each ,itness for, or each item of
evidence presented -y, the defeated party, it does not mean that the court has overloo.ed such
testimony or such item of evidence.
9
At any rate, the le)al presumptions are that official duty has -een
re)ularly performed, and that all the matters ,ithin an issue in a case ,ere laid -efore the court and
passed upon -y it.
"
Findin)s of fact, ,hich the Court of Appeals is re/uired to ma.e, may-e defined as 0the ,ritten
statement of the ultimate facts as found -y the court ... and essential to support the decision and
5ud)ment rendered thereon0.
!
2hey consist of the courtGs 2conclusions2 ,ith respect to the
determinative facts in issue0.
3
A /uestion of la,, upon the other hand, has -een declared as 0one
,hich does not call for an e<amination of the pro-ative value of the evidence presented -y the
parties.0
$
2. Dy statute, 0only /uestions of la, may -e raised0 in an appeal -y certiorari from a 5ud)ment of the
Court of Appeals.
9
2hat 5ud)ment is conclusive as to the facts. It is not appropriately the -usiness of
this Court to alter the facts or to revie, the /uestions of fact.
2%
=ith these )uideposts, ,e no, face the pro-lem of ,hether the findin)s of fact of the Court of Appeals
support its 5ud)ment.
6. =as Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claimsH
It is conceded in all /uarters that on +arch 2$, 9"$ he paid to and received from petitioner a first class
tic.et. Dut petitioner asserts that said tic.et did not represent the true and complete intent and
a)reement of the parties4 that said respondent .ne, that he did not have confirmed reservations for first
class on any specific fli)ht, althou)h he had tourist class protection4 that, accordin)ly, the issuance of a
first class tic.et ,as no )uarantee that he ,ould have a first class ride, -ut that such ,ould depend
upon the availa-ility of first class seats.
2hese are matters ,hich petitioner has thorou)hly presented and discussed in its -rief -efore the Court
of Appeals under its third assi)nment of error, ,hich reads1 02he trial court erred in findin) that plaintiff
had confirmed reservations for, and a ri)ht to, first class seats on the 0definite0 se)ments of his 5ourney,
particularly that from @ai)on to Deirut0.
2
And, the Court of Appeals disposed of this contention thus1
?efendant seems to capitalize on the ar)ument that the issuance of a first-class tic.et ,as no
)uarantee that the passen)er to ,hom the same had -een issued, ,ould -e accommodated in
the first-class compartment, for as in the case of plaintiff he had yet to ma.e arran)ements
upon arrival at every station for the necessary first-class reservation. =e are not impressed -y
such a reasonin). =e cannot understand ho, a reputa-le firm li.e defendant airplane
company could have the indiscretion to )ive out tic.ets it never meant to honor at all. It
received the correspondin) amount in payment of first-class tic.ets and yet it allo,ed the
passen)er to -e at the mercy of its employees. It is more in .eepin) ,ith the ordinary course of
-usiness that the company should .no, ,hether or riot the tic.ets it issues are to -e honored
or not.
22
#ot that the Court of Appeals is alone. 2he trial court similarly disposed of petitionerGs contention, thus1
>n the fact that plaintiff paid for, and ,as issued a 0First class0 tic.et, there can -e no /uestion. Apart
from his testimony, see plaintiffGs '<hi-its 0A0, 0A-0, 0D0, 0D-,0 0D-20, 0C0 and 0C-0, and defendantGs
o,n ,itness, (afael Altona)a, confirmed plaintiffGs testimony and testified as follo,s1
Q. In these tic.ets there are mar.s 0>.M.0 From ,hat you .no,, ,hat does this >M meanH
A. 2hat the space is confirmed.
Q. Confirmed for first classH
A. Ees, 0first class0. 72ranscript, p. !9;
< < < < < < < < <
?efendant tried to prove -y the testimony of its ,itnesses Auis Laldaria)a and (afael Altona)a that
althou)h plaintiff paid for, and ,as issued a 0first class0 airplane tic.et, the tic.et ,as su-5ect to
confirmation in *on).on). 2he court cannot )ive credit to the testimony of said ,itnesses. >ral
evidence cannot prevail over ,ritten evidence, and plaintiffGs '<hi-its 0A0, 0A-l0, 0D0, 0D-l0, 0C0 and 0C-0
-elie the testimony of said ,itnesses, and clearly sho, that the plaintiff ,as issued, and paid for, a first
class tic.et ,ithout any reservation ,hatever.
Furthermore, as hereina-ove sho,n, defendantGs o,n ,itness (afael Altona)a testified that the
reservation for a 0first class0 accommodation for the plaintiff ,as confirmed. 2he court cannot -elieve
that after such confirmation defendant had a ver-al understandin) ,ith plaintiff that the 0first class0
tic.et issued to him -y defendant ,ould -e su-5ect to confirmation in *on).on).
26
=e have heretofore adverted to the fact that e<cept for a sli)ht difference of a fe, pesos in the amount
refunded on CarrascosoGs tic.et, the decision of the Court of First Instance ,as affirmed -y the Court of
Appeals in all other respects. =e hold the vie, that such a 5ud)ment of affirmance has mer)ed the
5ud)ment of the lo,er court.
29
Implicit in that affirmance is a determination -y the Court of Appeals that
the proceedin) in the Court of First Instance ,as free from pre5udicial error and 0all /uestions raised -y
the assi)nments of error and all /uestions that mi)ht have -een raised are to -e re)arded as finally
ad5udicated a)ainst the appellant0. @o also, the 5ud)ment affirmed 0must -e re)arded as free from all
error0.
2"
=e reached this policy construction -ecause nothin) in the decision of the Court of Appeals on
this point ,ould su))est that its findin)s of fact are in any ,ay at ,ar ,ith those of the trial court. #or
,as said affirmance -y the Court of Appeals upon a )round or )rounds different from those ,hich ,ere
made the -asis of the conclusions of the trial court.
2!
If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-tic.et holder is not entitled to a first class seat, not,ithstandin)
the fact that seat availa-ility in specific fli)hts is therein confirmed, then an air passen)er is placed in
the hollo, of the hands of an airline. =hat security then can a passen)er haveH It ,ill al,ays -e an
easy matter for an airline aided -y its employees, to stri.e out the very stipulations in the tic.et, and say
that there ,as a ver-al a)reement to the contrary. =hat if the passen)er had a schedule to fulfillH =e
have lon) learned that, as a rule, a ,ritten document spea.s a uniform lan)ua)e4 that spo.en ,ord
could -e notoriously unrelia-le. If only to achieve sta-ility in the relations -et,een passen)er and air
carrier, adherence to the tic.et so issued is desira-le. @uch is the case here. 2he lo,er courts refused
to -elieve the oral evidence intended to defeat the covenants in the tic.et.
2he fore)oin) are the considerations ,hich point to the conclusion that there are facts upon ,hich the
Court of Appeals predicated the findin) that respondent Carrascoso had a first class tic.et and ,as
entitled to a first class seat at Dan).o., ,hich is a stopover in the @ai)on to Deirut le) of the fli)ht.
23
=e
perceive no 0,elter of distortions -y the Court of Appeals of petitionerGs statement of its position0, as
char)ed -y petitioner.
2$
#or do ,e su-scri-e to petitionerGs accusation that respondent Carrascoso
0surreptitiously too. a first class seat to provo.e an issue0.
29
And this -ecause, as petitioner states,
Carrascoso ,ent to see the +ana)er at his office in Dan).o. 0to confirm my seat and -ecause from
@ai)on I ,as told a)ain to see the +ana)er0.
6%
=hy, then, ,as he allo,ed to ta.e a first class seat in
the plane at Dan).o., if he had no seatH >r, if another had a -etter ri)ht to the seatH
9. &etitioner assails respondent courtGs a,ard of moral dama)es. &etitionerGs trenchant claim is that
CarrascosoGs action is planted upon -reach of contract4 that to authorize an a,ard for moral dama)es
there must -e an averment of fraud or -ad faith4
6
and that the decision of the Court of Appeals fails to
ma.e a findin) of -ad faith. 2he pivotal alle)ations in the complaint -earin) on this issue are1
6. 2hat ... plaintiff entered into a contract of air carria)e ,ith the &hilippine Air Aines for a
valua-le consideration, the latter actin) as )eneral a)ents for and in -ehalf of the defendant,
under ,hich said contract, plaintiff ,as entitled to, as defendant a)reed to furnish plaintiff, First
Class passa)e on defendantGs plane durin) the entire duration of plaintiffGs tour of 'urope ,ith
*on).on) as startin) point up to and until plaintiffGs return trip to +anila, ... .
9. 2hat, durin) the first t,o le)s of the trip from *on).on) to @ai)on and from @ai)on to
Dan).o., defendant furnished to the plaintiff First Class accommodation -ut only after
protestations, ar)uments andKor insistence ,ere made -y the plaintiff ,ith defendantGs
employees.
". 2hat finally, defendant failed to provide First Class passa)e, -ut instead furnished plaintiff
only 6ouristClass accommodations from Dan).o. to 2eheran andKor Casa-lanca, ... the
plaintiff has -een compelled -y defendantGs employees to leave the First Class
accommodation -erths at Dan).o. after he was already seated.
!. 2hat conse/uently, the plaintiff, desirin) no repetition of the inconvenience and
em-arrassments -rou)ht -y defendantGs -reach of contract ,as forced to ta.e a &an American
=orld Air,ays plane on his return trip from +adrid to +anila.
62
< < < < < < < < <
2. 2hat li.e,ise, as a result of defendantGs failure to furnish First Class accommodations aforesaid,
plaintiff suffered inconveniences, em-arrassments, and humiliations, there-y causin) plaintiff mental
an)uish, serious an<iety, ,ounded feelin)s, social humiliation, and the li.e in5ury, resultin) in moral
dama)es in the amount of &6%,%%%.%%.
66
< < < < < < < < <
2he fore)oin), in our opinion, su-stantially aver1 $irst, 2hat there ,as a contract to furnish plaintiff a first
class passa)e coverin), amon)st others, the Dan).o.-2eheran le)4 9econd, 2hat said contract ,as
-reached ,hen petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at Dan).o.4 and 6hird' that there
,as -ad faith ,hen petitionerGs employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation
-erth 2after he was already' seated2 and to ta.e a seat in the tourist class, -y reason of ,hich he
suffered inconvenience, em-arrassments and humiliations, there-y causin) him mental an)uish,
serious an<iety, ,ounded feelin)s and social humiliation, resultin) in moral dama)es. It is true that there
is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint. Dut, the inference of -ad faith is there, it
may -e dra,n from the facts and circumstances set forth therein.
69
2he contract ,as averred to
esta-lish the relation -et,een the parties. Dut the stress of the action is put on ,ron)ful e<pulsion.
Quite apart from the fore)oin) is that 7a; ri)ht the start of the trial, respondentGs counsel placed
petitioner on )uard on ,hat Carrascoso intended to prove1 2hat ,hile sittin) in the plane in Dan).o.,
Carrascoso ,as ousted-y petitionerGs mana)er ,ho )ave his seat to a ,hite man4
6"
and 7-; evidence of
-ad faith in the fulfillment of the contract ,as presented ,ithout o-5ection on the part of the petitioner. It
is, therefore, unnecessary to in/uire as to ,hether or not there is sufficient averment in the complaint to
5ustify an a,ard for moral dama)es. ?eficiency in the complaint, if any, ,as cured -y the evidence. An
amendment thereof to conform to the evidence is not even re/uired.
6!
>n the /uestion of -ad faith, the
Court of Appeals declared1
2hat the plaintiff ,as forced out of his seat in the first class compartment of the plane
-elon)in) to the defendant Air France ,hile at Dan).o., and ,as transferred to the tourist
class not only ,ithout his consent -ut a)ainst his ,ill, has -een sufficiently esta-lished -y
plaintiff in his testimony -efore the court, corro-orated -y the correspondin) entry made -y the
purser of the plane in his note-oo. ,hich notation reads as follo,s1
0First-class passen)er ,as forced to )o to the tourist class a)ainst his ,ill, and that
the captain refused to intervene0,
and -y the testimony of an eye-,itness, 'rnesto C. Cuento, ,ho ,as a co-passen)er. 2he
captain of the plane ,ho ,as as.ed -y the mana)er of defendant company at Dan).o. to
intervene even refused to do so. It is note,orthy that no one on -ehalf of defendant ever
contradicted or denied this evidence for the plaintiff. It could have -een easy for defendant to
present its mana)er at Dan).o. to testify at the trial of the case, or yet to secure his
disposition4 -ut defendant did neither.
63
2he Court of appeals further stated J
#either is there evidence as to ,hether or not a prior reservation ,as made -y the ,hite man.
*ence, if the employees of the defendant at Dan).o. sold a first-class tic.et to him ,hen all
the seats had already -een ta.en, surely the plaintiff should not have -een pic.ed out as the
one to suffer the conse/uences and to -e su-5ected to the humiliation and indi)nity of -ein)
e5ected from his seat in the presence of others. Instead of e<plainin) to the ,hite man the
improvidence committed -y defendantGs employees, the mana)er adopted the more drastic
step of oustin) the plaintiff ,ho ,as then safely ensconsced in his ri)htful seat. =e are
stren)thened in our -elief that this pro-a-ly ,as ,hat happened there, -y the testimony of
defendantGs ,itness (afael Altona)a ,ho, ,hen as.ed to e<plain the meanin) of the letters
0>.M.0 appearin) on the tic.ets of plaintiff, said 0that the space is confirmed for first class.
Ai.e,ise, Lenaida Faustino, another ,itness for defendant, ,ho ,as the chief of the
(eservation >ffice of defendant, testified as follo,s1
0Q *o, does the person in the tic.et-issuin) office .no, ,hat reservation the
passen)er has arran)ed ,ith youH
A 2hey call us up -y phone and as. for the confirmation.0 7t.s.n., p. 293, June 9,
9"9;
In this connection, ,e /uote ,ith approval ,hat the trial Jud)e has said on this point1
=hy did the, usin) the ,ords of ,itness 'rnesto C. Cuento, 0,hite man0 have a
0-etter ri)ht0 to the seat occupied -y +r. CarrascosoH 2he record is silent. 2he
defendant airline did not prove 0any -etter0, nay, any ri)ht on the part of the 0,hite
man0 to the 0First class0 seat that the plaintiff ,as occupyin) and for ,hich he paid
and ,as issued a correspondin) 0first class0 tic.et.
If there ,as a 5ustified reason for the action of the defendantGs +ana)er in Dan).o.,
the defendant could have easily proven it -y havin) ta.en the testimony of the said
+ana)er -y deposition, -ut defendant did not do so4 the presumption is that evidence
,illfully suppressed ,ould -e adverse if produced 8@ec. !9, par 7e;, (ules of Court:4
and, under the circumstances, the Court is constrained to find, as it does find, that the
+ana)er of the defendant airline in Dan).o. not merely as.ed -ut threatened the
plaintiff to thro, him out of the plane if he did not )ive up his 0first class0 seat -ecause
the said +ana)er ,anted to accommodate, usin) the ,ords of the ,itness 'rnesto C.
Cuento, the 0,hite man0.
6$
It is really correct to say that the Court of Appeals in the /uoted portion first transcri-ed did not
use the term 0-ad faith0. Dut can it -e dou-ted that the recital of facts therein points to -ad
faithH 2he mana)er not only prevented Carrascoso from en5oyin) his ri)ht to a first class seat4
,orse, he imposed his ar-itrary ,ill4 he forci-ly e5ected him from his seat, made him suffer the
humiliation of havin) to )o to the tourist class compartment - 5ust to )ive ,ay to another
passen)er ,hose ri)ht thereto has not -een esta-lished. Certainly, this is -ad faith. Bnless, of
course, -ad faith has assumed a meanin) different from ,hat is understood in la,. For, 0-ad
faith0 contemplates a 0state of mind affirmatively operatin) ,ith furtive desi)n or ,ith some
motive of self-interest or ,ill or for ulterior purpose.0
69
And if the fore)oin) ,ere not yet sufficient, there is the e<press findin) of bad faith in the
5ud)ment of the Court of First Instance, thus1
2he evidence sho,s that the defendant violated its contract of transportation ,ith
plaintiff in -ad faith, ,ith the a))ravatin) circumstances that defendantGs +ana)er in
Dan).o. ,ent to the e<tent of threatenin) the plaintiff in the presence of many
passen)ers to have him thro,n out of the airplane to )ive the 0first class0 seat that he
,as occupyin) to, a)ain usin) the ,ords of the ,itness 'rnesto C. Cuento, a 0,hite
man0 ,hom he 7defendantGs +ana)er; ,ished to accommodate, and the defendant
has not proven that this 0,hite man0 had any 0-etter ri)ht0 to occupy the 0first class0
seat that the plaintiff ,as occupyin), duly paid for, and for ,hich the correspondin)
0first class0 tic.et ,as issued -y the defendant to him.
9%
". 2he responsi-ility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not -e essayed. It is ,ell
settled in la,.
9
For the ,illful malevolent act of petitionerGs mana)er, petitioner, his employer, must
ans,er. Article 2 of the Civil Code says1
A(2. 2. Any person ,ho ,illfully causes loss or in5ury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals, )ood customs or pu-lic policy shall compensate the latter for the dama)e.
In parallel circumstances, ,e applied the fore)oin) le)al precept4 and, ,e held that upon the provisions
of Article 229 7%;, Civil Code, moral dama)es are recovera-le.
92
!. A contract to transport passen)ers is /uite different in .ind and de)ree from any other contractual
relation.
96
And this, -ecause of the relation ,hich an air-carrier sustains ,ith the pu-lic. Its -usiness is
mainly ,ith the travellin) pu-lic. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advanta)es it offers. 2he
contract of air carria)e, therefore, )enerates a relation attended ,ith a pu-lic duty. #e)lect or
malfeasance of the carrierGs employees, naturally, could )ive )round for an action for dama)es.
&assen)ers do not contract merely for transportation. 2hey have a ri)ht to -e treated -y the carrierGs
employees ,ith .indness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. 2hey are entitled to -e protected
a)ainst personal misconduct, in5urious lan)ua)e, indi)nities and a-uses from such employees. @o it is,
that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees to,ards a passen)er )ives the latter an
action for dama)es a)ainst the carrier.
99
2hus, 0=here a steamship company
9"
had accepted a passen)erGs chec., it ,as a -reach of contract
and a tort, )ivin) a ri)ht of action for its a)ent in the presence of third persons to falsely notify her that
the chec. ,as ,orthless and demand payment under threat of e5ection, thou)h the lan)ua)e used ,as
not insultin) and she ,as not e5ected.0
9!
And this, -ecause, althou)h the relation of passen)er and
carrier is 0contractual -oth in ori)in and nature0 nevertheless 0the act that -rea.s the contract may -e
also a tort0.
93
And in another case, 0=here a passen)er on a railroad train, ,hen the conductor came to
collect his fare tendered him the cash fare to a point ,here the train ,as scheduled not to stop, and told
him that as soon as the train reached such point he ,ould pay the cash fare from that point to
destination, there ,as nothin) in the conduct of the passen)er ,hich 5ustified the conductor in usin)
insultin) lan)ua)e to him, as -y callin) him a lunatic,0
9$
and the @upreme Court of @outh Carolina there
held the carrier lia-le for the mental sufferin) of said passen)er.-awphFl.nGt
&etitionerGs contract ,ith Carrascoso is one attended ,ith pu-lic duty. 2he stress of CarrascosoGs action
as ,e have said, is placed upon his ,ron)ful e<pulsion. 2his is a violation of pu-lic duty -y the
petitioner air carrier J a case of quasi-delict. ?ama)es are proper.
3. &etitioner dra,s our attention to respondent CarrascosoGs testimony, thus J
Q Eou mentioned a-out an attendant. =ho is that attendant and purserH
A =hen ,e left already J that ,as already in the trip J I could not help it. @o one of the fli)ht
attendants approached me and re/uested from me my tic.et and I said, =hat forH and she
said, 0=e ,ill note that you transferred to the tourist class0. I said, 0#othin) of that .ind. 2hat is
tantamount to acceptin) my transfer.0 And I also said, 0Eou are not )oin) to note anythin) there
-ecause I am protestin) to this transfer0.
Q =as she a-le to note itH
A #o, -ecause I did not )ive my tic.et.
Q A-out that purserH
A =ell, the seats there are so close that you feel uncomforta-le and you donGt have enou)h le)
room, I stood up and I ,ent to the pantry that ,as ne<t to me and the purser ,as there. *e told
me, 0I have recorded the incident in my note-oo..0 *e read it and translated it to me J
-ecause it ,as recorded in French J 0First class passen)er ,as forced to )o to the tourist
class a)ainst his ,ill, and that the captain refused to intervene.0
+r. FAA2' J
I move to stri.e out the last part of the testimony of the ,itness -ecause the -est evidence
,ould -e the notes. Eour *onor.
C>B(2 J
I ,ill allo, that as part of his testimony.
99
&etitioner char)es that the findin) of the Court of Appeals that the purser made an entry in his note-oo.
readin) 0First class passen)er ,as forced to )o to the tourist class a)ainst his ,ill, and that the captain
refused to intervene0 is predicated upon evidence 8CarrascosoGs testimony a-ove: ,hich is incompetent.
=e do not thin. so. 2he su-5ect of in/uiry is not the entry, -ut the ouster incident. 2estimony on the
entry does not come ,ithin the proscription of the -est evidence rule. @uch testimony is admissi-le.
99a
Desides, from a readin) of the transcript 5ust /uoted, ,hen the dialo)ue happened, the impact of the
startlin) occurrence ,as still fresh and continued to -e felt. 2he e<citement had not as yet died do,n.
@tatements then, in this environment, are admissi-le as part of the res *estae.
"%
For, they )ro, 0out of
the nervous e<citement and mental and physical condition of the declarant0.
"
2he utterance of the
purser re)ardin) his entry in the note-oo. ,as spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the
ouster incident. Its trust,orthiness has -een )uaranteed.
"2
It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay
rule. It forms part of the res *estae.
At all events, the entry ,as made outside the &hilippines. And, -y an employee of petitioner. It ,ould
have -een an easy matter for petitioner to have contradicted CarrascosoGs testimony. If it ,ere really
true that no such entry ,as made, the deposition of the purser could have cleared up the matter.
=e, therefore, hold that the transcri-ed testimony of Carrascoso is admissi-le in evidence.
$. '<emplary dama)es are ,ell a,arded. 2he Civil Code )ives the court ample po,er to )rant
e<emplary dama)es J in contracts and /uasi- contracts. 2he only condition is that defendant should
have 0acted in a ,anton, fraudulent, rec.less, oppressive, or malevolent manner.0
"6
2he manner of
e5ectment of respondent Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this le)al precept. And this, in
addition to moral dama)es.
"9
9. 2he ri)ht to attorneyGs fees is fully esta-lished. 2he )rant of e<emplary dama)es 5ustifies a similar
5ud)ment for attorneysG fees. 2he least that can -e said is that the courts -elo, felt that it is -ut 5ust and
e/uita-le that attorneysG fees -e )iven.
""
=e do not intend to -rea. faith ,ith the tradition that discretion
,ell e<ercised J as it ,as here J should not -e distur-ed.
%. Questioned as e<cessive are the amounts decreed -y -oth the trial court and the Court of Appeals,
thus1 &2",%%%.%% as moral dama)es4 &%,%%%.%%, -y ,ay of e<emplary dama)es, and &6,%%%.%% as
attorneysG fees. 2he tas. of fi<in) these amounts is primarily ,ith the trial court.
"!
2he Court of Appeals
did not interfere ,ith the same. 2he dictates of )ood sense su))est that ,e )ive our imprimatur thereto.
Decause, the facts and circumstances point to the reasona-leness thereof.
"3
>n -alance, ,e say that the 5ud)ment of the Court of Appeals does not suffer from reversi-le error. =e
accordin)ly vote to affirm the same. Costs a)ainst petitioner. @o ordered.
#oncepcion' #.).' Reyes' ).B.7.' Barrera' :i5on' Re*ala' (aalintal' 8aldivar and #astro' )).' concur.
G.R. No. 84698 1#4$.a$y 4, 1992
P+ILIPPINE 6C+OOL O1 /76INE66 ADMINI6TRATION, 37AN D. LIM, /EN3AMIN P. PA7LINO,
ANTONIO M. MAGTALA6, COL. PEDRO 6ACRO and LT. M. 6ORIANO, petitioners,
vs.
CO7RT O1 APPEAL6, +ON. REGINA ORDOBE5-/ENITE5, n "#$ %a&a%!y a' P$#'dn) 3.d)# o(
/$an%" 47, R#)ona* T$a* Co.$!, Man*a, 6EG7NDA R. /A7TI6TA and AR6ENIA D.
/A7TI6TA, respondents.
Bal*os and "ere5 for petitioners.
#ollantes' Ramire5 > !ssociates for private respondents.

PADILLA, J.:
A sta--in) incident on 6% Au)ust 9$" ,hich caused the death of Carlitos Dautista ,hile on the second-
floor premises of the &hilippine @chool of Dusiness Administration 7&@DA; prompted the parents of the
deceased to file suit in the (e)ional 2rial Court of +anila 7Dranch 93; presided over -y Jud)e 7no,
Court of Appeals 5ustice; (e)ina >rdoSez-Denitez, for dama)es a)ainst the said &@DA and its
corporate officers. At the time of his death, Carlitos ,as enrolled in the third year commerce course at
the &@DA. It ,as esta-lished that his assailants ,ere not mem-ers of the schoolGs academic community
-ut ,ere elements from outside the school.
@pecifically, the suit impleaded the &@DA and the follo,in) school authorities1 Juan ?. Aim 7&resident;,
Den5amin &. &aulino 7Fice-&resident;, Antonio +. +a)talas 72reasurerKCashier;, Col. &edro @acro
7Chief of @ecurity; and a At. +. @oriano 7Assistant Chief of @ecurity;. @u-stantially, the plaintiffs 7no,
private respondents; sou)ht to ad5ud)e them lia-le for the victimGs untimely demise due to their alle)ed
ne)li)ence, rec.lessness and lac. of security precautions, means and methods -efore, durin) and after
the attac. on the victim. ?urin) the proceedin)s a quo, At. +. @oriano terminated his relationship ,ith
the other petitioners -y resi)nin) from his position in the school.
?efendants a quo 7no, petitioners; sou)ht to have the suit dismissed, alle)in) that since they are
presuma-ly sued under Article 2$% of the Civil Code, the complaint states no cause of action a)ainst
them, as 5urisprudence on the su-5ect is to the effect that academic institutions, such as the &@DA, are
-eyond the am-it of the rule in the afore-stated article.
2he respondent trial court, ho,ever, overruled petitionersG contention and thru an order dated $
?ecem-er 9$3, denied their motion to dismiss. A su-se/uent motion for reconsideration ,as similarly
dealt ,ith -y an order dated 2" January 9$$. &etitioners then assailed the trial courtGs disposition
-efore the respondent appellate court ,hich, in a decision C promul)ated on % June 9$$, affirmed the
trial courtGs orders. >n 22 Au)ust 9$$, the respondent appellate court resolved to deny the petitionersG
motion for reconsideration. *ence, this petition.
At the outset, it is to -e o-served that the respondent appellate court primarily anchored its decision on
the la, ofquasi-delicts, as enunciated in Articles 23! and 2$% of the Civil Code.
1
&ertinent portions of
the appellate courtGs no, assailed rulin) state1
Article 2$% 7formerly Article 9%6; of the Civil Code is an adoption from the old
@panish Civil Code. 2he comments of +anresa and learned authorities on its
meanin) should )ive ,ay to present day chan)es. 2he la, is not fi<ed and fle<i-le
7sic;4 it must -e dynamic. In fact, the )reatest value and si)nificance of la, as a rule
of conduct in 7sic; its fle<i-ility to adopt to chan)in) social conditions and its capacity
to meet the ne, challen)es of pro)ress.
Construed in the li)ht of modern day educational system, Article 2$% cannot -e
construed in its narro, concept as held in the old case of 0xconde
vs. #apuno
(
and (ercado vs. #ourt of !ppeals4
3
hence, the rulin) in
the "alisoc
4
case that it should apply to all .inds of educational institutions, academic
or vocational.
At any rate, the la, holds the teachers and heads of the school staff lia-le unless
they relieve themselves of such lia-ility pursuant to the last para)raph of Article 2$%
-y 0provin) that they o-served all the dili)ence to prevent dama)e.0 2his can only -e
done at a trial on the merits of the case.
0
=hile ,e a)ree ,ith the respondent appellate court that the motion to dismiss the complaint ,as
correctly denied and the complaint should -e tried on the merits, ,e do not ho,ever a)ree ,ith the
premises of the appellate courtGs rulin).
Article 2$%, in con5unction ,ith Article 23! of the Civil Code, esta-lishes the rule of in loco parentis.
2his Court discussed this doctrine in the afore-cited cases of 0xconde' (endo5a' "alisoc and, more
recently, in !madora vs.#ourt of !ppeals.
6
In all such cases, it had -een stressed that the la, 7Article
2$%; plainly provides that the dama)e should have -een caused or inflicted -y pupils or students of he
educational institution sou)ht to -e held lia-le for the acts of its pupils or students ,hile in its custody.
*o,ever, this material situation does not e<ist in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the
assailants of Carlitos were not students of the "9B!' for ,hose acts the school could -e made lia-le.
*o,ever, does the appellate courtGs failure to consider such material facts mean the e<culpation of the
petitioners from lia-ilityH It does not necessarily follo,.
=hen an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is esta-lished a contract -et,een
them, resultin) in -ilateral o-li)ations ,hich -oth parties are -ound to comply ,ith.
7
For its part, the
school underta.es to provide the student ,ith an education that ,ould presuma-ly suffice to e/uip him
,ith the necessary tools and s.ills to pursue hi)her education or a profession. >n the other hand, the
student covenants to a-ide -y the schoolGs academic re/uirements and o-serve its rules and
re)ulations.
Institutions of learnin) must also meet the implicit or 0-uilt-in0 o-li)ation of providin) their students ,ith
an atmosphere that promotes or assists in attainin) its primary underta.in) of impartin) .no,led)e.
Certainly, no student can a-sor- the intricacies of physics or hi)her mathematics or e<plore the realm of
the arts and other sciences ,hen -ullets are flyin) or )renades e<plodin) in the air or ,here there
looms around the school premises a constant threat to life and lim-. #ecessarily, the school must
ensure that ade/uate steps are ta.en to maintain peace and order ,ithin the campus premises and to
prevent the -rea.do,n thereof.
Decause the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation -et,een the &@DA and
Carlitos Dautista, the rules on /uasi-delict do not really )overn. 8 A perusal of Article 23! sho,s that
o-li)ations arisin) from /uasi-delicts or tort, also .no,n as e<tra-contractual o-li)ations, arise only
-et,een parties not other,ise -ound -y contract, ,hether e<press or implied. *o,ever, this impression
has not prevented this Court from determinin) the e<istence of a tort even ,hen there o-tains a
contract. In !ir $rance vs. #arrascoso 729 &hil. 322;, the private respondent ,as a,arded dama)es
for his un,arranted e<pulsion from a first-class seat a-oard the petitioner airline. It is noted, ho,ever,
that the Court referred to the petitioner-airlineGs lia-ility as one arisin) from tort, not one arisin) from a
contract of carria)e. In effect, !ir $ranceis authority for the vie, that lia-ility from tort may e<ist even if
there is a contract, for the act that -rea.s the contract may -e also a tort. 7Austro-America @.@. Co. vs.
2homas, 29$ Fed. 26;.
2his vie, ,as not all that revolutionary, for even as early as 9$, this Court ,as already of a similar
mind. In#an*co vs. (anila Railroad 76$ &hil. 3$%;, +r. Justice Fisher elucidated thus1
2he field of non-contractual o-li)ation is much -roader than that of contractual
o-li)ation, comprisin), as it does, the ,hole e<tent of 5uridical human relations. 2hese
t,o fields, fi)uratively spea.in), concentric4 that is to say, the mere fact that a person
is -ound to another -y contract does not relieve him from e<tra-contractual lia-ility to
such person. =hen such a contractual relation e<ists the o-li)or may -rea. the
contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the
contract would have constituted the source of an extra-contractual obli*ation had no
contract existed between the parties.
Immediately ,hat comes to mind is the chapter of the Civil Code on *uman (elations, particularly
Article 2, ,hich provides1
Any person ,ho wilfully causes loss or in5ury to another in a manner that is contrary
to morals' *ood custom or public policy shall compensate the latter for the dama)e.
7emphasis supplied;.
!ir $rance penalized the racist policy of the airline ,hich em-oldened the petitionerGs employee to
forci-ly oust the private respondent to cater to the comfort of a ,hite man ,ho alle)edly 0had a -etter
ri)ht to the seat.0 In !ustro-!merican, supra, the pu-lic em-arrassment caused to the passen)er ,as
the 5ustification for the Circuit Court of Appeals, 7@econd Circuit;, to a,ard dama)es to the latter. From
the fore)oin), it can -e concluded that should the act ,hich -reaches a contract -e done in -ad faith
and -e violative of Article 2, then there is a cause to vie, the act as constitutin) a /uasi-delict.
In the circumstances o-tainin) in the case at -ar, ho,ever, there is, as yet, no findin) that the contract
-et,een the school and Dautista had -een -reached thru the formerGs ne)li)ence in providin) proper
security measures. 2his ,ould -e for the trial court to determine. And, even if there -e a findin) of
ne)li)ence, the same could )ive rise )enerally to a -reach of contractual o-li)ation only. Bsin) the test
of #an*co, supra, the ne)li)ence of the school ,ould not -e relevant a-sent a contract. In fact, that
ne)li)ence -ecomes material only -ecause of the contractual relation -et,een &@DA and Dautista. In
other ,ords, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua nonto the schoolGs lia-ility. 2he ne)li)ence of
the school cannot e<ist independently of the contract, unless the ne)li)ence occurs under the
circumstances set out in Article 2 of the Civil Code.
2his Court is not unmindful of the attendant difficulties posed -y the o-li)ation of schools, a-ove-
mentioned, for conceptually a school, li.e a common carrier, cannot -e an insurer of its students
a)ainst all ris.s. 2his is specially true in the populous student communities of the so-called 0university
-elt0 in +anila ,here there have -een reported several incidents ran)in) from )an) ,ars to other forms
of hooli)anism. It ,ould not -e e/uita-le to e<pect of schools to anticipate all types of violent trespass
upon their premises, for not,ithstandin) the security measures installed, the same may still fail a)ainst
an individual or )roup determined to carry out a nefarious deed inside school premises and environs.
@hould this -e the case, the school may still avoid lia-ility -y provin) that the -reach of its contractual
o-li)ation to the students ,as not due to its ne)li)ence, here statutorily defined to -e the omission of
that de)ree of dili)ence ,hich is re/uired -y the nature of the o-li)ation and correspondin) to the
circumstances of persons, time and place.
9
As the proceedin)s a quo have yet to commence on the su-stance of the private respondentsG
complaint, the record is -ereft of all the material facts. >-viously, at this sta)e, only the trial court can
ma.e such a determination from the evidence still to unfold.
=*'('F>(', the fore)oin) premises considered, the petition is ?'#I'?. 2he court of ori)in 7(2C,
+anila, Dr. 93; is here-y ordered to continue proceedin)s consistent ,ith this rulin) of the Court. Costs
a)ainst the petitioners.
@> >(?'('?.
(elencio-<errera' "aras' Re*alado and 4ocon' )).' concur.
G.R. No. 98690 3an.a$y 27, 1993
37AN 3. 62;7IA, CORA5ON C. 62;7IA, CARLOTA C. 62;7IA, CARLO6 C. 62;7IA and
ANT+ON2 C. 62;7IA, petitioners,
vs.
T+E +ONORA/LE CO7RT O1 APPEAL6, and T+E MANILA MEMORIAL PAR9 CEMETER2,
INC., respondents.
"acis > Reyes 7aw Hffices for petitioners.
!u*usto 9. 9an "edro > !ri-Ben #. 9ebastian for private respondents.

CAMPO6, 3R., J.:
*erein petitioners, Juan J. @y/uia and Corazon C. @y/uia, Carlota C. @y/uia, Carlos C. @y/uia, and
Anthony @y/uia, ,ere the parents and si-lin)s, respectively, of the deceased Ficente Juan @y/uia. >n
+arch ", 939, they filed a complaint
1
in the then Court of First Instance a)ainst herein private
respondent, +anila +emorial &ar. Cemetery, Inc. for recovery of dama)es arisin) from -reach of
contract andKor /uasi-delict. 2he trial court dismissed the complaint.
2he antecedent facts, as )athered -y the respondent Court, are as follo,s1
>n +arch ", 939, Juan, Corazon, Carlota and Anthony all surnamed @y/uia,
plaintiff-appellants herein, filed a complaint for dama)es a)ainst defendant-appellee,
+anila +emorial &ar. Cemetery, Inc.
2he complaint alle)ed amon) others, that pursuant to a ?eed of @ale 7Contract #o.
!$$"; dated Au)ust 23, 9!9 and Interment >rder #o. 3%! dated July 2, 93$
e<ecuted -et,een plaintiff-appellant Juan J. @y/uia and defendant-appellee, the
former, father of deceased Ficente Juan J. @y/uia authorized and instructed
defendant-appellee to inter the remains of deceased in the +anila +emorial &ar.
Cemetery in the mornin) of July 2", 93$ conforma-ly and in accordance ,ith
defendant-appellantGs 7sic; interment procedures4 that on @eptem-er 9, 93$,
preparatory to transferrin) the said remains to a ne,ly purchased family plot also at
the +anila +emorial &ar. Cemetery, the concrete vault encasin) the coffin of the
deceased ,as removed from its niche under)round ,ith the assistance of certain
employees of defendant-appellant 7sic;4 that as the concrete vault ,as -ein) raised to
the surface, plaintiffs-appellants discovered that the concrete vault had a hole
appro<imately three 76; inches in diameter near the -ottom of one of the ,alls closin)
out the ,idth of the vault on one end and that for a certain len)th of time 7one hour,
more or less;, ,ater drained out of the hole4 that -ecause of the aforesaid discovery,
plaintiffs-appellants -ecame a)itated and upset ,ith concern that the ,ater ,hich had
collected inside the vault mi)ht have risen as it in fact did rise, to the level of the coffin
and flooded the same as ,ell as the remains of the deceased ,ith ill effects thereto4
that pursuant to an authority )ranted -y the +unicipal Court of &araSa/ue, +etro
+anila on @eptem-er 9, 93$, plaintiffs-appellants ,ith the assistance of licensed
morticians and certain personnel of defendant-appellant 7sic; caused the openin) of
the concrete vault on @eptem-er ", 93$4 that upon openin) the vault, the follo,in)
-ecame apparent to the plaintiffs-appellants1 7a; the interior ,alls of the concrete vault
sho,ed evidence of total floodin)4 7-; the coffin ,as entirely dama)ed -y ,ater, filth
and silt causin) the ,ooden parts to ,arp and separate and to crac. the vie,in)
)lass panel located directly a-ove the head and torso of the deceased4 7c; the entire
linin) of the coffin, the clothin) of the deceased, and the e<posed parts of the
deceasedGs remains ,ere dama)ed and soiled -y the action of the ,ater and silt and
,ere also coated ,ith filth.
?ue to the alle)ed unla,ful and malicious -reach -y the defendant-appellee of its
o-li)ation to deliver a defect-free concrete vault desi)ned to protect the remains of
the deceased and the coffin a)ainst the elements ,hich resulted in the desecration of
deceasedGs )rave and in the alternative, -ecause of defendant-appelleeGs )ross
ne)li)ence conforma-ly to Article 23! of the #e, Civil Code in failin) to seal the
concrete vault, the complaint prayed that 5ud)ment -e rendered orderin) defendant-
appellee to pay plaintiffs-appellants &6%,%%%.%% for actual dama)es, &"%%,%%%.%% for
moral dama)es, e<emplary dama)es in the amount determined -y the court, 2%T of
defendant-appelleeGs total lia-ility as attorneyGs fees, and e<penses of liti)ation and
costs of suit.
2
In dismissin) the complaint, the trial court held that the contract -et,een the parties did not )uarantee
that the cement vault ,ould -e ,aterproof4 that there could -e no /uasi-delict -ecause the defendant
,as not )uilty of any fault or ne)li)ence, and -ecause there ,as a pre-e<istin) contractual relation
-et,een the @y/uias and defendant +anila +emorial &ar. Cemetery, Inc.. 2he trial court also noted
that the father himself, Juan @y/uia, chose the )ravesite despite .no,in) that said area had to -e
constantly sprin.led ,ith ,ater to .eep the )rass )reen and that ,ater ,ould eventually seep throu)h
the vault. 2he trial court also accepted the e<planation )iven -y defendant for -orin) a hole at the
-ottom side of the vault1 02he hole had to -e -ored throu)h the concrete vault -ecause if it has no hole
the vault ,ill 7sic; float and the )rave ,ould -e filled ,ith ,ater and the di))in) ,ould caved 7sic; in the
earth, the earth ,ould caved 7sic; in the 7sic; fill up the )rave.0
3
From this 5ud)ment, the @y/uias appealed. 2hey alle)ed that the trial court erred in holdin) that the
contract allo,ed the floodin) of the vault4 that there ,as no desecration4 that the -orin) of the hole ,as
5ustifia-le4 and in not a,ardin) dama)es.
2he Court of Appeals in the ?ecision
4
dated ?ecem-er 3, 99% ho,ever, affirmed the 5ud)ment of
dismissal. &etitionerGs motion for reconsideration ,as denied in a (esolution dated April 2", 99.
0
Bnsatisfied ,ith the respondent CourtGs decision, the @y/uias filed the instant petition. 2hey alle)e
herein that the Court of Appeals committed the follo,in) errors ,hen it1
. held that the contract and the (ules and (esolutions of private respondent allo,ed
the floodin) of the vault and the entrance thereto of filth and silt4
2. held that the act of -orin) a hole ,as 5ustifia-le and corollarily, ,hen it held that no
act of desecration ,as committed4
6. overloo.ed and refused to consider relevant, undisputed facts, such as those ,hich
have -een stipulated upon -y the parties, testified to -y private respondentGs
,itnesses, and admitted in the ans,er, ,hich could have 5ustified a different
conclusion4
9. held that there ,as no tort -ecause of a pre-e<istin) contract and the a-sence of
faultKne)li)ence4 and
". did not a,ard the &2",%%%.%% actual dama)es ,hich ,as a)reed upon -y the
parties, moral and e<emplary dama)es, and attorneyGs fees.
At the -ottom of the entire proceedin)s is the act of -orin) a hole -y private respondent on the vault of
the deceased .in of the -ereaved petitioners. 2he latter alle)e that such act ,as either a -reach of
private respondentGs contractual o-li)ation to provide a sealed vault, or, in the alternative, a ne)li)ent
act ,hich constituted a /uasi-delict. #onetheless, petitioners claim that ,hatever .ind of ne)li)ence
private respondent has committed, the latter is lia-le for desecratin) the )rave of petitionersG dead.
In the instant case, =e are called upon to determine ,hether the +anila +emorial &ar. Cemetery, Inc.,
-reached its contract ,ith petitioners4 or, alternatively, ,hether private respondent ,as )uilty of a tort.
=e understand the feelin)s of petitioners and empathize ,ith them. Bnfortunately, ho,ever, =e are
more inclined to ans,er the fore)oin) /uestions in the ne)ative. 2here is not enou)h )round, -oth in
fact and in la,, to 5ustify a reversal of the decision of the respondent Court and to uphold the pleas of
the petitioners.
=ith respect to herein petitionersG averment that private respondent has committed culpa aquiliana, the
Court of Appeals found no ne)li)ent act on the part of private respondent to 5ustify an a,ard of
dama)es a)ainst it. Althou)h a pre-e<istin) contractual relation -et,een the parties does not preclude
the e<istence of a culpa aquiliana, =e find no reason to disre)ard the respondentGs Court findin) that
there ,as no ne)li)ence.
Art. 23!. =hoever -y act or omission causes dama)e to another, there -ein) fault or
ne)li)ence, is o-li)ed to pay for the dama)e done. 9uch fault or ne*li*ence' if there
is no pre-existin* contractual relation between the parties' is called a quasi-delict . . . .
7'mphasis supplied;.
In this case, it has -een esta-lished that the @y/uias and the +anila +emorial &ar. Cemetery,
Inc., entered into a contract entitled 0?eed of @ale and Certificate of &erpetual Care0
6
on
Au)ust 23, 9!9. 2hat a)reement )overned the relations of the parties and defined their
respective ri)hts and o-li)ations. *ence, had there -een actual ne)li)ence on the part of the
+anila +emorial &ar. Cemetery, Inc., it ,ould -e held lia-le not for a quasi-delict orculpa
aquiliana, -ut for culpa contractual as provided -y Article 3% of the Civil Code, to ,it1
2hose ,ho in the performance of their o-li)ations are )uilty of fraud, ne)li)ence, or
delay, and those ,ho in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are lia-le for
dama)es.
2he +anila +emorial &ar. Cemetery, Inc. -ound itself to provide the concrete -o< to -e send in the
interment. (ule 3 of the (ules and (e)ulations of private respondent provides that1
(ule 3. 'very earth interment shall -e made enclosed in a concrete -o<, or in an
outer ,all of stone, -ric. or concrete, the actual installment of ,hich shall -e made -y
the employees of the Association.
7
&ursuant to this a-ove-mentioned (ule, a concrete vault ,as provided on July 23, 93$, the day -efore
the interment, and ,as, on the same day, installed -y private respondentGs employees in the )rave
,hich ,as du) earlier. After the -urial, the vault ,as covered -y a cement lid.
&etitioners ho,ever claim that private respondent -reached its contract ,ith them as the latter held out
in the -rochure it distri-uted that the . . . lot may hold sin)le or dou-le internment 7sic; under)round
in sealed concrete vault.0
8
&etitioners claim that the vault provided -y private respondent ,as not
sealed, that is, not ,aterproof. Conse/uently, ,ater seeped throu)h the cement enclosure and
dama)ed everythin) inside it.
=e do not a)ree. 2here ,as no stipulation in the ?eed of @ale and Certificate of &erpetual Care and in
the (ules and (e)ulations of the +anila +emorial &ar. Cemetery, Inc. that the vault ,ould -e
,aterproof. &rivate respondentGs ,itness, +r. ?e<ter *eusch.el, e<plained that the term 0sealed0 meant
0closed.0
9
>n the other hand, the ,ord 0seal0 is defined as . . . any of various closures or fastenin)s . . .
that cannot -e opened ,ithout rupture and that serve as a chec. a)ainst tamperin) or unauthorized
openin).0
10
2he meanin) that has -een )iven -y private respondent to the ,ord conforms ,ith the cited
dictionary definition. +oreover, it is also /uite clear that 0sealed0 cannot -e e/uated ,ith 0,aterproof0.
=ell settled is the rule that ,hen the terms of the contract are clear and leave no dou-t as to the
intention of the contractin) parties, then the literal meanin) of the stipulation shall control.
11
Contracts
should -e interpreted accordin) to their literal meanin) and should not -e interpreted -eyond their
o-vious intendment.
12
As ruled -y the respondent Court1
=hen plaintiff-appellant Juan J. @y/uia affi<ed his si)nature to the ?eed of @ale
7'<hi-it 0A0; and the attached (ules and (e)ulations 7'<hi-it 00;, it can -e assumed
that he has accepted defendant-appelleeGs underta.in) to merely provide a concrete
vault. *e can not no, claim that said concrete vault must in addition, also -e
,aterproofed 7sic;. It is -asic that the parties are -ound -y the terms of their contract,
,hich is the la, -et,een them 7(izal Commercial Dan.in) Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals, et al. 3$ @C(A 369;. =here there is nothin) in the contract ,hich is
contrary to la,, morals, )ood customs, pu-lic order, or pu-lic policy, the validity of the
contract must -e sustained 7&hil. American Insurance Co. vs. Jud)e &ineda, 3"
@C(A 9!;. Consonant ,ith this rulin), a contractin) party cannot incur a lia-ility
more than ,hat is e<pressly specified in his underta.in). It cannot -e e<tended -y
implication, -eyond the terms of the contract 7(izal Commercial Dan.in) Corporation
vs. Court of Appeals, supra;. And as a rule of evidence, ,here the terms of an
a)reement are reduced to ,ritin), the document itself, -ein) constituted -y the
parties as the e<positor of their intentions, is the only instrument of evidence in
respect of that a)reement ,hich the la, ,ill reco)nize, so lon) as its 7sic; e<ists for
the purpose of evidence 7@tar.ie, 'v., pp. !9$, !"", Masheenath vs. Chundy, " =.(.
!$ cited in Francisco, (evised (ules of Court in the &hil. p. "6, 936 'd.;. And if the
terms of the contract are clear and leave no dou-t upon the intention of the
contractin) parties, the literal meanin) of its stipulations shall control 7@antos vs. CA,
et al., C. (. #o. $6!!9, #ov. 6, 9$94 &rudential Dan. N 2rust Co. vs. Community
Duilders Co., Inc., !" @C(A 2$"4 Dalatero vs. IAC, "9 @C(A "6%;.
13
=e hold, therefore, that private respondent did not -reach the tenor of its o-li)ation to the @y/uias.
=hile this may -e so, can private respondent -e lia-le for culpa aquiliana for -orin) the hole on the
vaultH It cannot -e denied that the hole made possi-le the entry of more ,ater and soil than ,as natural
had there -een no hole.
2he la, defines ne)li)ence as the 0omission of that dili)ence ,hich is re/uired -y the nature of the
o-li)ation and corresponds ,ith the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place.0
14
In the
a-sence of stipulation or le)al provision providin) the contrary, the dili)ence to -e o-served in the
performance of the o-li)ation is that ,hich is e<pected of a )ood father of a family.
2he circumstances surroundin) the commission of the assailed act J -orin) of the hole J ne)ate the
alle)ation of ne)li)ence. 2he reason for the act ,as e<plained -y *enry Flores, Interment Foreman,
,ho said that1
Q It has -een esta-lished in this particular case that a certain
Ficente Juan @y/uia ,as interred on July 2", 93$ at the
&araSa/ue Cemetery of the +anila +emorial &ar. Cemetery, Inc.,
,ill you please tell the *on. Court ,hat or ,hether you have
participation in connection ,ith said internment 7sic;H
A A day -efore Juan 7sic; @y/uia ,as -uried our personnel du) a
)rave. After di))in) the ne<t mornin) a vault ,as ta.en and placed
in the )rave and ,hen the vault ,as placed on the )rave a hole
,as placed on the vault so that ,ater could come into the vault
-ecause it was rainin* heavily then -ecause the vault has no hole
the vault ,ill float and the )rave ,ould -e filled ,ith ,ater and the
di))in) ,ould caved 7sic; in and the earth, the earth ,ould 7sic;
caved in and fill up the )rave.
10
7'mphasis ours;
'<cept for the foremanGs opinion that the concrete vault may float should there -e a heavy rainfall, from
the a-ove-mentioned e<planation, private respondent has e<ercised the dili)ence of a )ood father of a
family in preventin) the accumulation of ,ater inside the vault ,hich ,ould have resulted in the cavin)
in of earth around the )rave fillin) the same ,ith earth.
2hus, findin) no evidence of ne)li)ence on the part of private respondent, =e find no reason to a,ard
dama)es in favor of petitioners.
In the li)ht of the fore)oin) facts, and construed in the lan)ua)e of the applica-le la,s and
5urisprudence, =e are constrained to AFFI(+ in toto the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals
dated ?ecem-er 3, 99%. #o costs.
@> >(?'('?.
4arvasa' #.).' $eliciano' Re*alado and 4ocon' )).' concur.
-ICENTE CALALA6, petitioner, vs. CO7RT O1 APPEAL6, ELI5A 373E7RC+E 67NGA and
1RANCI6CO 6AL-A, respondents.
D E C I 6 I ON
MENDO5A, J.?
2his is a petition for revie, on certiorari of the decision
8:
of the Court of Appeals, dated +arch 6, 99,
reversin) the contrary decision of the (e)ional 2rial Court, Dranch 6!, ?uma)uete City, and a,ardin)
dama)es instead to private respondent 'liza Ju5eurche @un)a as plaintiff in an action for -reach of
contract of carria)e.
2he facts, as found -y the Court of Appeals, are as follo,s1
At % oPcloc. in the mornin) of Au)ust 26, 9$9, private respondent 'liza Ju5eurche C. @un)a, then a
colle)e freshman ma5orin) in &hysical 'ducation at the @iliman Bniversity, too. a passen)er 5eepney
o,ned and operated -y petitioner Ficente Calalas. As the 5eepney ,as filled to capacity of a-out 29
passen)ers, @un)a ,as )iven -y the conductor an 0e<tension seat,0 a ,ooden stool at the -ac. of the
door at the rear end of the vehicle. @cla,
>n the ,ay to &o-lacion @i-ulan, #e)ros >ccidental, the 5eepney stopped to let a passen)er off. As she
,as seated at the rear of the vehicle, @un)a )ave ,ay to the out)oin) passen)er. Just as she ,as
doin) so, an Isuzu truc. driven -y I)lecerio Ferena and o,ned -y Francisco @alva -umped the left rear
portion of the 5eepney. As a result, @un)a ,as in5ured. @he sustained a fracture of the 0distal third of the
left ti-ia-fi-ula ,ith severe necrosis of the underlyin) s.in.0 Closed reduction of the fracture, lon) le)
circular castin), and case ,ed)in) ,ere done under sedation. *er confinement in the hospital lasted
from Au)ust 26 to @eptem-er 3, 9$9. *er attendin) physician, ?r. ?anilo F. >li)ario, an orthopedic
sur)eon, certified she ,ould remain on a cast for a period of three months and ,ould have to am-ulate
in crutches durin) said period.
>n >cto-er 9, 9$9, @un)a filed a complaint for dama)es a)ainst Calalas, alle)in) violation of the
contract of carria)e -y the former in failin) to e<ercise the dili)ence re/uired of him as a common
carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party complaint a)ainst Francisco @alva, the o,ner of
the Isuzu truc.. Morte
2he lo,er court rendered 5ud)ment a)ainst @alva as third-party defendant and a-solved Calalas of
lia-ility, holdin) that it ,as the driver of the Isuzu truc. ,ho ,as responsi-le for the accident. It too.
co)nizance of another case 7Civil Case #o. 699%;, filed -y Calalas a)ainst @alva and Ferena, for /uasi-
delict, in ,hich Dranch 63 of the same court held @alva and his driver Ferena 5ointly lia-le to Calalas for
the dama)e to his 5eepney. (tcspped
>n appeal to the Court of Appeals, the rulin) of the lo,er court ,as reversed on the )round that
@un)aPs cause of action ,as -ased on a contract of carria)e, not /uasi-delict, and that the common
carrier failed to e<ercise the dili)ence re/uired under the Civil Code. 2he appellate court dismissed the
third-party complaint a)ainst @alva and ad5ud)ed Calalas lia-le for dama)es to @un)a. 2he dispositive
portion of its decision reads1
=*'('F>(', the decision appealed from is here-y ('F'(@'? and @'2 A@I?',
and another one is entered orderin) defendant-appellee Ficente Calalas to pay
plaintiff-appellant1
7; &"%,%%%.%% as actual and compensatory dama)es4
72; &"%,%%%.%% as moral dama)es4
76; &%,%%%.%% as attorneyPs fees4 and
79; &,%%%.%% as e<penses of liti)ation4 and
7"; to pay the costs.
@> >(?'('?.
*ence, this petition. &etitioner contends that the rulin) in Civil Case #o. 699% that the ne)li)ence of
Ferena ,as the pro<imate cause of the accident ne)ates his lia-ility and that to rule other,ise ,ould -e
to ma.e the common carrier an insurer of the safety of its passen)ers. *e contends that the -umpin) of
the 5eepney -y the truc. o,ned -y @alva ,as a caso fortuito. &etitioner further assails the a,ard of
moral dama)es to @un)a on the )round that it is not supported -y evidence. @daadsc
2he petition has no merit.
2he ar)ument that @un)a is -ound -y the rulin) in Civil Case #o. 699% findin) the driver and the o,ner
of the truc. lia-le for /uasi-delict i)nores the fact that she ,as never a party to that case and, therefore,
the principle of res judicata does not apply. +issdaa
#or are the issues in Civil Case #o. 699% and in the present case the same. 2he issue in Civil Case #o.
699% ,as ,hether @alva and his driver Ferena ,ere lia-le for /uasi-delict for the dama)e caused to
petitionerPs 5eepney. >n the other hand, the issue in this case is ,hether petitioner is lia-le on his
contract of carria)e. 2he first, /uasi-delict, also .no,n asculpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has
as its source the ne)li)ence of the tortfeasor. 2he second, -reach of contract or culpa contractual, is
premised upon the ne)li)ence in the performance of a contractual o-li)ation.
Conse/uently, in /uasi-delict, the ne)li)ence or fault should -e clearly esta-lished -ecause it is the
-asis of the action, ,hereas in -reach of contract, the action can -e prosecuted merely -y provin) the
e<istence of the contract and the fact that the o-li)or, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport
his passen)er safely to his destination.
82:
In case of death or in5uries to passen)ers, Art. 3"! of the Civil
Code provides that common carriers are presumed to have -een at fault or to have acted ne)li)ently
unless they prove that they o-served e<traordinary dili)ence as defined in Arts. 366 and 3"" of the
Code. 2his provision necessarily shifts to the common carrier the -urden of proof. @l<mis
2here is, thus, no -asis for the contention that the rulin) in Civil Case #o. 699%, findin) @alva and his
driver Ferena lia-le for the dama)e to petitionerPs 5eepney, should -e -indin) on @un)a. It is immaterial
that the pro<imate cause of the collision -et,een the 5eepney and the truc. ,as the ne)li)ence of the
truc. driver. 2he doctrine of pro<imate cause is applica-le only in actions for /uasi-delict, not in actions
involvin) -reach of contract. 2he doctrine is a device for imputin) lia-ility to a person ,here there is no
relation -et,een him and another party. In such a case, the o-li)ation is created -y la, itself. Dut,
,here there is a pre-e<istin) contractual relation -et,een the parties, it is the parties themselves ,ho
create the o-li)ation, and the function of the la, is merely to re)ulate the relation thus created. Insofar
as contracts of carria)e are concerned, some aspects re)ulated -y the Civil Code are those respectin)
the dili)ence re/uired of common carriers ,ith re)ard to the safety of passen)ers as ,ell as the
presumption of ne)li)ence in cases of death or in5ury to passen)ers. It provides1 @l<sc
Art. 366. Common carriers, from the nature of their -usiness and for reasons of
pu-lic policy, are -ound to o-serve e<traordinary dili)ence in the vi)ilance over the
)oods and for the safety of the passen)ers transported -y them, accordin) to all the
circumstances of each case.
@uch e<traordinary dili)ence in the vi)ilance over the )oods is further e<pressed in
articles 369, 36", and 39!, #os. ",!, and 3, ,hile the e<traordinary dili)ence for
the safety of the passen)ers is further set forth in articles 3"" and 3"!.
Art. 3"". A common carrier is -ound to carry the passen)ers safely as far as human
care and foresi)ht can provide, usin) the utmost dili)ence of very cautious persons,
,ith due re)ard for all the circumstances.
Art. 3"!. In case of death of or in5uries to passen)ers, common carriers are
presumed to have -een at fault or to have acted ne)li)ently, unless they prove that
they o-served e<traordinary dili)ence as prescri-ed -y articles 366 and 3"".
In the case at -ar, upon the happenin) of the accident, the presumption of ne)li)ence at once arose,
and it -ecame the duty of petitioner to prove that he had to o-serve e<traordinary dili)ence in the care
of his passen)ers. @csl<
#o,, did the driver of 5eepney carry @un)a 0safely as far as human care and foresi)ht could provide,
usin) the utmost dili)ence of very cautious persons, ,ith due re)ard for all the circumstances0 as
re/uired -y Art. 3""H =e do not thin. so. @everal factors militate a)ainst petitionerPs contention. @l<
First, as found -y the Court of Appeals, the 5eepney ,as not properly par.ed, its rear portion -ein)
e<posed a-out t,o meters from the -road shoulders of the hi)h,ay, and facin) the middle of the
hi)h,ay in a dia)onal an)le. 2his is a violation of the (.A. #o. 96!, as amended, or the Aand
2ransportation and 2raffic Code, ,hich provides1
@ec. "9. Hbstruction of 6raffic. - #o person shall drive his motor vehicle in such a
manner as to o-struct or impede the passa)e of any vehicle, nor, ,hile dischar)in) or
ta.in) on passen)ers or loadin) or unloadin) frei)ht, o-struct the free passa)e of
other vehicles on the hi)h,ay.
@econd, it is undisputed that petitionerPs driver too. in more passen)ers than the allo,ed seatin)
capacity of the 5eepney, a violation of U627a; of the same la,. It provides1 +esm
0xceedin* re*istered capacity. - #o person operatin) any motor vehicle shall allo,
more passen)ers or more frei)ht or car)o in his vehicle than its re)istered capacity.
2he fact that @un)a ,as seated in an 0e<tension seat0 placed her in a peril )reater than that to ,hich
the other passen)ers ,ere e<posed. 2herefore, not only ,as petitioner una-le to overcome the
presumption of ne)li)ence imposed on him for the in5ury sustained -y @un)a, -ut also, the evidence
sho,s he ,as actually ne)li)ent in transportin) passen)ers. Calr.y
=e find it hard to )ive serious thou)ht to petitionerPs contention that @un)aPs ta.in) an 0e<tension seat0
amounted to an implied assumption of ris.. It is a.in to ar)uin) that the in5uries to the many victims of
the tra)edies in our seas should not -e compensated merely -ecause those passen)ers assumed a
)reater ris. of dro,nin) -y -oardin) an overloaded ferry. 2his is also true of petitionerPs contention that
the 5eepney -ein) -umped ,hile it ,as improperly par.ed constitutes caso fortuito. A caso fortuito is an
event ,hich could not -e foreseen, or ,hich, thou)h foreseen, ,as inevita-le.
86:
2his re/uires that the
follo,in) re/uirements -e present1 7a; the cause of the -reach is independent of the de-torPs ,ill4 7-;
the event is unforeseea-le or unavoida-le4 7c; the event is such as to render it impossi-le for the de-tor
to fulfill his o-li)ation in a normal manner, and 7d; the de-tor did not ta.e part in causin) the in5ury to the
creditor.
89:
&etitioner should have foreseen the dan)er of par.in) his 5eepney ,ith its -ody protrudin)
t,o meters into the hi)h,ay. Mycalr
Finally, petitioner challen)es the a,ard of moral dama)es alle)in) that it is e<cessive and ,ithout -asis
in la,. =e find this contention ,ell ta.en.
In a,ardin) moral dama)es, the Court of Appeals stated1 Myle
&laintiff-appellant at the time of the accident ,as a first-year colle)e student in that
school year 9$9-99% at the @illiman Bniversity, ma5orin) in &hysical 'ducation.
Decause of the in5ury, she ,as not a-le to enroll in the second semester of that
school year. @he testified that she had no more intention of continuin) ,ith her
schoolin), -ecause she could not ,al. and decided not to pursue her de)ree, ma5or
in &hysical 'ducation 0-ecause of my le) ,hich has a defect already.0
&laintiff-appellant li.e,ise testified that even ,hile she ,as under confinement, she
cried in pain -ecause of her in5ured left foot. As a result of her in5ury, the >rthopedic
@ur)eon also certified that she has 0residual -o,in) of the fracture side.0 @he
li.e,ise decided not to further pursue &hysical 'ducation as her ma5or su-5ect,
-ecause 0my left le) < < < has a defect already.0
2hose are her physical pains and moral sufferin)s, the inevita-le -edfello,s of the
in5uries that she suffered. Bnder Article 229 of the Civil Code, she is entitled to
recover moral dama)es in the sum of &"%,%%%.%%, ,hich is fair, 5ust and reasona-le.
As a )eneral rule, moral dama)es are not recovera-le in actions for dama)es predicated on a -reach of
contract for it is not one of the items enumerated under Art. 229 of the Civil Code.
8":
As an e<ception,
such dama)es are recovera-le1 7; in cases in ,hich the mishap results in the death of a passen)er, as
provided in Art. 3!9, in relation to Art. 22%!76; of the Civil Code4 and 72; in the cases in ,hich the
carrier is )uilty of fraud or -ad faith, as provided in Art. 222%.
8!:
In this case, there is no le)al -asis for a,ardin) moral dama)es since there ,as no factual findin) -y
the appellate court that petitioner acted in -ad faith in the performance of the contract of carria)e.
@un)aPs contention that petitionerPs admission in open court that the driver of the 5eepney failed to assist
her in )oin) to a near-y hospital cannot -e construed as an admission of -ad faith. 2he fact that it ,as
the driver of the Isuzu truc. ,ho too. her to the hospital does not imply that petitioner ,as utterly
indifferent to the pli)ht of his in5ured passen)er. If at all, it is merely implied reco)nition -y Ferena that
he ,as the one at fault for the accident. '<sm
@+ERE1ORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated +arch 6, 99", and its resolution, dated
@eptem-er , 99", are AFFI(+'?, ,ith the +>?IFICA2I># that the a,ard of moral dama)es is
?'A'2'?.
6O ORDERED.
Bellosillo' %#hairman&' and Buena' )).' concur.