Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Further, the City has an interest in supporting the will of its residents who
13 participated in the primary election, who in this case cast more than a majority of
14 their votes for Mayor Hafen and, as an obvious corollary, did not cast more than a
15 majority of their votes for Workman.
16
Finally, the City has an interest in seeing that its laws, as set forth in its City
17 Charter, are followed. For example, if the Court is inclined to create a vacancy as a
18 result of Workman's request for leave or writ petition, the City has an interest in
19 seeing that the vacancy is filled according to Section 1.070 of the Henderson City
20 Charter, which outlines the procedures for filling vacancies in elective office.
21
2 There is no provision under Nevada law that entitles a party who received the
3 second most votes cast in a primary (without later winning a general election) to the
4 office of Mayor. The fact that Workman finished with 37.1 8% of the votes cast
5 does not give him any greater legal claim to the office of Mayor than Eddie "In
6 Liberty" Hamilton, Kyler Robinson, Jerry Sakura, Joe Scala, or Clayton Simmons,
7 who all also finished with less than a majority of the vote in the primary election
8 held on April 2, 201 3, and who all also fail to satisfy any of the other legal
9 provisions that might entitle them to the office of Mayor of Henderson. See Ex. A.
1 0 Thus, Workman's claim that he is a competing office holder is meritless. 7
1 1 The Respondents and the Mayor have sufficiently set out the "American
1 2 Rule" (under which an election runner-up has no claim to office) in their briefs in
1 3 reference to Workman's standing. See Resp's. Brief at pp.8-1 0; Real Party in
1 4 Interest's Brief at pp. 8-1 1 . However, the holding in Ingersoll v. Lamb, 75 Nev. 1 ,
1 5 4, 333 P.2d 982, 984 (1 959) explaining the American Rule, is important when
1 6 considering any request by Workman that this Court install him as the Mayor of
1 7 Henderson. Aparty cannot by mandamus obtain an office when he has finished in
1 8 second placenot even when he receives 45% of the vote and his opponent is
1 9 deceased. Ingersoll, 75 Nev. at 6, 333 P.2d at 9848. If Ingersoll could not obtain
20 his desired office by mandamus, then Workman should not be able to do so here by
21 obtaining only 37.1 8%of the vote in a seven person primary.
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7
Workman's claim, even if it were true, would result in a violation of Sec.
1 .080 of the Henderson City Charter.
8
Ingersoll received 1 ,1 61 votes, his deceased opponent, Lester V. Smith
received 1 ,489.
8
B. Workman's Petition for Writ Relief Seeks to Eviscerate Nevada's
Robust Body of Law Governing Elections and Would Disrupt the
Efficient Governance of the City.
3
4 In Nevada, candidates and citizens have ample means to challenge the
5 qualifications of candidates, contest election results, unseat officials who have
6 usurped an office from another, and recall them from office. Candidates and/or
7 others with standing, as appropriate may:
8 1. Submit written challenges to a candidate's qualifications prior to the
9 election (see NRS 293C.186);
10 2. Seek a pre-election writ to prohibit a candidate from appearing on the
11 ballot (see Child v. Lomax, 124 Nev. 600, 606, 188 P.3d 1103, 1107
12 (2008); Lorton v. Jones, 322 P.3d 1051, 1054, 130 Nev. Adv. Rep. 8
13 (Nev. 2014);
14 3. File an election contest in district court (see NRS 293.410 setting forth
15 multiple grounds for challenging the results of an election including
16 eligibility of elected official);
17 4. Seek to, and if granted leave, file a quo warrant action (see NRS 35;
18 Lueck, 125 Nev. at 679, 219 P.3d at 898); and/or
19 5. Initiate a recall (see Nev. Const. Art. 2, 9; see also NRS 306 et seq.).
20 Contrary to Workman's contention, many of these remedies are not resource
21 prohibitive. See Pet. Brief at p. 16, Ins. 17-20. For instance, as long as a pre-
22 election challenge to a candidate's qualifications is not frivolous, there is no cost to
23 the challenger and there is limited use of the challenger's resources. See NRS
24 293C.186. Under the provision that governs challenges to the qualifications of
25 candidates for city office, all a challenger needs to do is prepare a written challenge
26 to the qualifications of a candidate and file it with the City Clerk. See NRS
27 293C.186(4). The City Attorney then reviews the challenge, and if he determines
28 there is probable cause to support the challenge, brings an action to determine it in
1
2
9
1 an appropriate court. See id. The challenger is not a party to the actionthe City
2 Attorney does all the work, thus a pre-election challenger spends limited funds and
3 resources to challenge the qualifications of a candidate pre-election. See id. As
4 such, a challenger is only exposed to costs if a court finds that the challenge was
5 frivolous. See NRS 293C.186(6).
6 Similarly, any citizen may initiate a recall with limited expenditure of funds.
7 There are no filing costs associated with filing a petition for recall. See NRS 306 et
8 seq. In fact, the statutory provision governing recall provides that a person who
9 brings or signs a recall petition is immune from civil liability, thus there is zero risk
10 of incurring legal fees or associated court costs. NRS 306.015(6).
11 This Court should not cure Workman's failure to exhaust, or even attempt,
12 any of the many available pre or post-election remedies (other than quo warranto)
13 with mandamus relief. This Court has made clear that quo warrant is the exclusive
14 remedy for challenging a person's right to hold office. Heller v. Legislature of Nev.,
15 120 Nev. 456, 464, 93 P.3d 746, 751(2004) (emphasis added). Further, this Court
16 has held that mandamus is ill-suited for post-election challenges to a candidate's
17 right to hold office. Id.; see also Child, 124 Nev. at 606, 188 P.3d at 1107
18 (considering pre-election request for mandamus to keep candidate off the ballot);
19 Lorton, 322 P.3d at 1054 (same). In Heller this Court stressed the importance of quo
20 warrant as the exclusive remedy for challenging a seated public official:
21 Quo warrant is the Gibraltar of stability in government tenure. Once
22
a person is duly elected or duly appointed to public office, the
continuity of his services may not be interrupted and the uniform
23 working of the governmental machinery disorganized or disturbed by
24
any proceeding less than a formal challenge to the office by that
action which is now venerable with age, reinforced by countless
25 precedent, and proved to be protective of all parties involved in a
26
given controversy, namely, quo warrant.
27 Heller, 120 Nev. at 464, 93 P.3d at 751 (quoting In re Board of School Directors of
28 Carroll Twp., 407 Pa. 156, 180 A.2d 16, 17 (Pa. 1962)).
10
1 Lorton is not the panacea Workman hopes it to be. Lorton does nothing to
2 alter the well-established framework this Court has recognized concerning
3 candidate challenges, election contests, and the other remedies for the removal of
4 elected officials. Lorton was a pre-election writ to determine the qualification of
5 certain candidates to run for office. Lorton, 322 P.3d at 1053. The Court made
6 clear that Lorton applied to pre-election challenges when it limited the opinion to
7 helping "future potential candidates" and "challengers" understand the effect of
8 term limits. Id. Had this Court intended Lorton to apply beyond the traditional pre-
9 election writ and statutory post-election contest context, it could have stated so, but
10 it did not. Id.
1 1 Prior to Lorton, this Court similarly applied the term limits provision in the
12 pre-election context. See Child, 124 Nev. at 605-06, 188 P.3d at 1107. This Court
13 emphasized its role in doing so as important because it would avoid impairing voter
14 input. Id. Further, this Court specifically acknowledged the difference in available
15 pre-election challenge and post-election contest remedies. Id. In detailing the
16 post-election remedies, this Court made no mention of writ relief. See id. at n. 15.
17 Lorton makes clear that Mayor Hafen may not run again for the office of Mayor,
18 but it does nothing to advance the idea that he should be removed from office now
19 because of his lack of qualification for future office. Lorton, 322 P.3d at 1053.
20 Nevada law provides a way for its people to police candidates and elected
21 officials at every stage of the political and governing processesfrom candidacy
22 through the end of the candidate's term in office. The City, its citizens, and for the
23 sake of effective government, its public officers, must be able to rely on these
24 provisions as the exclusive remedies for challenging candidates, contesting
25 elections, and unseating elected officials.
26 The failure to limit challenges to the methods currently set forth under
27 Nevada law would wreak havoc on the operation of government, exposing the City,
28 its citizens, and its public officials to the constant threat of vacancies in officea
11
1 significant disruption to the administration of public business. Vacancies and other
2 disruptions of government are not trivial: "the law abhors vacancies in public
3 office" for any period of time. See State v. Triplett, 134 Ohio St. 480, 17 N.E.2d
4 729, 731 (Ohio 1938); State v. Lutz, 226 Ala. 497, 147 So. 429, 432 (Ala. 1933);
5 Johnson v. Collins, 11 Ariz. App. 327, 464 P.2d 647, 65 1 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970);
6 State Ex ReL Warder v. Gainer, 15 3 W. Va. 35 , 167 S.E.2d 290, 296 (W. Va.
7 1969); Territory by Attorney Gen. v. Morita, 41 Haw. 1, 25 (Haw. 195 5 )
8 ("Vacancies in public office are contrary to the proper and efficient administration
9 of business."); Ex. Rel. Penrose v. Greathouse, 48 Nev. 419, 422, 233 P. 5 27, 5 28
10 (1925 ) (recognizing Nevada's legislative policy "to fill the vacancy for the office of
11 district judge by election as soon as practicable after the vacancy occurs"); State v.
12 Wells, 8 Nev. 105 , 109 (1872) (noting that a district attorney appointed to fill a
13 vacancy properly served "until the qualification of a successor . . . because the
14 presence of such an officer is necessary to the proper conduct of public business").
15 This Court should not grant Workman relief that will usher in endless
16 challenges to public officials to the detriment of the operation of the government of
17 the City. As a result, if this Court denies Workman's request for leave to file an
18 action quo warranto, it should not resort to mandamus to provide him relief.
19
20
21
22 Workman asks for the unprecedentedthe removal of a public official who
23 received more than a majority of the votes cast in a primary election and the
24 appointment of a candidate who received significantly less than the majority of the
25 votes in that same primary election. "It is a fundamental principle of popular
26 government that the legally expressed will of the majority must prevail in
27 elections." Banks v. Zippert, 470 So. 2d 1147, 1149 (Ala. 1985 ). Nevada's judicial
28 branch has significant responsibility in ensuring the integrity of elections by
C. Workman's Petition for Mandamus Relief Invites this Court to Bend.,
if Not Break, the Boundaries Among the Co-Equal Branches of
Government.
12
1 presiding over challenges to candidate qualifications before they are placed on the
2 ballot. See NRS 293C.186; NRS 293.182; Child, 124 Nev. at 606, 188 P.3d at 1107
3 (considering pre-election request for mandamus to keep candidate off the ballot);
4 Lorton, 322 P.3d at 1054. The judicial branch is also the arbiter of statutory post-
5 election contests for all public officials, which specifically exclude the members of
6 the State Legislature. NRS 293.407; Hdler, 120 Nev. at 466, 93 P.3d at 753.
7 However, this Court has recognized that its powers to remove public officials
8 from office are limited by the separation of powers doctrine and the express
9 provisions of the Constitution of the State of Nevada, namely quo warranto. Heller,
10 120 Nev. at 464,93 P.3d at 751.
11 Article 3, Section 1(1) of the Constitution of the State of Nevada states:
12 The powers of the Government of the State of Nevada shall be divided
13
into three separate departments, the Legislative, the Executive and the
Judicial; and no persons charged with the exercise of powers properly
14 belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any functions,
15
appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases expressly
directed or permitted in this constitution.
16
17 Emphasizing the importance of that constitutional provision, this Court stated in
18
Heller:
As we have previously recognized, separation of powers "is probably
the most important single principle of goverment declaring and
guaranteeing the liberties of the people." It works by preventing the
accumulation of power in any one branch of government.
120 Nev. at 466, 93 P. 3d at 752 (citing Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 18, 422
P.2d 237, 241 (1967) and 1 Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on
Constitutional Law 3.12, at 394 (3d ed. 1999)).
This Court rightly rejected Heller's request for an order forbidding executive
branch employees from serving in the legislature. Heller, 120 Nev. at 466, 93 P.3d
at 752. The Court not only relied on Article 4, Section 6 of the Constitution of the
State of Nevada, which expressly grants the legislature the right to judge the
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13
1 qualification, elections and returns of its own members, but the Court also
2 recognized the principal of "legislative self-protection." 9
3 In City of Sparks v. Sparks Mun. Court, this Court reiterated that the judiciary
4 is a coequal branch of government, with the inherent powers to protect itself and
5 administer its affairs. 302 P.3d 1118, 1128, 129 Nev. Adv. Rep. 38 (Nev. 2013).
6 This Court also noted that "[e]ach governmental branch also has certain inherent
7 powers, by virtue of its sheer existence and as a coequal branch of government, to
8 carry out its basic functions." Id. The Court further established that municipal
9 courts, as coequal branches of their local governments, are protected by the
10 constitutional separation of powers doctrine and possess inherent judicial powers to
11 the same extent as the other courts of this state. Id.
12 It follows then, that municipal legislative and executive bodies also possess
13 inherent powers to the same extent as their state legislative and executive branch
14 counterparts. Id While there is no express constitutional provision providing that
15 members of municipal legislative bodies may judge the qualification of their own
16
17
9
In explaining legislative self- protection in Heller this Court quoted the
Minnesota Supreme Court as follows:
18
19
power shall be lodged. If lodged in any other, than the legislative body
itself, its independence, its purity . . . may be destroyed . . . . No other
22
body, but itself, can have the same motives to preserve and perpetuate
23
vindicate its own character, and to preserve the rights, and sustain the
25
free choice of its own constituents. Accordingly, the power has always
been lodged in the legislative body by the uniform practice of England
26
and America.
27
Heller, 120 Nev. at 469 , 9 3 P.3d at 754 (quoting Scheibel v. Pavlak, 282 N.W.2d
28 843, 847 (Minn. 19 79 )).
14
1 members, the power to do so is an inherent power of each body. See Lueck, 125
2 Nev. at 676, 219 P.3d at 896 (holding that despite lack of standing by movant, the
3 Court could consider merits of decision to remove judge from office under its
4 supervisory responsibilities over the judicial branch).
10
The inherent power each
5 branch of government has to administer its responsibilities is subject to express
6 constitutional limitations and laws that do not violate those express provisions. See
7 Lueck, 125 Nev. at 677-78, 219 P.3d at 897 (explaining the constitutional basis for
8 the Court's authority over the judicial branch).
9 Thus, when it comes to the legislative branch, the Court may act in a limited
10 sphere with respect to the qualifications, elections, and returns of legislators
11 including when the legislature has: (1) devised a role for the courts by statute, such
12 as election contests, (2) infringed upon personal constitutional rights, or (3)
13 imposed extra-constitutional qualifications. Heller, 120 Nev. at 471, 93 P.3d at
14 756.
15 This Court has confirmed that the Mayor and the City Council are part of a
16 separate, legislative branch and specifically that the Mayor is a member of the
17 City's legislative body. See generally, City of Sparks, 30 2 P.3d at 1130 (discussing
18 the powers of the various branches of municipal governments); see also Lorton, 322
19 P.3d at 10 58-59 (holding that the office of mayor under the Reno City Charter
20 [similar to the Henderson City Charter] is a member of the local governing body
21 and a member of the legislative, not executive branch). Thus, in the absence of a
22 devised role for this Court by statute, the assertion of a personal constitutional right,
23 or the imposition of an extra-constitutional qualification, this Court has no role to
24 determine Mayor Hafen's qualification for office. Heller, 120 Nev. at 471, 93 P.3d
25
26
27
28
to
Workman cites Lueck for the principle that the Court may grant discretionary
relief without limitation when public policy is at issue. See Pet. Brief at p. 11.
Wrong. The Court's reason for granting relief in Lueck stemmed from its
supervisory authority over the judicial branch, not a general authority to remove
elected officials in the name of public policy.
15
I at 756. That role is left to the members of the Henderson City Council. See
2 Henderson City Charter Sec. 2.060(1) and (2) (providing that the City Council may
3 judge the qualifications and elections of its own members and adopt rules for the
4 government of its members).
5 As set forth above in detail, this Court's post-election role is limited to
6 determining timely election contests and quo warranto actions. At this point, any
7 action outside of quo wan-anto is left to the voters of Henderson through recall, or
8 the members of the City Council. See Henderson City Charter Secs. 2.030 and
9 2.060.
10
However, in the event this Court does act to order Mayor Hafen's removal
11 from office, in no event should this Court appoint Workman as Mayor. Again,
12 under the long standing principles of separation of powers, this Court should leave
13 the filling of any vacancy to the Henderson City Council. See Henderson City
14 Charter 2.030 (providing that a vacancy may be filled by a majority vote of the
15 remaining council, or special election called by resolution); see also Lueck, 125
16 Nev. at 686, 219 P.3d at 902 (ordering Governor to declare office vacant and
17 providing that office would be filled by applicable appointment process).
18
VI. CONCLUSION
19
6 Workman's request for a writ of mandamus to remove the Mayor more than a
7 year after the 2013 election invites this Court to impinge upon the inherent power of
8 the legislative branch and tests the doctrine of the separation of powers. This Court
9 should decline that invitation.
10 For the reasons set forth in this brief and in the briefs filed by Respondents
11 and Mayor Hafen this Court should deny Workman's request for leave to file a writ
12 of quo warrant and deny his request for mandamus or other extraordinary relief.
13 In the event this Court is inclined to order Mayor Hafen's removal, this Court
14 should not appoint Workman to the office of Mayorfor many reasons, including
15 separation of powers but chiefly because Workman is not entitled to be mayor.
16 Any vacancy created by this Court should be filled by the City Council as set forth
17 in the Henderson City Charter.
18
DATED this /7- 44..day of July, 2014.
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CITY OF HENDERSON
JOSH M. REID, City Attorney
11/6Ciz
JOSH M. REID
City Attorney
BRANDON P. KEMBLE
Assistant City Attorney
240 Water Street, MSC 144
Henderson, Nevada 89015
Attorneys for Amicus Curiae
CITY OF HENDERSON
17
1 NRAP 28.2 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
2 I hereby certify that this brief complies with the formatting requirements of
3 NRAP 32(a)(4), the typeface requirements of NRAP 32(a)(5) and the type style
4 requirements of NRAP 32(a)(6) because this brief has been prepared in a
5 proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft Word in Times New Roman in font
6 size 14.
7 I further certify that this brief complies with the page or type-volume
8 limitations of NRAP 32(a)(7) because, it is proportionately spaced, has a typeface
9 of 14 points or more, and contains approximately 5006 words
10 Finally, I hereby certify that I have read this amicus brief, and to the best of
11 my knowledge, information, and belief, it is not frivolous or interposed for any
12 improper purpose. I further certify that this brief complies with all applicable
13 Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure, in particular NRAP 28(e)(1), which requires
14 every assertion in the brief regarding matters in the record to be supported by a
15 reference to the page and volume number, if any, of the transcript or appendix
16 where the matter relied on is to be found. I understand that I may be subject to
17 sanctions in the event that the accompanying brief is not in conformity with the
18 requirements of the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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BRANDON P. KEMBLE
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I am an employee of the CITY OF
HENDERSON, and that on this 17th day of July, 2014, I electronically filed and
served by electronic mail and United States Mail a true and correct copy of the
above and foregoing BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE CITY OF HENDERSON IN
SUPPORT OF RESPONDENTS AND REAL PARTY IN INTEREST properly
addressed to the following:
Stephanie Rice, Esq.
Hardy Law Group
96 & 98 Winter Street
Reno, NV 89503
Attorney for Petitioner
The Honorable Catherine Cortez Masto
Attorney General of the State of Nevada
100 N. Carson Street
Carson City, NV 89701
Respondent
The Honorable Ross Miller
Nevada Secretary of State
101 North Carson Street, Suite 3
Carson City, NV 89701-3714
Respondent
Todd L. Bice, Esq.
Jordan T. Smith, Esq.
3883 Howard Hughes Parkway, Suite 800
Las Vegas, Nevada 89169
Attorneys for Real Party in Interest
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An employee of City of the Henderson
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1
Henderson.
1 0 5 . I am responsible for administering ballot process and maintaining election
1 1
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1 8
request to inspect any records pursuant to an election contest or receive any other
1 9
type of challenge.
20 1 0. The estimated cost to hold a special election is $1 23 ,000.00.
21 1 1 . There are significant resources and time commitments associated with preparing
22
for and conducting a special election that would otherwise be used to conduct
23
City business.
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Page 1 of 2
12. Ex. B is a true and correct certified copy of the results of the primary election
held on April 2, 2013
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.
Dated this r2i, day of July, 2014.
SABRINA MERCADANTE
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Page 2 of 2
142,813
5,929
9,109
2,600
Total.- 17,638
4.15%
6.38%
1.82%
12.35%
155/155 100.00%
9,618
390
186
241
459
123
6,520
Total... 17,537
54.84%
2.22%
1.06%
1.37%
2.62%
0.70%
37.18%
100.00%
155/155 100.00%
2,687
2,707
2,490
8,450
Total... 16,334
16.45%
16.57%
15.24%
51.73%
100.00%
155/155 100.00%
6,803
6,992
1,723
1,178
Total... 16,696
40.75%
41.88%
10.32%
7.06%
100.00%
2013 MUNICIPAL PRIMARY ELECTION
April 2, 2013
Subdivision Report
Clark County
Official Final--HEN
Henderson - At Large
Registration & Turnout
Election Day Turnout
Early Vote Turnout
Mail Turnout
MAYOR OF HENDERSON
Hafen, Arthur A. 'Andy'
Hamilton, Eddie 'In Liberty'
Robinson, Kyler
Sakura, Jerry
Scala, Joe
Simmons, Clayton
Workman, Rick
CITY COUNCIL, WARD III, HENDERSON
Cutler, Bruce
Doyle, Milt E.
Lale, Erin
Marz, John F.
MUNICIPAL COURT JUDGE, DEPT. I, HENDERSON
DiGiacomo, Sandy Allred
Stevens, Mark Jeffrey
Thompson, Gary D.
Zach, Terry Jones
CERTIFI n
m inum m Ib m
B 4.7)
". "I"T R Cal
th e
oxgrasiellialifilliamilfte Itiant
April 03, 2013 8:28 AM
Page 1 of 1
Ex. C
0
4.. 'N. E 5
.4 Rate 76 Ca 4:lone
CITY OF HENDERSON
City Attorney's Office
Josh M. Reid, City Attorney
P.O. Box 95050, MSC 144
Henderson, NV 89009-5050
(702) 267-1200
VIAE-MAIL
March 28, 2013
Rick Workman
Accreditation Coordinator
Henderson Police Department
223 Lead Street
Henderson, Nevada 89009
Re: Personal and Confidential Advisory Opinion
Dear Mr. Workman:
I was informed today that at some point close in time to your decision to file your
Declaration of Candidacy for Mayor of Henderson, you contacted a member of the City
Attorney's Office ("CAO") to determine if your decision to run for such office would have any
bearing on your employment with the City. Although you never requested a formal opinion
from the City Attorney, it appears that you were under the impression that a formal opinion,
setting forth the City's position on the issue was going to be prepared and provided to you.
On behalf of the CAO, I apologize for the apparent breakdown in communication. For your
future reference, as a City employee you have two resources when seeking an ethics opinion.
Under HMC 2.40.100 you can ask the City Attorney for an Advisory Opinion. Requests for
an Advisory Opinion should be made in writing to the City Attorney. In addition, as a City
employee you may ask for an ethics opinion by the Nevada Commission on Ethics.
With respect to your decision to run for Mayor and any effect that your candidacy may
have on your current employment with the City, HMC 2.40.090(B) states "[a] City employee
may run for or hold political office so long as that office is not inconsistent with the employee's
job duties." This provision in the HMC is not a bar against City employees, including you, from
running for elective office. This provision relates to a City employee's ability to fulfill their work
duties while running for elective office. Under HMC 2.40 someone could file a complaint with
the City Attorney with regard to a City employee's violation of this provision, but I can assure
you that this has not occurred with respect to your candidacy.
With respect to the City of Henderson Charter, Sections 1.080 1(a) and (2) do not
preclude a City employee from running for Mayor. Nevertheless, these provisions of the
Charter do not allow the Mayor or any member of the City Council to be a City employee.
Accordingly, if you are successful in your mayoral campaign you will have to resign as a City
City Attorney's Office (702) 267-1200 fax (702) 267-1201 www.cityofhenderson.com
Rick Workman Advisory Opinion
March 28, 2013
Page 2
employee before taking the Oath of Office as Mayor. Unless you resign from your
employment, you would automatically forfeit your office as Mayor.
Should you have any questions or need additional information regarding this important matter,
please feel free to contact me at your convenience. Again, I apologize again for any delay.
Sincerely,
Josh M. Reid
City Attorney