Adorno, Time, and Musical Time

Response to Stephen Decatur Smith

n
max paddison
durham university
o
Just as a piece of music compresses time, and a picture folds space in upon itself, so
the possibility becomes concrete that things could also be different than they are.
Theodor W. Adorno, sthetische Theorie
1
1
Given its importance, the concept of time in Theodor Adornos aesthetics of music
has so far received little attention in musicology or philosophy in the
English-speaking world, even though there has been substantial interest elsewhere,
especially in Germany,
2
France,
3
Italy, and Belgium.
4
It is in this context that
Stephen Decatur Smiths article Even Money Decays: Transience and Hope in
Adorno, Benjamin, and Wozzeck is timely in all senses of the word, because it
brings together a range of otherwise seemingly disparate elements in Adorno and
gives them an illuminating focus through the concepts of time and transience,
raising important issues.
The concept of time in Adorno is certainly fundamental, whether taken as the
experience in nature of all that is fleeting, transient, and in a perpetual process of
growth and decay; or as historical time as change and progress; or as the experi-
ence of time in the temporal arts, and especially as ways of organizing time in
music. But you can also argue, as does Smith, that an equally persistent preoccupa-
tion in Adornos work is the concept of space, including what Adorno calls the spa-
tialization of time, where concepts of movement and stasis can also be understood
in relation to time, even as motion and arrest around objects in space, circumambu-
lations that in the process of movement happen to take time. Indeed, Adorno goes
further and proposes that in the context of modernism a temporal art such as
music has moved increasingly toward the dimension of space and toward Stillstand,
time standing still. Furthermore, you might say that both temporality and spatiali-
zation are also, as duration and movement, associated with the persistence and con-
tinuity of the experiencing Subject, as a sense of self and of memory fundamental
to our sense of time passing and of time past, as well as an anticipated future and
the utopian or redemptive hopes that might accompany that. Many of these aspects
of Adornos concepts of temporality and spatialization, derived from his close
The Opera Quarterly Vol. 29, No. 34, pp. 244252; doi: 10.1093/oq/kbt034
Advance Access publication on February 6, 2014
The Author 2014. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com.

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association with Walter Benjamin in the 1920s and 1930s, and to an extent from
the pervasive influence of the ideas of Henri Bergson in the early twentieth
century, are taken up in relation to the interpretation of Alban Bergs musicand
in particular of his opera Wozzeckin Smiths article. As well as responding to
aspects of the case made by Smith through addressing some of the important
issues he raises, I want to introduce some speculations of my own that have been
sparked from reading his article and also to pursue some alternative readings of
Adornos critical reception of Bergson.
2
One big question is strongly implied, although not addressed directly, in Smiths
article, and I think it is one that can serve to locate the discussion within a broader
philosophical context: how does Adorno actually understand time in philosophi-
cal terms? That is to say, is it a real dimension of the world for him, and is it there-
fore to be seen as one of the invariants or invariables of music? Or is it a feature
of how the world appears to us, a convenient and conventional ordering of events
that might seem invariable and inevitable, but which could in fact be otherwise? In
view of the rebellion against the conventions of musical time and notions of
musical narrativity that took place in the 1950s and 1960s through the use of
chance procedures and of open forms (John Cage), and the substitution of meta-
phors of space in the form of labyrinth structures (Luciano Berio) and fields of
possibilities (Henri Pousseur), is Adorno really a Kantian as opposed to a
Newtonian realist in his rejection of supposed musical invariables such as time?
I think he most certainly was a Kantian in the sense that he did not regard time
as a real attribute of the world itselfan absolute reality, to put it in Kantian
termsbut regarded it rather as an empirical reality, an aspect of the way the
world appears to our minds.
5
Time is therefore not regarded as an invariable
(or invariant) for Adorno, in music at least. Or we can certainly say that this was
his view by the 1960s, when he wrote in the unfinished Aesthetic Theory ( published
posthumously in 1970) that today music is clearly rebelling against the conven-
tional ordering of time, making room for widely diverging approaches in dealing
with musical time. The point is that, no matter how doubtful it may be whether art
can shake off the invariable of time, it is more useful to regard time as a moment
rather than as an a priori assumption of music.
6
The implications of this are significant. On one levelthat is, in empirical sci-
entific termsit is worth noting that there is a strong cognitive-scientific case that
our experience of time is dependent on our encounter with things and events
either outside us (changes in the environment, the cycle of the seasons) or internal
to us but largely independent of our volition (breathing, pulse).
7
The neuroscientist
and ethnomusicologist Udo Will has pointed out that we dont actually possess a
adorno, time, and musical time 245

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special internal organ that enables us to sense time directly as such, and can only
experience time passing through our relationship to other things.
8
Music, you
might say, is one of those other things that enables us to experience time, not
simply as time passing or as measured time, but in a particularly intense, focused,
and directed way that also seems to shape our subjectivity and, importantly, to give
form to the apparent continuity of our experience. On another level, howeverthat
of musical time, and the relation of the specific musical work or event to the experi-
ence of musical time (as opposed to the experience of nonmusical time, or
empirical time, as Adorno calls it)the conventions and expectations of musical
time are challenged. In Aesthetic Theory, Adorno emphasizes that it remains unde-
niable that music is a temporal art, and that musical time and the time of real
experience (that is, empirical time), even though they are different in all other
respects, have one thing in common, which is that both are irreversible.
9
He also
points out that the relation of music to formal musical time is defined not
abstractly, but in the context of a concrete musical event.
10
It is on this basis that
the distinctions between the typical procedures of different composers in relation
to time within the structure of concrete musical works appear as significant to
Adorno, and demand interpretation.
3
So, to turn to Adornos interpretation of temporality in Berg: as Smith shows,
Adorno recognized the experience of stasis in Bergs music as one that is itself
expressive of a distinctive worldview, something that manifests itself in the physi-
ognomy of his music as a process of what Adorno elsewhere calls self-negation
and permanent reabsorption ( permanente Selbstzurcknahme).
11
Indeed, Adorno
identifies the paradox of Bergs music in a most perceptive way when he points
out that
Bergs music is not at all a Something [ein Etwas] which forms itself, so to speak,
out of a Nothingness [ein Nichts] of the smallest possible, undifferentiated compo-
nent elements. It only seems like this at first glance. In reality it accomplishes
within itself a process of permanent dissolution [ permanente Auflsung], rather than
achieving a synthesis. . . . Its Becoming . . . is its own negation [ihre eigene
Negation].
12
One of the remarkable features of Bergs music is its constant flow through time,
created to a large degree by its process of constant transition, so that when Adorno
calls the composer the master of the smallest transition (der Meister des kleinsten
bergangs) with reference to Wagners comment that music is the art of transi-
tion, it is to emphasize precisely this sense of Bergsonian continuity, with its
implications of permanent development toward a telos, largely evading the
246 max paddison

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calculated discontinuities that so often feature in Arnold Schoenbergs freely atonal
and twelve-tone works. What is particularly striking and even unsettling, however
something that Smith identifies very effectivelyis the apparent opposite of this
process, which is the drive both to extinction (so many of Bergs works end ppp,
fading into silence) and toward a kind of taking back of all that has previously
flowed forward, to the extent of employing cancrizans and structural symmetries
that appear to negate the onward flow of time. Adorno sees this dialectically, of
course, and even rejoices in the seeming paradox of a music that goes forward and
backward simultaneously. At the same time he also acknowledges that time is irrever-
sible, which is perhaps not such a conundrum, given that, even while going back on
itself, the music is also still moving onward. What is a conundrum, however, is how
to interpret this kind of musical gesture, and furthermore, how to interpret the fine
detail of musics relation to time (which, whether or not it is seen as an invariable, is
certainly irreversible) when faced with composers as diverse as Wagner, Stravinsky,
and Berg, all three of whom he interprets as using the same terms of reference in
relation to time, but with distinctly different critical judgments on their different
musical processes in the context of concrete musical works.
Issues of movement and stasis, of continuity and discontinuity, the persistence
of the Subject or the disappearance of the Subject in time, and indeed of the rela-
tionship of musical time to empirical time are not, of course, manifestations of
fixed meanings in any symbolic sense for Adorno. Rather they are variables that
can only be understood, so he appears to argue, when seen in a twofold context: the
concrete context of the particular work (as issues of form and structure, of gesture
and movement), and the specific context of history (as issues of historical period
and location)two contexts that Adorno also sees as thoroughly mediated by each
other. Further important dialectical axes for Adorno are the oppositional relation-
ships of history to nature and of rationality to myth, derived, as was so much else in
his conceptual world, from Walter Benjamin, in particular from The Origin of
German Tragic Drama (1928). For us, involved in the attempt to understand
Adornos interpretation, the issues are further compounded when we consider the
influence on his thought of two thinkers as different as Bergson and Benjamin,
who had at least one thing in common: they were both inclined to jettison dialectics
and turn to metaphysics and mysticism. Yet it seems to me that, while the seminal
influence of Benjamin on all aspects of Adornos thinking is undeniableSmith
demonstrates this in connection with Adornos interpretation of Wozzeck in quite
dazzling ways, combined with his discussion of Goethes Elective Affinitiesthe
influence of Bergson, while of undoubted relevance to this discussion, is of a differ-
ent order and calls for debate. I suggest that the reservations that came to be har-
bored by Adorno in this respect are clearly shown by the critiques of Bergson
(admittedly brief ) that can be read in particular in two of Adornos most substantial
mature works, Negative Dialectics (1966) and Aesthetic Theory (1970).
adorno, time, and musical time 247

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4
Smith recognizes that there is what could be called an antidialectical problem in
Bergson, and he draws attention to it by referring to Max Horkheimers Bergson
critique, which he argues quite plausibly had an influence on Adornos own recep-
tion of Bergson. However, it also seems to me that, in the process of applying
Bergson to the further enhancement of Adornos Berg interpretation, there are
moments when Smith could be accused of theologizing both Berg and Adorno
along Bergsonian lines, and of leaving the dialectical acuity of Adornos critical
approach to one side at certain points in what is otherwise a very thought-provoking
article. The emphasis on the utopian and idealist aspects of Adorno, and the strong
links made between Bergsons notions of continuity, immediacy, and spontaneity
and his positive version of utopian thinking inevitably perhaps encourage this.
There is no doubt, of course, that the idea of Utopia occupies an important
place in Adornos aesthetics, but it is one that is nevertheless tempered by negativity
in its refusal to give positive form to any utopian vision. In this context, Adornos
criticism of Bergson emerges quite clearly, particularly in relation to concepts of
intuition, immediacy, continuity, and spontaneity, all of which Bergson seems to
see rather monolithically and simplistically as absolute attributes of temps dure.
13
Smith is certainly correct to emphasize the importance of Bergsons influence, and
at the same time to recognize that references to the philosopher in Adornos writ-
ings are relatively few and far between and never developed at any length. Indeed,
in Aesthetic Theory, the book Adorno was working on at his death and which consti-
tutes even in its unfinished form his most definitive thinking on the philosophy of
art, the name Bergson only crops up three times as far as I can see, but on each
occasion there is a trenchant critique of particular assumptions implied in the
concept of temps dure. Smith is aware of these references and acknowledges them
in a footnote, but does not discuss them further. I want to examine them in a little
more detail, because I think they have a lot to tell us about the kind of critical reser-
vations Adorno had about Bergsons philosophy of time and its undialectical char-
acter, alongside the evident attractions the notions of temps dure and temps espace
also held for him.
The first mention of Bergson in Aesthetic Theory occurs in the section on The
Beauty of Nature, discussing immediacy and spontaneity versus analysis in the
perception of art, where we find: Perhaps [works of art] are completely perceptible
only in the temps dure, the idea of which Bergson seems to have derived from artis-
tic experience.
14
But Adorno then states that pure immediacy is not enough to
generate aesthetic perception.
15
In this he argues typically that the spontaneous
and intuitive aspects of the experience of art are also necessarily mediated by
degrees of concentration, reflection, and even analysis that are the opposite of spon-
taneity and intuition. He thus draws on Benjamins concept of aesthetic experience
248 max paddison

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as Erfahrung, as a kind of experience that is also able to reflect on itself and to bring
past and immediate present into conjunction, together with anticipation. He
opposes this, as does Benjamin, to experience as Erlebnis, which is bound to the
immediacy of the instant as lived experience. It is the latter, as pure immediacy,
lived experience, that Adorno associates with Bergson and which is the object of
his critique of philosophers such as Bergson and Edmund Husserl.
16
On the second occasion, in the section Riddle Character, Truth Content,
Metaphysics, concerning truth as illusion, Adorno writes:
Still, spontaneous recollection brings to life empirical existence when it is harnessed
to the imagery of art. Thus goes the theory of Bergson and Proust, who in this
respect were genuine idealists, for they attributed to reality what they wanted to
redeem, whereas actually it is part of art, not reality. Hoping to escape the curse of
aesthetic illusion, they simply shifted the illusory quality on to reality.
17
Adorno thus reveals the dialectical character of how he sees the relation between art
and empirical realitythe utopian promises of art are redemptive only in relation
to a potential utopian future, one that is, however, not actually present in empirical
reality as it is but only foreshadowed as an aspect of the illusory character of art.
On the third occasion, to be found in a fragment in the appendixes to Rolf
Tiedemanns edition of Aesthetic Theory, Theories on the Origin of ArtAn
Excursus, Adorno writes concerning the philosopher of art Benedetto Croce: His
idealism and the Bergsonian streak in his aesthetics combine to make it impossible
for him to see the constitutive relation that art has to what lies beyond spontaneous
subjectivity.
18
I have argued elsewhere that the polarization of continuity and dis-
continuity is a problem fundamental to the philosophy of duration, because
Bergson appears to insist that the flux of continuity has to be free of discontinuity
and (because it is conceived as being characterized by pure immediacy, intuition,
and spontaneity) that it is not in need of rationality and reflection.
19
In Negative
Dialectics Adorno criticizes Bergsons philosophy for the irrational immediacy of
the concept of dure: Intuitions succeed only desultorily, however. Every cognition
including Bergsons own needs the rationality he scorns, and needs it precisely at
the moment of concretion. Absolutized duration, pure becoming, the pure act
these would recoil into the same timelessness which Bergson chides in metaphy-
sics since Plato and Aristotle.
20
Adorno argues that, in absolutizing his concept of dure as the uninterrupted
flow of a perpetual becoming (devenir), Bergson renders it indistinguishable from
an uncritical timelessness, a metaphysical Absolute. This raises an interesting
question with regard to Smiths interpretation of Adornos reception of Bergson.
With the use he makes of Adornos grass angels image (from one of the frag-
ments in the posthumously published Beethoven book) in relation to Bergsons
account of dure, does Smith risk imputing a metaphysics and even a theology to
adorno, time, and musical time 249

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Adornos position that it does not really possess? Smith writes that if Bergson sees
in dure the refutation of a world that dies and is reborn at every instant, then
Adornos metaphysics of musical time entails precisely thisa teeming, disjunct,
and discontinuous multiplicity of constant creation and constant destruction.
21
I
can understand why he has arrived at such a conclusion, but the question that
arises for me is: does Smiths interpretation stop just one stage short in its pursuit
of Adornos dialectical convolutions, and could the process not be pushed a bit
further? I have argued here that an essential point about Adornos dual conception
of musical time and empirical time is that the relationship between the two is crit-
ical, in the dialectical sense that musical time constitutes a critique of empirical
time. This critique may change in character, depending on whether it is the music
of Berg, Wagner, Stravinsky, or Debussy that is being discussed, but I argue that
the idea of temporality as continuity or duration does not take on the character of
Absolute Being in Adorno. Gaston Bachelard also published a critique of Bergsons
concept of duration as continuity in his book The Dialectic of Duration (1950), which
argues a very similar position to that of Adorno, precisely on the grounds that
Bergsons concepts are not dialectical. In spite of the apparent duality of temps
dure and temps espace, Bachelard suggests that Bergsons real starting point is dura-
tion as the absolute unity of Being and continuity.
22
5
It is striking that Adorno, in his insistence that the modernist work of art has no
choice but to manifest discontinuity through the fractured character of its form, also
recognizes that discontinuity of this kind still exists critically within the continuity
of musical time, while simultaneously invoking the world outside musical
time. Adorno makes his distinction between musical time (musikalische Zeit) and
empirical time (empirische Zeit) in terms that recall Bergsons temps dure and temps
espace. I have made a case elsewhere for this in the context of Adorno along the fol-
lowing lines:
This is another . . . significantly different aspect of the continuity and discontinuity
of musical time as it is usually discussed. It refers to the continuity of musical time
within the musical continuum, and its discontinuity with empirical time outside it,
irrespective of the apparent continuity or discontinuity that characterizes particular
works in themselves. . . . It was precisely this separation that Adorno wished to keep
distinct, so that, unlike Bergson, the perspective of musical time functioned also as
a critique of empirical time and, by implication, of the empirical world.
23
For Adorno, the experience of musical time suggests that the experience of the
world could be other than it actually is, and this constitutes for him the utopian
moment of art and the aesthetic experience.
24
These are the terms of reference
250 max paddison

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that Smith takes on to explore the nuances of Adornos interpretation of Berg, and
in particular of Wozzeck. In doing so he succeeds impressively in demonstrating
something that Adorno had always claimed should be the case: that the relation of
music to formal musical time is defined not abstractly, but in the context of a con-
crete musical event.
25
My (unquestionably abstract) critique of his article does not,
of course, detract from this achievement but seeks rather to offer an alternative
reading of its Bergsonian idealism.
notes
Max Paddison is Professor of Music Aesthetics
at the University of Durham. He has published
extensively on Adorno, aesthetics, and critical
theory, and also on contemporary music, the avant-
garde, and the concept of modernism. He is
author of Adornos Aesthetics of Music (Cambridge
University Press, 1993); Adorno, Modernism and
Mass Culture (Kahn & Averill, 1996); and joint editor
(with Irne Delige) of Contemporary Music:
Theoretical and Philosophical Perspectives (Ashgate,
2010).
1. Drngt eine Musik die Zeit zusammen, faltet
ein Bild Rume ineinander, so konkretisiert sich die
Mglichkeit, es knnte auch anders sein. Theodor
W. Adorno, sthetische Theorie, Gesammelte
Schriften, vol. 7, ed. Rolf Tiedemann and Gretel
Adorno (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1970), 208 (my
trans.).
2. See especially Richard Klein, Eckehard Kiem,
and Wolfram Ette, eds., Musik in der Zeit, Zeit in der
Musik (Weilerswist, Germany: Velbrck, 2000); also
Klaus E. Kaehler, Aspekte des Zeitproblems in der
Musikphilosophie Theodor W. Adornos, in Mit den
Ohren denken: Adornos Philosophie der Musik, ed.
Richard Klein and Claus-Steffen Mahnkopf
(Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1998), 3751.
3. See especially Anne Boissire, La pense
musicale de Theodor W. Adorno: Lpique et le temps
(Paris: Beauchesne, 2011).
4. See the special edition of Musicae Scientiae on
Aspects du temps dans la cration musicale
(Discussion Forum 3), ed. Michel Imberty and Max
Paddison (Lige: European Society for the Cognitive
Sciences of Music, 2004), which addresses a wide
range of philosophical issues to do with time and
music, including Bergson and Adorno (in French
and English). See also Clestin Delige, Invention
musicale et idologies (Paris: Christian Bourgois,
1986), esp. chap. 4, Perception du temps
musical, which refers to Adorno and Gaston
Bachelard.
5. Kant writes: we deny to time all claimto
absolute reality; that is to say, we deny that it
belongs to things absolutely, as their condition or
property, independently of any reference to the form
of our sensible intuition. Immanuel Kant, Critique
of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith, 2nd ed.
(London: Macmillan, 1978), 78. Kant does not deny
the empirical reality of time, only its absolute reality.
6. Ibid. Theodor W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory,
trans. Christian Lenhardt (London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1984), 3435; see original German text
in Adorno, sthetische Theorie, 42.
7. See Ernst Pppel, A Hierarchical Model of
Temporal Perception, Trends in Cognitive Sciences 1,
no. 2 (May 1997): 5661. See also Robin Le
Poidevin, The Experience and Perception of Time,
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2011), ed.
Edward N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/fall2011/entries/time-experience/.
8. Udo Will, Rhythm, Time Experience and the
Body: Rethinking Musical Time, paper delivered at
the Institute of Advanced Study (IAS), Durham
University, UK, November 6, 2012. I am indebted to
several enjoyable and intensive discussions with
Udo Will on time perception during his period as
an IAS Fellowat Durham in 2012.
9. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 34; sthetische
Theorie, 42.
10. Ibid.
11. See Theodor W. Adorno, On the Problem of
Musical Analysis, trans. Max Paddison, Music
Analysis 1, no. 2 (July 1982): 184.
12. Ibid.
13. For a more extended critique of Bergson in
relation to Adorno, see my article Performance,
Reification, and Score: The Dialectics of
Spatialization and Temporality in the Experience of
Music, Musicae Scientiae 8 (Fall 2004): 15779.
14. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 102; sthetische
Theorie, 109.
15. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 103; sthetische
Theorie, 109.
16. Husserl also uses the concepts Erfahrung
and Erlebnis, but in almost the opposite sense to
Benjamin and Adorno.
adorno, time, and musical time 251

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17. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 192; sthetische
Theorie, 200.
18. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 448; sthetische
Theorie, 481.
19. See Paddison, Performance, Reification, and
Score.
20. Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics,
trans. E. B. Ashton (London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1973), 89. Original German text: Theodor
W. Adorno, Negative Dialektik, Gesammelte
Schriften, vol. 6, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt:
Suhrkamp, 1970), 20.
21. See Stephen Decatur Smith, Even Money
Decays: Transience and Hope in Adorno, Benjamin,
and Wozzeck, Opera Quarterly 29 (2013): 21243.
22. Gaston Bachelard, The Dialectic of Duration,
trans. Mary McAllester Jones (Manchester:
Clinamen, 2000), 44.
23. Paddison, Performance, Reification, and
Score, 176.
24. Ibid., 177.
25. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, 34; sthetische
Theorie, 42.
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