G. MANNOURY- D.

VUYSJE
Arnst erdam
SEMANTI C AND SI GNI FI C ASPECTS OF MODERN THEORI ES
OF COMMUNI CATI ON
I nt r oduct i on
I n his book " I nt r oduct i on to Semantics", publ i shed in 1942, Rudol f
Car nap has di st i ngui shed t hree fields of i nvest i gat i on of languages. He
assigns to t he field op pragmatics t hat i nvest i gat i on in whi ch reference
is made to t he speaker (or to t he user of a language) and to t he fi el d of
semantics t he analysis of t he expressions and t hei r desi gnat a abst ract ed
f r om t he user of t he l anguage (we woul d ask: what does i t mean to say
in this connect i on: abst ract ed f r om t he user?). Th e t hi r d fi el d of t he
science of signs, whi ch he calls in accordance wi t h Charles Morri s
semi ot i c is an abst ract i on f r om t he desi gnat a and refers to an analysis of
t he rel at i ons bet ween t he expressions.
I t may be known to you (or to some of you) t hat already Ot t o Neur at h
r a~ed obj ect i ons to this di st i nct i on and to t he use of t he t hree terms,
whi ch, accordi ng to hi m, easily lead to pseudo-probl ems and distract at-
t ent i on f r om genui ne probl ems.
We share these obi ect i ons ar gui ng t hat these t erms give no war r ant
for t hei r ut i l i zat i on as a classification of ki nds of signs ("pragmat i cal
signs", "semant i cal signs", "syntactical signs") and t hat such ext ensi on
of t hei r si gni fi cat i on may bl ur t he di st i nct i on bet ween signs in various
modes of si gni f yi ng and t he signs whi ch make up pragmatics, semantics,
and syntactics concei ved as t he t hree di vi si ons of semiotic.
You may also be aware t hat a later accept at i on of t he t erms by Morri s
has l ed to a consi derabl e enl ar gement when t he terms are so concei ved
t hat t hey are all i nt er pr et abl e wi t hi n, what Morri s calls, a behavi oral l y
or i ent ed semiotic; i n this accept at i on, semi ot i c studies t he si gni fi cat i on
of signs, and so t he i nt erpret ant behavi or wi t hout whi ch t here is no
signification. Pragmat i cs studies t he ori gi n, uses, and effects of signs
wi t hi n the total behavi or ol the i nt erpret ers of signs. Th e di fference lies
t herefore not i n t he presence or absence of behavi or but i n t he sector
ol behavi or under consideration. Th e f ul l account of signs will i nvol ve
147
G, MANNOURY. D. VUYSJE
all three considerations. And, indeed, Morris' later elaborations of his
theory of signs have emphasized the unity of semiotic rather than break
each probl em into its pragmatical, semantical and syntactical com-
ponents.
We have dwelt upon these conceptions not only to poi nt out the simi-
larity of same with those developed in signific studies, but also to stress
the objections which may be raised to the det achment of a semantic
system from the sign user, or, in other words, to the considering of the
semantic components of a language system as isolated factors.
It may be clear that this conception of semantics refers to the
cognitive ~sage of language, i.e., a usage of language for the purpose of
maki ng (so-called) true statements, "t rut h" being a characteristic rela-
tion between signs and objects. But it may also be obvious that this con-
ception leaves i mport ant aspects of language out of consideration.
Even the inductive rules, in which "t rut h" is replaced by a prob-
ability, can be assigned to the field of the cognitive usage of language.
From the outset signific writings have laid stress on the instrumental
use of language, on the aims of influencing the listener, or reader, or,
more generally speaking, the "hearer" (in the signific sense of the word),
for certain purposes i nt ended by the "speaker". The speaker has the
intention of maki ng the listener believe what he says.
Wi t hi n the scope of signific studies the study of the i nst rument al
usage therefore takes a pr omi nent place, and that in its three forms:
in its comm~,,nicative aspects representing a form of conveying infor-
mation to the listener; in its suggestive aspects, i.e., the use of language
with the i nt ent i on of arousing in the listener certain emotions, or of
det ermi ni ng hi m to assmne certain volitional attitudes; and in its pro-
motive aspects: the use of language having the purpose of i nduci ng the
"hearer" to perform certain actions.
According to a current conception, the i nst rument al usage fails into
a category to which the predicates "t rue" and "false" do not apply. For
these predicates express a semantical relation, namely, a relation between
signs and objects; but since i nst rument al usage falls into pragmatics,
i.e., includes the sign user, it cannot be j udged as true or false. It will
result from the last part of this paper how we have faced the t rut h
problem. We only wish to add here that the operational aspects of
i nst rument al usage have not always been studied in the way which,
in our view, it deserves, and that some statements are accepted by a
certain person at a certain time and not accepted by the same person
at anot her time.
148
SEMANTIC AND SIGNIFIC ASPECTS
II
The Semantic Approach
Aft er this short i nt roduct i on we Will try to face these views with more
recent devel opment s of the t heory of semantic i nformat i on, on the one
hand, analyzing the semantic approach in its present form, on the ot her
hand, trying to out l i ne a t heory in which the i nst rument al use of
language will also be taken into account. We t herefore will first give
a short survey of the t heory of semantic i nformat i on, as it has been
present ed by Carnap and Bar-Hillel.
The mat hemat i cal t heory of communi cat i on, which has been t ermed
a t heory of selective i nformat i on, measures symbols but is not interested
in the symbols it measures. These symbols have not hi ng to do with
what these symbols symbolize. In a study on semantic i nformat i on,
Carnap and Bar-Hillel write that it often turns out that "i mpat i ent
scientists in various fields applied the t ermi nol ogy and the theorems
of Communi cat i on Theor y to fields in which the t erm "i nformat i on"
was used presystematically in a semantic sense, or even in a pragmatic
sense". In our opinion, this t endency may poi nt to a nat ural and
sound devel opment , the more so as scientifically founded theories of
signs deal wi t h part of the problems with which theories of informa-
tion are concerned.
We fully -~hare their opi ni on that the semantic concept of informa-
tion will serve as a bet t er approxi mat i on for some fut ure explication
of a psychological concept of i nformat i on t han the concept dealt wi t h
in Communi cat i on Theory. From the beginning, however, the ques-
tion may be raised whet her and how far a t heory of semantic informa-
tion, as out l i ned by them, and beari ng on rat her restricted language
systems, will hol d for the languages of, what they call, full-fledged
sciences.
It lies outside the scope of this paper to compare or to review the
~everal approaches to an extension of a t heory of semantic i nformat i on,
but we wish to stress the significance, for certain purposes, of a restric-
tion to language systems of rigidly defi ned structures, so that any pro-
position expressible in one of these languages i~ i ndeed specifiable
"out of an ensemble of preconcei ved possibilities". In many cases --
and this, as said already, depends on the aims to be pursued -- such
l i mi t ed systems are by far to be preferred to the unsystemized language
of science with an unspecified number of pri mi t i ve predicates or
families of such, but certainly not in ot her cases. "Against a gain in
vigor stands a serious loss of closeness to actual scientific procedure, "
said Bar-Hillel himself.
149
G. MANNOURY- D. VUYSJE
Fr om t he above you will under s t and t hat we are ai mi ng at a t heory
in whi ch t he process of [unct i onal i zi ng or di nar y l anguage is of rele-
vance and whi ch to a cert ai n ext ent belongs to t he field whi ch has been
t ermed: l anguage engi neeri ng, or l anguage technology. It is t hat par t
of t he communi cat i ve process whi ch is concer ned wi t h t he messages
themselves, wi t h i ndi vi dual messages, and also wi t h probl ems on t he
affected conduct of t he receiver, in short wi t h what Weaver has called
t he semant i c (this t er m does not coi nci de wi t h t hat of Carnap) and t he
effectiveness pr obl em. It is t he l anguage engi neer who is conf r ont ed
wi t h probl ems of t heoret i cal linguistics, psychology, logic and semantics.
We t hi nk t hat for t he i nf or mat i on t heoret i ci an who is i nt erest ed i n
t he semant i c approach to t he t heory a clarification of t he concepts of
i nf or mat i on will be an i mpor t ant task. He t hen is concer ned wi t h t he
cont ent s of symbols whi ch wilt be decisively i nvol ved in t he def i ni t i on
of t he basic concepts of his t heory and an appl i cat i on of these concepts
and of t he t heorems concer ni ng t hem to fields i nvol vi ng semantics.
Ca r na pa nd Bar-Hillel have fol l owed t he pr ocedur e to defi ne t he
f undament al concepts of t hei r t heory on t he basis of t he t heory of
i nduct i ve probabi l i t y whi ch has been devel oped by Rudol f Car nap
these last years. Al t hough, in a recent review (in t he j our nal "Synthese")
of Carnap' s book on t he logical f oundat i ons of probabi l i t y, Van Dantzig
raised obj ect i ons to t he f oundat i on of pr obabi l i t y t heory on a gi ven
l anguage system and to t he f oundat i on of i nduct i ve logic on probabi l i t y
theory, we, in this connect i on, ai m onl y at r epr oduci ng t hei r system
wi t hout ot her comment t han t hat beari ng on t he probl ems of informa-
tion under consi derat i on.
The l anguage system (I-~n) contains a fi ni t e numbe r of i ndi vi dual
constants whi ch st and for i ndi vi dual s (things, events, or proposi t i ons)
and a fi ni t e numbe r of pri mi t i ve one-place predicates whi ch desi gnat e
pr i mi t i ve propert i es of the i ndi vi dual s. I n an at omi c st at ement a pri m-
itive pr oper t y is asserted to hol d for an i ndi vi dual . St at ement s f or med
out of one or mor e of t he at omi c st at ement s With t he hel p of t he usual
connectives (negation, di sj unct i on, i mpl i cat i on, etc.) are molecular
statements. Wi t h t he hel p of these tools numer i cal st at ement s can be
f or med and absol ut e frequenci es (cardinal number s of classes or pro-
perties) and relative frequenci es can be expressed in t hem. Any sent ence
is ei t her logically t r ue or logically false or factual (logically i ndet er-
mi nat e).
Let us now consi der t he f undament al concepts of i nf or mat i on and
a mount of i nf or mat i on, as they are present ed in this theory, and let us
compare t hei r defi ni t i ons wi t h those i nt r oduced by MacKay i n his
t heory of Scientific I nf or mat i on. I t is, of course, not our i nt ent i on to
150
SEMANTIC AND SIGNIFIC ASPECTS
ant i ci pat e t he consi der at i ons of ot her speakers at this Conf er ence, and
we t her ef or e will t ake f r om t hei r publ i cat i ons only those def i ni t i ons
and basic concept s whi ch we need to cl ari fy our own vi ewpoi nt .
We ful l y share t hei r opi ni on t hat t he concept of semant i c i nf or ma-
t i on -- i n their sense - has i nt r i nsi cal l y not hi ng to do wi t h communi ca-
t i on (in t he sense of Shannon f.i.), and i t will be cl ear t hat a pr oposi t i on
may car r y a cer t ai n a mo u n t of i nf or mat i on independently of whe t he r
a st at ement to this effect is ever t r ans mi t t ed (e.g. i t is r ai ni ng to day).
Leavi ng aside t hei r concept i on of an "i deal " r ecei ver wi t h a per-
fect memor y, "who ' knows' all of logic and mat hemat i cs", we may men-
t i on i n this connect i on t hat Car nap and Bar-Hi l l el i nt end to expl i cat e
t he presyst emat i c concept of i nf or mat i on, ' insofar as i t is appl i ed
to sent ences and i nasmuch as i t is "abst r act ed f r om t he prag-
mat i c condi t i ons of its use" (you under st and, of course, t hat we
r epr oduce her e t hei r own t er mi nol ogy) . Th e y t hen def i ne, on
t he basis of t he syst emat i c concept of semant i c i nf or mat i on, vari ous
expl i cat a f or t he presyst emat i c concept (or concept s) ' of a mount of
semant i c i nf or mat i on, and i nvest i gat e t hei r adequacy and appl i cabi l i t y.
Th e l anguage i n whi ch t hey talk about t hei r l anguage-syst ems (t hei r
met al anguage) makes use of some cust omar y t erms and symbols of
t he t heor y of classes (or sets). I t is not our ai m to r epr oduce, or to expl ai n
to you, at large t hei r t echni que, but it may suffice to say t hat by means
of t hese tools t hey make di st i nct i ons, so e.g. t hat bet ween absol ut e and
rel at i ve i nf or mat i on on t he presyst emat i c level. I t woul d be possible
to begi n wi t h t he r el at i ve i nf or mat i on as pr i mi t i ve and def i ne t he
absol ut e i nf or mat i on as t he val ue of t he rel at i ve i nf or mat i on wi t h
respect to a logical trutl~ sent ence, or, whi ch is a si mpl er pr ocedur e,
to begi n wi t h t he concept of t he absol ut e i nf or mat i on (because i t has
onl y one ar gument ) .
Th e same pr ocedur e has been f ol l owed wi t h r egar d to t he concept
" a mount of i nf or mat i on". A di st i nct i on is made bet ween t he absol ut e
and t he r el at i ve a mount of i nf or mat i on, t he l at t er bei ng def i nabl e on
t he basis of t he absol ut e a mount of i nf or mat i on. The r e f or e i t is
suf f i ci ent to state onl y t he r e qui r e me nt s wi t h respect t o t he absol ut e
amount .
Wha t mat t er s is t hat t he information car r i ed by a sent ence is t r eat ed
as a class of someth' ing, and as synonymous wi t h t he cont ent of this
sent ence, and t hat t he concept of amount of semantic i nf or mat i on is
expl i cat ed by vari ous measur es of this cont ent all based on logical prob-
ability f unct i ons r angi ng over t he cont ent s. I n this pr esent at i on t he
t heor y may be r egar ded as a cer t ai n r ami f i cat i on of Carnap' s Th e o r y
of I nduct i ve Pr obabi l i t y. I t does not deal, however , wi t h what has been
151
G. MANNOUR.Y-D. VUYSJE
t er med by Weaver t he semant i c pr obl em of communi cat i on whi ch is
"concer ned wi t h t he i dent i t y, or close appr oxi mat i on i n t he i nt erpret a-
t i on of meani ng by t he receiver, as compar ed wi t h t he i nt ended meani ng
of t he sender. "
The results obt ai ned by Car nap and Bar-Hillel are t herefore of
rest ri ct ed value, also wi t h regard to l anguage systems compl ex enough
to serve as possible languages of science. It is t he t heory of Scientific In-
f or mat i on whi ch aims at meet i ng ot her r equi r ement s.
I n his paper on t he "Nomencl at ur e of I nf or mat i on Theor y" MacKay
poi nt s out t he value of "oper at i onal def i ni t i on" (i.e., accordi ng to Mac-
Kay, a def i ni t i on in t erms of what it does, or, in Bri dgman' s t e r mi nol o~,
a def i ni t i on whose concepts cover a cert ai n set of operations). Thi s
concept i on may bri dge t he gap bet ween t he semant i c and t he signific
approach, for whi ch t he semant i c pr obl em (in t he sense of Weaver):
" How precisely do t he t r ansmi t t ed symbols convey t he desi red mean-
i ng?" and t he effectiveness pr obl em: " How effectively does t he re-
ceived meani ng affect conduct in t he desired way?" are of par amount
i mpor t ance.
I n or der to avoid mi si nt erpret at i ons, we t hi nk it advisable to dis-
t i ngui sh l i ngui st i c levels at whi ch t he t er m "i nf or mat i on" is empl oyed,
and we woul d prefer some di st i nct i ons di fferent from those made by
War r en Weaver. For what he calls t he semant i c level i ncl udes, as
we ha ve seen, anot her i nt er pr et at i on t han t hat whi ch has been ac-
cept ed by e.g. Car nap and Bar-Hillel, whereas t he l at t er concept of
~information can, as far as we see, hardl y be expressed in terms of
represent at i on, t he basic concept of MacKay' s t heory of scientific in-
f or mat i on. Perhaps a l evel i ng based on t he numbe r and the nat ur e
of wor d connect i ons, on t he one hand, and t he numbe r and ki nds of
operat i ons, on t he ot her hand, woul d prove to be useful, pr ovi ded
t he words of each level i mpl y acquai nt ance onl y wi t h those of t he pre-
cedi ng levels. I t will be obvi ous t hat in such a gr adat i on t he t er m
"selective i nf or mat i on", t he expression "semant i c i nf or mat i on" (in t he
sense of Carnap), "st ruct ural i nf or mat i on" (in t he sense of MacKay),
"met ri cal i nf or mat i on" (in t he sense of MacKay), bel ong to di fferent
levels. We do not pur pose subj ect i ng these concepts to a f ur t her analysis
here.
152
SEMANTI C AND SI GNI FI C ASPECTS
I I I
The signific approach
Th e signific approach, on t he analytic side, refers to an i nvest i gat i on
of t he communi cat i ve process in its vari ous aspects, but f r om a syn-
t het i c poi nt of view it is concer ned wi t h t he const ruct i on of l anguage
systems meet i ng special r equi r ement s and purposes. I n its general ac-
cept at i on significs, like semiotic, is a t heory or a science of signs, and
we fully agree wi t h Charles Morris, when he says: "i n general it is mor e
i mpor t ant to keep in mi nd t he fi el d of semi ot i c as a whole, and to br i ng
to bear upon specific pr obl ems all t hat is rel evant to t hei r sol ut i on. "
We will not speak here about t he analogies and t he differences bet ween
semi ot i c and significs, differences resul t i ng to a hi gh degree f r om a dif-
ference i n historical t radi t i on.
Let us r et ur n again to i nf or mat i on and communi cat i on theory, whi ch
these r ecent years have passed so an i npet uous devel opment . Ori gi nat -
i ng f r om pur el y t echni cal probl ems, ent ai l ed by t he need for a mor e
r api d and fact ual communi cat i on: i mpr ovement of t he t el egraphy
(wireless or not), television, code systems, etc., it at first was concer ned
With t he removal of mut i l at ed or del i berat el y conceal ed messages
(cryptography) and gradual l y has faced mor e pr of ound pr obl ems like
t hat concer ni ng t he f oundat i on and t he st r uct ur e of our cogni t i ve
knowl edge and t hat of t he analysis of these phenomena, and, i n doi ng
so, has ent er ed t he domai n of psycho-linguistic and epi st emol ogi cal
i nvest i gat i ons (phonol ogy, cybernetics, etc.).
A r at her opposi t e t endency reveals t he genesis of moder n met hods
of i nvest i gat i on i n t he fi el d of l anguage analysis (logical syntax,
semantics, significs, st udi es of t he f oundat i ons of science). For these
disciplines resul t f r om t he need of a deeper and clearer refl ect i on on
phi l osophi cal and i deol ogi cal pr obl ems and have been concer ned to
free this refl ect i on f r om pseudo- j udgment s and pseudo-probl ems fol-
l owi ng f r om an uncri t i cal usage. I n this way they, too, were i nduced
to st udy communi cat i on pr obl ems in general, and t he means of com-
muni cat i on i n part i cul ar, and to ai m at a mor e scientific, fnt ersub-
jective, way of expression.
These, so to say opposi t e, t endenci es have f ound, however, a common
sphere of action, open to a f r ui t f ul exchange of obt ai ned results a~ad
appl i ed procedures. Such an exchange requi res acquai nt ance of t he
met hods and t heori es of t he two disciplines and a conf r ont at i on of same.
We t hi nk t hat t he exi st i ng t heori es on mat hemat i cal communi cat i on
coul d be ampl i f i ed by (1) an analysis of these t heori es and (2) a quan-
153
G. MANNOURY- D. VUYSJE
titative t heory of under st andi ng. We are aware t hat t here are wri t i ngs
on semant i c i nf or mat i on whi ch insist on an analysis of t erms like sign,
signal, signal sequence, i nf or mat i on, a mount of i nf or mat i on, etc. Thes e
investigations, when carri ed out, coul d be s uppl ement ed by signific
investigations, not onl y of t er ms like "i nf or mat i on", "communi ca-
t i on" and t hei r word-family, but also of those t erms whi ch take a pro-
mi ne nt place in t he defi ni t i ons and extensions of concepts, like "in-
fl uenci ng", "probabi l i t y", '"increase and decrease of ent r opy", "l i vi ng
and lifeness nat ur e", etc.
A signific analysis of these t erms (i.e., a comparat i ve i nvest i gat i on
i nt o t he or di nar y and scientific usage in connect i on w'ith t he aims and
effects of t he acts of communi cat i on involved) will reveal t he dual i st i c
charact er of most of t he st at ement s in whi ch these t erms occur. The y
bel ong to what has been t er med " mi xt ed l anguage", i.e., to t he type
of l anguage prevai l i ng in or di nar y language, in whi ch el ement s t aken
from t he causal i t y-t ermi nol ogy (the id-language) and t he finality-ter-
mi nol ogy (the I-language) are oft en i next ri cabl y i nt erwoven.
An exampl e may be t aken from t he t heory of probabi l i t y, under-
l yi ng any general i zat i on of t he concept of i nf or mat i on, in wh'ich t he
f or mul at i ons of t he frequency-t heory bel ongi ng to t he it-language are
oft en i dent i f i ed wi t h those of t he t er mi nol ogy of expect at i ons bel ongi ng
to t he I-language. Thi s may easily lead to a pr ocedur e by whi ch t he onl y
roughl y-approxi mat ' i ve analogy bet ween t he positiveness of our expecta-
tions and t he f r equency of our experi ences beari ng on cor r espondi ng
sequences is dr awn too far. I n this case one speaks of a mor e or less
"pr obabl e" or "chaot i c" state or si t uat i on wi t hout consi deri ng t he fact
t hat t he concept "relative f r equency" can never be appl i ed i ndepend-
ent l y (e.g. t he ar r angi ng of a deck of cards accordi ng to suits and value,
whi ch is not less "relative f r equent ", but much mor e "ast oni shi ng" t han
any ot her per mut at i on caused "by chance").
The confusi on r oot i ng deepl y i n t he usage of or di nar y l anguage of
t he (ant hropocent ri c) di st i nct i on of " phenomena of nat ur e" and "phe-
nomena of life" wi t h t hat of mor e or less rough and mor e or less detailed
observations may be likewise r educed to t he same ki nd of dual i st i c
pseudo-j udgment s.
To t he above- ment i oned signific analysis also belongs t he t raci ng of
t he measurable propert i es of observations and percept i ons, an investiga-
t i on whi ch shoul d be made as much as possible by hetero-psychological,
i.e. behavioristic procedures. The measurabi l i t y shoul d t herefore be
sought in t he responses of i ndi vi dual s or groups to t he stimuli recei ved
by t hem ( i nf or mat i on in a wi der or in a mor e l i mi t ed sense). At t ent i on
shoul d be pai d to t he effectiveness, t he intersub]ectivity, and t he par-
154
SEMANTIC AND SIGNIFIC ASPECTS
cellizability (division i nt o parcels) of t he i nf or mat i on recei ved.
As for t he mat hemat i zi ng of t he concept s of this t heor y of understand-
ing a di f f er ent i at i on of t he usual t r ut h sign shoul d be i nt r oduced i n
pr opor t i ons to t he gr oup who accepts a cer t ai n ] udgement (-]A.-113, etc.)
and in pr opor t i on to t he "speaker" (sender) or t he " hear er " (receiver)
(-Lorl-). Mor e t han hi t her t o t he st udy of phe nome na like synt agmat i cal
connect i ons and synt act i c gradat i ons coul d make use of symbol i c no-
t at i ons and ar i t hmet i c met hods.
How far t he f r om a signific poi nt of view i mpor t ant di st i nct i on of
indicative, emotive, volitive, a nd symptomatic f unct i onal el ement s
will be accessible to symbol i zi ng a nd ar i t hmet i zi ng is di f f i cul t to pr edi ct
and will be de pe nde nt on t he di f f er ent i at i ons under l yi ng t he concept
of i nf or mat i on t o be appl i ed, but t he t endency to make use mor e and
mor e of exper i ment al and statistical met hods, r eveal i ng itself i n t he
fie.ld of "mass c ommuni c a t i on" (newspaper report s, pol i t i cal declara-
tions, sci ent i fi c discoveries, etc.) will i mpl y f ur t her studies of i nforma-
t i on t heor y ai mi ng at est abl i shi ng exact di st i nct i ons bet ween, what
Met zemaeker s has called, " i nf or mat i on" and "i nt er pr et at i on".
Fi nal l y, we shoul d wish to make some r emar ks about t he r el at i on of
i nf or mat i on t heor y and applied t heor y of probabi l i t y. " I nf or ma t i on"
and "pr obabi l i t y" may be concei ved as compl ement ar y concepts, i.e., as
concept s bear i ng on t he same f act ual cont ent s, but on a di f f er ent poi nt
of view. For bot h concept s st art f r om t he "compar abi l i t y" or "si mi l ar-
i t y" of a cer t ai n event (change of si t uat i on) wi t h a gr oup of event s pre-
cedi ng it. I n di st i nct i on to t he probabi l i st i c view, r ef er r i ng to t he oc-
cur r ence of event s i n t he f ut ur e, t he i nf or mat i onal view poi nt s to event s
bel ongi ng to t he past. Since, however, this di st i nct i on does not bear on
t he event itself, but onl y on t he poi nt of vi ew of t he sign user, t he mut ua l
r el at i on of bot h t heori es is essent i al l y of a psychol ogi cal nat ur e (op-
posi t i on of "expect at i on" and "r ecol l ect i on") . Ther ef or e, t he r emoval
of t he still exi st i ng t er mi nol ogi cal di ffi cul t i es, i nhe r e nt to t he t heori es
of t he f oundat i ons of t hese disciplines, can, i n our opi ni on, be expect ed
of a f ur t he r f or mal i zi ng and mat hemat i zi ng of psychological t heori es.
I t goes wi t hout sayi ng t hat this consi der at i on is of no r el evance so
l ong as we are deal i ng wi t h a calculus of ' i nf or mat i on -- i n whi ch case
we woul d pr ef er to speak of rel at i ve f r equency i nst ead of pr obabi l i t y
- - but onl y if we ar e concer ned wi t h its application.
Ne i t he r t he concept of semant i c i nf or mat i on - a logical concept -
nor t he concept of effect i ve i nf or mat i on (in our sense) -- a met r i cal
concept - shoul d be i dent i f i ed wi t h t he concept of communi cat i on i n
t he sense of Shannon, "t he semant i c aspects of communi cat i on" bei ng
"i r r el evant to t he engi neer i ng pr obl em". Bot h t he semant i c appr oach
155
G. MANNOURY-D. VUYSJE
(in its vari ous accept at i ons) and t he signific appr oach as such ar e not
concer ned wi t h a concept of i nf or mat i on i n whi ch t he a mount of in-
f or mat i on cont ai ned i n a message is de t e r mi ne d onl y as a f unct i on of
t he number s of symbol s used in t he text. Th e l at t er appr oach aims,
besides at a cl ari fi cat i on of t he f unda me nt a l concept s of t he t heory, at
t raci ng t he measur abl e el ement s even of phe nome na whi ch are gener-
ally r egar ded as unmeasur abl e. It approaches to MacKay' s concept i on of
met r i cal i nf or mat i on, but we have not empl oyed this t erm, since our
concept i on does not bear onl y on "logical el ement s i n a gr oup or pat-
t er n", accor di ng to MacKay' s def i ni t i on and is not r est r i ct ed to t he ap-
pl i cat i on to scientific l anguage. For a si mi l ar reason we have pr ef er r ed
t he t er m " under s t andi ng" to file t er m "i nf or mat i on", when l abel i ng
our appr oach. By i nt r oduci ng oper at i onal defi ni t i ons, MacKay has
paved t he way to an ext ensi on of t he axi omat i c-semant i c t heor y i n a
mor e effect i ve di rect i on. Whe t he r his f undament al concept s will prove
to be useful, is not onl y a t heor et i cal but also a pract i cal quest i on.
We do hope t hat this Conf er ence may cont r i but e not onl y to pur i f y
and to uni f y t he t er mi nol ogy empl oyed in t he br oad fi el d of i nf or mat i on
t heory, but also to i ndi cat e t he r el at i onshi p bet ween t he exi st i ng
t heori es whi ch, by di f f er ent means, pur sue si mi l ar aims.
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