Thai Army: Moral Vanguards or Pragmatic Political Players?

Nobody was actually surprised when the Thai military

announced a martial law last May 20, 2014 and eventually, a
declaration of coup dtat, two days after. For many students of
Thai politics the question is no longer about the politicized
military but rather on the timing as to when they will step in to
show their true political inclinations. While many scholars
predicted the militarys disengagement from politics that
comes with higher level of economic development, there is also
an acknowledgment that a host of other international and
domestic variables come into play in predicting the militarys
level of politicization. For Dr Muthiah Alagappa , these include the
political legitimacy of the government, the capacity of the state
and, international normative and material structures.
Meanwhile, Professor Chambers and Croissant (2010)
recognized the fluid character of the relationship between the
civilian government and the military organization. For these
authors the complex character of civil-military relations can be
traced to five major decision areas such as leadership selection,
public policy, internal and external security and, military
organization.
While countries across the SE Asian region may share similar
colonial backgrounds and existing levels of political and
economic development, the unique organizational culture of
the militaries within each country coupled with the dynamic
relationship with the other state institutions, make worthy
comparisons on the current role of the militaries within the
region.
After the bloody 1992 coup dtat, many thought that the Thai
military has permanently receded from Thai politics. However,
the 2006 coup to oust Thaksin Shinawatra indicated that the
Thai military is still very much in the game. While many analysts
consider this as a setback to the countrys democratization
process, such an intervention was not totally surprising, given
the countrys long history of military interventions (about 12
successful coups and 7 unsuccessful attempts since 1932). Thus
the decision of General Sonthi Boonyaratglin in 2006 to again
invoke their "moral vanguard" role highlighted once more that
the Thai military was never totally subordinated by the elected
civilian government.
The spate of mass actions calling for the resignation of PM
Yingluck Shinawatra provided still another opportunity for the
military to step in. Things began to unravel in November of
2013 following the dissolution of the Lower House, the failure
of elections last February 2, 2014, and the continuous mass
actions in the streets of Bangkok. Curiously enough, the Thai
military at that time decided to take a wait and see attitude.
The Thai Army Chief General Prayuth Chan-ocha, who
eventually led the coup dtat on May 22, 2014, invoked that
the military is taking a neutral stand and decided not to
intervene. On the other hand, military intervention of the 2010
protests of pro-Thaksin Red shirters was swift and forceful, to
say the least.
The set-up of Thai government, a constitutional monarchy, is
quite unique. Against a democratically elected civilian
government, is a set of institutions comprising what Professor
McCargo (2005) calls the network monarchy, a constellation
of institutions primarily controlled by the palace and is beyond
the control of any civilian oversight agency. Centered on the
Privy Council, this network includes members of the judiciary,
the senate and selected top-ranking military officials. First
known as the Privy Council of Siam, the council was started in
1884 by the western educated King Chulalongkorn. Abolished in
in 1932 and it was not until 15 years later, in 1947, when the
present Thai monarch, King Bhumibol Adulyadej created a
renamed Privy Council of Thailand and personally appoints its
members.
While the allegations of corruption against Thaksin may not be
unfounded, the 2006 military coup and the more recent one in
May 2014 are generally viewed as attempts to consolidate the
power of the traditional royalist elites in Thai politics. Thaksin
with his popular programs on health and agriculture was able
to cultivate an overwhelming support from rural Thais and
consolidate his own cohort of loyal officers from the police and
military sectors. Such developments were perceived as a direct
affront to the well-established hold of the King as supported by
the head of the Privy Council, on Thai politics. There is a
widespread acknowledgment that the head of the Privy
Council, Prem Tinsulanonda had a hand in both coup dtats. As
a retired military General, Prem also holds substantial influence
in Thais military and maintains close affiliations with a key
faction of the Thai Army, the elite Eastern Tigers/Queens
Guard (ETQG). Arch-royalists, both the 2006 and 2014 coup
dtats were spearheaded by members of ETQG.
The two coup dtats that racked the Thai government between
2006 and 2014 can be easily dismissed as a problem of over
politicized military. Underneath , however are the larger and
more deeply-seated fissures in Thai society: Thaksin and his
league of rural supporters who firmly believe in their inclusion
in Thai politics versus the old vanguards of Thai politics, the
royalists, who are resistant to change. While the military can
argue that they are merely acting as the moral vanguards of
Thai society, to a degree, they were also motivated by very
pragmatic considerations such as favors from the Privy Council.
Unless a recognition for a need for structural reforms is made, there will be an
active military arbiter in the continuous wrangling between the populists and the
royalist factions.
While the Philippines may not have a revered monarch like King Bhumibol
Adulyadej nor a parallel network such as the Privy Council, certain similarities
with Thai society are worth noting. One, the militaries in both countries share
histories of restiveness. Our ruling elite, habituated by a limited number of
families, remains in control of Philippine politics and co-opt with the military.
Finally, like the Thai military, the Philippine military has been very much involved
in Philippine politics.

Leslie V Advincula-Lopez taught comparative militaries as part time faculty of the
Ateneo de Manila Department of Political Science. She is also a member of the
Departments Security Sector Reform Working Group.